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German Employment Law - Contractual penalties for not commencing a job I have signed a contract with a German company, and one of the clauses says that if I am unable to start working for them, in the case of intentionally resigning, then they would charge me one month of paid salary (5000 EUR). I didn't even work one day for them, and they only have my emails and physical address in Argentina, but they don't have anything else. I have signed the contract, but meanwhile I found another job, in Germany too. And I would like not to proceed with them. Do I really need to pay them one month of salary? Is this something legal to have in a contract? They have told me that if I don't pay, they will take legal steps. Here is the clause: "The employee shall pay a penalty for breaking the contract in the amount of the monthly salary, if he or she fails to take up the employment." I just want to follow the law. How should I proceed?	I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht".	UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good.	When I signed up over 5 years ago, I signed a contract agreeing to a specific service at a specific price and I was locked-in for 24 months, lest I be charged a penalty for early breach of contract As the original 24-month fixed term has expired long ago, the service provider is no longer obliged to provide the service at the original terms. They may terminate the contract at any time, and equally you are allowed to quit any time as well. The notice you have now got is essentially a termination notice combined with an offer for a new contract. You can accept it, or give them a counteroffer, or walk away to another ISP.	I see that most (all up to this point) answers and comments are made around if a verbal contract is binding enough for the employer to "pursue back" the extra payment that you received... but as far as I can see, they don't even need to consider the verbal agreement. Your employer thought (and apparently was right) that you were going to resign, so they offered you a payment raise in exchange for you to stay for two more years. You verbally agreed but this agreement was never written down nor signed by any of the parts, yet your employer respected it and for X amount of time you received more money that what your initial, written, signed contract says. Now you want to quit; as mentioned above, you only have your original contract, a contract that says two things that are key for this "dilemma": The Employee will be paid £9/hr in arrears. Salary may be increased at the direction of The Employer subject to The Employee taking on additional responsibility which is agreed upon by both parties. If the Employer makes an overpayment to the Employee to which she is not entitled, or which is more than that to which she is entitled, the Employer has the right to recover the overpayment by deductions from the Employee's salary or from other payments due to them. You received payments for £11/hr, which is more that that to which you're entitled according to this (one and only) contract; so, your employer has the right to claim back those £2/hr that, officially, you were not entitled to. IF you want to argue that, as the 1st point says, both parties agreed to increase your salary for "additional responsibilities", YOU would also have to admit that you agreed to stay for two more years, agreement that you are not complying to; so, once again, it's a point in favour for your employer. All in all, it all boils down to how your employeer "feels" when you present your resign letter; maybe they will just agree and let you go without further issues, but if they want to claim back that payment raise, IMO they have both the right AND the arguments to do so.	In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment.	You already have a contract(s): you do work and they pay you is pretty much all you need to have a contract. Given that there is already a contract, formalising it in writing does not expose you to any greater risk and usually, clearly defining the terms of a contract reduces risk all around.	You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee.	You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions.
Annoying neighbor abusing insurance claims My mom's neighborhood was effected by the California wildfires. Her house was untouched, but it destroyed the fence that stood between her backyard and the backyard of a neighbor. Insurance has already approved the construction of a replacement fence; however, the neighbor is refusing to sign off on the construction. The neighbor works in construction, and is claiming that he and his friends in the industry will replace the fence themselves. My mom suspects that he is trying to drag his feet until my mom pays the full price for the fence, so that he can pocket the insurance pay out that was designated for the fence. He pulled a similar scheme when my mom moved in the house, so that he did not have to contribute to paying for a fence between the two properties. What can we do to make him pay his half for the replacement fence? I have considered reporting him for insurance fraud.	This is a context where you need to lawyer up. There are two issues, his share of the costs, and his permission to construct in part on his property. You mother has the same rights, so she likewise can refuse to sign off on his scheme (the lawyers negotiate a resolution). Assuming both parties are insured and (to make it more complex) have different insurance companies, the companies limit how much they will contribute for their part of the damage. Normally, you find a contractor who will do it for a given price, let's say $10,000, and the parties split the cost. Both parties have an interest in the choice of contractor because of cost issues, and quality of product and service (though the insurance company cares about the cost). If one of the parties is a contractor, they too can legitimately submit a bid, and then the parties can decide which is the best bid. It is not fraud if a contractor, who is an insured, submits a bid and makes a profit on the job. It would be fraud if that party withheld material facts from an insurance company. In the context of massive disaster insurance claims, the insurance companies may not perform a rigorous investigation (e.g. may not ask for multiple bids). It would then be a material fact that one of the insureds stood to profit from this arrangement, so the insurance companies would likely wish to see evidence that the costs were not unreasonably inflated. If the neighbors bid is in line with industry standard (and the insurance companies know who the contractor is), there is nothing fishy about the arrangement. This assumes that both parties are being cooperative with each other. When that is not the case, lawyers are good at getting cooperation (not letting the other party push their client around).	Are you at fault for the fact that Car C read ended you? Close call. A jury could go either way. Can this accident which is now appearing on your insurance be disputed as Car A did not report anything? Essentially I'm just wondering what the odds are that this can removed from Car A's record. I think that it is unlikely that the situation you suggest would happen, even though anything is possible. Usually there needs to be a claim of actual damage for an insurance company to treat it as an accident. The usual rule is "no harm, no foul" (unless someone is cited for a traffic violation). Insurance company accident records are not regulated to the same extent as say, credit reports. You could threaten to sue the company for negligent misrepresentation, or the driver of Car C for defamation, in order to try to get this statement removed, but those would be hard cases to win since you are at least arguably at fault and fault is to some extent a matter of opinion. It would be much easier to win a suit like that if the accident didn't happen at all. Here, it would be undisputed that an accident happened at a particular time and place involving certain cars and drivers, and the dispute is only over who was at fault.	Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.	I would like to give you a clear definitive answer, but there isn't one. This depends entirely on the scope of the easement which is determined on a case by case basis in light of the facts and circumstances. It is frequently ambiguous. These cases come up frequently and usually either get resolved fairly quickly via mediation or negotiation, or escalate into very ugly lawsuits that can last years. I have a case like this that has been pending eleven years, is on a final appeal to the state supreme court, has involved about $800,000+ of legal fees between all parties involved, has been to the court of appeals following about six times so far, and has led to five evidentiary hearings in addition to depositions, motion practice, etc. Obviously, this is an extreme example, but long, costly litigation if a negotiated resolution isn't reached is pretty common.	You are describing a liability suit. My sense is that based on the facts you describe you will face two serious challenges to making a successful case. Damages and liability. In order to win a liability case, you must first establish that you have been damaged in some way. According to your facts, your damages are at best, the replacement value of a used controller. I'm guessing that's what, $20 or so? That doesn't cover the cost of an attorney's time to even begin to hear your version of the facts, much less give you advice or pursue a case for you. After you establish damages, you must prove the company is responsible or has some share of liability for causing your damages. Again, I think this is going to be an obstacle for you. Not placing a warning that the game will affect you by causing you to throw your controller and be mean to your mom would be unprecedented if you were to prevail. AFAIK.	Both outcomes are possible. A's insurance company would resist full replacement, so B would probably have to sue and prove that full replacement was necessary. Since the basic idea behind compensation is making the person whole after having been harmed, and what is the harm in a more limited repair job? The jury would contemplate all of the details regarding B's apartment. Then it matters just how crisp the floor was originally, and how aesthetically offensive a mere 99% match would be. It would not hinge solely on B's self-serving statement that he would not accept less than 100% match. But the award would not be limited to "the cheapest possible repair".	The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.
Do I inherit some portion of property if there's no will? My mother passed away without a will a month ago. She owned a house with my stepdad in Albany, NY. He still lives there. I live in FL. What portion of the estate value do I get as a result?	IANAL. I am not your lawyer. Assuming that they bought the house together, and are both on the title, your step-father would, as a surviving owner, take sole possession of the house (and it wound not enter your mother's estate). If she bought the house before they married and he moved in, and he is not on the title, it would theoretically enter her estate, but there may be additional rules as it is his residence. As your mother lived in NY, NY law governs her estate. If the estate is worth less than $50,000, you would get nothing. If the estate is worth more than $50,000, he would get $50,000 plus half of the remainder, with the other half of the remainder being split between your mother's children. You don't mention any siblings, so I would assume you don't have any, in which case you should receive: (Estate_Value - $50,000)/2. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/WhenSomeoneDies/intestacy.shtml	No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally.	If the common law applies (i.e. there is no statute that changes it) then it depends on if the item was lost, mislaid or abandoned. The US has statute law dealing with lost money but that is not the question here. Property is generally deemed to have been lost if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did not intend to set it down, and where it is not likely to be found by the true owner. At common law, the finder of a lost item could claim the right to possess the item against any person except the true owner or any previous possessors. Property is generally deemed to have been mislaid or misplaced if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did intend to set it, but then simply forgot to pick it up again. For example, a wallet found in a shop lying on a counter near a cash register will likely be deemed misplaced rather than lost. Under common law principles, the finder of a misplaced object has a duty to turn it over to the owner of the premises, on the theory that the true owner is likely to return to that location to search for his misplaced item. If the true owner does not return within a reasonable time (which varies considerably depending on the circumstances), the property becomes that of the owner of the premises. Property is generally deemed to have been abandoned if it is found in a place where the true owner likely intended to leave it, but is in such a condition that it is apparent that he or she has no intention of returning to claim it. Abandoned property generally becomes the property of whoever should find it and take possession of it first, although some states have enacted statutes under which certain kinds of abandoned property – usually cars, wrecked ships and wrecked aircraft – escheat, meaning that they become the property of the state. For your specifics: If I purchase merchandise in a physical store, and then (accidentally or not) leave the merchandise at the store after I've paid for it, is the store allowed to resell that merchandise to another customer? This would be mislaid property and if they cannot find you and you do not return to claim it after a reasonable time (which would be different for a Mars bar and a Boeing 747) then it is theirs and they can do what they want with it: including sell it to someone else. How does this scenario differ from leaving personal items at the store that I purchased elsewhere? It doesn't.	Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters.	If the estate has not been settled, yes The executor is the legal owner of the house and does not need the beneficiaries' permission to sell it if they decide that is in the beneficiaries' best interests. They can consider their wishes, but they don't have to, and they don't have to follow them if they do.	There is no requirement that a will, or a trust created by a will, be "fair". The will could have left $500,000 in trust for one set of siblings, and $5,000 to another set. It could specifically exclude one beneficiary from some of the benefits, or specify an unequal division. That is all the choice of the testator. As described in the question, the trust does seem likely to give greater benefits to one set of children than to their cousins. Unless there are grounds to upset the will, that is just how it is. However, the wide "absolute" discretion granted to the trustee might allow the trustee to modify this outcome, but the trustee is not allowed to simply rewrite the trust. How much the payments can be varied will depend on the exact terms of the trust. It does sound as if this trust was not worded as carefully as it might be, since it does not specify a ration when the trust is to be split. The designated relative can decline to serve as trustee, then any specified alternate would serve, or if there is none, or none who will serve, the court would appoint a trustee.	The transaction you describe is a "taxable gift" to the extent that it exceeds $15,000 in fair market value (as of 2019) and that your significant other is not your U.S. citizen spouse now (special rules apply to non-U.S. citizen spouses and an unlimited amount of gifts can be made without being taxable to a spouse, including a same sex spouse). The first $15,000 of fair market value per donor per donee per year doesn't count, however (there is a $100,000 of fair market value per donor per donee exemption per year for gifts to non-citizen spouses, if a qualified domestic trust is not the true recipient of the gift). This means that the donor is required to report the gift on IRS Form 709 by April 15, of the year following the year in which the gift is made (or later if the donor files for an extension). But, each person is entitled to make up to $11,400,000 of tax free gifts (during life and at death combined) that would otherwise be taxable per lifetime, and this amount is indexed for inflation, so it goes up each year. So, in your situation, it is highly unlikely that any tax would actually be due in connection with your filing of Form 709, even though the donor is required to complete and file that form. In the event that both the annual and lifetime gift exclusions have been exceeded, the tax rate would be 40% of the fair market value of the gift (net of the mortgage debt to which the house is subject. For example, if the house were worth $40,000,000 and had a $10,000,000 mortgage and you were given a 50% interest in it, the amount of the taxable gift would be $14,985,000 of which at least $3,485,000 would be subject to a 40% gift tax, i.e. $1,394,000), if you didn't get married (the tax would be $1,360,000 if you were a non-citizen spouse of the donor). At one time there were some states with their own state gift taxes that had to be considered, but as of 2019, there are no such states. Also, upon a sale of the house, the donee would be subject to one half of the capital gain that the donor would otherwise have owed taxes upon (this is called a "carry over basis"). We paid with a loan from a family member which I helped to pay back. I also paid for work done on the home. This could arguably reduce the amount of the gift (which would ordinarily be valued at fair market value as of the date of the gift), but given the amount of the lifetime exclusion, that detail is probably irrelevant unless your home is a world class mansion or castle.	The primary question is why the trustee is disposing of the asset at all. The trustee has a particular fiduciary duty (we haven't seen the document so we have no idea what that duty is). It could be justified because, for example, the grantor needs cash for a brain operation. Self-dealing (acting in one's own interest, which is a conflict of interest), is prohibited for a trustee. With real estate, "fair market value" is a fluid concept, but within limits one can determine that a sale (to self) at $900,000 undervalued the house and that a sale to another would have garnered $1,100,000, therefore this would be an illegal self-dealing. However, the simple act of a trustees purchasing an asset from a trust that he is the trustee of is not categorially prohibited.
When Can I report my Social Security Card as Lost or Stolen? (My Situation in Body) A few months back I realized I couldn't find my SSN card and that the last time I saw it my ex-wife needed it for something because we were married at that time. I asked her if she had it still and she said no. Then last month she says she found it and I told her we could exchange it when she gets her mail. I keep reminding her to bring my SSN Card to me and get her mail but she's been ignoring me or when she replies it's that she's busy. I've been monitoring my credit to ensure she doesn't take my identity and bury me in debt but I would still feel better if she'd return it already. I'd get it myself if I knew where she'd moved to but right now I am powerless to get it back. I wondered if it was legally valid to report it lost/stolen even though I know who has it and have some expectation that I'll get it back without incident?	Reporting that an SS card is lost or stolen could be useful for two reasons: obtaining a replacement, and finding and prosecuting the perpetrator. You can obtain a replacement card from SSA at any time, and they do not require a justification for a card (they do not investigate thefts). The local police can investigate, but will only investigate a theft (not a simple loss). Their interest would be in prosecuting the perpetrator (and possibly retrieving the stolen property). In the course of investigating, the police will ask (in some form) if you have a clue where it is, and if you do not admit that you know where it is, they can prosecute you, because that would violate your state's version of the false statement law (Washington example here). The physical card is not so important: loan applications etc. don't require producing a physical SS card: what they need is the number on the card.	I don't know what you mean by "own a person's DNA", but analogous to owning a car or picture, you can't own a person, which is what would be required to have complete ownership of all of a person's DNA. You can legally own a sample of a person's DNA, for example by buying or bartering tissue, or if you are given tissue. If you grab a handful of hair from a person and pull it out, it is not legally yours, and you can be required to return it. If you lose, misplace or abandon tissue (or a knife), then the finder could end up owning it, depending on the circumstances. Tissue in the trash is more complicated since there may be municipal laws preventing dumpster-diving. Setting aside any such municipal codes, if you abandon your property, someone else can claim it. Hair on the floor of a barbershop, or in the trash, is a good example abandonment: it could also be an example of trespassing, in case the barber objects to you gathering samples from his floor. The 4th Amendment cannot be used to secure your DNA: it could be used to prevent securing DNA, if the intended application is compelled blood drawing. The ruling in Maryland v. King did not say that "your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason", since that was an objection to the majority ruling given in the dissent, not part of the actual ruling. Maybe that will end up being true, but that hasn't been determined to be the law yet. With a warrant, the police can take a tissue sample, and not wait for you to throw a tissue sample in the trash. They can also take a cheek swab from an arrestee just like they can take a photo or fingerprints (that's what Maryland v. King says). Once we've settled the matter of obtaining a DNA sample, the concept of ownership might be relevant if a party could restrict others from using that DNA pattern. But DNA is not subject to patent or copyright, so once I know your DNA pattern, you cannot legally prevent me from using that information. However, you might, if I gave you a sample as part of a contract, and there is a clause in that contract that prevents the other party from ever using that information.	Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."	It's governed by your credit agreement or some similar document, which you surely signed as a condition of receiving credit. There was almost certainly a clause that said the bank could reduce or revoke your credit line if you missed payments.	One official form of ID should be enough. Two pieces of ID is more than most people ever carry. And not selling to you because you’re black would be illegal discrimination. But that would be hard to prove. The most likely explanation is stupidity. Or lack of training. Might be an employee who is already deep into overtime, or just not mentally present. Some people go on auto-pilot and if you showed them an age card that isn’t accepted that’s fixed in their brain. Or maybe the passport photo doesn’t look like you. If it is an unusual form of ID like a 100% valid Japanese driving license, or a damaged passport, or a library card, those might be reasonably rejected. The best course of action would be to ask for the manager. The manager should either be able to give you a sensible reason why your passport is not acceptable, or give you the goods. And if not, your case for illegal discrimination is much stronger if a supposedly competent manager refuses to serve you. (Reading the other answer: Obviously if you are too young to buy the item, which is not true in your case, then showing 100 legal IDs wouldn't get you the item. And if you look so young that a reasonable person would think it's more likely that your ID is an excellent forgery than you being 18, they could deny the sale).	In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization.	No, the only purpose of a money order is that it's effectively a form of guaranteed cash that only one person can access. There are no additional protections offered by it. However, given that you are amenable to paying a little extra to facilitate your payments, you may want to consider using a credit card in the future. Provided it's not an all the time thing, credit cards will withhold payments on your behalf if a vendor fails to fulfill their obligations. This means that you're not liable for the cost of the merchant sending you the wrong thing or ignoring your order requests. I've personally done this for several things: Hotel reservation that was borderline unsuitable for human habitation. When a vendor failed to send something I'd purchased. When proceeding with this, bear in mind that the credit card company will want you to make such a claim as soon as possible and to provide as much information as possible to support your claim. If you've e-mail chains, save them. If you've been communicating by phone, write down and provide a summary of your communications. If you have an issue, don't wait a month to raise the concern, do it within a week. Probably about once a year I need to do something like this. Generally what this does is it starts a dispute process whereby the credit company will contact the vendor to get their side of the story (usually they don't respond to them either). After 60 days, the charge is dropped from your bill and presumably the credit card company refuses to pay for the disputed item. Ultimately, this gets you the best possible result. You get your money back and you didn't have to go to court to do it.	Because one is theft and the other is breach of contract Theft is taking someone’s property with the intent of permanently depriving them of it. It has always been a crime, in fact, it’s a toss up whether theft or murder was the first crime ever. Not giving someone something you lawfully owe them but that they never possessed is not theft because it lacks the dispossession aspect required of theft. That’s simply failing to pay a debt and that is just breach of contract. Now, there was a time, back in the nineteenth century when not paying your debts would land you in debtors prison but society moved on. Now, there are jurisdictions (australia) which are considering making wage theft, the deliberate and systemic underpayment of workers a crime. Perhaps society is moving on again?
How to gather Compelling Evidence to prove that business is fraudulent? My friend's small business agreed to a one-month risk-free trial service from one Credit Card Processor company. However, she did not like the service, because it did not live up to verbal promises made by sales person - monthly processing fees actually increased with them compared to the previous processor company. And now this credit card processor company auto-charged her $840 as ETF (Early Termination Fee) even though she gave them a notice within one month that she does not want to continue service with them once the trial is over. My friend does not have written contract - either nothing was signed on a paper at the time of signing up for service or they did not leave her a copy of written contract. I actually would not be surprised that there is no written contract in the first place, because other their customers are complaining about exactly the same issue on Better Business Bureau and YP websites that they don't have "written contract". This company also is not sending us a copy of contract - they simply told us that they don't have a file with us and hanged up the phone. However, I have to admit that this would be bold and dumb move by this company to practice such fraud if they really don't have a written contract. My goal is to help my friend to dispute this $840 ETF (Early Termination Fee), because to me this seems like a typical fraud scheme where: sales person over promises that service will be better than the current one. once victim realizes that service is worse, she (or he) tries to terminate it within this 1 month trial period. then credit card processor company charges Early Termination Fee of $840 which is ridiculous. My concern is that I don't have a copy of written contract and I actually don't know if one exists in the first place so I have to gather evidence via other sources. If this case would go to court where we have to prove that this company is practicing fraud, what would judge consider as "Compelling Evidence" to waive the ETF and void the written contract, if there really is one? Since I don't have much experience with Court I am not sure what evidence judge would consider as compelling enough: If I would manage to get other mistreated customers to testify? If I would manage to record a phone call with their customer service representative where he would admit that service was actually free for a month? They don't seem very professional and I thought to try this out, but how can I prove authenticity of this call to the judge? If I would get in touch with one of their ex-employees and try to get them to confess at court? Any other ideas what could be done here?	If there is no written contract, why not just respond to their invoice with a letter stating you do not intend to pay because the trial was free so you don't owe anything. If they attempt to collect, make the same case to the court. Then the burden is on them to prove otherwise. Which, if there is no written contract agreeing to pay an ETF, might be difficult for them to do. Be careful about surreptitiously recording phone calls without the other party's knowledge or consent. In some jurisdictions this is illegal and can subject you to criminal prosecution.	To paraphrase the Princess Bride: "I don't think those words mean what you think they do". The "truther-activist", "sovereign citizen", and "Citizen vs. Human Being" concepts will only hurt you. It has never succeeded, to my knowledge; It has failed multiple times. Let me tell you a little about myself to illustrate what I mean: I am a software developer (and it seems from your profile, you are at least somewhat computer inclined, so this will hopeful make sense to you). The business side of the company I work for think that myself and my team write "magic code", and having the system do whatever they ask for is just a matter of pressing enough buttons in the correct order. It totally insane, and it completely analogous to what you are propose. The court is a carefully designed system, and you don't have the power to make arbitrary changes to it. Certainly not through the "arbitrary button presses" of "legal fiction". Some things to note Legal fictions are never summoned. People are. Organizations are. See initial paraphrase with regards to "legal fiction". Your legal fiction has not been summoned, you have. You will be appearing as yourself, not a straw man. I'm sorry to break it to you, but whomever you have heard this from is wrong, and in the most best case scenario, they are confusing what they want to be true for reality. If they have received any money from you in relation to this opinion, then they are almost certainly a scammer and a liar. If you insist on going further with this nonsense, then you WILL lose, regardless of what actual facts you have. My condolences. Now, to answer the question you asked: Yes, you can file a monition for discovery before first appearance (but not before pleading). You can file by mail, and in some jurisdictions, online. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/goingtocourt/caseBasics.shtml.	First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea.	As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation.	Being as general as possible - refund policies are governed by bank and scheme policies, and so aren't necessarily the domain of law. There may be jurisdiction-specific regulations that limit your liability as a consumer, but there's not usually a legal requirement. This is almost certainly wholly governed by your credit card terms of use.¹ You can report this to your local authorities, but without proof of a crime, it's unlikely to be actionable. The website isn't necessarily to blame, either - if your computer or your connection to the website was somehow compromised, then your details may have been obtained in that way, and the website could have had nothing to do with it. Again, this is almost certainly wholly governed by their scheme agreement.¹ 1. Some off-topic information here, which may or may not be accurate, and which you should not seek clarification for here (check Money SE instead, and first check whether it is on-topic there) - generally, bank policies will refund you for fraudulent transactions below a certain quantity or value. In this case, the bank tends to take a loss and chargeback rights are not exercised. In other cases, the bank will require the merchant to prove that the authorised cardholder did in fact authorise the transaction. The level of proof is governed by the way in which the transaction was conducted and verified at the time of purchase - whether the CVV2 code was verified, whether address verification was completed, whether 3D verification was completed. If the merchant is unable to prove, according to the scheme guidelines, the transaction will be charged back to their account.	Some portions of your inquiry are confusing, as in "I insisted that we were going to continue to send money to the mortgage company if we don’t understand what the fees are for". It is unclear why you would continue to send money without understanding the reason for fees, especially since you purportedly sent "the complete payoff" already. What is an appropriate response to an email from a lawyer that says she’s going to withdraw from my case, because I would like to understand the additional fees and charges my mortgage company is charging (over and beyond the plan payment/payoff)? Rather than replying to the lawyer's email, it is more important that you timely file in court a response (with 2 or 3 copies) to her motion to withdraw and that you attend the court hearing (if any is scheduled). Don't forget to also mail your attorney a copy of your response. In the response, you will need to argue that your lawyer's refusal to adequately address your inquiries is in violation of the rules of "professional" conduct (with which attorneys are supposed to comply). By granting the attorney's motion, the court would improperly release her from pending obligations she has with respect to you. For instance, Rule 1.4 of Michigan RPC states: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and comply promptly with reasonable requests for information. [...] (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (note: other jurisdictions in the U.S. have equivalent rules, so you will need to refer to their corresponding label) By pushing you to pay another $850 without actually explaining you the details of the "settlement" with mortgage company's counsel, your lawyer clearly is failing her duty to reasonably inform you of the matter for which you retained her. Therefore, your response should substantiate that a granting of the attorney's motion to withdraw ought to be conditioned on the fulfillment of her obligation to provide you with reasonably sufficient information which you as her client are entitled to obtain. It will help if you attach to your motion & brief an exhibit showing that the mortgage company actually directed you to inquire of your lawyer the clarification(s) you are pursuing. Once you take care of that issue, I encourage you to seriously assess (and proceed accordingly) whether your attorney's misconduct merits being reported with the entity in charge of disciplining lawyers for their legal malpractice. If I were knowledgeable of bankruptcy law, I would be happy to address your first question. I can only suggest you to do some research on leagle.com to become acquainted with how courts decide bankruptcy issues. Be sure to set parameter "Search By Court" to "Federal Bankruptcy Court".	You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case.	First, refusing to provide proof of income to a lender cannot possibly be a crime per se. Lying about your income to get the loan might be fraud, but whether you agree to provide proof to the lender later cannot be a crime. Second, the loan agreement may contain language which obligates you to provide proof of income as requested. If the lender did not verify income up-front, this is not unlikely. If so, refusal to provide such proof would entitle the lender to any available remedies. It's possible that a loan agreement could entitle the lender to pursue specific performance which, if granted, might compel you to provide proof (or some alternative if this is impossible) or be held in contempt of court for refusing to comply with a court order. More likely, the lender would be able to require accelerated repayment of what they're owed. If, based on your refusal to provide proof of income, the lender suspects you committed fraud when you applied for the loan, they can file a police report and press charges. If the prosecutor thinks they have a case and chooses to pursue that charge, proof of income (at least, when you applied for the loan) might have to come out as part of your defense. This is all very speculative. Most likely you can just ignore the lender's request and avoid missing any payments. I wouldn't expect any favors from this lender going forward.
Are police legally required to stop a crime they see being committed? Say that a police officer walks down an alleyway and very clearly sees a crime being committed; say a mugging or a rape. Is the officer legally obligated to try to stop the crime? By “legally required”, I mean that they could be charged with a crime if they do not intervene. Also, would there be extenuating circumstances based on the likelihood of being able to stop it? For instance, would a group of three armed police officers be required to stop a single unarmed criminal? Would a single unarmed officer not be legally required to stop twenty armed criminals? This is a purely hypothetical question, not one I am facing.	No. Police aren't even required to protect people.	No If the police want to arrest you your legal obligation is to submit and, if the arrest was a violation of your rights, pursue a legal remedy afterwards. You do not have a right to resist an arrest even if that arrest is without legal basis. "Resisting arrest" is a specific crime with a specific definition. For example, in new-south-wales it is in s546c of the Crimes Act 1900 and it says: Any person who resists or hinders or incites any person to assault, resist or hinder a police officer in the execution of his or her duty shall be liable on conviction before the Local Court to imprisonment for 12 months or to a fine of 10 penalty units, or both. If you are charged with resisting arrest the state needs to prove each element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If they can't do that the charge will be dismissed. If they can prove it then you may have a defence to resisting arrest if: you did not know that the person was a police officer or you did not know that you were being arrested if the police officer was not acting lawfully. However, a police officer will be acting lawfully even if the arrest is subsequently found to be unlawful provided they are acting in good faith and without malice. Suspecting you of committing a crime even if you didn’t makes it lawful to arrest you.	The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.	An assault is carried out by a threat of bodily harm coupled with an apparent, present ability to cause the harm. There is no need for physical contact in an assault, all that is needed is the threat and the apparent, present ability. The drill sergeant was behaving in a threatening manner and had an apparent, present ability to cause harm; he was guilty of assault. Consensually engaging in a legal contact sport lacks the threat of bodily harm; that is to say that the bodily harm is a risk of the sport but it is not the object of it. Of course, an illegal sport where death or maiming is an inherent part would leave the participants open to assault (and battery) charges - you cannot agree to do illegal things. What is necessary to constitute the threat and the apparent means depends on the whole of the circumstances. A person throwing water when they had threatened the victim with acid is most certainly assault. Pointing a replica pistol at someone who doesn't know it is a replica constituted the threat and apparent means in one action.	In the US, police do not put a person under house arrest, instead, the courts do, as an alternative to standard imprisonment (either awaiting trial, or serving their sentence). The police are not involved at all; the courts cannot be sued for lenient sentencing. If a person leaves their house (even to buy a bottle of milk), they will have violated the terms of their more lenient sentence, and will be arrested and sent to regular jail. Generally, police are not liable for damages, especially when they fail to be omnipotent in their efforts to prevent others from doing wrong.	Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.	The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.	In general, police have no special protection from being recorded; if it is legal to video or audio record a person in that jurisdiction then it is legal to record a police officer in that jurisdiction. Anything that it is legal to do with the recording of a person is legal even if that person is a police officer. As to if it is legal to record a person see: Is it legal to post a photograph that I captured of a stranger in the street? Model release for image without faces How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame? What are the legal repercussions of taking a stranger's picture in public? What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?
What does it mean for an appeal to be "contested"? Does the terminology "contested" when applied to a case under appeal, mean simply that the defendant is appealing the the appeal, or does it mean something different?	An appeal may be made by a plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or other interested party, so the term 'defendant' is not very useful; the party opposed to the Appellant (and served with the appeal) is usually called the Respondent. A contested appeal just means that the Respondent wishes to be represented at the appeal, presumably to fight it; most appeals are contested, but not all. Unlike a first-order case which may go by default, an uncontested appeal will still have to have some sort of a hearing; you are, after all, saying that a court decision should be set aside, and the Respondent's views are not necessarily relevant. It is, though, fair to say that an uncontested appeal will have a greater chance of success.	Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong.	england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.	Can a judge change a sentence? No. Once a judge has delivered the sentence the case is finished and the court no longer has jurisdiction. Can the sentence be appealed? Yes. Both the defence and the prosecution can appeal the sentence (with or without appealing the verdict). A sentence appeal will only be allowed if: The sentencing judge has made an error of law; or The sentencing judge was guided by irrelevant or extreme considerations; or The sentence was manifestly excessive (or, if the Crown appeals, manifestly inadequate). In theory, the Crown could appeal on the basis the sentence was manifestly excessive but normally the Crown will have indicated to the judge the punishment they were seeking and it would be rare for the judge to exceed that. That is, the Crown almost always wanted more than they got and may appeal if it’s “manifestly inadequate”.	From the news article alone, one cannot tell just what is meant by "possible" here. My guess is that the passenger claimed that the event happened, the railway has not conceded that it did, but would rather settle than pay the costs of defending the case, and take the risk of a large verdict, and the risk of negative publicity. So "possibly" would mean "not proved in court".	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	They have the same standard of proof but different onus The legal system places the onus of proving an allegation on the person making the allegation. For your example, this is A if they are suing B or the government prosecutor if B is being prosecuted. The standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt” if B is defending a criminal prosecution and “balance of probabilities” if B is defending a civil prosecution or a lawsuit. Courts have historically been reluctant to define these terms further because doing so can lay grounds for an appeal if the judge oversteps so they mean what their plain English formulation means and what they mean precisely in any given case is one of the things the trier of fact has to decide. For A or the prosecutor to win, they have to meet this burden for each and every element of the offence or cause of action; if they don’t, then B wins. So, B doesn’t have to offer a defence at all and will still win if A doesn’t meet their burden. If B does offer a defence then the trier of fact compares the evidence of each side and decides which they prefer and therefore whether A has met their burden. A jury doesn’t have to give reasons for their decision; a judge does. In general, the decisions of the trier of fact are not appealable unless there was no reasonable basis in evidence to support the decision. For example, the evidence of B might not be believed - this is fine, unless the reason for not believing it is that B has a beard and everyone with beards are liars. Options 2 and 3 are simple matters of comparing evidence and deciding which is preferred. Option 1 is different; it is what’s called an affirmative defence. Here, A has met their burden because B conceded. Now B is relying on the position that they had a legal excuse, that is B is alleging a position and B has the burden of proving it. Now, the burden on B is always “balance of probabilities” because B is not alleging that anyone committed a crime so they don’t have to reach the criminal standard.	It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed.
