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Hot water has been stolen, what to do now? US, Arizona, if the city is important I will post but would rather not at this time. My dad moved into a condo some months back. For some reason he thought the upstairs neighbor might be plugged into his hot water. This morning he woke up and heard the neighbor's shower running. So went and flipped the valve on the hot water heater and sure enough the water stopped upstairs. So it sounds that it is the fact the neighbor is plugged into the hot water. Is this enough to start a process where evidence can be collected for a lawsuit? Is this enough where the police can investigate, securing a warrant to enter if need be? I believe that utility theft is a crime, should police be involved now or later? Whom should he engage first, counsel or police? An just an aside question that I am sure will be answered in time, do police share their findings with a victim so the victim can present that evidence in a tort case?
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Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.
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Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.
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Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.
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do I have a case against them in small claims court? Yes. Your description altogether indicates that there is --at least-- an implicit contract between you and the roommates. That implicit contract is palpable from the roommates' subsequent conduct, which includes --but is not necessarily limited to-- their excuses and promises. Although there is no written contract between you and the roommates, evidence that you have paid utilities in full places on your roommates the burden of disproving the default (and common sense) presumption that bills would be split among all four roommates. Your landlord can testify via an affidavit what he knows about that arrangement and/or what he informs each new roommate on the issue of how utilities are paid. You might want to email your roommates a reminder [to pay you] in such a way that prompts them to reflect their excuses/promises/admissions in writing. The terms of their written response might evidence an oral agreement. In the alternative, the roommates would have the burden to prove that they paid you, or that you promised to cover their utilities for free. The former scenario is precisely why a reasonable payer typically requires --or should require-- a receipt when making payments (as opposed to the payee when receiving them). Regardless, your description suggests that your roommates would be unable to prove either scenario. Also the landlord could include in his affidavit that the roommates have defaulted on their rent payments as well. If the landlord refuses to produce an affidavit, you can always visit the court where eviction proceedings are taking place and obtain copy of the relevant records. With those records you would evidence the roommates' pattern of lack of payment. Although obtaining copies from the court makes your landlord's affidavit somewhat unnecessary, it is in the landlord's best interest to cooperate with you because (1) it would be unreasonable for him to alienate himself from the only tenant who honors his lease, and (2) he might need your cooperation as witness at some point. Even if the roommates were successful in proving that there was neither a verbal agreement nor an implicit contract but only "unfounded expectations" on your part, you could ask for a ruling in equity in case your claim of breach of contract fails. In terms of mere "expectations", it is much more reasonable for you to expect them to pay their share than for three three individuals to presume an unrelated roommate will cover their utilities for free. The latter just departs from common sense and common practices. how do I prevent this from happening again with future roommates? Strictly speaking, it is impossible to absolutely prevent that situation from occurring again. However, you may take the following precautions to reduce your exposure. Have your roommates sign an agreement that reflects each party's obligations and deadlines. Your agreement should also state that it is each roommate's responsibility to keep his/her receipts --or akin evidence-- in case a dispute for non-payment arises. This would streamline the production of evidence if the matter ends up in court. Consider whether or not asking each party for an aval or endorser is practicable. This provides some sort of "insurance" of roommates' default risk. Lastly, do not wait for a party's debt to accumulate that much before taking legal action. The longer you wait, the unlikelier you are to recover that money because the party may go broke or simply disappear. Moreover, keep in mind that if a party's debt exceeds the maximum amount handled in Small Claims Court, your litigation will become more involved because it would have to be in a court of general jurisdiction (meaning a circuit or district court).
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As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal.
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Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.
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It depends. The police and only the police decide what are and are not police matters. However, although it might not be a police matter, you still have lots of options at your disposal. For example, does your jurisdiction (city, town, municipality, etc.) have an animal control division? i.e., City dog catcher. Most do. If so, I would call the animal control division and file a report. They might possibly do a field visit and take the animal into custody if the animal is still roaming loose. If you sustained bodily injuries, you should get checked by a doctor and have those injuries documented in a medical report. If possible, you could drive by the property and take photos of the unchained dog roaming loose. Then, armed with your evidence consisting of: police report medical injury report animal control report and photographs of the scene You could (with the help of a licensed attorney) file a civil suit against the pet owner. You might be able to win an award for damages, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages as well (check with your attorney). Also, your attorney could advise you if you might have a cause to move for an enforcement action against the dog and/or its owners that might or might not include having the animal removed from the owners custody or in extreme cases of negligence and bad behavior possibly "put to sleep." Your suit might focus on collecting from the homeowner's insurance policy of the pet owner and you could potentially collect a lot of money with the right set of facts and evidence on your side. You might want to look for an attorney who specializes in personal injury. Most PI attorneys work on a contingency. Meaning they don't charge an up front fee and will only get paid if you win your case or settle. In which case their fee is typically about 1/3 of what you get awarded in settlement or judgment.
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Does the town have any responsibility towards the direct and indirect damage done to these properties? What can be done to hold the town responsible for potentially lost property value, and direct property damage? Most claims are barred by some sort of governmental immunity and also face strict procedural hurdles, but it isn't impossible that the defectively installed storm drains could give rise to some liability for property damage if the suit were brought swiftly in the proper manner. Also, even if there is liability this will almost certainly not extend to lost property value, only to direct property damage, because while the direct property damage might be caused by something that the government has waived sovereign immunity for, the lost property value is almost entirely due to its discretionary regulatory decisions about land use and whether it should provide storm drainage at all. There are several potential theories of municipal liability that need to be considered. One is that the township has liability because it approved development that foreseeably caused this problem. This claim is probably without merit although there might be a claim against the homeowners who inadequately drained their properties in a way that impacted their neighbors. This is because land use regulation is a discretionary governmental action. A second is that the township has liability because it had a duty to an individual property own to provide adequate storm drainage and failed to do so. This claim is probably also without merit. This is also a discretionary governmental action and even if it was not, would not meet New York State's "special relationship" test set forth below. A third theory is that the township has liability because once it undertook to install storm drains the workmanship of the storm drains that it installed fell below the standard of reasonable care in workmanship that applies to all construction work that foreseeable causes injuries to persons or property. This is a much closer call and might prevail, although it would still be subject to the strict procedural limitations of the New York Court of Claims Act including a 90 day statute of limitations under Section 10(3) of the Act and a notice requirement. There would also be no right to a jury trial in the case. Once the storm drain is actually built, there is arguably a non-discretionary duty to build it in a workman-like manner and the location of the particular defective drain may trigger New York's "special relationship" test. Also, it might be possible to sue the private contractor that defectively installed the storm drain for the township. As explained in a July 8, 2014 article written by a lawyer in the New York City law department which is more or less identical in its sovereign immunity status to a New York State township: When municipalities are sued in tort, two of the most powerful bars to recovery are the public duty principle and the governmental function immunity defense. When these two principles are applicable, the City will not be made to pay compensation even if a City employee had been negligent and caused an injury. . . . An injured person alleging an injury caused by the City’s failure to perform a public duty cannot recover unless the injured person alleges and establishes, as an element of his or her claim, a special relationship by which the City assumed a specific duty with respect to the injured person. . . . the plaintiff, to present a prima facie case for recovery, must first successfully establish a special duty. If the plaintiff cannot get past the special duty hurdle, there is no need for the court to address the applicability of the governmental function immunity defense, which provides absolute immunity for discretionary determinations where discretion has been exercised. The often-repeated policy reason for limiting governmental tort liability is that government would not be financially viable if it were made the insurer of the safety of the public for injuries caused principally by third parties. Governmental entities could have a disincentive from providing important governmental services if they knew that doing so could seriously jeopardize the public treasury. The courts do not limit recovery, however, when a municipality acts in a proprietary capacity — when its activities essentially substituted for or supplemented those undertaken by a private enterprise, such as property ownership, operation of a motor vehicle, or providing hospital services. When a municipality acted in its governmental capacity, sovereign immunity historically protected the municipality against tort recovery by injured persons. That absolute protection against tort recovery lasted in New York until the State Legislature, in 1929, waived New York State’s sovereign immunity as part of the Court of Claims Act. Although the waiver by the State Legislature only mentioned the State of New York, the Court of Appeals in 1945, in Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361 (1945), interpreted the waiver to apply as well to municipal entities like New York City. But as the Court of Appeals subsequently held, the waiver did not eliminate all governmental immunities or other bars to governmental liability. In the years since 1945, courts wrestled with sorting out when liability was appropriate and when it was not. For example, courts generally refused to hold municipal governments liable for failing to prevent fires or crime. Municipal governments undertake all sorts of public duties like police protection, fire protection, child protection, education, building inspections, and the like. Were a municipality liable every time a crime was committed that governmental actors had failed to prevent, or an inspector made a mistake, or a student was not sufficiently educated, it would be under a crushing financial burden that could result in bankruptcy. At the same time, courts created exceptions that allowed negligence claims to proceed even where municipalities performed quintessential governmental functions. Special duty was one such exception. Another exception allowed for liability where the governmental action was ministerial rather than discretionary. . . . In October 2011 the Court of Appeals [*ed. the highest court in the state of New York called a state supreme court in most other states] in Valdez v. City, 18 N.Y.3d 69 (2011) clarified 70 years of jurisprudence and articulated an analysis to be applied when considering whether an individual may sue a municipal government for negligent performance of, or failure to perform, governmental functions. The decision in Valdez must now be the starting point in analyzing liability in any negligence tort suit against the government or governmental actors. First, the Court of Appeals confirmed the basic tenet that although sovereign immunity was waived in the Court of Claims Act, tort liability will generally not attach to governmental entities or government employees performing governmental functions, regardless of whether the function is discretionary or ministerial. Where statutory or regulatory mandates require a government to act for the benefit of the public as a whole, the government and its actors cannot be sued for failing to provide or negligently providing such services. The Court articulated this principle as the “public duty” rule, not as “immunity.” In order to overcome the public duty bar, an individual as a threshold issue must show that there existed a special duty running in favor of the claimant as an individual. The Valdez Court held that for a litigant to proceed successfully with a tort suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must first plead a “special duty” running specifically to him or her. A special duty can be formed when a municipality or its employee: • violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; • assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation; or • voluntarily assumes a duty that generated justifiable reliance by the person through the employee’s actions or promises to the person. The Valdez Court also held that whether the facts are legally sufficient to establish a special duty is an objective question of law for the court. The Court of Appeals made clear, therefore, that special duty is neither an exception to immunity nor a defense, but instead is an initial and essential element of any tort claim against the government and governmental actors. The Court of Appeals also made clear that, even if a plaintiff succeeds in articulating a viable special duty, tort liability may still be barred by the “governmental function immunity defense.” Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 75-76. That defense shields governmental entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions. This discretionary defense is qualified in that the municipality must establish that the governmental action related to the incident was both a discretionary one and that discretion was, in fact, exercised. A government employee’s failure to perform a ministerial action, on the other hand, may subject the government to liability if a special duty has been established. In late 2012 and mid-2013, the Court of Appeals issued two additional opinions which reconfirmed Valdez’s analysis of when the government may be sued in tort. In Metz v. State, 20 N.Y.3d 175 (2012), twenty people were killed and many others injured when a tour boat on Lake George capsized. Plaintiffs claimed that State inspectors had negligently inspected the vessel and had failed to exercise any discretion in fixing the number of passengers who could safely travel on the tour boat. They argued, therefore, that the State was not entitled to immunity for their actions. The Appellate Division, Third Department, ruled that the inspection function was governmental and found that plaintiffs had failed to establish a special duty. However, the Third Department went on to find a viable claim against the State because the State could not demonstrate that it exercised discretion in certifying the vessel as seaworthy. The Court of Appeals reversed and rejected the Third Department’s analysis. The Court, relying on Valdez, ruled that, since inspections are a governmental function, the Appellate Division’s analysis should have ended with the finding that plaintiffs had not established a special duty. Insofar as the plaintiffs did not and could not articulate a special duty, no liability could be imposed against the State and the nature of the governmental conduct – discretionary or ministerial – was not relevant. There was no reason to address the immunity defense since the plaintiff had not established the initial requirement of a special duty. In Applewhite v. City, 21 N.Y.3d 420 (2013), plaintiff, a 12-year-old child living at home and cared for by a private nurse, went into cardiac arrest after being administered certain medications. The plaintiff’s mother called 911 and an ambulance arrived within minutes. The plaintiff child and mother sued the nurse and the City, claiming that the child suffered severe brain damage as a result of negligent treatment at the scene. Plaintiffs argued that, although maintaining the 911 system and ambulance services are governmental functions, once the EMTs cross the threshold and tend to the patient, the function becomes a proprietary one. The City responded that the function continues as a governmental one and that no special duty was created. The Court of Appeals agreed with the City’s argument that the emergency rescue function is a governmental police protection function both before and after the emergency medical personnel arrived. Because these were governmental and public duties, the plaintiffs needed to articulate a special duty in order to state a viable tort claim. The Court then ruled that there existed a question of fact as to whether the City assumed a special duty under the unique circumstances of the case and remanded the case for trial. For litigants against the City, step one in developing a claim is to distinguish the City’s proprietary activities from the governmental. If proprietary, then there generally is no issue of a public duty bar and the claim may proceed. If the activity is governmental, however, the public duty bar must first be overcome. As an element of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must allege and establish the existence of a special duty. Assuming a plaintiff successfully overcomes the special duty hurdle, the government will still not be liable if the challenged conduct was discretionary and it exercised discretion. If plaintiff overcomes the public duty principle and the immunity bar, the plaintiff’s tort claim may then proceed.
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Is it legal to record an episode of a TV series or a movie? Is it legal to record an episode of a TV series or a movie? Isn't it considered as making an illegal copy of the movie?
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At least for the US, there's a good overview in The Atlantic of the SCOTUS benchmark case concerning home recording, still applicable in these days of DVDs and streaming content and torrents and thepiratebay.org: ...the Supreme Court's decision to allow home recording in the landmark 1984 case, Universal Studios vs. Sony Corporation of America, went 5-4; one justice flipping and you wouldn't have to imagine that alternate reality because you'd be living it. See http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/the-court-case-that-almost-made-it-illegal-to-tape-tv-shows/251107/ The case revolved around whether recording a television program was "fair use" under copyright law. Fair use is a legal doctrine that promotes freedom of expression by permitting the unlicensed use of copyright-protected works in certain circumstances. See https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html So yes, you can make yourself a copy, because "that the making of individual copies of complete television shows for purposes of time shifting does not constitute copyright infringement, but is fair use." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc. Time shifting as in watching it later, and much later again, as long as you don't distribute that copy, sell admission to watching it, and anything else reasonable when it comes to only you using the copy.
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Presumably by "is illegal" you mean "violates copyright law". Copyright infringement is simply "copying / distributing without authorization", which refers to the original work and not some other work. The act of originally writing a book is not "copying" (likewise "taking a picture", etc), so the act of writing a book using pirated software is also not copying and not infringement. Nevertheless, the scope of remedies for the original infringement is not limited to just the cost of the infringed work. Under 17 USC 504(b), The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. This is sufficiently open-ended that profits from the sale of an original work created using infringed software could be attributable to the infringement.
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The film you want to base your game on is probably covered by copyright and likely trademarks. For purposes of the question I'll assume it's not in the public domain (if the film was made before 1926 for example). If you used the film to create your game, it would be a derivative work. Derivative works require the consent of the copyright owner. Distributing it without their permission would leave you open to lawsuits for copyright infringement, unjust enrichment, and possibly others. Fair use/fair dealing likely doesn't apply here. This isn't criticism, parody, or a transformative use. You may be able to get away with this by flying under the radar if you don't distribute it for profit or on any large scale. Some studios are more litigious than others and some accept that leaving fan works alone is better than the bad publicity that comes with shutting them down. However, this is entirely reliant on the goodwill of the studio. The legal way to do this is to get in touch with the copyright holder and ask permission. This may be in return for something else- usually money, royalties, and/or some creative control over your work. This may not be feasible though as a large company may simply ignore such requests from random people. Note that a lack of a response in this case is not permission.
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if I directly purchase this custom content... As a general rule, "intellectual property" is very different from tangible property - arguably, "intellectual property" is a misnomer. Trying to apply concepts from property law (such as "a thing has a single owner, who can do anything not illegal with it as they please") is fraught with danger. You would generally not "purchase content", but rather purchase a license for the content, allowing you to do various things. One of those things might be to "curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online)". Another might be to "to sell or otherwise profit from this". All that depends on what your contract says. In an ideal world(?), contracts would all be detailed enough to leave no uncertainty about what is allowed and what is not. In the real world, a bunch of SMS can form a contract. For instance, the following is a contract: A (version 1): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will pay $10 for it. B: sure ...but it’s not clear what A and B agreed as to what the clip would be used for. Saving and viewing on A’s device, probably yes; putting it in fullscreen in the next blockbuster movie, probably no. Showing it to A’s friends, putting it in an art project? That’s getting dicey. You might have heard about "work for hire" granting full copyright control to whoever pays for the work to be created. In the united-states, the above exchange does not explicitly designate the content as work-for-hire, as would be required by 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire"). Here’s a better SMS contract: A (version 2): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will use it to make an art project, collating many such clips, and publishing that on the internet. I will pay $10 for it. B: sure Here there’s no question that B agreed with the proposed use. On the other hand, it’s likely than a different use would be deemed a copyright violation - the contract was proposed by A and should be understood as limiting A’s right to use the clip to exactly what they said they would do. If they wanted it to say something else, they could have sent a different SMS (see contra proferentem).
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Because of the nature of online distribution, "watching" a show involves copying, so you need permission from the copyright holder to make those copies. You get permission indirectly, when you access a show via a legal licensee who has permission to distribute. A pirate site has no permission, therefore you cannot legally sub-license the show, and in so doing, you infringe copyright. The issue is not whether you "paid for it", it is whether you have obtained proper permission. Under copyright law, a rights holder can simply arbitrarily deny you permission to copy the work.
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In ABC v Aereo 573 U. S. ____ (2014), the US Supreme Court held that activity almost identical to what you describe is copyright infringement. Respondent Aereo, Inc., sells a service that allows its subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. When a subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently airing, he selects the show from a menu on Aereo’s website. Aereo’s system, which consists of thousands of small antennas and other equipment housed in a centralized warehouse, responds roughly as follows: A server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber alone, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by the antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive and begins streaming the show to the subscriber’s screen once several seconds of programming have been saved. The streaming continues, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has received the entire show. We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes [copyright] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. We conclude that it does. A nicer summary, oral argument transcript and audio are available from the Oyez Project. In my opinion, your example is more clearly an infringement of copyright than Aereo's. Aereo dedicated separate antennae to receive a signals for each subscriber at the subscriber's direction, and rebroadcast the signal over the internet in near real-time. This let them argue two things: 1) that they were not performing the work, only letting other people perform it, and 2) that the performance was not "to the public". In your example, the server is receiving and saving the broadcast, and then later, that single copy is being reproduced and transmitted to whomever requests it. That would certainly be considered both reproduction and performance to the public.
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You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)
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It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation.
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Can a Canadian committing a crime against a Canadian in both the USA & Canada be prosecuted in both countries? If a Canadian citizen commits a crime against another Canadian in the USA and Canada, can that person be arrested and prosecuted in both Canada and the USA?
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Yes Usually, whoever got their hands on the defendant first would have first crack at it. The second jurisdiction would commonly not prosecute provided that justice was done in the first but they can - double jeopardy is not in play as a bar as they are different legal systems but courts usually apply the spirit that a person shouldn’t be punished twice for the same act.
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Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period.
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No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]."
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"Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060.
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Exact wording might matter here, so I looked up the law. It says "a permanent resident complies with the residency obligation with respect to a five-year period if, on each of a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are physically present in Canada". Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 28(2)(a). If you visit the Canadian side of the park, you're "physically present in Canada". It would therefore appear that this would meet the requirement. I am by no means an expert in Canadian immigration law, though.
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There's not any well-defined notion of what a person with a Red Notice is "allowed" to do. The notice doesn't have any legal force of its own. You can read more about Red Notices on Interpol's web site: INTERPOL cannot compel any member country to arrest an individual who is the subject of a Red Notice. Each member country decides for itself what legal value to give a Red Notice within their borders. So it would be up to the US authorities to decide what, if anything, to do about the Red Notice, in compliance with US law. We can only speculate as to why they declined to flag his passport and/or detain him. Without knowing anything about the specific case in question, here are some possibilities: They may have felt there wasn't sufficient evidence against him to justify detaining him. The conduct of which he was accused may not have been a crime under US law. They may have believed the Brazilian arrest warrant was primarily politically motivated. They may have wanted to annoy the Brazilian government, or make a political statement against its actions, by failing to cooperate. They may have decided that it simply wasn't a good use of their funds to pursue the case. They may have been lazy or incompetent or oblivious and simply not known where he was or what he was planning to do. The fact that he was intending to travel to Brazil voluntarily may or may not have been a factor in their inaction.
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These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.
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The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence.
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Can I demand partial deposit back on a joint lease? I am living in California. I am currently on a joint lease of a house for a little more than two years. The lease is on a monthly basis (used to be a one-year lease but continued as month-to-month). The lease is $5000/mo and the total security deposit is $5000/mo (both tenants paid $2500 each) I am moving out soon and want to give my 30-day notice. My roommate wants to stay and find another roommate. I want to get my security deposit back. However, the apartment has some damage. However, the landlord says that I will not get my security deposit from him. I should arrange with whoever might move in to replace me. That is fine, but the landlord is refusing to conduct an initial inspection. He is also refusing that I get the things fixed myself. I want to know my legal rights (with source). Who, in this case, is liable to pay me my portion of the security deposit? My fellow roommate, the one who (might) move in or the landlord? Can a landlord refuse a final inspection when one party on the lease leaves?
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You say that you have a joint lease. This means that you and your roommate are jointly (together) and severally (individually) responsible for fulfilling the terms of the lease. From the landlord's position there is only one tenant - both of you together constitute the tenant. If you want to change this so that the tenant from date X is your roommate and someone else you have 2 options: Jointly give notice, ending the current lease and triggering the return of the deposit. Your roommate and your replacement are then free to negotiate a new lease with its own deposit. The landlord would conduct a final inspection on your lease and an initial inspection on the new lease. With the landlord's permission, substitute the new person for you on the existing lease. This does not end the lease and does not trigger the return of the deposit. The landlord is not obliged to do anything. You can negotiate whatever deal you like about the security deposit with whoever you like.
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No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons?
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The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not.
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You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.
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This guide from Shelter lists the steps you should take. It can be summarised as: if the landlord fails to arrange the repairs, contact your local council. If they can't help, you can arrange the repairs yourself and request that the landlord reimburse you. If the landlord still refuses to co-operate, then you can pursue legal action. It's important that you document everything you're doing, and keep the landlord fully informed at every step. The guide states that you can deduct the cost from future rent. But it also says: You do not have the right to withhold your rent if your landlord refuses to do repairs. If you don't pay rent, the landlord could take steps to evict you. ...so you may want to get expert advice before going any further.
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Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.
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You can't give your landlord a "notice to quit" A "notice to quit" is something a landlord gives to the tenant under s8 or s21. Assuming you want to end the tenancy, you would give them whatever notice is required in accordance with the lease. Why the paranoia? Ending a residential tenancy is routine and would not normally land you anywhere near a court. You give your notice, pay your rent, move out and get your deposit back. Is there something going on that you're not telling us? If so, ask about that thing in a different question. The video would be fine as evidence However, it would only be used if there was a dispute over the service of the notice. While this can happen, its pretty rare and your precautions seem ... elaborate. Your landlord's name and address (and yours) will be a public record forever Courts are public, the names and addresses of the parties are a matter of public record (unless you are children, or sex offenders, or have some other reason the court accepts as to why this shouldn't happen). These records are kept indefinitely.
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In most jurisdictions, yes, you must give 30 days notice; this is a statutory requirement incumbent on both parties. This (your rental type) is a tenancy-at-will. If you pay rent monthly (on 1st) then this is the period of time required for notice to vacate. In some jurisdictions 30 days is required no matter what intervals you may rent (say weekly), other jurisdictions if you pay rent weekly then a week's notice is all that's necessary. This is In the absence of a rental agreement setting forth another agreed to term. See this question: If no prior contracts have been signed, can a landlord make tenants sign after a week of tenancy? It is not the same but there is some information on this type of tenancy.
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France: is it the same copyright principle? After reading this: https://www.joelonsoftware.com/2016/12/09/developers-side-projects/ I'm stuck with this: Well… maybe. In the United States, if you hired Sarah as a contractor, she still owns the copyright on that work. That is kind of weird, because you might say, “Well, I paid her for it.” It sounds weird, but it is the default way copyright works. In fact, if you hire a photographer to take pictures for your wedding, you own the copies of the pictures that you get, but the photographer still owns the copyright and has the legal monopoly on making more copies of those pictures. Surprise! Same applies to code. Is it the same copyright principle in France? If I make a big JavaScript "generic" implementation of something that I would like to re-use somewhere else, is it legal for me to do so?
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Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.
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Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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Unless the game is out of copyright, e.g. chess, snakes and ladders, Go, or checkers, your software would probably be considered a derivative work of the copyrighted game and an actionable infringement. The fact that you do not monetize it is not a defense. You would need written permission in the form of a license agreement from the copyright owner to do this legally. The penalties for violating copyright laws in this way could be punishingly serious.
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Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).
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As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission.
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You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.
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What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.
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We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to.
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Has the gay/trans panic defence ever successfully been used in court? The gay or trans panic defence, also known as the Portsmouth Defence, is where someone claims that they were temporarily not responsible for their actions due to extreme shock. The shock results from discovering that someone is gay or transgender, or some action related to those factors such as a straight person being invited to participate in a homosexual relationship. I know of at least once incidence in the US where a transgender woman was murdered after her sexual partners discovered she was not a cis woman. Has the gay/trans panic defence ever been successfully used to avoid conviction or to significantly lessen punishment? I'm interested in all jurisdictions, not just the US. I believe that the name "Portsmouth Defence" comes from the city of Portsmouth in the UK, for example.
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It has apparently been used to get first degree murder down to second degree murder in the "famous" "Jenny Jones" case from 1954. Other cases seem as if it was used as a defense, but the defendant ended up pleading guilty to a lesser crime.
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Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (which was amended by section 154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994). [F14A Intentional harassment, alarm or distress. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, he— (a)uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b)displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress. (2)An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is also inside that or another dwelling. (3)It is a defence for the accused to prove— (a)that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling, or (b)that his conduct was reasonable. (4)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.]
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To provide an initial answer, without getting to the specific of the 51 statutory standards for self-defense in U.S. states and the exact Canadian standard, as applied to your examples, I'll make some general observations: Self-defense is a justification for doing something that would otherwise be illegal (intentionally using force against someone else). Self-defense justifications include a sense of proportionality. It isn't proper to use more force than is reasonably necessary to achieve the defensive objective. There are basically two levels of self-defensive force: Deadly Force and Non-Deadly Force. Preventing some crimes and harms is statutorily justified to do using deadly force (e.g. to prevent a murder). To prevent other crimes and harms statutes only justify the use of non-deadly force (e.g. to prevent shoplifting). The exact list of crimes in each category varies somewhat. Historically, for example, there have been some U.S. states that have authorized the use of deadly force to prevent a rape that does not put the life of the victim at risk, and others that have not authorized the use of deadly force for that purpose (I don't know if that is still the case). Typically, law enforcement officers are also authorized to use deadly force in some circumstances in which a non-deputized civilian could not. As a practical matter, a use of force that causes death is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if the means used are not inherently deadly in all circumstances. Meanwhile, a use of force involving the use of a "deadly weapon" such as a firearm, is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if it doesn't actually kill someone. But both of these "presumptions" (and I am using that term loosely in this answer, rather than with its precise legal meaning), can be overcome with relevant evidence. Mildly shoving someone with hemophilia (or tossing a dish full of peanuts in the face of someone with a severe peanut allergy), without knowing that this person suffers from this condition, is not a use of deadly force within the meaning of laws justifying self-defense, even if it actually ends up causing their death. Similarly, proving that you intended to and did, shoot out the tires of someone's car, or shot their foot, instead of shooting to kill, would not always constitute a use of deadly force for purposes of statutes justifying the use of force in self-defense. Getting to the specifics of the question, the majority rule would be that the use of deadly force is justified in most circumstances to prevent a home invasion burglar from harming you or other people in the residence, and to repel the home invasion burglar from the residence, although some jurisdictions would qualify this in one respect or another. The case that the use of deadly force is justified would be stronger if the home invasion burglar was armed than if he was not, and would be stronger if the homeowner was not physically competent enough to be confident of an ability to dispatch the invader in a non-deadly manner. If deadly force was justified in that circumstance, it wouldn't really matter how you killed him, nor would it matter that you intended to kill him to defense your home and the people in your home. If the law only authorized the use of non-deadly force in the circumstances, for example, because the burglar had seized an envelope full of cash and was fleeing the house, so you were really only using force to protect your property, rather than to protect your home or the safety of the people in it, at that point, then the analysis would get tougher. If you intended to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, the weapon you used wouldn't matter. You intended to use deadly force, the force you used caused the intended death, and you did those things even though the law didn't authorize you to do so in those circumstances. If you didn't intend to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, but you ended up killing him anyway (so that you didn't have a prohibited intent behind your actions), then the question would be whether your intent and belief that your actions would not kill him was reasonable under the circumstances. If you caused his death with your bare hands, or with a less lethal weapon (in truth, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon), your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be more likely to be seen as reasonable. If you caused his death with a lethal weapon, your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be less likely to be seen as reasonable. If the jury (or a judge in bench trial) didn't believe you were reasonable in your use of force which you didn't intend to be deadly, then the jury (or judge as the case might be) would not allow a self-defense argument to prevent them from convicting you of some kind of homicide crime. So you would probably be convicted of some form of homicide (perhaps heat of passion manslaughter), although you might still not have the requisite intent for first degree murder in circumstances like that (so that your self-defense argument might end up providing you with an incomplete defense).
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The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing
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Are there cases or situations where both parties are burdened with justifying their positions? england-and-wales Yes, but different standards are applied. One example is the "reverse burden of proof" placed on the defendant in section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953: Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence... The prosecution have to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the article is actually an offensive weapon and that the named defendant possessed it on a particular date and that s/he was in a public place at the time. Whereas the standard of proof for the defendant to show they had lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for having is the, lower, "balance of probabilities". Similar legislation, for a similar offence, at section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states that: (4)It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place. (5)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. Which, again, is on the balance of probabilities. See, for example, R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37: If [a legal burden of proof on an accused] is created the matter in question must be taken as proved against the accused unless he satisfies the jury on a balance of probabilities to the contrary...
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So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.
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An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.
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None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.
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Driving with a revoked license In the state on Tennessee am I required to have a valid driver's license to drive myself around?
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Tennessee Code 55-50-301 (a) (1): No person, except those expressly exempted in this section, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless the person has a valid driver license under this chapter for the type or class of vehicle being driven; Moreover, under 55-50-504 (a) (1), it is a crime to drive with a revoked license: A person who drives a motor vehicle within the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained that is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel, or the premises of any shopping center, manufactured housing complex or apartment house complex or any other premises frequented by the public at large at a time when the person's privilege to do so is cancelled, suspended, or revoked commits a Class B misdemeanor.
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The relevant offence is at s.47(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988: A person who uses on a road at any time, or causes or permits to be so used, a motor vehicle to which this section applies, and as respects which no test certificate has been issued within the appropriate period before that time, is guilty of an offence. Benin commits an offence as he uses the car on the road, and as not having a valid and current MOT (usually) invalidates motor insurance, the car would in all likelihood be seized under s.165A of the Act. Aisha may commit an offence if it can be shown that she causes or permits Benin to use the car. This would hinge on what steps she would reasonably be expected to keep the car off the road and/or prevent Benin from using it such as taking it back (via a pre-arranged MOT appointment to not fall foul of s 47) taking the keys from him or selling it - which she can do as the registered keeper (the credit company is the actual owner).
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It is true that in the US, valid Federal law supersedes state law or regulation when there is a conflict. Precisely because of this, state laws and regulations are normally carefully written to avoid such conflicts. It is very unusual for a federal law issue to apply in traffic court. The question does not say what Federal law issue you think will apply to your case. Most issues where Federal law might plausibly affect a state court process, such as a fourth amendment violation on a search and seizure issue, would not apply in traffic court, although they might apply in a criminal court proceeding. Federal law does not generally deal with traffic issues, nor does it preempt state traffic laws, because there is normally no conflict. There is a group of people, who often call themselves "sovereign citizens" who have a habit of making wildly invalid legal claims, and trying to claim that much of the law does not apply to them. Such people often assert elaborate theories about why certain laws do not apply, not infrequently involving the Federal Supremacy Clause. Such claims are invalid, and will not be received well by a court. A claim that one travels by "conveyance" rather than by "car" and thus state laws do not apply is such an invalid claim. The argument made in this answer is such an invalid claim. Chapter 18 of the US code does regulate commercial vehicles to some extent. Therefore in that chapter "motor vehicle" does mean "commercial vehicle" because those federal regulations do not apply to private vehicles. This does not mean that state regulations that apply to private vehicles are preempted or otherwise invalid. If you think a Federal Issue will apply during a traffic court session, it would be wise to consult a lawyer in advance. Many lawyers offer free or low-cost initial consultations. If you think a relevant legal issue is not being addressed, politely, briefly, and clearly explain the issue that you think applies. Do not yell at the judge or other court personnel. Do not try to "make up your own rules". You will be given a chance to indicate your side of the issue. Response to recent edit, and related comments Without a record of the actual court hearing you describe, there is no way to determine if the judge was acting correctly or not. Even with the record there might well be no way to determine what the judge had in mind, or why s/he acted as s/he did. I maintain that any argument that state traffic codes are in fact preempted by federal law, or apply only to commercial vehicles, or that an ordinary personal car is not a "motor vehicle" because of a definition in Blacks or any other dictionary, is legally unsound and frivolous, and could well subject a person who makes it in court to penalties for contempt. A particular judge might not want to bother with the matter, of course. I think i have answered the question as asked, in a way likely to be most helpful to people in general. Others may have other views.
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So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).
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The US Department of Transportation does not "recognize" fast lanes, or have any limits on highway speed, which are determined by the states. Here is a resource on the various keep-right laws of the states. No state has a "fast lane" that allows speeds greater that the legal limit, nor does any state have a law requiring drivers to drive exactly the posted limit. Every state has some provision regarding slow-moving vehicles, and none frame the matter in terms of fast-moving vehicles. The legal convention is that slow-moving vehicles must be on the right, not the left. Some states have the restriction that you may not drive in the left lane except to pass, for example 625 ILCS 5/11-701(b), (d). You may drive in the left lane in Utah, but you must not impede traffic (which means you must move to the right). The signage depends on the laws of that state, and in all cases reflects laws against too-slow driving, and never approval of too-fast driving.
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a quick online search takes me to the DMZ website; Out-of-State Replacement Out-of-State or Military License Replacement You can replace a lost Arizona license while out of state using the online, telephone, or mail-in options outlined above. The MVD allows the same processes for military members deployed out of state and their dependents, too. Simply apply for your military replacement license online, by calling the MVD, or by mail—whichever is most convenient for you. If you apply online, you will need to choose the express delivery option for an additional $16.95 fee (see “Apply Online" above). This option lets you order delivery to an out-of-state address. Otherwise, the duplicate will be sent to the address on file with the MVD. The out-of-state address you provide for express delivery will NOT appear on your duplicate license or ID, nor will it change the permanent/resident address on file. Remember, express service is not available for military delivery boxes or P.O boxes (e.g., APO, FPO) and is only available in the U.S. You can apply online at the Arizona Department of Transportation. You do need an address they can send it to, however its likely to take up to 15 You may be able to get it delivered express which may be much faster. How long will it take to get my Duplicate Driver License or Identification Card? You will receive your Duplicate Driver License or Identification Card within 15 days. If you request express delivery, an expedited delivery date will be provided based on the state and zip code of delivery and the time the order is placed. Given you are on a road trip, this may or may not work for your time frame. Give it a try and see what the expected date of delivery is. Otherwise your friend best avoid driving without a license. Update: She can of course, order a replacement to be sent to her new Oregon address (which she has done). We can't however advise you on the legality of driving without a license in this scenario. Obviously there are other ways to continue her journey without driving.
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Would it be legal to jump into an unlocked car and start it? No. Same situation, different object.
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California Vehicle Code, division 3, chapter 1, article 1, section 4000: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. (Section 38010 defines "off-highway vehicles", essentially agricultural, construction, and other vehicles that are never driven on state roads) Article 2, section 4156: (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, and except as provided in subdivision (b), the department in its discretion may issue a temporary permit to operate a vehicle when a payment of fees has been accepted in an amount to be determined by, and paid to the department, by the owner or other person in lawful possession of the vehicle. The permit shall be subject to the terms and conditions, and shall be valid for the period of time, that the department shall deem appropriate under the circumstances. Article 7, section 4850: The department, upon registering a vehicle, shall issue to the owner two partially or fully reflectorized license plates or devices for a motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle, and one partially or fully reflectorized license plate or device for all other vehicles required to be registered under this code. The plates or devices shall identify the vehicles for which they are issued for the period of their validity. Article 9, section 5202: A license plate issued by this state or any other jurisdiction within or without the United States shall be attached upon receipt and remain attached during the period of its validity to the vehicle for which it is issued while being operated within this state or during the time the vehicle is being held for sale in this state, or until the time that a vehicle with special or identification plates is no longer entitled to those plates; and a person shall not operate, and an owner shall not knowingly permit to be operated, upon any highway, a vehicle unless the license plate is so attached. A special permit issued in lieu of plates shall be attached and displayed on the vehicle for which the permit was issued during the period of the permit’s validity. Divsion 17, article 1, chapter 1, section 40000.1: Except as otherwise provided in this article, it is unlawful and constitutes an infraction for any person to violate, or fail to comply with any provision of this code, or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code. In short, yes, you need a license plate or equivalent temporary registration permit to drive on the highways; California is a bit unusual in that it requires license plates for parked vehicles as well.
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Child Labor in Entertainment Why is the entertainment industry exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act? I have no idea how to research this question. edit: I mean, I thought the constitution specifies that laws shall be equally enforced.
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There is a specific exemption in 29 USC 213(c)(3) that The provisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions. See this article for further analysis, a propos state laws. Incidentally, the act defines "oppressive child labor" as: a condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child-labor age. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by regulation or by order that the employment of employees between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years in occupations other than manufacturing and mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor if and to the extent that the Secretary of Labor determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being. Without the statutory exemption, if you are under 16 and employed by a non-parent, in any occupation, that is oppressive child labor. But because of the specific exemption, what would otherwise be statutorily oppressive child labor is allowed. The political "why" question (why did the bill contain such language) is extremely difficult to answer. The only substantive clues that I have seen are in a 1959 dissertation by G.E. Paulsen and this article on the passage of the act. It seems to be a legislative compromise relating stricter original standards, and was particularly driven by the need to allow children to work on family farms. The relevant clause was added from the floor of the House on May 24, 1938 by Rep Charles Kramer (CA). This is recorded on p. 7441 of the Congressional Record, which, unfortunately, is not freely available online. The two toughest questions were asked by Schneider (WI), Kramer's reply in parentheses: The gentleman's amendment would exempt children engaged only in the making of moving pictures? (The gentleman is correct) There are very few young people employed in that occupation? (Very few. There are hardly more than 10 employed at one time.) Shirley Temple was in fact invoked by Kramer.
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You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations.
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It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.
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A government always has standing to enforce violations of its own laws in its own jurisdiction. The harm to its legally protected interest is its interest in enforcing its own laws. While the forum here is a civil action, the basic concept is the same one that authorizes a government to enforce its own criminal laws. Also, a government agency may seek fines and not merely compensatory damages or liquidated damages in lieu of compensatory damages, unlike private litigants in civil actions. A civil government enforcement action is civil in the sense that only monetary damages and injunctive relief are sought, rather than incarceration, and that the court rules for civil actions apply (and as a result, the constitutional rights of criminal defendants are not invoked). But from a standing/political theory/legal theory perspective, this is almost like a quasi-criminal action in which restitution for the victims is also sought. Many labor, consumer protection, health, safety and environmental laws authorize enforcement by a state agency through the attorney general, or in the alternative, by private litigants acting as a "private attorney general." In the area of employment discrimination, the usual situation is that you must first seek relief by filing a complaint with the appropriate agency, and then have a private cause of action to enforce your rights associated with the complaint only if and when the agency decides not to pursue the case with its own resources. The harassment involved here is being conceptualized as a form of employment discrimination that is subject to that kind of regime. This arrangement is legislatively favored because it provides a means by which people who can't afford attorneys can obtain relief.
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Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it.
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I've answered this in the context of US patent law, but similar principles apply elsewhere in the world. As stated in 35 USC 271, "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent". Thus, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to exclude others from performing these actions, and the right to sue anyone who does perform these actions (both to stop them from infringing the patent, and to collect monetary damages for their infringement). Creating an infringing product and then licensing it under the GPL (or any other scheme) does not change the fact that it infringes a patent. 35 USC 271 also states that "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer". This means that, even if the creator of the infringing product does not perform any infringing acts in the US, the act of offering it for free use could be construed as induced infringement of the patent, and they could still be sued for that infringement.
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There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.
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I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.
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Is there a way for participants of an industry to discuss how to keep a market healthy without it being considered collusion? For a particular niche in demand but broad in utility industry, I am both a consumer and producer that participates internationally. Within segments of the participants, there are public informal concerns that the elimination of a price floor policy would lead to market failure through the unregulated undercutting of competition that would lead to lower quality products for consumers and an unprecedented drop in the number of competitors. For more sophisticated alternatives, as citizens of a country where free speech is protected, it seems like the people involved should have the right to publicly discuss how a policy would impact their lives and what could be proposed in place of it. However, such discussions would also inevitably include other independent business owners. Because of that, one should keep in mind that it is also strictly illegal for people who own or manage businesses in the same industry to decide or discuss what prices to set for the industry, which makes sense for the purposes of preventing a monopoly or oligopoly. But, considering that such discussions wouldn't be solely to the benefit of the parties who would discuss such matters, but rather to the health of the entire market for any and all current and future participants, it seems unreasonable that participants who happen to be competitors wouldn't have any way to publicly voice the effects and alternatives of policies without it being considered collusion. Are there any laws detailing what the limits are in this context? Are there referable precedents for what is allowed and not allowed within the context of maintaining market competition? From what I gather, there is a form of tacit collusion if it would be called that which seems permissible, but I have never had any particular desire for this kind of discussion until recently, so I don't have much experience in knowing how I establish what is legal and what isn't. I am looking for laws that can illustrate details and limits to these discussions to make there are no infringements before proceeding with a quantitative analysis.
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Under US law, referring to the rather broad range of anti-trust legislation, regulation and case law, the most important issue is whether there is a conspiracy. A public discussion of some policy question is clearly not a conspiracy (even if only certain individuals are allowed to speak at the forum). So it is actually not illegal for executives to discuss their product. It would be illegal to engage in a a conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize prices. To quote from the instructions from an antitrust case in the 9th Circuit, the case of Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar: Under the federal Sherman Act, it is illegal for competitors, regardless of their size or amount of sales, to agree on the prices to be charged for their competing products. An agreement between competing firms can violate this rule even if there is not an agreement on the exact price to be charged. For example, it is illegal for competing companies to agree on maximum or minimum prices, a range within which prices will fall, a formula to set prices, or a component of prices, such as a shipping charge or an interest rate. It is also illegal for competitors to agree on a plan or scheme that will tend to stabilize prices. Interestingly, there was no instruction as to what constitutes a conspiracy: but, ordinarily, it means that means to agree in secret to do an illegal thing.
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united-states There is no general rule against one company or person buying both broadcasting rights and merchandising rights to a particular piece of content in the US. There are anti-monopoly/anti-trust laws, but those generally only apply if a particular entity holds a monopoly or a commanding market position in a whole market sector. If one firm held the rights to 80% of all online games, for example, an anti-trust action might well be warranted. But a single game or property is not generally considered to be a market sector for anti-trust purposes. Exactly what the proper market sector is in such cases is often a complex, technical, and highly disputed issue. The "original owner of the IP" can decide who s/he wishes to sell that IP to -- nothing requires, or forbids, that different sets of rights be sold to the same buyer. The original owner will attempt to get the best deal available. Sometimes that is a very lucrative deal, and sometimes it is far from that. As long as unlawful methods are not used to induce a sale, whatever bargain the parties make is generally acceptable to the law. I do not know who did, or did not, buy any of the rights to Squid Game, and that info might not be publicly available. But there is no law that I know of against the same party having both broadcast and marketing rights to it, and perhaps other rights as well.
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Under U.S. law, this is only actionable is you make this statement knowing that it would not "support the continued creation of X" and that instead, you had already completely abandoned that product and you were, for example, planning to change lines of work and become a lumberjack instead. Even in that case, common law fraud is hard to show, because you would need to show how that statement which related to how the profits will be used, rather than what you are actually receiving, could cause you damages in that narrow transaction. But, many states have deceptive trade practices acts that protect consumers by allowing the attorney general, local prosecutor, or a private individual or class of plaintiffs to sue if representations such as these are made when they are known to be false. Typically, these lawsuits provide for minimum statutory damages, attorneys' fees award, and when cases are brought by a public official, injunctive relief (ordering the advertising with that pitch to cease) are authorized. For example, saying this when it is false would be actionable in California and Colorado. A fairly common fact pattern is that someone will sell stuff at an above market price saying that "profits will help me pay for my cancer treatments" when in fact the person doesn't have cancer. This could even constitute criminal wire and mail fraud, for example. Sometimes, competitors can also sue you under the Lanham Act (which primarily governs federal trademarks), for false advertising about something that could unfairly undermine their sales if what you are saying isn't true and is causing their sales to drop. On the other hand, if you sincerely believe that what you are saying is true when you say it, and your belief is not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could believe that under the circumstances, then what you are saying is legal. Usually this is true, and if it is, ultimately, you will be fine. Although nothing can prevent you from being sued on a non-meritorious basis. In between are cases where this is true (you will be supported, but perhaps only get 5% of the profits while the rest are garnished for a lawsuit), but your statements were still misleading at the time you made them and you knew it. Those cases get resolved on a case by case basis. Outside U.S. law, your mileage may vary. Legal regulation of commercial speech varies significantly from one country to another. These statements might not be O.K. for example in a Communist regime on the Chinese or Korean model.
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Because the company that runs the contest is not in the banking or medical industry, or in another business or organization (NGO or governmental) that has to protect personal information by law, your login, email and password can be stored on pieces of paper scattered around their office and it's not illegal. And there are no laws regarding sending your information in plain text in an email. Yes, those are bad security and privacy policies, but they are not illegal. (This may vary by jurisdiction). The TOS (Terms of Serivice) you agreed to are at Eye Win Awards Privacy Policy. Part of it reads: By providing us your Information or by making use of the facilities provided by the Website, You hereby consent to the collection, storage, processing and transfer of any or all of Your Personal Information and Non-Personal Information by us as specified under this Privacy Policy. You further agree that such collection, use, storage and transfer of Your Information shall not cause any loss or wrongful gain to you or any other person. and We cannot guarantee the security of our database, nor can we guarantee that information you supply will not be intercepted while being transmitted to us over the Internet. And, of course, any information you include in a posting to the discussion areas is available to anyone with Internet access. You agree to the TOS and Privacy Policy simply by registering and using the site. This is known as a click wrap (Wikipedia) contract. You can choose to stop using the service, or by the company can choose to void the contract and close your account. You can complain, but it is entirely up to the company to address your complaint or even reply to you. The Grievance Redressal contact in India is at the bottom of the link above. There are probably consumer advocacy groups in India; Google will show you those.
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I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing.
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I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure.
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The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.
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None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.
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Is profanity a form of protected speech on college campuses? I am currently attending college in Oklahoma and have run into a confusing policy. We have been warned that anyone living on campus who uses profanity in the dormitory lobby will be written up for a violation of residency agreement and the student code of conduct. Nothing in either document clearly establishes what constitutes profanity, how it is a violation of the aforementioned notices, or why this is punishable at all. The only thing I found in their literature states that profanity is in poor taste and is thus not acceptable. This was immediately preceded by language demanding that students obey school policy as well as state and federal law. So the codes say it is unacceptable, but I can find no case law to back this up. Cohen v Calif., Matal v. Tam, and People v. Boomer seem to be the most relevant in the discussion, but I find the jargon a bit dense. This policy seems to be incongruent with federal interpretations of free speech and further work by the ACLU. If the language I use is not used to incite violence, issue a threat, or utter fighting words, can they enforce punitive action?
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As a state university, the institution would be subject to First Amendment restrictions on their restrictions. They cannot prohibit expression of religious or irreligious viewpoints, they cannot prohibit expression of racist or anti-racist viewpoints, and so on. That said, there may be some murk pertaining to anti-discrimination legislation and the concept of a hostile environment. See for example this statement from U. Michigan: the underpinnings of any such restrictions are pretty broad (see the USC statement, including titles VI and VII of theCivil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and so on – those sorts of concerns apply to private schools as well). SWOSU has a long list of prohibited activities. The only rule that marginally looks like it could cover bad language is the ban on General misconduct that adversely affects the student's suitability as a member of the university community such as immorality, commission of major crimes, inciting disorders, association with known criminals, peace disturbances, disorderly conduct, and all acts that recklessly endanger the students or others. And that would be an incredible stretch. The residence handbook states, pertaining to the rooms, that Obscene material, including, but not limited to, pornographic literature, X-rated movies, and displays of profanity or language that is offensive to others may not be displayed. I assume that someone would be offended by the B word, so you can't display that on a poster in your room. This does not apply to verbal profanity or profanity in the lobby. Since they don't make the residency agreement publicly accessible, I can't see what they might have said there that implies a no-profanity rule. I should mention that university employees often over-interpret their authority, so it is not guaranteed that this is actual university policy (even is distributed by the front desk in a dorm). It may, however, be necessary to sue the university in order to get a clear indication that this is official policy, and that the policy is not a violation of the First Amendment. I would expect that the rationale has to do with "hostile environment". A second runner-up would be that it's about "disorderly conduct", which is where Florida A&M places their anti-profanity rule.
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A cease and desist letter is basically a formal way of them saying, "stop what you are doing, and please don't do it again." It is not proof of tortious conduct by you, nor is it proof of illegal conduct by you. It does not open up an avenue for the university to sue you, nor does it open up an avenue for the university to have you committed to a mental institution. Your behaviour after receiving such a letter does matter however. What is most likely their next step should you continue emailing members of the university, is to apply for an injunction. It is possible that should the injunction be granted, you may be liable to pay fees. Breaching an injunction can have serious consequences, including jail. I would recommend against writing a letter apologizing. You are doing the very thing they asked you not to do. If you do feel in inclined to apologize, you should write the letter to the general counsel and ask them to forward it along. They probably won't. Obviously you have to be quite careful with the content of the letter. You are almost certainly within your rights to continue to email their general counsel. In addition, they almost certainly cannot stop you from communicating with the state agency responsible for the university.
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I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner.
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School administrators have the right to try to express the law in seemingly simpler language, but they do not have the right to enforce their misstatements of the law. The law of Louisiana does not refer to knives at all Carrying a firearm, or dangerous weapon as defined in R.S. 14:2, by a student or nonstudent on school property, at a school sponsored function, or in a firearm-free zone is unlawful... "Dangerous weapon" is defined so that it "includes any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm". The law does not exhaustively list the things that count as firearms or dangerous weapons, so every individual is held responsible for knowing what the courts have held to constitute "dangerous weapons". A novice interpretation (not relying on case law) might lead to the conclusion that a speargun is not a "dangerous weapon" (perhaps on the theory that it is used underwater to spear fish), but a reasonable interpretation of "dangerous weapon" suggests that it is a dangerous weapon because it can be used to kill a person. The same is true of a pencil, as well as a dog. You can turn to this article for an example of the dangerous weapon status of a dog, a propos Louisiana v. Michels, where defendant was "armed with a dangerous weapon". That court recited previous case law to the effect that "the dangerousness of the instrumentality because of its use is a factual question for the jury" State v. Munoz, 575 So.2d 848, 850 RX 14:3 also states that The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision which means that if faced with a novel application (dog, pencil, or speargun), the jury can decide based on "context and purpose", not just narrow words. The article points to a law review article by a lawyer involved in the 1942 codification of Louisiana criminal law that "the code was to be read as a civilian document, not a mere compilation of common law rules", thus the code is shorter and uses plain language. The article then reviews a number of previous rulings on the scope of "dangerous weapon", starting with Louisiana v. Calvin where it was ruled that teeth and fists are not dangerous weapons, even though you can kill a person with your fists. It therefore turns out that a "dangerous weapon" must be an inanimate object, under Louisiana law. A knife can be found to be a dangerous weapon, as reported in this opinion (deportation dependent on a prior criminal conviction for felony aggravated battery, specifically referring to R.S. 14.2(3) and deeming a knife to be a dangerous weapon). Since that conviction is no being appealed at the state level, details of the knife-usage are omitted, so all we know is that a knife was used. Insofar as box cutters were the essential weapons that brought about the airplane hijackings on 9/11, it is not unreasonable to at least consider that they are within the scope of "dangerous weapon" (I would not, but that's a matter for the jury). A butter knife or especially a pencil cannot reasonably be deemed to be "dangerous weapons". But there doesn't seem to be any case law specifically addressing these objects. If a pencil were actually used as a weapon, perhaps the jury might find that a pencil (so used) was a dangerous weapon. However, the question is about a law forbidding the mere possession of a dangerous weapon, eliminating how it was actually used from the calculation. It is extremely unlikely that I would get arrested for driving past a school with a screwdriver in my car.
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There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.
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None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.
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How can incitement of imminent lawless action not be constitutionally protected? The short answer to your question is "because the Supreme Court of the United States said so." In Brandenburg v. Ohio SCOTUS found that the Constitution protects speech that calls for lawless action in the abstract but does not protect speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". The court's per curiam opinion seems to treat the decision as self-evident - it's quite short after discussing the facts of the case. However, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion (his "caveat") that discussed and was critical of previous decisions in such cases, including the use of the 'clear and present danger test', so his opinion is useful for a brief history of First Amendment judgments to that point (Brandenburg). The Declaration of Independence is not law. Following "a history of repeated injuries and usurpations" and failures to reach political settlements it asserts a moral right to overthrow the tyranny of the British crown. It alludes to rights, it does not "enshrine" or create a legal right that the judiciary can interpret. Judges might refer to the Declaration in their judgments, not using it as legal authority but an articulation of fundamental values.
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You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?
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I want to translate some poems, when does the original copyright expire? Some poems were first published in South Korea in an anthology alongside the work of two other poets. This particular collection was released in 1946 (72 years ago) and the poet I am interested in translating died in 1968 (50 years ago as of May 2018). If it only comes down to the publication, I believe it should have entered the public domain by now. If it's up to the author's death, do I need to wait until their deathday, did it enter the public domain at the beginning of this year or will it enter at the beginning of next year? Does the fact that it was originally published alongside the work of two other poets change anything?
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For a particular poem(s) the copyright term in ROK is Life + 50 years. In copyright, these are measured as calendar years so it will enter the public domain on 1 January 2019. That is, unless you plan to use it in a country that doesn't observe the rule of the shorter term (like the USA) - in those countries it may still be under copyright based on the term using their individual domestic law. Ask another question if you want this clarified. Copyright in the anthology belongs to the person who created that work i.e. the editor(s) who selected and arranged those particular poems from those particular poets. The duration is measured from the (last of) the editor's death(s). IF you are not copying or deriving from the anthology (i.e. you are only using one of the poets and are arranging them in a different way), this is irrelevant to you.
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In the EU, that's the general rule going forward, but there are two big exceptions I'm aware of. The general rule from Article 1(1) of the Copyright Term Directive: The rights of an author of a literary or artistic work within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention shall run for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death, irrespective of the date when the work is lawfully made available to the public. Note that this is in fact an extension on the Berne Convention, which requires minimum 50 years after death. Big exception #1: Moral rights. Article 9 specifically states the directive does not apply to moral rights. These vary by country, but in the EU, moral rights have the tendency of lasting forever, and most often includes the right to attribution and a right against action which to the author is "prejudicial to his honor or reputation" (see Berne Convention Article 6bis). Therefore, as a rule, you cannot do "whatever you want" with an image (though sale is generally OK – that's an economic right, not a moral right). Big exception #2: Pre-existing longer term. Article 10(1) leaves intact pre-existing longer term limits which Member States had: Where a term of protection which is longer than the corresponding term provided for by this Directive was already running in a Member State on 1 July 1995, this Directive shall not have the effect of shortening that term of protection in that Member State. This of course means, you can't actually 100% rely on this "70 years after death" rule in the EU until 1 July 20661. However, most EU countries did have 70 years anyways. That said there are some interesting exceptions. For example, France has mort pour la France which extends copyright an additional 30 years for those who died on active military service. This means for French citizens who died before 1 July 1995 on active military service, this directive does not apply, and they still have up to 100 years of post-mortem copyright protection. As an aside, Wikipedia has a fairly detailed list on country copyright lengths. Not 2065, because per Article 8, the rule is actually the January 1st after 70 years after death. Then you have to wait till July 1 to be sure the rule 100% applies, because for some reason, they made the Article 10(1) exception start in the middle of the year.
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Issues considered Based on the papers you cite, it seems like its not even straightforward in U.S. law. They discuss three main legal questions that are obstacles to implementing an open-access policy: Is there a "teacher exception" to work for hire, giving researchers initial copyright over their papers? Does a non-exclusive partial rights transfer survive a subsequent exclusive copyright transfer? Is a university policy a sufficient legal instrument to achieve the non-exclusive rights transfer in question (2)? Turns out, this scenario is specific enough that it really matters which jurisdiction is being considered. I took this question as an opportunity to research the copyright regimes of France, Germany and Japan (translations of their respective copyright acts linked). Japanese copyright law is fairly similar to U.S. copyright law in terms of rights transfer, so I will mainly be analyzing the first two (that and I have no competence in Japanese). I am not in any position to be writing papers over this subject, but in considering questions (2) and (3) with a civil law context, I'll cover some laws on governing rights transfers. I'm not considering question (1) because if the university holds original copyright, then it is trivial for them to implement an open-access policy. I thus assume the faculty members hold original copyright for this answer (which is generally the case in France and Germany anyways). Author's rights basics Author's rights are separated into two branches: moral rights and economic rights. Moral rights are generally non-transferable. Often they cannot be waived and last for eternity. Economic rights are those which can be transferred and exploited, but as you note these may also be subject to restrictions. For the rest of this answer, I will be avoiding the term "copyright" as it is ambiguous: It can mean just the economic rights (like in the translated Japanese), or author's right as a whole (like in the translated German and French). Note: Links from this point on are in French (English resources weren't sufficient). Survival of non-exclusive rights transfers In Germany, this is a straightforward affirmative: Section 33 states: Exclusive and non-exclusive rights of use shall remain effective with respect to rights of use granted later. [...] In France, an answer to this question is elusive. This isn't too surprising as French statute hardly references non-exclusive licences. As an example, it took until 2007 for the GPL to be recognized in court. Given that the courts have been leaning towards giving weight to open licenses, my assumption is that they would follow the common-sense approach taken by German law though I've not found any direct statement to that effect. Implementing an open-access university policy From an author's right perspective, the biggest issue I see in drafting such a policy is that by default the authors give the university a non-exclusive right of distribution for future articles. France has particularly strong protections for future works. L131-1 states: Total transfer of future works shall be null and void. Though it may look as if this can be easily avoided by adding a few simple small clauses, jurisprudence has been to interpret this in favour of the author when possible. For further information, see here. While I'm of the opinion the scope of the policy would be narrow enough to avoid the reach of L131-1, there are additional restrictions on publication contracts. Noting that giving the university non-exclusive distribution rights will likely make the university a "publisher" in the eyes of the law, L132-4 states that: A clause by which the author undertakes to afford a right of preference to a publisher for the publication of his future works of clearly specified kinds shall be lawful. Such right shall be limited, for each kind of work, to five new works as from the day of signature of the publishing contract concluded for the first work or to works produced by the author within a period of five years from that same date. This makes it difficult to have a blanket open-access policy. I'm not certain whether an opt-out clause would be enough to avoid the above restriction. Additionally, France has the moral right of retraction allowing the author to withdraw granted rights of use under strict conditions (L121-4). French moral rights can't be waived so it's futile to account for it in a policy, but it's something to be aware of when implementing an open-access system. In Germany, while there are some protections for future unknown types of use, the scope is fairly well defined here. This puts the situation squarely under Section 40: (1) A contract in which the author undertakes to grant rights of use in future works which are not specified in any way or are only referred to by type shall be made in writing. The contract may be terminated by either party after a period of five years following its conclusion. The term of notice shall be six months, unless a shorter term is agreed. I therefore don't see an issue with this in Germany provided that the policy is specifically agreed to and is renewed with faculty at least every 5 years. Legislated open-access Whether or not the university implements a lawful open-access policy (which is challenging in France...), the author has another available option. Both Germany (Section 38(4)) and France (L533-4 I. of the Research Code) have legislated a limited form of open-access that the author has a right to. While the laws are slightly different, they boil down to the following: After publication in a journal, the author may publish the article in an open-access manner after an embargo period of at most 12 months notwithstanding any exclusive rights transfer to a publisher, provided that the research was at least half funded by public funds.
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You misunderstand the nature of copyright. Holding copyright allows you to decide how the work can be copied: there is no obligation on you to publish it if you don't want to. After your copyright expires you don't have to publish it either: the only thing that has changed is you can no longer prevent anyone making a copy. The lost works of Aristotle are in the public domain - if you can find them you can make as many copes as you like.
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If a work is in the public domain, then there are no particular requirements on its use; in particular, it can be used on a book cover without a copyright notice, a public domain notice, or any other kind of notice or mark. Wikimedia Commons' public domain template says, "You must also include a United States public domain tag to indicate why this work is in the public domain in the United States." This is a notice to users of Wikimedia Commons, informing them that if they upload a public domain image to Wikimedia Commons, they must include a public domain tag. That's a policy of Wikimedia Commons. It doesn't apply to people using the image outside of Wikimedia.
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It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.
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Probably not. It sounds like you've copied the complete work without any meaningful transformation. You've reduced the market for the original work by hosting your own copy. The fact that your purpose "is to share the information" doesn't really do you any good, as that is also the purpose of the original work. You're almost certainly outside fair-use territory. If you're looking for a "kosher" way to do this, the generally accepted practice is to link to the article and either paraphrase or excerpt the most relevant portions. That said, the fact that this piece came from a university may help you out. If it's a public university, it may be that its "news" articles are actually public records and not protected by copyright. For more information on how to run a fair-use analysis, see the answer here.
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According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that.
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Is it legal for an employer to charge an employee for lost equipment? I work for a hospital in Alberta, Canada. As part of our job, we're required to use a walkie-talkie-like device called a Vocera Badge. Over the course of the last few years that we've been using them, we've lost 5 badges, and they cost about $500 each. Recently we got a new batch of the latest model to replace our old ones and were informed by management that if any of us lose one, we'll be responsible for the cost of replacing it. Is it legal for an employer to require the use of equipment and make employees financially responsible for it?
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Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out.
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You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.
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In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.
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An employee is an agent of the employer when working and owes a duty of loyalty to the employer. One of the obligations associated with a duty of loyalty is to refrain from receiving anything other than the employer authorized compensation for the work, rather than benefitting personally from work done on behalf of the employer. By appropriating additional benefit from the customer in a way that is unauthorized by the employer (the employer would be within its rights to sanction and authorize this conduct if desired), an employee who does not turn the profit in this transaction over to the employer has breached a fiduciary duty to the employer for which the employer would have a right to sue the employee for the amount by which the employee was unjustly enriched in the transaction. Would it actually play out this way in real life for these sums of money? Probably not. The stakes involved wouldn't justify the time and money of a lawsuit. But, breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty to your employer in this context probably constitutes good cause to terminate the employment of the employee without paying severance that would otherwise be payable under Canadian employment law (in theory anyway, I've never seen a reported court case on point).
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In New Zealand, employers have a duty to take all practicable steps to ensure their workplace is safe for employees and for others who come onto the premises (Health and Safety in Employment Act s6). So if there was a wasp nest and they didn't do anything about it, presumably they would be liable. If it was a random bee, I doubt they would be liable, because they couldn't practicably prevent a bee flying in if, say, someone opened the door. The state would have to charge the company as HSEA is a criminal provisions act. If the plaintiff brought a claim based on the tort of negligence, they would have to prove that the company had a duty of care, breached that duty, the breach caused damage, and the damage was not too remote from the breach. The company does have a duty of care to their patrons. The standard for this is what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances. If they didn't remove a wasp nest they may have breached their duty of care. The breach will have caused damage (a wasp sting). It wouldn't have been too remote since had they removed the wasp nest, the person wouldn't have been stung. However if a random bee flew in, the company probably wouldn't have breached their duty of care, and if the court found that they had, the damage would probably be too remote or not have been caused by them directly.
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Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.
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Does this amount to the employer potentially paying the employee to lie to them, to no ultimate legal effect? Or will the employee have a problem if they end up with an obligation to sign a statement that is not in agreement with reality? Neither. Contract law contemplates a party's subsequent inability to comply with the terms that were established at the formation of the contract. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, this is referred to as supervening impracticability. See, for instance, the Restatement at § 261. In the hypothetical scenario you outline, the loss of a company laptop renders the employee's promise (namely, "to return any company-issued computers or devices") impracticable. Instead, the circumstances may entitle the employer to restitution (by the employee) for what the employee now is literally unable to return. That would be cognizable as compliance in substance.