Would I be liable for any illegal traffic that comes through my VPN? Say I hosted a virtual private network somewhere on a cloud hosting provider, say an amazon aws server. If I shared access to that VPN to other people (say for simplicity's sake, 5 friends), someone could potentially use it to access illegal content while trying to remain anonymous. I know I could be subpoenaed or sued for this. Of course, being personally innocent, I would hand over the server logs, or do whatever was required of me. 2 cases: If the logs showed that the illegal traffic was going to another IP address not in my possession, am I still liable for routing that traffic? If the logs for whatever reason couldn't prove that the illegal traffic was going to another specific IP address not in my possession, does liability default to me personally, for having ownership over the VPN server which routed it? I'm trying to ascertain the level of risk associated with hosting my own VPN server, for extra-personal use, but not as a business. No contracts, no fees, just like a club that also accepts donations to keep the service alive.	Generally speaking, in U.S. law, a provider of a service via the Internet, such as a VPN, is immune from liability for user generated content pursuant to Section 230, so long as a copyright take-down notice is in place is complaints are lodged. So, you do not default to liability or have liability merely as a result of running a VPN. But, there is a second problem. If the VPN is very small and you can't be distinguished from other users, you could conceivably face risk not as a VPN operator, but as a user of the VPN who is confused for someone engaging in illegal activity. For example, suppose that there were five users, and that two could be ruled out due to being in places with no Internet access or being sick in the hospital, etc., leaving three possible suspects, and some weak circumstantial evidence pointed to you. You could easily become a prime suspect and maybe even end up on a terrorism watch list, even if it might be difficult or impossible to actually prove any wrongdoing on your part.	A web site that is serious on protecting some content behind a paywall will put the protected content, or a version of the page with both protected and unprotected content, on separate page or pages, so arranged that a user will not be able to follow the link until that user has signed in and been accepted as an authorized user. A site that merely uses CSS to hide "protected" content is not really protecting it. CSS is designed to be modified by the ultimate user -- that is part of its function. If the site chooses to send you content, you are entitled to read it. Even if some of the content has a CSS tag attached which suppresses or obscures the display of that content, they know perfectly well that any user can supersede this with local CSS, and so I don't see how they have any legal claim, nor any way of knowing if you have accessed the "hidden" content or not. If you attempt to bypass or hack a login screen, that might be circumvention under the US DMCA, or "Unauthorized computer access" under any of several laws.	Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.	There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.	On the face of the CFAA: How does Aaron Swartz's mass download from JSTOR constitute hacking? He exceeded his authorised access on a protected computer. If this is hacking (the masking of one's IP address) then doesn't that make using VPN hacking? Hacking is not a term used in CFAA. In Aaron's case changing the IP address was a necessity for him to exceed his authorised access; if he stopped when blocked then the unauthorised access would have stopped. If you are authorised to use a VPN for access then you have not exceeded your authorisation, have you?	It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.	Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts.	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.
Is it criminal to take evasive actions to avoid paying a civil judgment? If a lawsuit goes against the defendant and a judgment is rendered against the defendant, is it a criminal act for the defendant to then start hiding their assets or taking deliberate steps to evade paying the judgment? For example, let's say a defendant gets sued and the judgment against the defendant is $200,000. The defendant has a house worth about $250,000 and the plaintiff starts executing on the judgment by taking steps to have the house sold to satisfy the judgment. While this action is pending in court, defendant then "sells" his house to his wife for $1 and the deed is transferred into her name. Can a criminal complaint be lodged against the defendant for this conduct?	Here's what would likely happen in general: the plaintiff would seek a prejudgment attachment before they even get to trial (here's an example of Civil Procedure Rules outlining prejudgment attachment). Note: there must be a state statute existent in your jurisdiction to even seek this remedy. Generally, prejudgment attachments start in the form of a writ from the requesting plaintiff. That document must confirm (usually) that there is a suit for damages, ID the property to be attached, etc. Usually they are approved specifically in cases where the defendant is moving property out of the state or is fraudulently getting rid of property or hiding property in order to avoid paying a debt. Some states have different laws respecting if and how much notice a defendant is entitled to receive. Also, the enforcement of such writs must be in line with Due Process requirements - here, that in order to issue a prejudgment attachment while the defendant is unaware of the prejudgment attachment is only constitutional when there are "exigent circumstances." You tagged Massachusetts, so check here for the relevant Mass. Gen. Laws. Even better, check Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (Attachment) and 4.2 (Trustee Process).	Yes, in england-and-wales the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced 'Unexplained Wealth Orders', which compel the respondent to provide a statement: (a) setting out the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the property in respect of which the order is made, (b) explaining how the respondent obtained the property (including, in particular, how any costs incurred in obtaining it were met), (c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified. There a few requirements set out in section 362B, for example, the property must have value of over £50,000; there should be "reasonable grounds" for suspicion that the respondent would have been unable to obtain the property using their lawfully obtained income; the respondent or their connections must have either been involved in serious or organised crime, or be a politically exposed person, and so on. If the respondent refuses to make such a statement, the police may apply for a Civil Recovery Order to confiscate the property, with the property in question "presumed to be recoverable property" (section 362C(2)). Giving false information in such a statement is a criminal offence.	a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.	No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria.	The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error.	The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case.	No. An eviction notice served while someone is an owner of record of a house would not be enforced. But, generally speaking, a divorce court retains jurisdiction to enforce its decrees after they are entered, and to clarify its existing orders. Obviously I will need to refinance it and pay him his share of the equity to get the deed solely in my name, which will take time. Usually, the ex's duty to get the deed in your name would precede the duty to refinance it. A deed from one owner of real estate to another co-owner doesn't violate a due on sales clause of a mortgage or deed of trust, and the fact that both of you are on the mortgage or deed of trust does not mean that both of you need to own it. Unless the decree says otherwise, the ex would usually have to transfer the property even if the mortgage is not yet refinanced. But, not all decrees and not all separation agreements have the same requirements and provisions. The exact language in the governing document would matter. If the decree doesn't say who gets to occupy the house, you could and probably should go to the court to have that issue clarified. Since violating a clear court order can give rise to contempt of court sanctions of incarceration or fines, often someone will comply with it without having to have the police intervene to remove someone. Conceivably, if the ex did not leave, you could seek to hold the ex in contempt of court for violating the divorce decree if it implies that the ex's right to occupy the house has ended. If the ex is found by the court to have willfully violated a court order following notice to the ex, an arraignment and a hearing if the violation was not conceded at the arraignment, the ex could face incarceration and/or fines (contempt proceedings are rather complicated and exactly how you do this is beyond the scope of a simple answer). You could also seek to hold the ex in contempt of court for not promptly signing the quitclaim deed (assuming that the decree does not condition the duty to do this on the refinancing of the house), but this would not be the best solution to that problem. This is because you could also go to the court and have it appoint the clerk of the court as the husband's agent to sign the quitclaim deed on behalf of the ex (assuming again that the decree does not condition the duty to do this on the refinancing of the house), if the ex failed to do so as required by the divorce decree by the deadline set forth in the decree, or a new court order, or within a reasonable time if not deadline is set. Then, after you were in title, you could bring an eviction action if necessary. It is much easier and faster to get an order directing the clerk to sign something on behalf of a party to a lawsuit than it is to hold someone in contempt of court. You could also ask the court to issue a protection order prohibiting him from occupying the house at any time prior to the title being put into your name pursuant to the decree. This could take effect as soon as the protection order signed/authorized by the judge is served upon the ex. A protection order (in most states) is directly enforceable by the police, unlike most court orders which are only enforceable by bringing contempt of court charges in the court that issued the order. But, a court would usually be reluctant to issue a protection order unless there was a clear and present risk of physical harm, or severe emotional harm to you from a violation of the decree. Also, while the ex wouldn't be committing the crime of trespassing by occupying the house, it wouldn't be unprecedented for you to persuade a police officer to remove the ex from the house after explaining the situation to prevent a breach of the peace between you, or because the ex's conduct in overstaying his right under the decree to be in the house constitutes "disorderly conduct" or "loitering" or "harassment" or some other minor offense in the opinion of the police officer, even if that charge might not hold up if prosecuted in court. But, there is really no way to compel a police officer to do that and it is close to the boundary of what a police officer does and doesn't have the authority to do. Most of these remedies would take several weeks, at a minimum, to complete. A protection order could be done in a day or two, subject to a prompt follow up hearing within a week or two after the fact. A court might also rule on a clarification order on an expedited basis by setting a shorter than usual deadline for the ex to respond given the urgency of the matter.	Suing them and winning may not be that difficult, and you can generally sue a business even if it ceases to operate as a going concern. Collecting the judgment you win, however, is likely to be very difficult. Still if you are going to sue, the sooner the better, because outside of bankruptcy, the general rule is that the person who is first in time to actually seize the available assets of a company with more debts than assets is first in right to those assets. Also a squeaky wheel is often the one that gets the grease. "Shaming" companies on social media often works for going concerns, but is rarely effective when a company is actually going out of business soon. There are special remedies available against recipients of improperly diverted funds when funds are deliberately sucked out of the organization without receiving anything in exchange for its money (this is called a "fraudulent transfer"), but those cases are expensive to bring and hard to prove. Often in the case of a legitimately failing business, operating losses and not improper diversion of funds from the company, is the reason that it doesn't have enough money to pay all of its debts in full, so this remedy is not available. Winning a lawsuit simply gives you a piece of paper stating that the defendant owes you money which you can then use to seize money and property from the defendant and/or people who owe the defendant money, if you can find either of those things. But, you can't get blood out of a turnip, and the alternative formal collection mechanism (forcing an involuntary bankruptcy) requires the coordination of multiple significant creditors and may not provide much better results if the company has genuinely run out of money, although unpaid wages are often entitled to priority in bankruptcy up to a certain dollar amount which is a preference that is not generally available outside of bankruptcy court. There are sometimes laws that can be invoked to hold people affiliated with the management of a defunct business personally responsible for unpaid wages (sometimes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and sometimes state wage claim acts). And, very rarely in egregious cases that affect lots of people where there was an intent to stiff you before you finished earning new wages at the company, a local or state prosecutor will prosecute a company or its officers for "wage theft". Finally, "freelancers" often have far fewer rights in efforts to collect wages than true employees, so a mere independent contractor is in a weaker position and should consider that fact when deciding whether or not to settle. Bottom line: consider seriously accepting a settlement because the cost of collection and the unavailability of assets to collect from once it goes out of business may make a bird in the hand worth more than two in the bush.
So… is prostitution in Canada legal or not? I'm confused, is prostitution in Canada legal or not? I've been looking, but have up till now only gotten mixed messages when it comes to it's legality; just a jumble of legislative actions, court rulings, and public statements all wrapped in a confusing multi-year timeline and many vague/assuming articles in the press. So... is it? And what are the nuances of it?	Yes and No Selling your own body for sex is legal. Buying sex is illegal. Therefore the transaction as a whole is legal on the part of the seller and illegal on the part of the buyer. See Prostitution in Canada and Prostitution law in Canada. If you think this is odd, you are not alone '... one judge referring to the laws as "Alice-in-Wonderland" and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred to the situation as "bizarre"'. In the circumstances, although I know of no case law on this, it would appear that any contract for prostitution would be void for illegality. Presumably, to enforce payment for services rendered the service provider would need to pursue a quantum meruit claim in equity.	If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent?	Might depend on where you are. I think it's illegal in North Korea. In the US, it is legally encouraged, by the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, especially the part that says "Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States requires that the Administration seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space". Previously, Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, which first expressed an interest in allowing commercial flights, but there was substantial opposition to non-government entities in space. There are a number of legal private space adventures from numerous countries. As Nate Eldridge points out, you still need government (FAA) permission. So it's legal to blast yourself into space in the same sense that it's legal to drive or to open a business.	Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar.	This is an amusing idea, but ultimately it seems frivolous: How does one establish the physical presence of a corporation in a car? Yes, corporations have some of the legal rights and liabilities of people, but they are not people. And there are plenty of rights a person has that a corporation does not. For example (at present) a corporation can't be a party to a marriage. The closest a corporation comes to any corporal presence is the address listed of their agents.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission".	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.
In English Law, official guidance can state "minor" matters exempt from a statutory requirement -- but on what authority? I just noticed an oddity in some legal guidance published by the UK Government. The Party Wall Act states that certain works are covered by its requirements, including the requirement to give notice. However in apparent contradiction, official guidance documentation from gov.uk and local councils universally states that quite a wide range of minor works would be considered "so minor" as to not require this provision to be complied with. On the face of it, the statute itself doesn't make any provision for any kind of "de minimis" exception. And yet, it's black-and-white stated in the official government-published guidance. Where does the authority for such a statement come from (its source or principle in law), and what is its standing in UK law (i.e., could it be relied on as a matter of law and if so on what basis)? I'm sure such a strong statement wouldn't be included in official guidance without some kind of legal standing/authority, but if so, what exactly is it and how far does the underlying legal principle stretch, which underpins this statement/exception?	The starting point of any analysis has to begin with asking what the scope of the Act's application is i.e. what acts fall under its remit and what does not. The question is whether Parliament intended the Act to apply to ANY alteration to the structure, or only a certain class of acts. Clearly it is not the former. With the latter then in mind, statements like that you pointed out merely acknowledge that the Party Wall Act does not cover every single conceivable alteration to a shared structure, as that statement has to be viewed in its entire context. You have left out the second half of the statement that stipulates the core principle of the Act, which is that the Act only imposes the req to serve notice only if, generally, the alteration would cause much structural change or damage. The de minimis threshold can be inferred from the list of activities covered under section 2. Notice that the general character of the listed activities envisage acts which are atypical (in the sense of just drilling holes etc.). This can also be inferred from Parliament's intent in its drafting of the Act as a whole. Also, it might just be common sense.	Negligent patent infringement is — obviously — not a criminal matter, and will only become one of civil nature if a proper patent infringement notice, pursuant to 35 U.S. Code § 287(b)(2), et seq., is duly served on the infringer, and the infringement continues thereafter. (Although even in the absence of it is not legal, but no action is enforceable without) Therefore, as a practical matter, they couldn't — unless one continues with infringing conduct duly served proper notice on unless the infringement is done knowingly and willfully. Additionally, "non-obvious" is a term of art; its case-law description gives broad discretion to patent examiners, supervisory patent examiners, the PTAB as well as the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court — as the case stands — to decide what is "obvious" and what isn't. For example, there is no case law defined upper limit of how many piece of prior art may be considered together when arguing they, combined, would make a system, method or computer program product obvious. The limitations on this generally require, for e.g, that the combination have an objective; in the absence thereof, an applicant may argue that it would not have been obvious. Lastly, it is not everywhere where there is no exception for private use; the U.S. has no such exception though.	Is a response to a N5B section 21 accelerated claim required to be given on the dedicated form N11B? YES. Assuming this refers to an accelerated possession claim on property let on an assured shorthold tenancy in England then Rule 55.14 Civil Procedure Rules applies: A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Practice Direction 55A, at Rule 1.5, states: [...) The defence must be in form N11, N11B, N11M or N11R, as appropriate. The use of must is well established in British law as meaning a non-optional obligation (unlike should). It is not, as far as I can see, defined by statute so the courts' convention is to use the normal meaning of the word by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary. The recently revised free online version has limited availability but the previous version merged with Dictionary.com which offers these examples: 1 to be obliged or bound to by an imperative requirement 2 to be under the necessity to; need to The use of must in Rule 1.5, by my reading, trumps the use of should in Rule 55.14 but Alice might be able to argue this apparent contradictory terminology as to why her case for her defence is submitted by letter rather than the prescribed form. What happens with this letter when it is received by the court...what happens with the case more generally? Does it get listed for a hearing? Do the contents of her letter reach or get considered by the judge? All that would be a matter for the court to decide and could go either way: a judge has the inherent power to deal with matters in his own court as he sees fit (within the limits of the law etc).	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.	That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.	You are referring to article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 which contains: Article 9 List of mandatory particulars In accordance with Articles 10 to 35 and subject to the exceptions contained in this Chapter, indication of the following particulars shall be mandatory: (...) (l) a nutrition declaration. In a comment you clarify that you are talking about wine. Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 contains: Article 16 Omission of certain mandatory particulars (...) Without prejudice to other Union provisions requiring a list of ingredients or a mandatory nutrition declaration, the particulars referred to in points (b) and (l) of Article 9(1) shall not be mandatory for beverages containing more than 1,2 % by volume of alcohol. As wine contains typically more than 1,2 % alcohol, a nutrition declaration is not required. See also Labelling of alcoholic beverages in the EU: some facts.	There is no legal requirement for an Assured Shorthold Tenancy agreement in England and Wales to be witnessed. Signatories to the agreement are legally free to have it witnessed. Some people may prefer it to be witnessed.	united-states Is a personal text (like a diary), submitted without the consent of the author, admissible evidence? Usually, it is admissible evidence. There is no legal right to keep your diary private. Production of a diary may be compelled by subpoena and admitted into evidence subject only to general considerations regarding whether particular entries in the diary are inadmissible for some other reason (e.g. lack of relevance, they recite the contents of an otherwise privileged discussion, they contain hearsay, they recite the terms of a settlement offer, the recite inadmissible prior act evidence, etc.). If the diary revealed information that could place the diarist at risk of criminal prosecution, the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could arguably be claimed even in a civil case, but at the risk of an adverse inference to be drawn from that decision in civil matters. I haven't ever seen how that issue is resolved legally.
Can you take back a gift? Suppose that I unconditionally and unambiguously give a person a thing such as a necklace with a moderate value (say $1000): I hand it to them and say "Here, you can have this, I don't need it anymore". Then suppose I have giver's remorse and the next day I request that it be returned. Assuming that the recipient has not relied on the fact of me giving it to them (all they would lose is the necklace), can I revoke the act of giving (so that the courts would order the return of the gift)? Then, suppose that I intended to give necklace A but mistakenly gave necklace B which I did not intend to give: can I legally reclaim B? In case it's not clear, I am not asking how I can guarantee a take-back right prior to giving the thing, so agreements are irrelevant. As always, relevant citations appreciated.	No. By handing the necklace the way you described, you commit personal property transfer as all the three requirements are met for the gift to be legally effective: donative intent, delivery and acceptance. Once property has been transferred (no matter gift or sale), it is not yours anymore.	There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.	There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.	You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.	Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED	You are not obligated to pick the thing up, but you are obligated to pay. Analogously, if you go into a restaurant and order a steak, you are obligated to pay for it, but you are not obligated to eat it. You can cancel the steak order within some reasonable short period of time (maybe a minute) – it depends on whether they have relied on your acceptance of their offer, and have done anything that puts them in a worse situation (such as "started cooking it"). You could have informed them that you decided that you didn't want the thing and they might have been able to cancel the order with no or minimum cost to you (depends on whether your job was simply "in the queue", or had they done something like ordered parts or detrimentally committed an employee to some schedule so that other customers could not be serviced). Once you accept their offer, you have an enforceable contract. The additional information about lateness of delivery doesn't clearly change the situation. If there were an explicit "time is of the essence" clause in your contract, related to any delay causing harm, then failure to meet a deadline could constitute a breach of contract. For example, if you have a contract where you will be transported to a location by a specific deadline so that you can get on the boat, failure to meet that deadline causes material harm (if you miss the boat, you suffer a loss). You apparently do not have any such clause, and there's no indication that you suffered a loss because of the delay in delivery. A reasonable delay would not be interpreted as the other party breaching the contract.	The idea is that, by default, we should assume the payment is a gift, unless we have specific evidence to suggest that it is offered in exchange for something. In the first case, the father-in-law has given no indication as to why he is giving her the money. It could be that he is indifferent to whether she remarries or not, and simply wants her to have a steady income in either case. He may be presuming that, if she remarries, her new husband will be able to provide for her, but until such time, he (the father-in-law) will pay her way. We certainly do not have evidence to show that he actually wants her to stay unmarried and is paying her for that purpose. In the second case, the father-in-law has given us more evidence. His words make it explicit that he does want her not to remarry, and that he is paying her in order to get her not to. Since he is clearly paying money with the intention of getting another party to do something (or in this case, to refrain from doing something), we understand it as a contract.	Reading the examples from the ftc site what they mean is if someone sends you a good (intending for you to be the one who owns it) and asks you to pay for it, then it counts as a free gift If a good was accidentally sent to you but intended for someone else, then you keeping the good is theft.
Should I be taxed on electricity in Florida as a private resident? I live in Tallahassee, Florida where everyone gets their electricity from Talgov. I recently looked at my utility bills and realized my electricity charges were about 10-11% larger each month than I expected from the rate posted on the website. I went to my account and saw this discrepancy came from a section on the monthly bill called "Taxes & Credits" so it appears I am being taxed on my electricity. However, when I Google "florida sales tax exemption electricity", the first result has a paragraph that says: Condos & Homeowners Associations This exemption is based upon Section 212.08(7) (j), Florida Statutes and Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.053(1)(a). The sale of electric power or energy by an electric utility is taxable. The sale of electric power or energy for use in residential households, to owners of residential models, or to licensed family day care homes by utilities who are required to pay the gross receipts tax imposed by Chapter 203, F.S., is exempt. Section 212.08(7) (j) reads: (j) Household fuels.—Also exempt from payment of the tax imposed by this chapter are sales of utilities to residential households or owners of residential models in this state by utility companies who pay the gross receipts tax imposed under s. 203.01, and sales of fuel to residential households or owners of residential models, including oil, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, coal, wood, and other fuel products used in the household or residential model for the purposes of heating, cooking, lighting, and refrigeration, regardless of whether such sales of utilities and fuels are separately metered and billed direct to the residents or are metered and billed to the landlord. If any part of the utility or fuel is used for a nonexempt purpose, the entire sale is taxable. The landlord shall provide a separate meter for nonexempt utility or fuel consumption. For the purposes of this paragraph, licensed family day care homes shall also be exempt. The second Google result says: Florida Sales Tax on Energy/Electricity Florida has an automatic residential sales tax exemption for residences and common areas of residential complexes used exclusively for residential purposes. If any of the energy serving a meter is used for commercial purposes, the entire electricity usage is taxable. There is also a PDF link on the Talgov website to an "Application For Refund Of Florida State Sales Tax". Can I just fill out this application and get back the 10% extra I've been paying on my electricity? I certainly don't use any of my electricity for "commercial purposes". I found this news article from over four years ago that seems to be related, but it doesn't give a final answer either way.	As it turns out, Talgov has a convoluted way it bills taxes which it doesn't explain on its bills or website. Its website claims to bill electricity at a rate of $7.59/month + $0.10522/kWh but, with taxes, it actually comes to $8.5631 plus $0.11598/kWh. On top of the advertised rate, it bills a gross receipts tax of 2.56406%. It also bills a public service tax of 10% on the monthly charge + $.07792/kWh + the gross receipts tax. That gets you the higher effective billing rate I mentioned above. The $.07792/kWh is reached by replacing the ECRC rate from the website with $.0077/kWh--I don't know why and I can't find an official document saying this--but that's what is happening apparently. So, Talgov doesn't bill sales tax after all and private residences are not exempt from the taxes it bills. Thus, it has not overcharged me a tax I should be exempt from and Talgov is allowed to do what it is doing, but it would be better if they represented their billing rate more honestly on their website. I'm also still not sure how they reach their 2.56406% gross receipt tax rate. The Florida statute that addresses gross receipt tax seems to specify either 2.5% or 2.6% (I can't figure out which should apply), but not something in between: (b) 1. The rate applied to utility services shall be 2.5 percent. 2. The rate applied to communications services shall be 2.37 percent. 3. An additional rate of 0.15 percent shall be applied to communication services subject to the tax levied pursuant to s. 202.12(1)(a), (c), and (d). The exemption provided in s. 202.125(1) applies to the tax levied pursuant to this subparagraph. 4. The rate applied to electrical power or energy taxed under subparagraph (a)3. shall be 2.6 percent. I found the information about the Talgov tax rates in a document from a Jacksonville utility company that compares utility rates for various utility companies, including many in Florida. Some Florida companies use a 2.5% gross receipt tax and some use a rate between 2.5% and 2.6%. This is also strange because that Florida statute seems to suggest the rate should be uniform statewide. TL;DR: Talgov is not charging sales tax, but rather some other taxes that I am not exempt from. I was able to figure out what rates they were charging for those taxes, but not why.	Summary: Constitutionally, the power of provinces to control liquor sale and to apply sales tax to those same sales are distinct. There must be sufficient presence in a province for its taxation power to apply. This is categorically not the case for sales aboard aircraft. For trains, case law is scant but a case-by-case analysis has so far been favoured. Independently, HST still applies according to the origin province, as that tax is backed by federal power. Liquor control—including sale—is far more complex and is probably an open question. Federal jurisdiction over aviation and railways does not remove provincial powers with respect to control of liquor sale. However, those provincial powers might not apply in this context on their own merits, especially with regards to aircraft. 0. Answer overview Due to the particularities of Canadian federalism, each combination of taxation & liquor control with respect to aircraft & trains could in theory have different answers. I've essentially reframed your specific questions into analysis of these four cases, though I provide direct answers at the end. I'm going to start with sales tax on aircraft since that has the strongest case law available. Then, I'll extend the reasoning to each of the other three cases. Note that to avoid excessive caveating and further lengthening this answer, I've mostly avoided specifying how confident I am in my interpretations of the legislation and case law available. While I'm relatively well-read with respect to the Canadian constitution, I would not consider myself very knowledgeable in the areas of tax, commerce, transportation or liquor. Please make your own judgments based on the strength of the citations and arguments I present. In writing this answer, I generally got less and less confident the further along I was, the exact opposite of what happens after each drink aboard an aircraft (so I'm told). 1. Sales tax Parliament is granted a very broad taxation power by the Constitution Act, 1867 s. 91(3), while provincial taxation power is limited to "within the Province" by s. 92(2). In practice, sales tax in Canada is a mess mix of systems. Parliament has established a federal sales tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Concurrently, all provinces except Alberta have some form of provincial sales tax applied. None of the territories levy an additional sales tax. Further complicating matters, Parliament has developed a Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) whereby participating provinces have ceded their authority in favour of the federal government administering a single sales tax and remitting a percentage which the provinces specify. Currently participating are Ontario and the Atlantic provinces. In Quebec, the arrangement is mostly reversed with Quebec generally administering both federal and provincial sales taxes. The remaining provinces have separately administered federal and provincial sales taxes. 1.1 Sales tax aboard aircraft There are two especially on-point Supreme Court cases, both involving specifically the sale of liquor in-flight. In The Queen (Man.) v. Air Canada, [1980] 2 SCR 303, the court found that: Merely going through the air space over Manitoba does not give the aircraft a situs there to support a tax which constitutionally must be "within the Province". In the case of aircraft operations, there must be a substantial, at least more than a nominal, presence in the Province to provide a basis for imposing a tax in respect of the entry of aircraft into the Province. In reaching this finding, similar American jurisprudence was cited specifically noting that "No question of legislative jurisdiction over air space was involved." This reasoning was then extended to include stopovers. In Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1133, this was further declared to apply to flights entirely within a single province. Therefore, provinces have no constitutional authority to tax sales in-flight as being in the air does not count as "within the Province" for taxation purposes. However, the federal government is not so restricted. While GST is straightforward, things get interesting with HST. It is legislated for in the Excise Tax Act Part IX s. 165(2). Despite the remittance to the participating provinces, it is de jure a federal tax which can therefore still be constitutionally levied. The attached New Harmonized Value-added Tax System Regulations states in s. 23: If a supply of property or a service (other than a passenger transportation service) is made to an individual on board a conveyance in the course of a business of supplying passenger transportation services and the property or service is delivered, performed or made available on board the conveyance during any leg of the journey that begins in any province and ends in any province, the supply is made in the province in which that leg of the journey begins. Therefore, if the leg of a journey beings in an HST province, the sale of liquor in-flight is taxed according to the origin HST. Otherwise, only GST could be charged per constitutional reasons above. Note that Quebec falls in the non-HST category. While it administers both federal and provincial sales taxes, they are still separate taxes unlike the HST. 1.2 Sales tax aboard trains The question is now whether sales aboard trains, and more generally, land-based transport are sufficiently "within the Province" to fall within provincial taxation power. Case law is scant, but four of the five applicable cases I could find have refused to mechanically apply the result from aircrafts, preferring to undertake a factual analysis on whether sufficient presence is established. They are Ace-Atlantic Container Express Inc, Re, 1992 CanLII 7103 (NL CA), Canpotex Ltd. v. British Columbia, 1999 CanLII 5844 (BC SC), Pétromont and Company Limited Partnership v. Ontario (Finance), 2008 CanLII 5980 (ON SC), Dow Chemical Canada Inc. v. R., 1992 CanLII 1019 (BC CA) and Lynden Transport Inc. v. British Columbia (Finance), 1981 CanLII 785 (BC CA). Notably, Lynden involved only transit through the province and directly applied the result from R. (Man.) v. Air Canada to find that the province could not apply its taxation power in this instance. Canpotex also involved transit only, engaging in some analysis before considering itself bound by Lynden. The other three are all similar fact patterns and results. Most operations of the taxed companies were transit through the province, but not exclusively. The non-transit operations were found to be a sufficient enough presence to allow the province to apply a general tax. Pétromont at para. 79 notably emphasized length of time railcars spent in the province as a reason for departing from R. (Man.) v. Air Canada. Unfortunately, none of these are directly analogous to sale of liquor aboard a train. They were all about whether tax could be applied to the land transport vehicle or the goods contained therein. There are hints in some of these cases and their citations of CPA Ltd. v. BC that this may make a difference, but nothing anywhere near definitive. Constitutional questions about provincial taxation power aside, I can find no statutory difference between planes and trains with respect to the applicability of HST per the Excise Tax Act regulations cited in the previous section (all cases cited here are pre-HST in the participating provinces). 2. Liquor control There is no singular "liquor" power in the constitution. This has resulted in liquor control having an extraordinary amount of possible constitutional bases for both Parliament and the provincial legislatures. To maintain a degree of sobriety (I'm sorry), I will focus my analysis on the provincial power to control sale of liquor which typically applies within their borders and whether federal jurisdiction over aircraft and railways impede this power. To fully understand the scope of the constitutional complexity of liquor, I strongly recommend reading in full the lecture paper The Effect of Alcohol on the Canadian Constitution ... Seriously (2011) by the Honourable Morris J. Fish (Supreme Court justice 2003-2013) though it is not strictly necessary for this answer. Note there are a few paragraphs in French, they aren't crucial to overall understanding. 2.1 Liquor control aboard aircraft As you point out, Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [1997] 2 SCR 581 at least to some extent confirms that airlines can still be subject to provincial liquor control. Specifically, the court found at paras. 72-76 that provision of onboard liquor is not a core part of the federal aviation power. Therefore, this opens the door for provincial liquor sale law to be applied in-flight. However, this provincial power must be grounded (again, I'm sorry) in a constitutionally granted power. In Air Canada v. Ontario the court acknowledged that a possible consequence of their main result was that provinces could impose importation fees on liquor that merely passed through their airspace (paras. 63-66). However, this is clearly dicta and was partially due to a very specific lending of federal power that isn't generally applicable here (or currently, as the involved federal statute has since been amended). I mainly wished to point out that the fact provincial airspace is not within provincial taxation jurisdiction does not imply provincial airspace is immune from all provincial authority. Moving on to powers specifically granted to the provinces by the constitution, there are three different bases that justify the provinces' ability to locally control liquor sale enumerated in the Constitution Act, 1867 (emphasis mine): In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, [...] Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes. [...] Property and Civil Rights in the Province. [...] Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province. Those familiar with the constitution will recognize the latter two powers as the "default" ones which allow the provinces do most things within their territory. Indeed, Air Canada v. Ontario acknowledges that 92(16) authorizes the provincial liquor monopolies (para. 54). In addition to the two usual suspects, there's 92(9) which by its wording likely doesn't amount to full control, but certainly allows imposing licences on liquor sale. The main question is whether any of them can apply extra-provincially or in provincial airspace. As you can probably guess by my added emphasis, extra-provincial legislation is generally not allowed (see eg. Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [1984] 1 SCR 297 at pg. 332). Yes, this does mean I'm extremely suspicious of WestJet's assertion tying their policy to a single province's laws, though I can certainly understand wanting to be in compliance with the liquor licences issued by your home province. As for airspace, Air Canada v. Ontario appears to be the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing provincial airspace jurisdiction. All we can note is that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the possibility of provincial influence on their airspace. It's additionally possible that even if provinces do in fact have jurisdictional control, aircraft might not be found to be "in" the province much like they are not "within" for taxation purposes. Should the provinces not have liquor control jurisdiction on the aircraft, this jurisdiction would default to Parliament through the Constitution Act, 1867 s. 91 peace, order, and good government clause. On the other hand, if the provinces have the necessary aircraft liquor control jurisdiction, it might be possible for Parliament to encroach on that jurisdiction, though I will decline detailed analysis. I would mainly be wildly speculating, and since your question concentrated on provincial power, I am content having found the necessary conditions for provinces to exercise their local liquor control power when there is no encroachment. I'll just briefly gloss the general constitutional principles: Parliament could not encroach by passing effectively provincial liquor control legislation and saying it's allowed because of their aviation power (pith and substance doctrine), though it's possible they could find a way through paramountcy or a separate power under s. 91 (in particular if sale aboard inter-provincial transport constitutes inter-provincial trade), since liquor control is complex and constitutionally divided. Finally I'll quickly comment on Porter Airline's FAQ you cite. They partially attribute their in-flight drinking age to the Canadian Aviation Regulations. It's an incredibly lengthy regulation so it's very possible I missed something, but I can't find any basis for this attribution. Perhaps telling is that in the very next FAQ question on drinking limit, they state: Under Canadian Aviation Regulations (602.04), cabin crew is expected to stop serving alcohol to a passenger who appears to be intoxicated. A specific section of the regulations is cited, now that one definitiely exists! Also, this is a good example of a federal regulation I would guess to be constitutionally valid through pith and substance & paramountcy doctrines (again, assuming provincial liquor control jurisdiction to begin with). Avoiding having unruly intoxicated passengers can reasonably be tied to the federal aviation power and so would displace any provincial legislation contrary to that. 2.2 Liquor control aboard trains While federal jurisdiction over aircraft is long established through the Aeronautics Reference, the basis for federal jurisdiction over trains is slightly more complex. The Constitution Act, 1867 s. 92(10)(a) confers federal jurisdiction over inter-provincial and international railways and s. 92(10)(c) allows Parliament to issue a declaration that a railway falls under federal jurisdiction, both in conjunction with s. 91(29). If Wikipedia is to be believed, railways are the majority reason for a 92(10)(c) declaration. The Queen v. Board of Transport Commissioners, [1968] SCR 118 confirms that the federal jurisdiction over railways extends to any train on those railways. I don't think it's controversial to state that provincial liquor sale law applies on trains outside federal jurisdiction. For those in federal jurisdiction, I don't see a reason why the legal reasoning in Air Canada v. Ontario wouldn't also apply, as well as the constitutional principles I covered in reference to it (substituting "airspace" for "railspace," I suppose). For trains, I would just add that as land-based transport, they might be more likely found to be "in the Province" and therefore under provincial liquor control. Indeed, it's difficult to imagine that if they can be "within the Province" for taxation purposes, they wouldn't also be "in the Province," as that appears to be a less stringent requirement per the line of case law established by the cited R. (Man.) v. Air Canada, CPA Ltd. v. BC and Air Canada v. Ontario (though frustratingly, never an absolute direct constitutional confirmation). 3. Answers to your main questions Do provincial laws on sales and supply of liquor apply to services of alcohol on board a plane or a train subject to federal jurisdiction? If so, which province's law apply, and to what extent? Open question, more likely yes on trains. If the province's law applies at all, it would apply within its borders and probably close to full extent. Does the law treat aircrafts (in air) and trains (on ground) differently? Does it matter if the plane or train makes any stop in the province? Aircraft and trains can be treated differently for sales tax and maybe for liquor control as well. Essentially this comes down to land-based transport being "closer" to usual provincial jurisdiction. For aircraft, stops matter only for determining whether HST applies. For trains, stops could additionally contribute to them being found to be more fully in the jurisdiction of the province they stop in. Which province's sales tax (HST/PST/QST), if any, apply to in-flight and on-train purchases? I would assume the destination since that's the assumed place of consumption, but it seems that it would be very complicated for trains. For travel by either mode, only origin HST (or federal GST) can be applied for each leg of the journey. PST and the provincial portion of QST are constitutionally barred from applying on flights. Provinces might be able to charge on-train sales tax within their borders given sufficient company presence.	Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.	I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant.	Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.	My understanding is that the "flow-through" treatment is specifically a tax law concept. The LLC has its own income, which it can use to pay expenses or acquire assets or for whatever other purpose, and such assets become the property of the LLC. It's just that when it comes time to pay taxes, the LLC's net income is taxed as income to the owner. But that does not mean that the LLC's income is treated the same as the owner's income in all other legal contexts.	The legal question is whether a tax (state or federal) constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the 5th Amendment eminent domain clause. The Courts have always held that a generally applicable tax does not constitute a taking, so the income tax is not a taking. The Court came to this conclusion because the 5th Amendment takings clause was always understood to refer to government exercise of the power of eminent domain, rather than generally applicable taxes or regulations, even though they might have a negative economic effect on someone by causing their property to be taken for public use or by making their property less valuable. The exclusion of taxes from 5th Amendment takings predates the 16th Amendment. There have always been taxes and taxes are always collected for public use. The direct/indirect tax distinction arises not under the 5th Amendment, but under Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the United States Constitution and governs what kinds of taxes Congress is authorized to impose. This has nothing to do with the 5th Amendment.	There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France