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If your friend was a salaried W2 full time exempt employee hired by the company to, among other things, write software like this, then the fact that it was developed "off the clock" with the employee's own resources means nothing once he gives it to the company. I mean if I give you a present and it blows up and breaks your arm, I'm still liable even if we didn't have a "contract" - especially if I knew it would blow up. Your friend's position is even worse since the relationship entails the employee's having the employer's best interests in mind. If I were your friend, I'd either figure out how to fix this or take gnasher729's advice from the comments and find a country where it's easy to hide from parties public and private. Maybe buy a bunch of canned food and go live on a boat?
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Are Harvard-style open access policies lawful under civil law? The open access movement tries to make scholarly articles freely available online, to move away from the traditional model where publishers charge access to the articles. To support this movement, universities implement open access policies, requiring researchers to make their works freely available. Open access policies such as that of Harvard or MIT are implemented by granting the university some non-exclusive rights on the works written by faculty. This is very useful as it circumvents subsequent copyright transfers (to some extent). There are a few articles explaining why this is compatible with copyright law, so in common law (see below). I wonder whether similar policies could be designed under authors' rights, in civil law (for instance the french "droit d'auteur"), where rights transfers seem to obey to slightly different rules. Useful links: Simon Frankel and Shannon Nestor, Opening the Door: How Faculty Authors Can Implement an Open Access Policy at Their Institutions Eric Priest, Copyright and the Harvard Open Access Mandate, Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, preprint August 1, 2012
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Issues considered Based on the papers you cite, it seems like its not even straightforward in U.S. law. They discuss three main legal questions that are obstacles to implementing an open-access policy: Is there a "teacher exception" to work for hire, giving researchers initial copyright over their papers? Does a non-exclusive partial rights transfer survive a subsequent exclusive copyright transfer? Is a university policy a sufficient legal instrument to achieve the non-exclusive rights transfer in question (2)? Turns out, this scenario is specific enough that it really matters which jurisdiction is being considered. I took this question as an opportunity to research the copyright regimes of France, Germany and Japan (translations of their respective copyright acts linked). Japanese copyright law is fairly similar to U.S. copyright law in terms of rights transfer, so I will mainly be analyzing the first two (that and I have no competence in Japanese). I am not in any position to be writing papers over this subject, but in considering questions (2) and (3) with a civil law context, I'll cover some laws on governing rights transfers. I'm not considering question (1) because if the university holds original copyright, then it is trivial for them to implement an open-access policy. I thus assume the faculty members hold original copyright for this answer (which is generally the case in France and Germany anyways). Author's rights basics Author's rights are separated into two branches: moral rights and economic rights. Moral rights are generally non-transferable. Often they cannot be waived and last for eternity. Economic rights are those which can be transferred and exploited, but as you note these may also be subject to restrictions. For the rest of this answer, I will be avoiding the term "copyright" as it is ambiguous: It can mean just the economic rights (like in the translated Japanese), or author's right as a whole (like in the translated German and French). Note: Links from this point on are in French (English resources weren't sufficient). Survival of non-exclusive rights transfers In Germany, this is a straightforward affirmative: Section 33 states: Exclusive and non-exclusive rights of use shall remain effective with respect to rights of use granted later. [...] In France, an answer to this question is elusive. This isn't too surprising as French statute hardly references non-exclusive licences. As an example, it took until 2007 for the GPL to be recognized in court. Given that the courts have been leaning towards giving weight to open licenses, my assumption is that they would follow the common-sense approach taken by German law though I've not found any direct statement to that effect. Implementing an open-access university policy From an author's right perspective, the biggest issue I see in drafting such a policy is that by default the authors give the university a non-exclusive right of distribution for future articles. France has particularly strong protections for future works. L131-1 states: Total transfer of future works shall be null and void. Though it may look as if this can be easily avoided by adding a few simple small clauses, jurisprudence has been to interpret this in favour of the author when possible. For further information, see here. While I'm of the opinion the scope of the policy would be narrow enough to avoid the reach of L131-1, there are additional restrictions on publication contracts. Noting that giving the university non-exclusive distribution rights will likely make the university a "publisher" in the eyes of the law, L132-4 states that: A clause by which the author undertakes to afford a right of preference to a publisher for the publication of his future works of clearly specified kinds shall be lawful. Such right shall be limited, for each kind of work, to five new works as from the day of signature of the publishing contract concluded for the first work or to works produced by the author within a period of five years from that same date. This makes it difficult to have a blanket open-access policy. I'm not certain whether an opt-out clause would be enough to avoid the above restriction. Additionally, France has the moral right of retraction allowing the author to withdraw granted rights of use under strict conditions (L121-4). French moral rights can't be waived so it's futile to account for it in a policy, but it's something to be aware of when implementing an open-access system. In Germany, while there are some protections for future unknown types of use, the scope is fairly well defined here. This puts the situation squarely under Section 40: (1) A contract in which the author undertakes to grant rights of use in future works which are not specified in any way or are only referred to by type shall be made in writing. The contract may be terminated by either party after a period of five years following its conclusion. The term of notice shall be six months, unless a shorter term is agreed. I therefore don't see an issue with this in Germany provided that the policy is specifically agreed to and is renewed with faculty at least every 5 years. Legislated open-access Whether or not the university implements a lawful open-access policy (which is challenging in France...), the author has another available option. Both Germany (Section 38(4)) and France (L533-4 I. of the Research Code) have legislated a limited form of open-access that the author has a right to. While the laws are slightly different, they boil down to the following: After publication in a journal, the author may publish the article in an open-access manner after an embargo period of at most 12 months notwithstanding any exclusive rights transfer to a publisher, provided that the research was at least half funded by public funds.
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A copyright notice like that could mean the authors are claiming copyright in different portions of the work, or claiming a joint copyright. With the former, standard copyright law applies with respect to each part, so I'm going to examine the joint copyright aspect. Broadly speaking, joint works tend to be an unclear and internationally inconsistent area of copyright law and you haven't specified jurisdiction. Since this is an English language site and the US and UK are polar opposites on most of these issues, those will be the jurisdictions I examine. US Definition: To qualify as a joint work, each author's individual contribution must be inseparable or interdependent, and the authors must intend to be joint authors (17 U.S.C. s 101, Childress v. Taylor, Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.). Rights of use: Joint authors can independently exploit and license a work without consent of other co-authors, but have a duty to account profits to co-authors (House Report No. 94-1476 (1976), Goodman v. Lee, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, etc.). UK Definition: To qualify as a joint work, each author's individual contribution must not be distinct, they must work towards a common design, but no specific intention of joint authorship is required (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Art. 10(1), an 11-factor test was articulated in Martin v. Kogan para. 53 by the E&W Court of Appeal). Rights of use: Joint authors must seek consent of the co-authors in order to exploit and licence a work (Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., Hodgens v. Beckingham). For further information, see this excellent paper by Elena Cooper comparing how US and UK law diverged on this point.
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There is no general prohibition against taking down material, even non-infringing material, which is posted by some person, but there is a risk to the service provider. Abstracting away from the specifics of github, a Provider has some agreement with the User whereby User rightfully makes Stuff available on Provider's site. Arbitrarily removing Stuff (in violation of the usage agreement) may cause damage to User, who may sue Provider, and Provider will avoid that if possible. DMCA protects Provider from copyright infringement suits by Victim, providing the proper DMCA procedure is followed, and it allows Provider to remove Stuff without fear of getting sued by User (17 USC 512(g)). This protection is not available if the takedown notice is not proper. (As a case in point, the entire series of Harry Potter books is still out there freely on the internet, because only the rights holder can demand a takedown, and the rights holder seems to not be concerned).
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Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.
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I can't answer for the Indonesian law specifically. But in general, under most international copyright schemes, a translation is considered a copyrightable work. This means that even if the original work (in this case, the Quran and Hadith) is in the public domain, derivative works based on that public domain work can still be copyrighted by their creators. This includes, for example: A song with lyrics taken from the Quran A play or movie dramatizing stories from the Quran A novel retelling a story from the Quran In all of these cases, the author has built something new, based on the public domain framework. Because they contributed something original, they are entitled to a copyright on their original contribution. They can't stop someone from copying the Quran themselves, but they can stop someone from copying their original work based on the Quran. Most copyright courts--again, I don't know about Indonesia specifically--will treat a translation the same way. A translation is an original work that requires creativity and skill--otherwise Google Translate would work a lot better than it does. Just like a movie based on the Quran, a translation based on the Quran will probably be copyrightable under most, if not all, countries' copyright laws.
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It depends on the nature of the quote. Quotes from Buddha, Aristotle and Lincoln are out of copyright. Otherwise, the two basic questions are: who put that quote in fixed form, and is copying it "fair use"? If for example you happen to be at a political rally where a politician makes a noteworthy extemporaneous quote, you could be the copyright holder, because copyright law protects the person who first puts the work into fixed form. (If he's reading from prepared text, the speech writer or his employer would hold copyright). You can also quote small bits from any source, such as "Don't think about your errors or failures; otherwise, you'll never do a thing". It would not be "fair use" to chop up a novel into a sequence of 2-3 sentence quotes. This assumes that you manually assemble the quotes from legal sources, such as a print copy of "The Martian". Whether or not you can legally pull the data from an online source depends on the terms of service for that site. That lets out brainyquote as a source, so check the TOS for whatever source you get the material from.
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We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.
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Wikipedia, at least the English-language edition of Wikipedia, takes the position that what applies to it is US copyright law. Under that law, anything published in 1924 is now in the public domain, and anything published first in the US, or simultaneously in the US and another country with no copyright notice prior to 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act) was never protected by copyright, but was in the public domain from the date of publication. See "Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States". Beyond that, the statement quotes would seem to be, in effect, a license permitting free but non-commercial use. That alone would not normally permit Wikipedia use, except under a claim of fair use. So Wikipedia use would be based on the date of publication, or the absence of a copyright notice, or both. As a long-term Wikipedia editor, I am confident that the images described would be usable in Wikipedia articles. They might or might not be up-loadable to Wikimedia commons, but I think they would be. The question of US Federal Government authorship is a distraction, this work would be in the public domain if the US Govt had no role in creating it.
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Update: Our neighbor's fence is on our property and they want adverse possession We had our property surveyed before we built a fence. Turns out our neighbor's fence is on our property. It is built 7 ft in at the back and runs the length of the lot line to 6" in at the front. Essentially they have about 500 square feet of our property. They claim a fence (which they have recently replaced) has been there since they bought the property in 1994. However, we live in Washington State and I noticed something about them having to pay taxes on that land during the time of their "adverse possession" in order to claim it. They have not done that, the previous owner of our lot paid the taxes, and we currently do. Is this true? Update: We have discovered that the new (4 year old) fence they installed does not exactly follow the previous fence's position. They actually moved the fence even further onto our property, skewing the whole line about a foot further our way... presumably to avoid (and include) at tree. They left other landscaping features, rocks, edging, plants in place showing how much the fence shifted our direction. Because the new fence is not on the same line...does that affect their claim? We first contacted them months ago about this, asking them to move or remove their fence. Since then, we have had no contact. They have made no move to formally claim the land. However, they seem to be preparing to put their house on the market. Should we wait until they do and then approach the listing agent/new buyers about the problem so they are informed of how much land they are actually buying/selling?
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If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor.
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I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.
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You can start here, with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which is aimed at children and the fact that they don't have adult common sense. The extent to which you are at risk depends on your jurisdiction. However, a fence does not necessarily protect you, because children can find a way to get around a fence, instead you need to eliminate the risk (so you also have to identify the risk). This article reviews some of the outcomes in attractive nuisance cases: there is no simple rule like "put up a fence and you're safe". Insurance is more predictable, as long as you read the fine print.
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It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report).
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I assume the lease does not clarify what the effective date for cancellation of utilities should be: when you "officially abandon" the property, or when the 30-day notice elapses. Who is responsible for the damage? At least under a principle of equity, the landlord is responsible for the damages. That is because, once you have returned the keys and officially abandoned the property, you have no control on how or whether utilities are consumed or (ab-)used thereafter. For instance, if sometime after the 30th of July a person breaks in that rental unit and extracts tremendous quantities of power or gas, that would lead to the inequitable outcome that the utilities company would charge you if your name is still in the utilities company's records. Similarly, it would be unreasonable and inequitable to expect you to essentially insure the landlord (by keeping your name on the utilities) despite his full awareness that you no longer are there.
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That is going to depend on the deed. In some cases a deed will include both surface rights and mineral rights. In other cases mineral rights are owned by some different entity, or by the state. If someone else owns the mineral rights, they can exploit those without the permission of the surface owner, and in some jurisdictions at lest they have a right to come onto the property and dig or drill there, even against the surface owner's wishes. In the US that varies by state, and also by the terms of the deed. If the surface owner also owners mineral rights, no one can dig ir drill from that land without permission, but I am not sure on the rules for 'slant digging".
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The Act requires that After the installation of a solar collector, a person owning or in control of another property shall not allow a tree or shrub to be placed or, if placed, to grow on that property so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area upon that solar collector surface at any one time between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., local standard time. The subsequent paragraph pertains to notice that can be given to property owners, and ultimately the tree would be deemable to be a public nuisance and subject to removal. However (25984): This chapter does not apply to any of the following: (a) A tree or shrub planted prior to the installation of a solar collector. (b) A tree planted, grown, or harvested on timberland as defined in Section 4526 or on land devoted to the production of commercial agricultural crops. (c) The replacement of a tree or shrub that had been growing prior to the installation of a solar collector and that, subsequent to the installation of the solar collector, dies, or is removed for the protection of public health, safety, or the environment. (d) A tree or shrub that is subject to a city or county ordinance. In other words, if you place a collector where an existing plant can eventually cause shade on the collector (it can be a short tree), you have no remedy. This follows the doctrine of coming to the nuisance.
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The Constitution said people have the Rights to Properties. No it doesn't. There is no such provision. The closest I am aware of is the so-called "takings clause" in the Fifth Amendment, which reads: Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. There has been a good deal of litigation over just when when a "taking" occurs under this provision. The classic and most obvious case is the use of eminent domain to aquire actual title to the property by a government (Federal, State, or local). This is always a takign, and compensation nis required. The more questionable cases have occurred when some law or regulation leaves the owner with title, but significantly restricts the uses to which the property may be put, particularly when the existing use becomes unlawful. Courts have ruled in different ways in such cases, but I think the current standard is that when a regulation removes all, or almost all, economic value from the property there has been a "regulatory taking" and compensation must be paid. But as far as I know, a tax on the property has never been considered to be a taking inn this sense.
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What might be illegal about a company using deceptive phone calls to establish a contract and seeking payments under it? I have recently been encountering an organisation whose mode of operation is to dupe members of venue staff into "agreeing" to have their venue advertised "online". Subsequently a bill arrives for this service. The initial conversation typically starts along the lines of "we advertise [xyz] online and we are ringing to update the details". The confirmation of details is interpreted by the seller to be a verbal contract. I have one instance of where "we advertise [xyz]" was a complete lie. Other cases are a bit greyer, for example one listing is there with details that appear to date back to the previous ownership of the venue (though I suspect that they never paid the bill when it arrived either). When the bill is ignored, they use a London-based harassment service to start sending official-looking letters. This service advertises that it will "send a carefully crafted series of letters prompting payment directly to the supplier". The letter states that the debtor should not reply to it and instead direct all correspondence to the creditor. I have personally taken some of the phone calls, from three different websites that are using this tactic. All are registered to the same individual. I even spoke to one guy who claimed to be a debt collector when I clearly recognised his voice as being from one of these websites. What aspects of this operation are illegal? Could any of these verbal agreements be enforceable?
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Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny.
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The first part is a matter of jurisdiction. I do not believe that simply using a cell phone with an Illinois number will give the Illinois courts jurisdiction, if you're standing in Wisconsin and calling a person in Wisconsin. Also, when you state that the call is recorded for ___ purposes, does that have any bearing on the actual use (e.g. they state it is for quality assurance, but instead they use it for marketing, legal, etc) The use can make a difference. There's an exemption in Illinois law if a business records if: the monitoring is used for the purpose of service quality control of marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation, the education or training of employees or contractors engaged in marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation, or internal research related to marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation If they do not use it for these purposes, presumably the exemption would not apply. In addition: No communication or conversation or any part, portion, or aspect of the communication or conversation made, acquired, or obtained, directly or indirectly, under this exemption (j), may be, directly or indirectly, furnished to any law enforcement officer, agency, or official for any purpose or used in any inquiry or investigation, or used, directly or indirectly, in any administrative, judicial, or other proceeding, or divulged to any third party.
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I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.
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I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.
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It is not legal in the case of a company. They must also accept communications by post. In the UK, "a company must at all times have a registered office to which all communications and notices may be addressed." (s 86, Companies Act 2006). It must display the address of its registered office on its website, business letters, and order forms (r 25, Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015). It must also disclose the address to you if you ask for it in writing (r 27). A failure to do either of these is a criminal offence (r 28). As a practical matter you can also look up the address yourself on the Companies House register if you know the name or registered number of the company. The company must provide you with its registered name on all forms of business correspondence (r 24) (this is a wider definition than that for disclosure of its registered office address). A company cannot rely on the fact that the registered office address it has given to Companies House is out of date. It must continue to accept communications at any address on the register for 14 days after it notifies Companies House of any change. (s 87, Companies Act 2006).
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I don't know too much about Mauritian contract law, but I'd assume you'd have to identify some legal obligation that the school breached. Here, the school offered you a full ride in its electrical engineering program, and has delivered on its promise. The fact that you don't like the program anymore probably doesn't make then liable for anything. In terms of false advertising, it's hard to say anything without seeing their advertisements.
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BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others.
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Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.
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Practicing Law without a License over the Internet John Smith is a US citizen who is ordinarily a resident of California who is not and never has been admitted to the bar in any jurisdiction. He is travelling in the UK, and gives legal advice on British law over the Internet to Jane Doe, another US citizen, who is in California. Under the Legal Services Act 2007, giving legal advice is not a reserved activity and thus no crime is committed by Smith in the UK. In California, however, practicing law without a license is an offence under sections 6125-6133 of the California Business and Professions Code. The relevant statute states: No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar. Smith is not physically in California. However, does giving advice over the Internet to a person in California amount to being punishable under this statute? Furthermore, do any of the following variations, or combinations thereof, substantially change the answer? Smith gives legal advice on California law, not British law. As a variation on this, Smith gives legal advice on California law to Doe, who is in Nevada, not California. Smith is a US citizen who is ordinarily a resident of Massachusetts, and has never been to California. Smith uses a different method of communication (e.g. a phone). I suggest California as a jurisdiction for purely arbitrary reasons; if a different state is easier to answer for (or is unusual compared to the rest of the US), that would also be interesting to know.
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It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.
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Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.
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For state courts, it depends on the state. Pro hac vice appearances like this are probably most common in New York, in relation to international commercial disputes. It is also common for foreign attorneys to take the New York bar exam - several thousand people do that each year - in which case they have a springboard to appear pro hac vice in other states. The NY exam is well-understood in this way, in terms of training and support that might be offered in the country of origin. But one-off appearances, particularly by in-house counsel, also take place routinely. Many states, including California, also have a category of "foreign legal consultant", someone who is retained to advise on the law of the specific foreign jurisdiction in question, but who isn't allowed to appear in court. In the current version of the California Rules of Court, pro hac vice is covered in Rule 9.40. On its face, this rule only applies to attorneys who are "eligible to practice before the bar of any United States court or the highest court in any state, territory, or insular possession of the United States". There is a broad exception in 9.40(h), This rule does not preclude the Supreme Court or a Court of Appeal from permitting argument in a particular case from a person who is not a licensee of the State Bar, but who is licensed to practice in another jurisdiction and who possesses special expertise in the particular field affected by the proceeding. "Another jurisdiction" is not facially limited to U.S jurisdictions, so it may be that the higher state courts could admit a foreign attorney. I do not know of an example either way. In general, California's licensing requirements for lawyers have often been strictly interpreted. The State Bar Act (Business and Professions Code, 6000-6243) says that: No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State Bar. An attorney appearing pro hac vice is temporarily registered with the State Bar once their application has been approved by the court. This general licensing regime, which aims to protect the public against dishonest or incompetent practitioners, has been held (e.g. in Birbrower v. Superior Court 17 Cal. 4th 119 (1998)) to imply a strong public policy favoring the practice of law in California by licensed State Bar members. Occasional admission pro hac vice does not extend to doing regular legal work of other kinds, including giving legal advice, preparing documents, and so on - and certainly not to maintaining a permanent physical office in California, or advertising to the public. If you would like to do those things then the state would like you to take their own bar exam, in which case (if you pass!) you are in the same situation as any other California lawyer. There is a fairly recent exception for international commercial arbitration (not applicable to normal arbitration about things like disputes over personal property). The Code of Civil Procedure, 1297.185, now says that if you are a member of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted or otherwise authorized to practice as attorneys or counselors at law or the equivalent, and meet various other conditions, then you can participate in arbitration work on a "fly in, fly out" (FIFO) basis. You don't need to register or pay a fee. (But, per 1297.187, you still need pro hac vice permission to appear as counsel in an actual court.) Additionally, if you FIFO, the Federal government will have visa requirements at the point you try to FI.
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In California, the small claims court has jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000. In order to have personal jurisdiction over him: He must have a summons and complaint hand delivered to him (or to certain other people such as an adult who lives in his household, or to his secretary if he has one). This is called "service of process" and there are professionals called "process servers" who can do this for you in most cities. The service of process can take place anywhere in the world and still be valid. The summons and complaint must be hand delivered by a person over the age of eighteen who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not your attorney. The events that form the basis of the lawsuit must have happened in California, not merely the United States (long arm personal jurisdiction), or he must have the summons and complaint personally hand delivered to him in the State of California (tag jurisdiction). If you win, either by default if he fails to respond by the deadline, or following a trial, you will get a piece of paper called a judgment that legally determines that he owes you $X, which you must then enforce. A judgment can be enforced, for example, by garnishing his bank accounts, garnishing monies due to him from an employer or from a sole proprietorship he operates, seizing tangible personal property that he owns with the assistance of a sheriff, or putting a lien on real estate he owns. A judgment from a California small claims court can only be enforced against assets in California. There is a relatively simple process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from any other U.S. state. There is a relatively difficult and expensive process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from England that only sometimes works because some aspects of the U.S. civil court system (like punitive damages) are considered to be against public policy in England and are thus not enforceable there. You cannot have someone arrested for failure to pay a civil judgment. Enforcing the judgment is likely to be much more difficult than getting the judgment in your case. It is also possible to make a criminal complaint if the acts genuinely constitute theft. If a prosecutor finds that there is probable cause to back up your claim, the prosecutor could obtain an arrest warrant from the court in the place where the theft took place and that could be served within California when the individual is present in California (i.e., he could be arrested in California, after which the criminal justice process would proceed). Generally, to constitute theft, it must be intentional and must not be a mere breach of an agreement, in which case it is a breach of contract rather than theft. Any theft small enough to be addressed in small claims court would probably not be considered serious enough for the government to request extradition from the U.K. for, a step usually reserved for serious felonies, but if extradiction was sought from the U.K., the process on the U.K. side is described here. Any extradiction request would be handled by the prosecutor's office and law enforcement, in cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies.
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"Legal requirement" can and in this case simply means "it's what is required in order for us to be reasonably able to offer you this service", noting that it would be unreasonable for such a dangerous business to operate, when one moron slipping and suing them could put them out of business. It's a little surprising that you've never had to sign a waiver before, but there are quite a number of similar waivers out there, such as REI (Seattle), The Edge (Vt), Croc Center (Coeur d'Alene), YMCA (MI) and U. Nebraska. They all have in common the requirement of a signature (indicating that you've waived your right to sue them), birth date, date of signature. This is the bare minimum that's required to have a valid waiver, and more info would be better (to uniquely identify the customer out of the 1000 John Smith's in the state and 500,000 in the US). If you break yourself and try to sue, they will trot out the waiver to put an end to the suit. Name, address, phone number and birth date do a long ways towards proving that the person who signed the waiver is indeed you.
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This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist.
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The answer from @user6726 is a good one. But, I'd like to add to it by pointing out that the body of law applicable to an individual is usually much, much smaller than the entire body of law. I'm a lawyer who has been in private practice for almost 25 years with an extremely diverse practice compared to the average lawyer, and I've never even looked at perhaps 80% of the laws on the books in the states where I practice, and even less elsewhere. By statutory and regulatory volume, the vast majority of statutory and regulatory law is applicable to either the internal operations of government, or to the way in which regulated industries and business transactions are conducted. And, it is customary for people in situations in all of those situations to have professional intermediaries such as lawyers, realtors, brokers, architects, general contractors, accountants, tax preparers, and consultants to assist them in complying. Some of the more technical areas encountered by average people (e.g. traffic laws) are areas in which training is mandated before you can get a driver's license. Many other areas of occupational and industry regulations are similarly distinguished by having a licensing requirement to make sure that everyone involved knows that a new body of law applies to them. You only need to know about nuclear power plant regulations, for example, if you build a nuclear power plant and will soon learn if you try to do so that you need a license to do that. Even within areas of law that have broad applicability like tax law and criminal law, a lot of the law has only narrow application. For example, most people don't need to know the rules for determining the taxable income of a life insurance company, or the criminal laws pertaining to people who have security clearances to review top secret national security information. The body of "private law" governing the rights of individuals vis-a-vis other private individuals, and of criminal law that an ordinary person is in a position to violate, is very modest. And much of the law in this area is devoted to determining how serious an offense is and what the penalty should be, and what law enforcement is allowed to do in order to investigate these violations, and not to what is legal and illegal in some regard. For example, intentionally, recklessly or negligently offensively touching or causing injury to someone else's property or person, is almost always either a crime and/or a civil wrong called a tort for which you can be sued. Some versions of this conduct are more serious (e.g. rape or murder), some are less serious (e.g. pinching someone on Saint Patrick's Day for not wearing green). But the overriding concept, once you strip away the details, is pretty simple. Likewise, damaging or taking property that isn't yours, intentionally, recklessly or negligently, is almost always either a crime and/or a civil wrong called a tort for which you can be sued. Add the notion that you have to honor your promises in most circumstances and shouldn't lie or deceive in most circumstances, you have to follow authoritative signs and directions from legal authorities, and you have to figure out if you owe income taxes or not each year with professional help, if necessary, and you are well on your way to knowing what you need to know to obey the law. Even within "private law" there are lots of areas like patent law, product liability law, and oil and gas property rights, that the average person doesn't need to know. Knowing that if you are injured by someone else you should think about talking to a lawyer is usually good enough. These bare bones may prevent you from doing things that are legal close to the boundaries of what is allowed sometimes, but having standards higher than the bare legal minimum is rarely a deep impediment to living a decent life. It should also be enough to let you have some intuition that you are in a gray area and need to confer if you aren't sure if something is illegal or not. There are more complicated areas that many average individuals do have to deal with to some extent. The law governing privacy, copyright and speech comes to mind, for example. But, you can go a very long way on some very basic principles. Most law that applies to ordinary people flows from simple moral intuition.
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According to Florida law 454.23: Any person not licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in this state who practices law in this state or holds himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice law in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualified, or recognized by law as qualified, to practice law in this state, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. What you propose therefore seems to be a felony. And according to a 2015 survey from the American Bar Association, Florida had the highest budget in the nation for prosecuting unauthorized practice of law - $1.8 million. So this seems like a very bad idea.
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General bankruptcy inquiry in Germany A person lives in Germany and owns a business which is in debt. They are afraid they will lose their child and be sent to "debt jail". Is this a real possibility? Is there any liability protection between an individual and their business in Germany?
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As in most of the world, there is a BIG difference between a person running a business and a person owning a company which runs a business. In the first case, the person is liable for all the debts of the business, in the second case, providing they have fulfilled the legal duties as am owner/director (as applicable) they are not liable for the debts of the company. One of those legal duties is to stop racking up debts you can't pay. In either case, your friend needs professional advice (legal and/or accounting) NOW! A person who is insolvent (cannot pay their debts as and when they fall due) can seek protection from their creditors through bankruptcy. German bankruptcy law, by most standards, is brutal but not so brutal as to take away parenting rights or put the person in jail.
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germany German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits. You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc. Some places in Germany differentiate their services between "locals" and "others", for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be "tourists" 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a "the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free" approach. Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy.
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You can search for study programs via Hochschulkompass. There’s essentially just the Bachelor of Laws attainable at the Fernuniversität in Hagen. You can also do the First Legal Examination there, but if you really wanna become a Volljurist, i.e. a judge or an attorney, you will inevitably have to come to Germany, because the Referendariat can only be done here. Note, AFAIK it is not necessary to be an EU citizen to study, but you have to be a German to do any of the typical legal professions here, e.g. being appointed as a judge → § 9 no. 1 DRiG. Naturalization is an entirely different issue, but I’ll rather mention that right away.
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As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.
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The danger is not “piercing the corporate veil” (which basically removes your personal protection against problems that the company might have), but being accused of tax evasion, which the director of the company is fully responsible for. I suggest you read your tax laws very, very, very carefully or better yet, ask an accountant. An additional risk is that once the inland revenue has their eye on you, they will handle you extra carefully. Not something you want.
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Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.
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switzerland "Gutgläubiger Erwerb gestohlener Dinge" (buying of stolen goods in good faith) is a big topic in law. Different jurisdictions handle it differently, but most European (civil law) systems have some kind of rule that accept the ownership of a buyer in such a case. Here is a good article that compares different jurisdictions on exactly such an issue. Luxury watches are a kind of art. According to Swiss law (Art 934 ZGB), the item must be returned when discovered within 5 years of the theft. However, the rightful owner must pay for any expenses you had. Since the theft was more than 5 years ago, the watch is, in my opinion, rightfully yours. Since Blancpain is in Switzerland, they are obviously bound to Swiss law. Also, they are not the police, so they cannot seize an item. They can only safekeep it and report to the authorities. I would also contact a lawyer for help. It seems to me like a case you should win.
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The registration office does not have access to your GEZ bill. They cannot deny you deregistration, but also cannot tell you whether your debts are settled. You might prefer to clarify this matter with the GEZ in writing rather than over phone, since you can more easily machine-translate an email or letter.
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Can I steal Elon's Tesla? My question is pretty simple: if I somehow retrieved the Tesla sent into orbit by SpaceX earlier this week, could I keep it? Why or why not? I'm specifically wondering if there are any laws pertaining to ownership/theft of items left unmanned out in space, either in the form of international treaties the US recognizes, or laws the US would enforce against its own citizens, as I do live there.
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If a private citizen or a company disposes of a piece of property with no expectation of its return, then it can be collected by another person without hindrance. It is considered "abandoned" per UNITED STATES v. REDMON. Thus, the intent to relinquish ownership and abandon trash is tantamount to “throwing away” a subjective expectation of privacy in it that society accepts as objectively reasonable. In short, when it comes to abandoned property, “I know it when I see it,” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (identifying what constitutes “obscene” material), and when the police see abandoned garbage which has been left unsecured in its usual place and at its usual time for collection, it is theirs for the taking.. Since Musk has stated that there is no reasonable possibility of its return and since he is no longer in communication with it, it can be considered (for all intents and purposes) to be abandoned garbage unlike, for example a privately owned orbiter or a communication satellite. "We estimate it'll be in that orbit for several hundred million years, maybe in excess of a billion years," Musk said before launch. Tuesday night, he tweeted: "Third burn successful. Exceeded Mars orbit and kept going to the Asteroid Belt." SpaceX's Tesla's out-of-this-world view
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Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is.
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If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime.
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In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.
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The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
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You're completely misreading the goals and purpose of the Export Controls Office - Overview. They regulate the transfer of US regulated information and technology, commodities, and software in the interest of national security and economic growth. Transfer and export are not the same as the use of technology that personal devices contain. The simplest thing to do is simply call the Export Controls Office, and they will explain the difference, and tell what you need to do and what is not required of you when traveling. Some countries do prevent the use of some personal tech or Apps, i.e. Russia and Signal, the encrypted phone app; but that has nothing to do with UC.
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Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.
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From what I can see on the USPTO registry, "tweet" is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate.
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Would it be illegal for Donald Trump to short twitter, then leave the platform? Presumably if Trump were to stop tweeting and move to a different social media platform (e.g., Instagram), Twitter's value would decrease significantly (source estimating Trump's value to Twitter). Would it be illegal for him to short Twitter stock and then make this switch? If so, why?
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The President wouldn't be in breach of Insider Trading Laws (Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act) since he has no information resulting from a position of trust within Twitter (or as a trusted provider of services) and no ability to depress their stocks through intentionally fraudulent practices. [O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information “that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.” The key word here is "insider". The President is not an insider, he's merely the user of a service. He certainly has material information, but not gleaned from a position of confidence or trust. anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed. That being said, it's arguable (and I'm reasonably sure his political opponents would argue it until the cows come home) that his shorting their shares would be a material violation of the STOCK Act, specifically section 6 which requires the President to have disclosed his holdings of shorted stock to the public. It's also pretty arguable that his popularity on Twitter is a direct result of his office as President, and hence making money by publicly and messily leaving their service will result in a breach of accepted ethical standards and potential impeachment even if no specific law has been broken.
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Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.
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However, what would be the actual, concrete events that must happen for [common carrier classification] to happen? Congress would have to pass such laws, since social media platforms are currently covered by a different set of rules. In particular, the Telecommunication Act's concept of “information services” is a far better fit for social media websites than the “common carrier” concept. If the FCC were to unilaterally reclassify social media platforms as common carriers, that would be a difficult to defend position. It is also likely that other laws that require some content filtering would need to be updated or removed. Can someone who has been extensively deplatformed […] file a lawsuit arguing that social media platforms are important enough such that they must be regulated as common carriers. And then the Supreme court basically legislates from the bench a la Obergefell? Congress has already provided rules for the regulation of social media platforms. A lawsuit would have to show that these laws are unconstitutional. The existing rules on social media regulation will not be unconstitutional merely because of the scale and importance of those platforms. A free speech argument will not automatically work, (a) because the deplatformed person's free speech rights must be weighed against the platform's free speech rights, and (b) because the first amendment is a defensive right against the government, not against private entities such as a social media platform. Quite specifically, the amendment only says that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech”, but it does not prevent private entities from making rules about how their services may be used.
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Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy).
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The additional protections for social-media platforms comes from Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, not from the First Amendment. Section 230 basically provides immunity from defamation and other kinds of liability. Generally speaking, it applies only to platforms, i.e., companies providing a service for other people to create and post content. This goes beyond social-media companies to include message boards, blogging platforms, dating websites, etc. Newspapers generally do not enjoy this protection because the information that they post on their websites is information that they have generated themselves.
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Let’s say I go to a cash machine, ask for £100, and the machine gives me £10,000. I use my banking app and see that £100 left my account, not £10,000. At this point I haven’t done anything illegal. If I asked for another £100 and got £10,000 again, that might be illegal. But the extra £9,900 are not mine. They are the bank’s money. If I try to keep it, that is simply theft.
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If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.
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You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.
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making a contract that includes video licence The best way to sign a contract online with international signers is to go with DocuSign or Adobe Sign being the witness to the contract signing. if the contract is about granting licence for a video, than the video must be referenced unambiguously within the contract. And this is where the problems arise. Unfortunately, electronic signature providers do not offer functionality of placing videos inside the contract. They do not offer anything, but the most simple text documents and images. basically, if it can't be printed, you can't place it in the contract. That includes zip files. How do you make a contract including video license permission then? Adding a link of the video is a terrible idea, because web is dynamic, and the content to which the video is pointing may easily change over time.
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If you are concerned with a digital thing being verifiable as exactly the same at some later time you ought to use a hash. A hash function takes some input bits like say a digital video and produces output bits often represented as hexadecimals. For any particular input it will always have the same output, but it is not reasonable for more than one input to have the same output. All modern computers have standard software to do this and I'm sure many websites offer it as a free service.
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Probably not Once you and the store have entered into a contract the price in that contract is determinative. However, most online stores' terms are very clear there is no contract when you place your order or when you get their automated reply; the contract comes into existence later when they do something. For example: With respect to products sold by Amazon AU, your order is an offer to us for you to buy the product(s) in your order. ... The Order Confirmation is acknowledgement that we have received your order, and does not confirm our acceptance of your offer to buy the product(s) ordered. We only accept your offer, and conclude the contract of sale for a product ordered by you, when we dispatch the product(s) to you and send e-mail or post a message on the Message Centre of the website confirming that we've dispatched the product to you (the "Dispatch Confirmation"). ... Now, even without these terms, it's unlikely that your offer and the company's automated response created a binding contract because the company (as in, an actual person acting for the company) did not consent to the formation of the contract. Consent is fundamental: see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?. What you received was an "order confirmation" - a reiteration of your offer to the company, not an acceptance of your order. Consumer protection Most jurisdictions have consumer protection laws that make it illegal to display an incorrect price. However, in most, that does not oblige the retailer to honour the price, it just exposes them to fines from the regulator.
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Providing they meet the basic requirements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) then they are binding contracts. Consideration is not an issue: the site provides the content, the user provides eyeballs on it. Consent is the major stumbling block. Online Terms of Service are either presented as browsewrap or clickwrap or sign-up wrap. A browsewrap provides notice of the terms of service but there is no specific user assent to them. A clickwrap requires the user to check a box specifically about agreeing to the terms (with or without user registration). A sign-up wrap presents user registration with a "Sign up" and provides notice to the terms at the point of service but doesn't have a check button specifically for the terms. As an example, Stack Exchange provides two types of wrap. For the casual user, there is a Legal link at the bottom of the page - a browsewrap. If you sign-up, you go to a page that says "By clicking "Sign up", you agree to our terms of service, ..." - a sign-up wrap. Whether a Terms of Service is an enforcable contract depends on whether the user provided notice, whether the user gave consent and whether enforcing the agreement is conscionable. Clickwraps and sign-up wraps have the advantage over browsewraps in the first two of these. Assuming that the contract terms are unremarkable (i.e. they are within the range of "normal" for that type of contract) a clickwrap will normally create an enforcable contract - Forrest v Verizon and Motise v America Online being the relevant case law. Browsewraps are more problematic: Specht v Netscape said no contract but where the browsewrap is shown prominently and repeatedly they can form an enforceable contract - Hubbert v Dell and Cairo v CrossMedia Services. Zaltz v Jdate was a sign-up wrap and did create an enforceable contract. All of these turn on the facts of how the information was was presented to the user. For example, in Meyer v Kalanick the Second Circuit said: Where there is no evidence that the offeree had actual notice of the terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.[sic] So, in general, Terms of Service are enforcable as a contract if a reasonably prudent user could, on inquiry (e.g. by clicking a link), make themselves aware of the terms. This also explains why skrinkwraps (when software came on actual physical media in a shrink-wrapped box with the terms inside) were not enforcable - a reasonably prudent user could not inform themselves of the terms without unwrapping a product they didn't yet own.
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There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.
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What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? what can the judge do to stop this paradox? I will assume that by "copying the signature" you mean "without the person's consent". In that case, the contract is void and consequently unenforceable. However, it would need to be proved that the person whose signature was unlawfully used did not intend to be a party to that contract. For a contract to be valid, the parties must have knowingly and willfully entered it, whether it is via a document or through their subsequent conduct/actions. False pretenses, identity theft, and akin offenses preclude these two essential requirements of any contract. Moreover, if the person who forged the signature is a party to the contract, then that unlawful act clearly contradicts the prerequisite "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that is presumed in contracts. The remedies or actionability available to a person whose signature has been forged depend on the laws of each jurisdiction.
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Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law.
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You cannot In a conflict between written and oral terms of a contract, the written terms prevail. In any event, by you utterance you have not accepted the contract; you have made a counter-offer which the other party has not accepted and have then gone on to accept their original offer. You would need the written agreement of the other party that they accept your terms and that they understand that clicking the “I accept” is not an acceptance of their terms but merely a means of completing the technical procedure.
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No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.
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What happens if I don't pay a speeding ticket from New Mexico? What happens if I don't pay a speeding ticket and am a foreigner? I recently found out, since it is not my native language, that it wasn't just a warning - it was actually a ticket.
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The exact situation depends on where you are. If you are in Washington state, what you get (but did not realize) is a notice to appear in court. By not paying the fine or showing up to court, you could be subject to RCW 46.64.025, so that the department of licensing is notified. You have 15 days to respond to the notice. We assume that you are a resident, because if you are a non-resident (and not resident of another state with a reciprocal agreement), they would have required you to pay a bond at the time of the ticket (though that isn't possible with automated infraction-detection). When the Dept. of Licensing gets the notice of the unpaid ticket, they may suspend or revoke your license. At this point, you will have received notice that your license was suspended (unless you changed your address and mail isn't forwarded, in which case you have a different problem, that you're supposed to apprise DOL of your current address, and didn't do so). At that point (after they send the letter), you have 15 days to respond. One response is to pay the ticket plus the added fines, or, you can request an administrative review (to appeal the suspension). The point of going to court to plead your case would presumably be to modify the judgment against you, for instance to reduce or eliminate the added fine. You would then need to give a good reason for not being punished: RCW 46.64.025 already has you covered, because the suspension process starts with willfully failing to appear. You would then need to show that your failure to appear was not willful. It does not legally matter whether you are a foreigner or have problems understanding the language. Speeding tickets usually say pretty clearly that you must pay the ticket within a specified time frame, or appear in court, but people don't always read tickets. It is entirely plausible that one's grasp of the language is low enough that there really was a misunderstanding. If you can provide credible evidence that your failure was not willful, by law you would only be liable for the ticket. In other states and countries, the situation could be somewhat or quite different (e.g. Norwegian traffic laws are stricter). In New Mexico, it is more serious to fail to appear. NM Statute 66-8-126 states that "It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued". Your license can/will be suspended (it is not clear whether suspension is automatic), but additionally since failure to appear is a misdemeanor, you can be arrested. Unlike Washington law, there is no willfullness requirement for such a penalty. Given the criminal nature of failure to appear, a traffic attorney would need to suggest an appropriate belated response.
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"I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true.
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This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.
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Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.
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england-and-wales What would realistically happen to this person, legally speaking? Nothing The most common speeding offence is at section 89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 A person who drives a motor vehicle on a road at a speed exceeding a limit imposed by or under any enactment to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence. And, section 1(1)(c) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 requires a Notice of Intended Prosecution (NIP) be served to the car’s registered keeper within 14 days of the offence, but as the car had false plates there is no way to identify who this was. If that 14 day deadline is not met, then the driver cannot be prosecuted regardless of any confession.
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When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well.
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at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood.
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What could be the consequences of this wedding? They would be married For example, if they break up and end their PACS in France, would they still be officially married in the USA? Yes, and also in France. And if after that they marry other partners, could this be a problem for them when applying for an American visa? Yes, bigamy is illegal in both the USA and France. Does France and the USA exchange information on wedding of foreign citizens on their soil? Don't know, probably not. Could they even end up being officially married in France even without doing any paperwork themselves? Most definitely. France recognises US marriages so they would be married in France (and the U.K., and Australia, and Germany, and ...). This is true even if the French government doesn't know they are married.
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How can I make sure that a house is clear of workmen's liens? Is there a legal process I can undertake (like advertising in the paper) to clear any workmen's liens on a house that I am planning to buy? In other words, the situation I am trying to avoid is buying the house, then some plumber showing up a year later claiming that he did work on the house and he never got paid. Obviously the debt belongs to the previous owner, not me, so I assume the workman loses his chance to attach the property at some point. What point is that?
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Short Answer Something must be filed within 90 days of the last work done on the property (in your state, there is minor variation in state law from state to state on the exact deadlines, but these are typical for the U.S.). If no work is done on the property after closing and nothing is recorded by a lien claimant by then, you are in the clear after three months. Filings by the current owner can shorten the deadlines as explained below, but you can never know if there was some contractor that the seller didn't mention. In practice, however, a seller will usually sign an affidavit at closing that there is no unpaid work outstanding, and in reliance upon that affidavit the title insurance company will issue a title insurance policy under which it promises to pay any liens that are filed after closing. If a lien is filed, the title insurance company will sue the seller for fraud and breach of contract damages, unless the lien filing was frivolous, in which case the title insurance company will pay for the lawsuit to remove the frivolous lien (and sue the person who filed it for slander of title). In practice, title insurance companies almost never pay claims because they review the public records for lien filings before closing and are ruthless about suing sellers who mislead them. Most of the cost of a title insurance policy goes towards this due diligence prior to closing. Long Answer The statutory basis of the short answer is as follows: A lien under M.G.L. c. 254 Sections 2 and 4 is dissolved unless the person claiming the lien shall record a statement signed under the penalties of perjury giving an account of the amounts due to them. The notice of contract must be recorded not later than the earliest of: – 60 days after filing or recording a notice of completion; – 90 days after filing or recording of a notice of termination; – 90 days after the contractor, subcontractor, or supplier last performed labor or provided materials. See M.G.L. c. 254 Sections. 2 and 4. In addition to filing the notice of contract, one must serve the Notice of Contract upon the owner to create a mechanic’s lien. See Ouellet v. Armstrong, 18 Mass L. Rep. 100 (2004)(failure to provide actual notice of the recording of the notice of contract is fatal to a mechanic’s lien claim). M.G.L. c. 254 Sec. 8 provided that a contractor’s, subcontractor’s or supplier’s lien will be dissolved unless the party claiming the lien records the sworn statement of account not later than the earliest of: – 90 days after filing or recording a notice of completion; – 120 days after filing or recording of a notice of termination; – 120 days after the contractor, subcontractor, or supplier last performed labor or provided materials. See M.G.L. c. 254 Sec. 8. After the statement of account is recorded, the general contractor must file a civil action in the appropriate county within 90 days of filing the statement of account and record the complaint in the registry in the county in which the land is located. See M.G.L. c. 254 Sections 5 and 11.
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You bought the item following the instructions of the landlords, and they are paying for the item (specifically, reimbursement). So, you were acting as an agent for the landlords, and the item is theirs. Of course, you could withhold it until you get paid (unless your agreement specified otherwise).
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To put it as nicely as possible, you're not being very smart by threatening to make the house guest's predicament the worst mistake they ever made. Drawing up a notarized contract with a financial penalty is ludicrous and likely simply illegal in terms of contracting for something that is against the law. Beyond that, any threats you make to against house guest could be grounds for them to file a civil suit against you, either for eviction or physical harm, and you'll end up in court rather than simply getting the house guest to leave. An Unlawful Detainer applies if there is verbal or written lease, and as such you would have to go through the formal eviction process. But if this is a simple house guest issue, with no lease or rental agreement in the past, and they are not a family member with some legal right to be in the house, law enforcement is the way to deal with it. It's very simple: set a move out date and say you will call the police or county sheriff if they don't move out on that date. If they don't leave and you do call the police or sheriff, simply say you have a house guest who won't leave, i.e. a trespasser. Law enforcement will come out and you will explain the story; they will likely make the determination that you are the property owner and the guest is indeed not welcome. Law enforcement will tell the guest to leave or be arrested, as per Florida Law - Chapter 810. You can call the police or county sheriff ahead of the move out date and determine the appropriate laws; and get advice on what you might need to do on the actual move out day. If the house guest has property, law enforcement will stand by at that time while they retrieve their property, or make arrangements for them get it at a later date, with or without law enforcement.
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Don’t ignore the debt collects In most jurisdictions, your failure to pay can and will be recorded on your credit history. This may affect your ability to obtain finance or the rate you pay for it. For credit reporting, there is no need for the creditor to prove the debt before doing this. For example. In general, you are not legally allowed to default on a contractual obligation (i.e. not pay the bill) even if the other party has defaulted on theirs (i.e. failed to complete the work). It is not clear that you have explained to the contractor that you are withholding the remaining payment until they have fixed the alleged defects or if you have just not paid the money. When you have a contract dispute you need to be clear and take active steps to resolve it. Perhaps head office thinks all these items have been resolved. Perhaps you think they are defects or omissions but they are actually within normal tolerances or are exactly what you contracted for. Unless you talk to them, you can’t resolve it. When you have set out the disputed items, given them a time to fix them, told them you will pay when they are fixed, and possibly set out an alternative method of resolution (like you accepting the defects for a 5% discount) then you have a bona fide dispute. At that point you can tell the debt collector this and they must stop pressing you and remove your name from the credit reports.
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There are two very important points you should keep in mind here: You are not under any obligation whatsoever to investigate the owner of a vehicle parked on your property. You have full rights to tow any unauthorized vehicle off of your property. So, by far the easiest thing for you to do is to shift all responsibility off of yourself. Make it somebody else's problem. Try the police first. The safest thing you can do is simply dial 911 (or try to find a non-emergency number if you live in a major city, but Nebraska suggests just calling 911 directly) and report the abandoned vehicles to police. Their process for declaring a vehicle abandoned can take a bit longer (takes seven days in Nebraska). Essentially they'll document the vehicles' location and tag them, and probably run the license plates (if they come back stolen, they'll be towed by law enforcement immediately). Then they'll come back seven days later and, if the vehicles are still there, have them towed as abandoned vehicles. Law enforcement will sometimes only respond to private parking complaints that are actually on paved surfaces, and it sounds like these vehicles are just parked out in the middle of a field somewhere, so they may not actually care. But it doesn't hurt to check. If that fails, just have it towed. If law enforcement says it's ok or doesn't care about the vehicles, the next easiest thing for you to do is to call around to different tow companies, and see if one will tow it off your property for free in hopes of recovering tow costs and other fees from the actual owner of the vehicle, or through sale of the vehicle if it's never claimed. Let them do all the research and contact the owner, or report the vehicle to the police if necessary. You don't need to do any of the work yourself. Sure that doesn't get you any money, but any scenario that gets you money will be a very long process and it sounds like you just want the vehicles gone. You do not own the vehicles. The previous owner saying you bought the vehicles with the land is blatantly wrong. Ignore him, completely. By that logic, someone buying an apartment complex would subsequently take ownership of all vehicles on its private parking lot. That's not how vehicle ownership works in any state, and you do not own the vehicles, nor do you have any right to dispose of them. Even if the vehicle is abandoned, there is still a legal process that must be followed to claim ownership of an abandoned vehicle with the state. Unless you really want to take ownership of the vehicle, those processes are probably way more time and effort than you're willing to expend (usually resulting in years of waiting). Taking it to a scrap yard could be very bad for you. Since you do not have ownership of the vehicles, you definitely should not take them to a scrap yard. Destroying the vehicles without giving a person the chance to come claim the vehicles could get you into a lot of trouble. You're basically destroying someone else's property. If the person came back looking and found out you destroyed them, they may even be able to press charges against you, the scrap yard, or a combination of both (a Class IV felony in Nebraska, since vehicles are worth more than $1500). As an aside, any legitimate and reputable scrap yard should outright refuse to destroy the vehicles for you, because you won't be able to provide them with any documents that verify your ownership of the vehicles. Make sure you don't destroy the vehicles in any other way, though. Again, shift the responsibility. Don't put yourself into situations if you don't have to. Law enforcement and tow companies deal with this stuff every single day, and are much more qualified to handle this situation in a legal way than you are. Let them take all the responsibility off of you, and don't worry about doing anything yourself. It will make sure you don't do anything illegal, and thus don't open yourself up to repercussions later on down the line.
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Every lot on the subdivision is and always will be acquired “through the Developer” Unless the developer still owns it. Somebody is the heir or assignee of the Developer - that’s who you need to seek approval from. Even if the Developer was at some point a company that got liquidated, the right of being the Developer would transfer to the creditors of that company.
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IANAL. I am not your lawyer. The following is not legal advice. The insurance company, regardless of how you feel about their process, has it appears, to have discharged their duties, namely they have paid out two separate claims. The personal property claim has been paid to the estate as the beneficiary, while the property claim has been paid out with the mortgage company as the beneficiary. The mortgage company seems, to me (disclaimer, I work at a financial institution, albeit in an IT role), to also be reasonable. Six months is an extremely long time without contact or payment (where I work, the loss mitigation department is sent all loans that are 3 months delinquent); the fact that you, the estate executor were not aware of the passing of the debtor is of no consequence. Also, many loans contain clauses that allow the lender to accelerate the loan (i.e. demand "immediate" payment of the whole outstanding balance). So they've started foreclosure proceedings, probably about 3 months ago. As for the foreclosure proceedings: The received $45,000 will be applied to the loan. The property (not just the house, but the entire lot) will be sold at public auction, as all foreclosed houses are in the state of New York. Proceeds from the sale of the house shall be applied to paying off the loan. If the proceeds exceed the outstanding mortgage amount, the estate will be sent the remaining proceeds. If the proceeds are less than the remaining amount, the estate is retains (i.e. owes) the remaining debt. EDIT: As an example of why the noting of jurisdiction is important on this stack-exchange, Nate Eldredge has informed me that in New York, it is possible for a judge to reduce the "remaining debt" of the estate by declaring that the sold house had a higher "fair market value" than it sold for.
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If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back.
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UK: If brother acts as guarantor on mortgage, is he no longer classed as first time buyer? If my brother acts as guarantor for my mortgage, but does not put his name on the house deeds, would he no longer be classed as a first-time-buyer? This is important because it makes a difference to whether or not he pays stamp duty when he buys his own house.
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According to https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/blog/stamp-duty-for-first-time-buyers-your-questions-answered: To be classified as a first-time buyer you must never have owned a residential property in the UK or abroad. This includes freeholds and interests in leaseholds. Being a guarantor on a mortgage is not "owning a property", having your name on the deeds at the Land Registry is. However, your brother should get his own solicitor (the mortgage company may insist on this), who can confirm my understanding is correct. More importantly, the solicitor can explain the risks of being a guarantor to him - he may decide to back out. (Having said which, I acted as guarantor for my son when he rented as a student.)
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Let's analyse the landlord's claims: You have an assured shorthold tenancy agreement. The fact that there isn't a written contract doesn't change this as a verbal agreement is legally binding. That's true. A tenancy exists even if this was never written down, and it's an AST by default if the requirements for being one are met. Payment of rent constitutes acceptance of these terms. Payment of rent by the tenant, and its acceptance by the landlord, is sufficient for a tenancy to be regarded as existing. The tenancy can only be terminated early from the permission of the landlord. That's rubbish. A tenant can always end a tenancy, but there may be restrictions. In particular, a tenant cannot end a tenancy before the end of a fixed term without the agreement of the landlord, but the landlord has an obligation to find new tenants if this happens. However, I've been unable to find any information as to whether a fixed term exists if there's no written agreement. Assuming there is no fixed term, then for a month-to-month tenancy, the tenant must provide one month's notice to end the tenancy, with that month ending at the end of a rental period (i.e. the day before the next payment would be due). If you leave early this is legally abandonment and you are still responsible for paying rent for the duration of the tenancy That's true. ... if you do leave next month I'll consider you in rent arrears and pursue payment through legal means That is possible - but if you give notice as described above, then the tenancy will end, and (assuming you're up to date with the rent) you'll no longer be liable.
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Possibly. Under UCC 3-402, a representative can sign for a party. There are some conditions though. One is that the signature should show unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the person identified in the instrument. If the signature is not clear that the signature is made in a representative capacity, the representative is liable. The only thing that a digital signature adds is the possibility that it is impossible to unambiguously show this because of the software. It seems from the internet that Docusign allows this.
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Question 1. In the trust that goes solely to my brother, in the event either my mother or father are dead, how is that asset split up? Can a trust dictate how an asset if split up if I am not on the trust. This is governed by the terms of the trust. The trust can say whatever the people who wrote it wanted. Question 2. How is the debt handled? The asset still has debt on it, who is responsible for the debt? I am thinking the answer to this question depends on the answer the Question 1. The trust owns the property subject to the mortgage. The people who originally signed the mortgage (presumably both of your parents) are also personally liable to pay the mortgage in the event that the debt is not fully satisfied in a foreclosure sale, or in the event that the mortgage creditor prefers to sue the mortgage debtors individually in the event of a default. After the death of the mortgage debtors, the mortgage company can file claims in their probate estates for repayment of the mortgage related debt if it does so in a timely fashion, although it would be more common to simply foreclose on the real property and obtain repayment of the debt that way. The death of the mortgage debtors is almost always an event of default under a mortgage, so if both mortgage debtors die, the mortgage creditor can usually force the trust to repay the debt, either by selling the house or by refinancing it. Question 3. They currently live in New York state, I found an article that New York state for nursing home care at more that 12k per year. If they were to move to a cheaper state like Alabama what are the laws or rules, ie. how long they have lived there, assets. This question verges on incoherent. But I think I understand what you are trying to ask. In every U.S. state, the joint federal-state program known at the federal level as Medicaid, although it has different names at the state level (California, for example, calls it "Medi-Cal"), will pay for nursing home care at approved nursing home facilities if the applicants meet state eligibility requirements. This generally involves an income test, an asset test, and a determination that the applicants have not made disqualifying gifts to trusts or to third-parties within the past five years. The income test is based upon state median or average income and is usually lower in a state like Alabama that has a lower median state income, than it is in New York, that has a higher median state income. For retirees, the main kinds of income considered are defined benefit pension plans payments, annuity payments, and investment income. The exact details of the asset test vary somewhat from state to state. Generally speaking, New York State is among the most strict in this regard. The basic outlines of the disqualification for gifts made within five years to others including trusts before applying for nursing home care are similar in broad outline, but the consequences for violating the rules are a function of the average cost of nursing home care in a state, which varies considerably. Generally, a gift of a fixed dollar amount gives rise to more months of disqualification of Medicaid in a state where the costs of nursing home care is low than it does where the costs of nursing home care are high, because the amount of the gift made in the past five years is divided by the average cost of nursing home care at the time the application is made, to determine the number of months that the applicants are disqualified from Medicaid. More generally, setting up trusts intended to qualify you for Medicaid is a highly technical matter with severe consequences if it is done incorrectly, and I would hope that your parents did so while conferring with a competent elder law lawyer. If they did it themselves, there is a high chance that this will have very severe negative consequences.
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To start with, this is a highly technical issue upon which different jurisdictions may differ, and in which different rules may apply in different circumstances either by agreement or by statute. Also, similar situations are sometimes treated differently in this regard in bankruptcy and out of bankruptcy. The majority rule is that the lender may choose which remedies - such as collateral and guarantee rights, to enforce, and the lender may choose in which order to enforce them. For example, most jurisdictions allow a lender to collect from a guarantor even when collateral is available to the lender, in lieu of foreclosing on the collateral. Sometimes, however, special rules apply. For example, if the guarantor is a government agency (e.g. the Small Business Administration or the Veteran's Administration), often the lender is required to take all reasonable efforts to collect from the borrower and recover the amount owed from collateral, before the guarantee can be invoked. Similarly, sometimes the law distinguishes between an accommodation party who receives no consideration in a transaction who signs as a direct debtor, and one who signs in a guarantor capacity. Those jurisdictions may require a good faith effort to collect from direct debtors (often including attempts to foreclose upon collateral) before attempting to collect from guarantors who sign as such. There are also arrangements, such as credit default swaps or a situation when a consumer provides a credit card payment authorization which a creditor can use in the event of a default (or the large dollar amount equivalent of such an arrangement called a "letter of credit"), in which the line between what constitutes collateral and what constitutes a guarantee can be blurred.
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Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.
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Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over.
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In the US, a house Title determines ownership, the name on the mortgage determines who owes the bank money. But a new mortgage will need the title holder to be on the document, because you cannot use someone else's real property as collateral. As to who can evict someone, it's the property owner, not the mortgage holder.
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What gives e-signatures legal standing/force in the United States? Having seen language in digital contract signing that basically say that you have to agree to use an e-signature as a signature, I feel like there's a bit of a problem in that needing to agree to use an e-signature suffers the same problem as needing to agree to use an e-signature, in that you sort of should, if you have to agree to digital signing, have an ever-backwards-stretching line of agreements that need to be agreed to...but this is obviously not how it works in practice, so how is it actually working?
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Every state except New York, Illinois, and Washington has adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and those three states have adopted their own electronic signature laws. At the federal level, a law known as ESIGN provides that electronic signatures are valid, and preempts state laws unless the state has adopted UETA or has its own electronic signature law compatible with ESIGN. One requirement of UETA is that both parties have to agree to use electronic signatures. It can't be forced on a party. If you send me a contract electronically and I electronically sign it, the question is whether I meant "I agree to be bound" or something else (like "I read it, this looks fine, send over a paper copy to sign"). By putting in the agreement "I agree to use an e-signature," it's hard to argue that you didn't mean to accept the contract. If you didn't mean to use your e-signature to accept, you shouldn't have put it on a contract saying "an e-signature is accepting the contract." However, you don't necessarily need to put that in the contract for the e-signature to be valid. The question is the intent of the parties, and the court can look at all relevant evidence to decide whether both sides really meant to use e-signatures to accept the contract.
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If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced.
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IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.
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That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached.
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The standard of care to determine documents are accurate varies. For example, in an ordinary notarized document, notarizing the signature of an imposter will ordinarily only impose liability on the notary for harm caused by the fraudulent imposter signing, if the notary is negligent, i.e. fails to use the reasonable care of a similarly situated notary. But, suppose that instead of a notary, the imposter uses a fake ID to get a bank to confirm his identity as part of a "guaranteed signature", which is a parallel system of confirming people's identities arising from an industry organization and mostly used to confirm identity in life insurance payouts and other non-probate transfers (e.g. pay on death bank accounts). In the bank that guarantees the signature is duped, the bank has strict liability without regard to fault to the party that is harmed by the imposter's bad signature. In the case of fake signatures on checks, there is an elaborate web of statutes in Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code and some related federal regulations, but basically, it boils down to the harm from a forged check falling on the person who dealt most closely with the imposter. The standard for a Fake IDs used to get alcohol is particularly tricky because rather than flowing from a common law rule, it usually depends upon the exact language of a liquor regulation statute and related regulations, so it is often non-uniform. There is not a general rule governing this situation and that situation is very common in American law. More often than not, you can not determine the correct answer to a legal question by simply applying a general rule to a new situation. Law is not physics.
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Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.
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Using software generally does not entail any legal requirement to acknowledge the use of that software, and would only arise as a licensing condition. Google services, including Translate, are subject to certain terms of use especial the part about what they expect of you. They do not impose any requirement regarding acknowledgment, therefore they cannot later demand any royalties. If a translation program imposes any demands on your usage of the program, that has to be part of the original agreement whereby you were allowed to use the software at all.
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In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.
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Can I claim compensation for loss of earnings due to work accident in Australia? I was working in a hair salon in Australia and fell backwards. I tore my rotator cuff and have slipped disc. I had surgery on shoulder when got back to UK. Can I claim for loss of earnings, etc.?
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All employees in Australia are covered by state-based Worker’s Compensation insurance. This is the workers’ guide for NSW. In theory, your loss of income and medical expenses should be claimable. However, as it seems that you did not follow the required procedures, in practice, you may find it a bureaucratic nightmare. First, you needed to have been seen by a registered Australian doctor and receive a Workers Compensation certificate to get the ball rolling. Do you have evidence that the injury occurred at work? Second, benefits are suspended if you leave the country. There may be exemptions for temporary workers but I am unaware of them. Contact the authority responsible for workers compensation in the state you were injured.
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Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.
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I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer.