Are there laws restricting who can go into "employees only" areas? I attempted to research this on my own, but found absolutely no results. Is there anything legally restricting customers from entering areas marked "employees only" and/or areas that aren't marked but are clearly not intended to be accessed by the public (such as a stockroom, employee bathroom, etc.)? Is it any form of trespassing or something similar that an employer could use as basis for legal action or calling law enforcement in an extreme case (e.g., disgruntled customer walks into the employee only area and refuses to leave until xyz demands are met)?	...a disgruntled customer walks into the employee only area and refuses to leave until xyz demands are met. That is called trespassing. Trespass is defined by the act of knowingly entering another person’s property without permission. Trespass \| Wex Legal Dictionary \| Legal Information Institute The boundary between areas legally accessible by the public and not is marked by the "Employees Only" signage. "Employees Only" in that context means "No Trespassing." The property owners, the police and the courts understand that. (Trespassing) is held to infringe upon a property owner’s legal right to enjoy the benefits of ownership. Of course, criminal charges and possible civil actions vary among jurisdictions, and can be superseded at the local, state and federal level. Criminal charges, which range from violation to felony, may be brought against someone who interferes with another person’s legal property rights. Criminal trespasses, depending on the venue of jurisdiction and case circumstances, fall under different subsets of law.	(IANAL, of course) My employer tells me that EVERY professional activity belongs to the company and for EVERY activity I mentioned before I need to get written permission, That's true for software (and inventions) that may be relevant for them, but not for other professional activities. which could be withdrawn at any moment. No, not in that very general sense. they can give the permission to publish possibly relevant pieces of code on SX, and they can withdraw that permission for the future. But they cannot take it back for the past. Once they tell you they don't want your invention, there's no way back from that decision (and there are legal deadlines for claiming relevance). Even if they require written permission for you to take a side job, they must give it unless they can show a valid reason against you taking the side job in question. And that would be a per-side-job decision. And it doesn't matter if I do it on my free time on my computer at home or not. That is indeed the case for copyright of software and for inventions. clause is to protect your employer from you helping anyone who is their competitor/you being their competitor while the employment lasts. This is pretty standard and, I believe, not only legal but would be the case also if they had not spelled out this to you. The lines between what is and what is not competition are sometimes a bit complicated* So, if your employer specializes in subway station surveillance systems and you work on face recognition and then help out your local pigeon breeder's association by implementing automatic door opening by camera + automated face recognition of the [unwinged] members that's close enough to touching the interests of your employer that I'd consider it off-limits unless you had talked to your employer and they are happy with this project (after all, they could be preparing similar products unknown to you). OTOH, overhauling the crappy Excel macros for the regional annual breeder's competition would be fine. And in general, the lower your position there and the further from the actual focus of the company, the more normal it is to have another job (think janitors, canteen staff of a software company as opposed to a janitor in a hire-a-janitor-service company) The general duty not be in competition with your employer also in general prevents you from being involved in a competitor business to the extent that you have noticable influence over that competitor. So the second part of clause 1 shouldn't be too surprising, neither. (update) OTOH, what may make this particular clause invalid is the requirement also for publicly traded shares that they cannot come with voting rights. I somehow suspect that thus prohibiting you from "normal person small scale ownership" of publicly traded stocks (not all of them even have non-voting shares) is undue and invalid (too broad a restriction). However, if that clause is invalid the legal default of "no competition to employer" still applies. Here's a (German language) web site of a lawyer that discusses these questions See also here https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Wettbewerbsverbot.html Unlike the 1st clause, this is AFAIK not a spelled out default of German employment law, but it may be a spelled out version of a Tarifvertrag (unionized group contract). In any case it is probably legal to have this clause in the contract. The point is that the employer can only forbid the side job if it is against their reasonable interests, a general "no side jobs whatsoever" would be invalid. Side note: they may even be of the opinion that employment law forces them to have some such clause: the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that you are not working more than the number of hours allowed by law. I've had such a permission that stated the constraint that the permission is valid only as long as I ensure that I stay within those legal limits and my working ability for employer is not compromised. https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Nebentaetigkeit.html https://www.fachanwalt.de/ratgeber/nebentaetigkeit-als-arbeitnehmer-anmelden-zustimmung-und-muster-antrag https://www.haufe.de/personal/arbeitsrecht/top-thema-nebenbeschaeftigung/nebentaetigkeit-und-arbeitsrecht-was-erlaubt-ist_76_418602.html Copyright law for employees in Germany is somewhat difficult. the one exception is copyright of software where §69b UrhG transfers the transferrable rights automatically to the employer. Whether the software is written out of office and outside working hours is irrelevant, as long as it is done in "fulfillment of the employee's role or the employer's orders" (famous court case) so again, if at work you code facial recognition systems and in the evening the pigeon breeders accounting system, the latter is not related to your work. Your open source game is also OK unless you are employed as game developer. Also that not all code is subject to copyright. An obvious explanation on SX explaining a typical pattern would not be a creative work (though the full answer may very well be) in the first place. But for creative works other than software such as plans how to implement features, technical drawings, etc. working hours or not seems to be more important for assigning the rights and the rules seem to be more similar to employee invention law ArbnErfG): if it is outside working hours and possibly relevant for the employer, the employee has to offer it to the employer before trying to sell to someone else. The clause that employer must give permission to publication of content that is possibly relevant for them seems to me to be in line with these general rules. https://www.zeit.de/karriere/beruf/2011-06/arbeitsrecht-urheberrecht https://eventfaq.de/25510-urheberrechte-im-arbeitsverhaeltnis/ http://www.urheberrecht-leipzig.de/urheberrecht-nutzungsrechte-des-arbeitgebers-an-kreativen-leistungen-der-mitarbeiter.html * I've been advised in a situation where I still believe I was not competing, and even had a written permission, that this is the stuff that makes lawyers rich, and both employee and employer poor.... Take home message: even if you believe to legally have the right to publish on SX/contribute to an open source project, think again whether you'd want this to be the source of a conflict with your employer - or whether there isn't a win-win possibility that makes everyone happy instead. What is the most legal way to participate in public activities in such situation? I'd advise to be open about what public activities you'd like follow. Whatever the contract says, your employer can always give your more permissions. In the past, I've found the majority of employers being happy to see me contributing (some had similar clauses to yours and just wanted to know, some was happy about an open source project I brought, some like to be able to say where their employees volounteer, etc.). Although there was one who wasn't (and that did contribute to my decision to leave there). From that experience, I'd personally discuss this early on now: in case the employer turns out to be too intrusive (speak to Betriebsrat or lawyer or your union if you have one to make sure they really overstep their rights) for my liking, for me that would be a reason to cancel the contract which is easier & faster during probation period.	It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.	Anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. have exceptions for someone who rents a room in a landlord's own residence, but generally speaking, for other purposes, there is not a distinction in U.S. or Florida law. People who stay at a place with the permission of the owner for a very brief period of time and not pursuant to a lease, such as someone who gains use of a particular seat in a movie theater pursuant to a purchased ticket, is, however, not a tenant with the full rights of a tenant, and is instead a licensee who does not have a property right to use that space, only a contract that can be terminated by the property owner or their agent at will, potentially with breach of contract damages if this is done without justification, but not with liability for violating a tenant's rights. In some cases, someone whose housing, at least part of the time, is for the convenience of the employer, like a medical resident who uses a sleeping room at a hospital, or a member of the crew of a ship who sleeps on the ship incident to their duties, may have reduced rights relative to housing when their employment is terminated for cause, although this is only sometimes clearly enunciated in statutes or case law and the law would not be terribly consistent in this area.	You can't just interpret the word "require" in isolation, you have to focus on what is allowed vs. disallowed by law. Guidance point K.1 starts with the rhetorical question Under the ADA, Title VII, and other federal employment nondiscrimination laws, may an employer require all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19? They respond that no federal EEO laws prohibit such a requirement "subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations" (thus providing an answer to the question whether it can always be "required". However, they do not discuss the possibility that other laws (non-EEO, state, local: also contract law) that would prevent an employer from "requiring" a vaccination. They do not elaborate on ways that an employer might "require" a vaccination, leaving it to the inventive reader to figure out what legal leverage a company might have to get compliance. Assaulting non-compliant employees is not legal; withholding wages is not legal. Reassigning a non-compliant worker to working in the sub-basement may be legal, requiring a non-compliant worker to wear an anti-vaxer warning badge might be legal. Firing the employee, or reducing their hours to 0 until they comply, might be legal. But the EEOC is not advising employers in safe ways to sanction non-compliant workers, they are just stating their interpretation of applicable anti-discrimination law. Indeed, they can only address matters of discrimination, because that is what they address in general. They do not write the labor law regulations, that's the job of the Dept. of Labor. They are not giving legal advice as to the scope of allowed requirements set by employers.	Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).	As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal.	Owners of property establish rules of trespass. This applies when the government owns the land just as it does for private property owners. Being a citizen of a country does not give you ownership rights on government land. The government is question can apply multiple rules to multiple pieces of property such as: Park use only during certain hours of the day No unauthorized access Access only for certain uses, such as no camping allowed Certainly no one thinks that military bases, prisons, etc. should have unrestricted access by the public. In general, if you're not allowed to be there the government will put up barriers, gates, lock doors, etc., or place signage to indicate limits. Really not all that different from private property.
Are public facilities required to adhere to the Flag Code as defined in Title 4, Chapter 1 of the United States Code? I'm curious as to whether public facilities in the United States (i.e. federal, state, county, and/or municipal grounds) are required, by law, to adhere to the Flag Code as defined in Title 4, Chapter 1 of the United States Code. It is my understanding that the Supreme Court has upheld the unconstitutionality of enforcing the Flag Code on private citizens or organizations as it conflicts with their First Amendment rights (United States v. Eichman), but are public facilities such as a public schools or police stations required to adhere to the flag code? Are those acting in an official capacity in those facilities legally required to adhere to the Flag Code as they are operating a public facility? For example, Section 6, Clause g states, "The flag should be displayed during school days in or near every schoolhouse." If a school were to fail to display the flag, would that be considered a crime? Who would be responsible if it were a crime?	Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	maryland I think not In Maryland (a typical state on such issues) the relevant law is Section 9-101 - Perjury, which reads in pertinent part: a) Prohibited.- A person may not willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact: (1) if the false swearing is perjury at common law; (2) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local law; (3) in an affidavit made to induce a court or officer to pass an account or claim; (4) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local government or governmental official with legal authority to require the issuance of an affidavit; or (5) in an affidavit or affirmation made under the Maryland Rules. A statement of intended future conduct is probably not a "fact" as required by this section. Classic perjury, that is making a false statement during testimony in an actual court session is covered by subsection (a)(1), which makes it relevant what was considered perjury at common law. In Volume 2 of A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States By Francis Wharton (Kay and brother, 1874) section 2226 says: At Common law perjury cannot be committed in an official oath, as far as such oath touches future conduct. On page 321 of The Law and Higher Education: a Casebook by John Seiler Brubacher (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971) appears the phrase: ... a promise of future conduct, the breach of which would not support a conviction for perjury This was in reference to the 1931 US law mandating a loyalty oath, and why such a law violates due process. Also relevant is the article "When Is a False Statement Perjury?" by the MoloLamken law firm. This discusses the federal perjury lws: 18 U.S.C. §1621 and 18 U.S.C. §1623. There is no mention of false sttements about future conduct.	The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes).	Can you be trespassing on public property for no reason at all? Yes. When the government owns property, it can direct you to leave for any reason (even a legally invalid reason), and you are trespassing if you don't leave. When you are present on land you don't own with permission, but without a lease, you have a "license" to be there which is a contract-like right and is not a property right. A license doesn't give you the right to stay on the property over the objections of the owner or an agent of the owner. You might be able to receive money damages for an improper termination of your license to be present at the property (e.g. if you are told for no reason to leave a movie after paying for a ticket), but you don't have the right to simply stay there. If you stay there over the objections of the owner or the owner's agent, you are trespassing. The law applicable to government property owners and private property owners is basically the same in this regard. Realistically, on government property, furthermore, the standard by which the government employee may legally terminate your license to be there and exclude you from the property is low. Basically, it must merely not violate any constitutional right you may have, and you do not have a constitutional right to be present on government owned property, except in a quite narrow subset of cases (e.g. the "town square"). More exactly, you do not have a right to be on government property per se, but you can't be excluded from it for a constitutionally impermissible reason. The government gets to decide what parts of property it owns are available to the general public and for what content-neutral purposes. Thus, the right to be present on government owned "public" property (which doesn't include private areas of government owned property) can be subjected to reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. For example, a town could legally decide that the town square is closed from midnight to eight a.m. every day. The quoted material from the case Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) cited in the answer by bdb484 is narrower than a plain reading out of context would suggest. In that quotation, the term "public place" is being used in a sense much more restrictive than in the broader sense of property that is merely government owned. It is referring to places where the government has expressly or implicitly allowed members of the general public to be present on land that it owns (as opposed, for example, to a government office area of a building, or a maintenance facility in a government owned park, or a conservation area in a government owned park). This narrow sense of the word resolves what would otherwise seem to be a contradiction in the law. But, the government has the authority to make something that once was a public place into a non-public place going forward. For example, historically, the Civic Center park in front of the capitol in Denver, Colorado has been a public place. But, the government can and did close it off to the public for many months for maintenance and out of public health concerns when heavy use of it by homeless people and drug dealers caused the premises to be seriously damaged and created a public health risk from it being used to dispose of dirty, used, injection-drug syringes, and for people to defecate. A Hypothetical Suppose that Chris is the sole librarian in one of the towns of College Corner, which is on the Ohio-Indiana border, which are in different time zones. In that capacity, Chris has the authority to set library policies including the hours of the library and the rules for its use without the approval of anyone else. Chris has a hot date at 5:30 p.m. But, at lunch time, Chris learned that the hot date was at 5:30 p.m. in Ohio and not an hour later at 5:30 p.m. in Indiana, but the library's official closing time is 5 p.m. in Indiana, because Ohio was observing daylight savings time, but Indian was not, at the time when this happened. Chris, as the sole government official in charge of the library, decides to close the library before its posted closing time at 4:00 p.m. Indiana time (5 p.m. Ohio time) in order to be able to make it to the hot date. Chris quietly asks everyone left in the library to leave at 4 p.m. Indiana time, and everyone but you does. But you, who are homeless, really want to stay the extra hour before getting out in the cold and finding a bridge to sleep under, so you refuse to leave saying that the library is still open until 5 p.m. Indiana time, as stated in its posted hours. Chris orders you to leave and warns you that he is calling the police to remove you if you don't do so voluntarily. The police arrive and restate the complaint of Chris. The police arrest you for trespassing and you are charged with this crime in the appropriate court by the appropriate prosecuting attorney. You had done nothing wrong whatsoever prior to being asked to leave and refusing to do so. But, Chris has not violated your constitutional rights by ordering you removed for some unconstitutional reason. Chris then goes on the hot date; it is love at first sight, and Chris gets married the next week. As an apology for putting you out for the sole convenience of Chris, Chris invites you to the wedding. Do you have a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge on the grounds that the librarian's actions were unconstitutional? No. You might have a "good faith claim of right" defense, however, to the criminal charges. Do you have a valid claim for money damages for a violation of your constitutional rights? No. Indeed, ordering you removed for "no reason" that has anything to do with your conduct, as in this case, is probably more likely to be legal and constitutional, than having you removed for "some reason" other than just "because I the librarian say so" that doesn't involve wrongdoing on your part. A Variation In The Hypothetical If instead, your were being ordered to leave the library because you were wearing an National Rifle Association cap (and the library didn't prohibit wearing caps), this affirmative reason, which is contrary to the First Amendment freedom of expression, would be a violation of your constitutional rights, which would definitely be a basis for a civil lawsuit against the librarian and police involved in you being arrested. I don't know the details of constitutional defenses in criminal law well enough to know if the violation of your constitutional rights would be a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge (or a failure to obey a police officer's order to leave charge) resulting from you failing to leave in that circumstance, and I can see legitimate arguments both ways. This is also a situation where the non-constitutional claim of right defense to a trespassing charge would be a strong one.	Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing.	Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.	The state has wide discretion on what to require that a school teach to children, particularly in the K-12 grade range. There is little case law where a parent or private school has challenged such requirements. However, for a state to forbid that certain things be taught would probably run into a first amendment problem, because the school has free speech rights. In addition, if the school is a religious one, forbidding teaching its dogmas and views might also impact the free exercise clause. Note that a state need not permit homeschooling at all, and some states do not. When a state requires that a school teach something that it disagrees with, it can often follow a line such as "Many people think X {Standard state supported concept} but we believe Y instead. Then it has taught X, but not endorsed it. Some religious schools have handles the teaching of evolution in this sort of way. If a state mandated teaching matters of opinion as fact, such as "CARTER WAS THE MOST HANDSOME president EVER" there might well be a challenge, and I am not at all sure how it would be resolved.
Destroying the TSA's equipment So let's say that you were detained by the TSA on your way out of the US. They demand your phone password and you give it too them. Now when they attempt to plug your phone, you phone breaks their computer (either by accident or on purpose). Would the TSA be able of charging you for anything and would they be able to inflict any repercussions on you (except for detaining you for longer)?	Intentional sabotage of a TSA computer system is almost certainly a serious crime and would also almost surely give rise to civil liability, although you might avoid both if you warned the TSA that the phone was set up to intentionally break their system, in which case it might be confiscated as contraband. If the product had a "feature" unknown to you and that you had no reasonable reason to know of that caused the harm, you would ultimately have no criminal or civil liability, although the manufacturer might be strictly liable to the TSA under a product liability theory, and you would probably be detained as a witness to figure out what happened. If the product had a "feature" that broke the TSA computer that could be de-activated and that you meant to de-active but carelessly failed to, you would have negligence liability to the government and might or might not have criminal liability (I'm not enough of an expert in the relevant statutes to know). You might be liable for a strict liability Federal Communications Commission offense for having a device that is in violation of their regulations.	I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.	I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.	Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.	Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de\|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.	I'm confident that there has been no successful breach of contract lawsuit on that basis: that is not the right legal basis. Actions against a shoplifter would either be under tort law or, much more likely, criminal law. Put simply, theft is a crime, encoded in the laws of all nations, and the government will shoulder the burden of punishing a shoplifter. Since the goal of criminal law is to guarantee a well-ordered society (not to restore the victim of the crime), a victim of theft may have to pursue their own legal case against the criminal, if they want to be restored for their loss (let us say that the criminal also ate the evidence).	This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.	Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.
Could Puerto Rico become part of a US state? Could Puerto Rico become part of a US state? I realise it has long been proposed as a 51st state, but that seems unlikely. So how about this alternative?	Yes. This would require the consent of Congress and the accepting U.S. state, but Puerto Rico's consent would not be constitutionally required (although it would be prudent to obtain and probably would be obtained as a matter of custom and fairness). New York States has floated the possibility of annexing Puerto Rico since it is the single most concentrated destination of Puerto Rican migration to the mainland historically and has a large and politically well organized Puerto Rican community and would favor the expansion of Democratic political party power that this annexation would entail. Contiguity is less of a concern for Puerto Rico since it is an island in any case. Florida would be another natural candidate, but its conservative/purple political makeup would probably oppose such an annexation even though geographically it would be a more natural annexing state. In a similar vein, there have been proposals to annex all of the District of Columbia except the federal mall to Maryland subject to the same formal requirements. Either annexation would be a compromise. It would give these territories full statehood status and full representation in the U.S. House but would deny Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, respective, their own two seats in the U.S. Senate which would favor Democrats more than mere annexation would.	Your caveat about not being a national of either country is a bit puzzling, because your question is about acquiring the countries' nationality, which implies as a matter of course that you do not presently have either nationality. After acquiring each country's nationality, of course, you will be a national of that country, so by the time you are a dual citizen of Italy and the US, it will no longer be true that you are not a national of either country. In other words, it's analogous to asking "Will I be able to get a driver's license after I learn how to drive? The problem is that I don't have a driver's license." US law does not require you to renounce Italian citizenship if you naturalize as a US citizen. I don't know Italian law on the matter very well, but the relevant section in Wikipedia says, without citations, that naturalizing elsewhere does not cause loss of Italian citizenship. Assuming that is true, and that neither country makes any relevant changes in its nationality law, then the answer to your question is yes: you can be a dual citizen of both Italy and the United States. (In fact, you may at that point hold three or more citizenships if your current country or countries of citizenship does not or do not have laws causing you to lose citizenship when you naturalize in Italy or the US.)	Any country can certainly decide who it should grant citizenship status to. There is no international rule that I know of requiring that the recipient be currently a resident of the country granting citizenship. Any country may issue passports to its citizens.	Nothing will happen. Wait for the 2030 census and January 3rd 2033. Representatives are only recalculated after each census. The last census and recalculation was 2020. So no ordinary recalculation will happen till 2030. It's unclear if there could be an extra census, which then might lead to redistricting - the only rules (in the constitution) I can find are, that a census has to happen every 10 years. Current laws are, that it happens every 10 years. It's up to politics to introduce laws to allow an extra census, but to make it that obvious that it is needed, there needs to be an exodus/death toll of the scale of the black death in Europe (one in 4 dies/moves) or a total depopulation of an area like New York City. Which has 8 million inhabitants, something like 10 districts, and is growing. Back in 1918 H1N1 killed between 2% and 10% of those that got it and in total about 675,000 (of 103.2 million) in the US, mainly in cities that did lag in their reaction to the fall/winter wave in 1918. As three (not fully) random examples: Philadelphia lost 16000 for something around 941 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (the town had about 1.7 million inhabitants at the time), LA had a death toll of only 494 per 100,000, all of Nebraska lost between 2800 and 7500 people on a population of 1.3 million - for - for between 200 and 580 deaths per 100,000. Yet despite this very disparate impact it barely impacted the 1920 census. Not even the hurricane Katrina, which pretty much wiped out New Orleans, did not result in an extra census and restructuring - so it is very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, there is a formula for assigning representatives. We use the same setup since the 1940 census. Legal basis? 2 USC §2b dictates each state gets at least one: Each State shall be entitled, in the Seventy-eighth and in each Congress thereafter until the taking effect of a reapportionment under a subsequent statute or section 2a of this title, to the number of Representatives shown in the statement transmitted to the Congress on January 8, 1941, based upon the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to receive less than one Member. 2 USC §2c dictates how many representative districts exist and how many representatives it will have: In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress [1969] or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress). The Redistricting is State-Law - and there are roughly 5 types how it's done. So, one representative per district. One district per representative. District borders are to be redrawn based on the decennial census as demanded in Art. 1 §2 - where it is called Enumeration: The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; [provisional numbers] When will redistricting take effect? Redistricting lags one term behind, and it will not fire or remove a representative from office, whose district is scheduled to vanish - or elect new people. That's because redistricting on the state level can only happen after the reapportionment of the seats has been handed out by the clerk of the House of representatives. Reapportionment has a deadline of 25th January the year after the census. That's after the house term starts. Since at that moment the districts are still in existence, the term of the current holder first needs to run out before the new districts take effect. So the district ceases to exist the same day they leave office on January 3rd. A good example would be New York: The 45th district was redistricted from the 43rd District and elected first for in 1944, and was redistricted back into the 43rd District after the 1950 census. It was last voted for in 1950, well before the results of the census were handed out and redistricting happened. So the district ceased to be the same day Daniel A. Reed left the office on January 3rd of 1953. The 28th Congressional District was established in 1823 and eliminated on January 3rd 2013 as a result of the 2010 census. The last election for its seat was - obviously - in 2010. As a result, any changes to the district map stemming from the 2020 census will take effect only on January 3rd 2023, and a massive depopulation showing in the 2030 census will have an effect only in the elections for the house that begins its term on January 3rd 2033.	with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.	One approach is to sue the (state) government, to see if the state or US Supreme Courts agree. This is probably the most complicated way to get what you want, because it involves a lot of legal arguing, but you don't need a lot of people to agree with you, you just need the right people agreeing with you. Another approach is to change the relevant state statute (repeal, reword, add another); or, you could change the state's Constitution. Changes could either come via the legislature, or via the people. The role of the people, in the case of a legislative change, is to politically persuade the government to do what you want. Via the initiative process you can eliminate the government-approval step by writing the desired change, then it gets voted on in an election if it qualifies (gets the necessary number of valid signatures: 8% of the last gubernatorial election). An example is Prop 1a (1966), which brought about a number of constitutional changes. There is in fact a distinction between an amendment and a revision, the latter being more extensive (Prop 1a was a large-scale revision). An example of a statutory change is this, Prop 12 (2018), which passed. Instead of collecting signatures, one can persuade a majority of the legislature, but this still requires voter approval. The easiest path for changing the law is for the people to persuade the legislature, because the legislature has the power to change / add laws. Even then, some legislative acts have to also be submitted to popular vote for (dis)approval, either bond measures or amendments to previous voter initiatives.	There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France	Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.
Does a rental car contract violation equate car theft? In the USA, many rental car agencies have clauses prohibiting driving on unpaved roads: for example, see those questions on Travel.SE: (1), (2), (3). From one example agreement including some causes many renters are likely to be in violation of: Prohibited vehicle uses and activities include: (...) Using a vehicle (...) other than on paved roads (whether "off-roading", driving on unimproved roads or parking areas, or otherwise) (...) to transport any flammable (...) substances The first point implies that any car (even a jeep) cannot be taken onto unpaved driveway or parking lot. The second point implies one can't have fuel in the fuel tank, and even if that's likely not what they mean, it means one can't bring a lighter or camping fuel. Many are likely to violate both items (for example, many tourists in rental cars park at the gravel parking lot for the popular Antelope Canyon tourist attraction, knowingly or unknowingly breaching their rental contract). A comment to a now-deleted post stated that If you use a rental car in an unauthorized manner, your right to use it terminates, and you are driving in a stolen vehicle. Is that right? If someone has signed a rental contract stating prohibiting the use of the vehicle other than on paved roads, and then violates this by driving the car onto a gravel driveway or parking area, does that mean the renter is guilty of car theft? For the purposes of this question, you may assume California, USA, but other answers are also welcome.	No If you breach the contract that may allow the rental company to terminate it (among other things), however, termination would need to be communicated to the customer. Only if they kept it after that, with the intention of permanently depriving the company of it, are they stealing it.	In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do.	No, she cannot 42-2-101(3), C.R.S. provides: “No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has in his or her immediate possession a current driver’s or minor driver’s license or an instruction permit issued by the department under this article.” "(5) No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without having such license or permit in such person's immediate possession." The law requires you to carry your license. If your sister only has an instruction permit in her possession, she must operate under its rules until she is in possession of her permanent license. Just in case people think "highway" means a high-speed roadway, the CRS defines highway: "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state.	There are only two rules I am aware of that apply to rear-end collisions on a roadway (in which all vehicles are properly headed in the same direction): The first vehicle that hits another in the rear is at fault for the collision, and any collateral collisions. The preceding rule is always true unless there is evidence that the vehicle that was struck did something reckless or intentional to cause the collision. For example, "cutting" in front of a truck and decelerating unnecessarily and faster than the truck can brake. (Before dashcams became widespread this was a common tactic of fraudsters, who would subsequently sue the "rear-ender's" insurance company for "whiplash" injuries.) You seem to be asking whether there is a law or rule against coming to a stop too close to a vehicle in front. Tailgating is generally illegal, but I have never heard of the concept being applied to vehicles that are not moving. (Clarification on your question: "Stop far enough behind the car in front of you so that you can see the bottom of their back tires" is a safety heuristic that allows you to pull around the vehicle in an emergency without shifting into reverse. It's a "rule" of defensive driving, but I have never heard it written into law.)	Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.	An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant.	The booklet from the condominium management could legally be seen as a part of the lease, and you should have been aware cars can be towed without notice, and have in fact agreed to that by living there. The fact that the tow company entered your car really isn't relevant; they are tasked with removing the car, and by law, they must do everything they can in order to tow the car while not causing damage. They will be insured and bonded for damage during the tow and liability for storage at their lot; but in order to safely tow the car, they must have access to the parking brake, the gear shifter (if manual), the steering wheel (to straighten the tires, if needed, which could be a problem if the steering wheel is locked), etc. They can legally enter the car to ensure a safe tow if the car is unlocked, or use a "slim jim" or other tool to unlock the door, disable the alarm if needed, etc. If the tow company damaged the car while towing, or you find property is missing from inside the car when the care is returned, your issue is with the two company and not the condominium management. See Virginia Code § 46.2-118. Prohibited acts by tow truck drivers and towing and recovery operators	4511.71, "driving on a closed road", doesn't apply here: it requires that the closure be done using a sign, rather than a generic "traffic control device". It also appears to be intended to apply specifically to construction closures, not closures in general. However, what you describe is, at a minimum, a violation of: 4511.25, lanes of travel: (A) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: [exceptions that don't apply] where "roadway" is defined in 4511.01 as (EE) "Roadway" means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, except the berm or shoulder. and 4511.28, passing on the right: (A) The driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle or trackless trolley only under the following conditions: (1) When the vehicle or trackless trolley overtaken is making or about to make a left turn; (2) Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle. In short, the road is "closed" in the sense that there is no legal way for you to drive past the police car. And it doesn't really matter which offense you're charged with: all three are classified as "minor misdemeanors", carrying the exact same penalties.