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In Common Law Countries In common law countries, Dale M. is right (the vast majority of the time). Without negligence there is usually no liability for damage to property in an accident. The general rule in the common law rule is that "shit happens" and no one is responsible for the damage, when no one was negligent and everyone defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances. The "shit happens" defense is generally a valid defense to a claim for property damages or personal injury in common law countries. "No negligence despite causation" findings are rare in auto accident or plane crash cases (absent truly extraordinary weather conditions or freak intervening causes like meteors falling from the sky that cause car accidents), but are common, for example, in professional malpractice cases. For example, suppose a reasonably competent surgeon does surgery on you in a fairly high risk case. The best surgeon in the hospital could have saved you. You didn't get that surgeon and died. There is no basis for a suit for medical malpractice against the surgeon since the surgeon was not negligent, even though the surgeon was not perfect. Also, sometimes the victim is the person primarily or totally at fault. For example, suppose a drunk driver T-bones your WellsFargo armored cash delivery car, which is built like a tank, in violation of a red light, with their SmartCar, and the SmartCar is totaled, while your armored car doesn't even have a scratch. Your car was a cause of the damage to the drunk driver's vehicle, but you have no liability for the drunk driver's losses, because you weren't negligent. Strict Liability Exceptions To Negligence Based Liability There are some exceptions if you have provided a warranty, guarantee, or insurance that the property won't be damaged (since contractual liability is generally strict liability unless otherwise provided by agreement). For example, you might be liable under a lease for any damage in excess of reasonable wear and tear from any cause other than the landlord's negligence. Sometimes there can be negligence by someone your are responsible for even if you aren't personally negligent (which is called "vicarious liability"). There is strict liability for accidents caused by defective products even in the absence of negligence, and for accidents caused by ultra-hazardous activities (e.g. explosives). U.S. states are divided about liability for animals that roam free with the main divide being between fence in states (mostly in the eastern U.S. and other more urbanized places) and fence out states (mostly in the west and more wild frontiers). There are a few other exceptions, but they are rare and somewhat inconsistent between jurisdictions. Comparative Fault Also, the modern trend in common law countries is to allocate liability for accidents based upon comparative fault or modified comparative fault. So, everyone who was negligent (including the victim), or would otherwise have had strict liability for the damage, is assigned a percentage of fault (adding up to 100%) that is their share of responsibility for the overall loss. If no one is negligent at all, there is no recovery. In modified comparative fault, if the victim is at least either 50% or 50%+ at fault (depending upon the state), there is no recovery. Some systems of comparative fault make negligent people who owe money jointly and severally liable with a right to contribution if you pay more than your fair share of the loss. Other systems limit each person's liability to their percentage of fault with no implicit guarantee of other negligent parties who are judgment proof. Who Determines Liability And Damages? In the U.S., and a small number of other jurisdictions, liability and damages are frequently decided by juries (and there is a right to a jury the vast majority of the time even if it isn't always elected). In most common law jurisdictions, liability and damages are always or almost always decided by judges (exceptions apply in perhaps 1% or less of cases). In Civil Law Countries In civil law countries (continental Europe, Quebec), the standard of liability for accidents in the absence of special cases like the ones discussed in the common law is that you are liable for damage that is your "fault." See, e.g. this article discussing civil law tort liability under Central American civil codes. It states: Much like in Europe (think of art. 1382 of the Napoleonic Code), in the Central American civil codes, the concept of tort ordinarily rests on a general clause imposing fault-based liability, though it is possible to identify among these civil codes some interesting variations. For example, only in Honduras (art. 2236) and Panama (art. 1644) tort liability is characterized using elements such as: action or omission, fault or negligence, and obligation to compensate. Whereas, Costa Rica (art.1045) and Nicaragua (art. 2509) add other elements to the characterization, such as fault and imprudence, and in the Nicaraguan text, the notion of malicious acts is also included. The Salvadoran Civil Code (arts. 2065 and 2080) is rooted in the classic construction of delict, quasi-delict or fault, although it also adds features such as malice and negligence. The exception to this trend will be the Guatemalan Civil Code (art. 1645). Although it uses terms such as intention, carelessness or recklessness as defining criteria, this provision is not really describing a fault based liability model, because it contains a rebuttable presumption of fault or negligence. The civil law concept of tortious fault is not spelled out in great detail in civil codes, although there are a few specific situations that are covered (e.g. bailments when your property is in the possession of another person and collapsing buildings). Civil law countries have instead been developed in legal doctrine in those countries that is not apparent from the civil code text. Basically, civil law tortious fault involves some culpability greater than mere "but for" causation of an accident, but involves a lower threshold of wrongfulness than the concept of "negligence" in the common law, which is a failure to act as reasonable person would have to prevent harm to others under the circumstances. You can have civil law tortious fault even if you were acting as a reasonable person, but you still have to have at least done something slightly wrong. So, there is still a "shit happens" defense in civil law countries, but it tends to be much harder to establish. Who Determines Liability And Damages? In civil law countries, the call is always made by judges (or by panels of judges in cases involving larger damages).
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Legal action might be taken by the garage, because you had a contract to repair the gearbox which you cancelled (causing them some damages in time spent). You could hope that the store-owner will pay the invoice that you sent, but that seems to not be likely. The store owner can't sue you for sending him the invoice: the mechanic can sue you for not paying what the work billed for. But you do have a recourse, which is that you were acting on behalf of the store owner. I assume that you were in possession of the old gearbox, so it simplified matters if you took transported it to the mechanic, since the store owner was going to pay. In other words, you were acting as the store owner's agent: you were authorized to create a contractual arrangement between the garage and the owner. The one problem is that apparently the garage thought they were doing the work for you, and not for the owner. So they may sue you, and you may sue the owner. And suing anybody costs money. The owner is, perhaps, trying a strategy of not paying what he does actually owe, in the theory that the alternative of suing is too much time and bother (besides, it's the garage owner who would have to get the ball rolling – unless the shop owner first wants to sue to recover the gearbox). Given the information you have provided, I don't see a basis for the shop owner suing you. In order to sue someone, that person has to have caused you some damage. He could claim that he didn't authorize you to take the gearbox to the garage, or that you were negligent in making the arrangements with the shop (for instance if he said "but only if they will do the diagnosis for free"), in which case the court will have to decide whose story is more believable.
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First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties.
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You would not be liable for a fine (If you think about it, how can you be - Australia does not have jurisdiction over you as you are in New Zealand, and you have broken no NZ law - Further, you declared the item to customs so even in Australia you could not be held liable) Looking at it another way, if you had gotten on a plane with it, declared it to customs on the arrival card, they would have simply asked to see it and made a decision whether to let it in or not - they would not fine you. Customs may or may not confiscate it (ie they may let it through). I've not sent a parcel to Australia, but I have imported seeds into NZ - I made a number of calls and emails to ensure I got the process right - expected to pay quite a lot of money to do it - in the end they just came straight to me - MAF did not even examine the parcel. Being that NZ and AU are pretty similar in terms of legislation (ie both the food standards are the same) - its probably actually Ok to send it anyway - in fact the Imported Food Control At 1992 - which I believe is applicable - specifically exempts many foods imported from New Zealand from the act. The last paragraph of this AU government web page states "The only New Zealand foods that are subject to the IFIS at the border are those classified as risk foods. Equivalence determination of food safety systems covering dairy products was reached in 2007 and seafood, uncooked pigmeat, chicken meat, coconut, pepper, paprika, peanuts and pistachios were aligned in 2011. This enabled these products to be brought under the TTMRA and removed the requirement for border inspection for these products."
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Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
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Why do laws or contracts repeat themselves unnecessarily? Legal texts - laws, contracts, etc - often contain passages that say something like, "You agree to waive your rights to blah except as prohibited by applicable laws or by the Whatshisface Amendment to the Something Act of 1985." What is the point of explicitly calling out the Whatshisface Amendment when it is clearly redundant after "applicable laws"?
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First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.
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Contracts are illegal if they require a signatory to break the law, so the contract here is detailing that this specific clause does not apply if following it would contradict the law. It's basically saying that no signatory may hold the other for breaking contract terms if the reason for breaking the contract terms is because the law specifically says these things are required. For example, if the contract reads "The hotel does not allow guests to have animals in the room", this creates an illegal situation if said animal is a guide dog assisting a blind person, which must be allowed under laws for Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). By changing this clause to "The hotel does not allow guests to have animals in the room, except as required by federal, state or local law." Then it is now acceptable. A able bodied guest will still be in breach of contract if a cat is brought into the room, but a blind person would not be in breach because the law says you cannot use this to bar a blind person with a guide dog, and the contract must comply with the law. The Cat Person can be thrown out for breech of contract, but the blind person cannot because this exception allows the blind person to bring the dog into the rented room.
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It means the entire code compilation has been updated to include all legislative revisions to the code that occurred in the XXXX legislative session (and obviously earlier ones too). Of course, not every section of the code is amended every legislative session, but the compilation will still report that it is accurate through to the end of XXXX legislative session. This method of reporting currency isn't a good match for online compilations or compilations that receive updates multiple times per year, so you may see variants, like "through 2012 portion of 2011-2012 Reg. Sess." (however the publisher itself reports its currency information). The Bluebook citation standard had traditionally required this currency information to be cited for all statutes, but in the latest version, that requirement has essentially been removed for federal statutes. What Justia is calling a "Universal Citation" is probably better called a "media-neutral" citation, following the format of the AALL Universal Citation Guide. However, it's a bit of a misnomer because no entity has a monopoly on citation style, although the Bluebook has a big influence. Justia even mentions, "this universal citation is not necessarily the official citation, the latter which should be used when citing to primary and secondary legal materials in court filings, scholarly publications, etc."
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It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.
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None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.
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I cannot speak for civil law systems (Germany) but in Common Law (UK, USA) systems the law looks at substance rather than form. So: Am I allowed to undo the word-wrapping of all the texts and unindent them, as well as performing a new word-wrap on them? Yes Do I have to make sure that it is readable for everyone on every device, and do I have to make sure that accessibility interfaces are used (e.g. for blind persons, which aren't even the target group of my software)? If they are licences (rather than contracts) they must simply be available; this does not mean universally available. Do I have to make sure, that if my application wouldn't even start correctly on a device, that the user is able to start the application in an impossible, absurd, magic or religious way to ensure that he can read the legal texts or is it enough to state it on the website then? It depends if you want the licences to be enforceable by you on the users or if you are simply complying with your disclosure obligations. See What if the user disagreed with the Terms of Service, but still registered on a website?. Do I have to make sure that the rendering of the licenses/privacy policy/impressum is performant (e.g. text rendering and refresh after scrolling takes less than a second)? I already have to include two external libraries with my software to display the texts, otherwise it would not be possible to display texts at all. No - make them wait if you want.
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Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.
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As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.
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Why doesn't everyone in UK just pay with exempted gifts? From what I've grasped from the gov.uk website, you can gift as much as you like to anyone without paying any tax, as long as you don't die in the next 7 years. So why doesn't everyone just gift money to each other, to avoid paying tax? For example, I could let 3 lodgers live with me for free (a room each). They could gift me £4000 a year each. I would pay no tax and keep £12,000 a year. If instead they paid me rent, I would pay income tax on anything over £7,500 (thanks to the Rent-a-room scheme). I'm guessing this is too good to be true, but if so, how would the law argue against this?
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In short, because the government is not required to honor your characterization of the transaction. A gift is something given without receiving anything in exchange. In almost all taxable contexts this is not a plausible argument. A judge would almost surely rule for the government that your money transfer was rent and not a gift, for example. And, if you didn't report the income that was found to be rent and not a gift, on an income tax form, you would be assessed serious penalties and might even be charged with criminal tax evasion, since the sincerity of your gift would be in doubt. Also, while in the bare example of an informal roommate arrangement, proof of the existence of a lease in the event of a dispute between the parties might not be necessary, usually contractual documents are in place to protect the rights of both parties to a transaction and those would be inconsistent with a gift characterization. For example, if you sell lumber on credit and it was treated as a gift, you couldn't sue someone who failed to pay for their lumber, and if you sold lumber for cash, it would be a clear quid-pro-quo.
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Yes that seems to be the case. The section after the one you quoted, 551:11 Share of Unnamed Child says: If the property not devised nor bequeathed shall be insufficient to satisfy the just share of such child, after allowing advancements received by him, the same shall be made up in just proportion from the property devised or bequeathed to others. The page "Can I Disinherit My Child?" from a law firm blog, says: New Hampshire has a strong policy of protecting “pretermitted heirs,” which are heirs that were not mentioned in a Will. N.H. R.S.A 551:10 states that [e]very child born after the decease of the testator, and every child or issue of a child of the deceased not named or referred to in his will, and who is not a devisee or legatee, shall be entitled to the same portion of the estate, real and personal, as he would be if the deceased were intestate. Simply put, you do not name or refer to your child in the Will, then he can claim an inheritance as if you died without a Will. Historically and currently, the rationale is that if you did not mention him anywhere in your Will, you most likely forgot about him, because it is human nature to forget things. However that same blog page also says: There are various ways to disinherit a child. The most often used method is to specifically name or refer to the child, or a class, such as “my children” or “my son, Alex, and his issue,” that you intend to disinherit, and you must then state that you intend to disinherit that child. Another way to disinherit a child is to state that you give that particular child one (1) dollar, or a small sum of money. So it would seem that if one chose to include language such as: I leave to any other children I might have, and to their issue, if any, the sum of $10, jointly. then such possible surprises are covered. This would be after mentioning specifically any children one wanted to leave larger amounts to.
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Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages.
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According to the information I was able to find, every zone, country, or even states, have their own taxation rules for sales made there. Correct. Well, in no way it's possible that small companies or individuals that sell products internationally deal with tax rules for each buyer, that would be a non-sense, and paying such taxes worldwide would be a nightmare not worth having a small business at all. You are required to comply with the law. If it is complicated, or difficult or expensive to do so then, it's complicated, difficult and expensive and you still have to do it. The answer is obvious: if it's not worth having a small business, don't have a small business. The main question, if someone buys a license from my web-site, is it considered a sale in the buyer's country/state which requires me to collect and pay some remote tax, or it's a purchase in my country/state which requires me to collect HST from that buyer? It depends on the law in both Canada and the destination country. In most cases, the sale will be an export sale from Canada (GST/HST exempt) and an import sale in the destination country - requiring you to comply with GST/HST obligations there. Another question is regarding invoices, I know that Canada requires certain information to be included into an invoice for sales in Canada. If my sales will be considered sales in a buyer's Country with some other rules, does it mean I have to manage tons of invoice templates? Yes. Let's say if my sales in UE exceed 30K EUR it looks like I need to register and pay VAT there. But what if I have less? Then you don't need to register and remit tax. Nor are you allowed to collect it from your customers. By the way, I have no idea what country in the Eurozone goes by the initials UE. In most jurisdictions, you need to register either when you reach the threshold in fact or reasonably expect to reach the threshold. Also in most, you can usually register even if you are below the threshold. For example, these are the rules for Australia. Anyone, please advice. Hire an accountant versed in international digital services. They will be able to give you the advice you need. They will also be able to recommend sales/payment platforms that can handle most of this for you (for a fee, of course).
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My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.
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If the situation described is accurate, then maybe First, let's deal with the implicit assumption that sales tax is not payable on gifts. Whether that is true or not depends on the law in your jurisdiction. For example, in australia there is no Goods and Services Tax (GST) payable on a gift because a gift is not a "supply" under the law. Technically, a value-added tax like the GST is not a sales tax but close enough. However, exchanging a "gift" for something of value (airline points, for example) is not a gift. Of course, Australian States and Territories levy Stamp Duty on the transfer of a vehicle's registration, and this is calculated on the sale price or the market price whichever is the greater. Also, technically, that's not a sales tax either. If it's a tax avoidance scheme, then no and it's a crime Assuming that there is no sales tax payable on a gift; if John and David entered into this arrangement (not a contract because of its illegal purpose) to avoid tax, then tax is payable and they are now criminals. If the relevant tax authority learns what happened and decides to investigate, then John and David might have some explaining to do. If David can show that he has routinely given John large cash gifts on John's birthday, then they may convince the authority not to prosecute. If they can't, then they get to try to convince a judge. It is not atypical for tax law to reverse the onus of proof: the government doesn't have to prove tax is payable, John and Dave have to prove it isn't.
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Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic.
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You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court.
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Hazardous Snowman, how to protect children from it, and myself from lawsuit This will sound absurd, but I promise this is a genuine question. I'm researching a method of home climate control in snowy climates, that involves enveloping a copper heatsink around a sheath of snow. The heatsink itself is by function, basically a spiked ball, with blade like protrusions all across it's circumference to maximize surface area, which are designed to be enveloped entirely by snow in order to be effective. The problem is that I live in a suburb with rowdy kids. I don't want to see any of them learn a lesson the hard way (mostly because I'd get sued for teaching it) so I also plan to surround the snowball with a fence and warning placards, about the same as one should do with a swimming pool. This should deter small children, but I fear teenagers will defeat these measures and kick the snowman anyway. (My daughter insists that I "complete the look" and really, it doubt it would make a difference if it were a Snowball or a Snowman) I am wondering, what protections/wards can I put in place so that I would not be liable should a teenager or child decide to defeat them and skewer their foot on my experiment?
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No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.
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If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal.
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No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.
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34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed.
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Is it true that I cannot buy a puppy and smash it deliberately for my perverse amusement (regardless of whether it's in front of them or not)? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? Is it true that I cannot buy a cow or a pig and throw it into a woodchipper similarly for my perverse amusement? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? You can't do either of these things. Every state has some sort of law banning cruelty to animals. For example, in Colorado, the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals are codified at Sections 18-9-201 to 18-9-209, Colorado Revised Statutes. The core language of the statute is codified at Section 18-9-202(1)-(1.5) (as of July 1, 2014) which states (in language that is not atypical nationally) that: (1)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence ovedrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm, carries or confines in or upon any vehicles in a cruel or reckless manner, engages in a sexual act with an animal, or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or procures it to be done, or having the charge or custody or ay animal, fails to provide it with proper food, drink or protection from weather consistent with the species, breed, and type of animal involved, or abandons an animal. (1)(b) Any person who intentionally abandons a dog or cat commits the offense of cruelty to animals. (1.5)(a) A person who commits cruelty to animals if he or she recklessly or with criminal negligence tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(b) A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(c) A person commits cruelty to a service animal if he or she violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section with respect to a service animal . . . whether the service animal is on duty or not on duty. The rest of the statute mostly spells out sentences and other remedies and definitions applicable to these offenses. For what it is worth, the laws against cruelty to animals, and the now obsolete laws prohibiting cruelty to slaves that existed when slavery was legal in the U.S., were quite similar. So, yes, an animal (pet or otherwise, there is almost no formal legal distinction between pets and non-pets, even though in practice, people evaluate what is cruel to a pet and to a farm animal differently) is property. Yes, someone who owns an animal may intentionally kill it or maim it, or have someone acting at the owner's instructions do so. But, an owner must do so humanely under the circumstances and must do so for a good reason (such as for food, to put down a sick or injured or dangerous animal, or for experimental research). Ranking states is a bit difficult. There are some states that have felony cruelty to animals statutes and some that don't. I don't have the time to look for an exhaustive survey of the law state by state (one summary is here). There are some states that are quite specific (like Colorado) and others that are more general in language. Idaho has an express provision that killing animals that are harrying livestock is an acceptable reason. Some of the difference boils down to how the law is applied in practice, rather than to the language of the statutes on the books. The overall gist of the statutes, however, is pretty similar: don't be cruel in how you do it, and don't harm animals if you don't have a good reason for doing so. There is also a lot of conduct (for example, separating mothers and young children, amputating body parts such as claws or tails or reproductive organs without consent, or confining and leashing them) that would cause emotional harm to animals and which would be grave human rights abuses, that is not prohibited as cruelty to animals. Similarly, there are many farming practices that are accepted as not violating these laws like the process of creating veal or foie gras that could be characterized as cruel but are accepted as not violating the laws against cruelty to animals. To a great extent, these exceptions, which are rarely codified, are simply a matter of custom and practice and tradition, rather than having any well reasoned logical derivation from statutory language.
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I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).
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The board is more complicated than you describe. It is a somewhat stylized world map, broken up into regions that do not necessarily correspond to countries. They have names that don't necessarily express what the region is geographically (particularly Ukraine, which extends far to the north of real-world Ukraine). There are defined water routes between certain regions that do not touch. Someone else starting from a world map would be very unlikely to duplicate the Risk board. I believe your friend's board would count as a derivative work. Now, the copyright holder is highly unlikely to come after your friend. I've seen stories of people who made their own X boards, publicized them, and the game company did nothing about it. The company (Hasbro? they own most of those games) would likely consider it as an extra bit of publicity.
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I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.
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Can I sue Apple if battery replacement was refused because the program is not available in my country? I bought an iPhone 6s in Moldova. I have sometimes unexpected shutdowns. Recently I discovered that Apple has iPhone 6s Program for Unexpected Shutdown Issues. I checked the serial number and my iPhone qualifies for a free battery replacement under that program. On the Apple Find location site the official repair service is DAAC SYSTEM INTEGRATOR and there is no alternative. I called that service and asked if I can bring the device to them but they answered that in Moldova this program is unavailable. Is Apple legally obligated to make the program available in Moldova?
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Unfortunately, no. Apple does not have any legal obligation to make the program available in Moldavia. The reason why Apple opened the battery replacement service was to limit the bad press after the BatteryGate had hit the press. So, to answer your question, you cannot sue on these grounds. However, you could theoretically sue Apple on the grounds of planned obsolescence, if such behavior is incriminated in Moldavia. I wouldn't advise on it, however -- it would be extremely expensive and quite a long procedure, for minimal result. A solution I could have to your problem, would be to get your phone sent & repaired by a store in a country were the program was made available by Apple -- even if you'll have to pay for the shipping costs... Hope it helps!
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Eritrea, Turkmenistan and San Marino are the three countries without copyright laws. A handful of other countries are not party to any copyright treaties, such as Iran, Iraq and the Marshall Islands. There is no law against infringing non-Iranian copyright in Iran, so if you are in Iran and download non-Iranian content, you won't get sued in Iranian courts. This is true whether you are an Iranian citizen or a US citizen. The same holds for Eritrea, except that there it doesn't even matter if the work is Eritrean. If, being in the US (or Germany), you download US (or German) material from an Iranian pirate website, you will not be sued in Iranian court, but you can be sued in US (or German) court. That is, it doesn't matter where the website is, it matters where you are. If you infringe German copyright in the US, or vice versa, you can be sued. The basic protection that the various copyright treaties provide is that works of member states are given equal protection, thus German copyright law does not just protect German works. If you, being in Germany, infringe my copyright (I'm in the US), I will sue you in German court, which I can do because of various treaties. The other thing to bear in mind is that copyright protection is stated as a protection of a work, so there is no "exception" whereby only citizens of Germany have to obey German copyright law. A work created in Germany is protected for citizens and non-citizens alike. The difficulty that arises is that if a person isn't in Germany but is in Eritrea, you would have to either sue them in Eritrea (can't do that: no basis in Eritrean law), or have a German judgment enforced in Eritrea (can't do that, no treaty), or lure them to Germany and persuade them to stay (can't kidnap them). While you cannot be sued in German court for infringing Iranian copyright using an Eritrean piracy server, you can can be sued in Iranian court if you subsequently travel to Iran. If you copy US material while in Iran, you can be sued when you return to US jurisdiction. Again, the basis for the lawsuit is an act of copying, and not copying while in a particular country, or copying from a particular country.
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Sania is entitled to a reward of 7,50€. germany In Germany, to reward honest finders, the finder of an item is entitled to 5% of a lost item's value of up to 500€ under § 971 BGB. Airpods cost about 150 €, so Sania is entitled to a Fider's reward of 7,50 €. Anything more would be at the discretion of Tam, accepting less is at Sania's discretion. Do note, that denial of the finder's reward at the moment that Sania hands over the item means, that they also deny their entitlement to the reward. In fact, it is upon Sania to demand the reward, and unless they do so, it is presumed that they do not want a finder's reward. However in making her entitlement to the reward known, Sania may not cross the line into coercion or blackmail (§§ 240, 253 StGB). Should Sania say, without explanation "I demand a payment of 100 € for the airpods", that could be coercion, as she is not entitled to that. If she however says "I am entitled to finder's reward of 7,50 €, and had expenses of 2.50 € to get the phone to you, therefore you owe me 10 €" the picture is different - that is exactly the amount that the law says she would be owed. This is because atop the actual reward Sania can reclaim reasonable fees, such as the bus fare to get the phone to Tam under § 970 BGB. Under § 972 BGB, Sania does not have to relinquish the item till the reward and expenses have been paid but also does not become the owner of the item. The Fundbüro To evade a possible claim for "Unterschlagung von Fundsachen" (~conversion by not reporting a found item), the Fundbüro (Found item's office) exists when the owner can't be made out rapidly. Not only does it calculate the required finder's reward, but also handing it over to the office fulfills the requirement to report a found item that is worth more than 10 € under § 965 BGB. It is customary to store the lost items at the Fundbüro, but that is not required. To gain the item from the Fundbüro, Tam will have to pay any required handling fees to the office but also gets notice of how much he should pay to Sania as well as her contact details. Sania will get contact details of Tam in return, together with a notice that she has a claim to a reward of such value. Should Sania not have given her details, it is presumed that she did not want the finder's reward. If Sania retained the item, the Fundbüro will inform Tam of the estimated finder's reward and contact details for Sania, so Tam can reclaim the item.
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None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.
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The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps.
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You can politely request over the phone that he fix it. You can politely request by letter that he fix it. You can hire an attorney to firmly request by letter that he fix it. You can sue him to get the courts to order him to fix it. You can also decide to fix it and forget the warranty. One thing that you can't do is let the physical situation get worse to the point of disaster and hope to recover the even greater damages that would result. If he is ignoring your letters, then get a lawyer.
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Bulgaria is one of many countries in which intellectual property can be protected with a single international patent filing, in lieu of a Bulgarian specific filing. In generally, you should assume that any patented idea likely to have international application, such as Internet based software, which is patented in the U.S. is also the subject of international patent protection, unless you specifically know that this is not the case. Virtually all patent lawyers know how to make this filing and most would recommend doing so in this case. So, yes, it is something you should worry about, and the better practice, by far, would be to obtain permission from the patent owner if the app is likely to have any meaningful commercial value. Now, if you were sued, there is a good chance that it would be in Bulgarian courts under Bulgarian patent law, which may be somewhat less harsh in some respects like damages awards than U.S. patent law. But, the basis for patent liability for an infringement in Bulgaria would be very similar.
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That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.
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How could an "unknown easement" exist on a property? I read in a list of potential property title defects that there could be an "unknown easement" (#7 in the list). How could there be an unknown easement? I thought all easements must be recorded on the deed.
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Unrecorded sewer easements seem to be a major category of such problems: the easement may only be recorded on the government sewer map, and not against the property. Likewise underground gas and electric. There is also a prescriptive easement, like adverse possession, though in that case the issue would be that the property owner may not know that he was granting an easement by allowing the use of the land.
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Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute.
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For example, is there a way to search my identity (SSN) in property records and get an official document verifying there are no matching results? No. You can search by name on a county by county basis, however. A certified search result from your county of residence to corroborate you affidavit or declaration and attached as an exhibit to the affidavit or declaration might be worth including (even if it is something of a matter of form over substance). You might also considering attaching a copy of your lease to the place where you reside in New Jersey if you have one. Both of these documents would only corroborate that you don't own what you claim to be your residential address, rather than proving by themselves that you own no real estate in New Jersey. But the authorities you are seeking to prove something to will inevitably have to take you at your word regarding what your residential address is anyway. For purposes of tax exemption in another country, I need to prove that I do not own a house or an apartment in my current state of residence, which is New Jersey. How can I do that? Usually, you would do this by executing an affidavit or declaration under the penalty of perjury to that effect.
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The possession is not adverse during the tenancy, so the clock does not run. If the tenancy contract ends or is violated for [appropriate length depending on location] with no reaction from the landlord, that is grounds for adverse possession.
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I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.
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Tell whatever lawyer is drafting the "official paperwork" about the problem and ask if it is covered or if you need to change the text or add a rider. If neither company competes, a mutual release/license of existing shared code should be perfectly manageable for an experienced attorney.
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Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant.
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A property owner can give you an easement for the air rights of their property, which can allow you to put your own structure over their property or prevent them from putting a structure over their property (depending on the terms of the easement). For instance, a railroad might sell the air rights to an urban rail yard to a private developer so that the developer can put buildings over top of the yard. A high-rise owner might buy an easement for a neighboring property that bans them from building above a certain height in order to keep the views from the high-rise unblocked. However, a property owner can't sell you rights that they themselves don't have. The US government has exclusive sovereignty over US airspace, and there's a public right of transit through navigable airspace (defined as airspace above minimum safe flight altitudes). While the traditional rule was that a property owner owned their land up to infinity, with the development of airplanes this rule has been changed to significantly limit the rights of property owners. The FAA doesn't limit how tall a property owner can build (although too-tall structures can be declared hazards to navigation, which can cause issues with planning boards or insurance companies). However, if there are no obstructions, the airspace above 500 feet in rural areas (in built-up areas it depends on local obstructions) is open for pilots to fly through. The only way to get obstruction-free airspace restricted is to try to get the FAA to issue a flight restriction. If you're trying to get large swaths of airspace restricted, this is extremely unlikely to happen.
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Can I modify a paper contract, and then mail it to the bank? If a bank sends me a contract to sign to apply for a credit card, can I scan the contract, modify it, and then mail it to the bank?
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The bank has made you an offer to contract with you: you can accept that offer by signing it and sending it back unamended. You can make the bank a counter-offer by amending the document, signing it and sending it to them for their consideration and acceptance or rejection. With a bank, I would count on rejection. Basically, if you don't like the terms, find another bank or do without the card.
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Written Contract If there was a written contract, the fact that it wasn't signed is not relevant. While a signature is evidence of agreement with the terms there are other ways that acceptance can be indicated: like you paying them $600. Wrong Information Where the error is fundamental to the performance - e.g. you needed shipment to Alaska and they were offering shipment to Alabama, the contract would be void ab initio. That is, it never happened and everyone needs to be returned to their original positions as far as possible. However, in general, an error by one or the other party in their understanding of what was agreed does not invalidate the contract. For example, if you told them it was a "small" dog because it was small for a Great Dane but under an objective classification, it is, in fact, a "large" dog the contract must be completed and either you or they wear the additional cost of doing so. Whether they are entitled to ask for additional payment "due to some wrong information" depends on who took the risk under the contract for its correctness? Barring a specific term, the risk usually lies with the party that provided the "wrong information" but some contract will assign the risk for one party's errors to the other party - subject to a requirement to act in good faith. If they are not entitled to additional payment, they have to perform the contract for the original fee. If they are entitled, then you have to pay a reasonable price increase - you are not generally entitled to cancel. All of this turns on the specific terms of the contract and the exact nature of the "wrong information". Consumer Protection Law CPL in your state or their state or both will almost certainly have something to say about this beyond common law rules of contract.
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You are never obligated to sign a contract. You already have a lease agreement in place, which will be enforceable for the agreed-upon duration. The lease can be changed if both parties agree to it, but one party cannot unilaterally demand that other agree to any changes to the contract - a landlord can't, for example, change your lease agreement to increase your rent payment in the middle of your lease term and demand that you sign it. The landlord is certainly allowed to ask, in the hopes that both parties can come to an agreement, but again, both parties need to agree in order for an existing contract to be changed.
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Yes, a contract implied in fact can supersede a written contract: if it both (1) arises after the parties have entered into their initial agreement and (2) if the subject matter of the agreement is not subject to the statutes of frauds (i.e. to a statutory requirement that agreements of this kind must always be in writing). A course of dealings before a written contract is signed if the contract states that it is the entire agreement of the parties, or appears from context to be the entire agreement of the parties, may not be considered pursuant to something known as the parole evidence rule (which is actually a rule of substantive law and not evidence, despite the name). An agreement that is required by statute to be modified in writing, something called a statute of frauds, might or might not be susceptible to being modified in this way. Sometimes, failure to comply with a statute of frauds is excused if the parties have partially performed the unwritten agreement, sometimes the statute is applied more strictly and cannot be overcome. Indeed, in Colorado, where I practice law most of the time, there is actually case law that specifically provides that even if a written contract states that it may only be modified in writing, that any oral or implied in fact agreement which could form a contract in the first place may supersede the written agreement. Proving that the course of dealings actually constituted an actual modification of the contractual obligation, may, in practice, be a challenging matter, however. In practice, there is probably a stronger argument on the available facts in the question, that there has been a waiver of the requirement for further provision of the service that may not be undone retroactively, but may be reasserted prospectively with fair notice to the other party, with the written contract remaining in force. The judge or jury would have to listen to the facts from the parties about their course of dealings and communications, about the nature of the "requirement", and about the pertinent terms of the written contract, and more generally, the larger context of the transaction, and then would decide which interpretation seemed closer to the truth, or if another explanation of what happened was more plausible. This dilemma and uncertainty is generically a problem any time that the parties course of dealings deviates significantly from a written instrument. These kinds of cases are never clear slam dunks for either party in the event of litigation.
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Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages.
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Generally a signature is binding even if you have not read the document you have signed; as far as the law is concerned you should have and it's too bad for you if you didn't. Of course, this presumes the contract is otherwise valid. In the circumstances you describe you should ask to see the document before signing. If that is not possible, then instead of signing you should write "I do not agree" instead and take the printed statement - only 1 in 100 people will actually check that you did sign. If you have signed and do not wish to be bound, you should contact the company immediately in writing and say that and that they can collect whatever goods they have supplied.
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Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
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If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract.
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Does a ban on plea bargaining still permit defendants to plead guilty? From my understanding, plea bargaining is the process where a defendant can plead guilty to a reduced charge. This means there is no trial, but a lesser sentence. I also know of fact bargaining - where a defendant says a certain fact is true in exchange for the prosecutor not using other facts in the case. From this definition, I assumed that abolishing plea bargaining meant that defendants could no longer plead guilty at all. However, then I read the following quote from a book: "The evaluation also revealed that, contrary to predictions that defendants would refuse to plead guilty and that the Alaska criminal justice system would grind to a halt, guilty pleas did not decrease and trials did not increase dramatically". This is in reference to the Alaska ban on plea bargaining. Here's the full paragraph for added context: Image: https://i.stack.imgur.com/v4PGv.jpg Text (OCR): Given the controversy surrounding plea bargaining. it is not surprising that a number of jurisdictions have attempted to restrict, or even to eliminate. it. In 1975, for example, the Alaska attorney general issued an order that banned all forms of plea bargaining. Under this policy. prosecutors could not reduce charges or dismiss counts in exchange for guilty pleas; they also were not supposed to ask the court to impose a particular sentence if the defendant agreed to plead guilty. The attorney general imposed the ban on plea bargaining in an effort to increase convictions and restore public confidence in the justice system (Carns 8c Kruse, 1992). An evaluation of the impact of the ban found that explicit sentence bargaining disappeared and that charge bargaining continued for a few months and then “dried up" (Rubinstein 8: White. 1979). The evaluation also revealed that, contrary to predictions that defendants would refuse to plead guilty and that the Alaska criminal justice system would therefore grind to a halt, guilty pleas did not decrease and trials did not increase dramatically. Although the authors of the study concluded that the Alaska experience showed that “the incidence of plea bargaining can be substantially reduced without wrecking a criminal justice system," they also cautioned that the results of the Alaska reform could not necessarily be generalized to other. larger jurisdictions (Rubinstein 8: White, 1979, p. 382). My question is, if there was a ban on plea bargaining in Alaska, then how could defendants still plead guilty, and why would they choose to do so? How could charge and sentence bargaining "dry up", but guilty pleas still exist?
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The 1975 ban by the attorney general prohibited prosecutors from offering to reduce charges, dismiss counts, or request a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. (Ad hoc exceptions were allowed, initially only by the AG, later by the head of each local office. For a while, there was also judicial bargaining). The AG's ban was on quid pro quo arrangements by his office, and the AG has absolutely no power over the plea by an accused, so that is how an accused could still plead guilty. The following quote is from the first page of Rubenstein & White: On July 3, 1975, the Attorney General of Alaska, Avrum Gross, issued written instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their assistants from engaging in plea bargaining. This prohibition extended to all felony and all misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15. They could not offer to reduce charges or dismiss counts in multiple-count complaints, informations, or indictments as a quid pro quo for guilty pleas. Nor could they request the court to impose any stated sentence; they could only recite the facts. I can't locate a copy of the actual memo, but also see this quote, esp. "...negotiations with defendants designed to arrive at an agreement for entry of a plea of guilty in return for a particular sentence...". A guilty plea is much cheaper for a defendant than paying an attorney and getting convicted, so if you're actually guilty and the evidence is good, it could be a wiser move to plead guilty. There is little reason to engage in a futile act. It apparently also caused a change in the prosecutorial standard for charging, from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt – consequently, the chances that the accused is actually guilty goes up. The re-evaluation study also found evidence some evidence that sentencing was lighter in the case of a guilty plea, and it would be sufficient for the accused to believe that he could get a lighter sentence as a reward for a guilty plea to nudge a person in the direction of a guilty plea.
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In the US, the prohibition against double jeopardy provides a hard restriction against re-trial and appeal of an acquittal. The government cannot appeal an acquittal (U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, Ball v. U.S., 163 U.S. 662), and a verdict of acquittal without judgment is also a bar to re-prosecution. The exception is that if the defendant was never in jeopardy – the judge had been bribed – then there can be a new trial (Harry Aleman v. Judges of the Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois). However, Adam does not take Dave to court. Adam may make an accusation that motivates the prosecutor to file criminal charges. When Adam sues Dave (not a criminal matter), there is no acquittal or conviction, or guilt. There may be a finding of liability, or not. Either side can appeal to the top, as long as there is a legal basis for the appeal. If Adam is found not liable because the judge makes a legally erroneous ruling, if Dave objected properly to the ruling, Dave can appeal if successful, the court could then change its mind and find Adam liable.
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According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 (c)(1), there are two different ways that such a plea deal could be negotiated: Paragraph B: the prosecution agrees to recommend a particular sentence or range. Such a recommendation is not binding on the court, but would probably be followed in most cases. Paragraph C: the prosecution agrees that a particular sentence or range is the appropriate disposition of the case. If the court accepts this type of plea deal, they have to impose the agreed sentence. The court does have the power to reject the agreement altogether, but in that case the defendant can withdraw their guilty plea and proceed to trial (or go back to the bargaining table with the prosecution). So it depends on which type of deal was in place. For (B), the movie's course of events would be possible. For C, it would not.
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In the overwhelming majority of criminal trials for felonies, and a very large share of misdemeanor and traffic trials, criminal defendants, following the advise of their criminal defense attorneys – who have a good knowledge of the system – overwhelmingly choose jury trials. (Even though criminal defense attorneys may personally have reasons to prefer bench trials which take less preparation as criminal defense attorneys are usually spread very thin with many clients and limited resources.) This is primarily for one very good reason. A jury is six times more likely to acquit than a judge and, unlike a judge, can also deadlock (resulting in a mistrial followed by a retrial or more lenient plea bargain in most cases), if the facts are at all susceptible to more than one interpretation. Judges and juries agree on the verdict in roughly 78% of criminal jury trials where a verdict is entered, but judges are much less likely to acquit defendants than juries do, (3% v. 19%+) (see the sources cited in this previous Law.SE answer). The National Center for State Courts conducted a survey of hung jury rates using felony case data from all federal courts and 30 state courts in 75 of the most populous counties. The NCSC project found that state courts in large urban areas had an average hung jury rate of 6.2%, with substantial variation across courts, ranging from a low of 0.1% in Pierce County, Washington to a high of 14.8% in Los Angeles County, California. Federal hung jury rates were found to be particularly low, averaging about 2% of all federal jury trials: federal civil trials had lower rates than federal criminal trials. (Source.) On average a criminal defendant is eight times more likely to avoid a criminal conviction in a state court criminal case in a trial before a jury than in a bench trial. In federal court, there is a 38% chance of bench trial acquittal (12% of all federal criminal trials are bench trials while 88% are jury trials), some of which are for misdemeanors and traffic cases, and a 14% chance of jury trial acquittal. But only 2% of federal criminal cases go to trial (roughly 99.6% of cases presented to federal grand juries result in indictments) with the remainder plea bargained (90% of cases charged) or dismissed (8% of cases charged, sometimes due to a state court conviction), and only about 2% of all U.S. criminal cases are filed in federal court. So, federal criminal bench trials are very rare and atypical. Secondarily, there is lots of highly prejudicial and legally irrelevant information (e.g., the criminal history of the defendant, or evidence excluded for 4th Amendment violations) that a jury will not know, but a judge will know. Jurors almost never disregard evidence that they are told to disregard, and often give it undue weight, and judges aren't any better. The real question should be: Who chooses a bench trial and why, notwithstanding these facts? Some situations in which someone might consider a bench trial rather than a jury trial include: A bench trial can be easier for a pro se defendant, which is one not represented by counsel either because the defendant is not indigent and hence not entitled to counsel, or because the proceeding is one in which there is no right to counsel (usually traffic cases). In these, usually low stakes, matters the cost of counsel does not justify the expenditure and it can be easier to do a bench trial as a pro se party than a jury trial. The vast majority of criminal or quasi-criminal bench trials are in low stakes cases (which are segregated into separate courts in state court and mixed in with more serious cases in federal court) where this is a primary consideration. A bench trial can be desirable for someone who needs a quicker trial date (e.g., someone who lives somewhere seasonally and needs to get home), especially in a low stakes case where the sentence is likely to be a fine or a sentence to "time served" if there is a sentence. A bench trial can be desirable when the guilt-innocence determination is largely a foregone conclusion but the defendant would still like to at least try to be acquitted, as a way to more fully tell a story of how the incident was understandable even if not a legal justification for conduct, to prepare the judge for sentencing with a more full picture of what happened than a guilty plea would provide. For example, it might be a strategy that someone who assaults (ambush style) someone who raped his sister might take, even though a tape recorded confession and video tape of the incident makes the likelihood of acquittal small (unless the defendant thinks that "jury nullification", i.e. ruling in his favor notwithstanding the law, is likely). Another example would be to provide a forum in a drug possession case to show that someone in possession of a large quantity of controlled substances was really a "mule" and not a big time dealer. This kind of consideration drives a fair number of bench trials in federal criminal cases. A bench trial can be desirable for a defendant who thinks that a judge will be favorably inclined towards him (e.g., some law enforcement officers or public officials). A bench trial can be desirable for a defendant when a jury is likely to be biased against him (e.g., a Muslim defendant at a time when anti-Muslim sentiment is strong due to some recent news event, or a defendant in a community with lots of racist potential jurors who is before a black judge). A bench trial can be desirable for a defendant whose primary defense requires above average sophistication to understand (e.g., a defendant in some complicated regulatory or white collar case). Bench trials are more attractive in cases where the criminal defendant is a first time offender, has no arrest record, and is not relying on suppressing any evidence at trial, so that the availability of more information to the judge than the jury is not a problem. A summary of jury trials in Colorado, which is typical, shows the revealed preference for jury trials. In 2016, defendants elected jury trials in 67% of traffic cases, 69% of misdemeanor cases, 97% of state court felony cases, and 59% of federal criminal cases (which are a mix of misdemeanors and felonies).
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Just to expand on what others have answered: It's important that each crime is also given its own sentence as it's possible that prisoners can be cleared of crimes if new evidence is found. This could make a significant difference to the amount of time the prisoner is serving. For example if a person was convicted for kidnap, murder, and stealing a car, all adding up to a total of 120 years, but later was found to be a car thief who was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and proven innocent of the kidnap and murder charges, that person would then only face the sentence from the car theft. If one life sentence had been issued for the three crimes, a new sentence would have to be worked out.
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Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.
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How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
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Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).
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Can a parliamentary government dissolve itself? The United States has a constitution with a separation of powers keeping it from becoming a dictatorship. What about countries with a single-housed parliment without a constitution (such as Israel[1])? If a party would win 61% of the parliament, can they just legally cancel the next election? [1]: Even though Israel has "basic laws", they are legally the same as all other laws and don't require a "super-majority" or anything like that. And even if it did, the US has a much harder time amending the constitution.
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You can certainly do so: it's been done many times in the past, and can be done even with a written constitution. The most recent famous example that I know of would be how the Nazi party used the Enabling Act, 1933 and Reichstag Fire Decree, 1933 to amend the constitution by essentially neutering all the safeguards, and used force to ensure that they could stay in power. Julius Caesar's reforms follow in a similar vein. For someone to successfully force change like this, you generally need a political system that is unstable and has no strong (or at least effective) checks and balances. Additionally, you need the support of the military because otherwise they will generally support the existing structure. Other less extreme examples I can think of where a system has changed to another system would be former colonies adopting new constitutions (e.g. Ireland and Pakistan), or where there has been significant change in the country's model (e.g. South Africa). Again, you need support, but this time it is within the existing political and judicial framework.
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Historically, this was true in the Icelandic Commonwealth in the Middle Ages, and in some democratic Greek city-states in the classical era. Similarly, in non-democratic feudal regimes, the lord or monarch was both the law giver and sitting in court was also the arbiter of all disputes arising under the lord's own laws. In places like Saudi Arabia where the monarchy's power is more than symbolic, the system still works this way to a significant extent. The practical reality in most one party Communist states is similar. In the United Kingdom, historically, the Appellate committee of the House of Lords (staffed by a subset of aristocrats usually appointed for life by the Prime Minister to the post) was the highest court of appeal of other courts in the British Commonwealth (with the Judicial committee of the Privy Council handling final appeals from outside Britain), and it was also a court of original jurisdiction for certain criminal cases against other aristocrats to satisfy the Magna Carta's notion that one is entitled to a jury of one's peers. Top level general purpose legislatures rarely serve as courts at the highest level, except in very isolated political matters. A good example of narrow quasi-judicial legislative power is the power of the Congress in the U.S., to be the ultimate judge for Congressional election disputes and of some Presidential election disputes. Congress also has quasi-judicial jurisdiction over impeachments of government employees whether or not they are elected, and over expulsions for cause of its own members and over other ethical sanctions of its own members. Many other legislatures have some sort of quansi-judicial impeachment and/or explusion power exercised as a whole by by some committee within it. It is common in the United States for administrative agencies, within their narrow area of competence to exercise both quasi-legislative power to enact regulations with a broad mandate in a subject area, and also to have quasi-judicial power in that same subject area. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Merit System Protection Board, for example, all operate in this fashion to some extent. Likewise, it is very common at the local government level for a city council and its planning board to carry out both legislative roles and quasi-judicial role when disputes come up regarding its land use regulations. Similarly, school boards routinely both establish employment regulations and other school rules, and serve in a quasi-judicial role with respect employee discipline or termination, and with respect to student discipline. This dual role is also common for the boards of other public institutions like hospitals and state colleges, and for private non-profit organizations. A recent example in that kind of situation is Colorado's State School Board which both exercises legislative power over when charter schools (i.e. public schools not under the direct supervision of any elected local school board) may be formed, and has the ultimate and final judicial review role over decisions by local school boards to grant or deny school charters.
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No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction.
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Canada Short version: In the mid-'90s, a Supreme Court decision and an Act of Parliament clarified the legal process under which a province could secede from Canada. While unilateral secession need not be recognized, the Canadian government would be obliged to negotiate the secession of a province following a sufficiently clear referendum result. Long version: Since around the mid-20th century, there has been an active sovereigntist movement in the province of Quebec, and a sovereigntist party (the Parti Québecois, or PQ) has formed the provincial government in Quebec a few times. The PQ has twice held referendums on whether Quebec should separate from Canada. The first referendum, in 1980, was soundly defeated; but the second referendum, in 1995, was defeated by a margin of only about 1% of the votes cast. The question in this second referendum was criticized by the federalist movement as being rather confusing and convoluted. It also later emerged that the PQ government at the time had planned to unilaterally declare independence if the sovereigntist option had won, even at a 50% + 1 level. In response to these events, two major events occurred which greatly clarified the legal and political circumstances under which a province would be "allowed" to secede from Canada. First, in Reference re: Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada found that according to principles of both Canadian and international law, a province does not have the right to unilaterally secede; but they also found that the federal government is obliged to negotiate secession after a vote in favor of separation. [As an aside, the discussion in the Reference re: Secession of Quebec concerning the various issues at play is broadly applicable to any separatist movement, and the decision is worth reading if you want to delve into this more.] Second, the Parliament of Canada passed the Clarity Act, which more clearly laid out the conditions under which the government of Canada would recognize a secession vote. The provisions of the Clarity Act are as follows: Giving the House of Commons the power to decide whether a proposed referendum question was considered clear before the public vote; Specifically stating that any question not solely referring to secession was to be considered unclear; Giving the House of Commons the power to determine whether or not a clear majority had expressed itself following any referendum vote, implying that some sort of supermajority is required for success; Stating that all provinces and the First Nations were to be part of the negotiations; Allowing the House of Commons to override a referendum decision if it felt the referendum violated any of the tenets of the Clarity Act; The secession of a province of Canada would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada. Taken together, the Supreme Court decision and the Clarity Act present a relatively clear legal & political path by which a Canadian province could secede. However, in the original question you ask Is there any sovereign country which currently has a law which would allow an arbitrary part of its territory to declare independence on its own if a majority of that territory is in favor? (bolding mine). If by "on its own" you mean "unilaterally, without negotiation", then strictly speaking this does not apply to Canada; a negotiation process and a constitutional amendment would also be required in the wake of a secession vote. Reference re: Secession of Quebec specifically bars a unilateral declaration of independence. Ironically (or perhaps because of these measures), support for sovereignty in Quebec has fallen significantly since 1995, and multiple splinter parties have formed out of the PQ. It therefore seems unlikely that the provisions of the Clarity Act will be tested in the near future.
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From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage.
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It is quite likely that a constitutional amendment was (and is) not needed to ban alcohol. For example, if the Controlled Substances Act is constitutional (and I have no reason to believe it isn't) then alcohol could be added to it tomorrow and it could be removed the day after tomorrow. Right there is the reason that you choose to use a constitutional amendment - it is as hard to reverse as it was to enact; it needs another constitutional ammendment.
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Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum.
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Yes. The leading case relevant to the question is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a self-executing bird migration treaty could override state law. It is also well established that a treaty may override a previously enacted federal statute. While there might be a requirement that the treaty not be a sham that really doesn't involve another county, or otherwise have an international component, as a practical matter, meeting this requirement is something that would almost always be possible. So, the President and a two-thirds majority of the Senate, in cooperation with a foreign country, by treaty, can accomplish legislative ends with which the House would not agree. As a practical matter, however, the two-thirds majority requirement for passage of a treaty in the Senate, the partisan organization of politics in the U.S., and the correlation of the partisan makeup of the Senate and the House, means that this observation is basically an irrelevant footnote. No treaty that could secure bipartisan support by two-thirds of U.S. Senators, and also be signed by the President, would not be able to be passed in the House. There has never been a time in U.S. history where one political faction has a two-thirds majority in the Senate and another political faction had a majority in the House. As a practical matter, it is almost always easier to pass ordinary legislation approved by majorities in the House and Senate, than it is to pass a self-executing treaty. The only scenario I could image where this might happen would be one in which an "old guard" President and Senate are in place, and then one election, some new political movement suddenly nearly sweeps the House and the U.S. Senate seats that are open due to some pivotal historic event, but there hasn't been more than a single Senate election or a Presidential election since that sea change in public opinion, something that very rarely has happened in other countries.
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Australia: Can a NDA be broken to show evidence in court? If a defendant says they have documents proving their case but will only show if a non-disclosure is signed and assuming the documents fail to vindicate the defendant, can I break the NDA and use those documents in court against the defendant? Thanks.
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No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context).
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Senators, and anyone else for that matter, can ask any questions they want. The witness is required to answer the questions only if under subpoena, and only if the answer of the question would neither require disclosure of privileged information nor violate a 5th Amendment right (which is a form of privilege). Many things that are the subject of an NDA are not privileged information, and the fact that someone claims that something is a trade secret does not automatically make it privileged information. Privileges can be established by statute, court rule or at common law.
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There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.
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The evidence will almost certainly be inadmissible And, of course, you will be disbarred and never work as a lawyer again, you might also go to jail for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Whether the person is convicted or not will depend on the strength of the other evidence the state has. In the notorious case of Lawyer X, Nicola Gobbo was acting as a barrister for a number of Melbourne underworld figures while simultaneously acting as a police informer. A number of those convicted have successfully appealed their convictions on the basis that they didn’t get a fair trial. In their judgement on AB (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym); EF (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 58 the High Court said: But where, as here, the agency of police informer has been so abused as to corrupt the criminal justice system, there arises a greater public interest in disclosure to which the public interest in informer anonymity must yield. EF's actions in purporting to act as counsel for the Convicted Persons while covertly informing against them were fundamental and appalling breaches of EF's obligations as counsel to her clients and of EF's duties to the court. Likewise, Victoria Police were guilty of reprehensible conduct in knowingly encouraging EF to do as she did and were involved in sanctioning atrocious breaches of the sworn duty of every police officer to discharge all duties imposed on them faithfully and according to law without favour or affection, malice or ill-will. As a result, the prosecution of each Convicted Person was corrupted in a manner which debased fundamental premises of the criminal justice system.
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It depends on what is of evidence for. Normally, any newspaper, be it "tabloid" or "respected" or even the jurisdiction's "paper of record" would be considered hearsay; instead the source of the newspaper story should be called to testify instead. However, there are a couple of exceptions to this, beyond normal hearsay exceptions, which basically boil down to when a certain thing being published is, in fact, the information being entered into evidence. For example, in certain circumstances, the courts may accept "service by publication" for certain notices. An instance of this publication would be evidence that service by publication was carried out. Another example, your link is to a lawsuit concerning defamation; defamation requires proving that the damaging falsehood was transmitted to a third party. So entering into evidence a tabloid that publishes such a damaging falsehood is evidence that it was transmitted to a third party (namely, the public).
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The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.
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Attorney-client privilege is normally waived if a privileged communication is voluntarily disclosed. Submission of an attorney-client privileged document to a judge to review in camera does not waive the attorney-client privilege. Most of the case law involves inadvertent "oops" style disclosures of attorney-client privileged documents (keep in mind that big lawsuits often involve exchanges of terabytes of data that have to be reviewed page by page for attorney-client privileged materials by armies of junior lawyers and paralegals, so mistakes are inevitably made now and then), which is a somewhat convoluted area of law. Basically, if it is caught soon enough, the person accidentally receiving it can be ordered to not look at it any more and to destroy it without keeping copies if it remains within an accidental recipient law firm or government agency's possession and has not been further disseminated into public records yet. In particular, such documents can't be presented as evidence at trial if the mistake is caught before it is too late to correct the mistake. In those cases, the legal system does its best to pretend that the mistaken disclosure of attorney-client privileged materials never happened.
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Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.
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Must the State compensate individuals from whom property is seized as evidence? Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers routinely obtain warrants under a "probable cause" standard to seize items that may contain evidence of a crime. This is a taking of private property for public use (i.e., the public interest in prosecuting crimes) and therefore, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, "just compensation" should be paid to the owner. I have come across examples in which police seize items from third parties (e.g., computer or video systems that may have captured evidence of a serious crime by unrelated suspects). As best I can tell, in practice so long as police assert that the seized item is potentially useful in their investigation of a crime (which, if serious but unsolved, may never be formally abandoned), they can avoid returning seized property – even if the ownership is uncontested and the items are not contraband. I.e., even when the owner is effectively permanently deprived of their property, I have not found any practical legal mechanism for them to seek compensation. (The only redress I have found is a right to petition for return of property, which is apparently denied so long as police assert the property has value in a criminal investigation or prosecution.) Are there any particular laws, rules, or procedures that provide for payment of compensation in these cases?
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This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.
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Anyone can be arrested, as long as the police (and in some cases, anyone) have probable cause to do so. This generally includes two points: You are in the process of committing a criminal act The police have probable cause, generally through evidence, that you are in the process of, about to, or have committed a criminal act. This usually requires obtaining a warrant for the arrest. However, it's important not to conflate searches with arrest. Arrests are when you are being taken into custody for the reasons mentioned above. Searches are when your personal belongings (i.e. property), are searched to collect evidence. It is not up to police to convict someone. This is the job of the judicial system. There's a bit of terminology here: convictions basically mean being found guilty of an offence. Police don't have the ability to convict someone of an offence. They do have the ability to arrest, and charge with an offence. To charge someone with a crime basically means to accuse them of having done something. Now let's get to the actual crime. Since you haven't mentioned a specific jurisdiction, I'm going to use Canadian cases and law, but in general, it should apply worldwide. If the police have reason to believe that you are engaging in unlawful hacking-related behaviour, then they have the authority to arrest you. They simply need to have a reasonable belief that you are engaged in the crime. Something such as connecting you with an IP address and connecting that you were online at the time is enough. If the police need to find out more information (which they generally do, to investigate further into the matter) - they can obtain a search warrant afterwards. With this, they can legally search into your computer, and investigate. Any evidence that they collect can be used in court. I've recently done some research into cyber crimes. One rather infamous case involved the attack on multiple large scale websites, including Dell, Yahoo, and Amazon, in 2000. This sparked a large scale investigations, between the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and the FBI. The attacks were claimed by some to cause nearly 1.7 billion dollars of damage. The hacker was charged with 58 different offences. You can imply from the linked article that he was arrested before his computer was searched.
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The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit. The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment. Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so. The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place. But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done. So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply. Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people. The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry. The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute, so, it is irrelevant that "Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws"). Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person "Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]" As the question claims that: "The definition "Adequate care" is vague as well." But the question also notes that: "The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case." The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse. Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies. The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause. So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any? If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court. The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong. In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri. A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.
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Yes and No See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967): What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. The glass has clearly been "knowingly exposed" and if that glass was, on the normal methods of examination by the officer (sight, smell etc.), evidence of a crime then it would be able to be used as evidence. However, any DNA on that glass is not "knowingly exposed" - finding the DNA requires a laboratory, specialised equipment and trained technicians.
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It depends on the actual content of the tip and to what degree the police believe the tip to be reliable given the totality of the circumstances. I'll give two examples where tips (one actually anonymous, one deemed anonymous) were found to give probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support a search or seizure. Illinois v Gates 462 U.S. 213 (1983) established that the test for whether there is probable cause for issuance of a warrant is based on the "totality of the circumstances". In Gates, police received an anonymous letter disclosing that the defendant was selling drugs, along with some predictions about the defendant's future activity. After verifying that some of the predictions were correct, the police obtained a search warrant for the home. The court observed that "under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work is of significant value." Navarette v California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) reiterated that "reasonable suspicion takes into account the totality of the circumstances, and depends upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. An anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates sufficient reliability, but may do so under appropriate circumstances" (quoting from the syllabus, with internal citations and quotations removed). In Navarette, an 911 caller asserted that a truck with a particular appearance was driving erratically and had run her off the road. The court said: "Even assuming for present purposes that the 911 call was anonymous, we conclude that the call bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. The officer was therefore justified in proceeding from the premise that the truck had, in fact, caused the caller’s car to be dangerously diverted from the highway." They also observed that "a 911 call has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity."
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The wording is a little confusing, but I interpret it as saying the following: Normally, discovery in a court case allows either party to demand documents from the other, to be used as evidence. However, our courts have exceptions; certain documents might be 'privileged against discovery', meaning they couldn't be demanded in that way. If one of those exceptions would apply to a document under court rules, then you can't request it under Freedom of Access either. To know what those privileges are, and how broadly they apply, you'll have to consult the rules of court procedure for your state.
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One legal notion of "abandoned property" pertains to tenants leaving things behind after they leave – clearly not applicable. A second regards e.g. bank accounts that haven't been used for a while, again, clearly not relevant. The law regarding goods dropped in the street, and so on, is here. The law starts by saying Any person who finds a thing lost is not bound to take charge of it, unless the person is otherwise required to do so by contract or law, but when the person does take charge of it he or she is thenceforward a depositary for the owner, with the rights and obligations of a depositary for hire. Any person or any public or private entity that finds and takes possession of any money, goods, things in action, or other personal property, or saves any domestic animal from harm, neglect, drowning, or starvation, shall, within a reasonable time, inform the owner, if known, and make restitution without compensation, except a reasonable charge for saving and taking care of the property. Any person who takes possession of a live domestic animal shall provide for humane treatment of the animal. Also relevant is the fact that stealing lost property is a crime: One who finds lost property under circumstances which give him knowledge of or means of inquiry as to the true owner, and who appropriates such property to his own use, or to the use of another person not entitled thereto, without first making reasonable and just efforts to find the owner and to restore the property to him, is guilty of theft. There is no specific legal definition of "lost", so the courts would look at the facts and ask whether the property was indeed "lost" – clearly, it is not. Property that is intentionally placed somewhere and is unattended is not "lost", and there is no law declaring open season on unattended property. This is true of bicycles, as well as unofficial ballot boxes.
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It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.
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What is a dispositive motion? Is a 'motion for judgment on the pleadings' a dispositive motion? Yes, no, maybe, sometimes?
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Yes. A dispositive motion is a motion that can end the case. The most common are a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is like a motion to dismiss but usually for plaintiffs arguing that even if everything in the answer to the complaint is true, that the plaintiff still wins as a matter of law. This tends to come up most often in limited jurisdiction courts with pro se parties who fill out and file their own answer on a court form, usually in response to a collection action or eviction, with stuff like "I can't afford to pay" or "my mother died and I need another few month since I used up my money for health care her final illness and for her funeral."
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Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court.
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The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.
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The language that you're referring to, where it states that if they do not provide responses to legitimately served discovery requests in a timely manner, that they would be responsible for attorney fees, this does not refer to your attorneys fees that you incurred in defending the suit. It refers to attorneys fees that would (actually could) arise out of a hearing on a motion to compel, in the event they never answered. If that occurred, the law allows you to ask the court to award you reasonable attorney's fees as well as sanctions, but only those having to do with getting the court to make them answer. Importantly, despite the rule that states this is a potential repercussion for continually failing to answer, they rarely get awarded. This usually only occurs when the court has already warned them, after you (i.e., your attorney) has willingly given them extensions, the court has given them further extensions, and they still failed to produce/respond. Typically an attorney will allow the other side substantial extensions of time, and this is something you may not even know about. When you say they completely ignored the deadline, I'm assuming you mean the deadline on the discovery notice that gets served with the papers. Interrogatories and Requests for production of documents rarely get done anywhere near the deadline in the rules, which is a mere 3 weeks. Many times, it takes much more than this to track down everything that was requested. This is why extensions happen all the time and unless you're asking, this isn't something your lawyer will even discuss with you. When you say they "didn't offer a remotely reasonable settlement until after the deadline and didn't finally dismiss the case until months after the deadline," I'm assuming you mean they didn't make a reasonable demand (it sounds like you were the defendant). This is actually very common, and in fact, it is very early on to make (or reduce the original) demand low enough that the Defendant will accept it prior to the discovery deadline and all the depositions have passed. (When I say deadline, I don't mean the one you're talking about, I mean the actual discovery deadline, which is set forth in the scheduling order; this can easily be 9 months from the time an Answer to the Complaint is filed.) If you're referring to the token deadline put in the first set of interrogatories served, this not a "real" deadline anyone of the attorneys expects to be adhered to. Further, this a very quick settlement and you should be happy your attorney disposed of your case so quickly. As you pointed out, you are paying a lot of money every day the case lives on. In fact, the money you saved by settling early is substantial. If your attorney had gotten the documents and responses and had to wade through all of them, organize them, send follow up requests, take depositions, etc., you would be out easily another $10,000. Your lawyer did you a favor, because a less honest attorney would tell you to wait, to see if there is a defense, just so they could pad their bill. Many times when it is clear that the case is going to settle, the lawyers will serve pro forma discovery, and will say to each other not to bother answering while they attempt to settle. They are timely served if you cannot settle, but it's clear that settlement is the ultimate goal. This is very typical when the defendant almost certainly has exposure, but when the plaintiff's case also has some holes. Because of issues on both sides, they agree a modest settlement to dispose of the matter, quickly, is the best course. When you say the settlement explicitly involved each party paying their own attorney's fees, all settlements contain this clause. I have never seen a settlement agreement where a party agreed to pay the other's attorneys fees. It's just not done. In the rare case it is, it's part of the structure of the settlement and it flows to the Plaintiff, not the Defendant. This may occur in a civil rights case where there are no real damages, but the statute allows for attorneys fees to be awarded if even one-dollar is awarded. So, in a case like this, sometimes the plaintiff will accept their attorney's fees being satisfied as the settlement, (usually along with some sort of consent decree), so as to curtail the abhorrent behavior. If you want to discuss these issues with your attorney, they are not billable: they are administrative pertaining to your bill; hence, you can do so without fear of being charged. If you're nervous, tell him ahead of time you'd like to discuss your bill. He won't try to bill you for this, as he can't, and furthermore your case is settled so your file is closed. To answer your question explicitly: No - your fees are not recoverable. This is not only because you've already settled, but you were never entitled to them anyway. To answer your question about the point of sending discovery at all if you are not going to expect answers and the goal is to settle, (1) is to preserve the right during the discovery period, in the event settlement negotiations break down; (2) to give the other side a picture of how sharp your attorney is, and that he/she will be asking the right questions and they will be invasive; and (3) this is just how it is done. What you've described is how almost all low level cases proceed. Lastly, just to address what you said about it taking a few months from reaching a verbal or "handshake" agreement and having the settlement actually be recorded by the judge and a dismissal issuing, this is just something that takes a little while. Depending on the type of case it is, the court may need to approve the settlement. Even when it's not necessary for the court to approve the settlement, it takes a while to go back and forth on the language, draft the stipulations of dismissal and so on. A few months is right on target. It sounds to me like you had a pretty effective and honest lawyer who could've dragged this out for much longer. Advice for the future, in case you ever find yourself needing the services of an attorney again: If you have these types of questions, you should ask them as they come up. Again, it's not something that you can be billed for, and your lawyer should be happy to answer. Some lawyers are better than others in remembering to explain what the technical stuff means, and what the game plan is. However, the client has a responsibility too, which is to ask if you don't understand.
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These are different terms for initiating documents. What one court or jurisdiction calls a petition, another might call an application. "Complaint" may not have a technical meaning in some contexts or jurisdictions, but often it is used to refer to the initiating document at a specialist tribunal. There are other names for initiating documents: notice of civil claim, notice of action, etc. There is no way to know which terms have a technical meaning and what those meanings are without looking to the rules and practice in a particular jurisdiction. "Indictment" is an initiating document in a criminal prosecution. But there are also "informations" (generally implying lesser charges).
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No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.
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Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.
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A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions.
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Help me interpret this court record I have a relative who's been dealing with a stalker. The guy has been arrested on stalking charges and is currently in jail. There was an arraignment yesterday and we went in and obtained the public court records for it from the courthouse website. Here's the record for reference, redacted for privacy reasons. Just holler if the link doesn't work for some reason. Overall it's easy to understand. He's been charged with stalking and has entered a plea of not guilty. My questions come down on Page 3 of the PDF. What does it mean that there was a motion/order to disqualify the judge? The particular judge that was disqualified is the one who initially heard my relative when she applied for a protective stalking order. Could that be the cause? A different judge ended up presiding over the arraignment. What does CFW stand for? Down near the bottom, the arraignment result is listed as "Held." I was thinking this meant the defendant is remaining in custody (unless he posts bail) until the next hearing on 2/5, but another family member interpreted it as just meaning the arraignment took place. Who's right? Right below that, what does DB stand for? Thanks for the help! I've tried Googling this information and just get a ton of irrelevant results. The word 'disqualify' shows up in a ton of court records and the abbreviations bring up stuff that's even more off-base.