Can this be considered as a case of fraud? I recently got into an argument regarding whether submitting the following letter to an instituition could be regarded as a fraud: To Whomsover It May Concern This is to certify that X is pursuing a Minor specialization in our department. The courses offered by our department that have been taken by X are as follows: A B C Signed, Head of the Department Now, B and C are the courses that X has taken as a part of the Minor specialization and A is a course that X has taken additionally but is not a part of the minor specialization. Now, one point of view is that the statement about the list of courses provides a sufficient reason behind the first statement--in which case, there is nothing fraudulent. Another intepretation is that the statement about the list of courses implies that these courses were taken as a part of the minor--due to which the document is obviously a case of fraud. I would like to know which interpretation is correct--whether one should assume that the second statement provides a sufficient reason for the first or that it provides a necessary reason for the first.	The second statement is completely independent of the first. This is to certify that X is pursuing a Minor specialization in our department.[PERIOD] The courses offered by our department that have been taken by X are as follows:[...] As long as both of these statements are true, it is not deceptive, therefore not fraudulent.	First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea.	I virtually never see "without prejudice" used in anything but court documents, unless the writer does not know what he's saying. A typical example would be when a person sues someone, but brings the case in the wrong court. The judge would dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could refile somewhere else. In contrast, if the person filed in the correct court, but the judge ruled that the plaintiff had done nothing wrong, the judge would then dismiss the case with prejudice. I believe I have on some occasions seen the phrase used in legal correspondence, perhaps noting, for example, that a party was willing to settle his sexual harassment claim for X amount of money without prejudice to their claims for some unrelated issue. In either event, "without prejudice" is typically referring to the ongoing ability to litigate a claim. I'm not entirely clear on how you're envisioning it being used as e-mail boilerplate, but I can't see any reason to do so. If you did, that would not have any effect on the e-mail's admissibility. EDIT: One other note, because I hadn't looked at it before. The LinkedIn article to which you linked and the comments on it are basically nonsense. Legal advice from a graduate of the "School of Life" is about as valuable as life advice from a graduate of a school of law.	We can assume there was a meeting of the minds when the contract was drafted, and both parties expected payments to me made based on product usage. Plaintiff alleges that this did not happen. Thus plaintiff is indeed alleging that the contract was breached. Now plaintiff alleges that defendant broke the contract, while defendant counters that plaintiff broke the contract. "[T]o be determined by tracking software" is woefully ambiguous. The court will want to know which party drafted the contract, as disputes arising from ambiguity are often resolved in favor of the non-drafting party.	You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know.	Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.	As someone who is not a lawyer, but is familiar with FERPA and university policies as a former instructor, I would be more than willing to bet that you signed or otherwise agreed to some type of Terms of Service before being given access to that type of service. There are almost certainly numerous things you signed to become a student, as well as various policies you agreed to in first gaining access to the computer services, which would apply here. I can tell you with certainty that the school where I was a student had a policy that I agreed to that they would make certain information available to other students unless I chose for it to be restricted. However, my university did not have any photos of students that were viewable by other students in a directory. That said, there were also times I participated in extra-curricular activities where I was required to sign release forms giving the school the rights to video tape, record, and photograph me, and to do what they wished with those things. So, with that in mind, I suspect that's partly due to FERPA restrictions, but also largely due to their own privacy policies that go beyond what FERPA requires. All in all, I doubt they would be okay with you using their photos for your own private use - student privacy is something that is taken very seriously.
Can getting medical marijuana prescribed prevent you from owning or buying a firearm? The federal law governing possession and ownership of firearms is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). This prohibits possession or ownership by a person who is “…an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act 21 U.S.C. 802).” So an unlawful user is; the user of an illegal controlled drug the wrongful user of a legal controlled drug Under the Controlled Substance Act, all Schedule I drugs are illegal to prescribe and use under federal law. So, if you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor. Are you automatically an unlawful user of a controlled substance and cannot possess, use, buy, sell, gift, or transfer firearms?	Short Answer if you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor. Are you automatically an unlawful user of a controlled substance and cannot possess, use, buy, sell, gift, or transfer firearms? Basically yes. If you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor on a regular basis you are a prohibited person pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and you are therefore subject to severe federal penalties for possessing, using, buying, selling, giving and transferring firearms (although case law has held that if, for example, you inherit a firearm, you can promptly negotiate its sale to a third party to divest yourself of ownership of it through a third party broker if you do not use the firearm or possess it; the statute is not intended to operate as a property forfeiture law). Long Answer Not many cases address this question. One of the leading cases is U.S. v. Bennett (10th Cir. 2003). It held that is someone is a regular user of illegal drugs at the time of the offense then that person is a prohibited person, even if he was not under the influence at the moment of offense. In an analysis that really needs to be quoted at length (some case law citations omitted) to capture exactly what was held: The sentencing guidelines define a “prohibited person” in relevant part as a person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 6. The statute does not define the phrases “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” or “addicted to any controlled substance.” It does, however, define “addict” as an “individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). Mr. Bennett believes the district court erred in not defining the language “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” the same as “addicted to any controlled substance.” He argues he is not an “addict,” as defined under 21 U.S.C. § 802(1), because he used methamphetamine and marijuana rather than narcotic drugs. Mr. Bennett's argument presupposes the definition of the word “addict” under 21 U.S.C. § 802(1) is synonymous with the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). We need not consider whether this presumption is correct because we conclude, whatever the precise meaning of the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance,” its meaning is distinct from the meaning of the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance.” The words “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” are written in the disjunctive, implying each has a separate meaning. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (“Cannons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not.”). Even Mr. Bennett agrees the statute “breaks down a prohibited person into two groups: a. User, or b. Addicted.” We therefore conclude the district court did not err in defining the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” differently from the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance.” In a related argument, Mr. Bennett argues he is not a “prohibited person” because he passed all drug tests while on bond. He claims this evidence demonstrates he was not an “addict” because “he definitely didn't lose the power of self-control.” We have already concluded the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance” is distinct in meaning from the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance.” The government only argues that Mr. Bennett was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. In any event, although Mr. Bennett did not fail any drug tests while on bond, we conclude the district court properly held him to be a “prohibited person.” The guidelines do not require a person to be an unlawful user of a controlled substance while on bond in order to qualify as a prohibited person. An individual's status as a prohibited person is measured “at the time the defendant committed the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). While a court may use evidence of a defendant's unlawful use of drugs while on bond to infer he was a user at the time he possessed a firearm, see Solomon, 95 F.3d at 35, such evidence is not necessary. The government need only show the defendant was an unlawful user of drugs or addicted to drugs at the time he committed the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). In other words, the government must show a defendant's drug use was contemporaneous with his firearm possession. After reviewing the evidence, discussed in detail below, we are convinced the government met its burden in this case. As mentioned previously, the government believes Mr. Bennett's extensive drug history qualifies him as an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. Mr. Bennett does not dispute he used controlled substances. Instead, he argues the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutionally vague because the phrase “unlawful user” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), adopted by the guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 6, “is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways.” A criminal provision “must explicitly convey what it outlaws.” A provision that “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.' ”. Where, as here, a vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment freedoms, we examine whether the provision is impermissibly vague “in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” We conclude the sentencing guidelines are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Bennett's conduct. A confidential informant told police Mr. Bennett was distributing methamphetamine. Upon searching Mr. Bennett's residence, the police found “a digital scale with white powder residue, [a] small baggie of suspected marijuana, numerous marijuana pipes and bongs, possible drug ledgers, assorted small containers containing white powder residue, small plastic bindles, and suspected marijuana seeds.” The police also found a small amount of marijuana on Mr. Bennett's person. Mr. Bennett admitted during an interview with police he used, purchased, and sold methamphetamine. Mr. Bennett also admitted to a probation officer he used marijuana and methamphetamine on a daily basis up until his arrest. As a result of the police investigation, Mr. Bennett pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges of possession of a controlled substance, i.e., marijuana and methamphetamine. Based on this evidence, we conclude the district court correctly found Mr. Bennett was a “prohibited person” under the guidelines. His regular and ongoing use of marijuana and methamphetamine during the same time period as his firearm possession qualifies him as a “unlawful user of ... a [ ] controlled substance” and therefore a “prohibited person.” The guidelines are not vague under the facts of this case. U.S. v. Bennett, 329 F.3d 769, 776–78 (10th Cir. 2003). A subsequent trial court decision from the District of Utah further elaborated on the standard set forth in Bennett considering rulings from the 5th and 9th Circuits as well: Mr. Grover refers this court to a decision by a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Herrera, which was subsequently vacated by an en banc panel of the court. The decision of the original panel is the only federal decision to expressly reach a definition of “unlawful user.” After analyzing the text, structure, and legislative history of § 922(g)(3), as well as the relevant case law, the court held: an ‘unlawful user’ is one who uses narcotics so frequently and in such quantities as to lose the power of self control and thereby pose a danger to the public morals, health, safety, or welfare. In other words, an ‘unlawful user’ is someone whose use of narcotics falls just short of addiction, as that term is defined by the Controlled Substances Act. Although the original Herrera court did not arrive at its conclusion by interpreting the phrase “unlawful user of” to be synonymous with “addicted to” (this was the argument of the dissenting judges on the en banc panel that subsequently vacated the decision of the three-judge panel), the end result is essentially the same. The panel did not define the meaning of use that “falls just short of addiction.” Thus, in asking this court to adopt the definition announced by the original Herrera panel, Mr. Grover is asking this court to equate the definition of “unlawful user,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), with the definition of “addict” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). For the reasons stated above, this court declines to equate the definition of “unlawful user,” as used in § 922(g)(3), with the definition of “addict” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). Furthermore, this court expresses serious doubt that any precedential weight may be accorded to the original panel decision in Herrera. Although the en banc majority did not expressly reverse the original panel's holding, it decided whether the defendant was an “unlawful user” only by asking whether “drug use [occurred] with regularity and over an extended period of time.” The majority never discussed the definition reached by the original panel, which roughly equated the definition of an “unlawful user” with that of an “addict,” requiring the additional element of loss of self-control. In sum, the phrase “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), may be interpreted as either joining separately definable or synonymous terms. The Tenth Circuit in Bennett clearly ruled that the phrase is written disjunctively, meaning that the phrases “unlawful user of” and “addicted to” have separate meanings, and are therefore not synonymous. This conclusion is consistent with the common, everyday meaning of the terms—a person may be a user of controlled substances without being addicted to them, and conversely, a person may be addicted to controlled substances even when no longer a user of them. Although Bennett did not expressly define the phrase “unlawful user of,” it did explain that the defendant's “regular and ongoing use of marijuana and methamphetamine during the same time period as his firearm possession qualifies him as an ‘unlawful user of ... a[ ] controlled substance’ ....” Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Purdy, Bennett impliedly defined three elements for qualification as an unlawful user of a controlled substance: (1) regular use of any controlled substance (or, in the words of Purdy, “[use of] drugs with regularity”); (2) on an ongoing basis (or, in the words of Purdy, “over an extended period of time”23); and (3) during the same time period as (or, in the words of Purdy, “contemporaneously with”) the possession of a firearm. Combining language from both Bennett and Purdy, this court holds that an unlawful user of any controlled substance, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is an individual who regularly and unlawfully uses any controlled substance over an extended period of time that is contemporaneous with the possession of a firearm. U.S. v. Grover, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302–03 (D. Utah 2005). On the other hand, evidence of a single use of marijuana six hours before the arrest with a firearm was not sufficient to show that someone was a controlled substance user, as this could have been "an isolated occurrence." U.S. v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004). In general, evidence that one has a medical prescription for marijuana would tend to show that one is a "controlled substance user" and hence a prohibited person with respect to firearms. The only real out in this case would be the Congressional appropriations bill prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds to prosecute people who are using marijuana in a manner that is legal under state law and related U.S. Attorney statements to that effect. But, it is not at all obvious that these protections extent to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The case closest to addressing the question of whether someone was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while regularly using marijuana on a basis that was legal under state law, considering among other things, a Second Amendment challenge, is Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016), certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1396, 197 L.Ed.2d 555. The 9th Circuit in Wilson v. Lynch held that the provision of federal Gun Control Act prohibiting sales of firearms to individuals whom sellers had reasonable cause to believe were drug users, and the accompanying regulation and administrative policy effectively criminalizing the possession of a firearm by the holder of a state marijuana registry card (in Nevada) did not violate the Second Amendment. The 9th Circuit reached this conclusion because the government had a substantial interest in preventing gun violence, and because empirical data and other evidence supported strong link between drug use and the risk of irrational or unpredictable behavior, including gun violence. Therefore, the 9th Circuit held that it was reasonable for federal regulators to assume that registry cardholder was more likely to use marijuana that an individual who did not hold such a card. In sum, it is safe to assume that someone with a medical marijuana prescription that is legal under state law is still a "prohibited person" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and is subject to severe penalties for possessing a firearm.	There are no rules against private sales of firearms in Arizona. If you (or your mother) own the guns, you can sell them to anyone you like unless you have reason to believe they are a prohibited possessor. There is no legal requirement for you to validate their identity. There is no limit on the number of guns you can sell to one person. A bill of sale is optional. You don't need a lawyer and, honestly, I'm not sure what a lawyer would do to help you sell a gun. The laws, being what they are, lead some to conclude that this must be how prohibited possessors get their guns. It's not. Most "illegal" guns are bought through straw purchases in which a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is not legally allowed to own one. You can work through a licensed dealer if it makes you feel better. If you don't want to use a dealer, you can simply require that a buyer have a concealed carry license as evidence that they are not a prohibited possessor. The CCW is not a surefire way to guarantee anything though. Personally, I would transact a private party sale with individuals via a dealer. You're in AZ. There is no shortage of gun buyers! At the risk of breaking site rules, you can also list guns online. For example, www.gunbroker.com is a popular site and follows an eBay-style bid structure (I have no affiliation to them). This model ensures that you get market price for the gun rather than trusting that a dealer is going to give you a fair price (they won't; they make their money buying cheap and selling at market rate).	Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not "contraband" (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned.	There is no general law requiring a doctor to report to the government that they have given medical treatment. On the contrary, there is a federal rule (the "Privacy Rule") that somewhat requires keeping medical information private. There may be certain instances where a report must be made, such as the obligation to report gunshot wounds or suspected child abuse. There could be entanglements regarding use of drugs that require a prescription, where there is a required paper trail.	We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.	Federal rules concerning carrying firearms generally apply only to federal buildings, military bases and Indian reservations. National Forests, BLM lands and National Parks are governed by state law. The Concealed Carry web site contains more detailed information summarizing the legal situation.	If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question.	As far as I can tell, it was punished severely, but not quite that severely. I found Nevada's 1971 controlled substances statute, AB 107. "Marihuana" appears in Schedule I, the list of drugs which are most tightly restricted (Section 31, subsection 4(j)). Section 65 makes it a crime to possess such substances. Under subsection 1, a first offense was punishable by 1 to 6 years in prison, a second offense by 1-10 years, a third or subsequent offense by 1-20 years. There were also fines of up to about $2000-$5000. There was an exception in subsection 3 for marihuana possession of less than one ounce: a first offense could alternatively be punished by up to one year in county jail, probably at the discretion of the prosecutor or judge. Second offenses were treated as a first offense under subsection 1, and so on. Selling and distributing drugs including marihuana was punished more severely. Under Section 62, the punishment was 1 to 20 years in prison for a first offense, and for a second offense, life in prison without possibility of parole. If the drug was distributed to a person under age 21, a first offense was punishable by life in prison, but with possibility of parole after 7 years. There was no exception for small quantities of marihuana. I didn't find a reference to the specific 25 year term you mention. It's possible that it comes from some version of the law as it existed before or after the 1971 statute; I didn't check. Also, marijuana was (and still is) also illegal under federal law; I didn't check what punishment federal law would have prescribed at the time. It's unlikely that the City of Las Vegas would have had separate laws; this sort of thing would normally be done at the state level. As far as I know, this is in keeping with other state drug laws of the time, and given the prevailing politics, I'm not surprised by the law. Drug use was treated very differently under the law than the other "vices" you mention. It'd be outside the scope of this site to discuss the possible factors behind this, but you could perhaps take it to Politics.SE or History.SE. Nevada eventually legalized recreational marijuana for adults in 2017, according to https://norml.org/laws/nevada-penalties-2/. It was not the first state to do so; Washington State had taken a similar step in 2012.
What is Admiralty law? What is Admiralty Law and where are the origins of it? What jurisdictions is this type of law applicable? What relevance does this have in the United States legal system?	Admiralty law is the law of the sea and maritime activities. (Admiralty law also applies to boats on the "navigable waters" of the United States such as the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.) It has its roots in a mix of customary international law, treaties related to the law of the sea, and domestic statutes. It is closer in some respects to the law of civil law countries than of common law countries, although it is distinct from both. In the U.S., admiralty law is part of federal court jurisdiction and the U.S. district courts are our admiralty courts. But, each country with maritime commerce has some version of admiralty law based around a core of customary international law and treaties, with domestic statutes similar to those of other countries statutes dealing with the topic. Admiralty law is distinctive and different from domestic law in a variety of circumstances, most notably: The law governing when a ship can be detained in port to make a judgment in an admiralty proceeding against it enforceable. This is similar to a writ of attachment in domestic law (a pre-judgment seizure of assets to make a potential judgment collectable) but more broadly available. The rights of seamen vis-a-vis their employers. The relevance of the flag under which a ship sails. The "traffic laws" of the sea. The duties of a ship that encounters another ship or individuals in distress at sea. The duties of a ship that encounters hostile others parties, such as pirates, at sea. The tort law applicable to torts particular to a maritime context that take place at sea. For example, in a collision of ships, or from a failure to honor duties related to distressed ships, or from interference with a ship's commercial activity (e.g. in connection with a fishing expedition). The law governing property interests and sharing of proceeds from "prizes" such as the salvage of sinking, sunk or abandoned ships. In general, admiralty law has declined in importance as lots of high value commerce has shifted to air travel, and as ocean going ships have become bigger and better behaved corporate interests, and because modern conditions make ships at sea less isolated from the rest of the world.	There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News.	No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the "Vagueness Doctrine" which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.	Choice of law A contract can include a choice of law clause that states the laws that apply to the contract. For the USA this would usually be the laws of a particular state. Most courts in most jurisdictions respect the choice of law clause - that is, if say a suit is brought in a new-south-wales court on a contract with a choice of law of californina, the court will (probably) apply Californian law to the contract. However, a choice of law clause does not affect non-contract law like torts, equity, criminal law, consumer protection law, and "no contracting out" laws. So, for the above example, while the contract will be interpreted using California/USA law, other claims will be assessed under New South Wales/Australian law. For an example of how this works in practice, see ACCC v Valve Software. It was never in doubt that the contract was under Washington, USA law, however, the "no refund" term, while valid in Washington violated Australian Law and was unenforcable and, more critically for valve, was misleading and deceptive, costing them AUD 3 million in fines (plus legal costs). Choice of Forum In addition to specifying the relevant law, a contract can also suggest the appropriate forum: "disputes shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of Californian courts". A clause that oversteps the suggestion and states the forum categorically is likely to be void on public policy grounds: a contract cannot exclude courts that have jurisdiction. A choice of forum clause is one of the factors a court will consider if one of the parties petitions that it is the wrong forum and the case should be transferred to the right forum. They are influential but not determinative and go into the mix with all the other relevant factors. Arbitration A well-drafted binding arbitration agreement will almost always be effective if it complies with local law. Courts have a very strong bias in favour of enforcing arbitration clauses.	Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause	You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too.
Is it against the EU freedom of movement for Italy refuse entry to an EU citizen with only an ID card flying from outside the EU/EFTA? Apparently, as stated in Timatic, a database operated by IATA and used by airlines to establish whether a passenger can enter the destination country, Italy recently introduced a restriction that non-Italian EU/EFTA citizens can only use their national ID cards to enter Italy if having flown from an EU/EFTA country. Italian citizens, meanwhile, can only use their IDs to enter if having flown from an EU/EFTA state, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Tunisia or Turkey. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state, and/or the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? UPDATE: Turns out this alleged quirk was merely misinformation from the Italian government. I learnt of it the hard way, by being denied boarding on a Pegasus flight from Istanbul to Bergamo (despite calling the border police in Bergamo, who sent a clearance message to Pegasus). I then e-mailed my IATA contact and asked him to ask their Italian government sources to re-confirm this restriction. It was found not to exist whereby Timatic was corrected.	You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence.	If the website containing the GDPR-wall processes any personal data of users who hit the GDPR-wall, the GDPR applies to that website. This can be as simple as writing a logfile of all visits to the website. In this case it will be illegal if the website owner does not comply with the GDPR. However a supervisory authority would probably not spent any time on such a minor violation. As long as the the website with the GDPR-wall does not process any personal data, the GDPR does not apply, so nothing in the GDPR can forbid the GDPR-wall. Some related remarks: The GDPR does not require a "privacy policy" on the website if the website does not process any personal data. If personal data is processed based on consent, that consent must be freely given. Also it may not be disruptive. So a cookie wall asking for consent would be illegal. But the GDPR does not care about any other disruptive popups, as long as they are not related to asking for consent. Using GeoIP is a perfect way to implement such a GDPR-Wall, because it would block everyone from within the EU, but nobody else. So it blocks exactly those for who the GDPR would apply. In such a case it would not be reasonable to expect anything more from a website owner. A user which uses a proxy, can not expect to be protected by the GDPR, because it bypasses a restriction set by the owner of the website. A webserver does use the IP-address of all incoming requests, to send the reply back. That could be considered a processing of personal data, but everybody seems to agree it is not. I am not sure why. But I do agree that it would be very impractical if that is considered processing of personal data. I added an example from the Washington Post So you have to pay $9/month for a GDPR compliant subscription. Because the price you have to pay is not unacceptable high, I think it would be valid to offer the premium version this way. This does not force you to choose one of the other subscriptions. In december 2018, the Austrian DPA (DSB) has confirmed that a similar offer is lawful. On derstandard.at you get a choice between free access with tracking and advertising, or pay 6 Euro/Month for tracking free access. Because 6 Euro/Month is cheaper than subscribing to the printed edition, the DSB accepted that as a valid choice. More information can be found on noyb.eu or, (with more details but in German), on wbs-law.de.	It is not possible for someone to forfeit their rights because the GDPR is compulsory law. In the EU, laws can be regulatory or compulsory. In case of an agreement, regulatory laws can be set aside, if both parties agree on that. But compulsory laws cannot be set aside. Of course laws can also be partly compulsory. For example provisions which cannot be changed in disadvantage of a consumer. So there is freedom of contract, but it's freedom is reduced by law for the common good or for example to avoid misuse of bargaining power. In particular consumer related laws are often compulsory because it has little power against the other parties. Companies can have their negotiations done by lawyers, so they can make a well informed an well negotiated decision. As an extreme example, you cannot kill someone, even if that person has given you written permission. See also "Peremptory norm" on wikipedia for international law examples.	Yes. A multi-nation citizen who has US citizenship has equal US citizenship with every other citizen; therefore the answer to this binary question is "Yes". The citizenship(s) of anyone who does not have US citizenship is irrelevant to this question; thus, the answer to this binary question is "No". Yes. The main point here is to determine if you have the relevant documents and permissions to be legally present in the US. If you are a US citizen, a) this makes the process easier for you and b) avoids any possible issues if evidence is found of citizenship from another country, which will make immigration think that A) you are not a US citizen and b) you lied to them. Most people have only a single citizenship. That is the default mindset of immigration. There's no downside for you to inform them; there may be additional difficulties, delays, and scrutiny if you do not. If you are not a US citizen, most of the same applies. Additionally, lying (even by omission) can be grounds to have your legal status revoked. In summary, if you have the legal right to be in the US (e.g. US citizen, legal resident) being fully honest cannot hurt you, and can make the process smoother. If you have legal permission to be in the US, being fully honest will help prevent that permission from being revoked.	The Art 15 GDPR right to access is pretty absolute. There are only three grounds under which access to a copy of your data can be denied: Art 12(5): the request is “manifestly unfounded”, e.g. clearly just submitted for trolling Art 12(5): the request is “excessive”, e.g. if you repeat the same request very frequently Art 15(4): access to a copy would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” Thus, I am confident that Twitch would respond to an access request with a copy of all your chat messages. Of course, the chat messages might be useless without context, but providing that context might infringe on the privacy rights of others (see Art 15(4)). There are two caveats to this right. The data need not be machine-readable, unless the more limited Art 20 right to data portability also applies. Twitch is under no explicit obligation to provide access in a self-service manner, e.g. through an app or web interface. It would probably in the best interest of Twitch to provide self-service means, but right now the Twitch privacy policy (permalink) asks you to exercise your rights by emailing [email protected]. Alternatively, their privacy choices page contains an entry to “Obtain access to or a copy of certain personal data we hold about you”, which contains a barely-visible link to a web form where you can request chat data.	A question like that is impossible to answer in general, but your question includes some incorrect assumptions. Many countries try to prevent visitors to become de-facto residents through repeated visits. For instance, the Schengen area limits visitors on short-stay visa to 90 days out of every 180-day rolling window, and the UK seems to give their immigration officials more discretion on every re-entry. Many countries give political asylum to people who are persecuted in their home country. A pandemic, or generally bad living conditions, do not count as persecution. Many countries give refugee status to people who have to flee war or disaster in their home country. The default case for these rules is a person who is in danger and wants to travel to a safe country. Then there are rules for force majeure when a person in the country is forced to overstay through no fault of their own. How that is handled usually depends on how cooperative the visitor was at securing a timely return or a visa extension. During the early days of the pandemic, there have been blanket extensions in some countries. As travel re-opened, these have run out. One of the differences between the last three bullet points is how long the stay is permitted. Political asylum tends to be for the long term, refugee status lasts until the end of the disaster, and a force majeure exception might just last a few days. So if this is not just a hypothetical question, contact a lawyer or the immigration authorities where you are now. Generic answers on Stackexchange cannot replace specific, professional advice.	I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data".	Losing your passport is fine, happens all the time But that’s not what you are talking about, is it? You’re intending to deliberately destroy it. While destroying a passport is not a specific offence under the Act or the Rules, your proposed course of action is still illegal. The passport doesn’t belong to you. It belongs to India and deliberately destroying other people’s stuff is illegal. To get a new passport you would necessarily be lying and giving false information on a passport application is an offence. Of course, one wonders why your family are looking at your passport; just don’t show it to them.
Order of precedence in cases where more than one nation has an interest? ... Disclaimer first: This is a hypothetical that came up during a discussion elsewhere. No real people were harmed during the creation of this question, and any resemblance to current or past events is purely an accident. Here's the scenario: Alice is a British citizen and foreign exchange student currently studying at MIT. Kurt is a German citizen visiting Boston on a tourist visa. Because he's planning on a bit of traveling, he rented a car. Because Kurt is also a bit of an idiot, one fine evening he gets behind the wheel after drinking a bit too much, and Alice is killed in a hit-and-run during his DUI, which ends nonfatally a bit later against a lamp post. There are three nations that would have an interest in this case: The USA, or at least the state of Boston where a DUI with a fatal accident took place; The United Kingdom, who have lost a citizen through no fault of her own and may want to have a word with the person responsible, or at least reparations of some kind for her family; Germany, who probably isn't happy with their citizen's behaviour right now, but is obligated to look out for the citizen's rights under their constitution. Presumably, the US has first right here because they're the nation in which the crime happened, but how does international law shake out the rest of the order of precedence? Would the order of precedence change any if it had been a deliberate murder (say, Kurt buys a weapon in Boston, goes to the pub Alice happens to be in as well, a drunken argument happens and Kurt uses his newly purchased weapon to settle it)?	DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law.	If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.	They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue.	There is no absolute rule in such cases. It is often a matter of negotiation between the state and federal authorities, and failing agreement, a matter of which authority has the prisoner in custody. Often the question of which crime is more serious or carries a longer sentence is an issue in such negotiations.	So the most obvious is that the U.S. Miranda Rights specifically mention right to legal counsel and right to state provided legal counsel (Public Defenders) if you cannot afford legal counsel (Contrary to some opinions, these guys are very good at their job... it's just that they are also very over worked and private industry pays better). While the right exists in the U.K., the U.K. version of the required reading of rights only speaks to right against self-incrimination, which, if you want a difference is a good place to look. In the self-incrimination clauses, the U.K. and U.S. versions are very different. The U.K. right is a qualified right where as the U.S. is an absolute or unqualified right. This is a distinction which sounds silly upfront but is very serious in how things will transpire. Suppose that you are arrested for the murder of your spouse. You definitely did not do and the "one armed man" definitely did. Either way, you remain silent during interrogation. At trial, your defense is "It wasn't me it was the one armed man" and you intend to present evidence of this. In the U.S. this would be permitted, no further questions asked (or at the least, defeated by other means unrelated to you giving the cops the cold shoulder). In the U.K., this would be first be challenged by the prosecution with "Why didn't you say this when you were arrested?" and your silence on this matter will be used against you. In fact, asking that challenge in the U.S. is very inappropriate, as was recently seen in the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, where the Prosecution did ask that up front to Rittenhouse, prompting a scolding from the judge out of view from the jury. The reason for this is that in the UK there are more strict rules placed on cops during interrogation than there are in the U.S. (In the former, cops cannot lie to you about the facts of the case and they cannot interrupt your statements to them once you start to respond. This is par for the course in the U.S. for cops. In fact, in the U.S., shouting "It was the one armed man" on arrest can do more damage than just shutting up until you're before a judge and jury since that lets the prosecution use the implausibility of a one armed man against you (in both nations, statements that are against your interest do not violate hearsay rules, thus, the cops will only use such a statement against you... it's your job to prove it true or at least plausible enough to make a jury doubt the cops are right.). Also note that this is England and Wales jurisdictions only. Scotland, having its own legal system, retains the right against self-incrimination as an absolute right. Also a big obvious one but the read rights would not be called the "Miranda Rights" by the police or legal community (it may be, by the crooks they are arresting who have no clue that the TV version might be the U.S. one since it's more likely to get shown there than on U.K. TV.). In the U.K. they would be called "Standard Cautions" or "Reading the rights". The U.S. name derives from the SCOTUS case Miranda v. Arizona which was the ground-breaking case that made this required by all police when interrogating a suspect. Additionally, each state has their own version, which generally reads the same way (they explain your 5th and 6th Amendment rights to silence and an attorney) and may vary on asking if you choose to waive the rights upon receiving an affirmative answer that the rights were understood ("With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?" is the proper phrasing). They also are read from cards (business card to index card sized) where the right is printed in English and Spanish and the suspect must sign it as part of acknowledging that their rights were read.	Treason, per se, is probably not a valid reason to shoot someone on the spot given how that crime is defined in the U.S. Constitution. But, keep in mind that in Arrival the situation has been defined as a military operation. As a result, the relevant body of law would be the law pertaining to actions that a military officer may take to carry out a mission which has been stated broadly by the President (as commander in chief) or by Congress in an authorization for the use of military force, or both. Thus, the authority of the officer in this situation would depend upon the rules of engagement and rules for military discipline for dealing with civilians present on base in a military operation for achieving their lawful mission. Under these circumstances, the question would not be the usual self-defense or defense of others analysis, but whether the order given was a lawful order in light of the mission. Naturally, we don't have the exact details of the legal authority that was given or the definition of the mission in the movie, but "all necessary force" to complete the mission would not be an unusual set of rules for a high priority, existential national survival military mission, and in that case, the lawfulness of the order would depend upon whether the military officer giving the order reasonably believed that shooting someone was necessary to accomplish his mission. If so, he would be authorized to give the order and it would be lawful.	There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.	The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months).
What are general rules for appropriated logos (Whether you are selling them as a design, or using them for marketing)? I have a clothing brand I've been working on (no official LLC yet, so I'm worried about any legal trouble). I've been doing full custom artwork for it mostly, but I've been working on a design that parodies the STP oil logo. I know there is the 30-40% parody law in terms that a design must be changed, but can I legally sell an item that has a graphic of something that appears to be a parody, or could be traced back to the original? Note: This will not be the logo of my LLC, I already have that in the queue for trademarking. This is simply a piece I want to pay homage to a logo that I really like. (posted on Graphic Design Stackexchange, but was reccomenede to take it here.) Thanks for the help!	The relevant law is trademark law. The basic question is whether the mark is identical or creates an unreasonable risk of confusion with the protected mark. There is no per se 30%-40% rule. I can imagine cases where changing a single letter in a long phrase turns a trademark violation into a parody or clearly different mark (see the Electric Company TV show). I can also imagine cases where changing a large part of the mark could still be infringing and confusingly similar. A parody is protected on fair use grounds in copyright law (which could conceivably come into play since this is a derivative work but would be protected since it is a parody), but in trademark law the issue is that a parody is unlikely to be confused for the original. Of course, at a fine grained level when one is looking at particular cases rather than general ideas, you would have to know which country's laws were involved, for example, where the goods would be sold.	The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.	Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html	If such a case came to court, the court would presumably rule that merely publishing the advertising could not be considered to be doing something "commercial". (Otherwise the contract would be absurd, as the question points out.) The court would therefore define "commercial" as some act beyond merely displaying the advertising -- perhaps charging for the website on which it is displayed, or using it to sell goods. Moreover, since the company apparently wrote the contract, any ambiguity in it would be construed against the company, if there is another reasonable interpretation. Thus the contract would not be void, and could be sued on, but the company would win only if it established some conduct that the court was prepared to consider as "commercial" in light of the circumstances and the purpose of the contract. By the way it is not really on point, but it is a common misunderstanding that: some customers may be organized as nonprofit and they're not allowed to make profits Nonprofit entities may do business and make income that would be considered "profit" for an ordinary corporation. What they cannot do is distribute that income as "profit" to owners, shareholders, members, or other individuals.	No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting.	Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.	First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.	We can't tell you if you can do that or not, because that would be specific legal advise. You should consult an attorney who specializes in trademark law to get an estimation of how risky it would be to use that name. So I am just giving you a couple general pointers. Names are not protected by copyright, but by trademarks. The purpose of trademarks is to prevent consumer confusion. They are supposed to prevent someone from selling a product under a name which consumers might mistake for official merchandise of someone else. Media companies in particular tend to be very protective of their trademarks, because merchandising is often one of their main sources of revenue. And they don't want to share that revenue with people creating knockoff products. Also, they must fight for their trademark in court, because when they only enforce it selectively, then they risk that a court will consider the mark so widely used already that it is no longer worth protecting. But the show is from the 1950s. Is the trademark still protected after all that time? Maybe. There are registered trademarks and unregistered trademarks. Registered trademarks, which usually but not always are followed by an "®" symbol, need to be renewed in regular intervals. So if someone still pays for the renewal, it might still be a protected trademark. Unregistered trademarks, which usually but not always are followed by a "™" symbol, are protected as long as they are "used in commerce". Which means that if the IP owner of that show still sells products branded as "Winky Dink and you", they can probably still claim unregistered trademark protection. In order to find out, you would need to do your own research or pay your attorney to do a trademark research for you. Are your proposed names even a trademark violation? Perhaps, perhaps not. That's for a court to decide. Personally I think that "Winky Dink and Me" is more infringing than "My Winky Dink Syndrome", because the first is a lot closer to the original name and brand image, giving it a higher likeliness of causing consumers to mistake it for an official "Winky Dink and You" product. But that's an argument you got to make in court. Estimating the chance that the judge will side with you and how much in legal costs it will take you to get to the point where you are even going to have the opportunity to make that argument is a job for your attorney.
What, Legally, Justifies Eminent Domain? In the United States, under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Federal Government's power of Eminent Domain is established: nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Therefore, even in a case where the use of Eminent Domain went against the expressed wishes of a given State, so long as it was "justly compensated" the Federal Government has full legal authority of the claiming of land. My question is: why? I know arguments about public necessity, and the origins of the practice in English Common Law, but what I'm looking for, is twofold: Where in the Constitution is it stated the Federal Government has full legal jurisdiction over all State land? Is this interpretation (that the Federal Government has complete control over State land) actually correct?	Article I, Section 8 of the United States lists the powers of Congress (and a handful a sprinkled elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution and its amendments, such as the power to regulate court jurisdiction in Article III and the enforcement powers of the 13th and 14th Amendments, to give a non-exclusive list). These powers include powers reasonable and necessary to achieve the other powers. Various federal statutes authorize eminent domain power exercises in different contexts for different purposes expressly set forth in those statutes and the constitution. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2) makes federal law supreme over state law in every state. It states: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. The federal government has control over everything happening in U.S. states to the extent that it is in furtherance of the limited powers of the federal government set forth in the constitution, and not in violation of any prohibition on federal action in that area (e.g. the federal government can bribe state governments but cannot generally force them to take a particular action on its behalf).	Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.	Can you be trespassing on public property for no reason at all? Yes. When the government owns property, it can direct you to leave for any reason (even a legally invalid reason), and you are trespassing if you don't leave. When you are present on land you don't own with permission, but without a lease, you have a "license" to be there which is a contract-like right and is not a property right. A license doesn't give you the right to stay on the property over the objections of the owner or an agent of the owner. You might be able to receive money damages for an improper termination of your license to be present at the property (e.g. if you are told for no reason to leave a movie after paying for a ticket), but you don't have the right to simply stay there. If you stay there over the objections of the owner or the owner's agent, you are trespassing. The law applicable to government property owners and private property owners is basically the same in this regard. Realistically, on government property, furthermore, the standard by which the government employee may legally terminate your license to be there and exclude you from the property is low. Basically, it must merely not violate any constitutional right you may have, and you do not have a constitutional right to be present on government owned property, except in a quite narrow subset of cases (e.g. the "town square"). More exactly, you do not have a right to be on government property per se, but you can't be excluded from it for a constitutionally impermissible reason. The government gets to decide what parts of property it owns are available to the general public and for what content-neutral purposes. Thus, the right to be present on government owned "public" property (which doesn't include private areas of government owned property) can be subjected to reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. For example, a town could legally decide that the town square is closed from midnight to eight a.m. every day. The quoted material from the case Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) cited in the answer by bdb484 is narrower than a plain reading out of context would suggest. In that quotation, the term "public place" is being used in a sense much more restrictive than in the broader sense of property that is merely government owned. It is referring to places where the government has expressly or implicitly allowed members of the general public to be present on land that it owns (as opposed, for example, to a government office area of a building, or a maintenance facility in a government owned park, or a conservation area in a government owned park). This narrow sense of the word resolves what would otherwise seem to be a contradiction in the law. But, the government has the authority to make something that once was a public place into a non-public place going forward. For example, historically, the Civic Center park in front of the capitol in Denver, Colorado has been a public place. But, the government can and did close it off to the public for many months for maintenance and out of public health concerns when heavy use of it by homeless people and drug dealers caused the premises to be seriously damaged and created a public health risk from it being used to dispose of dirty, used, injection-drug syringes, and for people to defecate. A Hypothetical Suppose that Chris is the sole librarian in one of the towns of College Corner, which is on the Ohio-Indiana border, which are in different time zones. In that capacity, Chris has the authority to set library policies including the hours of the library and the rules for its use without the approval of anyone else. Chris has a hot date at 5:30 p.m. But, at lunch time, Chris learned that the hot date was at 5:30 p.m. in Ohio and not an hour later at 5:30 p.m. in Indiana, but the library's official closing time is 5 p.m. in Indiana, because Ohio was observing daylight savings time, but Indian was not, at the time when this happened. Chris, as the sole government official in charge of the library, decides to close the library before its posted closing time at 4:00 p.m. Indiana time (5 p.m. Ohio time) in order to be able to make it to the hot date. Chris quietly asks everyone left in the library to leave at 4 p.m. Indiana time, and everyone but you does. But you, who are homeless, really want to stay the extra hour before getting out in the cold and finding a bridge to sleep under, so you refuse to leave saying that the library is still open until 5 p.m. Indiana time, as stated in its posted hours. Chris orders you to leave and warns you that he is calling the police to remove you if you don't do so voluntarily. The police arrive and restate the complaint of Chris. The police arrest you for trespassing and you are charged with this crime in the appropriate court by the appropriate prosecuting attorney. You had done nothing wrong whatsoever prior to being asked to leave and refusing to do so. But, Chris has not violated your constitutional rights by ordering you removed for some unconstitutional reason. Chris then goes on the hot date; it is love at first sight, and Chris gets married the next week. As an apology for putting you out for the sole convenience of Chris, Chris invites you to the wedding. Do you have a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge on the grounds that the librarian's actions were unconstitutional? No. You might have a "good faith claim of right" defense, however, to the criminal charges. Do you have a valid claim for money damages for a violation of your constitutional rights? No. Indeed, ordering you removed for "no reason" that has anything to do with your conduct, as in this case, is probably more likely to be legal and constitutional, than having you removed for "some reason" other than just "because I the librarian say so" that doesn't involve wrongdoing on your part. A Variation In The Hypothetical If instead, your were being ordered to leave the library because you were wearing an National Rifle Association cap (and the library didn't prohibit wearing caps), this affirmative reason, which is contrary to the First Amendment freedom of expression, would be a violation of your constitutional rights, which would definitely be a basis for a civil lawsuit against the librarian and police involved in you being arrested. I don't know the details of constitutional defenses in criminal law well enough to know if the violation of your constitutional rights would be a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge (or a failure to obey a police officer's order to leave charge) resulting from you failing to leave in that circumstance, and I can see legitimate arguments both ways. This is also a situation where the non-constitutional claim of right defense to a trespassing charge would be a strong one.	user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.	What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation.	Article III of the United States Constitution vests the nation's judicial power -- which includes the authority to hear "all cases, in law and equity, arising under ... the laws of the United States" -- in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the inferior courts established by Congress. The federal courts therefore have authority under the Constitution to hear basically any case alleging that a federal law has been violated. The federal district courts specifically have jurisdiction over any case in which the United States or any federal agency is a plaintiff or defendant. But jurisdiction to hear a case is different than being empowered to grant the relief requested in a case. That authority comes from the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress has specifically permitted judicial review of agency actions in 5 U.S.C. § 702: A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.	Art 14 GG provides a right to personal property, but not without limitations. In particular, expropriation is allowed on the basis of a concrete law with fair compensation, when necessary for a public interest. In 2013, these disputes relating to the Garzweiler mine were decided by the German constitutional court. In decision 1 BvR 3139/08, one such expropriation law was found constitutional. It gave public interests such as: supplying the economy with raw materials maintaining jobs in the mining industry maintaining and growing the economy More recently, the goal of fulfilling political energy strategies (e.g. energy independence) has become more prominent as well. Such public interests don't automatically override the right to property – all relevant rights and interests must be balanced. But in practice, the economic interests of a large corporation do seem to override individuals' right to their property, especially since they must be given fair compensation. Opposing public interests might weigh more strongly. It will be interesting to see how recent expropriation for the purpose of lignite mining will be viewed in retrospect, given that climate protection has also been found to be a constitutionally protected interest.	States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).
When parties settle without going to court, what prevents from suing for same thing? Say party X wants to sue party Y for $500 in damages. If, after some negotiation, party Y agrees to pay party X $400 if they don't go to court and make things quick and easy and party Y agrees. What would prevent from party X taking the $400 then still going to court? Would the case automatically be dismissed if the judge finds evidence this had been settled? What if party X argues that it had reconsidered and wants the full $500? I'm assuming some sort of contract would be needed, that says something like "this issue is considered resolved upon receiving $400 from party Y and party X agrees to not initiate litigation relating to the issue". But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies.	But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies. You are mistaken. A contract settling a bona fide dispute regarding people's legal rights can mutually (or unilaterally for that matter) release or waive their legal rights. In fact, a waiver or release of rights is routinely a part of a settlement agreement. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of such agreements are entered into every year and they are almost always enforced. Sometimes, but not always, a settlement agreement will also call for a dismissal of a case with prejudice, which (roughly) means a dismissal that prohibits refiling a case involving the same subject matter.	If it is a multi-party contract, generally all parties to the contract have liability for its breach regardless of who is supposed to receive payment. It is possible to contractually negotiate for limitations of liability in a contract, but not all liability and only with clear language to that effect. Further, if the CorpA and Corp B and Corp C all anticipated at the outset that if there was liability that CorpB incurred that it would not be paid, that would constitute both common law fraud and a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act by everyone involved (entities and individuals) because one is anticipating incurring future liability in an entity with no anticipated capacity to pay it. The circumstances would also plausibly justify "piercing the corporate veil."	No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child.	If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced.	NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory.	Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal.	If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.	One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does.
The difference between a self-governing colony and a dominion In 1949 Newfoundland became a part of Canada. Before 1949 it was a separate country. This Wikipedia article says in 1907 Newfoundland made the transition from the status of a "self-governing colony" to that of a "dominion". A "dominion" is what Canada called itself before 1982. As a "dominion", Canada was an independent country, which in particular sent and received ambassadors, etc., except that the basic constitutional law of the country was an act of the British Parliament, and so could be altered only by the British Parliament. I don't know whether that is how Newfoundland was organized when it was a "dominion". The Wikipedia article suggests the concept of "dominion" is defined in the Statute of Westminster, but that statute did not exist until the 1930s, so it could not have governed whatever it was that happened in 1907. What is the difference between the status of Newfoundland before 1907 and the status after 1907?	I'll be referencing the "Minutes of proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907" throughout (600+ pg. PDF). The page numbers refer to the ones printed on the page instead of any software page number. It seems that @owjburnham's comment is essentially correct, it is mainly a shift in terminology. It came from a desire to further distinguish self-governing from non-self-governing colonies (or "Crown Colonies" as the official term seems to have been). As such, "Dominion" came to be (re)defined as "self-governing colony." During the 1907 Colonial Conference, Prime Minister Sir Joseph Ward of New Zealand opined the following [pg. 30-31]: I think the term "Colony," so far as our countries are concerned, ought to cease, and that that term ought to apply to the Crown Colonies purely, and that those of us who are not at present known as Dominions or Commonwealths, should be known as States of the Empire, or some other expressive word, so as to make a distinction as between the Crown Colonies and the self-governing Dependencies. He also stated the following [pg. 48]: I assume that in this resolution New Zealand, now known by the term "Colony," will be included in the expression "Dominion," which I think it ought to be. Awkwardly, this was right at the end of the day and no one reacted to this statement as the conference adjourned. As the participants were deciding upon the structure and participants of subsequent conferences, there is a lengthy discussion of the exact term to be used to refer to the self-governing colonies [pg. 78-90]. Near its conclusion, the chairman states the following [pg. 89]: We agreed [...] that instead of the word "Colonies" we should use the word "Dominions;" but is it sufficiently defined if we use the word "Dominions" alone throughout? [...] I would suggest that we might take what is really the official term "the Dominions beyond the seas" in the first place where it occurs [...] and any other reference to it in the course of the Resolution might very well be "Dominions." That would make it absolutely clear what we mean by the expression in the first place. Thus, the conference opted for an implicit rather than explicit definition of "Dominion". The designation of Newfoundland as a Dominion in 1907 is just a reconciliation of the fact it was a self-governing colony and the new understanding that the word "Dominion" was to mean roughly that. There was no effective change of status. An explicit definition of "Dominion" would not come until the Balfour Declaration of 1926. Ironically, Newfoundland played no role in deciding the term to be used for itself as its Prime Minister only arrived on Day 4 of the conference [pg. 87].	Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.	Westphalian Sovereignty Israel has decided that this is the law in Israel and they are the only one who gets a say in this. The concept of the modern nation-state can trace its origins to the Treaty of Westphalia (possibly - there is disagreement among historians and political scientists but for our purposes we'll just let them get on with it) which ended the 30-years war. This was a complex and dynamic conflict of which one of the contentious issues was who had the right to determine the laws in a particular territory, particularly religious laws - the local prince/king/duke etc. or the Emporer. Long story short - it wasn't the Emporer. This is embodied in Article 2(1) of the UN charter: The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. That is, Israel and only Israel gets to decide what the law is in Israel. Which is to say, that what the law is in Israel is down to internal Israeli politics. Israel is a democracy so this is down to democratic politics. International law only allows involvement when the actions of a sovereign state (UN member or otherwise) infringe on the peace and stability of other sovereign states. I realise that there is a whole area of discussion here but suffice it to say that the internal operations of the UN are political rather than legal. However, laws on marriage in Israel seem unlikely to have international peace and security implications.	An Act is what's called Primary Legislation, where as Regulations are Secondary Legislation. An Act of Parliament is a law that both Houses of Parliament have agreed to and which has received Royal Assent. These Acts may include provisions for secondary legislation which is law created by ministers (or other bodies) under powers given to them by the Act. The UK's Legislation website says this: 'Primary legislation' is the term used to describe the main laws passed by the legislative bodies of the UK e.g. Acts of the UK Parliament, Scottish Parliament, Welsh Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly. It also includes Acts passed by historical parliaments, other primary legislation for Northern Ireland and Church of England Measures (legislation for the established church in England passed by the General Synod of the Church of England). These types of legislation are sometimes referred to as 'statutes' and the term 'the statute book' refers to the whole of the statute law currently in force. Whereas: 'Secondary legislation' (also called 'subordinate legislation') is delegated legislation made by a person or body under authority contained in primary legislation. Typically, powers to make secondary legislation may be conferred on ministers, on the Crown, or on public bodies. For example, the Office of Communications (OFCOM) is given such powers by the Communications Act 2003. The main types of secondary legislation are Statutory Instruments, Statutory Rules and Orders, Church Instruments. There are three main types of UK Statutory Instrument: 'Orders', 'Regulations', 'Rules'. However, there is no limit imposed on the descriptions that may be given to Statutory Instruments. Other examples include 'Scheme', 'Direction' and 'Declaration'. Different types of instruments serve different functions, but they all have the same legislative force. Prior to 1948, when the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 came into force, the equivalent instruments were known as 'Statutory Rules and Orders'. For example, Part 2A of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 allows for the making of secondary legislation regulations such as (the now revoked) The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-Isolation) (England) Regulations 2020 Secondary Legislation is still subject to Parliamentary scrutiny as it must be approved (the affirmative process) or not rejected (the negative process - and the one applicable to the majority of SI) by Parliament.	See Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, para. 272 OPCA litigants who advance these schemes will often focus on certain aspects of court formalities. Like Mr. Meads, they may scrutinize the court for some hidden indication of its true nature. A strange but common belief is that a flag with yellow or gold thread ‘fringes’ “denotes a military jurisdiction, not common law”. In R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 2, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199, Chief Justice Drapeau of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected a motion by Lindsay “... removing the gold‑fringed Canadian flag that has adorned the Court of Appeal’s hearing room for years ...”. This motion, and the argument that “[t]here is no lawful reason for a Canadian flag to be present other than the regular statutory authorized flag” was frivolous and vexatious: para. 9.	In the example given, both elements must be established. This is the most common meaning of the word "and" in a statute or rule or contract or other writing, but there are times when "and" does not have that meaning. One must always determine the meaning from context on a case by case basis. Words do not have a single universal meaning in all contexts for legal purposes. This variation by context in the meaning of words for legal purposes is especially frequent in countries with common law legal systems based upon the English legal system such as the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and India to have situations where a word often means one thing in one legal context and another thing in different legal contexts. This is because the governing statutes and case law are written on a piecemeal basis by many different people with no one in charge of maintaining stylistic uniformity, over a very long period of time (often centuries). In countries like those of Continental Europe, Latin America and much of Asia and Africa, which have what are called "civil law" systems, that are based on European civil codes, there are comprehensive codifications of the basic laws of the land that are drafted by experts all at the same time, and amended only with great deliberation and care, and these codes tend to use a word more consistently in most contexts than common law legislatures and judges do, although even then, this principle is not absolute.	The US has kept the original meaning More or less. The word entered English from Old French around the turn of the 14th century and meant a person appointed to handle the financial or legal affairs of another. Two branches developed, a common attorney which leads to the modern concept of an attorney under a power of attorney, and an attorney at law. These were qualified people who prepared briefs for barristers in the Common Law courts. The attorneys equivalents in the Chancellery courts were called solicitors. When the courts were merged in the UK in the late 19th century, the term solicitor was kept and attorney was abolished. At about the same time, the courts in the US merged but the Americans kept attorney and abandoned solicitor. Solicitor is still used in some parts of the US to refer to a government lawyer, particularly in the office of solicitor general. The US as well as Commonwealth countries have both an Attorney General and a Solicitor General. The AG is usually a politician and the chief law officer of the government. The SG is usually a civil servant and represents the government in court; for example, when the USA needs to appear in SCOTUS it’s the SG that does it.	What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.
Why are documentary crews allowed to be a party to illegal activity? I was recently watching a documentary that was about underground firearms trade. The crew found themselves in the Philippines where Colt .45 1911 knockoffs were being manufactured and stamped with seals and phony serial numbers, and in Oakland California where those firearms were sold to an underground dealer, and in Mexico and Guatemala where the Oakland dealer sells firearms that have been used in a crime in the usa. The crew was surely witness to many crimes and knew the identities of the perpetrators. Just from the documentary I saw possession of illegal firearms, possession of drugs, sale of illegal firearms, and numerous others. I'm not sure, but the video leaves you with the impression that the crew may have also witnessed assault, battery, robbery, and maybe even murder. These are serious offenses that you would otherwise be legally required to testify to, but film crews seem to get a pass. To what extent does that exemption go? Are all crimes witnessed exempt or just some? What about special interviews with wanted criminals? They get a pass too? Maybe too much for this question, but what is the historical basis and reasoning for this allowance? I cannot think of any and it seems to me that people (producers of this content) stand to profit from these crimes, which I think is also a crime. What makes what they are doing exempt from prosecution?	The general concept is reporter's privilege, which is a protection against being compelled to testify about confidential information. There is no clear national statute or ruling in the US, but most states have enacted shield laws. Since these are state laws, they vary considerably. It had been thought that the First Amendment protected reporters from having to reveal sources, but in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, it was held that The First Amendment does not relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation that all citizens have to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation That 1972 decision is the sum of what SCOTUS has to say about the topic. States then enacted various protections for reporters against compelled testimony. There are specific law requiring certain individuals to report suspected crimes, whereby doctors and teachers have to report certain suspicions or facts when they encounter them in the course of their work. As a subcase of mandatory reporting, in 18 states, everyone is required to report child abuse (but not in California). There are no mandatory reporting requirements for reporters apart from the limited universal requirement pertaining to child abuse. There are widespread laws against aiding and abetting, so if a reporter drove the getaway car, they would be in trouble – almost certainly not applicable to typical cases of investigative journalism. Some states have a law about failure to report a felony, so in Texas, it is a Class A misdemeanor to fail to report. However, the duty is somewhat narrowly limited to one who observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted Witnessing murder would be covered by this. Ohio has a stronger law, which creates a duty to report any felony. From what I can tell, California does not have such a law. [ADDENDUM] The Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press makes available a by-state compendium of legal sources, with case law for all sorts of situations.	They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue.	It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot.	The officers could incur liability under 28 U.S.C. 2680 (h) with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). This would probably be considered "loss of property" or a "wrongful act". It is very rare for cases to go forward for this because of the costs of litigation against an officer. "[I]t is well recognized that ‘officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.’" Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)). “Before any due process liability can be imposed for property damage occurring in a lawful search, it must be established that the police acted unreasonably or maliciously in bringing about the damage.” Cody, 59 F.3d at 16. That actually means that the burden of proof is on the victim to show unreasonableness / maliciousness. It would probably be easier if the thing destroyed could not possibly have contained the item looked for. For instance, if they are looking for a 65" LED TV, they can't even look in a 64" dresser (or something smaller than the object that could not physically hold the object). This issue becomes moot when dealing with drugs.	The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.	Yes, and sometimes it even makes perfect sense that such an activity would be a crime. For many crimes, attempting the crime is a crime. The attempt may have no actual effect on any person or property, but is still illegal. According to 16 U.S. Code § 1538(a)(1)(C) it is illegal to kill an endangered species on the high seas. A whale in international waters cannot really be considered anyone's "property" (and since it's in international waters there can't even be some weird theory of it being the government's property) but it is still illegal. 18 U.S. Code § 700 purports to prohibit the desecration of a flag, although this was found unconstitutional. 18 U.S. Code § 708 makes it a crime to commercially use the coat of arms of the Swiss Confederation, for some reason. And 18 U.S. Code § 711a makes it a crime to use the slogan "Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute" for profit, except as authorized. (But maybe that sort of thing counts as intellectual property.) 18 U.S. Code § 342 makes it a crime to operate a passenger train under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This really only affects people and property if the train is driven improperly as a result; if you make it safely, you'd probably never even know. But the driver would still be facing up to 15 years in prison if he was caught doing that. And finally, according to A Crime a Day on Twitter: 33 USC §1232(b), 33 CFR §401.101 & §401.94(a) make it a federal crime to violate the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations by not having a copy of the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations while you pass through the St. Lawrence Seaway.	Ah, but destroying the insulin is not "tantamount to to murdering the victim". Any pharmacy or hospital can supply more. Once the villain is secured, or the cop and victim are away from the villain, additional supplies can be obtained. That does not justify deadly force. (And since the T J Hooker series was set in a large US city, such supplies would have been readily available, 24/7. If the setting was far away from any such supplies, the case would be different.) However, if the cop has plausible reason to fear that the villain will attack him or the victim, and pose a serious threat of injury or death, the cop can use as much force as is reasonably required to defend himself or the victim, including deadly force if that is needed. He may not use more force than is reasonably required, but in practice once it is established that there was a valid threat, or reasonable grounds to believe that there was a threat, the cop's judgement on how much force was needed will only be overruled in a really egregious case. Under current law, the cop may not use deadly force simply to stop the suspect from escaping, unless there is some unusual factor involved. I think the law may have been interpreted differently on that point when the TV show was made, in the early 1980s.	There's no legal requirement in Canada or US that the police do anything to investigate a crime, so there's no requirement that they do anything specific to investigate a crime. If the police officers are satisfied by the witness accounts, or have some reason to think viewing surveillance recording wouldn't be useful they don't have to, either by law or policy. Note that ordinarily, police won't consider a physical altercation between two grown men a serious enough crime to warrant charges. If there was no serious injury and there wasn't a large discrepancy between the strength of the two men, police will often decline to lay charges even when they believe the evidence would sustain them. In this case the police may have decided it wasn't worth investigating further because it wasn't worth wasting the time of an already overloaded court system. The victim here still has legal options despite the lack action by the police. He can subpoena the video evidence if he wants to bring lawsuit for damages. In Canada, it's possible even to lay your own criminal charges in a private prosecution, although this much more expensive than a civil lawsuit.
If a company prices a product erroneously, then (in the US) do they have to sell the product for that price, if someone buys it at that price? If a company prices a product erroneously, then (in the US) do they have to sell the product for that price, if someone buys it at that price? Or are they allowed to correct the price and not sell for the erroneous price?	It will vary by jurisdiction. This is a complicated area of law, but usually an advertisement or a display of goods in a shop is not an "offer" (in the contract law sense of the term), but an invitation to treat (or "invitation to bargain" in the US). The "offer" is the shopper saying "I'd like one of those please" or putting the goods on the band for the till. The "acceptance" is the checkout girl saying "that'll be ..."	Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.	In fact, the first recognition of the First Sale doctrine came about precisely because a publisher attempted to do something of the nature of what you suggest. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs Straus, the Bobbs-Merrill Corporation attempted to enforce the following restriction, printed on the inside of a book it published: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright." They made the mistake of attempting to enforce it against, among others, R.H. Macy and Co., who they then had to take to court - and lost. This established the First Sale Doctrine, which then later (in 1976) was codified (in 17 U.S. Code § 109. Textbooks recently tested another element of this; in the 2013 case, Kirtsaeng v John Wiley and Sons Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Sale doctrine trumped a notice forbidding selling a book outside of a particular territory or region (Kirtsaeng imported textbooks from Thailand, where they were much cheaper than in the US, and resold them at a profit in the US).	The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other.	It would be a violation of 18 USC 1001, which is the law against making false statements to the federal government. Paul Mozer, who was a Salomon Brothers trader, received a four month sentence for doing something along those lines in 1994. Bidding on something implies an intent to pay for the thing, which in this case is a falsehood: in so doing, one "falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" (that you don't intend to pay for the thing).	Unless you have caused loss to the customer by making the typo, the answer is no. Obviously, anyone can attempt to sue anyone. However, for the court to accept their claim/charge for processing it needs to fall in one of these buckets: They had a contract with you personally and you were in breach of it — obviously this does not apply in your situation; You committed a crime — looks like this is not the case either; You had a duty of care towards them and committed the tort of negligence. This is what the customer must be referring to — making the typo could be regarded as negligence, especially if it caused actual harm/losses to them.	The price is not one of the terms and conditions of the CC-SA license. You may chose to attach a price to a derivative work (which you have the right to create under license section 3.b). But any person who receives the derivative work legitimately (from you or from someone who got it from you, directly or indirectly) must get it under the CC-SA license, and has the right to redistribute it, and may do so at no charge if that person so chooses. Also, you may not impose any copy protection or other technological measure that would prevent exercise of the reuser's rights. Whether selling a work that may be redistributed freely is good business is your decision.	A company can charge each of its customers a different price if it wishes. Providing this discrimination is not on the basis of a prohibited reason (race, sex etc.) this is not illegal.
Why is the bond for a $500 fraud identical to that for a more than $20 000 fraud? This man who was much advertised on the internet (see the links) has 19 charges, the bond for each of them being set to $40 000. The question is why, as long as some charges are for frauds ranging from $100 to $500 while others for frauds above $20 000? The total bond would be $760 000. See the list of charges here: https://www.donaanacounty.org/inmates/viewprofile/1700009732	Bail schedules In the United States, bail bond amounts are commonly set in accordance with a local bail schedule. According to Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, published in 2016 by the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School: Jurisdictions throughout the country use bail schedules to determine the amount of money bail that will be applied to certain categories of offenses. Generally, a bail schedule will list particular offenses or offense types (e.g., various classes of misdemeanor or felony) and assign a specific dollar amount or dollar range. Jurisdictions may embrace bail schedules as a tool of efficiency or because they provide uniformity along certain dimensions (that is, defendants accused of the same offense will have the same bond amount applied to them) ... But by setting out a simple matrix of offenses and corresponding dollar amounts, bail schedules do not allow for meaningfully individualized considerations of a defendant’s circumstances ... Bail schedules may be mandatory or advisory and may be set at the state or local level. Once bail schedules are in place, however, they often become de facto law even if they are not formally mandatory. Rules in New Mexico The use of bail schedules, and the associated bail bonds industry, is peculiar to the United States and has been widely criticised. As the CJPP report notes, bail schedules "are fundamentally inconsistent with individualized decision-making." In the jurisdiction you have referred to (New Mexico), a constitutional amendment was passed in November 2016 to encourage a more flexible approach to setting bail. Section 13 of the Constitution of New Mexico now provides: A person who is not detainable on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the absence of bond and is otherwise eligible for bail shall not be detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or property bond. A defendant who is neither a danger nor a flight risk and who has a financial inability to post a money or property bond may file a motion with the court requesting relief from the requirement to post bond. The court shall rule on the motion in an expedited manner. On July 1, 2017, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued new rules to comply with the constitutional amendment which prohibit the use of "fixed money-bail schedules that do not take into account evidence of dangerousness or flight risk cannot be used": New Mexico Supreme Court, Key Facts and Law Regarding Pretrial Release and Detention. However, the rules do permit the "standardized release of low-risk arrestees," and the process of "standardization" presumably involves a bail schedule: In place of the various inconsistent fixed-money-bond schedules that had been used by many local jurisdictions despite their lack of consideration of individual risk and noncompliance with controlling law, the new rules (Rule 408) also provide tighter regulation of procedures for early release procedures by detention centers and court employees, allowing standardized release of low-risk arrestees prior to initial court appearances but ending the practice of releasing high-risk defendants on fixed money bond schedules before they appear before a judge for a detention or release hearing. Given that the defendant in the case you have referred to was arrested less than two weeks ago, was extradited to New Mexico, and remains in custody, it is unclear that the bond amounts on the county inmate register have any significance. The situation may change at the next court hearing.	It would be a violation of 18 USC 1001, which is the law against making false statements to the federal government. Paul Mozer, who was a Salomon Brothers trader, received a four month sentence for doing something along those lines in 1994. Bidding on something implies an intent to pay for the thing, which in this case is a falsehood: in so doing, one "falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" (that you don't intend to pay for the thing).	If a person is wrongfully deprived of money (or something else of value) for a period, that is damage, even if the money is later repaid. The victim might have used the money in some profitable or advantageous way during the period when it was taken. But the victim need not prove exactly how s/he might have profited, it is enough to show that the victim was wrongfully deprived of something of value. Of course, there are other elements to fraud. There must have been a lie or deception, on which the victim reasonably relied. There must have been intent that the victim so relay. The deception must have been material and must have directly caused or led to the damage. (Or have gotten the Fraudster a benefit that would not have been provided had the victim known the truth.) But assuming that all the elements of fraud are proved, restitution, even full restitution with interest, does not excuse the fraud. However, as a practical matter, if offered full restitution on condition of a release or an agreement not to prosecute, many victims will choose to take it, preferring their money back, perhaps with interest, to a legal case, even a winning one.	They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation.	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).	The reason this section exists is pretty well stated in an English case: Holmes v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Another. In paragraph 12, they discuss the law of theft in England, and note that under the law there as it stood in 2004 (and reaching back to principles of common law, which are often but not always shared with the US), deception required causing someone to believe something. A machine has no mind, cannot think, and can't be made to believe anything -- it sees an input and mechanically performs some response in response to that input. For instance, suppose you were to discover someone's bank account number and printed a check of your own that had that number on it. You then make that check up to look like it's a check from the someone else to you, and deposit it to an ATM; you then withdraw however much is available immediately. In all likelihood, no human will see that check until the victim looks into why they're significantly poorer than they remembered, so no human was deceived. The only things that were possibly deceived were the computers involved in the check-clearing process. But they don't have a mind: as far as they're concerned, they see pixels, pass them through an algorithm, and then send a message to another computer at the bank with certain information (which a human recognizes as an image of a check and an amount of money, but an ATM doesn't know what it means for something to be an image of a check). The machine then mechanically pushes bills out a slot. They don't think the check's real, don't think it's fake, and don't think it's a check: they're just piles of semiconductors and wires acting in accordance with the laws of physics. If you gave a check like this to a check-cashing place, it's clearly theft by deception: you make the human there (falsely) think you have a legitimate check, and they then pay you money based on it. But these days, a lot of this stuff is automated. Alaska's legislature didn't want you to get out of theft by deception charged because something was automated. So, they said that a machine could be deceived. This isn't a crime by itself; you can't be charged with deceiving a machine. You are charged with an offense under the chapter that involves deception. What 11.46.985 does is say you can't argue "this wasn't deception because only the machine was deceived."	It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two.	A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.
How are old allegations handled? The current wave of sexual abuse allegations are (often) about actions that happened a LONG time ago (15+ years). I thought that, due to the long time, these crimes will be time-barred. Is this true? or can the accused be prosecuted for old crimes?	It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).	Given there was no answer here, I will state what I know about child abuse response, but note I am not a lawyer nor am I in Illinois, so my statements are likely generalized for most US states (individual laws vary by state, and I reside in Pennsylvania). In most US states, the police and child/youth services (that's what it's called in Pennsylvania but all states have similar services) work side by side and a complaint by the child to a police officer will have an emergency action taken to protect the child. The child is identified as a victim and the police and child/youth services have the obligation to protect the child and to keep them from harm. This is the main goal of police and children/youth services - to keep the child safe and act in the best interest of the child. Usually, a complaint to a child abuse center can take time to process. When a police complaint comes in it is more immediate, with police having more 'influence' with CYS (child/youth services). Especially when the child is in deadly danger (they were just stabbed, after all), the police may arrest the mother or abusive sibling or intervene therein to remove the child from the parents care with CYS-equivalent services working to find suitable alternative living situations for the child as a result of a order of removal/protection authorized by a judge. (PA at least had emergency situation response plans for these situations where a judge is just a phone call away). As well, the child will likely be made a ward of the state if the courts determine the mother cannot care for the child or is a threat as such (not caring enough to stop the brother may count), insomuch that the child may be removed from the dangerous situation and placed in the care of a willing relative or if none can be found will be placed in temporary foster care in a safer environment. Note that nothing happens rapidly without the initial complaint to the police. At age 16 the child is likely going to be taken more seriously (compared to a 12 year old, for example), and has the right to be allowed to reach out to hospital staff to ask to speak to a police officer - otherwise it takes a child abuse complaint from someone who knows the child and situation and that can sometimes take longer to process (though, the distance factor in the original question may make a complaint from overseas given a lower priority due to not knowing the person on a more personal in-person level)	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	"The EU" is a lot of different jurisdictions, and laws vary between them. The following answer applies to the UK. A: Alice is guilty of making and possessing indecent images of a child. The fact that the child was herself is irrelevant, as are her current feelings on the subject. The "making" offence was committed when she was under 18, so for that she would be treated as a child, but the possession offence would be be charged at her current age. If Alice has made recent copies of the pictures, for instance by moving her files to another computer, then she is guilty of "making" as an adult. B: As with "A", but with increased penalties for publishing it. C: As with "B", except that the offence was committed when she was under 18.	Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?	In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.	That depends on several things: Do the authorities have solid evidence of what happened? Authorities in which country? A screenshot is not evidence, that would be easily faked. It takes access to the metadata. Does the country where the perpetrator lives consider it a serious crime? Note that when two people exchange such messages, who is the criminal and who is the victim can depend on the ages of both, and the exact rules of who is guilty of what may differ from country to country. There are countries which prosecute child abuse by their citizens or residents abroad once they come back. So it may be that nothing happens, or it may be prosecuted.