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There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.
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Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.
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He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.
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Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.
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Short Answer A defendant cannot be found guilty on a charge for which the defendant was not arraigned, but this reality is a trivial matter whose sole practical effect is to prevent trials in absentia. There is also a buried second question implicit in the example given but not actually stated in as many words: Can a defendant be convicted of crimes for which an indictment or information is not secured? The answer to that buried second question is no, subject to the exception that a defendant may be convicted of a lesser included charge relative to one for which an information or indictment is secured and upon which the defendant is arraigned. A lesser included charge is a crime for which all the elements must be established to prove the greater charge, but the converse is not true. Thus, if someone is charged only with manslaughter in an indictment to which they plead not guilty, they cannot be convicted of murder. But, if someone is charged with murder in an indictment, to which they plead not guilty, they can be convicted of either murder or manslaughter which is a lesser included charge relative to a murder charge. Long Answer Basically, the criminal justice process goes through the following steps in a felony case (some of which may be omitted in misdemeanor and/or petty offense cases): Someone is charged with a crime in a criminal complaint and arrested. These two events can occur in either order. If the complaint is made first, an arrest warrant will be issued by a magistrate and form the basis for a subsequent arrest and booking. If an arrest is made first, usually because a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a crime was committed, the criminal complaint will be drawn up once the defendant has been arrested and booked. After both events in step 1 are complete, a first appearance of the defendant in person before a magistrate or judge is held in a matter of one to three days, or even a matter of hours, at which counsel is appointed if the defendant is indigent, the defendant is formally advised of the charges in the criminal complaint, and bail is set (or denied for cause or waived). Confusingly a first appearance is sometimes called an "arraignment on the complaint", but I am assuming that your question used the term "arraignment" in the predominant sense of an arraignment on an information or indictment. Then, in felony cases (but not misdemeanors), the criminal complaint is reviewed for probable cause following a preliminary hearing and if probable cause is found to exist it is converted to an "information" (if the preliminary hearing is waived by the defendant, the complaint is automatically converted to an "information"); or a grand jury reviews the criminal complaint for probable cause and if probable cause is found to exist it is converted to an "indictment." The defendant is arraigned in person on the information or indictment. In an arraignment, the defendant is formally informed of the charges in the information or indictment, and the defendant enters a preliminary plea to each of the charges in the information or indictment. This would typically take five minutes to half an hour, depending upon the number of charges brought. Pre-trial proceedings (e.g., "discovery" and motion practice), if any, are conducted by the lawyers for the prosecution and the defense. A trial is held (if the defendant demands it, before a jury). Caveat: There are also more steps prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or arrest (related to searches, seizures and interrogations), and there are also more steps after the trial (related to sentencing, appeals and collateral attacks on convictions and the sealing of records and pardons and commutations), but none of those steps are pertinent to this question. A jury trial would simply never be (definitively and officially) scheduled until an arraignment of the defendant was conducted. So, while it is true that a jury trial would not be conducted on charges in an indictment until the defendant is arraigned (i.e., until the defendant enters a plea to the probable cause screened charges), in the ordinary course, this is a trivial matter. But, because criminal trials can only be conducted after a defendant has been arraigned in person, the only time that a defendant can be tried in abstentia (i.e., without being present at the trial), is when the defendant is arraigned and enters a not guilty plea or the equivalent, and then absconds after that points but before the trial is conducted. (I'm not a complete expert on this, it may be necessary for the defendant to be present when the trial is commenced as well, but I don't need to know to answer this question.) Also, while the requirement of an indictment by a grand jury for felonies exists in federal court under the U.S. Constitution, and in some state courts (mostly in the Eastern U.S.) under state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution permits a state to substitute a preliminary hearing giving rise to an "information" for a grand jury indictment if its state constitution permits. My source for this post is a hard copy of the book Israel, Kamisar and LaFave, Criminal Procedure and the Constitution (1994). But, these basic principles have been in place unchanged for a very long time.
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In the US, the details are determined at the state level. The term "abandonment" is used very broadly, and can include a situation where a parent leaves a child without making contact for a period of time (which may result in termination of parental rights, but not a punishment). "Abandonment" as it applies in Washington state is explained here. There is what is known as a "safe haven" law, which allows a newborn (under 72 hours old) to be transferred (anonymously) to a qualified recipient (health care employee, medic, etc.), and not be liable under the criminal laws. This does not include dumping the infant in the snow. Under RCW 9A.42.020, the parent would be guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if their action "causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life" (note that the law is not specific to children), and this is a class B felony. There are multiple grades of mistreatment, so if the action "creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury" or "causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms", this is 4th degree mistreatment, which is a misdemeanor. There are, in parallel fashion, laws against abandonment of a dependent starting at RCW 9A.42.060, punished as a class B felony down to a gross misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for a class B felony is $20,000 and 10 years in prison, and for a simple misdemeanor it is 90 days and $1,000. In case death results, the discussion could move to the homicide statutes. Homicide by abuse is when, with extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person. and this is a class A felony. If a person "recklessly causes the death of another person", this is manslaughter in the first degree (class A felony), but if it is "with criminal negligence", it is manslaughter in the second degree (a class B felony). Manslaughter charges are predicated on there not being an intent to kill. If the intent was to actually kill the child, this would be first degree homicide, where the punishment is life imprisonment. Additionally, first degree homicide can be found if "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". State v. Edwards is a relevant case, where a person was charged with both second degree murder and homicide by abuse, and the issue came up that "extreme indifference to human life" is not a self-evident expression. It turns out that case law in Washington interprets this, as applied to first degree murder, as meaning "indifference to human life in general", not "indifference to the life of the specific victim". After a lengthy review of principles of judicial interpretation, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the first-degree murder definition of indifference, that is, it is up the the jury to decide what constitutes extreme indifference, for homicides other than 1st degree murder.
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Anywhere in the world, do parties to court hearings have no absolute right to access those transcripts (or recordings)? I have not checked every common law jurisdiction but I suspect that as all (?) such courts have their own inherent powers to make directions the answer is probably: NO. That said, a close-but-no-cigar example may be found at Rule 79.30 of the Civil Procedure Rules concerning terrorist financing proceedings in england-and-wales: Unless the court directs otherwise, rule 5.4 (Register of Claims), rule 5.4B (Supply of documents from court records – a party) and rule 5.4C (Supply of documents from court records –a non-party) do not apply to any proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies or to any document relating to such proceedings. "Sections 2 and 3 of this Part" refers to applications to set aside financial restrictions and appeals against being designated as being linked to terrorism. The relevant cited Rules are: 5.4 (1) A court or court office may keep a publicly accessible register of claims which have been issued out of that court or court office. (2) Any person who pays the prescribed fee may, during office hours, search any available register of claims. And 5.4B (1) A party to proceedings may, unless the court orders otherwise, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any document listed in paragraph 4.2A of Practice Direction 5A. (2) A party to proceedings may, if the court gives permission, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any other document filed by a party or communication between the court and a party or another person.
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I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.
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Assuming the U.S. President is convicted of a crime in their unofficial person, what happens next? Assuming that, e.g., a sitting President went and shot somebody, and was duly convicted by a jury of his/her peers, etc., in...let's say Washington D.C.... What would happen to the sentence? Would the President continue to be the President in jail? (Admittedly, this leaves out the whole "wouldn't they have been impeached before this" question...but let's assume that Congress is doing something weird again.) To reiterate: This question does not ask if a sitting President can be convicted of a crime. This question asks what happens to the sentence if and when a sitting President is convicted of a crime, which appears to be possible according to Can the US president be charged of crime such as murder while in office?
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To start, for this hypothetical to happen, a whole bunch of decisions contrary to sanity have to happen: The Vice President and President Pro Tempore do not invoke the 25th Amendment to temporarily remove the President from office Congress does not issue Articles of Impeachment The President does not pardon himself The District Attorney decides to prosecute the sitting President rather than waiting for his term to be over There are probably more I'm missing. With that out of the way, in theory there's no law that says a President cannot serve while in prison, and simply being a felon does not disqualify him from the Presidency. The judge might order that while he was still serving as President, he serve his time under house arrest - he'd constantly be surrounded by police officers, so it would be pretty difficult for him to run, and it would keep him as as able as possible to keep performing the official functions of the office. The judge could also just defer his sentence. Putting him in regular prison would have serious national security implications, both in terms of protecting his person and in allowing him to effectively serve as Commander-in-Chief, so the government could probably make a compelling case against putting a sitting President in prison. According to this Senate Report, the President will also continue to receive Secret Service protection once he leaves office, so long as he is not removed by Impeachment. There doesn't seem to be a provision against that protection if the President is in prison, so the Secret Service would be obliged to find a way to protect him while he is in prison. Most likely this would mean he would be put in an isolated prison wing, possibly with Secret Service protecting his section.
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What would happen? Nothing. The Courts would deem it to be a political question that was decisively and conclusively resolved when Congress ratified the electoral vote and the President was sworn in. To the extent that there was a possibility of challenging it, this would be considered untimely not later than the end of the President's term.
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Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt.
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High crimes and misdemeanors is interpreted by Congress While the concept is an import from English law as grounds for removing an officeholder from office, the conduct referred to is better thought of as a breach of trust rather than a specific (criminal) offense. One may commit a 'high crime or misdemeanor' without actually breaking the law. Because impeachment proceedings are political, they are not justicable under US law. As such, what meets the threshold of “high crimes and misdemeanors” is a matter for the individual members of Congress to decide just like what meets the threshold of "beyond reasonable doubt" is a matter for individual jurors to decide.
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The maximum determinate sentence for anything (outside of military law) was 21 years (in 2013 increased to 30 years for serious terrorism offenses). The law on penalties §43 says that In a sentence of detention, a time frame is set which should not normally exceed 15 years and cannot exceed 21 years. Breivik was tried once for the crime of intentional murder, and convicted -- 21 years is the sentence. I believe that Norwegian law does not have the "multiple counts" system that the US has whereby an act can be punished under multiple sections of the law or for each victim. He performed an act of killing with very many victims, so no penalty longer than 21 years is allowed.
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I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
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The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument.
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Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.
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Why are Metric Compatible fonts not copyright infringement? Metric compatible fonts (typically open-source) copy certain metrics from a (typically copyrighted) "source font". "Advance width" at least, and maybe other metrics (I have seen discussions of copying kerning data). Why is this not copyright infringement? Presumably the designer of a metric compatible font is not printing the source font and measuring it. They are using the exact metrics to achieve exactly the same horizontal spacing. Why does the creation of a metric compatible font not constitute copyright infringement?
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It is important to distinguish between a typeface, which describes the visual appearance, a font, which may be interpreted as a computer program implementing a typeface, and the name of the font. These aspects may be subject to different immaterial rights. The name may be subject to trademarks. The font may be copyrighted. The typeface may be protected by copyrights or design patents, highly dependent on the kind of typeface and on the relevant jurisdiction. A copyright for typefaces is not generally desirable, because this copyright would extend to all documents set in that typeface. Therefore, the U.S. doesn't acknowledge copyright for typefaces. Germany distinguishes between artistic typefaces (eligible for copyright) and utility typefaces (not eligible). If a typeface is not protected, it is possible to create a new font under a different name that implements the same typeface. This is an extremely common practice. E.g. the popular Helvetica font was cloned multiple times. Arial is heavily based on Helvetica but differs in a few details. Arial was in turn cloned as Liberation Sans. The TeX Gyre Heros font is closely based on Helvetica.
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It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment).
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Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.
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A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.
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Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine.
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Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this.
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If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission.
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Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.
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Searching for the term for an anecdotal "simple person" Maria Theresa and the Law Many years ago, I was attending a university course about legal aspects for computer scientists. It was a very basic course and in order to make the topic digestible more easily for us students, the lecturer was providing some anecdotes. As the course was provided by an Austrian university, some of the examples referred to the Habsburgans and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The lecturer told us that before a law could pass, a member of the common people had to read the law text and explain it in his own words. Only if that was possible and purpose of the law could be reflected, a law could become active and valid. The idea behind this was to ensure that the population, which received only basic education back in the days of Maria Theresa, could understand the meaning and implications of the law. This person had a specific name, if I remember correctly, it was Hungarian for "simple person" or even "stupid person". Does anyone know the term for this person?
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In the United States, we use the phrase "Reasonable Person" which is not to say an average person or a simple man, but an individual who understands the limitations of the situation and would act in accordance with that knowledge. For example, if a doctor improperly rendered help a patient, his actions would be evaluated based on reasonable knowledge of people with his medical knowledge, where as a person practicing medicine without a license would be subjected to a more common-man standard. The phrase person is therefor substituted for a reasonable individual and thus, a "Reasonable Landlord/Renter" could exist in housing cases, or a "Reasonable Doctor" in medical torts or "a Reasonable Woman" in sexual assault cases, so the "Reasonable Person" is often used to allow the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the witnesses and the accused and see how they would react (Historically, the term was called a "Reasonable Man" though "Reasonable Person" was used to make the term more neutral to what the definition of "Man" was (A human male or a member of the Human Species, regardless of gender).
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My understanding is that is simply another term for a "court of law" or for a "court of justice". All of those terms simply mean a court, a place where judgements under law are made. Which term is used is a matter of history and tradition, or perhaps of style. The term does not of itself imply any difference of rules or authority or procedure. Different courts do have different procedures to some extent, and if one court normally uses one term for itself, then that term may go with that court's procedure to some extent. Merriam-webster gives as sense 2: a court of justice Collins gives as sense 4: a court of law Cambridge gives: the legal system and the work it does The legal section of the Free Dictionary gives: A term used to describe the judicial branch of government; the judiciary; or those connected with the court system. ... Judicature refers to those officers who administer justice and keep the peace. It signifies a tribunal or court of justice. ... [sense 5] a court of justice or such courts collectively.
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Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
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Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).
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Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.
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Legalese The purpose of a legal document is to set out the rights and responsibilities so that: they can understand them, a third party (e.g. a judge) can rule on them in the event of a dispute. These two requirements are often in tension. We have about 1,000 years of legal precedent where certain words and phrases (sometimes in Latin rather than English) have developed very clear and precise meanings. This serves very well for the 2nd point but it can be confusing to lay people especially where: the word as used in everyday speech has a broader meaning than the way it is used in the law (e.g. shall), the word is no longer used in everyday speech (e.g. thou), or the damn thing is in Latin (e.g. certiorari). For example: "Thou shall not kill" is a legal prohibition - killing by you must not happen. However, "Killing is illegal" is merely an observation. TL;DR There is no reason why an agreement cannot be expressed in plain English. However, when put in front of a judge, that plain English must be interpreted; maybe it is better to use words that have clear and unambiguous legal definitions? An anecdote, probably untrue In the spirit of never letting the truth get in the way of a good story. The legal fraternity's love of opaque language supposedly dates from the 1600s. In those days a lawyer was paid by the folio - a large piece of paper. As a consequence lawyers used very big handwriting. Parliament, justifiably, thought that this was a rort and legislated that lawyers must be paid by the word. So now we have "in the event that" instead of "if" because 400 years ago it was worth four times as much. Parliaments do this kind of thing a lot.
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Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.
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First off, let me confirm that this text accurately describes the reality. Second, this is less far afield from the common law than you would think. If you are in a jurisdiction without any binding case law on a particular point, a so called "question of first impression", you then turn to persuasive authority. Persuasive authority includes case law that is binding in some other jurisdiction and legal scholarship, often in the form of a treatise or commentary. And, it is much easier to find an answer in a treatise which is carefully arranged on a subject matter basis, than to do case law research from other jurisdictions. This is particularly true when you have not devoted a lot of time to learning how to find the needle of the law you want in the haystack of the mountain of decided cases on all available subject. The very difficult task of case law research was only possible on more than an isolated hit or miss basis at all in common law systems where case law matters in the years before the 1980s when computerized case law word searching started to become possible at an affordable to lawyers price, because a lot of full time institutional actors devote a great deal of time and money to developing and maintaining tools like digests, citation indexes, and annotations to statutes to allow practitioners to locate that case law. If court decisions don't serve as binding precedents, those institutions aren't developed. For example, in common law countries, until very recently, there were no good resources for locating trial court decisions and rulings in state courts which handle the bulk of litigation, but whose rulings are not binding precedents. (Electronic record keeping in trial courts has changed the economics of this practice and made it much more common to publish trial court decisions and to index them appropriately.) So, if persuasive authority in your legal system in the form of non-binding case law is hard to find because it wasn't worth the money for the legal system to collectively develop the resources to publish and index it on a systematic basis for an audience of pretty much the entire legal profession, the other form of persuasive authority, legal treatises, becomes much more influential by default. You see something similar in very early legal opinion writing by American judges before the institutions necessary to systemically utilize case law precedents was developed. Judges were constantly citing treatises like Blackstone, which is something they rarely do now, because that was what was on their bookshelf. Further, there are feedback effects. Smart people who wish to influence the law for society without going the legislative route in common law countries will often seek careers as judges. But, absent the psychic perk of influencing the law and making a difference in society, a lot of the most ambitious people in the judiciary in a common law system will choose instead to go the route of academia and seek to become law professors where they can have a similar influence, while earning similar pay and having more time off and freedom to pursue your own personal and professional interests. So, in systems where legal precedents aren't binding, people who might otherwise be inclined to write probing legal opinions that develop legal concepts are less inclined to become judges, and the people who do become judges care more about getting the right result and less about explaining their decisions in a way that will influence future judges in the same circumstances. Finally, consider that many civil law legal systems involve countries with a lot less appellate litigation than the United States (currently 330 million people with more than 200 years of case law), or the UK (currently 60 million people with about 1000 years of case law), or India (more than 1 billion people with a couple of centuries of case law, since colonial precedents have relevance). Suppose that you live in Denmark or Belgium or Portugal or Costa Rica or South Korea, where your population is much lower and your time frame during which your legal system has been in place is not as long. In a situation like that, half a dozen or a dozen leading legal scholars can publish treatises over ten or twenty years that are going to cover, somewhere, the lion's share of the pressing issues in the legal system, and there is probably only one law school in the entire country, so it is quite likely that most of the lawyers in the entire country took contracts or property or family law from the the same people in law school, which makes them predisposed to consider a treatise written by that professor a credible one in that area of law. And, all other sources are a comparative vacuum. If you are a judge, why cite non-binding precedents from your fellow non-specialist judge in a country that simply has no precedents in many areas of law and has fewer carefully reasoned ones, when you could instead look for guidance from the person who taught you this area of law in the first place and literally "wrote the book" and who was probably consulted by the government in any recent amendments to relevant civil code or statute of broad general applicability. And, once you start out using those methods, it becomes habitual and legal treatises become very influential.
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Stop paying rent if landlord does not provide lease agreement and basic services I have been staying in a house for 9 months already, that I share with 4 other roommates. I have asked the landlord for a lease agreement on repeated occasions, but to this day I never received anything, so I do not have anything official proving that I gave him the 2-months worth deposit, and I do not feel protected at all if he suddenly decides to kick me out. Question 1: what would be the best course of action to force the landlord to give me the requested lease agreement? Now it gets a bit more complicated, and I hope it stays in the scope of this forum. One of the other roommates has been kicked out of the house. Some legal action is ongoing now, as he refuses to leave the house. As he is the one paying most of the bills, the landlord asked all the other tenants not to give any more money to the other roommate, in order to pressure him financially and force him out. As a result he stopped paying for the bills and we had the power shut down 20 days ago. When I asked the landlord about what he was planning to do regarding that, his answer was that it was not his business. To have him take action, I do not see any way of pressure except threatening not to pay my rent. Edit: I might have not been really clear: the landlord asked us all to stop paying the other guy for the power bill, and that he was going to take care of it. As a result we are now in our 20th day without power, and the landlord just does not care. It may not change anything regarding law, but I definitely have a pretty shaddy landlord. Question 2: if I plan on not paying my rent until the power is re-established, what is likely to happen, keeping in mind that I do not have any lease agreement. Am I protected in any way, or can the landlord just come in my room and throw everything away, or worse just point me with a gun and force me to move? Question 3: how does the notion of "not paying rent" apply if I do not have a lease agreement?
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I do not have anything official proving that I gave him the 2-months worth deposit What did you do, hand him a wad of cash? Pay by check, and put what it's for on the memo line. You've been there for nine months and there are several other people who can testify that you've been living there, so it would be difficult to claim that you aren't a renter. If you can show that the landlord is aware of your residence, that definitely helps even further, as does receiving mail there, registering to vote or with the DMV with that address, etc. Question 1 : what would be the best course of action to force the landlord to give me the requested lease agreement? You can't "force" someone to give you an agreement. That's kinda part of the definition of the word "agreement". If you find the conditions unacceptable, you can find another place to rent. When I asked the landlord about what he was planning to do regarding that, his answer was that it was not his business. It doesn't seem like it is. You could take the money you would have given to the other roommate, and give it to the power company instead. If paying for the utilities is part of the renters' responsibilities, and the renters are not paying for the utilities, then it's their choice to not have power. In California, landlords are required to make power available, but that just means that they can't interfere with you purchasing it from the power company, not that the landlord has to pay for it (if the landlord had agreed to pay for it, and isn't, then you can deduct the cost from the rent, but you can't simply withhold all rent, and your question indicates that the landlord hasn't agreed to pay for power anyway). Am I protected in any way, or can the landlord just come in my room and throw everything away, or worse just point me with a gun and force me to move? It would be difficult for the landlord to get rid of you, and would probably take several months to do legally. Performing an eviction himself, rather than getting the sheriff's department to do it, would expose him to serious charges, especially if a gun were used. Besides criminal charges, "If this or other unlawful methods, such as locking a tenant out or seizing his possessions before an eviction process has ended, are used to force a tenant to leave a property, a landlord may be subject to fees up to $100 per day of unlawful method use." http://homeguides.sfgate.com/tenants-rights-utility-billing-california-8073.html However, while the legal process will take a long time, at the end you will still be liable for back rent, and you will have an eviction on your record, which will make it harder to rent in the future.
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If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord.
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No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").
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Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position.
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Short answer: Yes, you can get out. However, this will be harder than you may want it to be. You will need to check your lease agreement for an arbitration clause. If the lease mentions disagreements will be handled by arbitration (or an arbiter), you need to know that going into this. Arbitration clauses usually stipulate that the landlord picks the arbiter, who will almost always be predisposed to side with the landlord. This pamphlet sheds insight into the situation. Skip down to PDF page 22, section header "My neighbors are constantly playing loud music..." Summarized, you can get out but if other tenants are not as affected, it will be hard to prove it affects you differently. You do, however, have the benefit of knowing the particular situation is illegal (as compared to the pamphlet's example of playing music, which is only situationally illegal). First, get written, signed testimony from other tenants (your roommate, the one above the smoker, etc). Preferably, get these signatures notarized. The testimony should include an acknowledgement that the signer has smelled the marijuana and a statement about how often this occurs, along with the date of signature. Next, send a certified letter to your landlord. Keep a copy of this letter. In it, state your intention to move unless they fix the situation within thirty (30) days. Remind them you already have informed them of this situation. Inform them you have (hopefully notarized) testimony of the marijuana smoking from other tenants, remind them that this is illegal, and that this is affecting your health. You may also warn them that if they do not rectify the situation and you leave after thirty days, they cannot keep your deposit or charge you a termination fee- they have breached your lease contract through failure to maintain a safe and livable rental unit (a gentle reminder that you will seek legal action if they attempt to keep your deposit or charge you fees is appropriate). In the letter, request an immediate, written response with their intentions on the matter, and give a deadline (like 3 days from receipt). As a certified letter, you will know when they get it. The wording of this letter is important. You want to clearly state the facts without sounding self-righteous, angry, or vindictive. And proofread the heck out of it. If the landlord is faced with possible legal action for forcing an illegal tenant to follow the law, and certain legal action for trying to keep a legal tenant to remain in illegal, harmful circumstances, they may well decide to oust the smoker. If your scare tactic doesn't work, however, you should make good on the threat- really do leave after thirty days, and if they attempt to charge you for anything or withhold your deposit, you really should contact a lawyer. You should also, however, have the money saved to pay the termination fees, just in case. Because the smoke affects you differently, and there is no easy way to prove this, an unsympathetic court (or arbiter) may rule against you. (NOTE: I am not a lawyer, but I did have to break a lease and spent a good deal of time researching and discussing my situation with a lawyer. In the end I lost my deposit but did not have to pay any fees or missed rent.)
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No, it was not done properly See here. You cannot, and the landlord cannot agree to remove your name from the joint tenancy. You can cancel the tenancy for both of you, as can your ex. If you do this, the landlord is not under any obligation to offer your ex a lease on the same terms or at all so they would risk becoming homeless. The court has the power under the Family Law Act to make such a substitution so you can apply to them for such an order.
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In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction.
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The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.
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What is the significance of dissenting opinions in appellate court decisions? Appellate courts often hear cases en banc and decide them by simple majority of the judges on the bench. The majority will typically sign a single "per curiam" decision, which constitutes the judicial precedent (and hence law) on the question decided. But judges who disagree with the majority opinion will often author dissenting opinions or statements which are published along with the majority opinion. What significance, if any, do these dissents have for purposes of law? For example, I was just reading a filing with SCOTUS requesting an emergency stay of a Pennsylvanian Supreme Court decision. The filing includes not only the majority state court per curiam in question (ref A1), but also several dissenting statements from that court in that case (ref A5-). Do those have any more weight before the SCOTUS than any other writing or argument that may be filed in support of the appellants' arguments? Or, do dissents have any sort of intermediate authority – less than precedent, but more than any other argument would have solely on its merits – in terms of informing future legal decisions?
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The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.
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Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
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If an appellate court interprets a constitutional clause, that interpretation only has precedential weight as long as the clause (and other clauses it interacts with) go unchanged. Some aspects of the original interpretation might have some persuasive weight on the way the new clause is interpreted (for example, if the new clause uses language that the court previously used or interpreted). But other than taking potentially persuasive guidance from that kind of interaction, a new constitutional clause is interpreted de novo (anew, without deference to previous interpretations). An example of this can be found in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). The Supreme Court had to interpret the newly ratified 21st Amendment which ended prohibition. Prior to the Twenty-First Amendment, it would obviously have been unconstitutional to have imposed any fee for [the privilege of moving beer across a state border]. But, the 21st Amendment changed that (cleaned up): The amendment which prohibited the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors into any state in violation of the laws thereof abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating liquors. The words used are apt to confer upon the state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.
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The decision which Assange sought to appeal, United States v Assange [2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin), was a decision of a divisional court of three judges. That is because s 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 provides for an appeal from "the appropriate judge" to the High Court, not the Court of Appeal. A divisional court of the High Court, called the Administrative Court, exercises this appellate jurisdiction and as an intermediate appellate court of three High Court judges, has a similar status to the Court of Appeal. When a point of law has already been considered by a single judge, and a panel of three judges on appeal, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to consider whether to grant leave to appeal directly under the provisions cited by Jen rather than requiring the parties to go through another intermediate court. An example of this is R (on the application of Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd) v Crown Prosecution Service [2020] UKSC 39, an appeal from a divisional court exercising judicial review jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from the divisional court in Assange's case.
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The Supreme Court does not handle hypotheticals. The court has interpreted Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, the Case or Controversy Clause as a limit on the powers of the judicial branch. The courts have jurisdiction over various types of cases and controversies but only those listed in the Constitution. This limits courts to hearing actual cases and prevents them from issuing advisory opinions. Additionally, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit. You can't sue the government just because you don't like a law (well, you can, your suit will just be dismissed because it lacks standing). You have to show That you have been, or will imminently be, injured (injury-in-fact) That there is a direct correlation between that injury and the law (causation) And that a favorable court decision will redress the injury (redressability) As a practical matter, the courts are already overwhelmed by the number of actual cases that come up and the Supreme Court can only hear a tiny fraction of the cases they are asked to hear. If they added the ability to hear hypothetical cases as well, the court could easily be overwhelmed by Senators and Representatives asking them to weigh in on every remotely controversial bill or amendment before Congress or interest groups bringing cases for speculative grievances.
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Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? Not really. Supreme Court justices decide unreviewably whether or not to recuse themselves from cases, informed by general canons of judicial ethics which guide their decisions even though they are non-binding on Supreme Court justices. There is a strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from particular cases in which the justice was involved as lawyer prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice. There is also a fairly strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases where they have a strong, personal, and particularized to them (as opposed to general to people of their class and situation) financial interest (e.g. from cases involving companies in which they have large investments or family members who are top managers). In the example given of the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case, her strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups would normally not be a ground for recusal. General strong policy dispositions are normally not a basis for recusal. But, if instead, she were an investor in (or even a long time regular customer of) 303 Creative LLC, she would probably recuse.
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Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual.
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If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.
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Is This A Legal Abuse of Teaching Power? From this question on Academia Stack Exchange, a professor is requiring students to submit support for a law as an assignment. It's possible that the question misrepresents this, in that this is a bonus question, but assuming this is an assignment for which the final grade will be determined, is this a legal action a professor (or teacher) can make - requiring students to advocate support for a law, even if they personally don't? Is it legal to make the students actually submit this to authorities, such as Congress? I realize it's legal to challenge students to think from different points of view, but is it legal to actually make them write support for a law and submit that to authorities?
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There is nothing wrong with this requirement. The teacher or professor isn't requiring you to change your opinion. Instead, the requirement is simply to marshall evidence in favor of an opinion that you may not hold. Being able to do this is a valuable rhetorical skill (and a skill which lawyers must routinely employ). For example, in competitive debate, you often do not have the freedom to decide whether you will be arguing in favor or against a resolution, and may not even know which side you will be advancing until moments before the event starts. Freedom of conscience does not extend to freedom from understanding people who disagree with your deeply held belief. UPDATE: Requiring a whole classroom of students (possibly many classrooms of students) to advocate with multiple representatives for a bill does seem problematic, in terms of election laws and probably in terms of the legal requirements that apply to the university, and also possibly in terms of "forced speech", because in requiring the advocacy to be submitted to the official and take a particular position, goes beyond the "let's pretend" veneer that applies in most debate contexts.
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Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.
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You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court.
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No, the result of an exam is not actionable. The court could only make a decision whether legal proceedings were met. However, the grader’s decision whether a particular answer (and thus the overall exam’s result) was correct or incorrect is not legal in nature. There is no German law saying “1 + 1 = 2”. Therefore, the court could not make a ruling on that, nor is it really their task to do so. Similarly, it is not the court’s (or the legal system’s) responsibility to ensure a certain share of students pass the exam. […] 93% not passing is just absurd. Welcome to Germany. Such exams did and do exist. I refer you to the local student’s body (specifically the Fachschaft). They will advocate for (future) students, especially if there are “design flaws” with the class to be found. Unfortunately, if it’s the “examiner’s fault”, there are no other options than finding an amicable solution. Sometimes, students change universities just to pass a certain module.
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Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress? No. Any use of force of any kind that only harms or kills the shooter who is actively engaged in a school shooting (and indeed, even if it caused bodily injury that isn't grave or deadly to someone else who is innocent) is always justified. You can't shoot someone who is not an ongoing threat to others if they flee, in order to arrest or punish them (e.g. an unarmed shoplifter), but under the leading constitutional case, Tennessee v. Garner, this limitation doesn't apply to murderers and mass shooters anyway, at least if they continue to pose a future threat.
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Yes, but maybe no. In many state universities that I am familiar with, there are contractual guarantees that exempt regular academic staff from the "we pwn all your stuff" rule, which does not extend to other staff. (I had to toss back a contract for subcontracted work once because they asserted automatic ownership of copyright). It depends on your contract, entirely. Which, if it is non-existent, is a bit problematic. Their claim would be based on "work for hire" law, 17 USC 101, where the central question is whether it is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment". If this is a work for hire, they have more than a right to the proceeds of the work, they own the work and can sue you for publishing without permission. Work for hire means they own the copyright, and only the copyright owner can authorize publication. You do not legally have to have an attorney to request a release, but you should have one, because if you request a release, you are admitting that this is a work for hire. Your lawyer would tell you not to admit to such a thing. Of course, if you are reasonably certain that this is a work for hire and don't intend to contend otherwise, that kind of foot-shooting is not a concern. If your lawyer delivers a formal letter to your boss, the boss will almost certainly hand it to the university attorneys, and both parties will then take the hardest line possible, in defense of the interests of their clients.
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In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.
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One of the relevant cases is Tinker vs. Des Moines. In it, students wore black armbands in protest, and were suspended from school unless they agreed to remove the armbands. Because their protest was non-disruptive, the school's position was found to be a violation of their civil rights. Generally, the school cannot interfere with students' rights to free speech and civil liberties. That does not mean that students are free from discipline however. If students walk out, whether in protest of a great injustice, or just to get lunch, or go to a concert, the school can discipline the student for walking out. What the school cannot do, however, is treat the reason for the walkout differently. They cannot give minor detention for one reason (say, a rock concert), and a full suspension for politically motivated walk-out. If they are dispensing harsher punishments based on the reason for the walkout, that is crossing a big line. More detailed discussion can be found at http://time.com/5171160/gun-control-student-protest-history/
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For HIPAA, Does US Patient Data Have To Stay On US Servers? For an application that stores US patient data, does HIPAA require that US data stays on US servers?
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No. This is governed by the HIPAA Security Rule which was a regulation that the HIPAA statute required the Department of Health and Human Services to adopt. The Rule does require someone covered by HIPAA to have a "Business Associate Agreement" (BAA) and a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with any cloud storage provider (which would be the usual way that a U.S. health care provider subject to HIPAA would have a foreign server), but the Rule does not require that a server be physically located in the United States. The lack of this requirement is a good one, because when you are transmitting data (which the Security Rule requires be done in a secure fashion), you can't know which servers the information will end up on in a trip from source to destination. Email and all other Internet content travels through what amounts to a pony express. It goes through a variety in intermediate server nodes which can change during the course of a session, and generally speaking, you never know which intermediate nodes are used. You could be seeing this answer via a server in China, for example, and you would never know it.
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The GDPR actually does require you to follow DNT in Article 21: In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications. I think this is quite explicit.
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As stated by GDPR article 3 you are required to follow it under the following circumstance: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. You can read the recourse better at What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU?, but in short the US will allow the EU court to press it's rulings due to wanting to keep its trades, treaties and other similar things in place.
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There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement.
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It doesn’t make you exempt from the GDPR if that’s what you’re asking The hash you produce is linked to one (or a small number) of computers and it therefore serves as an ID number. Because that ID number is linked to the owner of the computer it is personal information and if you are collecting it, you must comply with the requirements of the GDPR - valid legal reason, deletion when no longer required, deletion on request, data security etc.
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Yes. It is legal for them to do so. Also, they are often required, by their insurers and lawyers, if not as a matter of law, to maintain them for seven years in most cases, so that the information is available if a lawsuit arises from any of their dealings with you (e.g. if they receive notice of a lawsuit involving a Zipcar you were allegedly using or had under your control at the time of an accident, or if there is a class action lawsuit over alleged breach of contract or consumer laws involving their charges to you). There are virtually no circumstances, with the possible exception of certain credit card account information, when someone has a duty to destroy records maintained about you under U.S. law. In this particular instance, everything on your driver's license is a matter of public record in any case, so your privacy interest is reduced for this reason as well.
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Is this limitation enforceable? Sure it is; you agree to a TOS or EULA with the company to use the API, and that's a legally binding contract. If the contract stipulates limits to caching, that's enforceable in civil court by lawsuit (possibly criminal court, which will depend on jurisdiction). What if the end-user is the one caching the data on their end? If your end users might be caching, that's something you may need to outline in your own TOS/EULA to adhere to the API's stipulations. And, the API may not allow you to serve API data to your own users; read it and see. the information provided by the API is not proprietary,... That doesn't matter; you're using their API and service. If you don't like that, you need to write your own API or develop your own queries for the information. I'm designing a web application that will make use of a (non-free) third-party API. If that App is going to be distributed and used by others, talk to a lawyer about the API and have them write a TOS/EULA for your App; you run the risk of significant legal liability with a publicly distributed App that uses someone else's API, paid or free.
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In this statement of "Patient Rights & Responsibilities from Nash UNC it is said that: A patient has the right to know the names and the jobs of his or her caregivers. But I do not find any actual law that establishes such a right. Hospitals usually have a policy that doctors and other caregivers must wear name-tags and identify themselves to patients, but that does not necessarily apply to questions after the fact, nor can I be sure that any law mandates such a policy.
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Would a search engine be allowed to prioritize their content? I notice that when I type anything into google, google-related searches appear first. I know this is probably not what's happening, but it begs the question, could a search engine prioritize its own products and services legally?
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Due to competition/antitrust laws it can be illegal, more so if the search engine is dominant in the market. This has actually been realized in the EU where they fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing their market dominance and favouring their own Google Shopping service in search results. For further information, that fine has been specifically addressed on this site. In the US, this has not yet come to such a dramatic penalty, but there have been investigations. The FTC has investigated similar search results manipulation among other antitrust issues, but ultimately decided not to file a lawsuit as the changes to the search algorithms "could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product." Following this inaction, as of November 2017, the state of Missouri is also investigating Google on the same issue. I'm not certain if manipulating search results on its own is illegal, but with market dominance (like what Google has), it certainly is.
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You mean like Unilever, and countless others do? Yes. Many, many companies control a stable of brands, often of competing products. This is particularly prevalent in grocery lines (cleaning, food, beauty products) and motor vehicles (there are dozens of brands of motor vehicle but only a handful of automotive companies). Clearly, these products have different features (improvements) – you are entitled to segment your market anyway you like. If they are actually produced by the same company, keeping that secret would be virtually impossible. If they were separate companies (even with licencing agreements etc.), well, they are not the same company even if they have common ownership. As for having a monopoly: if you hold a patent you are allowed to have a monopoly, if you don't, expect to see knock-off rocket boots on the shelf in a week.
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Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.
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I don't think any appellate court has given an opinion on whether encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is not surprising as only recently has it come to light that the government may have weakened encryption protocols and asked for backdoors in order to aid in decryption. However, Orin Kerr, professor of Law at George Washington University School of Law wrote this article in 2001. He argues that encryption does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. He says: the Fourth Amendment regulates access, not understanding. Once you introduce your communication into third party systems (or the garbage :P), they may give it up to the government. If the government happens to be able to understand that communication, so be it. He shows how this conclusion is consistent with how the courts have ruled on "reassembly of shredded documents, recovery of deleted files, and the translation of foreign languages". Note that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is only one of the tests used to determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable. Another test is the "trespass" test which deems an interaction to be a search per se if there is a trespass on a person's personal effects. It was used before Katz and was reiterated recently in US v Jones (2012). Regardless, your question is still meaningful because the two tests are used alongside each other.
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In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.
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Law enforcement only investigates crimes, and they have significant discretion regarding which crimes to investigate. If they considered a crime to have occurred in your case, they could certainly seek a court warrant requiring Google to turn over IP addresses. More likely, you might have standing to seek relief in civil courts. In such a case, you could try to get the civil court to issue a subpoena for a third party like Google to provide IP addresses. Of course, you could have your civil suit contested by the counterparty, and even if not the court may decline to issue a subpoena, and if even if it issues one the third party may object to the court, or simply decline to comply with it.
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As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.
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An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party.
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Is it decorous to refer to mainstays (people recurring in a legal document) by abbreviations? Presume that these mainstays (even if their names are short) can all be named publicly. I fancy referring to them only with my abbreviations that I introduce on the first page, to save space and avoid typos, like for long surnames. E.g., I'd state (on the first page), before solely using thereafter, my abbreviations of the 4 counterparties (presume this) as: JK for Leoš Janáček (not LJ; this already means Lord Justice of Appeal), ZK for Zoltán Kodály, GK for György Kurtág, and BM for Bohuslav Martinů.
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No. In formal writing, you refer to people by name. After you use their full name you can just use their last name in future references, but you don't refer to them by their initials. Even in informal writing, you normally don't use initials unless the person is commonly known by their initials (e.g. JFK) or unless you're using shorthand.
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There is already any number of other pages that are named kleinanzeigen, just with different top level domains (probably sprung into existence after the plan for the renaming became public). But if you are a Website operating in Germany that owns the kleinanzeigen.de domain, that probably does not worry you too much (you could probably fight others over the use of the word for a specific purpose such as a classifieds website, because sometimes specific uses might be protected; but that would be an uphill battle, since as pointed out the name is the literal description of the business model). What might worry you is that somebody is tricked into confusing kleinanzeigen.eu or kleinanzeigen.biz with your valuable property. The way to avoid that is to register a "Wort-Bild-Marke", a combination of your name with one or more distinctive graphic elements. You will notice that the "kleinanzeigen" name on the website is rendered in a specific font and is preceded by what on closer inspection turns out to be a stylized letter "k". That is something that can be protected by law. Nobody else is allowed to be too close to that design, so that minimizes the danger that visitors confuse a competitor's page with the "original" kleinanzeigen page. Since the question alludes to eBay's business, kleinanzeigen is no longer a part of eBay - for some three years now they belong to Adevinta, a Norwegian conglomerate that runs classified portals in various countries. So keeping "ebay" in their name was not really an option (and all alternatives to "kleinanzeigen" were probably worse).
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Yes. There is no requirement that a company name be accurately descriptive. One could call such a company "Horror and Fury Brewing" if one chose to, or "Joe's Eats". Such a name might well reduce book sales, but there is no law against poor business decisions. As long as the name does not violate any existing trademarks, it should be OK unless there is some specific law in the local jurisdiction that regulates company names, which seems unlikely.
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There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one.
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Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.
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While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.
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You need to do something, if you don't like all-caps. This is a response to the requirement to be "conspicuous", as required under UCC 2-316, viz. to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SHOUT since under UCC 1-201 "conspicuous" means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following: (A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language There is a relevant case, American General Finance, Inc. v. Bassett, 285 F.3d 882, which deals with a "clear and conspicious" requirement in another context, which "sees no reason to depart" from the UCC understanding.
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There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan".
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How to get a proof of business address for mail forwarding service? We would like to use mailing forwarding service as our business address in US. Banks require us to prove business address. How to get a proof of business address if we are using a mail forwarding service?
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Each bank will decide for itself what it needs by way of evidence to satisfy its legal obligations. Ask them.
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You should not keep them at all. Mark them clearly with whatever variant of "not living at this address"/"not known at this address" is accepted in your area, or with "return to sender, wrong address" and provide them to the courier agent or post office responsible for your area. Keeping mail that isn't yours opens you to offences like theft or conversion, or of interfering with the post system. Opening mail that isn't yours opens you to offences specifically defined by that action, as well as potential privacy breaches. Destroying mail that isn't yours opens you to offences of property damage.
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Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.
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It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question.
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I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.
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Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.
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First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob."
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The answer may vary depending on your state. If you're in a state that's a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,* there's a designated heirarchy for sourcing sales of digital goods: First, if you're making delivery to the customer at your location, source to the location where you make the sale. If not, source to the location where your customer will receive the product. Neither of those works for you, so you'd continue down the list to the first one you can apply: The purchaser’s address that you maintain in the ordinary course of the your business; The purchaser's address obtained during the consummation of the sale; The address where you first make the product available for transmission or the address from which you provided the service. By my reading, that means that in the absence of an address, you basically come back full circle and source the sale back to your own location. *Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming
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Who has responsibility for tax records after the death of a tax preparation professional? My girlfriend's grandmother recently passed away. She ran a tax preparation and accounting business out of her home. She was in possession of decades worth of tax forms (returns, etc.) and similar documents that belonged to clients over the years, many of who are inactive. We have been unable to get a straight answer about our obligations for handling these documents. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? What if she refuses to take the documents? Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? She was licensed/registered in Oregon, USA. Update After contacting the IRS a second time, and speaking with regulatory bodies in Oregon, we took the following actions: The woman who purchased the active clients took possession of the relevant records. Records older than 10 years could be destroyed (though we still chose to try to return them) Individual records more recent than 10 years: Attempted to contact the owners and allow them to retrieve their documents. Provided a 7 day grace period to respond before destroying their records. Commercial records more recent than 10 years: Used the Oregon Secretary of State business search to find active businesses and offered to return the documents: Oregon SOS Business Search Inactive businesses not associated with an individual client were destroyed Food for thought: About half of the businesses wanted the records, and the rest wanted them destroyed. Most individuals were very eager to retain their records, and grateful that we did not destroy them.
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That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life.
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If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.
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The legal requirement to hand over the returns is found in 26 U.S. Code § 6103: (f) Disclosure to Committees of Congress (1) Committee on Ways and Means, Committee on Finance, and Joint Committee on Taxation Upon written request from the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, or the chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request, except that any return or return information which can be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer shall be furnished to such committee only when sitting in closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure. Enforcement is found in 26 U.S. Code § 7214 (a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States— ... (3) who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this title fails to perform any of the duties of his office or employment; or ... shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution. These punishments are essentially identical to those in Section 7213, which describe the punishments for those who unlawfully release returns. I've seen that section quoted in some articles as the basis for punishing failure to provide requested returns to the Chair of the House Ways and Means committee, but I'm not really seeing how that section covers non-compliance. Non-compliance seems only covered by Section 7214, which requires the "intent to defeat" (or various other issues, such as not disclosing known violations to the Secretary, etc.). That may be hard to prove in this scenario, and part of the stalling by Mnuchin may in part because they are exploring if they can build a strong case that it wasn't his intent to defeat the title. The quote of his you note is particularly on point on this, as he explicitly says he intends to obey the law; he's just questioning the constitutional issues involved.
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It's true that you can't prove what was in the envelope. But assuming this ends in small claims court or some sort of collections action lets play out how it works. The company is going to claim that they never got notice of cancellation. They will plead ignorance so they won't have any evidence of what you didn't send. That's obvious, but more on this later. You are going to have a trove of evidence. The emails you sent, the webforms you filled out, the voicemails you left. And finally, the letters that you sent. Let's think about the weight of evidence! At the very least you can ask them, if they claim they didn't get a cancellation from you, what did they get in that certified envelope from you? They'll need to produce whatever was in the envelope. Unless they claim that it was empty. At this point the judge will see exactly what is going on and you won't need to prove what was in the envelope. Legally, the way this works is covered by Rule 901. (a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. (b) Examples. The following are examples only — not a complete list — of evidence that satisfies the requirement (1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be. It's that last piece that matters here. You will take the stand and testify that the letter you brought to court is a true copy of the letter in the envelope.
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If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor.
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As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis.
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The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).
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There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.
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Incentive for offering discounted services to NPO/Charity/501(c)(3)? Backstory: I am exploring options for a business that offers Software, Platform and Infrastructure as-a-service (SAAS, IAAS and PAAS) and Insurance-Billing services to Ambulance companies, Fire Departments, Schools, and other Charitable and Not-for-profit organizations. These organizations tend to have strict budgets and often encounter financial impasses that directly affect their ability to maintain subscriptions and use productivity software and services that ultimately impact their businesses and their communities. We would like to offer discounts to these organizations, but our profit margin is already quite low, and we would essentially be breaking even or paying clients to use our products and services. Question: Can such discounts be considered tax-deductible charitable donations?
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Under U.S. federal tax law: In general, a discount on a service provided to a charity is not tax-deductible. There is no deduction for "opportunity cost." So, for example, if you bill professionally at $100/hour, but you offer service to a qualified charity at $25/hour, you do not get to deduct $75/hour of your time. But you can generally deduct the value of things that you pay for and give to the charity, like travel costs you incur specifically to serve the charity. So if you really are providing SaaS to a qualified charity at a loss then the difference between your cost and what you charge the charity could be deducted as a contribution for tax purposes. The rules covering tax consequences of charitable contributions are in IRS Publication 526. And if you find that easy enough, you can dive into 26 U.S.C §170 ... and the IRS's occasional attempts to explain its interpretation of that law with respect to in-kind contributions. Suffice it to say that if you aren't comfortable arguing for your interpretation of the rules then you should defer to a qualified attorney or accountant who is.
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It looks to me as if "money laundering" is a misunderstanding; though any organization has a duty to prevent this, charities have no special responsibilties. However, charity law does in general terms prevent a charity from giving money to a cause that does not further the charity's aims. The Charity Commission's guidance says "Charities can only spend their money on projects or activities that support the aims stated in their governing document" (and although it goes on to outline exceptions, you still need to obtain the Commission's agreement to return a gift from a source you find objectionable, for example). The rationale is that people gave money to the University to further the cause of education; the researchers have no right to divert that money to Shelter (or another charity like the Roman Catholic Church) without the giver's consent. My experienced but non-expert view is that these payments would be a breach of the law, though they would probably be treated as a de minimis exception; you can't blame the University's legal team for insisting they should not be made.
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No They will list the price they are charging you. This will normally be greater than what they paid because that’s how business works. The amount they are allowed to charge is what you agreed in your contract with them (which may incorporate a price list) or, if the contract is silent, a reasonable amount. What is reasonable will be related to what the market in your geographical area charges. While this is indirectly related to the input cost of a given item, business can and do charge what the market allows.
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In general you can dispute and negotiate any bill from a professional. The stronger your arguments for disputing it, and the more coherent your demands for adjustment, the more successful you will tend to be. This is like any business negotiation. One partner at a very large U.S. law firm once admitted to me that their corporate clients almost always ask for – and receive – billing adjustments. Of course, when push comes to shove, unless you're accusing the lawyer of fraudulent billing, then typically by contract you are liable for the bills. However, non-lawyers often assume that they will lose any dispute with their lawyers because it seems like lawyers have free access to the legal system. The reality is that there is a significant threshold that must be met before a law firm will sue a client for payment. That threshold will depend on the firm's opportunity costs, the costs of litigation, their assessment of reputational risks, how much they expect to actually collect, and sometimes just how ticked off they are.
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Some academics would describe any "non-profit" corporation that doesn't have transferrable shares as a company that owns itself. For example, the Red Cross or the United Way or Harvard University, are effectively companies that own themselves. In contrast, it would not apply to non-profits with transferrable interests such as country clubs or the New York Stock Exchange or an agricultural co-op which have members despite not being "for profit" entities themselves.
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Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms.
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The law related to the internal organization of corporations is a matter of state law. You cite the correct authority: The board of directors of a nonprofit corporation shall consist of one or more members. The number of directors shall be fixed by or in the manner provided in the bylaws. If not so fixed, the number of directors shall be the same as that stated in the articles or three if no number is so stated. 15 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5723 (West). The statement of the state attorney general is merely a suggestion. Although, in an entity with audited financial statements the audited financial reports must disclose that the organization lacks "adequate internal financial controls". But, non-profit entities such as charitable trusts or "corporations sole" (such as most legally distinct entities in the Roman Catholic Church) have only a single person with full control over everything that a Board of Directors does. The IRS likewise does not impose a minimum number of directors for a 501(c)(3) organization, or for any other kind of corporation. Nothing in the relevant statue requires that it have more than one, and many non-profits (e.g. probably a majority of churches) have only one director.
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It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures).
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loaded questions in pseudo-legal scenario How is a loaded question dealt with in a legal, or legalistic, context? Is there particular language which is typically employed, or is there a strategy which is particularly effective? The specific example would be of the form "when did you stop beating your wife?" The challenge being to prove a negative. Aside from asserting the negation as fact, how is the false premise embedded in the accusation best disputed?
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The first step is to be able to identify the presupposition, which is a claim that must be assumed to be true for the question to make sense. For instance, "Is the present king of France bald?" assumes that there is a present king of France, and that in fact is false. Such a blatant example is hard to miss (if you speak English), but a less obvious presupposition can be found in the question "When did you arrive at your subjective conclusion about the accused". Regardless of the time, answering the question accepts that the conclusion is subjective (not a god thing for an expert witness to be saying). If you want to study linguistic semantics, there are a number of ways to identify presuppositions: to keep it on topic for LSE, I'll just summarize it by saying you have to acquire the analytic skills for identifying presuppositions. The technical tests are probably not useful to a panicked witness being cross-examined. The Wiki on presupposition might be useful, for example pay attention to the negation test ("My car exploded" and "My car didn't explode" both presuppose that I have a car). If you can identify the presupposition, you can simply answer "I have never beat my wife", or "My conclusion was based on objective scientific tests", and ignore the literal question that was asked. They can still rephrase and ask an unloaded version of the question. If you are forced to limit responses to yes and no, you may need to address the judge to explain why you can't just say "yes" or "no", or blurt out the explanation before you are instructed to stop talking (the judge would probably allow the explanation if it's obvious that you're addressing a presupposition problem).
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There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.
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Contempt of court is when you refuse to do what the court (judge) orders you to do. Actually, you have been instructed by the judge to answer questions truthfully, so if asked, you are supposed to state your beliefs. Volunteering an unwillingness to apply the law as instructed is always an option, and will get you excused from that jury for cause.
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Yes Quite a large chunk of the legal system deals with those general concepts. 27 - pretty much all contract law deals with when and how you must discharge your obligations 28 - ditto, although if it’s not owed until tomorrow … 29 - there are laws against criminal conspiracy 30 - making false accusations can be a crime and can give rise to defamation
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If a law is struck-down as unconstitutional, but all the precedent used to find it unconstitutional gets reversed; what becomes of the law? In U.S. law, the law has effect again, unless it has been amended or repealed in the meantime. Is it totally dead, needing be passed anew? In the U.S., no. It is not totally dead. It is merely dormant. It stays on the books and legislators may decide not to repeal it as a political statement. It also might be considered for interpretive purposes when construing another part of the same law. For example, the meaning given to a phrase in an unconstitutional part of the law might be applied to a different part of the law that is constitutional. Can the judiciary be asked to reinstated, after which point it can be used again? In the U.S., any court can determine that a law is unconstitutional, but the extent to which that ruling is binding precedent on other courts or other parties than those to the case before it depends upon the court in question and upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). For example, the legal fight in the U.S. to hold bans on same sex marriage to be unconstitutional was fought in and resulted in ruling in dozens of courts at the trial court and state appellate court, and federal intermediate appellate court level before a uniform ruling was established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, even if the issue arises in another case where there is a controlling precedent, attorney ethics permit an attorney to make a good faith argument for a change in the law to any court, so if there is some good faith argument for doing so, the attorney can push that the issue be reconsidered. Of course, usually the answer from the court will be "no." Or can it just be enforced again without any formal process; so long as nobody sues and gets it killed again by a lower court? Sometimes government officials enforce laws that have been held unconstitutional, either because they aren't aware of the relevant court decisions, or because they think that their facts are distinguishable from those under which the law was held unconstitutional (which sometimes happens on an "as applied" basis rather than on a "facial" basis that applies to all cases), or because they think the judge before them might rule differently despite the precedent. Also, would the answer differ according to country? If so, could you please give me some examples of countries handling this differently. Yes. Many countries with legal systems based upon the legal system of countries of continental Europe like France and Germany and Spain, which are called "civil law" countries have a very different process of handling unconstitutional laws, as does the European Court of Human Rights and the highest court of the European Union. In Germany, for example, questions of the constitutionality of a law may be raised only in the Constitutional Court and not in other courts. This ruling is usually final. And, unlike U.S. courts, the Constitutional Court can rule a law unconstitutional during the legislative process, rather than in connection with an actual case or controversy relating to the law taking effect (in which case the law never gets on the books in the first place). I don't know what happens when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional. I do know, however, that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights and the highest courts of the E.U. that one of the usual remedies will be an order directed at a member state to amend its statutes to remove the offending law, with sanctions imposed if the member state fails to do so. Obviously, once such a law is repealed in this fashion, it would have to be re-enacted to take effect even if the precedent holding that the law was unconstitutional was undermined.
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Yes The case you want to know about is Cohen v. California: A young man was arrested for wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" and SCOTUS decided, that that was First Amendment-protected speech and the arrest illegal. The phrase מנא מנא תקל ופרסין is in Akkadian or Aramaic language but Hebrew script (as opposed to the Akkadian Cuneiform) and can be transcribed as Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin. It is also known in German as "Menetekel" or in English as the "Writing on the wall". It stems from the biblical episode of Belshazzar's feast. Literally, the text would be read as "counted, counted, weighed, distributed". Its meaning elaborated in Daniel 5 is generally understood as "Your days are numbered; Your days are numbered; You have been measured and found wanting; Your kingdom will fall and be divided". While stemming from religious texts, in the depicted situation it is more likely meant as political speech, and in that fashion indistinguishable from a flag. It also does not call for imminent lawless action - the so-called Brandenburg Test after Brandenburg v Ohio - and thus remains in the protected speech area. Remember, that even preaching genocide can be First amendment protected, as long as that line of imminent lawless action is not overstepped. As this phrase does neither, it is protected speech.
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First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.
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When it can be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference.” Which is the standard the New York appeals court endorsed in 2014 for “defamation by implication”. So, on the face of the statements, they have to imply fraud and they have to show that the speaker intended to imply fraud. Whether they did that is up to the jury.
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Can someone wait before patenting something? Let's say I invent something. I manufacture it without patenting it. 30 years later, someone reverse-engineered my invention. I see that he is a few months away from manufacturing it, can I rush in and patent it now?
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No A patent application must be lodged before the invention is made public in any way (or, in the US, within 1 year of the public disclosure).
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The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.
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Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.
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If the patent lawyer "hears about" such failed patents from clients, and then uses the client's work and modifies them into successful patent filings, that would seem to be a clear conflict of interest, just as a business lawyer cannot use info learned from a client to make his own business deals, unless the client grants an OK. But if the patent lawyer just hears through shoptalk, or through communication by, perhaps, patent examiners that the lawyer works with, I don't see any conflict of interest, although as the comment by Eugene Styer suggests, there is likely to be enough prior art to make the patent invalid.
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the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
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There is no international patent. Each country protects IP under its own national laws and registration system. However, there is the Patent Cooperation Treaty, which makes it easier to start the process in each of the countries that you eventually wish to patent an invention. A typical route would be to file an application under the PCT, and then pursue national patent applications in each country that you plan to exploit your invention.
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The government's position is that material in the patent documents is generally in the public domain See Public Domain Copyright Trademark & Patent Information Schedule: As part of the terms of granting the patent to the inventor, patents are published into the public domain. And slightly more specific, see Terms of Use for USPTO websites: Patents: Subject to limited exceptions reflected in 37 CFR 1.71(d) & (e) and 1.84(s), the text and drawings of a patent are typically not subject to copyright restrictions. 1.71(d) allows for the patent author to specifically indicate that some of the material is protected by copyright. But that position has not actually been tested in courts However, there is no actual statute explicitly exempting material in the patent documents from copyright nor any case law holding that in the absence of a notice, the material in fact becomes public domain. See Alderucci, "The surprising consequences of exempting patents from copyright protection (2016), at p. 13 and footnote 62.
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That is not at all what USPTO is telling you. Courts do not simply "dismiss" patents - that isn't a terminology you'd ever see used for a patent that was found to be invalid. Timeline of events: United Industries Corporation brought a suit against the owner of the patent, claiming unpatentability. That case went to trial, and the court found the claim to be invalid and that UIC failed to show unpatentability. UIC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case because both parties agreed to its dismissal (it's possible they reached some external agreement we don't know about). As far as I can tell, at this moment, the patent is active.
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Is employer legally required to accommodate those who do not want to work near sick coworkers? My question, at its core, seems fairly simple: When coworkers are sick at my workplace, does my employer have any obligation to accommodate those of us who do not want to work near the sick people? From what I have been able to find so far in my search, I know that the employer has the right (but is not required) to send sick people home. But I am asking from the point of view of those of us who are healthy and want to remain that way. Does the answer change if I (the healthy worker) am concerned the illness is not a common, simple cold or flue, since we currently have confirmed cases of both pertussis (whooping cough) and mumps in the area I work in (within the city itself, and also in a nearby city)? I am not asking for legal advice, rather I am asking about what the law says concerning my right to a safe work environment. Following is background information, some of which may be relevant. Keep in mind that, while my two oldest children have received the MMR vaccine and the one for pertussis, my two youngest children have not received these vaccines. Yesterday I went home early because of someone who works in very close proximity to my desk was coughing and sneezing. There were very recently cases of both pertussis and mumps in the city I am working in, and I work in an open area with aisles of cubicles. I talked to my lead engineer to explain, then sent an email to him and my manager to let them know I was leaving early yesterday and for the following days this week would be coming in to the office during off hours to work in the absence of the coughing and sneezing. Today I check my email to find that my manager's email response, to me and the lead engineer I work under, started off by asking my lead engineer if he is OK with this and if I would be able to do my job with minimal support during this time. You can guess about how I feel about this inquiry, but my question here is more to the point of: Does it matter if they are OK with this? Do they have a legal right to deny me reasonable accommodations while the work environment is literally toxic? Some points about my particular case: The building I work in is always open, and I think security is always here. There is no cost to company for me to work the off hours I proposed. It is not at all uncommon for people to work crazy hours for other reasons, especially for approaching deadlines (ie: work until midnight or later) The company claims to be flexible and officially we have "flex time" Even now, it is after 7AM my time, more people have started coming in, and several of them have already started coughing, sneezing, and sniffling, leading me to believe the problem is spreading. So, am I at the mercy of the whims of my employer such that they can allow or deny my request at their pleasure?
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There are regulations governing occupational safety, whereby e.g. an employer can be fined for forcing employees to work in a literally toxic environment, for instance breathing chlorine gas. You could file a complaint with a state or federal agency (OSHA). You would need to hire a labor lawyer to get advice about your specific circumstance, to see if there is indeed a provision that covers what you describe, though I doubt it would. OSHA's blurb on disease don't obviously cover your situation (they describe situations that govern healthcare workers in intimate contact with infectious materials). However, certain diseases such as TB or Ebola cause a general health quarantine to be imposed, so if a worker comes in with such a disease, action would be taken by the health department. This does not cover sniffles, and probably not pertussis (but that's a local decision). There are also regulations pertaining to disabled employees, whereby an employee who is disabled by having a severely compromised immune system can be entitled to reasonable accommodation, for example allowed to work in a closed room away from others (if the job is not a receptionist job). That entitlement only applies to the employee, and is controlled by objective health danger (requires a doctor's note), and not the comfort level of the employee.
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Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.
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Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not.
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Long story short, your employer can tell you when and how to take breaks, as long as they meet very simple conditions that don't help you. From the government's information website, Workers have the right to one uninterrupted 20 minute rest break during their working day, if they work more than 6 hours a day. This could be a tea or lunch break. The break doesn’t have to be paid - it depends on their employment contract. Employers can say when employees take rest breaks during work time as long as: the break is taken in one go somewhere in the middle of the day (not at the beginning or end) workers are allowed to spend it away from their desk or workstation (ie away from where they actually work) It doesn’t count as a rest break if an employer says an employee should go back to work before their break is finished. Unless a worker’s employment contract says so, they don’t have the right to: take smoking breaks get paid for rest breaks
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Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.
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Both Title VII of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), and the Americans with Disabilities Act(ADA) as amended, provide that employer mandates are subject to "reasonable accommodations" for "sincere religious beliefs". If any mandate was based on or subject to either of those laws, requests for accommodation would need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The belief does not have to be a tenant of any church or organized religious group, but may be purely individual. State laws granting religious exemptions might also apply. However, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the US Supreme court wrote: Thus, he [a parent] cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. Prince was a case of a child labor law (selling religious pamphlets in the streets) not an actual vaccination case, so the above statement was not strictly binding precedent. Whether it would now be considered good law I cannot say unless it coems up oin a current case. To the best of my knowledge, no major religion or denomination objects to vaccines as such, although some do object to vaccines developed using fetal stem cells. I believe that at one time the Jehovah's Witnesses did so object (one of them was the appellant in Prince) but they no longer hold that view. At least some individuals have expressed such objections, but most expressed objections to vaccines or vaccine mandates have not been on religious grounds.
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In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)
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Raise the question with your employer If you believe that you are an employee and not a contractor then there is presumably something you want from your employer. This may be additional wages and entitlements that you would have or will become entitled to for past or future work respectively. Or you may have been injured and want workers' compensation. Or terminated and you want redundancy pay. Whatever it is, work it out and raise the issue with your employer. You might want to consult an accountant or union to help you. They may acknowledge that you were incorrectly classified and give you what you want. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! Or they may dispute it. If so, you need to follow the dispute resolution processes at your workplace. These typically involve informal discussions, escalating to mediation and then to a workplace tribunal run by the government. You will almost certainly want to consult a lawyer or union to help you - given that you don't know where to start the learning curve is likely to be too steep. In virtually every jurisdiction if people are employees at law they can't choose not to be. in british-columbia the relevant law appears to be the Employment Standards Act although it's not unheard of in edge cases for a person to be an employee under one law (e.g. workers' compensation) and a contractor under another (e.g. income tax). From the linked site: The overriding question is “whose business is it?” Is the person who is doing the work doing it as a person in business for themselves? If you are working "for" your own business you are probably a contractor. If you are working "for" your employer's business you are probably an employee. For example, if you are an accountant with several dozen clients, maintain your own business premises and charge for your advice based on the amount quoted rather than by the hour, you're a contractor. If instead, you have 2 clients, work from their premises at set hours and get paid by the day or week, you're an employee with 2 jobs. In edge cases these are not cut and dried - Google are Uber driver's employees. In Australia: no. In California: yes. In the UK: yes.
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Can I hire someone to haul my waste monthly? Can I hire an independent contractor to haul my waste in my city of Colusa, California. Someone said there is an exclusive contract that prevents the hauling of ones own waste to a landfill.