Can a person outside the US, who is affected by a product in a US class action, join the class case? This question is motivated by a class action suit in the US, against a US manufacturer who sells their products worldwide. The product is alleged faulty, and a class action suit has been filed in the US. Can people overseas (not US citizens) who also bought the identical product by the same US company, and suffered the same alleged defect, join the US case, or do they have to file in their own country as a separate case? What would be the effect of being overseas (if any)?	The Answer Depends Upon The Facts Of The Case Related To The Forum Where The Suit Is Commenced The analysis depends upon some key facts that a person asking a question might not know, because they are not intuitively obvious and have actually changed in the last few years, without knowing the relevant law. When The Forum State Has General Jurisdiction Over All Defendants The most important question to consider is this one: Is the state in which the class action suit is brought is home to the headquarters of the US manufacturer (or a state where the manufacturer has a substantial equivalent to a headquarters)? This question matters because, if and only if the answer to this question is "yes" then, "general jurisdiction" would be present under a U.S. Supreme Court precedent established in 2014. If a forum state's courts have "general jurisdiction" over a defendant, this means that the defendant can be sued in that forum on any cause of action against that defendant arising anywhere in the world, regardless of any other relationship that the claim has to the forum state (except for claims in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts which can be brought in a U.S. District Court located in the same state, or in an arbitration forum pursuant to a valid arbitration clause that binds the parties, an issue beyond the scope of this question and answer). Until recently general jurisdiction over a defendant (i.e. jurisdiction over any lawsuit against a defendant without regard to the particular facts of the case) was present in any state where a company has a permanent office for the conduct of business, under half a century of precedent on the issue that traced back to a U.S. Supreme Court case known as International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In the case of large corporations doing business nationwide, this usually meant that a plaintiff had a large number of states to choose from in which a defendant could be sued on any matter whatsoever which also facilitated the filing of class action lawsuits with plaintiffs from all over the world covered by a single lawsuit. But, in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (January 14, 2014), general jurisdiction was limited to the state where the headquarters of the business is located, or another state the defendant is otherwise equally "at home." (For example, the state where Amazon.com chooses to locate its proposed "HQ2" in the case of a lawsuit against Amazon.) If so, the foreign plaintiff member of the class can probably join the lawsuit, since general jurisdiction is present. When The Forum State Does Not Have General Jurisdiction Over All Defendants But, if the forum of the class action lawsuit is not one of the typically one or two states where the defendant is "at home", then a U.S. Supreme Court ruling from June of 2017 that significantly changes the law of "specific jurisdiction" probably bars the joinder of the foreign plaintiff as a member of the class. This case holds that specific jurisdiction over a defendant arising solely from the fact that it sold a defective product in a particular state or country which it caused an injury to be limited to plaintiffs who actually purchased the product or suffered an injury in that state. So, if there is more than one defendant, the forum state must have general jurisdiction over all of the defendants, or must have specific jurisdiction over all defendants over whom it does not have general jurisdiction for a reason that applies to all members of the class bringing the lawsuit. For example, if the defective product was an airplane that crashed in California as a result of a defective product, everyone hurt in the crash could sue in a single action in California because that is where the injury occurred to all of them, even if the people on the plane who were injured or died came from different states and countries. Similarly, if the product was defective as a result of design work conducted by multiple large corporate defendants with different home states outside Colorado that took place entirely at a design collaboration workshop at the University of Colorado at Boulder, a class action including all persons injured globally by the defective products could be brought in Colorado, even if the injuries were dispersed all over the world at places where the defective products were delivered. The case adopting this radical change in the law of specific personal jurisdiction is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty. (U.S. June 19, 2017) in which the court finds that "specific personal jurisdiction" (as opposed to "general jurisdiction") is lacking with regard to the claims of members of the class of plaintiffs who are not California residents in this case brought in a California state trial court (in an 8-1 decision with Justice Sotomayor dissenting). According to the official syllabus of that case: A group of plaintiffs, most of whom are not California residents, sued Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in California state court, alleging that the pharmaceutical company’s drug Plavix had damaged their health. BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and it maintains substantial operations in both New York and New Jersey. Although it engages in business activities in California and sells Plavix there, BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, manufacture, label, package, or work on the regulatory approval for Plavix in the State. And the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that they were injured by Plavix in California, or that they were treated for their injuries in California. The California Superior Court denied BMS’s motion to quash service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s extensive activities in the State gave the California courts general jurisdiction. Following this Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, the State Court of Appeal found that the California courts lacked general jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeal went on to find that the California courts had specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident plaintiffs. Affirming, the State Supreme Court applied a “sliding scale approach” to specific jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s “wide ranging” contacts with the State were enough to support a finding of specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident plaintiffs. That attenuated connection was met, the court held, in part because the nonresidents’ claims were similar in many ways to the California residents’ claims and because BMS engaged in other activities in the State. The high court finds that the absence of an in-state injury or injury to a resident plaintiff is controlling. It is not sufficient in the high court's analysis that the corporation is already subject to suit in California as a result of its conduct in California to most of the people in the suit. Instead of analyzing whether California has jurisdiction over the product liability situation, in general, the high court decides that the determination regarding whether California has jurisdiction over a suit against a particular defendant must be made on a plaintiff by plaintiff basis when "specific jurisdiction" rather than "general jurisdiction" is involved. Sotomayor's dissent in this case emphasizes implications of this ruling in the kind of situation posed by this question at Law.SE: Three years ago, the Court imposed substantial curbs on the exercise of general jurisdiction in its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014). Today, the Court takes its first step toward a similar contraction of specific jurisdiction by holding that a corporation that engages in a nationwide course of conduct cannot be held accountable in a state court by a group of injured people unless all of those people were injured in the forum State. I fear the consequences of the Court’s decision today will be substantial. The majority’s rule will make it difficult to aggregate the claims of plaintiffs across the country whose claims may be worth little alone. It will make it impossible to bring a nationwide mass action in state court against defendants who are “at home” in different States. And it will result in piecemeal litigation and the bifurcation of claims. None of this is necessary. A core concern in this Court’s personal jurisdiction cases is fairness. And there is nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike. . . . It “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316, to permit plaintiffs to aggregate claims arising out of a single nationwide course of conduct in a single suit in a single State where some, but not all, were injured. But that is exactly what the Court holds today is barred by the Due Process Clause. This is not a rule the Constitution has required before. I respectfully dissent. The most serious issues arise in one of the situations that Justice Sotomayor addresses which the majority does not adequately consider in the rebuttal in its own opinion, which is the situation where there are multiple possible defendants with different home states, whose relative liability is unknown or independent or mutually dependent. For example, suppose that the product has two kinds of defectively manufactured components manufactured by companies with two different home states in the U.S. (e.g. an electronic device charging bay and a battery) that are assembled by the customer after they are delivered independently, which, when acting together, cause the assembled product to be dangerous and cause injury even though the design itself is not defective. Under Bristol-Myers, there is no U.S. forum with jurisdiction over all injuries caused by these compound manufacturing defects that can allocate responsibility between the responsible manufacturers on a consistent basis. Why Didn't It Matter That The Drugs Were Distributed By A California Distributor? The high court is also unimpressed with the fact that the drug giving rise to the product liability was distributed by a California company, presumably because the cause of action in question in the case was brought against the manufacturer as a strict liability defective product claim, rather than as a claim against a seller of the product arising from a warranty that the product was free of defects arising under the Uniform Commercial Code or an express warranty. This makes sense if the California distributor was a wholesale company not in direct privity with the retail buyers of the products from retail pharmacies who were injured by the products. The wholesaler could be sued under the Uniform Commercial Code on its warranty to the buyers of the drugs, only by the intermediate wholesalers or retail pharmacies that bought the drugs. The wholesaler could also be sued on its warranty only if those direct buyers themselves suffered injuries as a result of the defective product. For example, a retailer might have injuries in the nature of breach of warranty liability in suits brought against retail sellers by injured consumers under the Uniform Commercial Code that the retail sellers would be seeking indemnification of from the California based wholesale distributor. But, Bristol-Meyers does mean that it is basically impossible for injured consumers who were not injured in the forum state to sue both the manufacturer of the defective drugs (where jurisdiction would be present in New York and New Jersey) on a tort theory, and the distributor of the defective drugs (where jurisdiction would be present in California) in the same action. So, it is effectively impossible in this case for all people injured by the defective drugs to sue all of the potential Bristol-Meyers case defendants in a single lawsuit. Statutory Considerations Existing statutory limits on federal court jurisdiction limit the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts in most cases of cases to cases in which a state court in the state where the U.S. District Court is located would have either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction of the defendant (without regard to the fact that the case might be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which pertains to the nature of the cause of action asserted rather than the ties of the defendant to the forum state). But, the decision leaves Congress with the option of potentially changing that statute which currently limits the personal jurisdiction of federal trial courts to that of a state court of general jurisdiction in the same state, as it already does in cases that are predominantly "in rem" (e.g. interpleader cases and interstate boundary and real property title disputes), in bankruptcy cases, and with respect to the subpoena power of U.S. District Courts. The official syllabus also notes that: The Court’s decision will not result in the parade of horribles that respondents conjure up. It does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. Alternatively, the nonresident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respective home States. In addition, since this decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, the question remains open whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. Constitutionally, Congress still has the authority to vest all U.S. District Courts with jurisdiction over any case in which the United States treated as a single state for purposes of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction analysis. This would leave the question of which particular U.S. District Court was the proper one to file in as a question of venue (which does not have a constitutional dimension) rather than a question of jurisdiction (which is subject to constitutional considerations), and many legal scholars have urged Congress to do just that. But, so far, Congress has not altered a status quo that does not give U.S. District Courts the maximal jurisdiction allowed under the United States Constitution. But, so far, Congress has instead taken an intermediate position on the geographic scope of federal court jurisdiction in the jurisdictional portion of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (which also limits the extent to which "coupon settlements" of class action cases are permitted). In particular (per the link in this paragraph): The Act permits federal courts to preside over certain class actions in diversity jurisdiction where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million; where the class comprises at least 100 plaintiffs; and where there is at least "minimal diversity" between the parties (i.e., at least one plaintiff class member is diverse from at least one defendant). The court, however, may decline jurisdiction under certain circumstances, and is required to decline jurisdiction in certain others. But, while the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 allows many class action lawsuits which would otherwise be brought on exclusively state law claims in state court to be brought in federal court, or removed from state court to federal court, it does not authorize class action lawsuits that could not be brought in a state court which a U.S. District Court is located due to lack of either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction from being brought in that federal court either. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was favored by businesses likely to be defendants in future class action lawsuits (such as manufacturers), because state civil procedure law in some U.S. states such as California, is more favorable to class action plaintiffs than federal civil procedure laws related to class actions.	What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR.	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.	The Iran lawsuit depended on a statute directed against Iran, not applicable to the Chinese government. The Alien Tort Claims Act, which gives US federal courts original jurisdiction for torts "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States", neither of which is likely to describe the allegation against the Chinese government. The Chinese government probably would not entertain such a suit, and US courts do not have jurisdiction. It is also unclear how much US property is owned by the government of the PRC which could be seized: reports simply talk about "owned by the Chinese" without distinguishing government vs. private ownership.	Countries, and supranational governments like the EU, have jurisdiction over companies that do business in their jurisdictions. Oracle is technically not a U.S. corporation; it's a closely related group of California and Delaware corporations. Very few companies incorporate under U.S. federal law (I believe some banking corporations are required to, but don't quote me on that). Almost all companies are incorporated under state law. However, if Oracle does business in Texas, it still has to obey Texas law. And if it does business in the EU, it still has to obey EU law. Some laws make distinctions in some corporate matters between domestic corporations (incorporated under that state's laws) and foreign corporations (incorporated under another state's laws). But if you do business in a state, including an EU member state, you still need to obey that state's general laws, including antitrust law. Short version: if you visit another country, you can't go around shooting people, then say, "your laws don't apply to me, I'm an American." Neither can a company, no matter where it's incorporated. As for stopping the merger...any country where the merging companies do business can stop the merged company from doing business there if the merger violates local law. If this is a major, commercially important region like the EU, then failure to get EU approval will stop the merger. If it's a minor territory, the company will sometimes enter into an agreement to divest itself of local assets or entities. For example, if merging Oracle and Sun would create an antitrust problem in the minicomputer repair market in Laos, the merged entities would sell off either Oracle's or Sun's Laotian minicomputer repair division.	Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.	First, the seller has not violated copyright law by selling you this book. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. provides the precedent. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Sale doctrine applies to "grey market" imports of books, so buying a book cheaply in another country and then shipping it to the USA is entirely legal, regardless of what the publisher would like. The court wrote: Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the “first sale” doctrine applies to protect a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. Can that buyer bring that copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, someone who purchases, say at a used bookstore, a book printed abroad subsequently resell it without the copyright owner’s permission? In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. Wikipedia also has an article on the case. As for your recourse against the seller, this would seem to be very limited unless they specifically promised you the US edition, or the content is materially different between US and Indian editions. You don't say what kind of book this is. Textbooks typically have identical content. Fiction and other entertainment books generally have local idioms and terminology changed (e.g. "pavement" versus "sidewalk") but will otherwise be the same. You might be able to claim that this is a material difference, but its likely to be difficult.	Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.
FL, USA - Recording/Voyeurism Laws In Harassment Situation A good friend is being harassed by his neighbor, and is at the end of his wits trying to get some recourse. Essentially the neighbor is belligerent: comes out when family members are home specifically to verbally harass them, trashes the area around their house by blowing lawn debris or placing garbage around it, puts signs in his yard that points to their property to shame them, the list goes on. They do not have property surveillance, so the attempt thus far has been to hide a cell phone with recording on when he comes out to harass them from his driveway, photo-document the trash/signs, etc. The police can't typically do anything in this dispute because a crime hasn't actually been committed, even with video evidence of verbal harassment. Being said, in exasperation the friend has uploaded videos documenting the issue to a video-sharing site. I suspect there are Florida statutes that, regardless of reason, prohibit this manner of recording where the harasser is at home (a time/place which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy), does not know about the recording, and it has been disseminated online in a manner which would shame the harasser in the eyes of someone reasonable. I'd like to think this is in violation of FL 810.145 but the language there is almost specific for recording someone dressing or through their clothes. Am I correct in my thinking? As a side question, for such disputes, would the best course of action be to collect good audiovisual evidence and then file a harassment claim and just prove it in court?	FL 810.145 (c) - "Place and time when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy" In Florida, there is no expectation of privacy in public. You can legally record both audio and visual anything you can see in public. As for the harassment, set up security cams and record as much of it as possible in order to provide the Police with evidence of any potential crimes.	In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.	This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.	You have no right to privacy in public What you do and say in public is … public. In general, in common law jurisdictions, anyone and everyone has the right to record you unless you have a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. Where the exact line on that is situational but if you are shouting racist slurs, you don’t have it. The person who made the recording owns the recording and none of the people in the recording have a say in what they do with it. However, under privacy laws like the GDPR, a person’s image and voice are personal data so any data processor must have a legal reason for processing it. However, such laws do not usually extend to private individuals acting in a private capacity. So images captured on a private phone are unlikely to be caught while images on a corporate CCTV system will be.	Depositions must always be attended by a court reporter in every jurisdiction I have ever encountered (including Colorado, New York, California, Wyoming and Florida). Alaska may be an exception. Its state constitution creates a right to participate in many kinds of legal and legislative proceedings remotely because the distances involved are often so great. The court reporter administers an oath to the witness, keeps track of exhibits, impartially records what happens (usually stenographically and with an audiotape) and then reduces it to a transcript later, a process assisted by having been there when the testimony was given (and allowing for the court reporter, for example, to request spellings of words during breaks). A videotape can be used in addition to the court reporter and sometimes this is done when it would be helpful for understanding a highly visual topic (e.g. in a patent case where someone is explaining a 3D object) or when a witness is expected to behave badly or is known for problematic voice character or body language. Court proceedings in a courtroom are often audiotaped with a judge present but without a live court reporter present. Appellate court arguments are frequently live streamed over the Internet. There may be some jurisdictions where it is possible to have an oath administered by a notary and simply audiotape or videotape the deposition, but that would be very rare in every jurisdiction of which I am aware.	In addition to compelling a store to produce evidence such as video footage, via a search warrant as described by bdb484, police can request access to information in the possession of such information. The store may voluntarily comply with the request, or not. Especially in the case of online transactions, there may be a privacy guarantee that information about a customer's transaction will not be revealed to a third party unless required by law (ergo, a warrant), but security camera recordings are not protected by such guarantees.	can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected.	No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?
Is it illegal to backup your hard drive if you have copyrighted software on it? Is it illegal if you create a backup of an HDD that has copyrighted software installed on it? This could be anything from legally purchased games and or expensive popular graphics/video editing programs, just as an example. Is this backup an illegal copy of the original HDD?	You're allowed to make backups of copyrighted software, as long as you are authorized to use the software, the backups are not distributed, and they are destroyed when/if you are no longer authorized to use the software. 17 USC §117(a): (a) Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy. -- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) ...(not very helpful)...or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful. The law is usually used to justify copies of the installation media, but it would be unconscionable to cut your rights off there and make backups illegal for machines containing copyrighted software. After all, with such an interpretation, no Windows machine could be backed up since Windows is copyrighted.	Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.	The owner of IP owns the abstract thing that is protected by law (the intellectual property), and not the concrete product that relied on (illegally) using that abstraction. The person who made the thing, or to whom he sold it, owns the object. If you buy a disk with pirated or non-pirated software, you own the disk, and if you bought it legally, you probably bought a license to use the software. Using "pirated" to refer to the class of things legally manufactured (not stolen, not using stolen components) but in violation of IP law, pirated goods might be subject to seizure by the government (it would be slated for destruction), but the goods would not be the subject of a prosecution for theft. While infringement of IP rights is often called "theft", it doesn't have all of the elements of theft: you do not deprive the owner of the thing that they own.	No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.	Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine.	A few years ago, there was a trial in the USA about some short sound on some music CD: One party claimed that one piece of music on the CD contained a sound of less than one second length which is copied from another CD without the permission of the copyright owner of the other CD. It could never be found out if this claim was really true. The court's decision was: If it is not possible to distinguish between a copy and a work that does not depend on the other work at all, it is not a copyright infringement - even if the sound has been copied from the other CD. For this reason, I'd guess that a 4x3 image would not be a copyright infringement, yet, while 60x45 would definitely be one. Just for reference: The same image as 3x4 and as 45x60:	It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment).	That would be pretty much a classical case of copyright infringement. Drawing a thing from memory is copying just as much as drawing a thing with the original before you or xeroxing a thing. The degree of match between the original and your copy may vary depending on how good your memory is, but that doesn't matter, because copyright protection is not about "making exact replicas", it is about copying in any form.
Cheapest country to form a business within the European Union I am a Greek (freelancing) software developer interested in forming a company to be able to legally invoice my clients. Crazy taxes in Greece prohibit myself from running a company in my own country (according to my budget) therefore I'm looking for another solution. Case: Product: I will be selling software (code) Average annual income: 10k-20k euros Company type: From my research I think I should either register for a sole proprietorship (sole trader) or an ltd company. My Citizenship: US and Greek citizenship Some more info: Let me tell you that I need to pay less than 100 euros per month to run it. (wether that is accountant costs, virtual office rents or anything) and I WILL be working from home. What would you suggest is the BEST value for money road to choose? Thank you.	You need to consult an accountant but, in general, if you live in Greece and earn money anywhere in the world, you will pay tax on that money in Greece. If the country in which you earned the money has a tax treaty with Greece then, depending on the terms of that treaty, you will be entitled to a credit on your Greek tax for the foreign tax you paid. For example, if the tax in Greece is 50% and the tax in the foreign country is 25% and you earned 20,000, then you would pay 5,000 foreign tax, you would owe the Greek government 10,000 and be entitled to a credit for 5,000 leaving you in exactly the same position as if you had set up business in Greece.	Yes, you could do this be means of the EULA, provided you are not in the EU yourself. You only have to comply with the GDPR if you are offering a product or service to people that are in the EU. If you are making it clear that whatever you offer is not available to Europeans, you make your site exempt from the GDPR.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	Yes. The European Enforcement Order is an explicit procedure for uncontested claims like this. That means no German court is involved (unlike Dale M's answer suggests). The Greek Court files an EEO, and this can be enforced directly in Germany without going through German courts again. That means you can face wage garrisons, bank account freezes etcetera.	I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.	If you operate from outside Germany but within the EU, it is generally sufficient to satisfy your own country's regulations. This is a foundational principle of the EU single market, though it's not quite realized yet and has exemptions for consumer protection purposes. However, the German TMG law which includes the Impressumspflicht explicitly enshrines this principle. So from the German Impressumspflicht perspective, you're good to go. However, you will not be able to operate anonymously, because of your country's laws. GDPR requires you to clearly state your identity and contact details in your privacy notice. If you engage in internet-based commerce, the EU eCommerce Directive will have caused your EU member state to pass legislation that requires you to disclose: your name the geographic address where you are established contact details incl an email address if applicable, registration numbers from trade registers or similar if applicable, your VAT ID Note that you must have a VAT ID for cross-border B2B sales within the EU. You state that you are not selling anything via your website, and are instead collecting payments via another website. What the consequences of this are would depend on the laws and caselaw in your jurisdiction, but you will have to make these disclosures on at least one of the two websites. About Germany going after bloggers who show ads: income from ads is taxable income, and operating a business requires registration. However, the German Impressumspflicht is rarely enforced by the state. Instead, other market participants (competitors) trawl the internet for potential violations and then send a cease-and-desist letter. They can do this because skirting legal obligations distorts the level playing field, which harms those competitors. There is a thriving cease-and-desist industry built around this, but it only affects businesses that operate within Germany.	It seems that your friend is taking part in a multi-level marketing scheme. However, this does not necessarily exclude a pyramid or snow ball scheme. Both can be illegal in Germany and Switzerland under the respective unfair business practices codes, because the systems do not rely on the sales of goods and services, but on the continuous recruitment of further sales persons. To clarify whether your friend's system is illegal, you could report the scheme to the competent watchdogs. In Germany the "Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs" in Bad Homburg is recommendable. As the company is operating from Switzerland, German law not be applicable without more. Therefore also contacting the Swiss authorities may be advisable. This seems to be the "Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO" in Bern.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.
What does limited or unlimited mean in a license? What does limited or unlimited mean in a license? For example how is a limited license to use a program or specific source code, different than an unlimited one?	A limited license normally contains limits in the scope of use you may make of intellectual property (geographical or in type of use), in the extent to which it can be sublicensed, in the people who may use it pursuant to the license, and/or in the duration during which one may use it. Most licenses for intellectual property are limited. An unlimited license (which is very rare) would be a right to use intellectual property without limitation in the same manner as a true owner of the intellectual property rights in question.	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	See Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and Golan v. Holder 565 U.S. ___ (2012), especially the first four pages of Eldred (the syllabus). How does extending the term for existing works "promote the progress"? This is a judgement that the courts have left in the hands of the legislature. The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain. (Eldred) if it is generally expected that the copyright term will be extended continually, then, effectively, the perception is that the copyright term is unlimited First, this isn't generally expected. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress might evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together "an unlimited number of 'limited Times,'" the Court of Appeals stated that such legislative misbehavior "clearly is not the situation before us." (Eldred) Second, in the situation that has actually been happening, Eldred says: Although conceding that the CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights, petitioners contend that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." In petitioners' view, a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited," however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, "limited" meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed. Thus understood, a timespan appropriately "limited" as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights. This is Constitutional because the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to make these extensions, and its legislative actions until now have not strayed beyond the scope of what the Constitution permits. Briefly, the court took a textualist approach to interpreting the "limited times" restriction. They found that "at the time of the Framing, limited meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed," and that Congress has a long established practice of providing extensions to both patent and copyright holders. "Congress’ unbroken practice since the founding generation of applying new definitions or adjustments of the copyright term to both future works and existing works overwhelms petitioners’ argument." This weighs in favor of the view that "limited times" did not mean to the founders that extensions are unconstitutional.	General The legal discussion hinges on the question whether the concept of copyright exhaustion applies to software. (The linked article also discusses the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling mentioned below in the EU part of this answer.) Copyright exhaustion, in simple terms, allows certain uses (like the ones in your scenarios) of copyrighted (books) or patented (e.g. devices) items for which the copyright or patent holder has the right to first sale. If and when that principle applies, the original seller cannot control further sales or other uses of that particular specimen. Their copyright is "exhausted" with the first sale. Situation in India I want to emphasize that I have exactly zero experience regarding India in any way. All I did was that I went to the google. It appears that the Indian Supreme Court recently ruled in Engineering Analysis Centre for Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT that the typical EULAs are valid. In particular, copyright exhaustion does not apply and the EULA can restrict re-selling and similar actions. The case is discussed in this article, including relevant quotes. This would make everything illegal which is forbidden by an EULA. As I read the EULA, creating a backup copy is allowed, as is restoring Windows from it, obviously; whether that has to happen on the same computer is unclear to me and may depend on the license type (OEM vs. standalone), although I have two remarks: Microsoft is the copyright owner; if they provide you with a license (for example because you called them after you re-installed Windows from a backup copy, and the internet license process didn't work) without you making false claims it is their prerogative. You are good. What constitutes a different computer? The SSD? The case? The mouse? We do have a case of the Ship of Theseus, or here for a funnier take: How much can you change before it becomes a different machine? The answer: Call Microsoft and find out. Situation in the EU The situation in the EU is fundamentally different from the one depicted with a misguided metaphor in the accepted answer. In Europe, all of your scenarios are legal. In July 2012, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of the company usedSoft who is a license reseller. (I'm writing this text on a machine with a Windows license that cost me, together with a Microsoft Office Professional license, 30 Euros, from this store.) The title of the Court's press release couldn't be clearer: An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his ‘used’ licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet Not only can you re-install the software, provided it is the only installation, on the same or a different computer; you can even sell it. You can even sell OEM and bulk licenses. The full text of the decision can be found here. The court stressed that it doesn't make a difference whether the software was originally provided on a physical carrier like a DVD or as a download. Crucially, the seller is obligated to continue providing downloads and updates for the re-sold licensed software as if it were still owned by the first buyer. There is no legal difference between software provided on a physical medium or as a download. To quote the decision: 80 Since the copyright holder cannot object to the resale of a copy of a computer program for which that rightholder’s distribution right is exhausted under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24, it must be concluded that a second acquirer of that copy and any subsequent acquirer are ‘lawful acquirers’ of it within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24. 81 Consequently, in the event of a resale of the copy of the computer program by the first acquirer, the new acquirer will be able, in accordance with Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24, to download onto his computer the copy sold to him by the first acquirer. Such a download must be regarded as a reproduction of a computer program that is necessary to enable the new acquirer to use the program in accordance with its intended purpose. The court also examines the problem of how to prevent abuse of this permission for online copies (as opposed to physical media) and finds no substantial obstacles here. "79 As Oracle rightly observes, ascertaining whether such a copy has been made unusable may prove difficult. However, a copyright holder who distributes copies of a computer program on a material medium such as a CD‑ROM or DVD is faced with the same problem, since it is only with great difficulty that he can make sure that the original acquirer has not made copies of the program which he will continue to use after selling his material medium. To solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor — whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ — to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys. It seems noteworthy to me that the general question of how to prevent illegal copies is only loosely related to the question of reselling anyway. Even if it were illegal to resell, the seller's problem with illegal copies would not disappear. (It might be somewhat easier to enforce by "dongling" it to a specific hardware and not allow any re-installation whatsoever, but mainstream software producers don't appear to do that, generally.) Lastly it is noteworthy that the original seller may strong-arm the original buyer into signing an EULA that expressly forbids reselling; those restrictions are simply null and void in the EU.1 1 The German EULA of Microsoft Windows does not forbid reselling. The EULA for MS Office has restrictions concerning transfer to third parties in point 3 but notes that those are not applicable if the software was bought in the EU or EFTA and the transfer is inside that region.	The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.	As long as you own the copyright to the works, you can even publish the source code itself under two different licenses, which can be radically different. For example, MySQL is licensed under both a commercial and an open-source license. Given that you can publish a single piece of work as multiple licenses, it is your choice which one you wish to grant to the book or the code, as long as you own the copyright.	In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today.	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.
Is it illegal to download abandoned apps no longer sold on Google Play Store? Lets say you want to buy an app. Specifically Super Monkey Ball 2 which is no longer sold because it is unsupported by newer versions of android. The game runs great in newer versions of android. You just can't buy the game anymore. Here are the games by Sega and there's no Super Monkey Ball. So, you can't buy the game if you wanted to! So, is it illegal to get the game in an unauthorized way since the game has been abandoned by the copyright holder?	Yes, its illegal Sega owns the game - they can do what they like with it - including nothing. You can't.	A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.	Yes Playing recorded music in public is unlawful without permission (licence) from the copyright holder. Many jurisdictions allow automatic licensing by signing up with and paying for it through the authorised music organisation.	Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.	Apple has rules for publishing apps on the App Store, and either you follow the rules, or your app won't go on the App Store, simple as that. What you do is either not put your app on the App Store, or make the changes they ask you to make. Why are there conflicting statements? Because Apple and Google are different companies. Does Apple ask the other company? No, why would they spend their time on this, when they can ask you to make the changes? In the end, Apple has huge pockets, so they are not going to approve anything that might give a company a way to take money out of their pocket. What you want to do sounds very much like it could give some company a pretext to sue Apple; that's one thing that Apple won't let happen.	Public domain means that there is no (longer) copyright in the given work. This means that all rights associated with copyright are not controlled by anyone and there is no way to run afoul of copyright laws (note that in some countries a true "public domain" doesn't exist). Assuming you're correct that these works are in public domain, answers to your particular questions are: Does that mean I can play the video's as much as I want to any size crowd I wanted? Could I charge money to watch the videos? Yes and yes. If something is in the public domain does that mean all the parts of that thing are? This kind of begs the question. A work in public domain has no copyright in it. If one of its part has copyright, then it's not really public domain is it? What about the characters in the videos, could I make a new Bugs Bunny or Might Mouse animation on my own? If I wanted to use Popeye or Betty Boop or daffy duck in a video game could I? Copyright isn't your issue here, trademarks are. The characters are most likely trademarked, meaning you generally can't use them in your own works without licensing.	Imagine if the answer was a simple yes: adding a disclaimer was enough to exempt you from any and all copyright and trademark law suits. If that was the case, there would be no point in copyright or trademark law at all, because everyone could just include this disclaimer and never be sued. That doesn't mean every disclaimer is useless, but it does mean that copying and pasting some vague wording without understanding what it means is very unlikely to help you very much. The example you give is a good example of doing just that; the terms it uses are real, but they've clearly been thrown together without real understanding: Copyright is the right to control and profit from a creative work. This is relevant because images of Pokemon characters created for games, manga, etc are copyrighted by their creator. Trademarks are words, symbols, images, etc exclusively associated with a particular company or product. Trademark law aims, among other things, to avoid customers thinking they are getting an official product when they are not. "Nintendo" and "Pokemon" are both themselves trademarks. They are also the names of different companies. My limited understanding is that "The Pokemon Company" will be the owner of all the copyrights and trademarks related to those games, manga, etc. Naming them is a way of showing that you have researched this and understood their rights. "This app is not affiliated , endorsed or supported by Nintendo in any way". This is a disclaimer on the trademarks. Whether this is sufficient to protect against claims of counterfeiting depends on how prominent it is compared to other branding - you need to make it obvious to users that the product is unofficial, not bury this in small-print for the lawyers to find. "also some images used in this app are ... supported under fair use" - fair use is a US legal concept which allows copyrighted works to be used in certain specifically limited ways. Saying your use is covered does not make it true, you need to actually understand what provisions of the law allow your specific use. "no copyright infringement intended" This is a fluffy apology that has no legal standing. A more useful statement might be "every care has been taken to adhere to copyright and trademark law, if you notice a violation please contact X"; but you're still relying on goodwill, and it won't stop someone sending the lawyers in if they decide to. Which brings us back to the real question: The apps mentioned before are in the store since 2015 and they haven't been removed yet. The real reason for this has nothing to do with the poorly-written disclaimers, it is that Nintendo / Pokemon co haven't bothered. If an app is directly competing with an official app, or receiving a lot of attention (even if no money), the lawyers will descend; if it's a buggy image gallery with a dozen downloads, they might decide they have better things to do. If they do notice, they might just get Apple and Google to de-list the app, but not spend the time and money pursuing a legal case. On the other hand, at any time they might decide they need to tighten up control of their intellectual property, and make an example of a few authors picked at random. The only way to avoid that is to actually avoid violating their rights, rather than just saying so in a disclaimer.	It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.
Evidence found during police search of incorrect address listed on search warrant A warehouse is a single structure with several divided units separated by concrete walls. These units have different sequential addresses; 1000 Fake St (unit A) 1001 Fake St (unit B) 1002 Fake St (unit C) 1003 Fake St (unit D) Lets say a person is selling marijuana from unit C. Police get a search warrant for unit C but mistakenly enter the wrong one (unit B). Inside of unit B, Police find 1 lb of marijuana. Can this evidence be used against the suspect who is listed as the renter/owner of unit c? Can the renter/owner of unit b, be charged for the marijuana? Is this evidence even admissible in court? In a situation where a judge doesn't allow the submission of this evidence in any case. Can the rightful owner of the marijuana ask for it to be returned even thou it is illegal in the state?	Here is an excellent (and extensive) explanation of jurisprudence regarding the "good faith exception" to the admissibility of evidence found due to an error. In short: Yes, the contraband found in Unit B would be evidence admissible in court. (Of course, evidence found in Unit B would only support charges against whomever had a nexus to that property. If the owner of Unit C had no access to Unit B, then evidence in Unit B would not per se implicate him in a crime.) Law enforcement will not return seized property if it believes the property is "contraband." As an example, in Pennsylvania a person can petition a court for return of property seized by law enforcement: Rule 588 requires the petitioner to establish entitlement to lawful possession of the property, but the motion will be rejected if the State successfully argues that the property is contraband, or "derivative contraband" (which has been defined in case law to mean there is "a specific nexus between the property and criminal activity").	Such a search would have been emotionally satisfying for many people, but it would almost certainly not have been legal. Evidence that someone committed a crime is not always sufficient to permit a search of their home. An arrest warrant requires probable cause to believe the target individual committed an offense, and a search warrant requires probable cause to believe that the target location will have evidence of a crime. So whatever evidence they had that Epstein committed a crime, they would generally need a separate warrant to search his properties for evidence of that crime. There is no "emergency clause" for search warrants. I imagine you're thinking of the "exigency" exception to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before searching property, which allows a search in cases where there is an actual emergency, where evidence is being destroyed, or when someone ducks into private property while officers are pursuing them. "Reasonable suspicicion of possible threats to ... potential victims" would not be enough to justify a search based on an exigency. If Epstein is already in jail, he doesn't really pose a threat to anyone, he isn't able to destroy any evidence, and no one is pursuing him anywhere.	In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.	It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.	In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.	In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.	So, lets say for argument's sake the search is illegal (we'll discuss scenario later). Is the murder weapon inadmissible? No. Evidence seized in an illegal search is inadmissible for use in court, as to allow it would reward the state for breaking the law. At time of arrest it's still evidence and depending on what other evidence comes out might not be inadmissible (More on this later). If the knife is the only thing linking the driver to the murder, then it's inadmissible. What would happen to the driver, who was most likely the murderer? At this stage, the driver might be arrested and charged... inadmissibility is a matter for pre-trial motions, which takes place after the cop made the search. Whether the guy is a murder or not, he is a suspect who has been accused. Can the police arrest him, and investigate him with the hope of finding other evidence that would be enough to sentence him for the murder, despite the inadmissibility of the actual weapon? This all takes place before the inadmissibility of evidence is declared, so they certainly could investigate the guy, cuff him, read him his rights, book him, Danno, and put him in jail to help build their case. HOWEVER, if the knife is the only thing linking the man to the crime, then all of this becomes what's called "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree". Because the knife was used as the sole evidence to secure search warrants against the suspect, and should the knife become inadmissible, anything that resulted from the execution of the warrants is itself inadmissible. is the murderer in practice immune from being charged for this case, since the weapon cannot be tied to him? Not entirely. Rarely is a murder weapon needed to secure a conviction. Not only that, but while the search is illegal, there is an exception called "Inevitable Discovery" which holds that evidence seized illegally initially may still be admissible if the cops can show that the legally obtained evidence would have led to the knife. Suppose they had CCTV footage and captured the man entering the area of the scene and found out he had a connection to the victim, and got a warrant that would have included his car... that would mean the knife is admissible even if the search was illegal. If the weapon is considered inadmissible, is it returned to the suspect? If yes, would it also be returned even if it is of a type that the suspect is not legally allowed to own? Yes to both, though when it would be returned is subject to possible use in other investigations. Additionally, while I don't know of any knife ban laws in the U.S., there are examples of contraband seized by arrest for a different offense was not returned when the initial offense was overturned on appeal, meaning the contraband evidence was no longer validly seized and thus that half of the case was overturned... but the defendant wasn't returned his drugs. Is the weapon permanently inadmissible for all future, or could it be used in a later court proceeding? No. I'm starting to suspect I know the TV show and episode that inspired this question, but the search violated suspect 1's rights and thus was inadmissible for his trial. However, if a second suspect was discovered as the evidence was developed, and the investigation lead to the knife (say... suspect 2 had access to suspect 1's car... like say... through his job at a car wash that suspect 1 was patronizing... and planted the knife in suspect 1's car to frame him) then the knife is admissible because of inevitable discovery rule. Now, the TV Show I alluded too, and you'll forgive me as it's been a while, the events were that the cop pulled over suspect 1 for a valid reason (busted tail light, intentionally done by suspect 2 to get attention) and saw the knife on the backseat of the car, which is not a violation of search and seizure rules. The bloody knife was in plain view and gave probable cause to arrest and search the entirety of the car. If you leave evidence in a place where the officer can see it, they can seize it in a car at least. Places like the glove box, under the seats, or the trunk would properly hide it and not allow the officer to search the car, but through the windows is just fine.	Wooden made two arguments to suppress the evidence, first that he had not consented to the officer entering his house (the officer and the court disagreed) and the second that even if the officer's entry had been legitimate, the evidence wasn't legitimate because of the Fourth Amendment: Much of Wooden’s challenge turns on the fact that Mason was neither in uniform nor identified himself as a police officer. Both are true. But generally speaking, neither amounts to improper deception in the Fourth Amendment context. United States v. Baldwin , 621 F.2d 251, 252–53 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Lewis v. United States , 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966) ). Nor did Mason take any affirmative steps to attempt to deceive Wooden regarding his identity. Mason was silent as to his official position; he did not hold himself out to be anything he was not. He merely asked to speak to Harris and then asked if he could come inside, to get out of the cold. Probably relevant also is that the officer didn't "search" for the rifle that prompted the arrest. Wooden picked it up in plain sight, the search of Wooden's person that revealed the second firearm was done as the officer arrested him for the rifle and the subsequent search of the house was carried out with the consent of the other resident Janet Harris.
Using "Educational Use" to circumvent copy-protection? Does this link mean "educational use" gets a free pass on circumventing copy protection. 17 U.S. Code § 1201 - Circumvention of copyright protection systems Specifically this section. (d)Exemption for Nonprofit Libraries, Archives, and Educational Institutions.— (1) A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution which gains access to a commercially exploited copyrighted work solely in order to make a good faith determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work for the sole purpose of engaging in conduct permitted under this title shall not be in violation of subsection (a)(1)(A). A copy of a work to which access has been gained under this paragraph— (A) may not be retained longer than necessary to make such good faith determination; and (B) may not be used for any other purpose. In the answer explain/translate the legalese in terms that an average person could understand please.	"Educational use" does not get a free pass on the law against circumventing copy-protection. First, "educational use" is extremely broad and could include "to post on Stackexchange", or "so that I can learn something". The cited clause specifically limits this exception to "A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution" – the library must be nonprofit, and the archive or educational institution may also need to be nonprofit (until the courts fix the ambiguity in the scope of "nonprofit"). Second, the circumvention has to be very limited: the purpose must be only to evaluate the work, to see if you want to legally acquire it. So a nonprofit library can peek into a work to see if they want to buy a copy, but you may not. The only thing the library can do is evaluate the work for legal acquisition, and they have to get rid of the pirated copy once they've made the decision. Additionally (other parts of the subsection say), they can't do this is there is an equivalent legal copy available (e.g. if there's a print book available, they can't hack into the e-book to "determine" whether they want the book), and w.r.t. libraries and archives they must be open to the public.	Of course. Copyright law prevents you from making copies, and prevents others from making copies. It doesn’t oblige you to take extreme precautions against vague possibilities that others might break the law. And reading is not considered “copying”. So you don’t have to prevent others from reading your books at all.	Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center.	Choice 2 is what the writers of the license have in mind. You own the physical media on which the copy is delivered, such as a DVD or floppy disk (if there was physical media). But you do not own the copy of the software, you merely have purchased a license to use it, which may be revocable under specified circumstances. This is different from the law in the case of a book. Why you buy a book, you own a copy of the book, although you do not own the copyright to the book, and may not make additional copies. The license model was adopted by commercial software distributors for several reasons, but largely to avoid the "first sale doctrine". When you buy a copy of a copyrighted work, you have the right (under US law at least) to lend, rent, sell, or give-away that copy. You do not need the permission of the copyright holder to do any of these. Those in the commercial software business did not want customers to be able to do those things legally. By making the software subject to a license, which is a contract, they could write that license to restrict or prohibit those rights. Sellers also wanted to prohibit reverse engineering of the software, and to restrict use of the software. (For example, to limit the user to installing it on a single computer.) There was at first much dispute over the enforcability of such license agreements. But most US courts now accept them as valid and enforceable, and copyright law has been modified to take account of them. Specifically, 17 USC 109 (2)(b)(1)(A) seems to include a legislative acceptance of this rule.	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.	united-states Ignoring fair use, copying code in which copyright subsists would be copyright infringement. ... the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights [...] to reproduce the copyrighted work (17 USC 106) Code is eligible for copyright as a literary work. Copyright protection subsists [...] in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression [...] Works of authorship include [...] literary works [...] (17 USC 102) Oracle v Google. (Fed. Cir. 2014): It is undisputed that computer programs— defined in the Copyright Act as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result, 17 U.S.C. § 101—can be subject to copyright protection as literary works. One way that copying the code would not be infringement is under a scenes a faire or merger analysis. In some circuits (e.g. 6th Circuit), scenes a faire/merger can preclude copyrightability. In other circuits (e.g. 2nd and 9th Circuits), these apply as affirmative defences after an initial finding of infringement. In either case, just as in fair use, this would be a case-by-case analysis, so we can't provide a blanket answer.	Apparently not The full text of the license is not included on the page you link to, or on any linked page that I checked. But the FAQ says: free educational licenses can be used strictly for non-commercial educational purposes (including academic research). Exactly how this company defines "non-commercial educational purposes" is not stated. If work is done on a student project, and after a non-student license is purchased that project is commercialized, would the license have been violated, and if so, would the company be likely to sue? The fist question cannot be answered without the full text of the license, and the second would require reading the minds of the company officials. But it seems reasonably clear that this is not what the company has in mind. Another user has pointed out a link to the actual license terms which I failed to note. Section 3.1 of the license says, in relevant part: ... JetBrains grants You a non-exclusive and non-transferable right to use each Product covered by the Toolbox Subscription for non-commercial, educational purposes only (including conducting academic research or providing educational services) ... This would seem to confirm what the FAQ quoted above says. It is hard to see how any development intended as an eventual commercial product would be covered under such a license term. It would appear that a regular non-student license would be needed for such use.	There is a subtle difference between NSF policy and enforceable obligation. The primary stick that goes with the carrot is being excluded from future funding. Current policy does not generally force material in the public domain, but it is a possibility in "exceptional circumstances". There no doubt is a paper record somewhere in D.C. indicating whether such a codicil was added to any of these grants. NSF generally does not have contracts with individuals, they have contracts with institutions who have relations (typically employer-employee) with individuals, so even if there were a policy requiring works to be put in the public domain, NSF would have to go after the institution, who would have to go after the author. Since that would conflict with longstanding NSF policy on copyright, it is unlikely that they would want to pursue such an approach. The statement that McGraw-Hill Book Company announces that the material, which is copyrighted, will be available for use by authors and publishers on a royalty-free basis on or after April 30, 1970 is not itself a license, it is a suggestion that a license will com into existence. A present-tense declaration "this work is dedicated to the public domain effective April 30, 1970" can be interpreted as a license effective of a date certain. Similarly, "will be available to all publishers for use in English after December 31, 1970, and in translations after December 31, 1975" does not say that it is in the public domain effective of some date. One might say that the copyright statement is simply not well written and the author really intended the books to be in the public domain as of those dates. But without compelling evidence that the book was actually released into the public domain, a court is very unlikely to abrogate a person's property rights.
Do economic sanctions prevent repaying debts? Suppose that I lend money to a business or individual associated with the government in Russia, Venezuela, or some other country. Suppose that by the time the debt is due, my country of citizenship or residence business or individual has declared sanctions on my debtors and prohibit me from doing business with them. Would the sanctions prevent me from legally getting my money back?	Yes If it is illegal to transfer money between the jurisdictions then any contract that requires that to happen is unenforceable. This is a subset of "sovereign risk" in a trans-national deal.	It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.	This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.	so it's unclear to me whether the US Executive Order 13884 (August 5, 2019) targets the Property of the Government of Venezuela only or of all Venezuelans. Neither. By its literal text, it excludes any Venezuelan who is a citizen of the US, a green card holder, or lawfully present in the US, or who holds a valid US visa. More pertinently to your question, perhaps, it also excludes any Venezuelan who has never been an agent of (or purported to be an agent of) Venezuela or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.	Is there any validity to these claims? No, except maybe in bankruptcy proceedings that involve additional circumstances/factors. A loan is a contract. What you describe is simply a debtor's attempt to replace the contract he incurred with a creditor. As such, the creditor is entitled to decline the settlement offer, thereby leaving the initial contract (in this case, the original conditions of the loan) in force. Generally speaking, declining a new proposal does not invalidate the contract that would have been replaced if the offeree were to accept such proposal.	The default is that countries are not required to repatriate alleged criminals It is one of the cardinal provisions of sovereignty that one country cannot "reach into" another country's territory for any reason. However, countries can voluntarily repatriate an alleged criminal subject to their own legal systems allowing this. This can be ad-hoc or through a longer-term extradition treaty. Even where extradition is allowed, there are common things that will prevent it: Dual criminality - generally, the alleged crime must be a crime in both jurisdictions, Political crimes are usually not subject to extradition Possibility of certain types of punishment - nations without the death penalty will generally not extradite for alleged capital crimes. This can be overcome with appropriate guarantees that such a penalty will not be sought. Jurisdictional issues Own citizens - some countries will not extradite their own citizens notably Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Syria. Fair trial standards - extradition will usually be refused when a fair trial cannot be expected.	This Reconocimiento de deuda is a real and standard thing, and they also use them in Zimbabwe, but it says that the amount should be stated exactly ("Se debe indicar con exactitud la cuantía de la deuda que se reconoce"). Unless you fill in an amount that you are willing to accept as your debt, you are trusting that the various people who come to be in possession of the document are trustworthy. The document basically deprives you of the right to oppose the debt.	Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.
Can I be liable for damages for wrong advice I give on a Stack Exchange site? I often help people out on different stack exchange websites and never have any issues whatsoever. I usually answer questions on the Apple stack exchange website. I was wondering, if I give out incorrect advice and someone damages their computer or device more, can I be liable in anyway for those damages? I'm not that familiar with the law, so I though I would ask before I answer certain questions, that I'm not 100% sure on. I understand if they don't follow the advice I'm not liable, but if they willingly follow my advice themselves and if my advice was slightly incorrect, causing more damage, could they attempt to sue me for the damage it causes?	This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney.	The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation.	Intentional sabotage of a TSA computer system is almost certainly a serious crime and would also almost surely give rise to civil liability, although you might avoid both if you warned the TSA that the phone was set up to intentionally break their system, in which case it might be confiscated as contraband. If the product had a "feature" unknown to you and that you had no reasonable reason to know of that caused the harm, you would ultimately have no criminal or civil liability, although the manufacturer might be strictly liable to the TSA under a product liability theory, and you would probably be detained as a witness to figure out what happened. If the product had a "feature" that broke the TSA computer that could be de-activated and that you meant to de-active but carelessly failed to, you would have negligence liability to the government and might or might not have criminal liability (I'm not enough of an expert in the relevant statutes to know). You might be liable for a strict liability Federal Communications Commission offense for having a device that is in violation of their regulations.	Assuming USA law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2315 If you accept or buy goods that are knowingly stolen you may be fined or imprisoned. If you buy goods and later find out they were stolen you can sue for a refund. However, I'd say the likelihood of getting your money back is incredibly low.	Not necessarily. Many jurisdictions prohibit admission of evidence of subsequent remedial acts to show liability, although it could be admitted to show that it was possible to do something. Also, the law of border trees is quite arcane and involved, and frequently subject to local ordinances, state laws, and common law rules all at once (and isn't terribly uniform from one place to another). But, usually, the bottom line for your liability to your neighbor will be whether you were negligent in maintaining the tree, which in the case of a healthy branch and an extraordinary storm, you usually would not be.	Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question.	You are describing a liability suit. My sense is that based on the facts you describe you will face two serious challenges to making a successful case. Damages and liability. In order to win a liability case, you must first establish that you have been damaged in some way. According to your facts, your damages are at best, the replacement value of a used controller. I'm guessing that's what, $20 or so? That doesn't cover the cost of an attorney's time to even begin to hear your version of the facts, much less give you advice or pursue a case for you. After you establish damages, you must prove the company is responsible or has some share of liability for causing your damages. Again, I think this is going to be an obstacle for you. Not placing a warning that the game will affect you by causing you to throw your controller and be mean to your mom would be unprecedented if you were to prevail. AFAIK.	I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer.
Can someone who owns property on the border prevent/delay government related construction? A card game company has reportedly bought acres of land on the Us/Mexico border, and also hired eminent domain lawyers to defend it. Could this actually prevent the construction of something (i.e a wall) from being built, or perhaps delay the process?	Could this actually prevent the construction of something (i.e a wall) from being built, or perhaps delay the process? It could not prevent the construction of a wall from being built. It could slightly delay the process, but government eminent domain lawyers are very efficient and the immediate possession phase of eminent domain cases is very fast, so the delay would be on the order of a few weeks to a few months, not a long delay. Also, good project managers figure in the time necessary to handle the eminent domain process into their project timing by working on land the government already owns first. The determination of the amount of compensation to which the owner is entitled would take longer than that, but would happen after construction was commenced.	The picture shown is not fraudulent or problematic. Fraud involves using a false representation (or concealing a fact) in order to obtain a result that would not have been possible to secure without the misstatement or concealment. No one is using the photograph of the exterior of a passport (which is identical for all U.S. passports) to obtain any immigration benefit or for a non-U.S. citizen to obtain citizenship. All that is being done is visually associating international travel (which would usually be done using a passport) with a credit card that can be used internationally. Since a passport is a federal government document, it is also not protected by trademark or copyright laws -- the exterior, generic design of a passport is in the public domain. It can't be used for a purpose to mislead someone about citizenship or immigration benefits, but otherwise, it can be used for any purpose. I suppose that you could be interpreting the photograph (on a Spanish language speaker's facebook feed) as implying that by getting this credit card you will also get a U.S. passport and cool sunglasses, but that would be a patently unreasonable assumption in this context, particularly in light of the clarifying caption at the bottom, and, of course, many people who speak Spanish as a primary language have legitimate U.S. passports (including more or less all passport holders in Puerto Rico). You could also, I suppose, be interpreting the appearance of the passport as some sort of implicit government endorsement of the product when the government does not, in fact, endorse the product, but again, nothing in the advertisement that I can see that can be reasonably interpreted as conveying that message.	I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.	Unrecorded sewer easements seem to be a major category of such problems: the easement may only be recorded on the government sewer map, and not against the property. Likewise underground gas and electric. There is also a prescriptive easement, like adverse possession, though in that case the issue would be that the property owner may not know that he was granting an easement by allowing the use of the land.	My general belief is that in the United States entering structures like the ones you've pictured would be considered trespassing regardless of if there is a sign in place or not. This is based on the fact that I'm almost certain that if you become injured while on the premises you could sue the land owner. I believe the trespassing signs are just there to give legal cover to the land owner in case someone does try to sue them. Here are two sources that essentially support my beliefs: General definition: Trespass is defined by the act of knowingly entering another person’s property without permission. More detailed legal definition: § 11.411 Criminal trespass. (a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so, he or she enters or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure. An offense under this subsection is a misdemeanor if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a petty misdemeanor. As you can see these buildings are clearly owned by someone, and you clearly haven't gotten permission to enter the building. Ergo, you're trespassing. Now if you were talking about ancient Mayan ruins, or an Old West ghost town then this would be more of a gray area, I believe, since those structures have been abandoned for 150+ years. The same goes for structures in National Parks, since a National Park is public land you could make a case that you thought you were allowed to go since you weren't specifically told you can't go (assuming you didn't cross a fence line/no trespassing sign). You should definitely contact a real lawyer though. Now if you do enter then I think the probability that you will be caught and prosecuted would be fairly low. It is your decision if that risk is worth the reward of entering/exploring the structure.	It depends; Permission may be Required This depends on both the facts on the ground, and the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Residential fences are often governed by specific local laws at the municipal or county level in the US, so no generally applicable answer is possible, short of a book giving laws for each locality. Common-Law Rules Under the common law, followed by many but far from all US jurisdictions, the key question is whether a fence is a "partition fence" or not. A partition fence is one built on or near the property line that is owned jointly by the owners of the properties it divides. A fence near the property line is probably a partition fence if: The two property owners jointly built or paid for the building of the fence; Parts of the fence are on each side of the property line; The owners have agreed that the fence is common property; or Both owners "use" the fence, as by connecting it to another fence running in a different direction, or by relying on it to contain domestic animals. A Fence is probably not a partition fence if: It is entirely clear of the property line; Only the owner on whose property it rests maintains it; and Only the owner on whose property it rests uses it. The owner of one of the properties may not remove, demolish, or modify a partition fence without permission from the other. Removing or modifying a partition fence without the permission of the owner of the adjacent property is a tort, and can lead to damages for the value of the fence begin awarded. The owners must each maintain a partition fence, often each caring for his or her side. Failing to do so may be a tort. If a fence is not a partition fence, the owner of the land is also the sole owner of the fence, and may modify or remove it without permission from, or notice to, the owner of any adjacent or nearby property. However, the above common-law rules may be modified by local laws, and one would be wise to check, or consult a lawyer who knows how to check, before making any demands. Sources The page "Removal or Destruction of Fences" from US legal reads: A fence is an enclosure creating an adequate blockade around a particular land for the purpose of prohibiting intrusions from outside. A landowner can remove a fence, separating his/her land from that of his/her neighbor, when such fence is located wholly upon his/her own land. However, a landowner is not empowered to remove a partition fence without the adjacent landowner’s consent. A partition fence is the joint property of adjacent landowners. A fence erected on the line between the lands of adjoining owners generally belongs to the parties as tenants in common. Generally, a partition fence is built equally on both sides of the line. Until the contrary is shown, the partition fence is presumed to be the common property of both owners. An owner of adjoining land can remove a partition fence upon formal notice to adjacent landowners. For an improper removal of a partition fence, an aggrieved party can bring an action for damages. The standard for measuring damages for such removal or destruction is its value at the time. The value is determined by replacement costs minus depreciation for age and use. Moreover, when someone builds a fence on another person’s land without any authority to do so, the landowner can remove or destroy such fence. A person is liable for removing, destroying, or injuring a fence belonging to another person just as one who commits such acts against any kind of property belonging to another is liable[i]. Such person is considered a tortfeasor. However, an individual cannot remove or destroy a fence on another individual’s land without his/her consent. The page "Property Line and Fence Laws in Maryland" from FindLaw reads, in relevant part: Maryland doesn't have specific rules dealing with fences. Instead, the state follows the common law practice that a fence built along a boundary line is owned in common by both property owners when both use the fence, unless otherwise agreed. A property owner is said to use a fence when they "hook-up" to the fence with another row of fence, or keep animals in the enclosure created by the fence. A fence built and used only by the builder is that person's sole property. When you purchase a new home, you take a property with an existing fence built and used by prior owners. Simply put, if you buy a property with a co-owned fence, you likely need to continue your maintenance of the fence. The page "Is it legal for the neighbor to remove a fence on our shared property line?" from Justia's "Ask a Lawyer" feature reads: If both landowners paid to install a fence directly on a property line in the past, then yes, they need your permission to remove or replace the fence. Many fences are not built on a property line, but are instead just on one property or the other. If you have had your land surveyed, you may be able to determine your exact property line. You or your neighbor are free to build new fences without permission as long as neither the fence nor any construction or excavation encroaches on the other's property. Fences are a common property dispute, and can have long term effects. If a fence encroaches significantly on someone else's land for many years, this can actually become the new legal property line in some cases. According to the "Fences" section of the page "Disputes between your neighbours" from th New Zealand Law Society: In New Zealand this is regulated by the Fencing Act 1978. Except where modified by individual agreements: Fences must be on the boundary line, though there is provision for give and take where the true boundary is difficult to fence. The cost of building or repairing a fence is borne equally between adjoining owners, unless one owner damages it, in which case the cost of repairs will fall on that owner. You can compel your neighbour to contribute to the cost of the fence bordering your two properties by following the procedures set out in the Fencing Act ... Developers of new subdivisions usually exempt themselves from contributing to the cost of a fence. Under the Property Law Act 2007, it is possible to apply to a District Court for an order to remove or alter a fence that is detrimentally affecting land or obstructing a view. Usually the cost of any removal falls on the person applying for the order. The Booklet "Fences and the Law from the Legal Services Commission, South Australia states, on page 2: Fences should be regarded as a joint asset between neighbours. Even if your neighbour has not paid for the fence they are still a joint owner. This is because a fence on the boundary is legally considered to be part of the land on each side. If you intend to remove or alter an existing fence, you should have your neighbour’s permission or a court order. If you want to put up a fence where there has not been one before, your neighbour has a right to object. It makes no difference if you intend to pay the total cost	First of all, usually negligence by an HOA or its agents does not create liability for owners of the HOA directly. Instead, it creates a debt of the HOA, which the HOA might choose to pay through assessments on individual owners. But, the creditor probably doesn't have the right to compel the HOA to make those assessments, although they could starve the HOA of funds needed to operate and the creditors might be able to seize common interest property management by the HOA (depending, in part, on some quite subtle details of how the association has been set up that have varied, mostly as as matter of customary practice that changes in different time periods - in some HOAs, common interests are owned by the HOA, in others they are tenancy-in-common interests of the owners with limitations on transferability). Second, self-settled trusts (i.e. trusts for you benefit funded with money from you) are almost always ineffective (outside some select asset protection oriented jurisdictions of which Idaho is not one) as they are a form of fraudulent transfer. So, no it wouldn't work. In particular Idaho Statutes § 15-7-502(4) states: If a person is both a settlor and beneficiary of the same trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the settlor’s beneficial interest in such trust does not prevent the settlor’s creditors from satisfying claims from the settlor’s interest in the trust estate that relates to the portion of the trust that was contributed by the settlor. The same subsection clarifies that federal rules related to grantor trusts are not relevant to this determination, and other parts of the statute also clarify the relevant definitions.	No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract.
Is my wife required to attend a deposition? My wife worked as a property manager for a private owner of an apartment building about 3 years ago. Her former employer has since sold the company, and the new owners are now being sued by a former tenant who lived there while my wife was the manager, although we don't know why. She was served a subpoena by the former tenant's attorney requesting her to turn in all documents related to the case. Although she was responsible for record-keeping during the time she worked there, she does not have possession of any such documents now nor does she know who does since she is no longer employed there and the building is under new ownership. She explained as much to the attorney and we thought that would be the end of it. She just now received an email from the attorney asking to schedule a deposition. She has already explained to the attorney that she has no information of any kind regarding the case and I do not believe she is obligated to do anything. A deposition with the attorney would be a waste of time since my wife no longer has anything to do with the apartment and has no association with the new ownership. Could she simply explain the situation again and refuse to appear at a deposition so we can end her association with this case for good?	Your wife is legally obligated to attend the deposition. If she does not attend, the Court can summarily hold her in contempt of court, issue a warrant for her arrest, and hold her in jail until a deposition can be rescheduled and held. She can be required to answer questions under oath at the deposition for the duration shown on the subpoena, or if no duration is specified, typically for up to six or seven hours. It is not her job to decide if it is a waste of time or not.	First of all, the amount involved is probably a few hundred dollars, maybe a thousand: if you do not pay it is extremely unlikely that your roommate will attempt to recover. Even if they do, they will probably fail - 30 days notice is 30 days notice: unless last month was February, the 8th to the 8th is either 30 or 31 days, you have complied with the terms of the lease. If the lease had said "one named months notice" then your roommate may have a case; as it is, they don't. Is he right? No. Is there ever a case where I'm liable for pro-rated rent beyond the 30 day notice period? Only if it says so in the lease. Do I owe him rent for each day in November that the room is vacant beyond the 8th? No Would a judge make an exception in his favor since I didn't tell him I was looking for a new place to live? Judges don't make exceptions, particularly not in anybody's favour. The role of a judge is to enforce the law - not to make exceptions to it. A judge would give effect to the terms of the contract except where those terms are prohibited or against public policy.	The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract.	Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) – those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) – in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong – especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform – the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook!	However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. The decedent's security deposit, less valid deductions, is property of the estate, so if the landlord takes a second security deposit he is double dipping. Generally speaking, after someone dies, money judgments that have not been reduced to judgment liens, and unsecured debts (i.e. debts not supported by collateral) only have a right to be paid via submission of a claim to the probate estate in the probate process with claims made paid according to a priority schedule set forth in the probate code. But, generally speaking, death does not impair the property rights of third parties, so the fact that a debtor's estate is in probate is usually not a basis upon which a foreclosure or repossession of collateral for a default on a secured debt, or an eviction due to the termination of a lease, may be postponed while the probate case runs its course. Probate does not have the equivalent of the "automatic stay" in bankruptcy that prevents any creditors, secured or unsecured, from engaging in any collection activity against an estate, and probate estates are not allowed to file for bankruptcy either. If you really wanted to play hardball and only needed the apartment for a few days in March, the estate could simply continue to occupy it for that period of time and they pay the landlord the extra month's rent but not the additional security deposit when it was done. The landlord can't begin a foreclosure proceeding until there is a default which can't happen sooner than the last day of February. Even if the landlord is really on his toes, the landlord will be hard pressed to get a notice to vacate served on the estate and then to prepare and serve an eviction lawsuit on the estate and get that case in front of a judge before the estate will be ready to move out anyway. The estate might incur some attorneys' fees in the process if it did that, but the attorneys' fees would be an unsecured claim of the landlord that would have to be collected through the claims process in the probate proceeding which is usually a fairly favorable forum for the estate, instead of the usual court where small landlord-tenant disputes are handled. The probate estate could simply deny his claim for attorneys' fees and then, if the landlord wanted them after making a claim, the landlord would have to bring a lawsuit on fairly tight deadlines in the probate court to have the disallowance of the claim overturned. If you wanted to be even more aggressive, rather than paying the last month's rent, the estate could just holdover into March without paying rent or a new security deposit (vacating before the eviction process can run its course), effectively forcing the landlord to use the security deposit for March rent, and then forcing the landlord to use the probate claims process for both damages to the property claimed and for an attorneys' fees. If the estate is insolvent, or if the claim wasn't filed by the landlord (who may not even know that it is necessary to file a claim in probate) within the short deadline for probate claims arising after death, those expenses just wouldn't get paid at all.	While I am a U.S. attorney, the U.K. and U.S. are essentially the same on these issue in practice: "reasonable wear and tear" is a classic issue of fact to be decided by the judge (unlike the U.S. there are never juries in U.K. landlord-tenant disputes) based upon the evidence presented to him and his or her good judgment if the case goes to court. There won't be a lot of case law that is specific enough to provide guidance in your particular case (if any) because cases like these aren't worth appealing and creating case law on and because the law intentionally vests judges with great discretion on these issues and only intervenes in appellate decisions when a judge is deeply out of line. The legal definition of "reasonable wear and tear" is basically vacuous and don't provide much meaningful guidance. I know you are joking, but no, do not set it on fire. You will find yourself incarcerated for arson, with a felony criminal record and a restitution judgment in the amount of the damages and a fine and court costs as well, and your credit record will be screwed and no one will rent to you ever again if they find out by doing a cursory background check. Your mum probably won't even invite you to Christmas dinner this year. If they charge your security deposit and you don't think you owe it, you would have to sue them for a return of the part of your security deposit you don't owe, knowing that you face a risk of paying their legal fees if you lose, but will get your fees if you hire a lawyer and win (caveat: there are more nuances to fee shifting in the U.K. courts than I spell out here which are rather technical). If they say you owe more than your security deposit and you don't pay, they can sue you for the balance, knowing that they face a risk of paying your legal fees if they lose, but will get their fees if they win. In practice, it doesn't really make economic sense for either party to hire an attorney because the amount of the fees is so high relative to the amount of money at stake. The security deposit is 2-4 hours of legal time, and the amount claimed is maybe 7-14 hours of legal time, neither of which is sufficient to address the respective issues economically in a fully litigated hearing. Short of going to court, you can provide them documentation and your video to show that you are right and to discourage them from docking your security deposit (in full, anyway) or suing you, ideally A.S.A.P. before they are too committed to taking legal action. You could also propose a compromise and see if you can get them to agree to it with neither party facing the risk of going to court.	There is no public place to “file” that. When privilege is claimed and the other side challenges it then the person claiming privilege needs to establish somehow that the attorney client relationship exists and is pertinent to the question. In the normal course of things there would be an engagement agreement in the attorneys files. And not everything communicated between a client and attorney is protected by the privilege. It only covers legal advice and specifically does not cover discussions planning criminal activity.	From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement).