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Sec. 14-3 of the city ordinances says that No person may engage in the business of collecting recyclable materials, solid waste or green waste within the city, or haul recyclable materials, solid waste or green waste through a street or public right-of-way in the city, unless that person has been granted a franchise or license to do so by the city. However, a property owner may occasionally transport recyclable materials, solid waste or green waste produced on his or her own premises to a licensed disposal area, subject to the requirements of Section 14-7 pertaining to solid waste transportation So that means you can't contract with someone else to haul your trash. You can do it yourself if you can follow the various regulations pertaining to transportation of waste.
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It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.
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Update: I've filed a complaint with the CA Attorney General. They automatically forwarded the complaint to Comcast and sent me a notice in the mail. If you have filed a complaint against a business, we will forward your complaint to that business and request that it contact you promptly to resolve the issues you raised. Please note that we cannot represent you, advocate for you with the business, or force the business to satisfy individual requests for relief. Please contact the business directly to discuss your complaint. While we cannot provide specific legal advice, please see the information below, which may help address your concern. For more information about the CCPA, please see https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa and https://cppa.ca.gov/. [...] If a business has violated the CCPA, you may notify the Office of the Attorney General by filing a consumer complaint. While we cannot file an action on behalf of an individual consumer over an individual violation, consumer complaints are an important source of information for the office. We will review consumer complaints to identify patterns of misconduct and to determine what law enforcement actions to take. You can sue a business under the CCPA only if your unencrypted and un-redacted personal information was stolen in a data breach as a result of the business's failure to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect it. You must generally give the business written notice of its violations and 30 days to fix the violations before you can sue. For more information about when you can sue for a CCPA violation, visit https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa If you want to consult an attorney, you can obtain a referral to a certified lawyer referral service through the State Bar at (866) 442-2529 (toll-free in California) or (415) 538-2250 (from outside California), or online at https://www.calbar.ca.gov. If you cannot afford to pay an attorney, contact your local legal aid office to see if you qualify for free or reduced-rate legal assistance. For a referral to local legal aid offices, visit https://lawhelpca.org/ and click on the Search for Legal Help tab. Comcast responded immediately to the forwarded complaint and appears to have deactivated my login, but nearly a month later have still not confirmed whether any personal information has been deleted. I'd strongly recommend anyone in a similar situation to file a complaint as well. There's no guarantee the Attorney General or California Privacy Protection Agency will act on it, but it can increase the civil penalty to the company by $5,000 per complaint (see section 1798.155) and makes it more likely they will comply. Don't waste your time with any unnecessary calls from the business or obfuscating information yourself as a commenter here mentioned. Just submit your CCPA request in writing, complete the identity verification, wait the 45 days as allowed by the law (or 90 if an extension is requested, see section 1798.130), and file a complaint if it's not completed. Update 2: I received a forwarded letter from Comcast to the Attorney General in response to my complaint. They lied and backdated their alleged completion date of the deletion request to fall within the 45 day deadline, despite emails I sent past their claimed date repeating the request as I was still able to login. Before filing a complaint, make sure to take screenshots showing you logged into the account and email it to the business in order to document it.
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As indicated here, throwing away mail is the crime of obstructing mail. There is no exception for "junk mail" i.e. standard mail. It is possible (virtually guaranteed) that an individual postmaster or the USPS has a different disposition of the two kinds or mail when returned, but that is about USPS and not you. It is highly unlikely that you will find an official statement to the effect that it is "okay" to violate the law in the case of disposition of returned standard mail, even if in fact there is virtually no chance of being prosecuted for recycling. I assume that the junk mail is not addressed to "or current resident", or simply "Resident", because then the letter is addressed to you and you can do what you want.
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what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? None. There is no contract (implicit or otherwise) between the owner and you. The owner receives no consideration from you in exchange for storing your goods, and an essential element of contracts is an exchange of considerations. Thus, he has no obligation to continue storing your goods. Another essential element in contract law is that the agreement --meaning the conditions thereof-- be entered knowingly and willfully. Since the time of making the arrangement and up to now, you were reasonably unaware of the likelihood of an obligation to pay the owner. This preempts the owner's right to start billing you. If anything, you would need to prove special circumstances to avail yourself of a viable claim of promissory estoppel. See Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172 (1994): To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish (1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. However, the viability and duration of any relief pursuant to promissory estoppel seems very unlikely in the situation you describe. The hardship you are undergoing --and which prompted you to store your goods there-- is unfortunate. But generally speaking, a third party (such as the owner) who is unrelated to the causation or prolongation of that hardship cannot be lawfully forced to aid you for free.
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The State of California is not responsible for injuries committed by private citizens Sorry to hear about your friend. Jamal may have a case (although the scope is narrow and timeframes are strict and tight) if someone employed by the state didn't do what they should have done. There is a whole raft of rules and regulations surrounding child welfare and Jamal would need to demonstrate exactly what they did that they shouldn't have done or what they should have done that they didn't do to have any basis for a claim. You will note that there is an obligation to make assessments -if they didn't make an assessment, they might be liable; if they made the wrong assessment, they aren't. Contested child welfare cases are difficult - caseworkers and social worlkers are presented with a lot of contradictory information and outright lies and the law accepts that if they make a good faith attempt to do their job, they haven't done anything wrong even if they make the wrong call. As for the court "assuming" anything, that is simply not true. The court would have heard the evidence (contested and contradictory no doubt) and made a judgement based on that evidence. It may have been the objectively wrong judgement but it was a perfectly legal one. In any event, you can't sue the court for a wrong judgement, you can only appeal it to a higher court subject to the time limits and your ability to pay. As a practical matter, child protection services are generally chronically underfunded, understaffed and overworked as are the courts that deal with such cases. A typical caseworker might have to deal with 50-100 cases similar to your friend every week - that gives them 5-15 minutes to (partially) read the file and try to decide what's best for the child. Sad to say, your friend is one of the lucky ones - came out the other end with a good relationship with one of his parents, isn't dead, isn't a drug addict and isn't homeless. And no, you can't sue the state for things being the way they are: that's what the voters want because if it isn't they'd elect politicians who would change it.
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This is not a place for specific legal advice, but you shouldn't be afraid of the small claims court; I'm doing that myself and it really is a low-risk and straightforward way to get money that is owed to you. Step 1: Get the boiler repaired or replaced as necessary. Keep the receipts. Don't be tempted to get an upgrade or anything else to push expenses that are legitimately yours on to the other party; find out what the cheapest thing is that you can reasonably do to fix the problem and then do that. Step 2: Write a letter to the seller in which you set out the facts of the case and demand the cost of the repairs. Also include any other expenses you have had to incur, like money for your time off work while the repair is done. End it with "If you do not agree to pay this money within one month then I will take action in the county court to recover the money". Send it by recorded delivery and include a copy of the repair receipt (NOT the original). Step 3: If you do not get your money then go here and follow the instructions. You have to pay an up-front fee to the court which gets added on to the amount you are claiming. That is the only money you are putting at risk if you lose. The whole thing is as informal and straightforward as possible, and is purposely designed so that you don't need a lawyer, nor can you or the other side claim for the cost of a lawyer if you win. This is why your lawyer is pushing you to do this by yourself: he knows that his fees would be out of proportion to the amount in question, and you wouldn't be able to get that money back even if you won. The only other wrinkle is if the other party has moved far away: in general if a hearing is needed then it will be held near them rather than near you, so you might have to travel.
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Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? No. Not based on what you've posted. Go to the definitions to see how engineer is defined. It may be they are talking about actual structural engineers or environmental engineers, where if you're wrong people die. But based on above, you can't use the word engineer unless you're licensed as such. Is there even a license for computer engineer? This seems more like it could be a term of use but not actually descriptive of what you're doing. IDK. You'd have to see the definitions and exceptions. Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? Yes, your CV is supposed to say what you have done, and learned and especially published (lest it's just a resume), but the answer as far as promotional materials, is NO. This, because you don't post your cv on your ad's and if you put that, you will likely be found to be trying to pose as a licensed professional based on a technicality. If that happens the licensing authority will probably censure you by disallowing a license when your qualify. If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately,(of course, but you'd also have to divulge the fact that you are not licensed and cannot act in that capacity) Would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? It could be if the person reports that you are soliciting work as an engineer w/out a license. It's like a person who went to law school, passed the bar, but never got sworn in. They cannot solicit business as a lawyer. Unless there is a license for being a computer programer, there is nothing barring you from using that terminology. You could be, that if you look up the definition prior to the statue, that it says something like "for the purposes of this section the term engineer means…", In which case it doesn't even apply to you.
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Blanket statement to avoid all liability I am currently developing an app which facilitates an Assassin game in which players stalk and shoot their friends with water guns in order to win a monetary prize (as facilitated by whoever runs each specific game). How can I ensure that I have no liability if a player is injured, a game host refuses to pay up, etc. Essentially, is there any blanket statement where the user waives all rights to sue me? I live in the United States.
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I like easy questions: you can’t. You can limit but not eliminate liability with people you have a contract with. You can’t limit liability with third parties. You need to consult a lawyer and buy insurance.
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It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment).
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Suing relatives or friends to trigger an insurance policy is sometimes necessary, particularly if the insurer is being recalcitrant. Apart from that it is pointless to sue someone who has no money! In common law jurisdictions you can of course sue anyone for negligence. One of the things that you have to prove to be successful is that the defendant owed a duty of care. It may be difficult to prove that a child had such a duty.
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I think that the question you are really asking is whether a contract not to disclose certain information (e.g. to authorities) might be void as contrary to public policy, or illegal. Sometimes it is illegal to do so. For example, often concealing personal information in connection to the transfer of funds constitutes money laundering, which is a crime, or securities fraud. The key question is whether there is a legal duty to disclose in a particular context and whether the concealment facilitates some sort of fraud.
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Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.
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Although the assailant (or their estate if they are killed) could lodge a claim for damages it does not necessarily follow that they would win - they would have to show that the shooting was not legitimate self-defence but rather was unlawful by, for example, negligence or use of excessive force - say by shooting them when they didn't pose an immediate and unjustified threat. The Federation rules, as far as I can see, are not actual legislation. Although they should be adhered to in normal circumstances, this shooting would be, in the given circumstances, legitimate self-defence according to Article 122-5 of the Code Pénal which says: N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte. N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction. Which Google translates to English as: The person who, in the face of an unjustified attack on himself or others, performs, at the same time, an act ordered by the necessity of the self-defense of himself or of others, is not criminally liable, except 'there is a disproportion between the means of defense employed and the seriousness of the infringement. The person who, in order to interrupt the execution of a crime or an offense against property, performs an act of defense, other than intentional homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the aim pursued, is not criminally liable. provided that the means employed are proportionate to the gravity of the offense.
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I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.
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Does the original 'No Problem' good will waiver from Party B holds in court? Generally speaking, yes. Party B cannot undo his waiver unless (1) it was induced fraudulently, or (2) the contract supports striking that kind of waivers. There might be other scenarios entitling B to undo his waiver, but all of them are exceptional and don't differ that much from these two alternative conditions. That being said, the evidence (such as the recording) should make it clear that party B waived enforcement of the timeliness of payments, not his entitlement to payments themselves. In the event that party A has already made the payments he missed and scenario (1) or (2) applies, party B's remedies are limited to the concrete losses he incurred as a result of party A's belatedness. The principle is that remedies be available to the extent necessary to avoid injustice, as is frequently contemplated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
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"Designated Survivor" scenario: What if a President is sworn in and someone earlier in succession resurfaces? If something like what's depicted in "Designated Survivor" (TV-show) happened – POTUS, VPOTUS, Speaker, &c, were all (believed to be) dead – and the "designated survivor" had become acting President and then sworn in as President: What would then happened if someone further-up the line of succession were found to be alive? Would the new President then be automatically removed from office? Or would he remain President even if it turns out he was sworn in by error? Would he be obliged to step down? Could he refuse? If he didn't step down, would the one higher up in the succession have a claim on the office? Could he too be sworn in, and become sort of an "anti-President" (like how there were two Popes – the Pope and an "anti-Pope")? Would it matter who resurfaced? For example, is the answer different if it was the Vice President who was later found alive, or some other elected official (e.g., the House Speaker) instead of "just" another (but higher-ranking) appointee? And what if the President himself was found to be alive days later (and still able to perform his functions)? Would that compel the new acting President to step down?
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Once a person is sworn in as POTUS, there are only two legal mechanisms for involuntary removal of that person from the office: Article II Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides only that: The President ... shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The 25th Amendment was passed to establish clear procedures of official succession. Its Section 4 also provides an elaborate mechanism whereby "the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" can precipitate a process that would allow Congress, within 21 days, to transfer the office to the Vice President. Otherwise, there is no contemplation in the law of a "backsies" mechanism for removing a person from the office because "it should have gone to someone else." (The idea that a person who was in the designated line of succession, but in the wrong order, was sworn into office does not seem nearly as problematic as other events that have happened in real history. For example, in the 2000 Presidential Election it was conceivable – and some people probably maintain in fact – that the "loser" of the election would be sworn into office. The U.S. Supreme Court settled the legal questions before the inauguration. However, the realization at the time was that any legal challenges or decisions after that date would be moot, because "election error" is not a cause to remove a sitting U.S. President.) The question of a previous President reappearing, and his successor refusing to cede the office, takes us to the height of speculation. In this case I would merely note that I can find no law pertaining to Presidential Transition in which an outgoing President is "stripped of authority" or "removed from office." Rather, the acting POTUS is effectively the most recent person sworn to the office, and not removed from it.
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You can certainly do so: it's been done many times in the past, and can be done even with a written constitution. The most recent famous example that I know of would be how the Nazi party used the Enabling Act, 1933 and Reichstag Fire Decree, 1933 to amend the constitution by essentially neutering all the safeguards, and used force to ensure that they could stay in power. Julius Caesar's reforms follow in a similar vein. For someone to successfully force change like this, you generally need a political system that is unstable and has no strong (or at least effective) checks and balances. Additionally, you need the support of the military because otherwise they will generally support the existing structure. Other less extreme examples I can think of where a system has changed to another system would be former colonies adopting new constitutions (e.g. Ireland and Pakistan), or where there has been significant change in the country's model (e.g. South Africa). Again, you need support, but this time it is within the existing political and judicial framework.
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In the united-states, attorneys are almost never placed under oath. Their statements -- whether they are assertions of fact or legal arguments -- are not evidence, and they are not subject to cross examination. There are limited circumstances in which an attorney would be competent to present actual evidence. In such cases, the attorney would be sworn in as a witness and subject to cross examination, but the attorney would likely also be disqualified from acting as an attorney in such a situation under Model Rule 3.7.
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He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached".
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Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
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The Fifth Amendment would not apply, because nothing in the testimony would incriminate the doctor. Indeed nothing would be at all likely to incriminate the President either, it is not a crime to be unable to carry out Presidential duties. It is likely in such a case that the President would waive confidentiality. In that case the doctor could testify freely. If the President insisted on confidentiality, and attempted to prevent the doctor from testifying to Congress, there would be a conflict between the power of Congress to compel testimony, in this case on what is clearly a vital national issue within the scope of the needs of Congress, and traditional doctor-patient confidentiality, let alone the requirements of HIPAA. I am not sure how this conflict would be resolved. There might be an emergency application to the Supreme Court, but the SC does not usually do very well with truly urgent issues. The Pentagon Papers case and Bush V. Gore indicate some of the problems that can arise. If the doctor was prevented from testifying, that might incline members of congress to think the testimony would not be favorable to the President, and thus tend to suggest that they should not approve the President resuming or continuing his or her powers and duties. But that is rather speculative. The 25th has never been invoked, and the detailed procedure that would be followed if it were is not very clear. I am not aware of any similar situation in which medical testimony has been demanded to deal with an urgent issue, but the patient has attempted to block it. I think this case must be considered to be undecided until it actually arises and a court rules.
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I am assuming you are not the councilor. Civil matter you have no standing. The councilor does. Maybe the hotel bar does. I can’t think of anyone else who does. Criminal matter If a crime was committed in DC, the DC prosecutor is under no obligation to prosecute it. As a political matter, if you were a citizen of DC you could complain and try to get the prosecutor voted out next election. Political matter As a citizen of your city, it is a political matter: You call your councilman* or any city councilman really and ask them to begin impeachment or whatever similar action you have there. Then next election to try to get the mayor voted out. If you are unsatisfied with the council, try to get them voted out also. The cost of investigation is a cost of running a government. Someone could have chosen not to spend seven grand investigating a hundred bucks, but they did it. *Note this is called petitioning for redress which is the right that the current SCOTUS nominee could not recall off the top of her head.
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The relevant part of the 22nd amendment to the US constitution says: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. The question is dues "more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President" mean "more than two years of any single term ..." or "more than two years of any and all such terms taken together". The former is closer to the plain meaning of the text, but the latter is almost surely what Congress intended, given the history of the 22nd. There is no case law, because there is no case in which a person has been elected VP and become president in two or more different terms. Indeed there is no case of a person who, having become president on the death or resignation of a president, then ran again as VP. There is no telling how a court would rule in such a situation, but I rather suspect that the 10-year limit interpretation would be upheld.
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Intimidation by other jurors? What recourse do I have if, as a juror, I am intimidated with threats of physical violence or other misfortunes by other jurors to reach a conclusion they want? If the answer is to talk to the judge, what do I do if the judge simply ignores my problem and says to get back in there with the other jurors and stay there until a verdict is reached?
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You could ask the bailiff to bring this concern to the attention of the judge. If you feel the need to protect yourself, you should. If you are really sincerely scared, stand your ground and refuse to participate for this reason in your response to the judge, even if this puts you at risk of a contempt of court sanction - better to being in jail briefly than to be physically harmed by another juror. The judge might release you from jury service or dismiss the threatening juror, or might declare a mistrial if you bring this to the judge's attention. The mistrial could result in the de facto acquittal of the defendant in a criminal case, especially if no alternates are available and dismissing you or the threatening juror would bring the jury below a quorum, so keep this in mind. I would also not tell the bailiff what position you are being coerced to take, merely that you are being coerced with physical threats. And I would identify the threatening juror (who might also be removed). Of course, if you are actually on a jury right now, you are almost surely violating your obligations as a juror by going on line to ask this question.
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If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate.
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canada What should have happened Jurors will be instructed along the following lines (Model Jury Instructions, 8.4 - Outside Information): The only information that you may consider is the evidence that has been put before you in the courtroom. You must disregard completely any information from radio, television, or newspaper accounts, Internet sources, Twitter, Facebook, or any other social media, that you have heard, seen or read about in respect of this case, or about any of the persons or places involved or mentioned in it. Any other information about the case from outside the courtroom, is not evidence. They will also be instructed about reasonable doubt in relation to expert evidence: The issue on which these experts... differ is an essential element that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Before you accept the opinion of the Crown’s expert on this issue you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that s/he is correct. If you are not sure that s/he is correct, then the Crown has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that essential element of the offence charged. Given that the jurors were waffling, they would have had reasonable doubt and should have acquitted. Regardless, once a jury verdict is rendered, it is not possible for the trial judge to alter the verdict except where the judge learns that the jury did not render the verdict it intended (R. v. Burke, 2002 SCC 55). Even a judge learning of potential juror bias does not have the power to declare a mistrial after the verdict is rendered: R. v. Halcrow, 2008 ABCA 319. There are very narrow grounds to appeal a verdict based on a problem with what the jury did There may be very limited opportunities on appeal: if one can show a reasonable apprehension of bias based on evidence that does not include matters intrinsic to the jury room (e.g. R. v. Mehl, 2021 BCCA 264) if the verdict was unreasonable in the sense that it was a verdict that no jury, properly instructed and acting judicially, could reasonably return—this is the standard referred to in ohwilleke's answer (in the circumstances you've described, it seemed that there was evidence in the record that the jury could have been convinced by, so your scenario does not seem to meet this high standard for an unreasonable verdict) Jury-secrecy rules prohibit matters internal to the jury from ever being introduced as evidence Above all of this are the statutory and common-law jury secrecy rules. The rule in Canada is this (from R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer, 2001 SCC 42): statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced and votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations are inadmissible in any legal proceedings. In particular, jurors may not testify about the effect of anything on their or other jurors’ minds, emotions or ultimate decision. On the other hand, the common law rule does not render inadmissible evidence of facts, statements or events extrinsic to the deliberation process, whether originating from a juror or from a third party, that may have tainted the verdict. The dividing line between intrinsic matters protected by the jury secrecy rules and extrinsic matters that might be able to be revealed is not always clear, but the evidence you've described seems to be an intrinsic matter: [61] Jurors are expected to bring to their task their entire life’s experiences. It is on the basis of what they know about human behaviour, knowledge that they have obviously acquired outside the courtroom, that they are requested to assess credibility and to draw inferences from proven facts. Even though not the object of evidence tendered in the trial, an opinion, a piece of general information, or even some specialized knowledge that a juror may reveal in the course of the deliberations, is not an extrinsic matter. Typically, such information would not be the object of evidence tendered at trial. It would be viewed as either irrelevant, too remote, or as attempting to usurp the functions of the jury. On the other hand, if a juror, or a third party, conveys to the jury information that bears directly on the case at hand that was not admitted at trial, by reason of an oversight or a strategic decision by counsel or, worse yet, by operation of an exclusionary rule of admissibility, then it is truly a matter “extrinsic” to the deliberation process and the fact that it was introduced into that process may be revealed. [62] The line between matters of general knowledge and information that bears directly on the case may not always be evident. For example, if a juror shares with his fellow jurors his detailed familiarity with the location where the crime was alleged to have been committed, this may be viewed as an intrinsic matter protected by the secrecy rule. If the same juror, however, went on a visit to the site, took photographs and brought them back to the jury room to support his interpretation of the facts at issue, this may be extrinsic, outside information that falls outside the secrecy rule.
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Because it's explicitly a jury of your peers That is, every person is entitled to have their guilt or innocence decided by people "like them" - not kings, lords or, heaven forbid, lawyers. The jury doesn't need to know the law and indeed, in many jurisdictions, lawyers are explicitly disqualified from jury service (hint: if you want to avoid jury service, get a law degree). The role of the jury is to decide the facts - what happened and whether that meets the prosecution's burden of proof. The jury is told what the law is by the judge - that's their job. Most law shows on TV skip over the very important role of the judge's instructions to the jury. These usually go along the lines of (greatly abridged and paraphrased) "If you decide that X, Y & Z are true then you must return a guilty verdict but if any of them are not true you must return not guilty." A very brief potted history of the jury system is contained in this answer: Why 12 Jurors, why not 11, 10, 9, 1? Now, this is, according to those from common law traditions, the great truth and beauty of the jury system. To those from civil, sharia and other legal traditions: it's just stupid.
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This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling.
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When the required number of jurors vote "yes" (or "no", or whatever the question is), then the jury has reached a verdict. There is no provision whereby the presiding juror can re-interpret "yes" as "no". In the case you describe, if a unanimous verdict is required that despite a reasonable inference that the last juror believes the defendant to be guilty, he has voted not guilty so the jury has not reached a verdict. In case the guy in charge decides "In this case no means yes", thus falsely presents a supposed unanimous verdict, there is still an option for juror polling, in which case the not-guilty juror gets a chance to affirm his not guilty vote; though one of the parties has to request jury polling. If during polling the juror's response is not a clear "yes", then it could be more complicated.
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Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).
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NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory.
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Is there any penalty for intentionally over-reporting income on your 1040? When filing their USA Federal taxes, someone might want to state more income than they actually had, for reasons. This would result in paying more taxes than the person actually owes. Specifically, this unreal income would be reported on 1040 Schedule C, line 1 or line 6. Are there any laws or IRS regulations which prohibit that? Since the "error" (actually, deception) is in the government's favor, would there be any penalty other than $0?
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26 USC 7206: Any person who— (1) Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter [...] shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. ("Return", as defined in 26 USC 6696, includes an income tax return.) This clause notably doesn't care whose favor the falsification was in, or why you did it. You knew it wasn't true and you put it on your tax return anyway, and you declared under penalty of perjury that it was true and correct. That's a felony, end of story. (Paragraph (4) of this section covers some other types of fraud done "with intent to evade" taxes, but that restriction does not apply to paragraph (1).) The likelihood of actually being prosecuted in such an instance is beyond the scope of this site. But in the given case, the falsification really isn't in the government's favor. The purpose was to become eligible to collect government social security benefits, which you otherwise wouldn't be eligible for. Presumably you would only bother to do this if you thought you'd collect more in benefits than you pay in extra tax, which means the government loses in the long run. This also eliminates any chance you'd have of claiming the falsification was "immaterial": it affected your eligibility for social security, and you knew that - it was the whole reason you did it.
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No, nor can I request a copy of your tax return. See 5 USC 552a. Record maintained on an individual are not subject to disclosure.
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There is a clear conflict of interest - or the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest - here. On the one hand, you are supposed to be looking for a good deal for your employer - within reason, of course. On the other hand, you want to make as much money for yourself as you can by claiming as high a rental fee as is reasonable. Most employers have policies against this. This is like hiring your side company as a vendor. You should follow your employer's policies for making sure his is totally above board, or just stay elsewhere.
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Yes, of course you still owe it. There's no logical reason why ceasing to be a citizen should relieve you of existing obligations. The State Department mentions this explicitly Persons who wish to renounce U.S. citizenship should be aware of the fact that renunciation of U.S. citizenship may have no effect on their U.S. tax or military service obligations (contact the Internal Revenue Service or U.S. Selective Service for more information). In addition, the act of renouncing U.S. citizenship does not allow persons to avoid possible prosecution for crimes which they may have committed or may commit in the future which violate United States law, or escape the repayment of financial obligations, including child support payments, previously incurred in the United States or incurred as United States citizens abroad. I think the "may" is just to cover their butts - I can't find any indication of any provision that would forgive tax debts when you renounce. Indeed, renouncing your citizenship may cause you to owe more tax, because of the expatriation tax. Basically, all your unrealized capital gains are treated as if they were realized and taxed on the day before your expatriation, and you owe capital gains tax on them.
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Both of these answers assume U.S. law. Craigslist has no liability per a statute commonly known as Section 230. In a barter transaction, each party must declare as income on their tax return the fair market value of the goods or services received, by a commercially reasonable means (subject to audit), less any basis (or, in the case of accrual accounting taxpayers, at least, any cost of good sold expense deduction) applicable to goods parted with. Under changes to the tax law effective January 1, 2018, this answer applies even if the barter involved tangible personal property of "like kind" which was previously not taxable under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 1031 continues to provide special treatment to barters involving investment real estate.
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Can an employer charge employee/contractor a processing fee for payment? No. The matter depends on whether the person qualifies as employee for purposes of the British Columbia Employment Standards Act. Your description suggests that you meet criterion (b) of the definition of employee insofar as you are (i.e., if you are) "a person an employer allows, directly or indirectly, to perform work normally performed by an employee". See section 1(1) of the Act. Section 21(1) prohibits an employer to "directly or indirectly, withhold, deduct or require payment of all or part of an employee's wages for any purpose", and item (2) prohibits the employer to "require an employee to pay any of the employer's business costs except as permitted by the regulations". There is no indication that the alleged business cost of e-transfers would be one such exception. do I have any recourse for such a small amount of money that isn't worth starting a law suit over? You have the option to file a complaint in "an office of the Employment Standards Branch". See sections 74 et seq for further details. You are not specifying the amount of the e-transfer that is being deducted from your compensation. The smaller the amount(s) at issue, the more important it will be for your complaint to persuasively explain how it is not "frivolous, vexatious or trivial". See section 76(c). Directing the employer's attention to the aforementioned statutory prohibition prior to filing a complaint tends to disprove allegations of vexation. That is because you are giving the employer an opportunity to mend its conduct and avert the proceedings that otherwise would take place. That being said, a very occasional cost of few cents is very likely to lead to a conclusion of vexation or bad faith regardless of your preliminary steps. In most other contexts, though, it is in your best interest to stay aware of the obligations that are being presented/proposed to you so that your actions do not constitute an acceptance of terms & conditions you would rather reject. Not all contracts come in the form of a written document signed by the parties.
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Yes, money received from Kickstarter campaigns is usually considered taxable income. Who pays the taxes and how much (if any) they pay depends on how much the teenager makes, how old they are, and whether they are claimed as a dependant by someone else. For information about taxing children see IRS Pub. 929. As pointed out in the comments, certain campaign contributions could be considered nontaxable "gifts" by the IRS. There are also taxable gifts but the taxes are paid and reported by the gift giver. You will want to talk to a tax professional about these. It is worth noting that interest on gifts is taxable unearned income unless the gifts were set up under a UGMA trust, which has its own rules. You can deduct most expenses from income, as pointed out in the comments. This too is covered by Pub. 929.
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The legal requirement to hand over the returns is found in 26 U.S. Code § 6103: (f) Disclosure to Committees of Congress (1) Committee on Ways and Means, Committee on Finance, and Joint Committee on Taxation Upon written request from the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, or the chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request, except that any return or return information which can be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer shall be furnished to such committee only when sitting in closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure. Enforcement is found in 26 U.S. Code § 7214 (a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States— ... (3) who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this title fails to perform any of the duties of his office or employment; or ... shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution. These punishments are essentially identical to those in Section 7213, which describe the punishments for those who unlawfully release returns. I've seen that section quoted in some articles as the basis for punishing failure to provide requested returns to the Chair of the House Ways and Means committee, but I'm not really seeing how that section covers non-compliance. Non-compliance seems only covered by Section 7214, which requires the "intent to defeat" (or various other issues, such as not disclosing known violations to the Secretary, etc.). That may be hard to prove in this scenario, and part of the stalling by Mnuchin may in part because they are exploring if they can build a strong case that it wasn't his intent to defeat the title. The quote of his you note is particularly on point on this, as he explicitly says he intends to obey the law; he's just questioning the constitutional issues involved.
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Initial Coin Offering restrictions for Non-Resident Aliens (F-1 Student) United States residents who are not accredited investors are often not allowed to participate in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) which are not public offerings for the purpose of U.S. Securities laws. Are there such restriction for F-1 students who have been in the US for less than 5 years, who are non-resident aliens for tax purposes and are actually not citizens of the US but are citizens of another country?
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Are there such restriction for F-1 students who have been in the US for less than 5 years, who are non-resident aliens for tax purposes and are actually not citizens of the US but are citizens of another country? Short Answer For the most part, citizenship and immigration status are legally irrelevant to your eligibility to participate in an ICO (there are isolated exceptions related to international trade sanctions, and there are certain "sensitive" industries that usually wouldn't apply to an ICO). This said, no issuer of coins is required to make the offering available to everyone who is not prohibited by the applicable laws from participating. For example, if someone wants to make an ICO available to anyone but Canadians, that is their prerogative. But, in practice, most private ICOs require investors to be accredited investors, and few students on F-1 visas have the wealth, income or professional qualifications necessary to be accredited investors. Long Answer In an ICO made in the United States, the issuer (i.e. the person creating the coins) and the underwriter (i.e. the professionals retained to handle the ICO for the issuer, which will sometimes be the same person as the issuer) are electing to treat the coins as "securities" for the purposes of U.S. law which means that they can be issued only as a "public offering" upon registration with the SEC under the '33 Act or the '34 Act, or under an exception to those acts. While the statutes enumerate exceptions to the Acts, almost everyone sticks to trying to comply with one of the safe harbor exceptions created by SEC Regulation D. This protects the issuer and underwriter from legal liability for making an unregistered offering of a security that does not fall within an exception to the registration requirement, even though it is not unambiguously clear that cyptocurrency coins are "securities." They do this because the consequence for being wrong on this legal question of first impression are very severe and could lead to civil liability for all losses that coin holders experience, large civil penalties that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, and criminal convictions. Eligibility to participate in a private offering made pursuant to the Regulation D exceptions to U.S. Securities laws (mostly the '33 Act and '34 Act) governing public offerings of securities that often require someone to be an "accredited investor" does not depend upon the immigration status or citizenship of the investor. A private ICO would ordinarily be made under a Regulation D exception. There are two Regulation D exceptions (one for offerings of less than $1,000,000 in the aggregate by an issuer, and another for intrastate offerings) which do not require you to be an accredited investor and there are other exceptions with allow a small number of non-accredited investors to participate if they are provided a professional advisor to counsel them in evaluating the offer. The most popular Regulation D exceptions for private offerings, however, are limited to accredited investors, which are available without regard to citizenship. A non-citizen could probably not participate in an offering made pursuant to the intrastate exemption, but this exception is quite unpopular for issuers and underwriters because very few offerings qualify under it and the boundaries for qualification are not well defined. I could imagine an ICO being made under this exception but I am not aware of any that actually are be made in that manner. Generally, to be an accredited investor you must be a certain kind of business entity (e.g. a bank), or a member of a certain set of professions (e.g. lawyers and brokers), or have a certain net worth and/or income. To be an accredited investor, a person must demonstrate an annual income of $200,000, or $300,000 for joint income, for the last two years with expectation of earning the same or higher income. An individual must have earned income above the thresholds either alone or with a spouse over the last three years. The income test cannot be satisfied by showing one year of an individual's income and the next two years of joint income with a spouse. The exception to this rule is when a person is married within the period of conducting a test. A person is also considered an accredited investor if he has a net worth exceeding $1 million, either individually or jointly with his spouse. The SEC also considers a person to be an accredited investor if he is a general partner, executive officer, director or a related combination thereof for the issuer of unregistered securities. An entity is an accredited investor if it is a private business development company or an organization with assets exceeding $5 million. An organization cannot be formed with a sole purpose of purchasing specific securities. Also, if an entity consists of equity owners who are accredited investors, the entity itself is an accredited investor. In 2016, the U.S. Congress modified the definition of an accredited investor to include registered brokers and investment advisors. Also, if a person can demonstrate sufficient education or job experience showing his professional knowledge of unregistered securities, he is also considered an accredited investor. In contrast, in the case of a public offering, which must be registered with the SEC under the '33 Act or '34 Act, any adult of any nationality (except as noted below) can participate without being an accredited investor. Still, in general, a U.S. securities law perspective, an investor from the U.K. or France or South Africa is the same as a U.S. citizen, even though the tax treatment of the investment for a non-citizen is very different from the tax treatment of the investment for a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. The primary exception to this general rule is that there are some people in some countries who are prohibited from investing in U.S. securities as a consequence of international trade sanctions. These would include members of the families of certain government officials in Russia, Syria and Venezuela, for example. Usually, a private offering packet provided to potential investors (such as one I wrote a couple of months ago involving international investors as well as U.S. investors) will include a separate form in which potential investors certify to the issuer and underwriter of the offering that they are not prohibited from investing under these laws which are enumerated in the form. Non-citizens who are not resident aliens (i.e. who are not green card holders), are also usually required to make a disclosure related to income tax compliance that is different than the Form W-9 that has to be provided by U.S. citizens and green card holders. There are also certain industries (e.g. equity investments in Colorado legal marijuana dispensaries, or farms in some Great Plains states) in which non-resident non-citizens are simply prohibited from making investments entirely although there are no ICOs of which I am aware that would fit in that category.
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I see that this would put me under heavy US regulation, and I'd like to avoid that, since it would require huge funding to hire lawyers to do something like that. There are many reasons for financial and banking industry regulations; namely, fraud protection, corruption and money laundering preventions, use of crypto to avoid taxes and records, etc. If you're serious about a startup that involves financial transaction, one of the first things you do is find a law firm to advise you on the legal plausibility of an idea. And be prepared to spend thousands and thousands of dollars in legal fees for regulatory approval. Would doing something like this solve my problem? You're really going to trust randos on the web for legal advice?
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The GDPR allows the right to access to be limited if this access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” (Art 15(4) GDPR). However, access to the recording would not give you more information than you've already received during the phone call, so this exemption is quite unlikely to apply in any case. UK data protection law also has a large list of additional exceptions, as summarized here by ICO guidance. These exemptions also cover some aspects of trade secrets, and even mention insurance examples. However, not such exemption is likely to apply in your case: the recording would not give you more information than you already have. If the data controller is concerned about some parts of the conversation, they should provide a redacted copy and explain why the redactions were performed. They should not reject the request outright. If the data controller wants to reject the request entirely, they must do so within the time frame for the DSAR (one month), must explain their reasons, and must inform you that you're allowed to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority or to sue them. However, ICO guidance is flexible on how detailed the reason for refusal can be: Where an exemption applies, the reasons you give to an individual for not complying with a request may depend upon the particular case. For example, if telling an individual that you have applied a particular exemption would prejudice the purpose of that exemption, your response may be more general. However, where possible, you should be transparent about your reasons for withholding information. Here, I don't see any reason why full transparency would be a problem, so I would expect that the data controller can point to a specific exemption in UK data protection law. If you are unsatisfied with the data controller's response, please consider lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority. In the UK, this is the ICO. On the ICO complaints page, you can fill out the online form about “your personal information concerns”.
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Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.
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The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory.
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What does the contract say? I write that so often I should get a stamp made. If the contract is silent, then it is implied that payment in US currency is acceptable, as is any other method of payment the parties agree to. As you have correctly quoted, there is no limit to the number of US coins that are valid for payments, unlike in many other jurisdictions where there is such a limit. Accept the coins, make the tenant wait while you count them one by one and then give them a receipt. Oh, and change your lease when you can to nominate sensible forms of payment like electronic transfer.
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As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.
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Any answer is somewhat speculative, because there are no significant legal precedents. That said, you are probably not in breach of counterfeiting laws, as they typically protect physical currencies. However, due to the way that laws are written, their scope may be somewhat fuzzy in areas that were not foreseen, so you may find that a law unintentionally does cover your act. However, even if the act would fall under the law as written, jurisdiction remains an issue. Where would this counterfeiting happen, legally? Again, as this was not foreseen by lawmakers, it's possible that you may fall under foreign jurisdictions, e.g. because you spend the fake BitCoin and the the recipient lives in a country that assumes jurisdiction because their citizen was defrauded.
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USC / MPEP / Guidance Docs / Cases I'm new to the world of law and trying to get a high level picture of things. Am I right to think of the structure of information (at least in the patent realm) as: USC title 35 = high level source, compilation of laws MPEP = detailed guidance on interpretation of the USC title 35 Guidance docs and cases = further colour on the interpretation of law along with Interim updates to the MPEP, until the MPEP is updated. Do all titles of the USC have an associated manual along with supporting guidance documents? How often does the manual get updated? Delving a little deeper: I understand that the manual of patent examining procedure serves to provide guidance for use by USPTO professionals in applying the laws set forth in USC 35. I don't see mention of the judicial exceptions (abstract ideas/laws of nature/natural phenomena) in the USC. Is the MPEP along with guidance documents such as these/relevant cases the only place to find information on them?
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Other Authorities You are missing at least several important sources of authority, which include: (1) The United States Constitution; (2) the set of regulations issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at Title 37, Chapter I; (3) applicable international treaties; (4) case law with the most important being the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, followed by U.S. District Court cases on point; and (5) case law from the administrative bodies of the PTO. All of the above and the sources you mention are "primary sources". These are interpreted collectively in "Treatises" on patent law which are often cited on issues where primary authority is either too thin, or so numerous that it is not easily summarized merely by resort to primary authority. A number of them are listed here. Chisum on Patents is the leading treatise in the field and should usually be your first destination. It will mention most of the relevant primary source authority in the subject area you are researching. Priority of Authorities The CFR is superior to the MPEP but inferior to Title 35. Treaties are co-equal with Title 35 with conflicts resolved by the date of enactment. Case law of the U.S. Supreme Court trumps everything (even, in practice, the language of the United States Constitution). Case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Federal Circuit trumps everything except the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the very long string of recent reversals of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court (almost one or two a year for the last decade or so), however, every Federal Circuit case should be analyzed to determine if it has been implicitly overturned or limited by the applicable U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The United States Constitution trumps everything except U.S. Supreme Court cases and cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (these cases impliedly provide definitive interpretations of the United States Constitution). Case law from a U.S. District Court is not binding on anyone but the parties to the case, but is highly persuasive and in practice is about on a par with the MPEP, but subordinate to the CFR and administrative case law of PTO bodies. One complicated aspect of case law is that it is only binding when it resolves a question of law necessary to resolve to decide the case before it. Sometimes opinions go off on tangents which discuss other questions of law not before the court and that is called "dicta" which is persuasive on that point of law, but not binding and not as authoritative. It is not always obvious what constitutes the binding portion of a court decision and what constitutes dicta. Another complexity in case law involves concurring or dissenting opinions in cases. Dissenting opinions, obviously, are not binding on anyone but sometimes clarify the scope of the majority opinion. If there is a plurality opinion and a concurring opinion in a case, they have equal weight and neither opinion's rule is definitive except to the extent that they agree. Generally speaking a majority opinion will be binding relative to a concurring opinion in the same case, but that status isn't really definitive and a concurring opinion should be considered even when it accompanies a majority opinion even though the concurring opinion shouldn't be considered binding in that situation. Of course, all case law (and for that matter all other authority) can be made obsolete by subsequent amendments to Title 35 or by the adoption of new treaties. A treatise isn't binding on anyone, but a well reasoned passage from a leading treatise like Chisum will, in practice, be given weight a little below a U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit case, but often greater than any lesser source of authority on a topic. A well reasoned passage in a lesser treatise is typically given a weight comparable to a U.S. District Court case that is on point. Loose Ends One of the important sources for prior art is the compendium of all patents ever issued by the United States (the vast majority of which have expired and entered the public domain). You can get them all for a very reasonable cost in electronic form. The compendium of patents which have not expired is obviously relevant when attempting to determine if a potential patent or technique or process of a client infringes on any existing patent. There are also some patent issues (e.g. jurisdiction and venue in patent disputes) which depend upon other Titles of the United States Code and have the same priority as Title 35 of the United States Code. There are circumstances in which the procedural rules of various courts which issue relevant case law are relevant. Each type of court has its own rules of procedure, and each particular court has its own local rules. (This is not hypothetical, I've had a case involving patent law in which three-quarters of the motion practice in the heavily litigated case depended upon the local rules of practice in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.) Precedents of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, and precedents from U.S. Court of Appeal for Circuits other than the Federal Circuit, are sometimes relevant as well (e.g. interpreting procedural court rules, rules of evidence, or very general principles of law that aren't restricted to patent law such as the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution). But, for the most part, patent case law arises in U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court and the administrative tribunals of the PTO. Issues related to the relationship between an attorney and a client in patent law cases (e.g. attorney malpractice law in patent cases) is a question of state law rather than federal law.
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That depends what the issue is. On constitutional issues, and on issues of federal law (which do come up in state cases) , they are binding precedent, at least in that circuit for an appeals court opinion, and in the whole US for a Supreme court opinion. District court opinions are not generally binding unless upheld on appeal. On matters of state law, the state's own highest court is the final word, but a federal opinion could be at least as persuasive as one from a different state. to the best of my understanding one does not use the term "estoppel" to describe the effect of a previous judgement by a different court. If it is in the same case and not on appeal, the term is Res judicata ("A thing (already) judged"). If it is a general matter of adhering to clear precedent, the term Stare decisis (“to stand by things decided.” ) would be used.
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Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.
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In-house counsel is presumed to be intimately familiar, in a way that retained counsel is not, with both the day-to-day operations of the business and its longer-term strategic planning. So imagine that you're in an R&D intensive industry, and you've been sued by a competitor. The competition's in-house counsel has served you a request to produce documents relating to the research that you're working on, your plans to monetize it, your assessments of the market, etc. Do you want someone to reviewing those documents on their way in to C-suite conference? Courts recognize that providing those documents to in-house counsel creates an almost unavoidable risk that that information will be (mis)used for purposes beyond the litigation. If you've only got your in-house counsel on the case, you can expect a court to be much more reluctant to enforce those kinds of discovery requests than it would be if you had outside counsel who isn't involved in the business. Vorys wrote a good article about this in 2004: http://ccbjournal.com/articles/4159/exclusion-house-counsel-discovery-sensitive-data
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A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law.
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I haven't used the extension, but here are the concerns I would have: Does RECAP detect and handle documents filed under seal? Under some circumstances, IIRC, Pacer gives certain attorneys access to documents sealed from the general public. If you access these sealed documents through PACER and thereby submit them to the RECAP public repository, you have violated the Court order sealing the documents and might well be found in contempt. It is not unheard of for a Court to order a document replaced by a corrected version; this is most common when a document was inadvertently filed with information not redacted that should have been. As long as nobody but the parties and their lawyers have accessed it, this can prevent that information from being public. If you log on to PACER and see your client's personal information...you can no longer keep it private by asking the Court for that remedy, because you just submitted it to a public repository. Enjoy your malpractice suit. Does the use of RECAP constitute a waiver of work product protection? Under some (admittedly limited) circumstances, your use of PACER might constitute attorney work product, which would ordinarily be protected from disclosure in a manner similar to a privilege. Revealing your research pattern to a third party could waive that protection.
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the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
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There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.
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Getting New York based company to delete my personal information I registered with Topresume.com and uploaded a copy of my resume. I found their service to be poor and according to the Privacy Policy they may sell information to third parties. Is there any laws in the state of New York I can use to my advantage to compel them to delete the data they have on me, for example if I write to them telling them to delete all data regarding me must they do so? According to their Privacy Policy "if a child under 13 submits personal information to us and we learn that the personal information is the information of a child under 13, we will attempt to delete the information as soon as possible" so can I just lie and tell them I was 13? Also, in there terms (ToS) it states TopResume will provide the right to request and receive, once a year and free of charge, information about third parties to whom we have disclosed certain types of personal information (if any) about you for our direct marketing purposes in the prior calendar year, and a description of the categories of personal information shared. To make such a request, please send an email to [email protected] and please include the phrase "Personal Information Privacy Request" in the subject line, the domain name of the website you are inquiring about, along with your name, address and email address. At our option, we may respond to such requests by providing instructions about how our users can exercise their options to prevent our disclosure of personal information to third parties for their direct marketing purposes. Which to me sounds like it contains doublespeak but may mean they will not share information with third parties if they ask you to?
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You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.
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Basically how reducible is personal information until it's no longer personal information? When it can no longer be used, alone or combined with other data, to identify a person (or small number of people). Context matters, if you have data on the people in say New York City, (pop. 8 million+) there are only 676 2 letter initials which averages out to about 12,000 each BUT initials are not uniformly distributed: there are a lot more JS out there than XX. In fact XX could be so rare that you can identify an individual in NYC just from this. Of course, if you are using all initials then in, English speaking countries most people have 3 names and so, 3 initials; this not only reduces the number of people in each “bucket” it makes it way easier to identify unique individuals with 2, 4, 5 or more names. If your data set is smaller than this and people have a way of working out who was in your data, then the prospect of being able to identify an individual just from their initials is much greater. For example, my family has 4 individuals and there are 4 unique first initials so in that group, the initial clearly identifies each of us.
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You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members.
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No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose.
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The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.
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The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date.
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But that a phone number exists in your collection is interesting information. Since phone numbers are identifying and so short that they are guessable, hashing does not provide anonymization. Hashing could still be an appropriate safety measure or pseudonymization technique. Note that the salt is typically stored as part of the hash value, and should not be considered to be a secret key. If the information had been anonymized it wouldn't be personal information and the GDPR wouldn't apply. However, since the phone numbers are personal information (even hashed, they relate to an indirectly identifiable person), you should apply standard GDPR compliance processes to determine whether storing these phone numbers is legal: What is the purpose of processing? Some purposes like national security or purely personal and household purposes are exempt from the GDPR What is the legal basis for this purpose? E.g. consent, legitimate interest, legal obligations, … What is the minimum data necessary to fulfill the purpose? If pseudonymized data is sufficient, pseudonymization is mandatory. What safety measures do you think are appropriate? This could shift a legitimate interest balancing test in your favor. What compliance measures are you obliged to take? E.g. information per Art 13–14, preparation for data subject requests, engaging data processors, further safety measures. While your purposes are probably benign, it can be useful to recall that the presence of identifiers in data sets can be a matter of life and death. When accounts were leaked in the Ashley Madison data breach, that drove some users to suicide. In some countries, the existence of a Grindr account can be a death sentence. Those are examples involving special categories of data per GDPR Art 9, so likely far more sensitive than the context of this question. However, in the AM breach it would not have helped much to hash identifiers like emails: third parties would still be able to check whether the email of someone they know was part of the breach.
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Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.
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Could United's upgrade policy be legally interpreted as gambling? United provides Global Premier Upgrades (GPU) to frequent fliers that can be used to upgrade one leg of a flight by one class, e.g., economy to business. However, for international flights, the economy ticket also has to be in minimum fare class ("W" typically), which is often significantly more expensive then the cheapest available ticket at time of booking. It's typically around $200-$300 more per leg. Other than being eligible for an upgrade, the higher fare class has no other benefits. That was actually confirmed to me by an United agent on the phone. The upgrade is also dependent on availability of a special type of tickets (R-space). Availability at time of booking is quite rare on most routes. You can still apply the GPU, but you get wait listed. If R-space becomes available or United doesn't sell all business class seats for cash, they will upgrade by going down the wait list. Often the upgrade does not go through. In this case, the GPU is returned to the customer. However the price difference of the tickets is not. So you have spent $200-$300 for nothing. So in short: at time of booking, you need to decide whether you want to spent extra money for a chance at an upgrade. If you get it, great. If not, the money is gone with no value or benefit and United keeps the cash. Some frequent flier web sites refer to this actually as the "upgrade lottery". I looked at some legal definitions for gambling, and it seems the main ingredients are there. See for example: https://definitions.uslegal.com/g/gambling/, or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambling You wager money there is an event with uncertain outcome if the the outcome is "good" you have a substantial gain, if the outcome is "bad", you lost your money without any benefit from it. It's a simple "yes"/"no" You have little or no information to predict the outcome at time of wager. You have no control on the outcome
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No. This is not gambling. Your quoted and paraphrased definition is especially misleading, since the original definition given on uslegal.com explicitly excepts bona fide business transactions valid under the law of contracts, such as the purchase or sale at a future date of securities or commodities, contracts of indemnity or guaranty and life, health or accident insurance. You pay an extra fee for the privilege of being on a waitlist for selection to an upgrade. That fee and list does not guarantee getting the upgrade any more than the fee and ticket guarantees you will have that seat on board that flight on that day. You only receive the tangible benefit if there is sufficient space and you satisfy the criteria set out by the airline (terms and conditions as provided at booking, policies applied by the airline whether publicly known or not, etc.).
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This is an interesting and challenging question, with broad applications. The standard answer is "read the contract", to which one should reply "show me the contract". It has to be findable from a web page – a contract can't be a secret document that the accepting party cannot find. At the bottom of their main page, you can find a TOS. It states that This Website is provided solely to assist customers in gathering travel information, determining the availability of travel—related goods and services, making legitimate reservations or otherwise transacting business with travel suppliers, and for no other purposes. In other words, they disavow any implication that they are also selling you a product. The agreement is with "the customer visiting the Website and/or booking a reservation through us on this Website, or through our customer service agents", which confirms that they are "facilitating" an arrangement (with a "partner" i.e. the airline). The agreement part comes where they say By accessing or using this Website, booking any reservations for travel products or services, or contacting our call center agents, you agree that the Terms of Use then in force shall apply In case of dispute, there is a section on "working it out informally", which has the bottom line You and Expedia agree that any and all Claims will be resolved by binding arbitration, rather than in court, except that you and we may assert Claims on an individual basis in small claims court if they qualify. This includes any Claims you assert against us, our subsidiaries, travel suppliers or any companies offering products or services through us (which are beneficiaries of this arbitration agreement). The section "SUPPLIER RULES AND RESTRICTIONS" which starts Additional terms and conditions will apply to your reservation and purchase of travel—related goods and services that you select. Please read these additional terms and conditions carefully. In particular, if you have purchased an airfare, please ensure you read the full terms and conditions of carriage issued by the travel supplier, which can be found on the supplier’s website. You agree to abide by the terms and conditions of purchase imposed by any supplier with whom you elect to deal, including, but not limited to, payment of all amounts when due and compliance with the supplier's rules and restrictions regarding availability and use of fares, products, or services. Airfare is only guaranteed once the purchase has been completed and the tickets have been issued. Airlines and other travel suppliers may change their prices without notice. We reserve the right to cancel your booking if full payment is not received in a timely fashion. I went through the exercise, and it does offer a highly unintelligible stream of text that states the "rules", though the text is hosted on Expedia and not the carrier's website (this refers not to the contract of carriage, but to the booking-specific contract details that state the flight-specific conditions. The contract of carriage is on the UA webpage). The next paragraph states In case of a no-show or cancellation, you may be entitled to a refund of airport taxes and fees included in the price of the ticket purchased. Where you are eligible for a refund, you can request such a refund from Expedia customer service, who will submit your request to the airline on your behalf. You will note the conditionality of this information. They do promise to submit your request to the airline – that's part of the contract. Your agreement with Expedia is murky, but it appears that you have not agreed to acquire a flight from Expedia in exchange for money, rather, you have agreed to allow Expedia to facilitate your contract with the carrier(s), where there is no clear statement of "consideration" in the agreement, but one may assume that what they get is whatever commission they have negotiated in their contract with the carrier. It is not clear to me that there is such a thing as "Expedia credit". They refer to airline credit, which is certainly a thing. The first thing they say is "If you’ve had to cancel or change your non-refundable flight, most airlines will offer you a credit instead of a refund". I can attest that issues do arise when an airline cancels a flight then issues a credit rather than a refund, however that was a foreign carrier who changed their policy after a year. The named airline has a (current) statement of refund policy. Your relation with the airline is ultimately reducible to their contract of carriage. Refunds are covered under Rule 27. In theory, they should therefore issue a refund, but also read Rule 24, where para D says In the event of a Force Majeure Event, UA without notice, may cancel, terminate, divert, postpone, or delay any flight, right of carriage or reservations (whether or not confirmed) and determine if any departure or landing should be made, without any liability on the part of UA. UA may re-accommodate Passengers on another available UA flight or on another carrier or combination of carriers, or via ground transportation, or may refund, in its sole discretion, any unused portions of the Ticket in the form of a travel certificate or travel credit. So it depends on the circumstances.
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The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered.
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AA "requests" that you remove batteries from checked laptops and put them in carry-on luggage. You must, per their contract of carriage, "comply with airline safety rules", and they say that they can deny you boarding if you do not comply, which includes "Are uncooperative, abusive, harassing, or show the potential to be while on board". You might then hope to sue them because you didn't violate any safety policy of theirs but they denied you your seat, but there's nothing in the contract that states "The following is a complete list of policies". You should discuss this in more detail with your lawyer, but on the face of it there is no legal recourse, except of course a refund.
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In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed a case that sought one dollar in nominal damages. I'm assuming you mean only claims involving money damages as a remedy, because there are many claims every year involving no literal money damages and the remedy sought is some other kind of relief (although such relief would still have practical or economic value).
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Assuming you have suffered a delay, you may complain both to the airline and the national enforcing body with this form. If you don't know your NEB, this will tell you where they are. This document spells out the procedure interaction between your NEB and the airline, specifically addressing the "extraordinary circumstances" question. If information provided by airlines is of a coherent and detailed character, NEB are left with a margin of flexibility and can apply a system of random checks, respecting the principle of proportionality. If information is only provided in a generalised manner not allowing NEB to draw sound judgements, each incident has to be followed up on individual case-by-case assessment requesting for example, as matter of proof, logbooks, incident reports, maintenance manuals etc. The airline may provide the NEB with sufficient evidence that there were "extraordinary circumstances", in which case you're probably not going to get compensation, or they were too vague and the NEB will follow up, and you either get compensation or you won't. If the NEB doesn't rule the way you'd like, you could sue (which is a risk) if you think there was a misinterpretation of the regulation, for example, if the NEB didn't get the message that care is always mandated and only compensation goes away. Or, it may be necessary to sue in order to get an official interpretation (such as what "arrival time" means), but such cases are rare (this seems to contain the applicable case law)/ This only goes to the question of whether the airline interprets the facts in accordance with the law, where the NEB will correct the airline if necessary. There is no cost effective way to test whether the facts reported to the NEB were falsified.
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The order itself is here. It applies to "any United States person", which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that "you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE", and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading.
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What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause "bears no reasonable relationship" to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to "all the money you have, and then some," "all the money you have," "half the money you have," or even " "1 percent of all the money you have," the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.
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If roommate steals, can police search other people's rooms too (US)? I was speaking with my friend, who sounded real nervous, saying she thinks her roommate might be stealing from work. It's been going on for a few weeks and she can't tell for sure, because her roommate is apparently sort of a mysterious person and my friend goes to school all day and barely sees this roommate anyways so is not really sure, but feels like there are enough hints of things she seen the roommate carry in and that it might be the case. That maybe her roommate is selling stuff she stole from work, she doesn't know. My friend has been afraid of asking the roommate directly if she's stealing. Long story short, given that my friend is on anxiety medication and I felt real bad for her cause she sounded real anxious, I said just protect yourself, it's nothing to do with you, and don't think about it, and she said what if it IS true and cops come and go through her stuff and turn her room upside down and interrogate her (she has a trauma of when her dad went to prison when she was younger, and she and her family used to live in Russia). I said it's not gonna happen, unless she has anything of the roommate in her room and she said none. But after the call now I'm starting to wonder because I don't know the laws and have never dealt with cops myself, don't know their process. She lives in Seattle btw. So can anybody tell me what the procedure would be, like if someone is suspected of theft, like can they just break into a place and turn the whole apartment upside down, interrogate everyone, etc, if several people live there, or is it just the one person they suspect?
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Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend.
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If I remember the case correctly, he didn't make his home look uninhabited (that is nobody is living there) but as if the inhabitants had left (gone shopping etc.) to make it look attractive to burglars. He then waited inside, armed with a gun, with the intent of shooting any burglars that might arrive. He shot the first burglar in the legs, and then proceeded to kill the unarmed and now defenseless burglar, who was lying injured on the ground and was in no position anymore to hurt him. He then did the same with a second burglar, shooting her in the legs, then shooting her multiple times, and when he found she was still alive, he shot her point blank in the face while she was lying on the ground. You are asking the wrong questions. You are asking "is it illegal to remove a truck". It's not. What is illegal is to intentionally create a situation where you shoot people and try to claim "self defence". It can very well be argued that by luring burglars into your home with the intent to kill them, they are not actually illegal in that home, because you wanted them to be there. You can do many things that are each completely innocent but add up to a crime. Actually, for everyone interested, I posted a question maybe last week or the week before whether you can be convicted for both first degree murder and second degree murder for killing a person, and it was exactly this case that inspired the question. What should he have done? If he hadn't lured the burglars in, I believe the case would have still been a double murder, since he killed both unarmed teenagers when they were absolutely no threat. It might not have been first degree murder since it would not have been premeditated. But he intentionally lured them in, making it premeditated (first degree) murder. If he had only injured them, the fact that he lured them in could very likely have made this an assault. You asked: "Now that the burglars are in his house, what should he have done? " Well, he got himself into a dangerous situation. Remember, he was convicted for premeditated murder. So just before he shot the girl in the head, he should have instead put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been one murder instead of two. Just before he shot the boy, he should have put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been just attempted murder. When he heard the first person entering, he should have called the police and waited. When the burglar came in sight, he should not have shot and injured him. It's a similar question to "if I try a bank robbery and there is an armed guard, what should I do". The only legal thing to do is to drop your weapon and wait to be arrested. If an armed burglar had appeared instead of two unarmed teens, well, he would have put himself into a dangerous situation. Just as the burglar would have no right to shoot even if a home owner points a weapon at him, he had no right to shoot, no right to self defense, since he had intentionally created the situation. Tough shit. That's what you may get if you plan a murder. Responding to some comments: @J.Chang Are you being serious? You are not allowed to make your house inviting to burglars, while waiting inside with the intent of killing them. Self defense only applies when a reasonable person would believe they are in danger. Reasonable persons don't think that a burglar comes in with the intent of blowing themselves up and taking the home owner with them. And no, you don't get to "assume the worst". Not when the worst is something no reasonable person would expect. Thanks to Dale for pointing out that even for soldiers in a war situation, where different rules apply, deliberately killing a helpless enemy combatant is murder.
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If that which you describe in your comment ( Facebook post as only basis for warrantless search) is, and can be shown, to be the only basis for the search, and there was no evidence of a crime in plain view when they arrived.....then yes, it is likely the search and all evidence acquired from the search would be excludable. As to whether the individual could still be prosecuted, that depends if a case could be built independent of the evidence collected during the search.
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There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office.
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(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).
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The customers are able to leave, so there's no reason it could be a crime. Even if they weren't able to operate the lock themselves, they are presumably able to leave by asking a staff member. There is no way this could be remotely considered false imprisonment. Depending on the layout and size of the store and presence/lack of other fire exits, this might violate fire safety regulations.
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Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation).
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In this instance, the police were almost certainly trying to get you to volunteer to be in a line-up with the victim of the crime picking out potential suspects (of which you were absolutely one, and probably remain so). Assuming the chap or chappete who got mugged, who basically only saw the barrel of the gun, picked you out of the lineup at random, you could have expected to be carted off to a holding cell pending an interview, followed by arrest and very likely conviction for armed robbery. You were wise to refuse. You should never cooperate with the police even if you think have an amazing alibi that means that you couldn't have committed the crime. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE
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Are published sports results copyrightable? In NBA vs. Motorola where Motorola did not infringe NBA's copyright by publishing scores of games. However, I am wondering if published scores are copyrightable. For instance, the result "Bulls 99-89 Lakers" itself may not be copyrightable (since it's a fact), but what if it is published on the NBA website? If I want to use the score that is published on the NBA website (without reaching an agreement with NBA), would I infringe NBA's copyright in that case?
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The fact is not copyright: the method of presentation (font, colour, logos etc.) is.
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Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.
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Copyright in musical works extends to the composition itself, not just to the sheet music (as you notice, there may not even be any sheet music). If the musical work is protected by copyright then publishing a transcription of that work would be a potential violation of the copyright, subject to exceptions such as fair-use and fair dealing. If the piece is in the public domain, then you can publish your transcription.
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Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.
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Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)
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The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.
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This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.
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Copyright law requires permission of the rights holder to e.g. post material. The terms of that permission could be very complicated, as seen in royalties contracts with publishers, but they can also be simple. If someone asks "can I post your video on my website" and you say "Sure, as long as you give me credit", then they can post the video on their site as long as that say something like "This video was made by Jake" or something like that. There is no exception to permission where permission is retroactively withdrawn just in case it turns out that one can make money off of the video. However: you gave That Guy permission, and that does not mean that the hundreds of Other Guys have permission. So you can pursue all of the Other Guys and demand that they take the video down, or require some payment to get your permission.
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Dispute about whether a day consists of 7.5 or 8 hours I've recently run into a dispute for an invoice with a company for whom I'm doing IT contract work about the number of hours in a work day. We agreed on a rate of £N a day, which I had assumed to mean N/7.5 as an hourly rate. However, they have recently said that "everyone contracting here assumes an 8-hour day". The contract that I signed doesn't state either way which one is correct. However, if I adjust said invoice to assume an 8 hour day, I will lose 6.25% of my revenue (assuming my maths is correct). Without this being specified in the contract (or verbally at any point before today), is it legally acceptable to state that 7.5 hours is the standard amount and that I should bill as such, and what can I do about resolving this issue? Also what should be done about going into the future with this work and asking for a revised contract? Can I request 6.25% to be added on to my day rate, or ask to be billed on a 7.5 hour basis, and have that stand up against their legal team if push came to shove? I am invoicing on an hourly basis rather than by half-day/day, and have done many hours of overtime. Thanks in advance for any help.
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is it legally acceptable to state that 7.5 hours is the standard amount No. Because you are a contractor not employee, there is no "standard" to refer to. You are only entitled to what your contract provides for, that is £N per day no matter how much time you worked. That said, if there is no word "overtime" in the contract, you cannot use one to justify how much you charge. You can, though, charge for weekend days (unless the contract explicitly prohibits working on weekends). what should be done about going into the future with this work and asking for a revised contract? 1) Learn the lesson; 2) Make up your mind about what you want to be paid for: hours, days or output; 3) Discuss/negotiate contract terms with your clients.
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If you were in the office, and ready to take instructions what to do from your manager, then you were legally working and need to be paid. There's plenty of things you can do in an office without electricity unless it's too dark. If the manager didn't ask you to do anything, it's the company's problem, not yours. If you took the opportunity to leave for 90 minutes to do your weekly shopping, then you shouldn't get paid.
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How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.
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None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.
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It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.
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Dale M is correct. Lawyers get calls all day long from people who want free advice and have no intention of entering into a paid representation. That is what your letter sounds like. I write separately just to add that you may have better results if you make explicit that you are aware of their rates and prepared to pay them. Even then, though, it may be that whatever you'd pay for the two hours to walk you through this is not as valuable as time they'd spend on other matters. If I have to prioritize between a repeat client and someone who will probably not pay for anything more than having one question answered, that's an easy choice.
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No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.
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From your account, you seem to have entered into a verbal contract for this extra work to be done without agreeing a price. According to this article, Canadian courts will assume that a contract contains "implied" terms "on the basis of the presumed intentions of the parties where necessary to give business efficacy to the contract". To put that in English, these are terms that must be there because otherwise the story wouldn't make sense. In this case the implied term is that the lawyer will be paid a reasonable amount for his work, as it would be unreasonable to expect him to do this for free. Lawyers generally bill by the hour, so a reasonable amount would be the time he spent multiplied by his usual hourly fee. If that is what he has billed you, then I'm afraid you owe him the money.
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Is saying "Sorry" assuming fault? I am unsure where I heard of this, but the basic premise is that if an individual in says "Sorry" either to law-enforcement or to another party, they are in effect, assuming fault for a given action. i.e. car accident: two cars, one rear-ends the other. The presumably at-fault driver says "Sorry" and this is documented. Insurance companies would utilize such a statement as an admission of guilt. To what degree is this claim true? Should a person in all potentially legal-situation remain silent and not communicate at all?
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Your thinking that an apology might be understood as admitting fault hasn't gone unnoticed by lawmakers in some countries. I know you're asking about the USA, but I thought to mention (as I commented) that Ontario actually has an "Apology Act" that essentially says that you can apologize for something and that apology is not to be considered a confession, admission of fault/guilt. Apology Act, 2009 S.O. 2009, CHAPTER 3 Consolidation Period: From April 23, 2009 to the e-Laws currency date. No Amendments. Definition In this Act, “apology” means an expression of sympathy or regret, a statement that a person is sorry or any other words or actions indicating contrition or commiseration, whether or not the words or actions admit fault or liability or imply an admission of fault or liability in connection with the matter to which the words or actions relate. 2009, c. 3, s. 1. Effect of apology on liability (1) An apology made by or on behalf of a person in connection with any matter, (a) does not, in law, constitute an express or implied admission of fault or liability by the person in connection with that matter; (b) does not, despite any wording to the contrary in any contract of insurance or indemnity and despite any other Act or law, void, impair or otherwise affect any insurance or indemnity coverage for any person in connection with that matter; and (c) shall not be taken into account in any determination of fault or liability in connection with that matter. 2009, c. 3, s. 2 (1). There are, of course, some exceptions. You can read the act here. Edit: This law also applies in British Colombia. See the similar Act here. According to, MillerThomson Lawfirm, as of Nov. 2009: To date, seven Canadian provinces have adopted legislation of this sort. British Columbia passed the first Canadian Apology Act in 2006. Saskatchewan adopted similar legislation in its Evidence Amendment Act, 2007. Alberta followed with an amendment to its Evidence Act in 2008. Other provinces that have adopted similar legislation to date are Manitoba, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. It is important to be aware however that the Acts only provide immunity from civil liability. They do not apply to criminal proceedings or Provincial Offences Act matters And for further reading, The University of Victoria has a draft paper entitled "Legal Consequences of Apologies in Canada"
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The fault lies with the people who vandalized your house. In general, whoever causes you damage is responsible (liable) for that damage. This is true whether or not you are selling your house, having guests over, letting a friend stay over for a night or a week, or whatever the circumstance is. Insurance is there to cover many such losses: if a friend trashes your house in a drunken rage, your insurance will cover the damage, but they will invoke the doctrine of subrogation whereby they get to go after the friend, and you have to cooperate. In a situation where nobody has a clue who did the damage, the only possible way that the agent has any responsibility is if they were negligent in their duty to take care of the house. For your specific case, you'd need to discuss the forensic facts with your attorney. But generally speaking, the issue would be whether the agent had breached his/her professional duty of care, which is best understood as comparing his actions (or lack) compares to actions of other professionals in the same circumstance. If a house has 3 or 4 sets of visitors simultaneously, it is really not possible for an agent to supervise all of them at once. So the question would be, was this the result of one concentrated vandalism attack, or serial vandalism. The former is more in the realm of "stuff happens", and the latter is indicative of an endemic lack of care. To repeat, the fault lies with the miscreants who vandalized your house. You, or your insurance company, may nevertheless have to bear the financial burden. Your insurance company will certainly have an interest in spreading responsibility to the realty firm, if warranted by the facts.
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Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.
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[L]et's say you almost get run over by a car[; t]here was a very real probability that you may have been runover […], but you didn't. Why isn't there some civil repercussions for that? Construing the first question broadly, and in line with the one reading "[w]hy isn't there some civil repercussions for [a missed although very real probability of a car run-over]?", the question is, admittedly, based on a few incorrect premises. There are "repercussion" some of them being of criminal nature (reckless driving, vehicular assault etc.), and others may become of civil nature as follows: Common law tort of negligence — Mere threat of harm can be harm for purposes of damages "“When there is a breach of duty, "a person who is in the path of negligent conduct and reasonably fears for his or her own safety may recover for resulting emotional distress." In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal., 973 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1992). ” […] See Potter, 863 P.2d at 833 (George, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing hypothetical pedestrian narrowly avoiding speeding car and indicating that threat of injury is the relevant issue); Wooden v. Raveling, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 897-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Potter hypothetical and holding plaintiff was not precluded from relief simply because car did not actually hit her) (Taylor v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 599 F. App'x 664, 2) (bold type added) Accordingly, broadly construing the question so as to effect the greatest scope of the spotting of damages, one may sue, although not for injuries per se, but instead damages under an emotional distress legal theory and its particular categories like anxiety, depression, recurring nightmares, sleeplessness, anger, angst etc. depending on the actual facts of the case, and typically supported by expert testimony when possible. Strictly construing the question, the mere possibility or even probability of injuries do not merit a cause of action for damages in and of themselves, as such damages never occurred. It may be possible that in certain scenarios the mere possibility is so outrageous that it exceeds all bounds of a civilized society, that nominal damages, say, of $1 are awarded and punitive damages are awarded so as to deter such conduct, but even in that case such a hypothetical case the cause of action will not be the damages under a personal injury tort, but one for nominal damages and for punitive damages even if the factual underpinnings are the same. Standing Standing is one's positive relation to at least one event that is the basis of a legal proceeding in a court, that is, one being the presumptive subject of some sort of wrongdoing that merits their recognition as a party to a legal proceeding. The term there would have been "damages" instead of standing. Why doesn't law take into account probability? It does. Rarely enumerated probabilities other than in case of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof where the quality of the evidence must weigh in favor of the one who has the burden of proof, in other words the fact finders job is to decide whether something is greater or smaller than 50 percent probability. Although it is rather the exception than the rule, probabilities other than the greater-than-50-percent standard also appear here an there in the judicial process, for example, in asylum cases “"[t]o effect a well-founded fear [from persecution so as will constitute protected for purposes of U.S. asylee or refugee status], a threat need not be statistically more than fifty-percent likely [to have been made; however,] the [U.S.] Supreme Court has suggested that even a one-tenth possibility of persecution might effect a well-founded fear." Lim,224 F.3d at 934-935 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 430, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2004) (see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, [“ "Let us ... presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of origin every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp.... In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to escape from the country in question will have 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' upon his eventual return”]) In less enumerated forms many other aspects of the judicial process rely on probabilities.
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No. It means the existence of reasonable doubt is in doubt... One cannot conclude the question of guilt in either direction, so one must try again to see if a different jury can answer the meta-question, to then answer the legal question of guilt. ... or is not being addressed If only one person is voting against the consensus, or as many as are allowed by the jurisdiction, they are overruled. That's the allowance made for bias that has somehow reached the jury despite the filtering done beforehand. If more people are voting against the majority so that consensus is not possible, it is potentially because someone has made up their mind on the question of guilt regardless of what (some significant part or the weight of) the evidence indicates, defeating the purpose of the trial and providing all the evidence. A person not accounting for all the evidence can't be said to have reasonable doubt of guilt, since the doubt may be excluded by the remaining evidence. Similarly, guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be supported by only partial evidence, as exculpatory evidence may be among the part not accounted for. ... or cannot be addressed by that jury at all. Finally, a jury split on the decision of how to weigh the evidence cannot claim either to have or to have dismissed reasonable doubt, because they cannot agree on what a reasonable doubt is, in the first place.
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Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.
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You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.
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That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.
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Vehicle Repair Manual - What material is copyright protected? I am fully aware that most vehicle repair manuals have some sort of copyright protection but my confusion is regarding what specifically is protected and more specifically, things like fluid capacity values and bolt tightening specs. If this information is copyright protected (the actual specifications / values listed) how is it that multiple manuals from completely different companies all list this information in a nearly identical way? Sometimes there are differences, but mostly not. Looking in the front of various manuals, it seems that the copyright protection is on the manual producer themselves, pictures, methods etc. For example, Haynes / Chilton does not reference Ford copyrights or that they have permission from Ford in a Ford Escort manual. Is information like this considered common property ie. no ability to copyright? Reason for asking: Has to do with online repair blogs and how to stay legal.
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In the US, you cannot copyright facts. See, for example, Feist Publications Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co, where a phone book was held to be not copyrightable. You can, however, copyright a particular arrangement of facts, if there is at least a spark of creativity involved. You can't copyright a recipe, but you CAN copyright a cookbook. In general, you're OK if you copy the fluid capacity from the manual, so long as you don't copy the manual itself.
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A name is not protected by copyright. It can be protected as a trademark, but it would almost certainly be allowed as nominative fair use, since the alternative of indirect descriptive reference ("the grocery store founded in 1930 by George W. Jenkins") is not only cumbersome, but it doesn't even answer the question, where only the name can be used. Trademark protection is not absolute ownership of a word, it is the right to a specific use of a word (e.g. to identify a specific brand of computer for commercial purposes). If you use a trademark symbol, you have to be careful to use the right one (it may be illegal to imply registration by using R when the trademark is not registered). As far as I can determine, there is no obligation for a third party to so mark trademark terms, though it is commonly done.
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Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.
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Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles)
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Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.
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copyright.gov is the oficial site of the US Copyriuht office, and is here quoting 17 USC 102(b) which is the actual copyright law. Under it, copyright protection extends to expression, but not to any idea, etc. However, these are not in conflict, because using information or ideas from a work to create a new and original work is not "duplication or use of images, diagrams, or text, or other electronic or printed publications" so Site A is also correct. However, a close paraphrase where the words are changed but the sentence and paragraph structure of a text is followed, presenting the same ideas in the same order in sentences of the same structure in the same order, may constitute a derivative work, and thus a copyright infringement. Wikipedia describes "close paraphrase" as: "... the superficial modification of material from another source." It goes on to give an example: Facts and ideas cannot be protected by copyright, but creative expression is protected. The test of creativity is minimal. Hilaire Belloc's 1897 More Beasts: (for Worse Children) illustrates creative expression in his description of a llama: The Llama is a woolly sort of fleecy hairy goat, with an indolent expression and an undulating throat; like an unsuccessful literary man. If this somewhat dubious source was used for the article on llamas and was still protected by copyright, it would be acceptable to say that the llama is an animal with a shaggy coat, and perhaps that it has a long neck. These are facts. But use of the phrases "indolent expression" and "undulating throat" might violate copyright. The original choice of words is part of Belloc's creative expression. Going further, the simile "like an unsuccessful literary man" is also creative, and is also protected. A clumsy paraphrase like "resembling a failed writer" might violate copyright even though the words are entirely different. More than the facts have been copied. So when the question reads: am I allowed to take the facts and information from Site A and use it on my own site? There answer is: "Yes, but the rewriting must be more than superficial, A mere substitution o synonyms will not do, the expressive structure must also be rewritten." However, if the expressive structure is simply a list of facts in an obvious order, such as alphabetical or chronological there is no copyright at all on either the words or the structure. see Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) edit The scenario added by edit looks reasonable. In this case it would seem that the operator of "my site" has probably not infringed the copyright on "Site A".
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Main Question: Most likely not under Magnuson-Moss or U.C.C.. Question 1: If a charge payable before hand was not set forth in any written warranty, it is most likely not legal to deny remedy to the consumer. However, even if it was, it is possible that it would not meet the federal minimum standards for warranties as, per paragraph (d) a warranty has to provide for remedy without a charge. If there is absolutely no way for you to obtain the information to prove that a remedy is due — for e.g. no third party has legal or technical capacity to diagnose the vehicle — that is likely also a term to be found unconscionable and void, and may be found fraudulent, malicious and/or oppressive which may entitle one to collect punitive damages. (It is worth obtaining written confirmation of whether this decision is made in accord with their policies or on a line that they announce to be recorded) Question 2: Most likely same as Question 1. Question 3: Most likely same as Question 2. According to 15 U.S.C., subsection (a) of Section 2302 entitled "Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements for contents: "In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of time." (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear. (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. (12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty. (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. It may, in addition to any or all of the above, be a violation of paragraph (8), (9), (10) and/or (11) based on specific fact patterns. To the 2nd point added: If the manufacturer stated that the vehicle would run at least a certain number of miles on a full charge for a certain number of miles driven or number of years, and did not stipulate it otherwise, they would have to remedy this. It is highly likely that they tried to evade making such written statement (if not written, it's not a warranty under Magnuson-Moss). If they did, and they did not define the scope of what they would have to do in the case of a defect or malfunction, they would have to remedy it by repairs within a reasonable time; if they fail, they would have to refund or replace. This does not mean that it is likely worth pursuing the matter in court other than maybe in small claims (See: ohwilleke's reply to this question for a general explanation). Moreover, most auto manufacturers put arbitration provisions in their sale contracts and/or their warranties and generally it may be required of one to opt out of it within 30 days of entering into the agreement. If that took place, first the dispute would likely need to be disputed through a qualified dispute resolution mechanism of the manufacturer, dealer, distributor and/or sellers choice depending on who gave the warranty. The specific State's lemon laws may provide for civil penalties for willful violations which may or may not be a very high bar to meet depending on the State's case law, and which is more likely to make it worth for "lemon" lawyers to take the case, but generally they are not a great deal more like hyenas of this segment of the law. It may still be worth considering for one depending on the specific facts, including State jurisdiction and the impeding nature of the nonconformity. (Please specify a State for the State's lemon laws applicable in this hypo)
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You likely have no legal recourse Your copyright claim is irrelevant and your title claim is likely statute barred. It is a little unclear exactly what is going on here so I will state my understanding and answer on this basis. There is a historic artifact (the notebook) that contains words and possibly pictures made by someone, now deceased, who was a relation of yours. You believe that in the normal course of inheritance, that notebook should have become a possession of yours or others in your near family. At some point in the (distant?) past the notebook came into the possession of another family. The museum acquired the item from someone in this family; I will assume in good faith - that is, without knowing about your claim to it. Copyright You say you have "copyright of a precious notebook" - this is not true. Any copyright you might have is in the words and drawings in the notebook - they give you no claim to the notebook itself. The distinction here might be illustrated by considering the words of the Declaration of Independence (which are available for the Googling) and the actual engrossed copy held in the National Archives. Copyright is a bundle of exclusive rights that attach to literary and artistic expression once placed in a tangible form. The notebook is the tangible form but it is the words and pictures that the copyright subsists in. Assuming that you own the copyright that does not give you any right over the physical notebook; it only gives you rights to prevent or allow copies or derivative works to be made and only to the extent that those uses are not permitted by copyright law. Based solely on copyright, you could not prevent the museum from displaying the notebook (as an artifact without displaying the copyrighted words), including photographs of it in catalogues or on their website, or even reproducing small parts of it for educational purposes. In any event, copyright only lasts for a set period of time. The exact details depend on which nation's law the copyright was originally created and sometimes when. The US is particularly tricky here but other nations can also make things challenging. In addition, when suing for copyright infringement, the laws of the nation where the infringing copy is produced are also relevant. Title Title is the legal term for the bundle of rights that we commonly think of as ownership of property. For our purposes we are going to limit ourselves to just these: possession: who physically has the property whether they have a right to it or not. right of possession: who has the legal right to be in possession, whether they presently have it or not right or property: is the right which, if all relevant facts are known (and allowed), defeats all other claims These exist in a hierarchy - 3 beats everyone, 2 beats everyone but 3, and 1 beats everyone but 2 or 3. Often these rights are possessed by a single person - when I'm driving my car I have possession, I have the right of possession, and I have the right of property. When I take my car to the mechanic and it gets stolen - the thief has possession, the mechanic has the right of possession, and I have the right of property. Here the museum has possession of the notebook - which gives them the best claim so far. To defeat that, you would need to be able to prove that you either have a right of possession or a right of property. This is not as easy as it sounds. To do this thoroughly, you would need to prove that the original author had one of these rights in the notebook - that he didn't steal it, or buy it from somebody who stole it, or that it wasn't made with stolen paper, or stolen glue etc. This could be presumed unless someone had evidence to contest it. Then you would need to prove that the notebook should have come to you through gift or purchase. This is particularly troublesome. Let's assume that this notebook originally belonged to your great-grandfather (that is he had all three rights above) and, when he passed, he had three surviving children. Unless he specifically willed it to one of those children (or the cat's home) then the three children will inherit the right of property and the right of possession collectively. Of course, unless they share a house, only one of those children can actually possess it. Then each of those children has 3 surviving children; when all three pass on, those 9 will own it collectively - and so on. Now, because this becomes such a bloody mess, governments have passed statutes of limitations that draw a line in how far back people can go in pursuing these claims against the person in possession. These limits vary by jurisdiction but ranges of 2-10 years are typical; they may sometimes be extended in exceptional circumstances by the courts. So, when the other family took possession of the notebook, the clock started running for your family to file a claim to get it back. Unless this happened within say, the last half-decade, you basically have no legal recourse.
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What should an asylee do when a Green Card comes NOT "1 year backdated"? Based on USCIS regulation "The date of adjustment for approved applications filed by asylees shall be one year prior to the date of being approved for permanent residence" Here is the link to that regulation https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManual-Volume7-PartM.html#S-G I became a permanent resident based on being an asylee. But my green card came with the "Resident Since" date equaling to my "Permanent Residence Application Approval" date, i.e. not "1 year backdated". What should I do? I have two options: 1) File form I90. Apply for a new card, and request the "Resident Since" date to be backdated 2) Do nothing. Wait. Four years from now, apply for naturalization and attach an explanation of why I'm applying after 4 years and not 5 years. Which option is the best? Note: It is important to have the "Resident Since" date backdated because this allows for an earlier Naturalization
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File I-90 to apply for a replacement green card, since some information on the card is wrong. You will not have to pay a fee because you will select the reason being the information is wrong due to a USCIS error.
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According to https://www.gov.uk/renounce-british-nationality/after-youve-applied: After you've applied You’ll get a ‘declaration of renunciation’ if your application is successful. This will be your application form, officially signed and stamped. The date your citizenship or status stops will be shown on the form.
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Changing your name won't affect your immigration status. It may be more or less of a hassle if you do it before or after getting your green card. My guess is that the cost and hassle of replacing the green card would argue in favor of changing your name now, before you apply for the green card. You'll normally change your name through a state court where you reside, though, and then submit the court order with your subsequent submissions to USCIS, rather than effecting the change of name through the green card application itself. You'll probably also want to check whether this has legal effect in your country of citizenship. Detailed questions on practical aspects of the change belong on Expatriates, however. As far as this site is concerned, the answer is yes, it's fine.
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Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)
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There is a note attached to the relevant section of the Revised Code of Washington. It used to be "not more than one year", but in 2011, Substitute Senate Bill 5168 changed this and many similar instances to "up to 364 days". They explained their purpose in the first section of the bill: The legislature finds that a maximum sentence by a court in the state of Washington for a gross misdemeanor can, under federal law, result in the automatic deportation of a person who has lawfully immigrated to the United States, is a victim of domestic violence or a political refugee, even when all or part of the sentence to total confinement is suspended. The legislature further finds that this is a disproportionate outcome, when compared to a person who has been convicted of certain felonies which, under the state's determinate sentencing law, must be sentenced to less than one year and, hence, either have no impact on that person's residency status or will provide that person an opportunity to be heard in immigration proceedings where the court will determine whether deportation is appropriate. Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to cure this inequity by reducing the maximum sentence for a gross misdemeanor by one day. In federal law, 8 USC 1227 (2) (A) (I) provides that: Any alien who— (I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable. The Washington State legislature didn't think that deportation was an appropriate punishment for an alien who committed a gross misdemeanor. Therefore, they reduced the maximum sentence by one day so as not to trigger deportation under 8 USC 1227 (2) (A) (I).
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health care checks. Hotel check in. Employment? maybe. Background Checks? doesn't matter. It actually does matter, because there is sometimes a law governing the documents that may be shown for a given purpose. For example, the I-9 form, for verifying someone's eligibility to accept employment in the US, has a well defined lists of documents that an employer must accept, and the passport card is one of those documents. A similar situation exists for Transportation Security Administration screening of air passengers. On the other hand, laws concerning proof of age for buying various products will vary from state to state, and retailers may or may not be required to accept any particular document. In the case of alcohol sales in North Carolina, for example, there is a brochure that lists "acceptable forms of identification" on page 17 and explicitly says that "passports may be in the booklet or card form." But that does not seem to create a legal requirement for the retailer to accept passport cards, because page 19 outlines the retailer's right to refuse, saying among other things that "there is no legal recourse by a customer who you have refused a sale." US passport law (22 USC Chapter 4 and 22 CFR parts 51 and 53) doesn't have anything to say about the passport's or passport card's role as an identification document; it speaks only of the more specific role as a travel document. So the general answer to your question, appears to be no. There is no law generally requiring people to accept a passport card if they also accept passports or driver's licenses. But in most specific instances, there may be a general requirement such as "government-issued identification" that includes passport cards in addition to passports and driver's licenses, or there may be a list that explicitly includes passport cards along with driver's licenses and passports.
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Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.
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The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts.
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How do I copyright a song with my lyrics but a public domain melody? I used a melody from an old Eastern European folk song and my own lyrics to record myself singing and playing the guitar. Do I copyright just the lyrics and just the performance or copyright the whole thing?
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Copyright is automatic - it starts to exist when you create a work of a type protected by law. Lyrics are such a work, and thus your lyrics are protected. Even the fact that the lyrics go with an existing (public domain) melody is protected. In addition, your recording is protected. However, the melody is probably not copyrighted, and does not become copyrighted merely because you re-used it. (Probably, because you didn't indicate how old, so I assumed old enough that nobody remembers the origin)
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You also retain the right to license the work to others. Therefore you can sell similar rights to MusicBook and anyone else, as long as you do not grant an exclusive license (you have already licensed another party to distribute). They do not gain the right to sub-license your work. If you had executed a copyright transfer, you would have no rights to the work whatsoever (leaving out moral rights for jurisdictions that have them and where they are absolute).
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No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.
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The comment is incorrect; creating a derivative work without permission is still disallowed, even for private use. In US copyright law 17USC 106 defines the exclusive rights that the copyright holder has, the right "to do and to authorize". The second of these is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that the right is the right to "prepare" a derivative work, not the right to "distribute" or "sell" the work. US copyright law defines a derivative work in 17 USC 101 which reads: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. The laws of other countries are similar to US law on this point. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. However, it should be noted that if a person creates a derivative work in private, and never shows it to anyone else, the copyright owner would never learn of it, and so could never sue for infringement. But if it were shown or described to anyone, and the owner did learn, then he owner could in theory sue. Whether the owner would choose to sue over a derivative work never circulated is a different matter. The real effect of this law is that when an infringing derivative work is distributed and the owner wants to sue, the owner need not prove distribution. Proving creation of the derivative work is enough. The quoted comment asks about whether such a rule is "unconstitutional or something" and says that "You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home." The US constitution does not grant any such broad right. There are lots of things one might do in own's own home that are illegal: building a bomb for example. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, sometimes called the Copyright Clause or the IP clause, grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See the LII page "Intellectual Property Clause" and the page Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright where it is written that: Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed. {Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).} See also the Wikipedia article "Copyright Clause".
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You are in breach of Copyright. Plain and simple. Certain websites allow you to use the website content as long as a link is made, but the website must clearly state that. You may also use a tiny portion of the content if it falls under Fair Use, where "Fair Use" does not mean "I want to". The best thing to do is not to do it. You can't copy anybody's work without consent. If you're thinking about Google specifically then they offer multiple APIs so that you can use their content in a wide variety of ways.
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Yes Playing recorded music in public is unlawful without permission (licence) from the copyright holder. Many jurisdictions allow automatic licensing by signing up with and paying for it through the authorised music organisation.
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You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.
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No. These companies seem to be saying that they are entitled to sell music under some sort of mandatory licensing agreement authorized by the law of the Ukraine, or by a licensing agreement specific to the Ukraine. Even if this were true, it would only give them the right to distribute the files in the Ukraine. If an American, sitting in the U.S., makes a digital copy of a file on a Ukrainian server by copying it to his or her U.S. hard drive, they have to have a license to do so issued either by the U.S. copyright holder or authorized by U.S. law. A license to distribute in the Ukraine doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. A Ukrainian statute doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. If the end user doesn't have that license, he or she is violating the copyright holder's rights and may be civilly or criminally liable. There is no scienter requirement for copyright infringement. In fact, it's not at all clear that any Ukrainian site is operating even under this dubious legal cover. This report on Ukrainian licensing agencies by an industry group claims that many Ukrainian licensing authorities are actually scams that have no rights to distribute music under any license--one of the "rogue licensing agencies" discussed is Avtor, referenced in your first example. There is some legal confusion over what group does have permission to license music and collect royalties in the Ukraine, but it's clear that Avtor doesn't, and it certainly doesn't have permission to distribute them in the U.S. If a guy came up to you on the street and told you he had written permission from Disney to videotape their latest movies with a camcorder and sell them to you for a dollar, are you violating the law if you buy it? The answer is yes, and it's the same for these Ukrainian sites.
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Can a company refuse my redundancy payment because they changed their mind? I got made redundant a little while ago and managed to find a new job reasonably quickly. However, before I left the old job they changed their mind about making me redundant and asked me to stay. I refused as the new job was a much better package and they wouldn't match it. As a consequence they then refused to pay me my redundancy money as they said it was my decision to leave. Would I stand a decent chance of winning if I took them to court to get my money?
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Unfortunately, you are probably not entitled to the redundancy / severance money since you weren't technically ever made redundant / laid off - there was no point in time where you were willing and able to work where they refused you, and I presume you were paid for all time worked. If you're concerned that they only changed their tune because they knew you had a better job already lined up - well, you can call their bluff or just use it as a learning experience. In what jurisdiction do you work? If the US, you could call their bluff, say you'd rather stay and see what they do. You would then keep the option of simply walking away with your stuff in a box any time you felt like it (assuming at-will employment and no contracts that state otherwise).
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You asked the rep about how to change some details on your account, and asked him about the cost. It is clear from the recording that you are not changing anything right now. I can't see anything where you state that you want to enter a contract right now, I can not see anything where the rep indicates they want to enter a contract right now. In other words, no contract has been formed. The rep did tell you that a name change will not increase the phone plan price. That was a promise. It was a verbal promise, and you have evidence that the promise was made. Your contract will determine whether the company is bound by such a verbal promise. If you change the name on the contract, with nobody mentioning a price increase, and the price increases, you can surely complain that you were misled and wouldn't have changed the name if you had known about the price increase. However, if you get told that the price will increase before the name change, and you quote the previous promise, I don't think that will force the company to allow a name change without price increase, because your phone conversation didn't create a contract.
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The Company is performing wage theft I have never heard of a wage method that pays a salary according to hours but doens't pay for hours over 40. Monthly Salary, by definition, is paid regardless of hours. Your contract doesn't give hours, it just gives a monthly total. That's a contract, and you should be paid according to the contract. In terms of fairness, it certainly isn't right to dock pay for weeks you worked less than 40 but not give you credit for weeks you wored more than 40. Now, it's not clear if you moved to direct employment for the second month. If you did, the first month would be a contract violation, and the second would be a violation of wage & labor law. A company can't pay you salary as an exempt (exempt from hourly wage laws, like management) employee and also dock you pay according to hours worked. So what can you do? If you are still a contractor and actually want the job, not much more than arguing with payroll. Since you (why?) decided to be a contractor instead of a direct hire, you have exactly zero protections to getting let go. If you are a direct employee, you have protections from bringing action about being paid fairly, though your long-term prospects there would be problematic if you have to take the company to task using the government. Any HR rep should know all of the above. But never just go to HR without talking to your manager first. Remember that HR works for management, and working against your manager is generally a bad career move.
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It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service").
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Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die.
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The statement "you don't need to put it in writing" is not an instruction, and should not be interpreted as on in lieu of other evidence (e.g. the follow-up question "you don't want to get fired, do you?"). It is, at best, a recognition that your concerns have already been noted (and at worst, a ham-handed threat). In the context of an at-will non-union position, it is legal for a boss to directly demand "take it or leave it, no back-talk allowed". The reduction in salary can't go below the statutory minimum, or otherwise circumvent any laws, but assuming that the new salary is per se legal, they can demand that you accept it and not argue. If this were a government position, there is a potential (but not guaranteed) First Amendment issue.
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Some portions of your inquiry are confusing, as in "I insisted that we were going to continue to send money to the mortgage company if we don’t understand what the fees are for". It is unclear why you would continue to send money without understanding the reason for fees, especially since you purportedly sent "the complete payoff" already. What is an appropriate response to an email from a lawyer that says she’s going to withdraw from my case, because I would like to understand the additional fees and charges my mortgage company is charging (over and beyond the plan payment/payoff)? Rather than replying to the lawyer's email, it is more important that you timely file in court a response (with 2 or 3 copies) to her motion to withdraw and that you attend the court hearing (if any is scheduled). Don't forget to also mail your attorney a copy of your response. In the response, you will need to argue that your lawyer's refusal to adequately address your inquiries is in violation of the rules of "professional" conduct (with which attorneys are supposed to comply). By granting the attorney's motion, the court would improperly release her from pending obligations she has with respect to you. For instance, Rule 1.4 of Michigan RPC states: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and comply promptly with reasonable requests for information. [...] (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (note: other jurisdictions in the U.S. have equivalent rules, so you will need to refer to their corresponding label) By pushing you to pay another $850 without actually explaining you the details of the "settlement" with mortgage company's counsel, your lawyer clearly is failing her duty to reasonably inform you of the matter for which you retained her. Therefore, your response should substantiate that a granting of the attorney's motion to withdraw ought to be conditioned on the fulfillment of her obligation to provide you with reasonably sufficient information which you as her client are entitled to obtain. It will help if you attach to your motion & brief an exhibit showing that the mortgage company actually directed you to inquire of your lawyer the clarification(s) you are pursuing. Once you take care of that issue, I encourage you to seriously assess (and proceed accordingly) whether your attorney's misconduct merits being reported with the entity in charge of disciplining lawyers for their legal malpractice. If I were knowledgeable of bankruptcy law, I would be happy to address your first question. I can only suggest you to do some research on leagle.com to become acquainted with how courts decide bankruptcy issues. Be sure to set parameter "Search By Court" to "Federal Bankruptcy Court".
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The primary question, in case of such a lawsuit, is whether you accepted the terms of the contract. You could accept the terms verbally, or you could accept them with a signature, or you could even accept by behavior (such as showing up to work). If you breach the contract and you want to make the argument that you didn't accept the offer (or some identifiable part of the offer), the plaintiffs would have a "yes you did" piece of paper to support their side. Now you would have to advances a very dangerous claim, that you didn't sign the document and that the signature there is a forgery. This is dangerous, because you perjured yourself in so testifying (it would eventually come down to you testifying, that you didn't sign the document). It's really beyond the scope of Law SE to get into forensic graphanalysis debates, but you should expect that the other side will have compelling expert testimony that you did in fact sign the document, with your other hand. In a civil suit (breach of contract), the other side would have to show that it is most likely that you did agree to the terms. It isn't just about the signature, it's about all of the evidence, which would include eyewitness testimony ("I saw him sign it", "I gave him the pile of papers and he returned them all, signed" or a later conversation "Remember that you agreed to X" – "Yeah, whatever").
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Meaning of the term causal nexus? I recently attended a talk related to government workplace harassment law. The presenter repeatedly used the term nexus (i.e., a causual nexus) to describe any situation where actions outside of the workplace could be seen as related to workplace harassment. After the talk I found an interesting article by Prof. Jeanette Cox on the American Bar Association website on First Amendment Rights in the workplace, but it doesn't speak to the extent an employee must modify speech in their personal life to avoid liability for workplace harassment. What are the limits of behavior on personal time that might be considered a causal nexus for a harassment case? I'm assuming that any such behavior would have to also be conjunct with behavior that occurred in the workplace involving the same individuals.
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"Nexus" means "connection". A "causal nexus" in this context is a connection that causes harassment at work. There isn't any bright line dividing behavior on personal term that does or does not meet this test. The law does't work that way. Instead, there is a fairly vague test (in legal theory this is called a "standard" as opposed to a "rule") and there are examples of conduct that does or does not meet the test. A lot of the more obvious examples would be the kind of situations that come up in small town life. For example, suppose that the worker who is being harassed is the firm courier, and has only about half a dozen main stops that she visits several times a week, all of which are businesses or government agencies run by people who are part of the Pessimists Club together, whose members have beer and rubber chicken at a member's bar together every Tuesday night. In that context, saying lewd and suggestive things about the courier whom a member employs over a poker game with the people who run all of her main stops in connection with her job might have a causal nexus for harassment case purposes with her job, effectively enlisting everyone she has to do business with in her job in a campaign of harassment against her. In contrast, suppose that someone who is engaging in iffy conduct that doesn't quite cross the line of harassment at work towards this courier goes to that Pessimists Club meeting and targets his crass comments not at the courier but his ex-girlfriend towards whom he has engaged in lots of harassing conduct. His comments about his ex-girlfriend would not have a causal nexus to the courier's workplace and probably wouldn't be something that could be considered to determine if he was engaged in workplace harassment. This would be true even though small town gossip made his harassment of his ex-girlfriend common knowledge which make the courier take otherwise ambiguous conduct from him much more seriously knowing his modus operandi and capacity for escalating the situation. But, ultimately, one has to make a rather holistic evaluation of the entire situation to determine if there is a causal nexus or not between non-workplace behavior and alleged workplace harassment.
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The Rules of Professional Conduct apply only to lawyers and are the foundation for a lawyer to be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred or receive other license related professional discipline. They are neither criminal offenses, nor on their own, a grounds for a civil lawsuit (although they may be relevant to an element of a civil cause of action giving rise to a lawsuit). The Rules of Professional Conduct also prohibit using a non-lawyer as a sock puppet to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. But, the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves are not applicable to pro se parties or even to non-lawyer parties who are acting fully independently of the lawyers they have retained. In some circumstances, a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(g) could also constitute the crime of extortion, or could constitute duress such that an action taken in the course of litigation or a business deal is not actually legally considered to be voluntary and making it potentially voidable. But this would not always, or necessarily even usually, be the case. Incidentally, Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 is one of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the most state to state substantive variations and it also has multiple differing interpretations even in cases where the language is verbatim identical between states. The appropriate scope of this rule as a matter of policy is one of considerable controversy. And, it isn't unusual for the converse to happen (i.e. for a criminal prosecutor or an attorney regulation system official to force the hand of a civil litigant in the course of negotiations about those charges).
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In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)
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Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
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What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.
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No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.
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the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
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Under the doctrine of "respondeat superior", can an employer in Michigan be legally liable if an (intoxicated) non-salary employee hits and kills a person on their way to work? Probably not. For most purposes, under principles originally established for minimum wage laws under the Portal to Portal Act, you are not at work and acting within the scope of your employment when you leave home to go to work (i.e. when you are commuting) or when you leave work to go home at the end of the day. Would the employer's legal responsibility change if the vehicle was owned by the company? Not on a respondeat superior theory. The employee still isn't acting within the scope of employment. But, Michigan does impose statutory liability upon vehicle owners which is vicarious liability even though it isn't respondeat superior liability, under a theory similar to (but broader than in some respects since it applies to non-family too, and narrower than in other respects since it is limited to vehicle owners) the common law family car doctrine. Specifically, Michigan Vehicle Code § 401(1) states (the balance of the section pertains to leased vehicles): This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family. So, unless the employee had a company car without the express or implied consent or knowledge of the employer, the company is responsible for harm caused by negligence. There might be an argument that criminal activity (driving while intoxicated) which was intentional or reckless, is beyond what the employer gave express or implied consent to do and was not done with employer knowledge (I haven't reviewed the case law to examine that theory), in the same way that the employer would probably not have liability if the employee, while sober, intentionally murdered his ex-wife by driving over her with the company car. But, at first blush, it looks like the employer would be on the hook if it was a company car, since drunk driving is a traffic statute that was violated for which the negligence per se liability referred to in the statute would apply. The fact pattern of the question is notable because it catches a case where there is statutory liability in Michigan, despite the fact that neither the family car doctrine, not respondeat superior, nor a negligent entrustment theory would impose liability on employer at common law. (There are negligent entrustment cases at common law in Colorado and elsewhere where negligent entrustment liability is imposed when an employer allows a drunk employee to leave work in a company car that the employer could have forbidden the employee to use because the employee was drunk.)
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landlord suing me for $5k damage to property. How to prepare (small claims court, White Plains, NY) The dispute: mold and crack in a common bath tub shared by multiple users. Landlord refuses to return deposit until tenant pay for a replacement of bath tub including professional installation. Signed lease agreement: none. Only some emails. Venue is White Plains, NY, US I moved in 21 Apr and moved out 18 Nov 2017. Until now landlord has not returned my $750 deposit. According to landlord, the bath tub was spotless when I moved in, but I could see it had been in use for at least 5 years. There was already another tenant in the other guest room when I moved in. My room had been used by Landlord's son. All of these occupants have only one bath tub to share. A few months later we noticed minor mold in the bathtub. Landlord insisted (by email) that the other current tenant (Zuhur) and I restore it to the original condition, using our own money to pay for two thirds of the total cost. There’s no ventilation to prevent mold, but there are many wet objects in the bath room creating moisture. The crack became visible to everyone a few days after I moved in, when there was another short-term tenant + me sharing the common bathtub. No idea who caused it, but there's a clue -- the plastic (not ceramic) bathtub lacked solid support underneath, so much so that any adult standing on it would notice the base sinking down. This was noticed by all tenants I have spoken to. The wife of the landlord confirmed that the installation was not perfect and missed the support beneath the tub. Unfortunately no one is willing to provide written witness. This crack is probably the main reason for the replacement, even though the landlord has always mentioned it as a second "problem" to be fixed -- his emails always singles out the mold as the primary problem. In Dec 2017, landlord finally fixed the bathtub. He didn't treat the mold but instead replaced the entire bathtub and sent me a bill over $3000. I replied to say let court decided how much I should pay. Landlord then counter-sued me for $5000 damage to his property. As to the "ordinary cost of repairs", for mold it should be a few hundred dollars. Total area of mold added up to less than my thumb fingernail. For the crack, total cost is the replacement cost, probably $1000+ rather than the $3000 bill he sent me.
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Your rights and responsibilities in this realm are a matter of local law, sometimes down to the level of the city, plus whatever is stipulated in the lease. In San Francisco, for example, No Person shall have upon any premises or real property owned, occupied or controlled by him, or her, or it any public nuisance [which includes] Any visible or otherwise demonstrable mold or mildew in the interiors of any buildings or facilities This does not say whether the owner or the occupant is liable for remediating the situation. Shower mold is gross but not a health hazard (the SF ordinance just lumps all mold into one category). Since you have no written lease, there is no automatic clean-up requirement. There might be a law requiring a tenant to clean the premise to its original condition, for instance in Washington, tenant must Upon termination and vacation, restore the premises to their initial condition except for reasonable wear and tear or conditions caused by failure of the landlord to comply with his or her obligations under this chapter. Landlord duties are here: there is no duty to provide ventilation. However, the bathtub appears to be in a common area and not your particular unit. The landlord duties also require the landlord to Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe from defects increasing the hazards of fire or accident so in Washington, it's his problem and not yours. In general, even if a tenant is responsible for some form of cleanup, that does not constitute legal license for a facility upgrade. It might cost a couple hundred dollars to hire a person to wash ordinary mold accumulation, and does not justify getting a $5,000 new tub. Since this is in a common area, you would not be solely liable for whatever the damage was. The part where you say "crack in a common bath tub" is a large red flag: it suggests to me that somebody negligently broke the bathtub, and then caused behind-the-wall damage by letting water infiltrate without notifying the landlord. If you broke the tub and let it rot, you could be liable. If the tub was broken already and the landlord didn't bother to do anything about it, that is his negligence. The three questions that you should try to answer are: (1) what are the duties of landlord and tenant in my jurisdiction, (2) what was the actual harm done, and who did it, (3) what is the ordinary cost of whatever repair was done.
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You signed a contract where you agree to not have pets and the landlord agreed to let you live there. If you decide to not follow your end of the deal, the landlord might not either. In simple terms, you can get evicted. There is probably a clause in the contract to the effect of "you will get evicted if you don't follow these rules". Depending on contract and local law, you may also be fined, forced to remove the pet, or have your security deposit withheld. One reason landlords don't want pets is that pets leave odors and fur in the apartment, requiring costly cleaning. Not to mention some cats love tearing up the carpeting and otherwise destroying the property. Thus the deposit is used to "repair the damage" caused by the pet. Some landlords charge an additional pet fee for tenants with animals, so if you secretly keep a pet you are cheating them out of the fee as well. If you want the cat for several months or more, then you probably shouldn't try to hide it from the landlord. There is a big risk you will be discovered and suffer repercussions. The landlord may also refuse to renew your lease later. In theory, and depending on your tenant, you could claim that the cat was there for a day and it will be removed right away. But as I said, landlords are concerned more about the damage to their property than policing you, so once the landlord gets suspicious (probably already happened since you asked him about it) they could inspect the place and demand you pay for damage regardless of how long the cat was supposedly there. Well being of the cat is unlikely to create an exception to the contract. However, you could have some recourse by claiming that the cat is an emotional support animal and vital to your well being. I am not familiar with the process for this in Austria, but presumably it will involve paperwork from a psychologist verifying the fact. Simply saying you really like the cat and don't want to give it away will not be a sufficient reason - you initially agreed to not have pets, so it can be argued that you should not have taken one in to begin with. I love cats too, but you probably shouldn't do it if your landlord already told you no. You could end up in a situation where you are forced to put the cat in a shelter, which wouldn't be good for the cat. If your landlord won't budge, your best option is to move somewhere else.
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You sue BOTH the contractor AND his insurance company. Your interest is in being made whole. It doesn't matter who pays you — whether the contractor pays or the insurance company pays. As long as you are made whole. One scenario you want to avoid is holding a judgment against a contractor who doesn't have the money to pay you then turns around and claims bankruptcy or skips town. That's why you sue both. You want to have a judgment against the insurance company too in case the contractor can not or does not pay you. Also, check your jurisdiction but you might need to sue in Circuit Court because the limit of jurisdiction for small claims court might be set at $5,000 as it is in many jurisdictions. You should sue for the highest amount possible. Then negotiate downward if warranted. Your invoices for materials and labor from your recent renovations and any photographs you might have taken would be your evidence to support your claim exceeding the ACV. If you sue them, they will negotiate.
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Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position.
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Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing.
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By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable.
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Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client.
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There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term.
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Must stores legally have lighting available and switched on? I walked into a liquor store at 8:50PM. They turned the lights off at 8:55PM. I repeatedly asked to have the lights turned on, and stated that it is a risk to have no lights in the store, but received an unhelpful response from the staff. The front of the store around the cashier was dimmed. Eventually I found my way out of the store. Are there laws for stores that require them to have the lights on as long as there are customers in the store? Are there any such laws specific to liquor stores?
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They are, at the least, required to maintain emergency lighting to comply with OSHA regulations. According to 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(1), Each exit route must be adequately lighted so that an employee with normal vision can see along the exit route. State law may also apply. Wisconsin has a law which requires that a place of employment be safe for both employees and "frequenters". According to Low v. Siewert, Wisconsin Supreme Court 1972, failure to light a parking lot could have incurred liability under this law (but in that particular case it was not established that the business could have reasonably known about the light being out - it could have burned out just before the incident - so the owner was not found liable.)
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No, you don't need to physically be there. The landlord may be required to refund some rent if they rent it out early. They may also not be available for a walk through until your last day, so you may need to show back up. Technically if you pay rent for the month the apartment is yours until July 3. You can turn the keys in early.
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There is no intention to commit theft, so there is no criminal act on the part of the customer. Even if there was a criminal act, the ability of the restaurant to detain the cusomer (citizen's arrest) is very limited in most jurisdictions. The restaurant can ask the customer for his name and address, but there is no legal obligation on the customer to provide this. Refusal to do so, however, might be evidence of intention to avoid paying and at that point the restaurant might call the police. The customer can leave, and the restaurant can pursue the debt through the civil courts if they have means to do so - they may have CCTV of the customer and his car registration which can be traced. Petrol stations, where people often fill up and then realise they can't pay, usually have established "promise to pay" procedures where they take the customer's details and the customer has 48 hours to pay before police or civil enforcement action is taken.
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I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise.
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The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.
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Probably not Once you and the store have entered into a contract the price in that contract is determinative. However, most online stores' terms are very clear there is no contract when you place your order or when you get their automated reply; the contract comes into existence later when they do something. For example: With respect to products sold by Amazon AU, your order is an offer to us for you to buy the product(s) in your order. ... The Order Confirmation is acknowledgement that we have received your order, and does not confirm our acceptance of your offer to buy the product(s) ordered. We only accept your offer, and conclude the contract of sale for a product ordered by you, when we dispatch the product(s) to you and send e-mail or post a message on the Message Centre of the website confirming that we've dispatched the product to you (the "Dispatch Confirmation"). ... Now, even without these terms, it's unlikely that your offer and the company's automated response created a binding contract because the company (as in, an actual person acting for the company) did not consent to the formation of the contract. Consent is fundamental: see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?. What you received was an "order confirmation" - a reiteration of your offer to the company, not an acceptance of your order. Consumer protection Most jurisdictions have consumer protection laws that make it illegal to display an incorrect price. However, in most, that does not oblige the retailer to honour the price, it just exposes them to fines from the regulator.
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I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.
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Yes, they're able to discriminate as long as its not illegal discrimination; and there's currently no law protecting people with these views. Both at a physical or digital store, they can be refused service and told to leave.
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Can a defendant get probation without being convicted of a crime? I believe my friends are being scammed. I discovered this information on the person in question from a court case December 2017: DEFERRED ADJUDICATION Jury Waived. Defendant arraigned. Defendant warned. Defendant enters plea of guilty before Court and prays that Court withhold adjudication of guilt under Art 42.12 C.C.P. Court finds that the evidence and Defendant's plea substantiates the Defendant's guilt of the offense of tamper w/govern record defraud/harm beyond a reasonable doubt as charged in the indictment. Adjudication of guilt Deferred and Defendant placed on probation for 4 years, subject to terms and conditions of probation served on Defendant. Fine: $500. Perform 150 hrs cs, anti-theft, corrective thinking, run CC w/199-83286-15. When confronted the individual claims that he took a plea deal to avoid conviction. Can you plead guilty to a crime, get probation and simultaneously avoid a conviction? This is important because he claims to be in the process of purchasing a FDIC insured bank and according to 12 U.S. Code § 1829 - Penalty for unauthorized participation by convicted individual, it should be illegal for him to engage in such activities even if they were legitimate.
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Can you plead guilty to a crime, get probation and simultaneously avoid a conviction? Yes. In a deferred prosecution, there is not a conviction. If a defendant follows the terms of the program faithfully, the charges are dismissed and a guilty plea is never entered. It is a bit like a conviction with a probation sentence, but milder, because if you carry out the deferred prosecution terms you never receive a conviction and the associated collateral consequences of a conviction such as the one that you allude to in your question. Therefore, this individual would not be statutorily disqualified from purchasing an FDIC insured bank.
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No In many but not all common law jurisdictions, a person who comitts an "inherently dangerous" crime can be found guilt of "felony murder" (not manslaughter). The Wikipedia article says: In most jurisdictions, to qualify as an underlying offense for a felony murder charge, the underlying offense must present a foreseeable danger to life, and the link between the offense and the death must not be too remote. For example, if the recipient of a forged check has a fatal allergic reaction to the ink, most courts will not hold the forger guilty of murder, as the cause of death is too remote from the criminal act. Floyd was arrested on an accusation that he passed a counterfeit $20 bill. This is not an "inherently dangerous" felony. Nor has it ever been established that he had the criminal intent that would have been required to convict him of a crime. Indeed it has not been proved that he knew the bill was counterfeit. But a finding of criminal intent to commit the underlying felony is essential to invoking teh felony murder rule. MN code 609.632 subdivision 3 requires "intent to defraud" and "having reason to know that the money order, currency, note, or obligation or security is forged, counterfeited, falsely made, altered, or printed". Moreover when the value is under $1,000 the possible penalties are much lighter and may not even be a felony. In any case passing a phoney $20 is not the kind of offense for which the felony murder rule is normally invoked, nor is being killed by an arresting officer a plausible, outcome, althoguh obviously it is possible. Further sources The University of Minnesota's page on "felony Murder" says: When the defendant commits a felony that is inherently dangerous to life, he or she does so knowing that some innocent victim may die. In essence, this awareness is similar to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. What is difficult to justify is a conviction for felony murder when the felony is not inherently dangerous to life. Thus most jurisdictions limit the felony murder doctrine to felonies that create a foreseeable risk of violence or death. ... Joaquin, who has just lost his job, decides to burn down his apartment building because he can’t afford to pay the rent. Joaquin carefully soaks his apartment with lighter fluid, exits into the hallway, and throws a lit, lighter-fluid-soaked towel into the apartment. He then runs outside to watch the entire building burn down. Several tenants die of smoke inhalation because of the fire. In jurisdictions that recognize felony murder, Joaquin can probably be charged with and convicted of murder for every one of these deaths. In this example, Joaquin did not intend to kill the tenants. However, he did most likely have the criminal intent necessary for arson. Therefore, felony murder convictions are appropriate. Note that Joaquin exhibited extreme indifference to whether the tenants in the building lived or died, which could also constitute the criminal intent of implied malice or depraved heart. The Minnesota code Section 609.19 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE says: Subd. 2.Unintentional murders. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of unintentional murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years: (1) causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting; [Paragraph (2) deals with death "while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim" which clearly does not apply in this case.]
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In the US this is generally governed by state law: RCW 4.24.350 in Washington state. The criminal jury is not empowered to make such a decision, but a separate civil trial for malicious prosecution would be possible. Plaintif (ex defedant) would have to prove that the action was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known to be false and unfounded The basis for the lawsuit would be the objective facts that prove that the prosecution was false and malicious, and not the fact of acquittal or the subjective opinion of a juror.
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Acquittals in criminal jury trials cannot be appealed (at least in a way that affects the outcome, Colorado and a few other states allow criminal appeals by the prosecution solely for the purposes of clarifying the law prospectively). Interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before the case is over) by the prosecution are allowed for pre-trial rulings (e.g. suppression of evidence rulings in a pre-trial hearing), in criminal cases, but not for evidentiary rulings made in the midst of a jury trial (which is when jeopardy attaches for the purposes of the double jeopardy rule, which is what prevents acquittals from being retried). An error in a ruling on an admission or rejection of evidence at trial may be appealed by a convicted defendant if the alleged misapplication of the evidence rule was an abuse of discretion by the judge, and was not "harmless error" (i.e. if as part of all errors made in the case there is a reasonable probability that it changed the outcome that the jury reached).
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The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.
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Such an action by the lawyer is certainly unethical, but there is no automatic or routine mechanism to detect it and give better advice to Rob, at least not in the US. Rob could get a second opinion, but criminal defendants do not often do this, and there is no requirement to do so. If the situation is extreme, it might be reported, after the fact, and the lawyer sanctioned. But no one is ever required to do a plea bargain, and there is always a chance, even if only a very small one, that a jury will acquit. Whether to try for a trial is a judgement call. That makes it hard to deal with the unethical intention, which the lawyer presumably did not tell anyone about. Rob's only practical protection is to pick a lawyer with a good reputation for not doing that sort of thing, and reputations can be misleading. If Rob does not have money he may not be able to choose at all, but then the lawyer will not be tempted to go to trial to "suck money out of" Rob, because there will be none to suck. In that case the lawyer may, indeed, be tempted not to go to trial when (rarely) that would be in Rob's best interest. Rob would have little protection against that.
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By producing sufficient evidence at trial. In this case, the most likely sources of evidence would either be eye witnesses (if someone witnessed the forgery) or expert testimony (i.e., handwriting experts). Any experts would have done an analysis and would testify about the results of their analysis. Any eye witnesses would testify to what they personally observed. Judges are not handwriting experts. They don't evaluate signatures. Judges are law experts. They evaluate evidence. Sworn testimony (subject to cross-examination) by a qualified handwriting expert stating so would be evidence of a forged signature. The handwriting expert would conduct all the necessary analysis, then provide a conclusion and their testimony in exchange for a fee. Also, patterns of deceptive conduct (that can be found during discovery) could be introduced as evidence to impeach the credibility of the testimony of any witness (including your counterparty). I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. Please do not do anything based on anything I have written because I really don't know what I am talking about. I'm just stumbling around in the dark like everybody else. If you need help with a case, please hire a real attorney and even offer to pay them for their time and expertise.
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The short answer is "yes". There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.
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What are the potential legal consequences for a company that has GPL violations? In the news recently was that the smartphone company Xiaomi has not released the kernel source code for its Android phone that has been on the market for over 3 months. Since Android is based on the Linux kernel and that has GPLv2 licensing which, among other things, requires source code distribution, this is a violation. What are the potential legal consequences for a company violating the GPL like this? Can they be sued (and if so, by whom)? Does it matter that a company like Xiaomi is based on China?
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A person that fails to comply with a copyright licence does not have a licence to use the copyrighted material. The owner of the copyright can take all the normal actions for copyright violation including seeking an injunction to stop the breach and/or suing for damages. Additionally, if the breach constitutes criminal activity, then the state can enforce those sanctions. However, suing a Chinese company in a Chinese court is generally a hiding to nothing. I won't say the Chinese legal system is biased towards its citizens but I wont say it isn't either. However, a case can be brought in any jurisdiction where the breach occurs (e.g. the USA) and enforcement action can be taken against any assets located in that jurisdiction.
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You need to check if the original game developers patented the mechanics/rules of the game. For your example, Monopoly was patented, but expired in the 50s and while it would not be a copyright violation to mimic the rules/mechanics, it would be a different intellectual property violation (patent infringement). Spry Fox vs LOLAPPS is also relevant as it extends copyright protection to the implementation of an idea, but ideas (like rules/mechanics) cannot, by themselves, be copyrighted. This means that there is an avenue for the original developer/company to sue even if the visual/audible aspects are different, but the overall gameplay is the same. Also see Tetris Holding LLC vs Xio Interactive Inc. as it relates to the visual aspect of the game.
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What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.
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If you aren't including those libraries, then yes because it's entirely your own work. If you are publishing those libraries, then no because their licenses will limit how you can do that. GPL's and MIT's main features are restricting how you can distribute software that includes the licensed code, and they don't allow the "do whatever you want" of public domain.
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I've answered this in the context of US patent law, but similar principles apply elsewhere in the world. As stated in 35 USC 271, "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent". Thus, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to exclude others from performing these actions, and the right to sue anyone who does perform these actions (both to stop them from infringing the patent, and to collect monetary damages for their infringement). Creating an infringing product and then licensing it under the GPL (or any other scheme) does not change the fact that it infringes a patent. 35 USC 271 also states that "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer". This means that, even if the creator of the infringing product does not perform any infringing acts in the US, the act of offering it for free use could be construed as induced infringement of the patent, and they could still be sued for that infringement.
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Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.
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Sources of Liability Liability can come from: Statute law Contract law Common law Statute Law There may be (almost certainly are) laws in the jurisdiction where Joes Cheap Carnival are operating relating to Work Health and Safety. In general, these laws will impose a non-delegable duty (i.e. one you cant get out of) to comply with certain minimum standards. If operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Contract Law If you are selling this software then you can limit your liability in any way you like providing that the limitation is not unlawful. For example, under Australian Consumer Law (which covers B2B transactions up to AUD$40,000 - how much are you selling for?) you have a non-excludable warranty that the software is fit-for-purpose; so, again, if operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Common Law Only parties to a contract can take action under a contract; anyone you owe a duty of care to can sue your for negligence. A person injured by a machine your software helped design need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; it would be hard to argue you didn't, You breached that duty; the software was not "fit-for-purpose", There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your software there would have been no loss, There was a legal (proximate) cause; you may be able to raise something here, if your software was used incorrectly by an engineer, your breach may be too distant Harm; the person must suffer real loss. The only plausible advantage of making your software open source is that you are showing a greater amount of care by allowing your algorithms to be sort-of peer reviewed. This is not a legal shield I would really like to depend on. TL;DR Nothing can stop someone suing you - if they want to sue you they can sue you. Your best defence to a lawsuit is to demonstrate that you did everything a reasonable person could do without the benefit of hindsight Do you really think publishing your code is "everything a reasonable person could do"? You would be far better off: Taking out professional indemnity insurance Validating you algorithms thoroughly Engaging an independent third-party to validate your algorithms Developing proper and thorough testing procedure for your software Testing it in-house Engaging an independent third-party to test it Thoroughly documenting your software including all the assumptions along with the domains where they are valid and invalid.
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The FCC has clarified their stance on this: ... were we mandating wholesale blocking of Open Source firmware modifications? We were not, but we agree that the guidance we provide to manufacturers must be crystal-clear to avoid confusion. So, today we released a revision to that guidance to clarify that our instructions were narrowly-focused on modifications that would take a device out of compliance. The revised guidance now more accurately reflects our intent in both the U-NII rules as well as our current rulemaking, and we hope it serves as a guidepost for the rules as we move from proposal to adoption. Essentially, Open Source firmware modifications are allowed, the modifications are disallowed are things like excessively increasing signal strength.
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What's so Grand about Grand Theft Auto? Why does the law use the word "Grand" when describing Grand Theft Auto. It's almost like they're glorifying it. Is there a lesser type of theft auto?
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Grand theft, a term which is used in some jurisdictions, is "big theft". It is defined in California in terms of what and how much you steal, for instance "over $950" except over $250 for domestic fowl (and other things). It also includes any auto theft. Otherwise, it is known as petty theft ("small theft": the terms derive from French and sometimes spelled "petit"). On the other hand, Washington state does not use those terms, instead they have 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree theft, as well as theft of motor vehicle, two degrees of taking of motor vehicle, and so on.
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Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
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An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.
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Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.
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I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.
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I should have done my research properly, hopefully this will be indexed and be helpful to someone else in the future. The specific legislation is The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 regulation 98: Stopping of engine when stationary 98.—(1) Save as provided in paragraph (2), the driver of a vehicle shall, when the vehicle is stationary, stop the action of any machinery attached to or forming part of the vehicle so far as may be necessary for the prevention of noise. (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) do not apply— (a) when the vehicle is stationary owing to the necessities of traffic; (b) so as to prevent the examination or working of the machinery where the examination is necessitated by any failure or derangement of the machinery or where the machinery is required to be worked for a purpose other than driving the vehicle; or (c) in respect of a vehicle propelled by gas produced in plant carried on the vehicle, to such plant.
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If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.
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No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.
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Is a firearm magazine a regulated part in Austria? I've looked at the "Weapons Law of 1996" (in german), specifically §2 (2), which states that regulations of firearms also extend to the barrel, the drum and the breech. I am uncertain if this also extends to magazines, given that I can simply go into a gunstore and buy a magazine for a category B weapon without any sort of validation. In relation to that: Would I be able to buy a magazine online and have it shipped to me?
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After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely.
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The relevant conventions tried to discourage the traditional mercenary business model, but they also try to avoid loopholes in their rules. Under command by and authorized by Russia? Yes. Wearing clothing/insignia recognizable at a distance? I don't know, but a big Z would be enough. Carrying arms openly? I presume so. There is no requirement that armed forces use only their own nationals (see the French Foreign Legion). While Russia tries to deny being "at war," under international law it is, and residents of the unoccupied part of Russia may rally around the flag. We don't know what will happen after the war. There is the precedent of the SS, which was declared a criminal organization at Nuremberg (that is, membership was considered evidence of complicity in their crimes).
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Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret.
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Those countries have more restrictive gambling laws than others. For discussion of some of those relevant laws, see here. For example, [In Hong Kong], "Under the Gambling Ordinance, a prize draw is considered to be a form of lottery. Lotteries include raffles & sweepstakes... In most cases, prior approval is needed for a prize draw in the form of a licence and for the majority of competitions, this will need to be in the form of a Trade Promotion Competition Licence. Selling, disposing, printing and publishing tickets without a licence are criminal offences ... punishable by fines or imprisonment. Because of Italy's strict restrictions, Unless a promotion falls under one of exceptions provided by the DPR, it is not possible to run multi-jurisdictional promotions, they need to be addressed only to people located in Italy and any activity, including the server, used for the promotion must be located in Italy.
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There are many regulations to consider, for the firearms themselves, the permits needed by potential customers, and licensing you will need as a business dealing with firearms and ammunition. Start with the Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/search?q=firearms I.e., https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479794/Guidance_on_Firearms_Licensing_Law_Nov_2015_v16.pdf
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You are referring to article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 which contains: Article 9 List of mandatory particulars In accordance with Articles 10 to 35 and subject to the exceptions contained in this Chapter, indication of the following particulars shall be mandatory: (...) (l) a nutrition declaration. In a comment you clarify that you are talking about wine. Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 contains: Article 16 Omission of certain mandatory particulars (...) Without prejudice to other Union provisions requiring a list of ingredients or a mandatory nutrition declaration, the particulars referred to in points (b) and (l) of Article 9(1) shall not be mandatory for beverages containing more than 1,2 % by volume of alcohol. As wine contains typically more than 1,2 % alcohol, a nutrition declaration is not required. See also Labelling of alcoholic beverages in the EU: some facts.
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Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)
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I can at least look at the federal sentencing guidelines. From the description of the offense I'm guessing he's charged under 18 USC §922(g)(3). In the guidelines, this offense would appear to fall under "§2K2.1. Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition". The notes here say: For purposes of subsections (a)(4)(B) and (a)(6), "prohibited person" means any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n). I therefore believe he meets the criteria of §2K2.1(a)(6) ("if the defendant was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense"), which would mean the base offense level was 14. Then the big question is whether he falls under §2K2.1(b)(2): If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6. I doubt the handgun was for sporting purposes or for collection; it was likely for self-defense. But I also don't think he is accused of unlawfully discharging or using it. I'm not sure exactly how this would be interpreted. If the offense level is 6, a sentence of probation would normally fall within the guidelines. If it was 14 (or even 12 after a possible 2-level decrease for taking responsibility), a sentence of probation would not be within the guidelines. This is, however, a pretrial diversion, not a conviction. I'm not sure how much the ordinary guidelines apply to that, or whether that's normally done for this sort of thing. It's also possible that I'm missing some factor which would change the offense level more.
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Is it illegal for an employer to give a job applicant an unfair advantage in the selection process? Diana was invited to pre-employment test for a job. But it appeared that that the content of test was the same as last year, and she knew that content because of her friend who passed the same test last year for the same position (though she did not get the job in the end). After the test there is an interview, and if Diana gets a job, is there any legal consequences as it is an unfair advantage for her because the company did not change the content of the test?
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No - there is no general requirement to be fair to all applicants when selecting someone for a job. It's not even clear how this would work - you would need to define what "fair" means in this context, and there would be many competing definitions. Is it fair to prefer an applicant who has more experience because they received help from their parents with landing their first job? Is it fair to prefer someone with a certain look for an acting job? Is it fair to prefer someone who happens to have a similar personality to the person hiring? So if the employer finds it more convenient to use the same test every year, and if they do not mind that this gives some applicants an advantage, they are free to do that. The only exception is that discrimination based on certain, specific factors (often called "protected characteristics") is usually outlawed. The list depends on jurisdictions, but usually includes things like gender, race and age. However, even in that case discrimination is allowed if the business can demonstrate a genuine need - for example, when looking for an actor, it is allowed to hire based on gender.
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Unfortunately, you are probably not entitled to the redundancy / severance money since you weren't technically ever made redundant / laid off - there was no point in time where you were willing and able to work where they refused you, and I presume you were paid for all time worked. If you're concerned that they only changed their tune because they knew you had a better job already lined up - well, you can call their bluff or just use it as a learning experience. In what jurisdiction do you work? If the US, you could call their bluff, say you'd rather stay and see what they do. You would then keep the option of simply walking away with your stuff in a box any time you felt like it (assuming at-will employment and no contracts that state otherwise).
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Most employment in the US is "at will". That means that the employer or the employee can terminate the relationship without notice for any reason or for no reason. There are certain statutory protections that limit this, however, such as federal protections against discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. Arizona may have other protections. So the first thing you need to do (or your lawyer needs to do) is determine whether your employment was at will. If so, then it doesn't much matter if the reasons they gave you were lies, unless you can show that their actions constituted illegal discrimination. (If they lied about you to someone else, though, you might be able to go after them for libel or slander.) If your employment was not at will, then you may be able to challenge the reasons for the firing if the firing violated the conditions under which your employment could be terminated. Even if your employment was at will, your firing might fall under one of the exceptions listed in the Wikipedia article: public policy, implied contract, or good faith/fair dealing (although the article gives conflicting information about whether Arizona has an implied contract exception; the text says that it does not, but the map shows that it does). To analyze the facts of your case in connection with Arizona employment law, you really need to talk to a lawyer with a practice in Arizona employment law. The lawyer will want to review your contract or other written agreement, if there is one.
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Can job interview questions be confidential? Is this legally enforceable? It is lawful, unless the nature of questions is outlawed or hinting at illegal activity. For practical purposes, though, confidentiality would be hard to enforce because Google cannot realistically prevent you from disclosing those questions. Whether or not Google can remedy any breach of that clause, that is a separate and uncertain aspect. Google's clause is binding only if you consent to it. Signing an NDA is not the only way to render confidentiality binding. Consent can be evidenced by anything that reflects your agreement to abide by that condition. It could be an email reply, or by subsequent conduct such as attending the interview with knowledge that constraint and without objecting to it. The fact that you attended the interview after reading that email makes their clause binding unless you objected and they nonetheless conducted the interview.
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Given that they told me I would get back pay and I worked conditional on that information, am I entitled to it? You are entitled to backpay in accordance with the terms you accepted from HR. The employer's refusal to pay you from October 1st is in violation of Austria's Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch at § 860a. At this point you have fully complied with the conditions on which your continued employment was contingent. From then on, the employer's belatedness in revoking its commitment to backdate your start date to October 1st is not cognizable: Prior to your full compliance with the conditions of academic nature, there was no possible way for you to be aware of the employer's repudiation of its obligations regarding the October-December compensation. The employer's failure to timely notify you of the unilateral change is especially notorious and hard to justify. Your employment & relocation to Austria suggests that the employer had --and waived-- ample opportunity to inform you that any work you perform prior to addressing the contingent aspect will not be compensated. Even if the employer ventures with a dubious allegation of that sort, it is unlikely to survive § 1152.
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Is it legal to retaliate against an employee who answered falsely when asked an illegal question? It depends. It is important to ensure we understand the distinction between (1) questions which are illegal in and of themselves, and (2) the illegality of hiring, discharging, or failing to hire based on a candidate's/employee's answer(s) or attributes. You yourself might have been aware of the difference beforehand, but your question is a good occasion for clarifying a general misconception. In instances of the first category, it would certainly be illegal to retaliate against the employee insofar as the falsehood is traceable to the employer's violation of the law. Examples of this category are sections 432.3(b) ("An employer shall not [...] seek salary history information, including compensation and benefits, about an applicant for employment") and 432.7 ("An employer [...] shall not ask an applicant for employment to disclose, through any written form or verbally, information concerning an arrest or detention that did not result in conviction") of the California Labor code. Scenarios of the latter category are more intricate, since an employer might prove that his decision to discharge the employee falls outside of conduct sanctioned by statute. For instance, 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) does not outlaw --at least at a federal level-- questions about the individual's protected categories (such as sex, religion, or national origin). It only outlaws the decision making that is influenced by the protected categories which are the subject matter of the interview questions. The example you gave ("what would your husband do if you got this job?") serves to illustrate the difference, putting aside that questions of that sort might be intended to indirectly ascertain the candidate's marital status. Let's assume that the employer seeks to hire a waitress, and that the jurisdiction at issue outlaws discrimination on the basis of employee's marital status but not the questions about it. The employer has a cognizable interest to avoid employing any waitress whose husband is an overly jealous person with propensity to attack male clients. The waitress's lie when answering that question (for instance, by fraudulently representing that she is single or that her husband is ok with her employment as waitress there) contravenes the employer's legitimate interest to protect its clients. In that context, the employer's discovery that the employee lied during the interview gives reasonable grounds for discharging that employee. After all, the employee's intentional misrepresentation only strengthens the employer's suspicion of being at greater risk (of liability toward clients) than the employee is willing to admit. For the employer to prevail at law, it would need to be proved that the reason for discharging the female employee was not her marital status itself, but the employee's concealment of a risk that is a matter of employer's lawful concern.
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As I understand it, the legal distinction here is: Whose choice was it that you not continue in your job? If the company was prepared to offer you an extension, until you told them that you were not interested, you are leaving of your own free will, and would not be entitled to redundancy rights. If your employer did not extend the contract when you would have been willing to continue, that is either a redundancy, or a dismissal of another kind. If you were dismissed for valid cause, you have no redundancy rights. if you were let go because of a lack of work, or because the employer decided not to have anyone doing that job, that I gather would be redundancy.
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the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
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Establishing GDPR consent when the person doesn't access a system themself My company hosts an online database for organisations to manage training data for their people. In most cases, administrator users (team leaders/line managers) manage data for their staff/teams. From an organisation of say, 500 people, usually only around 30 people might ever log in and view data for their teams. I'm currently trying to understand how the new GDPR regulation regarding consent will be relevant/applied: (32) Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject's acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If the data subject's consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. How therefore can organisations like ours realistically provide this, when many people won't actually see/access their own data? Is consent still required here? Can that consent be managed by the central point of contact at the client (outside our software)? I've looked at over a dozen sites providing "advice", but each re-hash the same generic information that doesn't provide enough clarity.
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I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).
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GDPR Article 4 paragraph 1 says: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 says Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. ... The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. Recital 30 says: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This may leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers and other information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural persons and identify them. An IP address hashed through a cryptographically secure one-way hash cannot reasonably be used to establish the original IP address, nor to geolocate, nor to directly identify the data subject. However if such addresses are stored in a database with a link to the subject's individual record, or to other data which identify the data subject, then they would clearly be personal information. The ICO's page on "What is personal data" says: ‘Online identifiers’ includes IP addresses and cookie identifiers which may be personal data. The page from GDPR.EU on "Personal Data" says: Any information that can lead to either the direct or indirect identification of an individual will likely be considered personal data under the GDPR. ... Any data that relate to an identifiable individual is personal data. The page on "Personal Data" from gdpr-info.eu says: Personal data are any information which are related to an identified or identifiable natural person. The data subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, especially by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or one of several special characteristics, which expresses the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, commercial, cultural or social identity of these natural persons. In practice, these also include all data which are or can be assigned to a person in any kind of way. For example, the telephone, credit card or personnel number of a person, account data, number plate, appearance, customer number or address are all personal data. Since the definition includes “any information,” one must assume that the term “personal data” should be as broadly interpreted as possible. This is also suggested in case law of the European Court of Justice ... See also "Can a dynamic IP address constitute personal data?" If a hashed IP address is stored so that it can be related to a specific individual, it is personal data. as such, it would be subject to the GDPR. To store it one would need to identify a lawful basis under GDPR Article 6 This could be the Data subject's consent, or the Controller's legitimate interest. In either case the information should be included in the list of personal information collected (often in a privacy policy document), disclosed to the subject on request, adn deleted on request if possible. If that is done, such a use of a hashed IP, although personal information, would seem to be compliant. If a hashed IP is stored in such a way that it cannot be related to any particular user, then it would not constitute personal information, and no compliance issue would seem to exist. Limiting the retention time of a hashed IP is a good practice which would reduce any possible impact it might have.
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No, a company cannot suspend your GDPR rights – contracts can't override the law. Your rights as a data subject apply as long as your personal data is being processed. However, there is no requirement in the GDPR that they fulfill your data subject rights through a self-service mechanism like a “download my data” button. They can require you to use another support channel. (But Google offers infamously bad support.) In some cases, the service may legitimately decide that they cannot give you access to the data, for example if they believe that you are not the actual data subject (e.g. if they think that you hacked the account). The right to access must not adversely affect other people (Art 15(4)). If they have doubts about your identity, they can require further information to verify you (Art 12(6)). If your requests are excessive or unfounded (if you are spamming them), they can also turn down the requests (Art 12(5)).
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The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization.
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Alice's business sells database management software. Organisations buy or licence the software, deploy it on hardware they control and use the software to help store and, process and analyse 'personal data' within the meaning of GDPR. Alice's business has no access whatsoever to the personal data being stored and processed by those organisations. In respect of that personal data, GDPR is not engaged by Alice's business. The business is neither a 'controller' nor 'processor' of that personal data. Who does the data protection law apply to? - European Commission Who does the UK GDPR apply to? - Information Commissioner's Office
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Artice §12(5) GDPR limits the right to access: Information provided under Articles 13 and 14 and any communication and any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge. Where requests from a data subject are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the controller may either: (a) charge a reasonable fee taking into account the administrative costs of providing the information or communication or taking the action requested; or (b) refuse to act on the request. The controller shall bear the burden of demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the request. A request to request the filing that you acted on their request is already excessive, repeated and frequent requests could be acted upon by taking the not-acting steps or sending an invoice before any action is taken. Also, very frequent requests with overlapping times might be answered jointly. It would be good to inform the customer in the last answer granted for free, how often they requested information and that any further answer might incur such and such fees for compiling the information.
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Most likely yes if you are subject to UK or EU laws: The EU ePrivacy directive and implementing laws such as PECR in the UK require that you obtain consent before accessing information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to perform a service requested by the user. Cookies and similar technologies such as LocalStorage are stored on the user's device. Analytics are not strictly necessary to display a website. Thus, you need to obtain valid consent before setting any analytics cookies. GDPR and ePrivacy/PECR have some interactions: Even though the cookies might technically be set by GoSquared, you as the website operator are responsible for compliance. You are the data controller, the third party analytics are usually a data processor who only process data on your behalf. You must ensure that the data processor is compliant. Even if they were a joint controller you'd be responsible for what happens on the website (relevant precedent is the Fashion ID case). While ePrivacy originally had a fairly weak concept of consent (e.g. “by continuing to use this site, you consent …”). However, the GDPR updated the definition of consent, so that valid consent must be freely given, informed, actively given, and specific. If you set cookies for different purposes in addition to analytics, users should be able to give or withhold consent for analytics independently from other purposes. Since consent must be actively given, consent is never the default, e.g. pre-ticked checkboxes are not compliant (relevant precedent is the Planet49 case). Like Google, GoSquared stores data in the US. You are causing personal data to be transferred into the US, which is an international transfer. Before it was invalidated earlier in 2020, such transfers were easy to do under the Privacy Shield adequacy decision. Now, such transfers are only legal if you sign SCCs with your data processor, and your risk assessment indicates that your user's data is sufficiently safe there, despite your processors potentially being legally unable to comply with the SCCs. Fortunately for you the UK's ICO has taken a more industry-friendly stance on this matter than other countrie's data protection agencies. Why do so many websites use Google Analytics (GA) without requesting proper consent? A variety of potential reasons: They are actually non-compliant. After all, GA is not GDPR-compliant in default settings, and Google doesn't do a good job of providing essential information. Many data protection agencies have indicated that cookie consent enforcement is not their focus. GA can be used without using cookies/LocalStorage/…, and thus without requiring consent under ePrivacy or PECR. The websites might not be subject to EU or UK laws such as ePrivacy.
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Cookies are information stored on the end users device and require consent¹ per the ePrivacy directive, even if the cookies or similar technologies don't contain personal data. Conditions for consent are defined by the GDPR. This was also confirmed by the "Planet49" case. 1. consent is required unless the storage of or access to information on the end users device is either strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, or necessary for technical reasons. E.g. functional cookies like a shopping cart feature in a web shop are fine, as are cookies used solely for security purposes or technical features like TLS session resumption. It is however likely that this cookie does qualify as personal data in the sense of the GDPR. The cookie contains an ID that lets you single out/distinguish this user from all other users, even though that ID doesn't link the user to a real-world identity. It is also possible to argue that the cookie is entirely anonymous, but the safer approach is to treat it as personal data. Similarly, other features of the website necessarily involve the processing of personal data, such as processing the user's IP address, if only for the purpose of responding to their HTTP requests. The GDPR's criteria for valid consent are mainly about ensuring that the consent is a freely given unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. For example, consent can never be the default, it needs to be an opt-in. However, Art 7(1) GDPR says that the data controller has the burden of proof of showing that valid consent was given. The GDPR itself does not provide further guidance on what this means specifically. I would argue that it can be decomposed into two aspects: Showing that valid consent was given. The manner in which you ask for consent must enable a free choice, and must respect that "no consent" is the default. For example, you could archive screenshots of the cookie management flow to show that there is a free choice. You could archive the frontend software so that it can be demonstrated that the cookie is not set until consent is given. Showing that this user gave consent. There is a wide variety of opinions on how to do that. My personal opinion is that the existence of a cookie paired with a valid consent flow to set that cookie demonstrates that the cookie can only have been set in a valid manner. However, there are consent management solutions that provide additional insight, such as the user's entire history of giving and revoking consent. For example, the user's browser might generate a pseudonymous ID enabling that user's consent history to be stored on some server. Indeed, that would be personal data, and this would have to be disclosed transparently. It would not be valid to use the consent management information for other purposes, for example by using the consent management ID for analytics purposes. Storing the user's consent history is definitely appropriate if you have a concept of identity, such as for signed-in users. I have doubts whether this is also helpful on websites that don't have user accounts, and I have not heard of a case where the existence of such records made a difference. After all, such records can only be relevant if the user gave consent but later disputes this in a complaint with a DPA or in a lawsuit. Which approach to choose will depend on more specific guidance provided by your country's data protection authority, and on the risk balance appropriate for your business. After all, the purpose of such compliance work is not to be 100% safe from lawsuits, but to reduce risks from enforcement/litigation to acceptable levels. What is acceptable is ultimately a business decision. E.g. the only 100% safe way to do web analytics is to have no analytics at all, but that is not acceptable for most businesses.
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Can a gag order prevent someone from testifying in a congressional hearing? In this article from the guardian - https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/16/steve-bannon-trump-congress-intelligence-questioning it has been mentioned that, former white house aide, Steve Bannon is claiming that he is unable to testify because white house told him not to do so and so leaders from democratic party are claiming that a gag order has been used to stop him from testifying to the the House Intelligence Committee. Isn't it unconstitutional to do so? unless gag order has been given to prevent any kind of leak which may lead to risk associated with national security, which is not the case here? And ultimately who has the final authority to issue a gag order?
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There is a legal doctrine of executive privilege, where the executive branch can resist subpoenas, but that privilege is limited (US v. Nixon). Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. SCOTUS pointed to the kinds of cases where such privilege would be valid Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution. But otherwise, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice Decades later, Harriet Miers claimed executive immunity (as White House counsel) to a subpoena to testify before the Committee on the Judiciary, and the district court ruled rebuffed that claim There are powerful reasons supporting the rejection of absolute immunity as asserted by the Executive here. If the Court held otherwise, the presumptive presidential privilege could be transformed into an absolute privilege and Congress's legitimate interest in inquiry could be easily thwarted. if the Executive's absolute immunity argument were to prevail, Congress could be left with no recourse to obtain information that is plainly not subject to any colorable claim of executive privilege. However, executive privilege has been invoked dozens of times since Nixon – there are no other SCOTUS decisions. We should set aside current political posturing. POTUS might claim executive privilege, and then the question is whether the courts would order Banon to testify. We don't know the basis for such privilege, but we can assume that it would involve national security issues (thus might be within the penumbra of the Nixon ruling). Traditionally, executive privilege has involved the person who is president, not the person who ended up becoming president, so it would be extremely surprising if the courts upheld immunity in a pre-election matter.
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There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.
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None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.
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Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.
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Your silence can be used against you: this is known as an adoptive admission. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is based on the premise that if a person hears and understands an accusation against them (even framed very indirectly), and "adopts" the truth of the accusation by directly acting in a certain way or by failing to dispute the accusation, this can be introduced as a form of admitting to the accusation. For instance, B might say to A "I laughed when you shot Smith in the foot" and A might say "That was pretty funny, right", that can be admitted and interpreted as a confession. The same goes for A saying nothing. What's crucial is that the accusation has to be made in the defendant's presence, they must hear and understand it, they must be able to deny the accusation and it would be natural to deny the accusation. There is a relationship between this and the Fifth Amendment, see Salinas v. Texas (and prior law), that "To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shielding information not properly within its scope, a witness who “‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’". During a non-custodial interview, defendant was asked asked if his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder”, and he said nothing (and actually gave non-verbal indicators that the accusation was true). He did not invoke his right to silence, thus the court reasoned that "Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment".
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What prevents someone from pleading the Fifth Amendment, even if they don't necessarily have something that would incriminate themselves if they answered? Immunity. Sometimes prosecutors offer immunity to a witness in exchange for testimony against another defendant. In such cases, the witness cannot claim protection under the fifth amendment because the witness's testimony can no longer incriminate the witness. Does the opposition have to prove that nothing they say could incriminate themselves to remove the protection? No. Proving a negative proposition is generally impossible. Does the witness have to reveal something to the judge to enforce the protection? No, because such a revelation would also tend to incriminate the witness. Additionally, who knows what random law they might have broken, and might admit to if they testify? Can someone plead the fifth on those grounds? Yes. It is not in fact necessary to cite specific grounds for invoking the fifth amendment, because forcing a witness to cite a reason would itself be tantamount to forcing the witness to incriminate him- or herself. Quoting Wikipedia: Truthful statements by an innocent person An incriminating statement includes any statement that tends to increase the danger that the person making the statement will be accused, charged or prosecuted – even if the statement is true, and even if the person is innocent of any crime. Thus, even a person who is innocent of any crime who testifies truthfully can be incriminated by that testimony. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege: protects the innocent as well as the guilty.... one of the Fifth Amendment’s basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances..... truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker’s own mouth. (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (per curiam)) The U.S. Supreme Court has also stated: Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege. (Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (footnote omitted)) (Citations inlined)
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Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”
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The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing.
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My unit was broken into after uhaul put a non payment lock on it, so isn't it now their responsibility? I'm in Arizona and like my question says they put a non payment lock on my unit (payroll messed up at my job) and I said I had my own insurance so I didn't take theirs, but I never brought them my proof of insurance because it is slipped my mind and who thinks you would need to do that it's supposed to be secure. They're saying it's my responsibility now to cover it despite the fact I couldn't even access my unit when the break in took place and I can't even access the unit until tomorrow to check what was stolen because the property manager has the day off. What should they have done and what should I be doing? I was told the onus is on them but I have my doubts.
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They almost surely have no liability to you for the loss of, or damage to, your property, as the standard rental agreement that you signed almost certainly relieves them of this responsibility. If you have insurance (even though you didn't provide them with proof of insurance) that would probably cover your loses. If not, you are probably just screwed and have no recourse.
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let's look at the referenced Section 28085 ARTICLE 13. Theft Alarm System [28085- 28085.] ( Article 13 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 993. ) 28085. Any motor vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm system which flashes the lights of the vehicle, or sounds an audible signal, or both, and which operates as follows: (a) The system may flash any of the lights required or permitted on the vehicle. (b) The system may sound an audible signal. (c) No vehicle shall be equipped with a theft alarm system which emits the sound of a siren. (Amended by Stats. 1994, Ch. 516, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 1995.) This tells us what is allowable as a theft alert system. It may use sound(b) and turn the car into a goddamned Christmas tree(a), provided it is not: a siren sound(c) not audible(b) or a non-permitted light like Emergency Vehicle Lights(a). It does not regulate when it may fire, only that the sound alert has to be audible (preventing infrasonic make-your-ears-bleed or dog whistle sounds) and that the lights have to be an allowable part of the vehicle. So you could set the alert to honk or play imperial march or berate the wannabe thief or use painful loud music, all provided that it is audible and does not violate other laws. So, what is the correct operation of a car theft alert? Nothing in the article says, that you may just use the signals and honking for alerting in the case of theft, but that the system may use all the things in A and B under condition C to operate. Operation is "effect brought about in accordance with a definite plan". The definite plan for the alarm system is as follows: initialize alert the owner that it has correctly initialized wait for theft attempt or shutdown in case of theft: alarm everybody in case of shutdown: shutdown How the alertion and alarm are set up is up to the manufacturer's discretion, as long as the Article 13 is not breached. Example: My Ford Fiesta does a double-flash of the turn lights and a low key beep overpowered by the lock operation on locking and a single flash on unlocking. That is the factory setup (for my area) afaik. The manufacturer (or if I wanted to go to a car shop) could under Article 13 set the activation to trigger a short honk or any other audible to signal proper initialization as part of the normal operation. The failure of the sound coming after locking the car would alert me that something is amiss and it is not operating. The top 3 causes are most likely that the car key battery might be dead, a malfunction of the car alert or someone jamming the frequency of the key. As it is clearly part of the operation of the alert system, which is marked as a legal use of the horn of a car in Article 12 under Section 27001 b, yes, the alert may honk. INAL, so only my layman reading.
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the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it.
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My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.
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Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.
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Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.
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Probably not. Theft generally involves an intent to permanently deprive someone of property, or knowledge that one is taking actions that have the very likely probability of permanently depriving them of property. Here, there is an intent only to hold possession of the keys during the shift and to return them. Also, while the surrender of keys is contingent upon the incentive of further employment, it is still a voluntary surrender of the keys. The place where theft issues could arise is if the keys are not returned by the person holding them, either at the end of the shift as punishment, or in mid-shift, if someone insists upon their return, either in an emergency or because they are sick of this manager and want to quit. If keys were retained in those circumstances upon a demand for their return, there might be a problem. This is because continuing to refuse to surrender possession of property permissively given to someone when that permission is revoked, in the absence of a legal right to impose a possessory lien, would generally constitute theft. While the purpose for the manager holding keys in this particular situation don't seem very valid, I can imagine circumstances (e.g. MRI technicians, jail guards, underwater divers, the site only has tandem parking), where retaining keys during a shift might be reasonable and appropriate.
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Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property.
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Who can claim copyrights on Machine Learning models? Consider the following: person A owns a lot of data person B develops an algorithm that can be trained on this kind of data to produce a ML model that can make statistical predictions person C develops a software that implements said algorithm person D uses A's data, transforms it a little (cleaning, formatting, aggregations…) so that it fits the B's algorithm's expected input format, and trains it using C's software I imagine it all depends on the license of the data / algorithm / software, but my question is who, via those kind of licenses (or in which conditions) has at least a partial claims on commercial benefits resulting in using the final model?
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Person A has to have created the data to hold copyright; for most kinds of data this has no legal effect because facts are not protected by copyright. A mineable database probably does not have the necessary creative elements for copyright. An algorithm is not protected by copyright (it might be patented). Person C's program is copyrighted. The product created by D is probably copyrighted, depending on what degree of creativity is involved in their transformation. If the transformation is automatic then no, but if creative judgments are applied to the output of the program then maybe. Though the resulting product is another database of facts, and the facts cannot be protected. In terms of "using the model", only C and possibly B have any control. If it is necessary to validate the software using A's data and A has kept the data secret, C might negotiate with A to use the data, in order to complete his program, and that could give A some interest in the program.
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It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.
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The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)?
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You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer.
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Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need.
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Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.
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There are two common approaches. The first approach is simply to let copyright law apply. Under the default terms, the IT provider has no rights to copy your software. Running software is allowed, of course, and not a problem that you need to deal with vis-a-vis the IT provider. You still can sue them if they copy your software, even in the absence of a contract. That is the chief function of copyright, after all! The second approach is to allow the customer to subcontract third parties to act on behalf of them, while acknowledging that such subcontracting does not dissolve them from any responsibilities towards you. In other words, if the 3rd party would do something unauthorized, you have a claim towards the customer and they have a distinct but related claim towards their IT supplier.
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The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.
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How does the law guarantee true disregard by jurors? How can the court and public guarantee disregard by jurors when they're instructed to do so? I doubt that a verbal instruction suffices, when judges themselves can be biased. What forestalls or thwarts such potential subconscious regard or bias? Source: Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), p. 9 Top. Criminal defendants are at a disadvantage if a judge's or prosecutor's missteps can be forgiven by the judge's telling the jury to disregard them, for the bell cannot be unrung; the jurors cannot exclude what they should not have heard from their consideration of the defendant's guilt.
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You can't guarantee a juror's disregard, and some attorneys might utilize the "once it's said, it can't be unsaid" strategy because they know that the jury will still keep it in the back of their mind even though they've been told to ignore it. But there are checks and balances to prevent a remark having an impact on the final decision: Jury deliberation. Chances are, not all jurors will keep the thought in their mind. The jury gets a chance to deliberate after the case has been presented, and it's very easy for other jurors in the deliberation room to point out they're ignoring that piece of information and not let it influence the final decision. Declaring a mistrial. A mistrial is fully at the judge's discretion, but generally anything that affects the jury's ability to remain impartial can result in a mistrial being declared (for example, if an attorney deliberately said something outrageous to influence the jury when they knew it would be withdrawn, the judge will likely declare a mistrial without much thought). Once a mistrial is declared, the case will be postponed and a brand new jury will be selected that hasn't heard the previous remarks - easiest way to erase it from their minds is to not use their minds.
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There are two important points you need to consider: jurors cannot be challenged (in the US sense), and the judge has wide discretion to handle any problems that arise in his court. If a juror has prior knowledge of the case, or could not be expected to be impartial, the judge (or sometimes the bailiff) will excuse him, and bring in one of the three replacements. If either side's lawyers dislike the look of a juror, they may if the judge allows ask questions to elicit such reasons, and then ask the judge to disqualify (I was on a jury where one of my colleagues was a policeman, and the defence suggested that he could not be impartial; the judge asked some questions and then excused him, and I understand he was never actually empanelled that week). But you are not permitted to select jurors you think will favour you or (equivalently) to ask to dismiss a juror without a factual disqualification; you can't, for example, ask about a juror's politics. Disqualifying a juror is thus rare, and the chance of four jurors having ties to a particular case is so remote as to be not worth worrying about. The second point, and the reason why written authority is hard to find, is that the judge has almost unlimited discretion over any action in his Court that does not infringe statute. There was a case in the newspapers recently where a juror discussed the case he was hearing in the pub, and was therefore dismissed from the jury; the judge consulted prosecution and defence and decided to proceed with eleven jurors rather than start the trial again. This does not mean that 'any trial can be heard with eleven jurors'; it means that in that particular case justice was best served by continuing. There is always the option to request a mistrial (which may or may not be granted) or to say that, a fair trial now being impossible, you intend to appeal on this point; but failing that the judge's decision on any procedural point is binding.
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There's nothing illegal about the media discussing your case. In fact most media outlets don't hold back many details about the accused, because it's all public information that anyone curious about it can get from the court clerk's office for free and with no reason specified. If jury selection hasn't started yet, then asking each juror about what they might know about the case is a pretty standard question that any competent defense attorney would be asking, even without knowledge of media coverage. If they already know about the case and say they can't put that knowledge aside when rendering a verdict, they are almost always dismissed. If you're concerned your defense attorney isn't aware of the media coverage, that's something you need to bring up with them. If jury selection already took place, and nobody bothered to ask them if they had prior knowledge of the case, then there's pretty much nothing you can do. A judge might ask the jury if anyone's seen the coverage, but it usually results in nothing happening. The media talking about your case is not grounds for a mistrial; it's rarely even grounds for a change of venue. Getting a mistrial would require you to prove a specific juror engaged in misconduct somehow.
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Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court.
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You do not automatically have the right to trial by jury in traffic court. The government only requires courts to allow trials by jury when it is not a petty offense. Refer to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968): Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). ... In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. Since most traffic violations do not involve jail time and do not exceed a $500 fine, most traffic violations are also not eligible for jury trials as defined by the government. Presumably the law is built this way so as not clog the courts with a bunch of people demanding jury trials for very minor infractions that need not be tried by jury. The Washington State Civil Rules you reference do not grant any further rights to trial by jury not already granted otherwise. It can be quickly summed up as saying that trial by jury rights cannot be revoked, and outlines how one should go about requesting a trial by jury. If you were fined more than $500 and were denied a jury trial, consult an attorney in the area about the situation.
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One limit is that potential jurors cannot be excluded solely on the basis of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019). As summarized in Flowers: Equal justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. Enforcing that constitutional principle, Batson ended the widespread practice in which prosecutors could (and often would) routinely strike all black prospective jurors in cases involving black defendants. By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Batson immediately revolutionized the jury selection process that takes place every day in federal and state criminal courtrooms throughout the United States. The Batson restriction is not merely that one cannot explicitly announce race as the factor by which one is excluding a juror. This will most often not be the kind of evidence available and if that were the rule, the purpose of the rule would easily be defeated. What Batson prohibits is exclusion of a juror "on the basis of race" (whether or not a proxy was the proximate or purported means by which the prosecutor made the decision). See Flowers at p. 18 of the slip opinion: The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons are the actual reasons, or whether the proffered reasons are pretextual and the prosecutor instead exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”
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It depends on what the jury said, and if it's criminal or civil. In criminal cases, the judge may almost never set aside a verdict of acquittal. There is a single case in the US in which this happened, and it was a bench trial (no jury). That case featured the defendant bribing his trial judge; the Seventh Circuit held that he was never in jeopardy due to the bribe. As far as I can tell, that's the only one. There have been no cases that I can find of a jury's verdict of acquittal being overturnable. Judges can poll the jury to make sure they're unanimous (at least in federal court), and if they aren't then it's a mistrial, but that's because the jury was never in agreement in the first place. On the other hand, a judge has several ways to enforce an acquittal. In federal court, for instance, the defense can move for a motion of acquittal either before or after the case goes to the jury. If the motion is granted before the verdict, double jeopardy applies to retrial. If it's granted after a conviction, then the judicial acquittal can be reversed on appeal, possibly requiring a new trial. Before the verdict is returned, the judge can declare a mistrial. After the verdict is returned, it's too late for that. In civil cases, things are more complicated: double jeopardy does not exist there. There, there is a notion of a judgment as a matter of law: the judge determines that, based on evidence presented, no reasonable jury could possibly find the other way. This can happen before or after the verdict, and is appealable.
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They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction.
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If the defendant declines the plaintiff's counsel's request to give evidence, then how did the latter err? Source: pp 182-183, The Art of the Advocate (1993) by Richard Du Cann QC. Less fortunate was a Mr Barker in 1896, who suddenly found that all his furniture had been sold by a man named Shalless through a firm of auctioneers. Counsel for Mr Barker was con- fident he could prove his case against both Shalless and the auctioneers for 'converting' the furniture (selling it against his will and keeping the proceeds) by cross-examining Shalless. Mr Shalless was of the same opinion, and although present in court during the hearing, he declined to give evidence on his own behalf. Determined not to be foiled by this ruse[,] counsel then applied to the Judge for leave to call Shalless himself. [1.] The Judge pointed out that if he had wanted to call Shalless he should have done so as part of his own case. He went on: ... in granting the Plaintiff's application ... I should be making a precedent which would, if established, lead to an improper amount of laxity in the conduct of the plaintiff's case. [End of 1.] This is a convoluted way of saying that the advocate must make up his mind before the case begins how he is going to conduct it: that he cannot wait until he sees which way the wind is blowing and then call extra evidence. The basis of the rule is more fundamental. A defendant, whether in criminal or civil courts, is entitled to know the whole of the evidence proving the case against him before he is obliged to answer it. That is the principle. Practice demands its enforcement if only because trials last quite long enough already. If purely confirmatory evidence in rebuttal were allowed, it would be difficult to prevent evidence in surrebuttal (evidence called by a defendant in rebuttal of rebuttal evidence) being called with equal frequency, and it would be difficult to see the end of any trial. I do not understand 1. Mr Barker's counsel had already asked Shalless to give evidence, but Shalless declined. So why did the Judge still blame Mr Barker's counsel?
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He should have summonsed him to appear as a witness for the plaintiff.
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If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.
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This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.
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A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.
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Assuming that privilege applies, no Not all communications with your lawyer trigger privilege and if it doesn’t then the lawyer is not your lawyer and is under the same obligation to report as any other member of the public. If privilege does apply then they must keep your secrets. If they are defending you and you confess to the crime then they can: represent you if you plead guilty withdraw unless that would prejudice your defence continue to act providing that they do not: suggest someone else committed the offence set up a defence inconsistent with the confession they can: argue the prosecution has not made their case, that you are not guilty of the offence charged by reason of law, or argue for any other (non prohibited) reason that you should not be convicted.
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A not guilty plea is not part of the case of a defendant or a defense attorney. A "case" refers to evidence and argument made at trial (or conceivably in a pre-trial hearing). The rule in question specifically contemplates a defense attorney entering a not guilty plea for a client who has confessed to the lawyer that the client is guilty of the crime (emphasis added). If at any time before or during a defended trial a client makes a clear confession of guilt to his or her defence lawyer, the lawyer may continue to act only if the plea is changed to guilty OR the lawyer— (a) does not put forward a case inconsistent with the confession; and (b) continues to put the prosecution to proof and, if appropriate, asserts that the prosecution evidence is inadequate to justify a verdict of guilty; and (c) does not raise any matter that suggests the client has an affirmative defence such as an alibi, but may proceed with a defence based on a special case such as insanity, if such a course appears in the lawyer’s professional opinion to be available. The attorney can argue that the defendant should be released from custody prior to trial, and over what terms of pre-trial release are appropriate. The attorney can advise the client not to do anything else that would make it easier for the prosecution to prove the client committed the crime (e.g. advising the client not to brag about having committed the crime on social media). The attorney can advise the client on how to behave in the courtroom so as to avoid contempt of court sanctions, and how to dress and behave appropriately and in a manner that the court will find to be sympathetic (e.g. wearing a suit to court, acting respectfully, not speaking ill of the victim). There are a variety of defenses not inconsistent with guilt that are available: One can argue that the statute of limitations has run. One can argue that the court that the case is being tried before does not have jurisdiction over the offense. One can argue that the crime was committed prior to the effective date of the law, or after it was repealed (if relevant). One can argue that the law in invalid under human rights treaties or similar grounds for invalidity. One can argue that the defendant has immunity from prosecution (e.g. due to diplomatic immunity, or because the defendant was acting pursuant to lawful military or court orders, or because of an agreement reached with a prosecutor previously perhaps in exchange for testimony in another case, or because the defendant acted based upon assurances from an authority upon whom he was entitled to rely that his actions would not be punished) One can argue that evidence is inadmissible for some legally recognized reason (e.g. lack of authentication or doctor-patient privilege or a marital privilege). One can argue that the facts presented by the prosecution don't establish the elements of the crime charged (e.g. no evidence has been presented that permission to use the property was not granted in a trespass case). One can argue that the facts presented don't establish the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt even if some evidence is presented (but subject to limitations on what kinds of doubts may be suggested). One can make an insanity defense, or a lack of capacity to commit a crime defense. One can argue that a justification (e.g. self-defense) excuses the crime. In the U.S., an attorney could implicitly or even expressly make a jury nullification argument, but I do not know if this would be permitted in New Zealand or not. But one cannot argue, for example, that a different individual than your client committed the crime, or that the crime didn't happen at all. This ethical limitation, by the way, is much more restrictive than the limitation under U.S. law, which prohibits an attorney from introducing evidence or testimony known to be false or fraudulent, but does not generally prohibit making arguments based upon possible inferences from the true facts that the attorney knows to be false inferences (i.e. the facts are true, but the conclusions that the lawyer asks the court to draw from the facts are not consistent with what really happened). For example, a U.S. attorney could argue in a case with several co-defendants, that the victim might have been assaulted by one of the co-defendants rather than his client, based upon the evidence available, while a New Zealand attorney whose client had confessed to having assaulted the victim, couldn't ethically make that argument. A defense lawyer in either the U.S. or New Zealand could find a forensic science article showing that the technique used to link the bullet to the gun by police investigators is unreliable and use it to cross-examine a prosecution forensic expert. But, a New Zealand lawyer, unlike a U.S. lawyer, could probably not argue that there is alibi evidence putting your client on the other side of town at the time that the coroner erroneously believes the time of death to have occurred. Of course, any counsel or advocacy provided by defense counsel in connection with a sentencing phase of the proceeding would also not be inconsistent with this ethical rule and, in practice, much of the value that a defense attorney adds to the process for a defendant comes at that stage of the case.
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This judgment (R. v. H.E., 2017 ONSC 4277) was overturned on appeal (2018 ONCA 879): [2] After accepting the complainant’s testimony that both she and Mr. E. believed that, as his wife, she did not have the right to refuse to have sex with him, the trial judge explained the acquittal by expressing a reasonable doubt about whether Mr. E. had the required mens rea for the offence. ... [3] Mr. E. concedes that the trial judge committed reversible errors in this reasoning. He acknowledges that to the extent the trial judge based his acquittal on Mr. E.’s and the complainant’s shared belief that the complainant could not refuse to have sex with him, that belief would be a mistake of law that cannot form the foundation for an honest but mistaken belief in consent defence. He is correct. To avoid conviction based on an honest but mistaken belief in consent, the accused must believe in a state of facts that amount to consent according to law... ... [6] The parties therefore agree that the appeal must be allowed and the verdict of acquittal set aside.... [7] We would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and order a new trial.
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You could bring a motion to compel for failing to respond substantively to a motion to admit which is objected to, just as you could for an interrogatory. The process is the same. Normally, a request to admit would not be deemed admitted if a substantive objection was filed by the deadline, even if there was no express admission or denial. Only if the objection were completely and utterly meritless would a judge be likely to order that the request to admit would be deemed admitted in that case since the response was a de facto non-answer and the objection was a mere sham. @Iñaki Viggers states in his answer: the purpose of a request for admissions is [to attempt] to stipulate --rather than to discover-- the facts on which plaintiff and defendant agree. This is not really true. A request to admit is a discovery tool to prevent you from having to prove up what should be non-controversial facts that might nonetheless take time or documentation to prove at trial and to gather evidence for in advance of trial. The questions in a request to admit are typically ones that the other side would not willingly stipulate to (for example, because they'd like to be able to offer testimony to explain a seemingly unfavorable fact) but may not be able to deny. If a party denies a request to admit and then offers nothing to support the denial in discovery practice or at trial, that party risks court sanctions for the groundless denial. Good litigation practice is also always to include some requests to admit that are effectively outcome determinative to give the opposing party a chance to screw up and essentially default the case by not responding on time.
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Is a professor allowed to access my grade from a previous class not taught by them? This question is prompted by a similar question on academia.StackExchange: Is a professor allowed to ask me what grade I got in a previous class? This is in the U.S. Obviously, FERPA was brought up. Comments and explanations in answers talked about what it means to have a "legitimate educational interest" in a student's grades. This question posed to law.StackExchange is about what constitutes "legitimate educational interest"? Generally, schools must have written permission from the parent or eligible student in order to release any information from a student's education record. However, FERPA allows schools to disclose those records, without consent, to the following parties or under the following conditions (34 CFR § 99.31): School officials with legitimate educational interest; The majority opinion on Academia seems to be that a teacher wanting to know their student's pervious grades in a different class - a class which was a prerequisite for the current class - is a legitimate educational interest. The only reason provided as for why is that the teacher can use it to deny access to the class to some students or to adjust the class speed and/or content to better accommodate the students' level of understanding. I suggested that teachers can get this information in other, better ways, and have no true need or interest in previous grades. For example, when I want to get a feel for the level of the class up front, I have given an anonymous quiz on the first day of class. Since it's anonymous, it is obviously not graded. Others still insist that teachers in this situation have a legitimate educational interest in the student grades. One person went so far as to suggest that FERPA only denies the teacher in cases of idle curiosity. That seems wholly ineffective to me at that point, as any teacher could always get out of a reprimand by claiming "I heard this student was concerned about their standing and I wanted to see if there was anything I could do to help." You cannot easily prove that a teacher had only idle curiosity. So the question is, in a nutshell: Legally, what has FERPA's "legitimate educational interest" been interpreted as meaning, strictly? If this has ever been tested in court for any grey areas like this (ie: not cases of negligence or idle curiosity), that would be great. My personal interest in this is to get a better idea of when FERPA denies access to student records and when it does not. I am concerned, as the interpretation of some people of "legitimate educational interest" makes me wonder if FERPA does not really protect our privacy in practice, since negligence and idle curiosity should already have been grounds for workplace discipline for school officials in any competent school.
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The exact text of 34 CFR § 99.31 makes it clear that the determination of who has "legitimate educational interest" is left up to each educational institution to establish: (a) An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from an education record of a student without the consent required by § 99.30 if the disclosure meets one or more of the following conditions: (1) (i) (A) The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests. Moreover, 34 CFR § 99.7 requires each institution to notify students of their particular definition of "legitimate educational interest": (a) (1) Each educational agency or institution shall annually notify parents of students currently in attendance, or eligible students currently in attendance, of their rights under the Act and this part. ... (3) The notice must include all of the following: ... (iii) If the educational agency or institution has a policy of disclosing education records under § 99.31(a)(1), a specification of criteria for determining who constitutes a school official and what constitutes a legitimate educational interest. (bolding mine) As far as whether this has ever been tested at law, I'm not sure. There are a few cases mentioned in this legal review article from 2003, though the author calls the existing case law at the time "meager": Not surprisingly, schools' interpretations of the legitimate educational interests exception have been at issue in some FERPA controversies. In Krebs v. Rutgers, for example, a university attempted to characterize its disclosure of students' Social Security numbers to campus post office personnel as a "legitimate educational interest." The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey enjoined the practice, noting that "the regulations do not suggest, and it is far from clear, that distribution of social security numbers ... serves a 'legitimate educational interest.' " In contrast, in Achman v. Chicago Lakes Independent School District No. 2144, a Minnesota federal district court held that the supervisor of the school's detention room had a legitimate educational interest in accessing the disciplinary records of a student she monitored. In another FERPA case from 1987, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that a school official who requested students' education records to defend against her pending criminal charges did not have a legitimate educational interest in the records." Finally, in another instance that some commentators have deemed "an egregious example of when disclosure serves no legitimate educational interest," a substitute teacher told her class that a student had HIV and classmates should not share lip balm with him. Earlier in the article, the author makes basically the same point you make in your question: Thus, if a professor, campus employer, or other school official can contrive a colorable "legitimate educational interest" for accessing a student's education records, the official may obtain the data without the student's knowledge or consent. ... Because policies are not uniform, systems administrators are largely untrained, and schools are not held accountable, school discretion in defining legitimate educational interests may undermine student privacy.
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Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.
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For the record, the requirement says: The board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing, except that a parent or person in parental relation seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement shall have the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement. To understand "burden of proof", think in terms of what claim is being made, by whom: this is different from understanding what you want to happen. To get the outcome you want, you have to make the right claims. Assume that the law requires the school to accommodate a student's learning disability, then the plaintiff (parent) would claim that the school failed to accommodate. The school would then be required to prove that they did accommodate. In other words, all you have to do (initially) is allege a failure to follow the law, and it is up to the school to provide the evidence that your allegation is incorrect (by providing records, also indicating standards that students are held to; the presumption that the panel is supposed to adopt is that the plaintiff's allegation is true, unless facts are introduced that show that it is false). It's not clear what action of the school is alleged to be at variance with the law. It sounds like a simple correctable bureaucratic error, so a hearing should not be necessary, but that doesn't mean that one isn't (e.g. if they have a policy of not admitting to making mistakes).
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Whether published or unpublished, they are still protected by copyright. (They are probably unpublished for copyright purposes, but in the US this makes little difference for any recently created work (that is anything after 2002). For older work see the Cornell chart.) They cannot be copied or distributed without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing applies. And it is hard to see how either would apply to entire essays simply begin placed in a database. Placing text in a database is probably making a copy, and might be distributing it or publishing it, depending on how access to the DB is granted. Now data from the essays, as opposed to the texts of the essays themselves, are probably facts. Facts are not protected by copyright in any Berne Convention country, including the US, the UK, and the EU.
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There is no nationwide prohibition on physical contact between teachers and children. But there are positive duties for child safeguarding which might result in a local policy that is more restrictive. The exact legal background is different depending on whether this is happening in England, Scotland, etc., or on whether it's a state or private school, but the net result is the same. For music tuition which takes place outside school, bodies such as the Independent Society of Musicians (the UK's main professional association for musicians and music teachers) will have their own policies for members. For example, for state schools in England, the governors must "make arrangements for ensuring that their functions relating to the conduct of the school are exercised with a view to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children who are pupils at the school" (Education Act 2002 s.175(2)). This is a bit of a mouthful, but the rough idea is that the school has to implement certain policies in the interests of the child, including protecting them from sexual abuse and grooming. The school has to take account of statutory guidance from the Department for Education. In addition, there are standards for teachers' conduct which are used to assess their performance, and include language around safeguarding duties as well as "proper and professional regard for the ethos, policies and practices of the school in which they teach". Now, there is nothing here to say that a teacher can never make physical contact with a pupil. There are rules about how allegations of abuse are meant to be handled, as well as the general employment law around unfair dismissal, which would mean that accidentally touching a child ought not to result in immediate sacking. A particular school could decide that on balance, the appropriate policy is one of no physical contact at all, or they could be more nuanced (which is likely). Whatever policy they do have must be communicated to the teaching staff, who naturally are meant to follow it - although again, there are requirements of fairness on the employer as to how they handle noncompliance. Given that overall framework, scenarios of accidental touching, or administering first aid, or breaking up a dangerous situation, are different from physical contact as part of normal instruction. Even a local policy which ostensibly says "no touching ever" would have to give way to the Education and Inspections Act 2006, s.93 which specifically authorises our hypothetical teacher at an English state school to use reasonable force to stop a pupil injuring someone else, among other examples. That is also in line with the teachers' duty of care towards the wellbeing of their pupils. These examples are not really the same as what is happening in an ordinary music lesson. Meanwhile, outside the school gates, the Independent Society of Musicans has its own Code of Conduct which includes specific rules about touching in Annex 2, paragraph 20. Physical contact between teachers and pupils is only appropriate in very limited circumstances. Teachers should consider using other strategies such as demonstrating for the student to copy or using a mirror. If a teacher intends to use any physical contact in their teaching, they should state this in writing before lessons begin and ask the parent or guardian to sign that they have read the document. Explain the type of touch involved, where on the body and why, and make sure the pupil is aware of the reason for physical contact. Explain this orally to parents, guardians and pupils, and keep them informed of any need to modify the type of touch required as pupils progress. It is not advisable to touch a child on the trunk of the body unless there is a justifiable reason (e.g. to administer first aid). It is not appropriate to touch a child around the chest, waist, diaphragm or ribs in order to teach breathing. These rules are also made in the context of safeguarding, with the threat of terminating ISM membership (at least in principle). Note that this does not say that touch is disallowed, but does ask it to be limited and respectful, and clearly signalled to the child and their parents or guardians. Other professional societies may well have their own rules. All of this is happening at the level of law and policy, and so it's a little removed from the highly emotive social question of what sorts of behaviour are considered acceptable. Someone who teaches music in the UK would be exposed to a range of strongly-held views on the topic, which don't necessarily relate very clearly to the legal minimum requirements.
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The data you cite as PII are simply facts that are public information; your name, photo, your school, track meets, race times, track records, and you have little recourse against the publishing and dissemination of public information, either on a site like Athletic.net that collects and scrapes public information, or against the original sources, such as news outlets and school officials. Collecting and publishing public information is clearly allowed under press freedoms and the 1st Amendment. And, concerning photos: news outlets have the clear right to photograph people in public spaces and identify them. A possible exception regarding athletic.net is the Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule ("COPPA") for children under the age of 13. But they cover that in their Privacy Policy and offer a removal policy. One other possible exception is FERPA, the federal student record law, as pointed out by user6726 in their answer; see eCFR — Code of Federal Regulations. But your parents may have signed a release to allow the information to be made public. In the event neither of those exceptions is the remedy, you would need a court order to force Athletic.net to remove information, and you would need to show very compelling evidence that such data is harmful to you in order for the court to risk violating the First Amendment. Also see Cyberstalking and RateMyProfessors.com
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No. You are a "person of interest" in a criminal investigation based upon a bona fide reasonable suspicion, even though they lack probable cause, and the government has not threatened to say anything that isn't true, so you have no cause of action against the government. You might have a claim against the school or your employer for wrongfully firing you (being a person of interest in an investigation isn't itself unlawful or even a meaningful mark of bad character), but you are probably an "employee at will" and thus may have no recourse against the employer other than to apply for unemployment benefits because you were fired without good cause. Your recourse against the school would depend upon the nature of that relationship.
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Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.
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Using trademarked names as a reference in a commercial context Is it possible to use a trademarked name as some sort of a reference for public available data (even when used in a commercial context)? Non-Commercial example: Let's say we have an app that displays the amount of twitter followers for each account. To do so you obviously have to display the names of the account which (some of them) might be trademarked names. This is a non-commercial use case and is just using publicly available information (through twitter api for example). As far as I researched this is fine as long as of course Twitter in this case allows it. Commercial example: Let's extend on previous example for easier explanation. We extend the app with actual in-app purchases. For example a user could place a bet on the amount of growth the account will have in the next x days. Would this still fall into "fair use"? The trademarked name is only used to reference to the publicly available "follower count" and the app / product is in no other way connected to the twitter user / trademark. (Except of any special laws for gambling, that was just the easiest example I could imagine)
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“Fair Use” is a (US) copyright concept: it has no relevance to Trademarks. A Trademark may also be subject to copyright, for example, the word Google is a trademark but it is not copyright - the Google logo is both a trademark and subject to copyright. You infringe a trademark when you use it in such a way that people think that your goods and services are their goods and services. You don’t infringe a trademark when you use it to actually refer to them or their goods and services- that is what trademarks are for.
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Literary references are generally considered to be a form of Fair Use in the US, and a form of Fair Dealing in those countries that have that legal concept. Mentioning that a character has read a fictional work, or likes a character in na fictional work, or even models his actions on such a character, or thinks he is that character is not treated as an infringement of copyright. Indeed, even "cameo" appearances of a literary character are not usually treated as infringements. A character in a period mystery might briefly meet Sherlock Holmes or Hercule Poirot, say, without that being an infringement. If significant sections of the new work involve imitating the plot of the source work, while the delusional character tries to act out his or her delusion, that might make the work a derivative work of the source (here DC comics). Creating a derivative work requires permission from the copyright holder. Whether a work is derivative depends on the specific facts, and cannot be judged from the information in the question. The more of the specific details from the source work that are used, and the more extensive the use is within the new work, the more likely it is that the new work would be held to be derivative. The details will matter, and ultimately it would be a matter for the judgement of a court if a suit were brought claiming that the work was derivative.
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Names cannot be copyrighted at all, in any country. They can, however, be protected as trademarks. The general idea is that if one uses a name to identify a product or service, or a creator of products or services, others cannot use the same or a similar name to identify their products or services in such a way that a reasonable person might be confused into thinking that the two came from the same source, or one was endorsed or approved by the other. Trademarks are limited in scope to a particular country, A name that is protected in Canada, say, will not be protected in the US unless steps have been taken to protect it there. In some countries a trademark must be officially registered to get any protection, In others, such as the United States, merely using the mark can give a degree of protection, although registration give more protection. Each country maintains a trademark registry which can be searched for existing marks. There are search firms that will do such searches for a client, and also search for marks in use but not registered, for a fee. Trademark protection is generally restricted by the type of product or service involved. An anti-virus program, say, called "Guard dog" would probably not interfere with a fantasy game called "Guardog". A private security service of the same name would pretty surely not interfere. The range of protection depends on how widely known the product is, but "software related" is a very wide area, and except for famous marks, a mark protected in connection with one area of software will not be protected in a very different area of software. Names that a purely invented, such as Kodak, are more strongly protected than descriptive marks such as "Best Pizza" Particularly famous names such as "Microsoft" get additional protection even outside their usual areas, so "Microsoft Pizza" might be a problem. Logos and other graphic marks can also be protected as trademarks, but that is not what the question asked about. The styling of a trademark, such as a particular font, choice of colors, and so on, can also be protected. This is called "trade dress". A disclaimer making it clear that a somewhat similar name is not related, and the is no affiliation can help avoid avoid an infringement suit. For example: Pear brand kites are in no way associated with, sponsored or approved by the makers of Pear smartphones. On this site we cannot give specific legal advise, so we cannot evaluate whether a specific proposed trademark would or would not infringe an existing mark. It might be well to consult an attorney with trademark experiences before finally choosing a name and doing marketing under it.
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Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.
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Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.
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Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.
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It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons?
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Yes it would be legal to do so. A full analysis would look at trademark law (where the bottom line is that the use of the Coke mark is not misleading since you are selling bona fide Coke), and copyright law. Whether it was non-infringing or fair use, is a closer call, but there is little doubt that one way or the other, this would be legal.
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Falsely admitting to breaking a civil injunction So say somebody asked Bob if he'd broken a civil injunction, which Bob hadn't, but Bob admitted to having broken that injunction. Bob was taken to court, but it quickly became apparent Bob could not have committed the crime, because he had an undisputable alibi. (Bob is any person.) Is these a feasible situation? Could Bob be charged with wasting someone's time or something? I'm interested in this in the UK. (Apologies if the style of this question is innapropriate, I'm not really sure how things work round here:) )
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We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.
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You could bring a motion to compel for failing to respond substantively to a motion to admit which is objected to, just as you could for an interrogatory. The process is the same. Normally, a request to admit would not be deemed admitted if a substantive objection was filed by the deadline, even if there was no express admission or denial. Only if the objection were completely and utterly meritless would a judge be likely to order that the request to admit would be deemed admitted in that case since the response was a de facto non-answer and the objection was a mere sham. @Iñaki Viggers states in his answer: the purpose of a request for admissions is [to attempt] to stipulate --rather than to discover-- the facts on which plaintiff and defendant agree. This is not really true. A request to admit is a discovery tool to prevent you from having to prove up what should be non-controversial facts that might nonetheless take time or documentation to prove at trial and to gather evidence for in advance of trial. The questions in a request to admit are typically ones that the other side would not willingly stipulate to (for example, because they'd like to be able to offer testimony to explain a seemingly unfavorable fact) but may not be able to deny. If a party denies a request to admit and then offers nothing to support the denial in discovery practice or at trial, that party risks court sanctions for the groundless denial. Good litigation practice is also always to include some requests to admit that are effectively outcome determinative to give the opposing party a chance to screw up and essentially default the case by not responding on time.
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Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.
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I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.
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You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all
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The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.
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Unless you received an order from the court prohibiting contact, it might be legal; but it's probably not the best idea. Let the lawyers handle it Attorneys have far better, more effective means of dealing with this situation than the course of action you describe. Lawyers have productive tools to accomplish the job and they know how to use them. For example, assume the best-case-scenario results from your idea and you get the other side to admit their affidavit is fallacious in some way. "Aha!" you shout. "Success! Daylight!" But then what? It's not on record. You can't testify to the admission because that's hearsay. Now imagine they next share this information about your little conversation with the counterparty that had them sign the affidavit in the first place. After first being alerted of your concerns, they both now act in concert to shore up their stories and you never see that "daylight" again. Contrast that outcome with one where your guy or gal's attorney deposes the witness under oath, gets them to concede to your version of the facts then introduces the deposition as favorable evidence at trial. That's a much better outcome for "your side." Wouldn't you agree? Be wary of unintended consequences Generally speaking, such direct contact between the parties is often problematic and rarely helpful. (Except, in some cases, when direct contact between the parties leads to a negotiated settlement. Which happens far less often than the direct contact going sideways making the situation even more intractable.) Before you launch off on your own and do something that might be counterproductive. First, identify the areas of the affidavit that you think are inaccurate. Give that information to the party you support, then have them run it by their attorney to figure out the best way to handle the situation.
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Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it.
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Does a deed supercede a will when a house is transferred to one sibling? I have been taking care of my elderly mom who has dementia the past three years basically with no help from siblings. I live with my mom . She transferred the house to me. We did a life estate. I am now listed as the owner of the home. However many years ago my mother made a will and had the house being shared among her three children. Now my question is if I am paying all the bills and the property taxes on this house and living there and taking care of my mom do I have to divide the house equally when it's sold even if I am listed on the deed as owner. My siblings keep talking about their share of the house and it makes me crazy since they refuse to help take care of our mother with me.
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A deed executed during life trumps a will. The other siblings would have to argue: Your mom did not have the capacity to execute the deed (which is a very low standard in terms of her capacity). The deed was procured from undue influence from you (which requires them to meet a high bar of proof). The deed was really the implementation of an agreement for you to hold the property in trust for everyone (which requires some affirmative evidence of this intent).
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If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).
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Owners can't be evicted from their own property. That's one of the fundamental rights of real estate ownership. You may have a contractual basis for a lawsuit that either leads to payment or provides for forfeiture of their share, but that relies on the details of your specific case and will require specific legal advice from your own lawyer.
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Close family members can stay as long as the tenant wants The tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property which includes living with their close relatives - spouse, de facto and children would all qualify; parents and siblings might as well. It doesn't matter if these people are children or adults. You cannot contract out of this as you are not allowed to discriminate in housing based on family situation. The tenant is also entitled to have non-relative house guests stay for as long as is reasonable. A month or so would be reasonable; longer than that and it starts to look like a sub-lease for which they would need your permission. There is generally a limit under texas law of 3 adults per bedroom but that doesn't seem to be an issue here. I also can't see where having a non-resident's mail delivered to the property is something you have a say about. I'd be very careful if I were you because it seems like you are on the wrong side of the law here.
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First off: if someone in DHS is telling you this, your first, best, and really only option is to get advice from an attorney specializing in family law. Regardless of what we tell you here, without representation you will have a hard time with officials who believe otherwise. That said: I don't find anything exactly matching what you describe. The Uniform Adoption Code (AR Code § 9-9-200 (2014)) does not specifically address sibling groups at all. Adoptive parents do have rights to streamlined adoption of a sibling of a child they already adopted, under the Streamlined Adoption act (AR Code § 9-9-701 (2014)). In the section related to Placement of Minors (AR Code § 9-28-108 (2014)), however, is likely what the case worker was describing. Subsection (b) (2) reads, in part: (2) When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles, the department shall attempt to place: (A) A sibling group together while they are in foster care and adoptive placement This is discussing foster care and adoptive placement, of course. I think the key wording is When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles; that would be your argument (that it is not in their best interest). I see a 2011 case, for example, discussing a sibling group of four children not entirely different from yours; while there are not children with special needs, there is a child with major behavioral issues, and one of the (three) foster parents is considering adopting one of the children and "would be open" to considering others, but clearly isn't expecting to be required to do so. Note: I am not a lawyer, and particularly not one specialized in family law This is based on my reading of the 2014 Arkansas code. That is almost 2 years old. That said, I don't see any news articles or similar discussing limitations in sibling group placement in Arkansas recently, which is the sort of thing that usually would get attention. That said, this has also been something that HHS has been trying to encourage states to push for – more sibling group placement and awareness of sibling group issues – so it's entirely possible something could have changed.
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Yes. An HOA covenant binds successors to the owners who make the HOA declarations and establish the relevant covenants. Generally, there is a process in the HOA rules by which a supermajority of owners can disband the HOA, but otherwise HOA rules automatically bind successor owners, whether they agree or not. Fines imposed by an HOA member by an HOA normally only bind a successor owner if the fines have been recorded as HOA liens against the property.
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Certain things are your separate property, and only you can sell them (but you are also responsible for them). That would include things acquired before the marriage; also anything inherited by just one of you, or gifts provably given to just one of you. Other things are community (marital) property, including your pants and probably your dog. Writing your name on the object or a piece of associated paper doesn't really matter, what matters is how it was acquired. One party can sell their half-interest in joint property, but nobody (?) would buy a property interest in a dog, they would buy the dog. For another person to actually buy a dog, they would have to buy a 100% interest in the dog, meaning that you would have to agree to the sale. When it comes to property with a solid title system, such as real estate, one party cannot sell the whole property without the consent of the co-owner. However, a co-owner could petition the courts to force a partition of the property, where the courts would order that the proceeds be divided equitably. Ohio law on division of marital property is spelled out here. Getting a lawyer is really the only reasonable solution. You can't just "put a block" on selling stuff. If you want the tools, somebody has to collect the tools and take care of them, and they can't just break in to the house in the middle of the night to do this.
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No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally.
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What's the age in which people are allowed to engage in cybersex in Germany? As far as I understand, Germany has an age of consent of 14 or 16 depending on the context but in addition a law. On the other hand § 184 sets up a ban for "Verbreitung pornographischer Schriften". Translation via Gesetze im Internet §184 Distribution of pornography (1) Whosoever with regard to pornographic written materials (section 11(3)) offers, gives or makes them accessible to a person under eighteen years of age; Does cybersex, especially when it's text-based, fall under that statute and is therefore outlawed?
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Does cybersex count as pornography? The law does not define pornography, so this is up to an interpretation of the courts. However, it appears to be common consent that a depersonalisation of the subjects is an essential aspect. For example, this verdict notes (translations and emphasis mine): Pornographie liegt nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs und der Oberlandesgerichte vor, wenn eine Darstellung unter Ausklammerung aller sonstigen menschlichen Bezüge sexuelle Vorgänge […] in den Vordergrund rückt […] (vgl. BGHSt 37, 55 (60); 32, 40 (44 ff); OLG Karlsruhe NJW 1974, 2015 (2016); OLG Düsseldorf NJW 1974, 1474 (1475); ebenso BVerwG NJW 2002, 2966 (2969)). […] Hinzukommen muss deshalb als weiteres Kriterium die sog. „Apersonalität des Geschlechtspartners“ (vgl. Erdemir, MMR 2003, 628 (631)). Die Darstellung muss mit anderen Worten durch eine Verabsolutierung sexuellen Lustgewinns unter gleichzeitiger Entmenschlichung der Sexualität geprägt sein. Pornographie ist danach anzunehmen, wenn der Mensch im Rahmen der Darstellung zum bloßen, auswechselbaren Objekt sexueller Begierde degradiert wird (vgl. S/S/Lenckner/Perron/Eisele, StGB 27. Aufl., § 184 Rdn. 4; MK-Hörnle a.a.O., § 184 Rdn. 15; jeweils m. w. Nachw.). […] According to the Federal Court’s and the state courts’ jurisdiction, a depiction is pornography if it emphasises sexual procedures disregarding all human aspects [references] […] Therefore, a necessary further criterion is the so-called “depersonalisation of the sexual partner” [reference]. With other words, the depiction must be dominated by a absolutisation of sexual pleasure and a simultaneous dehumanisation of sexuality. Therefore pornography has to be asserted if a depiction reduces human beings to mere replaceable objects of sexual desire [references]. (Also see the German Wikipedia for another summary and further references on the subject.) Now, cybersex usually, if not inherently, is a personal procedure, as opposed to a depersonalised one. Therefore I would not consider it to fall under the quoted definition of pornography. What other laws do regulate cybersex? The law governing the age of consent is § 176 StGB (translation), which includes: (4) Mit Freiheitsstrafe […] wird bestraft, wer […] auf ein Kind mittels Schriften (§ 11 Absatz 3) oder mittels Informations- oder Kommunikationstechnologie einwirkt, um […] das Kind zu sexuellen Handlungen zu bringen, die es […] vor dem Täter […] vornehmen […] soll, […] (4) Whosoever […] influences a child with written materials (section 11(3)) or with information or communication technology to induce him to engage in sexual activity […] in the presence of the offender […] shall be liable to imprisonment […]. *Translation adapted from this one to reflect recent changes to the law. Note that Kind (child) was established as Person unter vierzehn Jahren (a person under fourteen years of age) before. I would interpret this to capture cybersex. The only thing about this that may be debatable is whether the sexual activity during cybersex happens in the presence of the offender (i.e., the other person).
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These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.
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U.S. law does not forbid 15 year olds from joining dating websites. Direct U.S. regulation of Internet communications mostly via the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) has a cutoff age of 13 years old. This said, nothing obligates websites to allow minors to join their dating app, and they may be reluctant to do so for fear that if you are mistreated by someone as a result of the app that they could be held responsible. In particular, amendments to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) called FOSTA-SESTA for the "Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and "Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA)" which took effect April 11, 2018, limited the prior near total protection from liability under Section 230 of the CDA. The amendments maked it illegal to knowingly assist, facilitate, or support sex trafficking, and amended the Communications Decency Act's section 230 safe harbors (which make online services immune from civil liability for their users' actions) to exclude enforcement of federal or state sex trafficking laws from immunity. Federal sex trafficking laws largely apply to commercial sex by people under the age of 18, which an online dating app could facilitate, if used by someone inclined to use it in that manner. The two main federal sex trafficking laws are as follows: Section 1591 now provides in part the following: “Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion ... , or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act,” shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age). The Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that involve interstate or foreign travel. It consists of three principal substantive sections. Section 2421 proscribes the interstate or foreign transportation of someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity; misconduct which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, or using interstate communications to coerce or entice a child to engage in such conduct. The communications offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years; the travel offense by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses: (1) §2423(a) - transportation of a child in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes; (2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful sexual abuse of a child; (3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a child; and (4) §2423(d)— arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of these offenses. The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years. So, the reluctance of a dating app to allow minors to use their services is understandable. They either need to aggressively police a low cost or free except for ad support service with considerable employee expense to do so, to avoid the risk of FOSTA-SESTA authorized liability, or they can not offer the service at all. In a nutshell, the app providers consider you to be jail-bait and don't want to face the associated risks.
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Most states have two parallel sets of sexual assault statutes. One set punishes sexual assaults involving sexual penetration that has greater penalties. The other set punishes sexual assaults involving sexual contact without sexual penetration that has smaller penalties but otherwise the same elements of the offense. Usually, almost every offense which is a crime when it involves sexual penetration is also a crime when it involves sexual contact but not sexual penetration, with the fairly frequent exception of statutory rape offenses that cover an adolescent victim who is below the age of consent but post-pubescent (with the statute itself setting specific age thresholds that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction). Often, even when statutory rape of an adolescent (i.e. sex with consent by an adolescent under the age of consent) itself is a relatively minor crime, often a misdemeanor, and is rarely prosecuted to the full extent of the law, child prostitution or attempted child prostitution with the same victim is often a very serious offense, and child pornography offenses often also carry serious penalties when the "child" is under the age of eighteen, even when the sexual act filmed or photographed itself is of people who are above the age of consent and are legally having consensual sex. In many states, sex with someone in a position of authority over the victim is a crime without regard to consent, much like a statutory rape offense, but without regard to age. In some states there would be a parallel sexual contact offense, and in some states there would not be one. The name of the offenses varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Sometimes they are different degrees of the same offense, sometimes they are offenses with different names, and the names used varies quite a bit. Also, even when an arguable sexual contact offense is not a sex offense, it would almost always be some form of non-sexual criminal assault offense. For example, Colorado has sexual assault related crimes called sexual assault at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-402 (involving sexual penetration and including two grades of statutory rape, and including cases where "the victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to coerce the victim to submit, unless the act is incident to a lawful search" and cases where "the actor, while purporting to offer a medical service, engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than a bona fide medical purpose or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices"), a parallel crime called unlawful sexual contact at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-404 (not involving sexual penetration, including cases where "the victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to coerce the victim to submit, unless the act is incident to a lawful search" and cases where "the actor, while purporting to offer a medical service, engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than a bona fide medical purpose or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices"), a crime called sexual assault on a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-405, sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-405.3, internet sexual exploitation of a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-405.4, sexual assault on a client by a psychotherapist at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-405.5, incest at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-6-301, criminal extortion at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-207, second degree kidnapping at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-302, aggravated incest at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-6-302, human trafficking for sexual servitude at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-504, sexual exploitation of a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-6-403, procurement of a child for sexual exploitation at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-6-404; soliciting for child prostitution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-402, pandering of a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-403, procurement of a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-403.5, keeping a place of child prostitution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-404; pimping of a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-405, inducement of child prostitution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-405.5, patronizing a prostituted child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-406, internet luring of a child at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-3-306, obscenity at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-102, posting a private image for harassment at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-107, posting a private image for pecuniary gain at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-108, posting, possession, or exchange of a private image by a juvenile at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-109, prostitution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-201, soliciting for prostitution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-202, pandering at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-203, keeping a place of prostitution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-204, patronizing a prostitute at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-205, pimping at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-206, and prostitute making display at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-207, public indecency at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-301, indecent exposure at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-302, sexual conduct in a correctional institution at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-701, criminal invasion of privacy at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-7-801, harassment at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-9-111, hazing at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-9-124, cruelty to animals at Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-9-202, and violations of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act at Colo. Rev. Statute § 18-17-101, et seq. If found guilty, what would a typical punishment be in the US? In a system in which there are several classes of felonies and several classes of misdemeanors, usually sexual contact offenses are one to three offense classes below the sexual penetration offense with the same elements. For example, if unaggravated sexual penetration without consent is the second lowest grade of felony, unaggravated sexual contact without consent is typically the lowest grade of felony or the highest grade of misdemeanor. A highly aggravated sexual assault with penetration offense is often punishable by decades in prison. An unaggravated sexual contact without consent offense may be punishable by up to six to twelve months in jail or a long period of probation. The offenses are too varied by jurisdiction and crime details to summarize easily. Aggravated rape is a death penalty offense in U.S. military justice although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the imposition of the death penalty (at least in cases where the victim is not a child) is unconstitutional. Some states declare in their statutes that the aggravated rape of a child is a death penalty offense although the constitutionality of those statutes has not been tested in court and no one has been executed for such an offense since the death penalty was reinstated in the 1970s in the U.S. Most sex offenses in the U.S. of all types, including both sexual contact offenses, sexual penetration offenses, and even offenses involving no contact at all, such being a peeping tom, also require to convicted defendant to register as a sex offender, either for a long period of time or for life, which is a quite severe and separate punishment in addition to the incarceration and/or fine and court costs and surcharges involved. In the case of child sex offenses and some repeat rape offenders, even after a term of incarceration is fully served, the state may seek to have the offender detained indefinitely civilly to protect the public until it is determined that the offender is no longer a threat, which rarely happens in practice.
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Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed.
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you can still have a free and open moderation-free internet in a post-Sec 230 world Sure, but remember what moderation-free means: no moderation whatsoever. That means no removal of offensive content like trolling, profanity-laden or racist rants, or even outright spam. Stack Exchange, for example, gets thousands of attempted spam posts a day, despite the fact that very few of them actually get through, and the ones that do are usually quickly removed. Section 230 protects Stack Exchange's ability to do this without incurring liability for what users post. Imagine a Stack Exchange in which spamming was allowed. So I would say that the EFF's statement is substantially accurate, in that the ability of sites to perform such moderation is fairly essential to their ability to function as communities. The fact that they could avoid liability by not moderating is not relevant if it would make the site unable to function properly.
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It depends on the jurisdiction and particular facts. The long history of not counting marriage as prostitution under law because of its social and religious legitimacy makes the transaction-related aspects of marriage fall outside the definition of prostitution in most cases that are not the explicit sale of a person for consideration, which is obviously forbidden as slavery today and could probably also be charged as prostitution in most jurisdictions. In your particular example, the girl is also saying what things will influence how she feels, and no reasonable person would say that she gives up her ability to withhold consent after marriage based on any alleged contract. A contract to lose the ability to withhold consent would also be void as against public policy, regardless of whether prostitution is involved. Bitcoin is a form of virtual currency. It is regulated by money transmitter law and trading it to obtain goods or services that cannot legally be traded for is still illegal. It's not that there is a defined "limit." It's that some things will fit into the definition and others won't. It's about categories, not quantities.
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"How can these things be compatible at all"? The law is that prostitution isn't illegal, which means prostitutes cannot be thrown into jail, they cannot be blackmailed by customers or police officers, for example. This protects and is intended to protect the prostitute. If a business owner tried what you suggest, that would be trouble. It's not asking the woman to do something that would be illegal for her to do, it's asking her to do something that you don't have the slightest right to ask her, which probably constitutes sexual harassment at least. I can't really get how you would think that making prostitution legal and protecting women from harassment would be incompatible. The legality actually takes a huge amount of harassment away.
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How are the Localbitcoins.com founders safe from money laundering laws? There are lots of news regarding localbitcoins.com seller arrest against money laundering laws. I know it is seller or buyers responsibilities to follow their local AML laws. But how localbitcoins founders are safe from any prosecution even their website is intentionally used as money laundering hub in different countries? What kind of legal loopholes they uses to avoid any legal action against them? Why countries like usa not just shut down localbitcoins service so nobody abuse their service for money laundering and tax hiding like Germany?
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The developers of the site localbitcoins.com are providing a service that is not itself illegal. They explain their service and its limitations in their Terms of Service (my emphasis): All trades on this site are concluded solely between users of the service, and while LocalBitcoins.com may help in resolving disputes between the parties, it does not itself become a party to such transactions, contracts or relationships. LocalBitcoins.com is not a Bitcoin marketplace but a service enabling its users to set up markets for peer-to-peer exchange by way of creating advertisements for trades directed to other users. Until local or national jurisdictions decide that people advertising to conduct person to person crytpocurrency trades are illegal, the site is legal. Some users of the site may be evading taxes or laundering money, and those could be crimes in jurisdictions, but if so, those crimes are perpetrated by the individuals that have contacted each other through the site, and not the site developers or owners themselves.
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To avoid criminal penalties in the U.S. (18 USC 473 and related general provisions of the federal criminal code in Title 18 of the United States Code), the suspected counterfeit status must be disclosed, and the seller must be able to reasonably determine that the buyer does not intend to pass off the bills as true and genuine (otherwise there would be potential accessory or conspirator liability for the counterfeiting conduct of the buyer). Counterfeit currency may be sold as an object, but not as currency or as a tool for someone else to engage in counterfeit currency offenses.
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A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.
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Suppose I obtain the ability to access someone else's cryptocurrency. This sounds like fraud e.g. I overheard them saying the password to their wallet out loud or I am a custodian of their assets. Nope, STILL fraud, possibly even Computer Misuse aka hacking... and because you use internet: it's Wire Fraud I now borrow those assets, keep them for some period of time, and then return them, without the owner's consent. hmmm, let's take california... Luckjy you, it is not embezzlement because you were not entrusted with the cryptocurrency, you gave yourself access. 503. Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted. No it is plainly... theft under California law: 484. (a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Giving it back doesn't matter. The person taking the crypto for any amount of time without being entitled to them is committing theft. You see, California doesn't interest that you just want to borrow. They don't even require Mens Rea for the mere taking - only for fraudulent pretense there is an intent question. In fact, it might even be automatically Grand Theft: 484d. As used in this section and Sections 484e to 484j, inclusive:[...] (2) “Access card” means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access card, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper instrument. 484e. (a) Every person who, with intent to defraud, sells, transfers, or conveys, an access card, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, is guilty of grand theft. YIKES! and now, intent to defraud comes in, but that is actually minimal: that just means taking without being allowed to by the owner in many cases.
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The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
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You can be charged. The criminal act is defined here and here. A core defining feature of violation of The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 is knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity So if someone writes you a check funded by drug sales, then you have to worry about the reason for the check. Two of the reasons that will get you in trouble if the transaction is (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; Another reason would be knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law A "paper trail" if proof of nothing, it just makes it easier to get caught.
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Your understanding of “legal tender” is flawed There is plenty of case law to show that governments can place reasonable restrictions on payment by legal tender up to and including excluding it entirely. Picano v Borough of Emerson explains this very succinctly: Finally, there is no basis for concluding that defendants violated 31 U.S.C. § 5103. Section 5103 provides that "United States coins and currency . . . are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues." None of the cases cited by plaintiff stands for the proposition that § 5103 requires a local government (or any other entity) to accept payment in cash, and no court has so held. The refusal by governments to accept pennies (or any other small denomination) has withstood challenge multiple times. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 does not create a requirement to accept cash.
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It's always amazing to me why some people find it so difficult to understand, just because the word "crypto" is involved. It goes like this: Cryptocurrency is an asset, like any other asset. It's also a currency, but that part can be ignored for this purpose. Buying an asset, any asset, is (usually) not a taxable event. "Buying" in this case consists of exchanging US$ for the asset, just to be clear. Selling an asset, any asset, is (usually) a taxable event. Exchanging an asset for another asset is (usually) also a taxable event. So exchanging a cow for two sheep is a taxable event. The taxable event consist of being deemed to have sold the cow for an "amount realized" equal to the value of two sheep. That amount, less the cost of the cow (the "adjusted basis") is taxable gain (or loss), short or long term - depending on how long the cow was held before the exchange. The outcome is the same if you replace the two sheep with several hundred cups of coffee or several hundred hamburgers; the outcome is still the same if you replace the cow with any currency (other than the US$), crypto- or otherwise. And that's (almost) all there is to it...
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What if any law is broken if Person B hugs Person A against A's expressed wishes? Here is a recent post about person A in the US who doesn't want to be hugged, yet keeps getting hugged despite voicing that the hugs are unwanted: https://interpersonal.stackexchange.com/questions/9016 As described in the post, are those people committing a crime? If so, what crime? If not, what is the minimum that A would need to do to escalate the situation into a crime?
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This is the common law crime of battery - “any unlawful and or unwanted touching of the person of another by the aggressor, or by a substance put in motion by him." Many jurisdictions have abolished common law crimes and codified criminal behavior - it is a subset of what is commonly called “assault” and may be codified in that section.
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Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: "hate speech" based on race, religion, disability and "homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation" was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime ("to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt" based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination.
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canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin"). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, "If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism..."), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. "Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence..." This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. "Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence..." Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.
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In Florida, as in most common-law jurisdictions, you may legally use force to defend yourself and others from someone else's imminent physical assault. Florida makes it explicit. 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person. (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. The force you're defending against must be imminent, though. You can't just believe you may be in danger; you have to believe you are. Further, you must reasonably believe not only that use of force is necessary to defend against that danger, but also that you have to use that much force. Once you believe any of those statements to be false, or any of those beliefs become unreasonable, you're no longer protected by 776.012. If you continue to use force past that point, you're no longer defending; you're attacking. Yes, there may be criminal charges. I mean, use of force is illegal by default, and justified or not, you did just knock a guy out. The government has a duty to ensure that your use of force was lawful, and if it finds reason to believe otherwise, you may be charged. Yes, you might be held liable for the attacker's medical expenses. Mix Tape Guy is likely to try to sue in any case. He has some small chance of winning, partly because civil and criminal trials present different burdens of proof. If you weren't charged, or were found not guilty (and didn't get off on a technicality), then that chance remains pretty small. But if you are tried and found guilty of assault, you're much more likely to lose. Yes, you might be held liable for damage to the restaurant etc. Same story as with Mix Tape Guy. The outcome will depend heavily on the outcome of the criminal trial. If you weren't charged, or you were found not guilty, then you're less likely to have to pay to fix the restaurant. If you're tried and found guilty, you'll almost certainly have to chip in.
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Has Person B committed assault even though person A may have verbally offended person B? Yes An assault is any act (and not mere omission to act) by which a person intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer or apprehend immediate unlawful violence. The term assault is often used to include a battery, which is committed by the intentional or reckless application of unlawful force to another person. source Under common law, the use of force against another must be proportionate and justified, but not excessive in the particular circumstances - Person B's retaliatory assault (and battery) does not appear, according to the details in the OP, to meet this criteria. See palmer v R (19711) AC 814: It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances.
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Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.
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RockApe's answer is correct but I think it would be better to explain what did happen: the officer is not compelling the suspect to buy the water, she is offering him the opportunity of avoiding arrest, thus if the suspect refuses to clean his mess, he will be arrested, but the charge will not be "he refused to buy water" but "they urinated where he was supposed not to" (however that translates into the English legal code). That arrest would not be a punishment for not buying the water, but for the urination. In this case, buying the water seems to have been the most immediate way of getting the water required to clean. If there was some other water source (for example a public fountain) the police officer could have allowed the suspect to get the water from there. Even if there was some public fountain and the police officer insisted in the accused buying the water, the situation would revert to 2 --> the suspect can simply refuse and he will not be punished for refusing.
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A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act.
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Is executing code from external server banned on Google Play? I am creating a program that needs to download additional code and resources from external server. (Of course that code is safe). Is it illegal on Google Play? These additional assemblies will not be tested by Google. Could be my account or program banned? Will Google think, that I want to harm my users, or I am creating a virus? This program is created in Xamarin (C#) and I uses System.Reflection to load assemblies from downloaded DLL files. Thanks for help!
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The law itself wouldn't specify what origin of code can be retrieved and then executed. The terms of service of Google would be what would restrict you from doing this or not, including what consequences you would have if Google discovered this. I can say that as a developer, I have created assemblies in C#, sent them to a server and my application downloaded them and executed them. In my case the assemblies were compiled from script code that the user created themselves and so they knew this was happening. There is no law that dictates that a particular block of code must go through a vetting process by Google prior to running. A quick check of Google's terms of service say that they do not allow this kind of updates. Here is a quote: An app distributed via Google Play may not modify, replace, or update itself using any method other than Google Play’s update mechanism. Likewise, an app may not download executable code (e.g. dex, JAR, .so files) from a source other than Google Play. This restriction does not apply to code that runs in a virtual machine and has limited access to Android APIs (such as JavaScript in a webview or browser).
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No, it is not illegal in UK to use proxies. No, it is not like the tor concept. No, the ISP does not slow you down (they mostly throttle detectable p2p connections), but if you use public proxies, many of them will be unacceptably slow. Note: for things like facebook, a proxy is utterly useless. You already donated your private data to them, there's nothing to hide.
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I see no reason to doubt your conclusion; since it's not allowed by the license it's forbidden by copyright. As you figured it, you gain the right to use these tools by obtaining one of those 3 Visual Studio licenses. A Visual Studio Code license is free, so it makes business sense that it doesn't include a license for Microsoft C++ Build Tools. I.e. you can't claim it's an "obvious oversight", as there's a justifiable business reason.
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Yes, commercial use is allowed for the AGPLv3 license. You can charge for your use of the software so long as you provide a way for the public to download the source code in its entirety.
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Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters.
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No You are limited to “your ... use only”. You are not given permission to make this available for 3rd parties either commercially or for free.
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The companies really need to speak to an IP lawyer as this question is seeking specific advice which this site is loathe to give out for fear of compouding issues. The answer would depend on the license agreements and enforceability in various jurisdictions. According to https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0368d7ee-0eb3-4e3e-a143-4410969a15bb/eula-for-vs2010?forum=vssetup Microsoft says you cant rent out the software - but this applies to the "Pro" version - I could not find anything on the "Premium" version - so most likely Microsoft to have some clam. The flipside is how enforceable this EULA is - and this would probably vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It would be a very, very good idea to speak to a lawyer before letting Microsoft come onto the premises - as "inviting them" to do this is almost certainly not going to improve the Asians company's case and will allow Microsoft to go fishing further and make it easier for them to expand on and collect evidence should they decide to pursue the matter.
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You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did.
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What can person A not authorize person B to do which A can do on their own? In the US, there are many things a person has the right to do. Regarding these things, what actions are legal for person A to do but which would be illegal for person B to do even if formally authorized by A? Only one comes to mind: (How) Can Person A grant immunity to Person B for ending Person A's life? Are there others? If specifics are needed, suppose the state is Oregon.
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Legal Representation: You have the right to represent yourself in a legal proceeding, but you cannot assign that right to anyone that you choose, only to certain approved individuals. Vote: You can vote, and you cannot assign that right to another. Jail Sentence: You can (indeed must) serve a jail sentence or be executed for a capital crime yourself, but you cannot allow another person to do that on your behalf. Military Draft: When we had the draft (most recently), you could not authorize another person to serve in your stead. Marriage: You can marry your neighbor's sister (if she is not related to you), but you cannot transfer that right to your neighbor (who is the brother of the intended bride). These are different things from committing suicide, but it's not clear exactly what concept of exclusive sovereignty you're getting at.
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It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.
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So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.
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tl;dr According to the ACLU, who are experts on this… yes, it is perfectly legal for you to refuse to provide documentation or ID to border patrol, and your refusal cannot be used as a basis for reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation. The ACLU has a very helpful guide to your rights when questioned at Border Patrol checkpoints, whether fixed or random. Emphasis in these excerpts is mine: Refusing to answer CBP’s questions may result in the agent persisting with questioning. If this occurs, you should ask if you are being detained. Another way to ask this is to say, “am I free to leave?” If the agent wishes to actually detain you — in other words, you are not free to leave — the agent needs at least reasonable suspicion that you committed an immigration violation to do so. As I understand it from other legal sources, this means that the agent must have a reasonable suspicion that you are: not a US citizen and that you have violated immigration law And furthermore: You do not have to answer questions about your immigration status. You may simply say that you do not wish to answer those questions. If you choose to remain silent, the agent will likely ask you questions for longer, but your silence alone is not enough to support probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest, detain, or search you or your belongings. … As before, when you are at a checkpoint, you can remain silent, inform the agent that you decline to answer their questions or tell the agent you will only answer questions in the presence of an attorney. In the YouTube videos of checkpoint refusals, you'll see lots of folks declining to answer questions or stating that they will only answer questions from law enforcement in the presence of an attorney. If you are held at the checkpoint for more than brief questioning, you can ask the agent if you are free to leave. If they say no, they need reasonable suspicion to continue holding you. Lots of this in the checkpoint refusals too. The drivers ask if they're being detained and/or if they're free to leave. If you watch closely you'll probably see that many of the Border Patrol agents avoid answering these questions — because they know that they don't have sufficient suspicion to detain the drivers. You can ask the agent to tell you their basis for probable cause, and they should be able to articulate their suspicion. This is also seen in some of the videos. There's a very important caveat about when you are required to provide documentation (other than at the border): A limited exception does exist: for people who do have permission to be in the U.S. for a specific reason and for, usually, a limited amount of time (a “nonimmigrant” on a visa, for example), the law does require you to provide information about your immigration status if asked. While you can still choose to remain silent or decline a request to produce your documents, people in this category should be aware that they could face arrest consequences. If you want to know whether you fall into this category, you should consult an attorney. … If an agent asks you for documents, what you need to provide differs depending on your immigration status. U.S. citizens do not have to carry proof of citizenship on their person if they are in the United States. If you have valid immigration documents and are over the age of 18, the law does require you to carry those documents on you. If you are asked by an immigration agent to produce them, it is advisable to show the documents to the agent or you risk being arrested. If you are an immigrant without documents, you can decline the officer’s request. An agent may likely ask you more questions if you decline a request. No matter what category you fall into, never provide false documents to immigration officials. If you are a citizen you have no obligation to provide documents to establish this; it is not illegal for you to refuse. If you are undocumented, you do not have any obligation to provide documents; it is not illegal for you to refuse. If you are a non-citizen and do have valid documents, you are required to provide them — apparently, it is illegal for you not to do so. So if you're a non-citizen who's legally present in the USA for a temporary term (e.g. tourist, student, business trip, etc.) then you are required to show documents proving this. But if you're undocumented you can — and should!! — do what you see in the videos, and refuse to provide documentation. The Arizona ACLU has a helpful printable sheet with additional pithy points: You may be asked where you were born, how you entered the U.S. or how long you’ve been here. You don’t ever have to answer those questions. Your responses may be used to detain and deport you. … NEVER FLEE A CHECKPOINT!
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Off the top of my head, unless there's a provision that says otherwise, no, they cannot do that. Obviously, I can't tell you if there's a provision that says otherwise. Consult a lawyer for more specific advice.
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united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.
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The law applies equally to everyone The fact that the person misunderstood the law is irrelevant irrespective of the reason for it. That said, in both cases the person would have access to a lawyer and consular assistance who could explain the law to them.
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New Hampshire law makes it illegal to resist arrest, "regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest." RSA 642:2. You can likely defend yourself against excessive force used in or after the arrest, but you may not resist the arrest itself.
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How strong would a cable company's case be against Google for allowing users to find illegal streams through search? With the recent trend of cord-cutting, cable companies are suffering with low ratings, especially on NFL. I understand that not all of it is due to illegal streaming but even a single streaming result can be shown to be a detrimental impact on their business. Google has tried to remove or downgrade stream results but still they show up. How strong would, say ESPN, case be against google if it tries to sue?
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They'd have a big hurdle to clear. According to 17 U.S. Code § 512(c): (d)Information Location Tools.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link, if the service provider— (1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; (B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of this paragraph, the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that reference or link. So long as these conditions are met, Google is immune. So, what is ESPN going to argue? Are they going to argue that Google had actual knowledge of infringement? Are they going to argue that Google received a financial benefit directly attributable to the streaming? Are they going to argue that they sent a DMCA notice to Google and the links were not then expeditiously removed? Or are they going to argue something else entirely?
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That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.
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No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.
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The U.S. could pass a law directing Apple to create software for fair compensation. Similar statutes have been passed in wartime compelling companies to do all sorts of things and companies don't have all of the rights of individuals. If it can be done (not obvious in the case of existing products in the market place), it might be possible for the government to compel it to do so; if it can't be done, it can't be compelled and not all things are possible retroactively. There would also be a constitutional contracts clause issues with such a law impairing contracts between Apple and its customers when applied to existing phones retroactively. Whether it could require Apple to create a law enforcement back door depends upon whether 4th Amendment privacy rights trump the creation of a means to do so. There is an expectation of privacy in electronic records, but it is not absolute. But, there is no law on the books requiring this from Apple. It does not flow naturally from existing powers of law enforcement under existing statutes. It goes beyond what a subpoena would ordinarily require someone to do, and a subpoena is the main means by which governments compel people to provide information. In my opinion, a court faced with that question would rule that a statute requiring Apple to do this prospectively would be constitutional, but no such statute exists. However, this is currently an open legal question because there is no statute of the kind that have been litigated in a manner that produced a binding precedent.
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Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.
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You are making an argument along the lines of promissory estoppel, but this requires reliance on a promise (roughly). From Google's Developer Distribution Agreement: Google reserves the right to suspend and/or bar any Developer from the Store at its sole discretion. From Apple's iOS Developer Program Agreement: You understand and agree that Apple may, in its sole discretion, reject Your Application for distribution for any reason Apple and its licensors reserve the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable access to any services at any time. Neither company makes any representation or promise that a developer will have the right to distribute their product through these official stores. It is irrelevant that an app happens to not violate any terms of the agreement. Even if you demonstrated this, distribution of an app through the official stores is at the sole discretion of Apple and Google.
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Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-).
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the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
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Is growing and consuming plants a “natural right” in the United States? The Declaration of Independence says: ”We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are not part of the Bill of Rights, but they are recognized as unalienable rights. The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution says: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. So we have many other rights besides those included in the Bill of Rights. Even in the Bill of Rights, we are told we have a natural right to “bear arms” and that it shall not be infringed, so it seems self-evident that growing and consuming plants would surely be a natural right. Is growing and consuming plants a natural human right in the United States?
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US constitutional law does not refer to "natural rights", it refers to "fundamental rights". This enters into the doctrine of strict scrutiny vs. lesser scrutinies. If the US Constitution specifically names it, it is a fundamental right: bearing arms, speaking and worshiping freely, protections against search and seizure and so on. The Supreme Court can also recognize a right as being fundamental, even if it is not directly protected in the Constitution; for example there is no explicit provision protecting the right to self defense, interstate travel, marriage, privacy and freedom of contract, but these are or have been treated as fundamental rights. Sometimes a fundamental right can be downgraded, such as the right to freedom of contract. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, the right to contract is taken to be a case of the right to liberty. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. But later, in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, the court backpedaled a bit and said that it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 relied on this to essentially overturn Lochner (without expressly saying so). Parrish agred to work for less than state minimum wage, then sued for the difference. This court dismissed the supposed fundamental right to contract saying: In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Sometimes, a fundamental right is explicitly recognized and relied on in a court ruling, such as the right to privacy in Union Pacific v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, where the court said that No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley; "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone." Note that the ruling does not call it a "fundamental right", but the notion of fundamentality is clearly there in the ruling. Other examples are the right to marry (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1): The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Also, the right to chose to use contraceptives is a fundamental right (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 – note how this depends on and elaborates the right to privacy) If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Roe v. Wade also relies on the right to privacy. The court notes that "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy", and then lays out how it is implicit in the Constitution. There is a vast area of actions that might reasonably be taken to be fundamental rights, but have not been ruled on one way or the other. If (in some bizarre dystopian future scenario) a law were passed that made it a crime to grow and use plants, it would not be surprising if SCOTUS ruled that such a law violates a fundamental right, but it almost certainly would be something much more general than "growing plants". Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 already spells trouble for a supposed fundamental right to grow plants. In this case, appellee grew wheat, but the growing of wheat (and a few other crops) were subject to federal regulation. The court ruled that The effect of the Act is to restrict the amount of wheat which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing for his own needs. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to limit interstate commerce. Even though Filburn was not selling the wheat to another state, he also was not buying it from another state, and he was thus (minutely) affecting interstate commerce: that the production of wheat for consumption on the farm may be trivial in the particular case is not enough to remove the grower from the scope of federal regulation where his contribution, taken with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. Another indication that there is no absolute fundamental right to grow plants is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, which held (relying on Wickard) that "Congress' Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law".
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A state's criminal jurisdiction normally applies to acts committed in that state's territory. So if you consume something in state A, you can't be charged in state B for violating state B's prohibition against consuming that thing. However, if state B has a prohibition against public intoxication, and you enter its territory while intoxicated, you could be charged for violating state B's prohibition on public intoxication. The fact that you're crossing state lines also increases the possibility that the federal government would want to get involved; the location of the federal prosecution could be in either state, although neither state's court system would be involved.
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States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).
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Generally, "yes", but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise "public accommodations" from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason.
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The Meme is Incorrect Law enforcement in the united-states may disturb or dig up plants that are listed as endangered species while unearthing evidence of a serious crime. 16 U.S. Code § 1538 subsection (a) ,(2) provides that: (2) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of plants listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to— ... (B) remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law; Digging up a member (or members) of an endangered plant species during a legitimate criminal investigation as part of a focused search for evidence would not be to "maliciously damage or destroy" them, nor would it be in "knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State". This notion (that evidence is safe if buried under endangered plants) misunderstands what is prohibited by the law.
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This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.
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"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
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The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.
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Is O'Reilly Media engaging in false advertising? Background: I own copies of several fairly expensive paper books published by O'Reilly Media. One of my primary reasons for buying these books instead of alternatives from competing publishers, was that inside the book, the following offer is advertised:* Get even more for your money Join the O'Reilly Community, and register the O'Reilly books you own. It's free, and you'll get: $4.99 ebook upgrade offer 40% upgrade offer on O'Reilly print books Membership discounts on books and events Free lifetime updates to ebooks and videos Multiple ebook formats, DRM FREE Participation in the O'Reilly community Newsletters Account management 100% Satisfaction Guarantee Signing up is easy: Go to: oreilly.com/go/register Create an O'Reilly login. Provide your address. Register your books. Note: English-language books only (An image of the same page, as it appeared in a different O'Reilly book from 2015, is shown below.) This gave me to understand that by buying the books, I was also buying the right to redeem this offer. I attempted, a few days ago, to take advantage of the "$4.99 ebook upgrade offer" for a couple of O'Reilly books of which I have paper copies. I have performed the steps above, except for the last one, because I could not find any option to register the books. Because of this difficulty, I contacted O'Reilly, who said, to my considerable surprise: Thanks for reaching out. We've recently discontinued the "Register Print Books" feature on the website, as well as the "$4.99 Ebook upgrade" deal tied with it. This feature was disabled because we've shuttered our online store and are no longer offering the direct sale of ebooks or print books. To me, this seems unacceptable, because: the offer has no expiry date; and O'Reilly appears to be a "going concern", so is presumably obliged to fulfil the written offers it has made to its customers; and books advertising the offer are still being widely sold in bookstores (new, not second-hand), so even today, customers could still be buying books on the basis of the offer. My question: Under English or US law, and given the above facts, is O'Reilly engaging in false advertising? Update: Image of a page showing the offer: * This wording is taken from an O'Reilly book published in 2015. Books from other years might have marginally different wording, but for all the books I have checked so far, the offer was essentially the same.
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No (in almost all U.S. jurisdictions). Truth or falsity is evaluated when a statement is originally made and doesn't have to remain true forever. Also, generally the law treats an ad like that as an invitation for you to make any offer to them, not a binding offer to form a contract that is held open indefinitely. So you can't force them into a contract simply by accepting their offer. The default rule is that an ad is an invitation to make an offer rather than an offer that can be accepted. And, even if it really is an offer, when it does not state any termination date, the default rule is that it can be withdrawn at any time.
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This sounds a bit far-fetched. There are laws against circumventing copy protection measures (DRM) but not against aimbotting (to the best of my knowledge). Thus, you cannot reasonably believe that a click-assist functionality would be used to break laws. It could definitely be used to break private contracts such as an EULA, but you are not a party to that contract and are not bound by its terms. Of course, when you use such click-assist tech in an online game, you might be breaking your contract with the game vendor or server provider. But this doesn't imply that a click-assist would be forbidden outside of that context. Note that assistive technologies sometimes have exceptions from laws, e.g. a permission to circumvent DRM if necessary for accessibility. In the US, the Librarian of Congress adopts exceptions for a duration of three years. While none of the current exceptions match your specific scenario involving video-games, it can be permissible to break DRM on e-books or videos for certain accessibility enhancements.
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It should not surprise you that copyright protects the right to (among other things) make copies. There are limited exceptions that are considered "fair use", like if you reproduce a limited amount of text for educational, reporting, or review purposes. Giving your friend a copy of a large portion of the text just because they want it would almost certainly violate copyright. Whether the book is available or out-of-print has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on who holds the copyright or whether your actions violate it. This is very different from giving your friend the book itself. The book itself is covered under the "first sale doctrine", meaning that by buying a copy of the book, you buy the right to sell, transfer, or dispose of that particular copy, but it doesn't give you the right to make more copies. I will note that in practice, it is vanishingly unlikely that the copyright holder would ever learn of your isolated instance of limited infringement in the first place (especially since it's out of print), much less bring legal action against you for making a single copy that did not affect their bottom line.
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Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion.
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Under U.S. law, this is only actionable is you make this statement knowing that it would not "support the continued creation of X" and that instead, you had already completely abandoned that product and you were, for example, planning to change lines of work and become a lumberjack instead. Even in that case, common law fraud is hard to show, because you would need to show how that statement which related to how the profits will be used, rather than what you are actually receiving, could cause you damages in that narrow transaction. But, many states have deceptive trade practices acts that protect consumers by allowing the attorney general, local prosecutor, or a private individual or class of plaintiffs to sue if representations such as these are made when they are known to be false. Typically, these lawsuits provide for minimum statutory damages, attorneys' fees award, and when cases are brought by a public official, injunctive relief (ordering the advertising with that pitch to cease) are authorized. For example, saying this when it is false would be actionable in California and Colorado. A fairly common fact pattern is that someone will sell stuff at an above market price saying that "profits will help me pay for my cancer treatments" when in fact the person doesn't have cancer. This could even constitute criminal wire and mail fraud, for example. Sometimes, competitors can also sue you under the Lanham Act (which primarily governs federal trademarks), for false advertising about something that could unfairly undermine their sales if what you are saying isn't true and is causing their sales to drop. On the other hand, if you sincerely believe that what you are saying is true when you say it, and your belief is not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could believe that under the circumstances, then what you are saying is legal. Usually this is true, and if it is, ultimately, you will be fine. Although nothing can prevent you from being sued on a non-meritorious basis. In between are cases where this is true (you will be supported, but perhaps only get 5% of the profits while the rest are garnished for a lawsuit), but your statements were still misleading at the time you made them and you knew it. Those cases get resolved on a case by case basis. Outside U.S. law, your mileage may vary. Legal regulation of commercial speech varies significantly from one country to another. These statements might not be O.K. for example in a Communist regime on the Chinese or Korean model.
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In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.
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You are not supposed to "explain" anything. See this site: http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/responding-dmca-takedown-notice-targeting-your-content What you have to do is to state, under penalty of perjury, that you have a good faith belief that your material was wrongly removed. That's it. Nothing more, nothing less. Google (or whoever the host is) doesn't care and shouldn't care about the actual copyright situation, only whether you supplied a counter notice where you state that your material was wrongly removed. Now Google should reinstate your app (however, since nobody can force them to host your app at all, I suspect they can remove it at any time for any reason), and whoever put in the DMCA claim can then go and sue you for copyright infringement. If they do, you can use as a defence that they could have and should have a DMCA notice to you. The whole DMCA is about your host, here: Google, to remove itself from any copyright infringement case. By following the rules for a proper notice and proper counter notice, they achieve that. And then the matter is between the complainant and you.
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Hosting copyrighted material on your servers is probably a bad idea, but software that changes how such material is displayed is likely fine – and there already are tools doing similar things. For example, the news publisher Axel Springer sued adblocker maker Eyeo for copyright infringement in Germany in 2021, since the adblocker manipulates the contents of a web page. This was rejected by the court. (See summary by The Register which also provides US context, summary by Eyeo, actual ruling (in German)). Core argument in that case was that adblockers do not distribute protected works, and do not create derivate works of the website. They merely change how the website is interpreted by a browser. However, the details here are dependent on German copyright law and on the specific capabilities used by adblockers – it might not generalize to other scenarios. Some browsers (e.g. Safari, Firefox) offer a reading mode that strips out all website contents except the main content, and then displays it in a more legible fashion. This strips out all navigation, sidebars, ads, and so on. So far, I don't think this kind of functionality has been challenged. This existing reading mode sounds quite similar to the reformatting tool you're envisaging. There are similar tools available in many programming languages, such as the Arc90 readability project (software, archived website), which is in turn inspired by the Instapaper app. Read-it-later apps like Instapaper and Pocket do involve a bit of a grey zone though, since they involve server-side storage of articles.
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Who would declare a law unconstitutional if the Supreme Court couldn't? Let's say the US Congress is passing a law. They are afraid that it would be declared unconstitutional in court, so they add an addendum saying "It is illegal for the Supreme Court to try this particular law in court." Now, the law is obviously unconstitutional, since the Supreme Court has a constitutional power to try any law in court. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. But if the Supreme Court can't try the law, it can by definition never get declared unconstitutional by them. My question is, who could then? Is there a check/balance in place that would allow that would allow the law to get declared unconstitutional?
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Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact.
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There has never been a right to appeal directly, or discretionarily form a state trial court to SCOTUS. But, one can apply for a common law writ in SCOTUS with respect to a state trial court actions under the All Writs Act which is functionally an appeal, even though it is technically an original SCOTUS proceeding. But, original SCOTUS writs are extremely rare and I don't know if it has ever been used in the manner you describe. If so, it probably happened before the intermediate federal courts of appeal were created in the late 1800s. It isn't easy to do a search of cases to determine the answer. UPDATE WITH CORRECTION: After further consideration, I think that I have a better idea of what the question was getting at and want to elaborate on that. Most state courts (Utah, Texas and Oklahoma are exceptions to the general rule[1]), have either an intermediate court of appeal and then a state supreme court (sometimes given a different name such as "Court of Appeals" in New York State, in which the Supreme Court is the name of the trial court of general jurisdiction and the intermediate appeals court), or only a state supreme court from which appeals lie directly to the state supreme court. [1] In Utah there is an appeal of right in every civil case to the state supreme court and the intermediate court of appeals considers cases that it "kicks down" to the court of appeals rather than dealing with itself. In Texas and Oklahoma, there is a Court of Criminal Appeals in addition to the State Supreme Court, which operates much like a Supreme Court in criminal cases with the state supreme court that is nominally superior only rarely intervening in criminal cases (I don't know when precisely it can intervene in those states). In every state with an intermediate appeals court, there is an appeal of right to an intermediate appeals court which must be considered on the merits, and then a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court. Sometimes in these states there are a handful of exceptions. For example, in Colorado, there is a direct appeal of right to the state supreme court in death penalty and water law cases, and in municipal court and limited jurisdiction court cases (i.e. cases in courts limited to $25,000 in controversy or less), there is an appeal of right to what would usually be the general jurisdiction trial court and then a discretionary appeal from there to the state supreme court). But, there is still almost always one court to which there is a direct appeal of right. There are a small but non-negligible number of cases where what is usually a general jurisdiction trial court serves as an intermediate court of appeals of right for a lower trial court (e.g. a small claims court or municipal court), with appeal from there only in the discretion of the state supreme court. Those cases can and very rarely (but sometimes) do go on to be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court when a state supreme court denies discretionary review (in addition to being rare, few such cases are significant enough to justify the effort on the part of the parties to do so and are considered significant by the U.S. Supreme Court too), just as they would when an intermediate court of appeals rules and a state supreme court denies certiorari at the state level. But, in that case, the direct appeal still isn't a direct appeal of a "court of first instance" (i.e. a court where the original trial on the merits is held). But, there is no constitutional right to a direct appeal of right (there is only a constitutional right to a collateral attack via habeas corpus in criminal cases resulting in incarceration). The right to a direct appeal in state courts is a product of state law and state constitutions (in the federal courts it is a consequence of federal statutes). In some states without an intermediate court of appeals, there is also an appeal of right to the state supreme court. But, in other states without an intermediate court of appeals, appeals to the state supreme court are discretionary (much like appeals to the state supreme court from an intermediate appellate court and appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court). Thus, if you are in a state in which there is only a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court, and the state supreme court declines to consider your appeal on the merits, you can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court once the state supreme court has declined your state level petition for certiorari. The actual pre-requisite at the state level in a direct appeal is that your state direct appellate options be exhausted. So, if you are in a state without intermediate courts of appeal in which the state supreme court reviews trial court decisions on only a discretionary basis, then you can make a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court if you have sought review on direct appeal in the state supreme court and it declined to grant certiorari to review your case on the merits. In practice, this is still very rare. States without intermediate appellate courts are universally small in population and hence have small case loads. Most states with only a single supreme court still have at least one direct appeal of right and have had that right for most of their history. And, state supreme courts usually do exercise their certiorari power in cases that are worthy of discretionary consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court. But, in this narrow situation, the U.S. Supreme Court may consider a trial court decision on a direct appeal, without it ever having been considered on the merits at the state level. This happens rarely (although the U.S. Supreme Court not infrequently, i.e. perhaps a couple of times a year, considers a case upon which there has been an intermediate direct appeal and a state supreme court has refused discretionary review), but it has almost certainly happened sometime. It is hard to devise a legal research search that would locate such a case, however, and strictly speaking, the denial of certiorari can be seen as a state supreme court ruling that is required in almost every case.
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Public Law ##-### is a reference to a slip law -- an actual bill, as passed by Congress and signed (or vetoed, if the veto was overridden) by the President. The first number is the number of the Congress that passed it, the second the number of the law in that Congress. (the "Public" is in contrast with private bills, which are things like "XYZ person, who is otherwise ineligible for citizenship, is a citizen" -- things that affect basically one person). The US Statutes at Large are a compilation of slip laws (both public and private). Each volume has all the slip laws from a session of Congress, at least these days (I'm not sure how it interacts with the first few Congresses before the Statutes at Large existed). Laws there are still often called PL such-and-such, because that just means "law as enacted." If that doesn't line up exactly with the enrolled bill as passed and signed, something has gone wrong that really shouldn't go wrong. If this happens, someone is getting fired. The slip law and Statutes at Large are both official, pretty much irrefutable evidence of any laws of the United States. Laws are passed by Congress, and they contain exactly what was passed. Logical. However, while they're logical, they're also a terrible research tool. If you want to find the law from them, you need to scan through every federal law ever passed. They aren't organized in any way having to do with topic. But there is another way: instead of just saying "everything the legislature has done is the law," you can rearrange those laws by topic and update them as the legislature does things. This is not easy: the legislature is passing things organized by what they're trying to do, and you need to put it all in an order that's based on what the laws actually regulate. There's a lot of editorial judgment involved. But it makes a better research tool to see what the law is. The US Code is the second attempt at that (the first attempt failed). It's made by the House of Representatives Office of Law Revision Counsel, and does not inherently form part of US law. By default, it's merely strong evidence for what US law is; it is not conclusive, and the Statutes at Large takes precedence. This is because codification is hard. However, some titles of the US Code have gone further: the House OLRC cleaned them up and Congress enacted them into law. With the titles where this happened, Congress then passes all laws about them with direct reference to sections of the US Code, the OLRC can't move things around by themselves. The title itself becomes US law. With these titles, the US Code is just like the Statutes at Large: it's identical to the law as passed, and if not then heads will roll. Also, in such cases, the US Code becomes just as official evidence as the Statutes at Large.
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Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS.
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While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.
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This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
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Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
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Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.
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What is the extent of legal power of a USA Congressional inquiry? When a US Senator or Congressperson poses a question to a private company about some behavior or action of the company, does that carry any legal weight? In other words, is the company required to answer? if the result is "bad" (however that is defined), can the Senator or Congressperson impose any penalty? Is it all just "showboating" on the part of the politician?
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When a US Senator or Congressperson poses a question to a private company about some behavior or action of the company, does that carry any legal weight? In other words, (a) is the company required to answer? and (b) if the result is "bad" (however that is defined), can the Senator or Congressperson impose any penalty. Is it all just "showboating" on the part of the politician? Individual members of Congress cannot compel a company to testify, although a failure to respond might result in legislation being adopted in a way contrary to the preferences of the person being asked, while a response might influence legislation in a manner that the person being asked likes. Congressional committees have subpoena power which if disregarded may be enforced in federal district courts on pain of the non-responsive person being held in contempt of court, which is essentially equivalent to the power of a court to subpoena someone's testimony.
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No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid.
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The veto aspect of the scenario is a red herring. All bills not passed into law by the end of a Congress die (subject to a small 10-day window for approval by a President). This is a frequently asked question at the Library of Congress: If a bill from any Congress does not become law during the Congress in which it is introduced, it is considered “dead.” For a “dead” bill to be enacted in a new Congress, it would have to be reintroduced with a new number and begin anew its journey through the legislative process. This is because when Americans elect a Congress, "[t]hey are electing a particular Congress, which lasts two years. So through 2013 and 2014, the 113th U.S. Congress has been making laws. For 2015 and 2016, the 114th U.S. Congress will be in office. ... When one Congress expires, all the pending legislation goes with it" (The Congressional Institute). "The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect before the adjournment of Congress" (H. R. Report No. 108, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1864, as quoted in Edwards, below). There is only one exception, discussed in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). It was held that even if a Congress has adjourned at the end of that Congress's term, the President still has the full ten days to approve a bill presented from that former Congress.
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Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.
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The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime.
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The FCC Commissioner is appointed, per 47 USC 154, by POTUS, subject to approval by the US Senate (as a member of the Commission). Thereafter he serves for 5 years. However Article 2 of the Constitution allows removal from office: The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors. But only the House of Representatives can impeach and only the Senate can remove (of the President declines to do so). There is no provision for a citizen to sue to remove a civil officer. It is, of course, legal for citizens and others to lobby politically for whatever action that want Congress to take. "Net Neutrality" rules can be more permanently fixed by act of Congress. By act of Congress, the FCC may be required to, allowed to, or prohibited from setting some set of rules. Such laws are typically broad and leave a lot of discretion to the executive branch. Congress has not passed a law mandating "net neutrality", and as ruled in Comcast v. FCC the FCC lacks "ancillary jurisdiction" over internet services of at least Comcast. There have been previous attempts to legislate "net neutrality", such as the Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006 which died on the floor of the House, which purported to guarantee "net neutrality" via an extension of antitrust law. However, the only way to make such a provision permanent is to make it be a Constitutional Amendment, since an act of Congress can be repealed or amended in such a way that it effectively doesn't exist.
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No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.
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As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth.
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Question about Freedom of Religion in Kentucky’s State Constitution The Bill of Rights, Section 5, of Kentucky’s Constitution says: ”and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall be taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.” I personally and sincerely believe when my particular God says: ”Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat.” Genesis 1:29 ...that means I have the God-given right to grow and consume any plant that I wish (ex. Cannabis). Is this true, or is growing and consuming plants not considered a human right?
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If you want to sue them, you should start with the US Constitution (as a model), in particular the Free Exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The question is whether one could overturn homicide statutes on the grounds that an individual holds to traditional beliefs that a human sacrifice is required every few months. Or, is it an unconstitutional prohibition of the Mormon belief in polygamy to outlaw polygamy, see Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145. The court held that the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Observe that a religious exception to the law would be unconstitutional, as establishing religion as a means of gaining extra rights. The reductio ad absurdum of the unfettered religious-belief excuse is: Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. The "wall of separation" was modified more recently in the 60's and 70's. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the issue was compulsory education imposed on Amish children, where higher education was held to be antithetical to the Amish doctrine of a simple life. The court rules that The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children and especially it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish There were additional holdings pertaining to the legitimacy of the purported belief (that is, is there really such a doctrine – clearly yes). You might have better luck purporting to be a Rastafarian or Hindu, so I will set aside that complication. The core question will be whether the government has a "compelling interest" in the restriction, also whether the restriction is narrowly tailored. In the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, Sherbert's employer required her to work 6 days a week (a change in policy during her time of employment), which she refused to do (as a member of SDA) and was fired. Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because the firing was for cause. The court ruled that Disqualification of appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion. and There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute which justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 brings us to the neighborhood that you are interested in living in. The relevant detail is that Smith (and Black) were fired for ingesting peyote in connection with a ceremony at a Native American church. The court ruled that The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use To be more precise, Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. We can contrast this with Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. The city of Hialeh passed an ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice, specifically to suppress the Santeria church. The Supreme Court said, no, you may not do that: Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied ... The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice. At least so far, restrictions on drug use have not been overruled as conflicting the the Free Exercise clause, although if e.g. Washington state were to prohibit Mormons from purchasing marijuana (where others can), that would surely be struck down as unconstitutional. There are a number of other relevant developments, for example Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, in reaction to Employment v. Smith, and that law statutorily mandating that strict scrutiny be applied to the question of whether a law violates the 1st: but this was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Then in Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (Schedule 1 tea for religious purposes), the court ruled that The courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca which is to say, we have a case where the federal government was prohibited from enforcing a drug prohibition involving religion. A challenge of the type which you have in mind will surely also involve the question of the legitimacy of the purported religion, where UDV was founded in 1961 whereas one might suspect that your claimed religion is a pretext to smoke pot (hence the Rastafarian suggestion). The WWII era conscious objector cases held that the CO exception to military service is not limited to governmentally-approved religions, but as a general rule, the courts have not ruled that you can simply claim to have a religious belief which is being infringed on and thereby be excempt from the law. The basic issue would be whether either the US government of the state of Kentucky have a compelling interest in preventing the use of marijuana. The Kentucky Supreme Court does indeed recognize the concept of "strict scrutiny", so the case is not doomed from the start.
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Contact the local affiliate of the ACLU: Affiliates | American Civil Liberties Union. They have a long history of protecting schools and public institutions from religious influences. They will be able to determine the legality of the displays in the school and if the subject of the presentation by the speaker is legally problematic, and will know the correct approach to the school board and school district and their legal representatives. See Religion and Public Schools | American Civil Liberties Union: Dating back to the Bible Riots of the mid-1800s, the role of religion in public schools has been one of the most hotly disputed—and most frequently misunderstood—religious freedom issues in America. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has long made clear that the Constitution prohibits public school-sponsored prayer or religious indoctrination, violations remain rampant in many parts of the country. The ACLU can protect your identity. Or, use a throwaway email from Yahoo or similar service, or use *67 to block caller ID when phoning. If for some reason the ACLU finds little they can legally do, and if your local newspaper(s) or TV station(s) are not politically conservative, contact them and see if they want to cover the situation.
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There is some precedent for claiming a right to free scientific inquiry. For example, the primary holding of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 is that "Speech that is obscene and thus lacking First Amendment protection must be without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" (note the omission of commercial speech). In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, the court overturned a law banning teaching children foreign languages, finding that such a law "invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment", and observing While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 the court finds that the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 319 U. S. 143) and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 344 U. S. 195) -- indeed, the freedom of the entire university community. In Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, the court found unconstitutional an Indiana law that would have outlawed research done at the Kinsey Institute at IU (that would have been a later consequence of the law, not the instant matter), stating that "This chilling effect on the research, development and exchange of scholarly ideas is repugnant to the First Amendment", and the state has unconstitutionally intruded itself into two areas of protected activity. The first protected area is the right of scholars to do research and advance the state of man's knowledge. This is the freedom of inquiry referred to in Griswold v. Connecticut Then in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, the court glancingly groups academic research with other forms of First Amendment protected activities: Freedom of the press is a "fundamental personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Article 25 of the California constitution recognizes a specific research right There is hereby established a right to conduct stem cell research which includes research involving adult stem cells, cord blood stem cells, pluripotent stem cells, and/or progenitor cells. However, there have also been (failed) attempts at the federal level to prohibit such research. More generally, one might look into rulings on acts which are preludes to any form of expression, such as buying paper and ink, acquiring a printing press, hiring reporters, and investigations of events by reporters – it is unlikely that the courts would uphold a law that outlaws reporters investigating crimes or political situations because that is not yet "expression". Indeed, "freedom of the press" does not just refer to the act of disseminating ideas and information. But a definitive court ruling has not been made.
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This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
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In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17).
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There are a number of specific limitation on what can be made criminal in US law, derived from constitutional protection. Specific Rights Expressions of free speech, for example, cannot be made criminal, although there can be laws which regulate or impact speech to a degree. Similarly, the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits a law requiring people to attend a particular church, and he free Exercise clause prohibits any criminal penalties for any religious practice or lack of practice. Most of the other provisions of the Bill of right would impose similar limitations. The legislature cannot criminalize what people have a constitutional right to do. Thre are also specific limitations not in the bill of rights, such as the prohibition of Ex Post Facto laws, the right to trial by jury, and the constitutional limitation of Treason laws. Rational Basis Beyond that the Due Process clause of the 5th and the parallel clause of the 14th impose limits on criminal law generally. Criminal laws must have (at least) a rational basis. The legislature cannot just prohibit picking up papers because they felt like it, they must have articulated a problem and a plausible reason why a given law would address it. If they don't the law may be overturned as unconstitutional. If a law is challenged as being unconstitutional, it will currently either be subject to rational basis analysis, or to one of the stricter levels. However a law which cannot pass rational basis analysis will not survive intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny either. Laws which appear to invade one of the enumerated rights, or a right that the Court has deemed "fundamental" are normally tested under either strict or intermediate scrutiny. According to the the Wikipedia article: Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is "rationally related" to a "legitimate" government interest, whether real or hypothetical. The higher levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. ... laws implicating unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has not recognized as fundamental receive rational basis review. ... In modern constitutional law, the rational basis test is applied to constitutional challenges of both federal law and state law (via the Fourteenth Amendment). This test also applies to both legislative and executive action whether those actions be of a substantive or procedural nature. The rational basis test prohibits the government from imposing restrictions on liberty that are irrational or arbitrary, or drawing distinctions between persons in a manner that serves no constitutionally legitimate end. ... A court applying rational basis review will virtually always uphold a challenged law unless every conceivable justification for it is a grossly illogical non sequitur. (See Killian, Johnny H., George A. Costello, & Kenneth R. Thomas, co-eds., The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Senate Document No. 108-17, 108th Congress, 2d Session) and specifically Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) at 635) Rational Basis analysis became accepted after the demise of "substantive Due Process", mostly in a civil, rather than criminal context. A version of it was suggested in Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in the dissent by Justice Holmes. It was adopted as governing in [*Nebbia v. New York * In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528 (1973) The Court overturned, on a rational basis scrutiny, a law excluding households consisting of unrelated people from the Federal Food Stamp program, writing: [A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. Specific cases In Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) a law that criminalized the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was overturned on a rational basis review. Similar cases are now generally treated with intermediate scrutiny. In James v. Strange 407 U.S. 128 (1972). a Kansas law reclaiming payments for public defenders was overturens on rational basis review as “an impermissible burden on the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright." In Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rational basis analysis was employed to sustain a statute criminalizing homosexual activity. However, this was later overturned.. Vagueness Also under Due Process, vague laws are prohibited. If a reasonable person cannot tell from the law what is or is not illegal, the law can be overturned for vagueness. Procedural protections Then there are procedural limits, also largely derived from the Due Process clause(s). A law cannot automatically convict people without a genuine hearing, in which a person can present a defense to an independent, impartial judge or jury. A law cannot impose duties which are flatly impossible to perform. A law cannot impose punishments which are considered unreasonable for the seriousness of the crime (as evaluated by judges). Other Limits There are other limits as well, it would take a book to list them all in detail. But those are some of the more frequently applied ones.
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Hair is not personally property until it is removed from your body, it is just part of your body, just like your nose or your femur. After it is removed from your body, it is the property of the person it used to be attached to, although it is frequently promptly abandoned to a trash bin or the floor of a hair cutter. A married woman in Michigan is not now required to have her husband's permission to cut her hair (unless the husband has been declared her legal guardian for extraordinary cause due to something like dementia by a court with ample due process protections, in theory, anyway). This wasn't true even in 1850 and hasn't been true at any time since then. It may never have been true in Michigan while it was a part of the United States of America, although the state of territorial law under the Northwest Ordinance was not necessarily easy to determine with certainty. Almost certainly, there was never a statute to that effect on the books in Michigan or any preceding U.S. territory. The 1850 Constitution recognized the right of a married woman to have separate property that was not marital property (not unlike the law of community property states and countries at the time and not unlike states like Colorado). The 1855 statute, a 1911 statute not linked above, and the 1981 statute essentially put married women on equal footing with single adult women in terms of property ownership and legal status, with the 1981 statute basically just re-codifying the 1855 and 1911 statutes in more modern language. These legal authorities did so in order to abolish the common law doctrine that upon marriage, a husband and wife become one legal person who acts legally though the husband, called the merger doctrine a.k.a. coverture. Historical background for this wave of statutes can be found here. Justice Kennedy reviewed the history of this law in his 2015 opinion legalizing same sex marriage nationwide in the United States. One U.S. state was outside the common law tradition and a laggard, but it wasn't Michigan: In 1979, Louisiana became the last of the states of the U.S. to have its Head and Master law struck down. An appeal made it to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1980, and in the following year the high court's decision in Kirchberg v. Feenstra effectively declared the practice of male-rule in marriage unconstitutional, generally favoring instead a co-administration model. While these statutes are not directly applicable to the question, they do, more generally, disavow a legal worldview in which one could imagine that a woman would require a man's permission to cut her hair, although this is almost surely just an urban myth. Pre-1850, the government in Michigan, which was basically on the frontier at the time, was just too weak to maintain that kind of control over people.
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As cited by @xuhdev, discrimination on the basis of marital status is prohibited in Colorado. And, even though age is not on the list, the couple could claim that you discriminate them based on their marital status, whether current or would-be, and whether related to their age or not. Note that the reason why you discriminate is irrelevant: whether you do it by calling on your religious freedom or without giving any reasons at all does not make any difference. Holding religious beliefs is by no means a lawful excuse for discrimination, no matter how deeply they are held.
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How can one prove that a contract was signed by force? I posted another question recently relating to the same person but I didn't want to include two questions in the same post. My father is an extremely abusive person and has been physically, mentally, and emotionally abusive throughout my life. When I was in college, he came to my apartment and forced me to sign a "contract" in which I would be forced to pay him $30000. This contract was essentially me writing out "I promise to pay $30000" with my signature at the bottom. I told him numerous times I did not want to sign anything without a lawyer present, and he threatened to hit me if I did not sign it. I even tried telling him I would sign it if it included that he never contact me after college, but he cornered me and raised his fist up in an attempt to punch me. That was 2 years ago, and he still has the contract and threatens to use it if I don't listen to him. Is there any way I can prove to someone that I was essentially forced to sign this contract, assuming he did try to use it?
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If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.
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A deed executed during life trumps a will. The other siblings would have to argue: Your mom did not have the capacity to execute the deed (which is a very low standard in terms of her capacity). The deed was procured from undue influence from you (which requires them to meet a high bar of proof). The deed was really the implementation of an agreement for you to hold the property in trust for everyone (which requires some affirmative evidence of this intent).
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I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.
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No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child.
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So you entered a contract that was a bad deal. The law says: tough People are legally allowed to make bad deals. The law will hold you to the bad deal you made. If it only worked for good deals, no one would ever use the law because you don’t want to break a good deal. Providing it has all the required elements of a contract, it will be enforceable. Put up with him or pay him out.
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There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute.
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What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will? A will has no effect or validity until it is admitted to probate. You can't do anything with a will outside a probate proceeding. Usually state law requires that a will that is in someone's possession be lodged with the court, whether or not they plan on opening up a probate estate, but this requirement is widely ignored. Unlike a will, a trust can be administered without court supervision, without being admitted to probate, although usually, the trust is required to file a notice of its existence with the court if it has become irrevocable (a requirement that is also widely ignored). The trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about it. Again, sometimes the notice to the beneficiaries is overlooked. Also, it wouldn't be unusual for someone to inaccurately say that a will provided that a certain thing happen, when, in fact, that was a provision in a trust. People are sloppy in ordinary conversation about the distinctions between wills and trusts. If a trust was drafted to avoid probate, the will is probably just a "pour over will" which states that if there is any property that is not in the trust as her death that it is hereby transferred to the trust. Normally, a person would not have both a trust designed to avoid probate and a will with substantive provisions at the same time. If you suspect that you know who the trustee is, the first step would be to write a formal letter that you can prove was sent and received (e.g. via certified mail or FedEx), asking if there is a trust, and if there is one, if you are a beneficiary of that trust, and asking for the trust agreement (or at least the parts of it pertinent to you status as beneficiary). If the person that you suspect is trustee is a trustee, he has a legal duty to let you know these things (which doesn't mean that he necessarily will do so). If you fail to receive cooperation or a response after this initial inquiry, you may need to hire counsel to attempt to obtain this information through the courts.
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A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end.
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(How) Can Person A grant immunity to Person B for ending Person A's life? In the US, some states are "death with dignity" states. In such a state, suppose resident A wants to die earlier than allowed by that state law, and perhaps even before A becomes terminally ill. Even more generally, suppose A gives person B the right to end A's life at any point in time. A wants to ensure that B is not prosecuted or even investigated for ending A's life, even if there is suspicion of wrong-doing or negligence or malpractice. Is there a procedure by which A can grant immunity (if that is the correct word) to B for this? If specifics are needed, let's say the state is Oregon. Edit: If the answer is 'no', then without asking another person to face murder charges, how does a person prearrange to die when they are no longer physically or cognitively capable of suicide?
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No. This is not possible. You cannot give consent to homicide, and only the state can provide immunity from prosecution. Consent is not a "justification" or "excuse" under Oregon law, as those terms are defined in its penal code (there is nothing even remotely close in the definition of the relevant terms). Assisting suicide under Oregon law is, however, a situation which can reduce a homicide offense from murder to manslaughter: ORS 163.117 (2015) Causing or aiding suicide as defense to charge of murder It is a defense to a charge of murder that the defendant’s conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter or any other crime.
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A child is not property, therefore a (deceased) parent cannot transfer ownership. In case the sole custodial parent dies, the court will appoint a guardian for a minor child, and will take into consideration the wishes of the deceased parent, however their primary duty is to protect the interest of the child. It follows from this that objections to nomination of Smith as guardian are more easily sustained, since the requirements for being a guardian (e.g. in Washington) are stricter than the requirements for receiving $100,000. RCW 11.130.090 excludes any guardian who has been "convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, neglect, or use of physical force or other crime relevant to the functions the individual would assume as guardian", but such a person is not barred from inheriting property. There are limited formal grounds for contesting a will: testator mentally incompetence, formal failure of the document, (the laws surrounding signatures and witnesses), no clear indication that the document is intended to be a will, forgery or fraud, undue influence (such as a gun to the head), or mistake (for example, mistakenly believing that their child was dead therefore leaving it all to a neighbor). So it is possible, but not so easy, to contest a will. Organ donation takes place under separate laws: you can't wait for the probate process to get finished in three months before donating organs.
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The closest the Supreme Court has gotten to criminal liability for official acts seems to be Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). There it addressed civil liability and held that the U.S. President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." It's unclear how the Justices would decide criminal liability for official acts. (Though some might argue that non-precedential logic in Fitzgerald suggests the Court could extend immunity to the criminal context as well.) As to homicide, murder and manslaughter are federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112. The latter involves the commission "of a lawful act which might produce death" "without due caution and circumspection."
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usukaustralia Yes, this can be charged as a type of negligent homicide, involuntary manslaughter. The degree of culpability might be greater than negligence, since the initial act was a premeditated crime. There is no intent to kill The act is criminal and malicious The consequences are reasonably foreseeable The offense would be a type of constructive manslaughter, where a crime not intended to kill or cause bodily harm results in death. In the UK this is also known as an unlawful act manslaughter. The perpetrator of a premeditated crime is held responsible not only for the intended consequences, but also for foreseeable incidental ones, albeit at a reduced degree of culpability. This doctrine is established in both civil and common law, and will apply in broadly similar ways, with different local names, usually variations on unintended homicide, in most civil law jurisdictions as well. us Medical or fire-fighting equipment being among the stolen items is, in many jurisdictions, by itself sufficient to raise the charge to grand theft, which is a felony in common law. If Bob actually specializes in this, and a death did occur, the prosecution might charge them with second-degree felony murder, if applicable in their state. That rule is generally applied when the base offense presents danger to human life, but there have been cases that stretch it. Burglary is sufficient to apply this rule. Such a charge is less certain to stand up in court and is usually traded down in a plea bargain.
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X can be convicted of murder in all jurisdiction in the United States (and probably the other common law jurisdictions). The issue here is two-fold. Contracts that involve illegal actions are not enforceable. In fact, the contract killing example you gave is a classic illegal agreement/contract. See the Wikipedia articles on illegal agreements and contract killings. Most criminal prosecutions involving bodily injury or death proceed regardless of the victim's wishes. This is because the prosecution represents the State's interests and can prosecute a case where the victims want it dismissed. Consider and example where the "battered spouse" doesn't want to testify against his/her abuser. The prosecution can still bring changes where the victim is not cooperative. It just makes proving their case more difficult. Check out this article from the DOJ that discusses how victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement or other prosecutorial decisions. http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6439-input-into-plea-agreement One could make an argument that the affirmative defense of consent could apply; however, most states have consent statutes like Colorado's that would not apply to murder. See C.R.S. § 18-1-505(2), which states: When conduct is charged is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. This statutes basically says consent doesn't apply where someone received serious bodily injury (murder would meet this standard), unless they are in a lawful athletic sport, such as boxing.
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Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what.
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There is no prospect for equitable relief in such an outcome. The Texas state government enjoys sovereign immunity, except as specified under the Tort Claims Act. Under that law, immunity is waived only in the case of damage caused by negligence of a state employee, and is limited primarily to vehicle accidents and physical injuries. So the state cannot be sued for passing a law found to be unconstitutional. An individual would not enjoy such immunity, but given the law, there is no identifiable defendant to seek relief from (everybody is a potential defendant). An former abortion provider who now declines to perform an abortion can't be sued, because doctors in general have no obligation to perform particular medical procedures (most doctors in Texas won't perform an abortion, even before SB8), and the course will not render a judgment against a doctor on the grounds that they obeyed an existing law but should have known that it would be found unconstitutional.
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This effectively comes under duty of care. Firstly, in England and Wales there is no obligation to be a Good Samaritan - in other words, there is no obligation to be a rescuer. Until you intervene to try and rescue someone, you do not owe that person a duty. As soon as you do intervene, however, you do owe them a duty. Specifically, you owe them a duty not to make the situation worse (Horsey and Rackley, Tort Law, 3rd ed., OUP 2013, p. 75). The specific situation Horsey and Rackley give is that of resuscitating a drowning child and breaking a rib as you do so: this may be 'making the situation worse' (Horsey and Rackley, pp. 75-76). Does this mean that you'll be liable if you give someone first aid and in doing so, you make the situation worse? Not necessarily, because, as Horsey and Rackley point out, duty is different to liability. Using the drowning child example again, they state: So, for example, while someone who intervenes may owe a duty not to make the situation worse, their actions would still be judged against those of a 'reasonable person' in the circumstances (and so if a reasonable person would have tried to resuscitate the child in the same way, there will be no breach of their duty and therefore no liability to pay compensation.) (p.76) The 'reasonable person' standard corresponds to what you mentioned in the question about lack of expertise. If a doctor intervenes in such a situation, the standard of care they'd be expected to give would be higher than, say, for someone who's simply done a basic first aid course. The question is whether or not you've acted as the reasonable person in your situation would have done. On that basis, then, your tutor is pretty much correct: so long as you take such care as is reasonable based on your expertise, or lack thereof, then under English and Welsh law, you're unlikely to be liable.
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