Can congressional leaders "expel" elected members of Congress? According to a Washington Post article about Alabama Senate candidate Roy Moore, in the spotlight for an apparent history of sexual relations with teenagers, congressmen are trying to... pressure GOP nominee Roy Moore to withdraw from the Alabama Senate race amid allegations of sexual misconduct, declaring him “unfit to serve” and threatening to expel him from Congress if he were elected. That last part is the interesting one. Do members of Congress have the power to "expel" a democratically (if controversially) elected senator from the United States Congress?	The leaders can't do it unilaterally, but the members collectively can expel other members. It requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. US Constitution, Article I, Section 5: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. Normally this would be preceded by a committee investigation, which might issue a recommendation as to whether the member should be expelled. To date, fifteen US Senators have been expelled via this process: see https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm. Fourteen of them were in 1861 for supporting the Confederacy, and the other was in 1797 for "Anti-Spanish conspiracy and treason". There were several more cases in which the Senate considered expulsion but ultimately voted not to, and others in which the Senator in question resigned under threat of expulsion.	A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.	Only "legislative acts" give rise to legislative immunity. Perhaps surprisingly, being a legislator is neither necessary nor sufficient for the privilege to apply. A defendant would need to assert the act in question was essentially a legislative activity. Quoting from the Federal Judicial Center's extensive paper on section 1983: State and local legislators enjoy absolute immunity for their legislative acts. Under the functional approach to immunity, the critical issue is whether the official was engaged in legislative activity. The determination of an act’s legislative or executive character “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Legislative action involves the formulation of policy, whereas executive action enforces and applies the policy in particular circumstances. The primary case cited is Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998), Bogan further cites Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372, 372-376 in clarifying questions of the defendant's intent or motive are irrelevant as long as the act is part of a legislative activity. So proposing, drafting, voting or debating (for or against) a specific measure fall within the immunity, regardless of the claimed improper motive for doing them. For example, in Bogan, Scott-Harris made arguments that closing of a government department was motivated by racial animus which violated her civil rights as the only employee in the department. The high court found that closing the departmental was essentially a legislative activity regardless of claims about improper motive for the action. Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions. Bogan also shows the privilege applied not only to the legislators, but the mayor (an executive), because his actions in drawing up a budget proposing the closing of the department, and his signing the action into law were of essentially parts of the legislative process. IMHO, the hypothetical examples now in the question, only act #1 seems to be making a policy decision similar to legislation activity.	Each state has its own election laws, so you will get 50 different answers depending on what state you are interested in (perhaps 49, since Washington doesn't have polling places - depends on what you mean by "poll watcher"). This page is a starter list of legal resources. This page starts you on deconstructing this notion of "poll watcher". Colorado is one state that explicitly allows partisan observers, here are the rules. No person is compelled to be an observer, so I don't understand who you think might be abusing a poll watcher. Perhaps you are referring to the possibility that an election official will prevent an observer from doing their job. Or perhaps you are thinking that being a poll watcher abuses the intent of some law. Whatever you have in mind, there are laws in each state that say what is allowed and what is forbidden, so you have to address this at a local level. No state has a requirement that observers must come from or swear allegiance to the majority party of that polling jurisdiction (e.g. county, or precinct). Any attempt by election officials, or anyone else, to block observers from the minority party would be rebuffed by the courts. The courts will not attempt to divine inner motivations for sending an observer. Most states allow partisan observers. Michigan distinguishes "challengers" and "poll watchers", and there are distinct rules and powers for the two sets. A crucial difference is that a watcher cannot legally challenge a claimed right to vote or a precinct board action, but a challenger can. There are rules of conduct imposed on both kinds of observers, one of them being that you cannot challenge a voter for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter. This is a misdemeanor (a crime) under MCL 168.727, and as a criminal prohibition, the state would have to prove intent beyond reasonable doubt. Blog posts by the observer might provide sufficient evidence, but speculation by the majority party would not.	There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC §19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.	The presidential line of succession is governed by the U.S. Constitution, specifically Article II section 1: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th amendment reinforces this and says "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." So, after the vice president, the constitution lets Congress pass laws governing the rest of the succession. This is governed by the Presidential Succession Act. 3 U.S. Code Chapter 1, Section 19 lays out the rest of the line of succession: Next come the Speaker of the House of Representatives (subsection a) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (subsection b) and "then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security" (subsection d). So you have the Attorney General at number 7. However, the next subsection says the following (emphasis mine). (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them. I think the bolded text answers your question. The Acting Attorney General has not been confirmed by the Senate, so is not in the presidential line of succession. Now there is potentially room to argue that, if the Acting Attorney General has been confirmed by the Senate for some other office (most likely Deputy Attorney General), then they qualify. Of course, there is no case law to clarify this, since the presidential succession has never gone beyond what is listed in the constitution. However, I don't think it's a very compelling argument, particularly for the current Acting Attorney General who was not appointed on the basis of his previous confirmation. (Interestingly, a Bill was introduced to the House in 2003 that would have explicitly removed acting officers from the line of succession. Ultimately, that Bill did not progress.)	The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.	House Rule XI(m), p. 19, states the power of committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas. (1)…a committee or sub-committee is authorized (subject to subparagraph (3)(A)) …to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses… (3)(A)(i) Except as provided in sub-division (A)(ii), a subpoena may be authorized and issued by a committee or subcommittee under subparagraph (1)(B) in the conduct of an investigation or series of investigations or activities only when authorized by the committee or subcommittee, a majority being present. A subcommittee could therefore authorize the chair of the subcommittee to issue subpoenas with no vote at all. Otherwise, the (sub)committee must "authorize" a subpoena, which conventionally means "vote on the motion". There is no requirement that the entire house must vote on subpoenas. There is no question that POTUS did not obey the demand of the House subcommittee. The argument that will most likely be proffered is not that the House violated its rules, but that the House rules exceed constitutional authority in issuing the subpoena. As pointed out in this analysis, this is not a well-established and settled question of constitutional law. There is no rule that requires a full House vote on all subcommittee rules established by a subcommittee that forwards articles of impeachment to the full House. That is, a subcommittee does not have to get prior approval of the full House in order for a subcommittee to conduct business and recommend an action to the full house. Instead, the House simply votes yes or no on the particular articles, following the rules for House votes.
Does home rental agreement last after death of owner This is in Texas A homeowner leases a home to a renter for a one year term. The lease agreement is written by the homeowner and is plainly worded and not done by a lawyer. There are no mentions about early termination of the lease, nor fees for such. It outlines a term of one year, with a monthly amount payable on the 1st for each months rent. The homeowner dies with about half of the lease fulfilled. Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions?	Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? No. The estate of the decedent steps into the shoes of the decedent and the executor of the decedent's estate can enforce the lease. What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions? The heirs do not have the authority to modify the lease without the tenant's consent, although the tenant knows that the lease may be less likely to be renewed if the tenant does not consent. Also, the heirs, strictly speaking, don't have the authority to do anything. Only an executor duly appointed by a court does.	Many states require an escrow of rent for habitability issues, simply not paying rent can be grounds for eviction proceedings. Illinois has a statute for deducting a repair from rent (765 ILCS 742/5). If it’s less than half the monthly rent and less than $500, a tenant can inform the landlord of the repair required. If the landlord has not provided a repair within 14 days, the tenant can have the repair completed in a workman like manner by someone having the appropriate licenses. In this case, if you’ve notified the landlord and they’ve done nothing, you can have an licensed exterminator come and treat the property. BUT... your lease may override this statute. Many leases include terms that the tenant is responsible for pest control - since often it’s the tenant’s lack of cleanliness that draws pests (not in all cases of course). So definitely review your lease and discuss with someone who is more familiar with IL law. Note that Chicago has its own interesting laws that may add to or contradict IL laws.	The closest you will get is the first-in-time ordinance passed by the city, but that was overturned in court. That law required accepting the first qualified applicant for a rental: it did not say anything about sales. If there is a specific provision to that effect in your lease agreement, that would be applicable, but there is no general legal mechanism that forces a seller to accept a particular offer.	Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property.	First review the existing contract for anything that specifies what happens at the end of the term. I have seen ones that switch to month to month, others automatically extend by a whole year. In the United states the rental law is done at the state level or even more local than that. So I took a look at the UK policies. I focused on England. Guidance How to rent: the checklist for renting in England Updated 24 March 2023 At the end of the fixed period If you want to stay If you want to extend your tenancy after any initial fixed period, there are a number of important issues to consider. Check Shelter’s website for advice. Do you want to sign up to a new fixed term? If not, you will be on a ‘rolling periodic tenancy’. This means you carry on as before but with no fixed term. Your tenancy agreement should say how much notice you must give the landlord if you want to leave the property – one month’s notice is typical. Shelter publishes advice on how you can end your tenancy. I then went to the shelter website How to end a periodic tenancy: How much notice You can give your landlord a legal notice called a 'notice to quit' to end a rolling tenancy. This is a more formal option. Your tenancy will end legally if you follow the rules on how much notice and where to send it. A legal notice must: be in writing give the right amount of notice end on the correct day Here is an example of a notice to quit. A legal notice ends your tenancy and your right to live in your home. Joint tenancies will end for all tenants even if only one of you gives notice. You cannot withdraw a valid notice if you change your mind. Your landlord may agree to let you or other joint tenants stay on after a notice ends. Minimum notice periods You need to give at least: 1 month if your rent is due monthly 4 weeks if your rent is due weekly You can usually give the minimum notice to end your tenancy if your most recent agreement does not mention a longer notice period or if you've never had a written agreement. You may still need to give more than the minimum notice to make sure it ends on the right day. If your agreement says you must give more notice Your agreement might have a 'notice clause'. For example, if it says you have to give 2 months' notice. A notice clause might not apply after your fixed term has ended but sometimes it will. When will the longer notice apply? The longer notice period will only apply if either: you never had a fixed term agreement your agreement says it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy after the fixed term You can ignore a notice clause in your most recent agreement if both: your fixed term has ended your agreement does not say that it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy It looks like the notice period is a month, unless the contract says that the notice period is longer during the periodic tenancy.	First, you will need to look at your existing lease. Most leases automatically transfer to month-to-month after the initial term ends. It is quite probable that your landlord said "fine" to the month-to-month extension because it was already part of your existing lease. Second, you will need to look at your existing lease and see what notification was required for you to move out. Typically, a lease transitions to month-to-month and in your lease it probably already said that you needed to provide 30 days notice even if you were leaving at the end of the lease's original term. Third, yes, you are on the hook for rent until you give 30 days notice. Your "verbal agreement" is a contract and your landlord agreed to allow you to stay in the apartment as long as you gave him 30 days notice before moving out and paid your rent every month. Most of this is probably already spelled out in your current lease. Even if it isn't, you have indicated that you have a verbal contract with your landlord.	The will is overridden by the new law. Suppose the owner had not died: then he would have to comply with the change in the law. When a person inherits property, they gain the right to that property which the originally had, and they do not gain any additional immunity to the usual obligation to obey the law.	You are allowed to sublet the whole of the premises but not part of it (VIII a); if you do you must create the agreement mentioned, pay to have it stamped by the government and pay £10 + VAT to the landlord. You must only use the premises as a domicile for one family; better make sure you rent those rooms to your cousins.
civil liability insurance in the UK (for an individual) I am a French national living in the UK. My experience is that in France, something called "civil responsibility insurance" (assurance responsabilite civile) is not only commonplace but mandatory to go to school, uni, get a job, etc. I have been renting for years and according to my research, only the landlord has to have an insurance. The occupier may also insure their belongings but that's optional. So what happens if, say, a candle falls over and I burn my flat? What if a flower pot falls from my windowsill and accidentally kills someone? What if my trolley bumps into an old lady at the supermarket and I break her hip? What if I walk on my friend's glasses and break them? For all this, the civil liability insurance would come into play in France. I have been googling to find something similar for the UK but mostly what I find is about businesses or professionals insuring themselves, not individual. Does it exist for individual? If yes, is it mandatory? What will happen in the examples above if I don't such insurance? As it seems not to be commonplace, I am wondering... Is it for some reason not useful in the UK?	The correct term for this insurance is personal liability insurance - it is neither compulsory nor common in common law jurisdictions. However, some aspects of it may be bundled with other insurances like homeowners, landlords and contents insurance. Liability for damage in common law flows either from a breach of contract or a tort. Of course, if you intentionally cause harm you have crossed the line from civil liability to criminality and no insurance will indemnify you. For your specific examples: [I]f, say, a candle falls over and I burn my flat? If your lease prohibited you from having open flames then this would be a clear breach of contract and you would have to pay for the damage to the flat (and your own property, of course). If your lease was silent on this, then you would be liable if you were negligent and each party would bear their own losses if you weren't (i.e. it was a pure "accident"). What if a flower pot falls from my windowsill and accidentally kills someone? The passerby has no action under contract as they don't have one. They can sue you, or the landlord, or the body corporate (or all three) for negligence - the landlord's and/or body corporate's insurance would respond and if it included a waiver of subrogation (most do), the insurer could not sue any of the other parties for their losses. What if my trolley bumps into an old lady at the supermarket and I break her hip? What if I walk on my friend's glasses and break them? You have no contract with either of these people so they cannot sue you under one. If they can prove negligence then you have to pay for the damage. If it is, instead a pure "accident" then they bear the cost. However, for the old lady, she is way more likely to sue the supermarket as they will have insurance. It is not as useful in the UK as it is in France due to the need for the plaintiff to prove a breach of contract or negligence. In the UK, you are not responsible for accidents you cause - only accidents you cause negligently.	I think the question answers itself : what's being put forward as a problem (that official organisations can cover their members' liability at events) is actually their main advantage. Liability doesn't go away - assuming your friend's lawyer's advice was accurate, it might have been better phrased as "liability will be on the participants". I'm not sure it's entirely right (though it might just be overly specific) in the way it's been reported - if there was anything that could be considered incitement to, or encouragement of, unlawful activity, there may be an additional liability on the person whose name is attached to the group, and possibly the platform used (though this is a young area of law at the moment). What's covered by the insurance will be dependent on the policy, so that's not a question that The Bloke On The Internet can answer. In terms of discounts, I don't see any reason these couldn't be offered on a social media group - or that there would be a significant difference between a social media group, an official or unofficial website, or coupons published in a magazine or distributed in flyers on a street corner. It's worth bearing in mind that distributors don't do this out of kindness - it's just advertising. If an official club, or the associated manufacturer (the owner of the brand), believed there was quantifiable loss - primarily financial, but possibly reputational - there may be grounds to demand any unofficial group cease and desist, irrespective of where (social media, websites, physical premises) they had a presence. But perhaps the greatest advantage (though I'm drifting off topic for this SE) for an official group is that it can use whichever medium it considers most useful at the time, or a combination of several. One tied to a specific social media platform will always be limited in its longevity.	The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview	As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.	No more than using your own phone, eyeglasses or underwear while working for the LLC. These are all tools of trade than one wold expect employees of the LLC to bring to their job (especially underwear). There is potentially a problem if assets of the LLC are alienated for personal use rather than the other way around. However, that would be subject to a reasonableness test - using your work computer to book a personal holiday is eminently reasonable. Where there is a real liability issue is if the use of that personal asset caused damage to third parties e.g. if the personal computer was hacked and damage resulted. This would allow a potential plaintiff to bypass the LLC and sue the owner directly (or, more likely, as well).	The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do.	The landlord is not free of liability risks. In California, everybody is responsible for injury brought about by lack of ordinary care or skill in management of his or her property or person. This applies to landlords, falling under Business Proprietor’s Liability for the Criminal Conduct of Others. Therefore the landlord must use reasonable care to protect tenants and guests from another person's harmful conduct on the property if the conduct can be can reasonably anticipated. The duty is towards anyone on tenants and guests alike. To figure out whether the landlord has breached his duty of care, the courts will "balance" the probability of harm to the tenant with the burden of the duty imposed on the landlord to prevent or mitigate the risk of harm, see Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 269. In that instance, the landlord failed to replace a missing pane of glass on the front door, contributing to the tenant's murder, for which the landlord was held liable (wrongful death). This ruling has extensive discussion of that balancing act. The crucial question is, how did the assault happen, and how do the landlords actions relate to the assault? The answer may be different in other jurisdictions. In the modified scenario, liability would hinge on scenario details (I'll continue to assume California). The factual question is whether in light of the background check, the assault was foreseeable, and to what extent it was preventable – what did the landlord do wrong? For instance, if the criminal history check revealed a number of arrests for assault in the state and the check was limited to CA (the new tenant moved to CA just a year ago), and if the assault was in old-tenant's room which had no lock due to landlord indifference, then the landlord is more likely to be held liable (he could have fixed the lock for a few dollars, or paid for a better criminal check). On the other hand, if a thorough criminal check reveals no arrests or complaints for anything, anywhere, and the assault happened in the common area while talking politics, there is no reasonable course of action that the landlord could have undertaken to prevent the assault (hiring 24 hour guards would not be reasonable, in this scenario). In Vasquez, the issue came down to the landlord's failure to implement a cheap fix on the front door. In a third version of your scenario, suppose that there was some evidence of past violent behavior, but the only fault that could be assigned to the landlord is the fact of renting to the new tenant. Does a landlord have a duty to deny housing to a person with a past record of violent behavior? It is legal in California to do background checks and deny a prospective tenant a lease based on existing criminal history, as long as the criteria are applied consistently (not discriminatorily), and not in a jurisdiction where criminal checks are illegal (Oakland). There is a non-fantasy scenario where that includes "the US", given a guidance from HUD, based on a disparate impact analysis. HUD says that a housing provider excluding applicants with arrest but no conviction "cannot satisfy its burden of showing that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest". If there are convictions and there is a blanket no-convict policy, the provider must still be able to prove that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest. A housing provider that imposes a blanket prohibition on any personw ith any conviction record –no matter when the conviction occurred, what the underlying conduct entailed, or what the convicted person has done since then – will be unable to meet this burden If it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of past convictions, a landlord cannot be held liable for obeying the law. In short, "it depends (on minute details and whether the plaintiff's lawyer makes the necessary arguments): ask your attorney".	Yes, the correct forum is the Local Court in the relevant state (in some states these are called Magistrate's Courts). The amount is too large ($10,000) to qualify as a small claim . If you want to do it yourself the court websites are very informative and in NSW, at least, the process can be initiated online including your paying for the Sheriff to serve the summons (they will not find the person, you have to give them an address). After being served they have 28 days to file a defence or you can get a default judgement and begin recovery. If they do file a defence then things will get more expensive. Of course, you may want to hire a local lawyer.
Is Ryanair doing anything illegal by purposely allocating separate seats? Recently I was checking in with Ryanair, and shockingly encountered the following situation: Each row contains seats ABC JKL My wife was allocated 3C and I was allocated 30K. After closer inspection it turned out that 3A, 3B, 30J and 30L were completely free (and for a fee I would be allowed to book them) Even after takeoff we both had an empty seat next to us Both of us ended up sitting next to someone who encountered the same, and thus did not get to sit with their travel companion. (our neighbors were not companions of each other) There is no doubt in my mind that this practice is wrong (and others seem to agree), but I wonder if it is anyhow illegal/against guidelines or whether they can receive penalties for this. There may be many grounds for this, but the first one that came to mind for me is that they seem to create inconvenience, with (in at least some instances) the main purpose of letting people pay for removal of the inconvenience (rather than creating value for others, or optimizing their operation in any other way). I booked this flight from The Netherlands to Morocco, but would also be interested if this practice is illegal elsewhere, or if there has been precedent for punishment in similar situations.	I can't see any law that would make this illegal. If you don't like it, you can either pay the upgrade, or not fly Ryanair.	This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.	B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do.	Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?	It could be the passenger's problem or the taxi's problem When these sorts of breakdowns in communications happen in specifying contract terms then either or both parties can be at fault. If the passenger specified the wrong address then it is clearly the passenger at fault. Similarly, if the driver drove to a different address from what the passenger said, it would clearly be the driver at fault. However, if the passenger was imprecise and the driver made an assumption then who bears responsibility depends on whether that assumption is reasonable or not. For example, the main street in the Sydney, Australia CBD is George Street. Even though George Street is an extremely common name with literally dozens in the Greater Sydney area, a taxi driver would reasonably assume that a passenger at the airport asking for "George Street" means the one in the city, not any of the others. In such a circumstance, the onus is on the passenger to specify exactly where they want to go. Whether the driver is an employee or a contractor is irrelevant - they are the representative of the organisation with whom the passenger has a contract.	Even though as you found out calling is also sufficient, there is also a form available for this: Abmeldung der Wohnung/en One of the reasons listed is Ich ziehe dauerhaft ins Ausland (I am moving abroad) They ask for a Meldeamtliche Bescheinigung for this case. That's the deregistration notice.	Why would this be a concern? The adults have some duty in an elementary school setting to monitor the children in the restroom in any case. Separate restrooms are an employee perk, not a liability driven decision.	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
How can federal law require seating for disabled people in a city train? Once in a city train in Bay area, I saw a plate which says something similar to "federal law requires this seat to be reserved for disabled people". What part of the constitution authorizes the US congress to establish such a law?	The basic constitutional underpinning is the Commerce Clause and the 14th amendment (see Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 § 2(b)(4)). As a general rule, if you do a thing that has potential commercial impact involving another state (such as growing feed for your animals and therefore not buying feed from a farmer out of state), then Congress can pass laws that restrict such actions. ADA was not constructed specifically to address seating on trains: that is just a consequence of the law.	I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.	It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.	Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center	Yes Being disabled is a protected class under the Equality Act. being a cyclist isn’t. The landlord has to make reasonable accomodations for her, he doesn’t have to for you.	For the record, the requirement says: The board of education or trustees of the school district or the state agency responsible for providing education to students with disabilities shall have the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion and burden of production, in any such impartial hearing, except that a parent or person in parental relation seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral parental placement shall have the burden of persuasion and burden of production on the appropriateness of such placement. To understand "burden of proof", think in terms of what claim is being made, by whom: this is different from understanding what you want to happen. To get the outcome you want, you have to make the right claims. Assume that the law requires the school to accommodate a student's learning disability, then the plaintiff (parent) would claim that the school failed to accommodate. The school would then be required to prove that they did accommodate. In other words, all you have to do (initially) is allege a failure to follow the law, and it is up to the school to provide the evidence that your allegation is incorrect (by providing records, also indicating standards that students are held to; the presumption that the panel is supposed to adopt is that the plaintiff's allegation is true, unless facts are introduced that show that it is false). It's not clear what action of the school is alleged to be at variance with the law. It sounds like a simple correctable bureaucratic error, so a hearing should not be necessary, but that doesn't mean that one isn't (e.g. if they have a policy of not admitting to making mistakes).	There will be a local rule regarding what police have to do with a person in custody. Here are the rules for Seattle. The main relevant rule is that they must take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of the detainee. They must use seat belts, unless the vehicle does not have seat belts in the detainee area. Additionally, they are not to respond to routine calls while transporting a detainee, but they may may respond to a threat to life safety. Typically, high speed response indicates a threat and not a noisy dog complaint. There is no obligation to refrain from responding, nor is there a requirement to release detainees. I don't think there is a clear and bright line: it comes down to what an officer would (in light of department instructions) judge to be reasonable. The officer may be wrong and the department may be wrong in what is legally "reasonable", and this could come out as a result of lawsuits and Dept. of Justice investigations. You can file a complaint with the Civil Rights division of the DoJ, see here.	I believe the relevant section is 28 CFR 35.150 - Existing facilities § 35.150 Existing facilities: (a)General. A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This paragraph does not - Because of this, it seems theoretically possible that someone could complain that the youtube videos of lectures are not accessible enough to disabled persons, and therefore have them taken down. Regardless, it seems that UC Berkley decided to preemptively take down the videos in order to "reset" their online lectures catalogue and make large improvements. But yeah, nothing in the statute says they must take such videos down, but it would be a theoretical violation of the law to leave them up.
Is it legal to take full pay for partial service? My fiance recently went on a 7 night cruise abroad and would not have cellular service. She hired a local pet sitter to come by her house 3 times a day to feed, water, and change her dog's paper. They agreed on 9 days for $35.00 per day. The pet sitter requested and was paid $315.00 in full prior to beginning the service. My fiance stays in a gated community and added the sitter to her guest list so that she can access the home. After the second day, the pet sitter was denied entry through the gate by security. The sitter contacted her emergency contact to notify her that she is unable to care for the animal since she cannot access the home. Her mother took care of the pet for the remainder of the 9 days. Upon returning back to the country, she learned from her mother everything that happened. Thankfully, the dog was okay since her mother was able to take care of the dog while she was abroad. My fiance contacted the sitter to offer 4 days' pay, $140.00, for the 2 days of service she was able to do her job to compensate for any inconveniences. The sitter maintains position that the agreement was for $315.00 for 9 days of service and that it was not her fault she couldn't do her job for the remaining 7 days, so she kept the full payment. Is it legal for the pet sitter to keep the full payment, even though the contract was breached? Was the sitter right for keeping full payment with only providing a fraction of the services agreed upon?	It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told).	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.	If you were on your parents policy with the understanding you were a student in college, then yes, they can drop you and refuse to pay. You need to read the terms of the insurance very carefully, somewhere in there it says that the policy is only in effect while you are enrolled as a full time student. You (or your parents) broke this agreement, and the insurance company doesn't have any obligation to pay. Should I refuse to acknowledge the debt as mine? Can I claim it's the insurance company's debt? No, the debt is yours from the moment of service, the insurance company's job is to cover some of that expense on your behalf. It isn't the insurance company's debt, it is yours. Contact my old insurance company and try to get them to pay up? Unfortunately you will not be successful at this. You violated the terms of your insurance (not being enrolled in school), the company has no obligation to pay. Your parents may be owed some refund of money for any extra premiums they paid while you were not enrolled, but that would be the extent of the insurance company's obligation. Negotiate with the dentist office to reduce the bill and just pay it? This is probably the best route to go. Insurance companies often negotiate fixed prices for certain procedures that are different than what they would charge uninsured customers. You can ask your dentist if they have any kind of help for uninsured patients. Simply have them fix the charge so that it's accurate (it should be $700, not $1400, since I already paid half), and pay in full? If you already paid $700, and $700 was your insurance providers portion, then yes, the bill that the dentist sends to you should be $700, not $1400. Make sure though that the entire bill is $1400 though, not $2100 ($700 your portion, and $1400 insurance).	Per GDPR Art 12(5), “any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge”. The right to rectification is Art 16 and reads in its entirety: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement. Thus, I think it would be invalid to charge a fee for an address change if that change was made in exercise of your data subject rights. If you didn't invoke this right, it's debatable whether charging a fee would be proper. On the one hand, they can charge whatever service they want (provided that this was part of the contract you entered). On the other hand, they have an obligation to assist you with your exercise of data subject rights. This includes recognising a data subject request even if you didn't explicitly invoke the specific GDPR article. For example, refusing a request for erasure just because you didn't invoke some magic GDPR words would be clearly noncompliant in my opinion. If the company offers multiple customer service options, charging for some of them may be all right. Typically, the lowest-cost solution for a company to deal with GDPR requests is to offer an online self-service option. An email to the data protection officer would typically also be free. Charging for phone support might be fine though. In an insurance context, there could also be a legitimate claim that updating your address is not a mere correction of your personal data, but a modification of the contract (depending on what you're insuring). Another possible counterpoint (which I think is not valid though) would be that the company never stored inaccurate data and therefore doesn't have to satisfy a rectification request.	If this requirement was not made before rendering the service, you are under no obligation to accept the term. You and the service provider must now find an agreeable method of payment. You still owe the provider but if you are compelled to pay then the provider will be compelled to be more accommodating in their allowed payment methods (cash, at least). As a general rule, if you are providing a service for any significant amount of money, you should require payment up front or at least a deposit and payments at milestones. Especially if you're 7,000 miles away from your client and put any restrictions on method of payment.	No illegal eviction took place, if he wasn't a tenant The term of the room rental was specified beforehand. There was no renewable or extension clause in the rental agreement. Bob also is not a tenant: he is a guest in a hotel. The Hotel offers cleaning services, as the OP specified. By overstaying, his items now were trespassing, the removal was legitimate. However, there is a point at which a short term renting of a hotel becomes living at it. Where this is is often dependant on how long or in what way you stay. Where's the line between a Tenant and a Guest? THAT is the operative question. When does a Guest/Lodger become a Tenant and can get eviction protection? In germany a couple of Hotels actually do have renters with a special rental contract - which is vastly different from the normal room rental. For example, the Maritim in Hamburg has year-rentals. These are actual renters with a rental contract and eviction protection, that give up some tenant rights for services (e.g. room cleaning service for limits in remodeling). However, overstaying at a hotel can actually become a crime: Einmietbetrug - obtaining a room in a hotel or a residency but not wanting to pay or mischaracterizing your ability to do so - is a variant of fraud and thus can be punished under §263 StGB; Under the operating law, a hotel guest is not afforded with all rights of a tenant, unless they are explicitly pointed out like with longstay contracts. In california the line is 30 days, in new-york-state it is the same but they also need to not have a different residency. in england-and-wales, the operative case when someone is a lodger or tenant is Brillouet v Landless (1995) 28 H.L.R. 836: a hotel Guest is not a tenant, even after more than a month of stay. In fact, courts following this case argue, that such a person is only licensed to be on the premises, and the license could be revoked without eviction procedures. In fact, the Brillouet v Landless case is very close to the example. Brillouet rented a room in September, and extended the stay. Then he did not pay (or rather, his accommodation services didn't. In October, Landless sought to get rid of Brillouet for non-payment, just telling him to leave. Brillouet applied for an injunction against the eviction and got a temporary one (to preserve the status-quo) till the hearing. Mere days later, and the first instance court handed out judgement against the application of an injunction to protect Brillouet. The Hotel guest, so the court, was not a tenant under the Housing Act 1988: The Protection from Eviction Act depends on premises having been let as a dwelling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of protection from eviction and seeing no tenancy (emphasis mine): It is an essential prerequisite of any tenancy that the tenant should have, so it is said in some of the authorities, exclusive possession. In my judgment the facts of this case particularly when one bears in mind that Mr Brillouet upon his own assertion avails himself of at least some of the facilities (he goes to the restaurant occasionally for his breakfast) — come nowhere near demonstrating that he has or has had within this room exclusive occupation. At best in my judgment he could conceivably be a licensee. One then has to examine once more the terms of the statute to ascertain whether he is a licensee entitled to protection under the 1977 Act. As the section to which I have alluded makes plain, only licensees who occupy as a dwelling premises which they do occupy are entitled to protection. If, as in my judgment the facts here clearly demonstrate, the occupant is no more and no less than a hotel guest properly so-called, then the accommodation is not let to the licensee as a dwelling. Street v Mountford (1985) AC 809 most likely doesn't apply if any hotel services are offered by the hotel. In the case, Mountford was found a tenant because Street did not offer any services beyond the room and furnishings itself. The presence of any service would change the pattern significantly, as the House of Lords decided: It applies against Bob if the hotel offers cleaning service/room service, and by offering service beyond the room and the furnishing within it, it is lodging, not a tenancy: The occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance or services which require the landlord or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises. A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own. [...] Street provided neither attendance nor services and only reserved the limited rights of inspection and maintenance and the like set forth in clause 3 of the agreement. On the traditional view of the matter, Mrs. Mountford not being a lodger must be a tenant. Mehta v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (2000) 32 H.L.R. 45 doesn't apply, as that case revolved around a verbal contract with the manager for 6 month exclusive use of rooms. Mehta became a tenant by that contract and eviction protection applied. In contrast, due to how agreements with hotels are generally written, Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) might apply: If the contact specified that the hotel does have unlimited access (which is typical) and that reassignments of rooms (like, another guest in the room) might apply, then there is no tenancy. Could Bob be a tenant? For Bob to be a tenant under the E&W interpretation (following the pattern established by Street & Brillouet), the facts must be such, that several things must be true: Exclusive possession: No services are offered at all beyond the room. For example, there can't be any shared facilities with the rest of the hotel that Bob has access to, and services such as room cleaning or fresh towels or laundry are not offered either. Not using them is not enough, they can't be offered at all. (both Street, Brillout) If in exclusive Possession, Bob still isn't a tenant if he is what Street calls a service occupier. That's an employee who is given a place to sleep in to perform his duties to the employer, like a Butler or Maid. (Street) Bob is also not an owner in fee simple, trespasser or mortgagee in possession, or an object of charity - for which all other rules apply. (Street) In the alternative, one fact makes them automatically one: There was a contract that in its form stipulates they are a Tenant (Mehta v RBS)	She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.	I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
In Québec, are restaurants legally required to provide free potable water upon request? In the province of Québec, are restaurants legally required to provide free potable water upon request? If so, what is the name/article of this law?	No. There are plenty of Quebecois laws covering what you must have water for (food prep, bathrooms, etc) and that if you are using the water in any fashion that it might come in contact with a human mouth (i.e. food preparation, etc) it must be drinking water (as defined in the document I linked), but no such laws requiring free distribution of drinking water on request by restaurants. It's worth noting, I suppose, that tap water must be provided by restaurants in their bathrooms for the washing of hands and that said water must be of drinking water quality, but they are not required to offer it in a glass, free of charge. Anecdotally, I will also note that there are laws in several other Canadian jurisdictions that DO require free drinking water on request, but those laws also do not stipulate the glass must be provided for free.	Is it lawful to offer smaller portions only to children below a certain age..? Yes Part 3 of the Equality Act 2010 covers "Services and Public Functions" and at section 29 states: Provision of services, etc. (1)A person (a “service-provider”) concerned with the provision of a service to the public or a section of the public (for payment or not) must not discriminate against a person requiring the service by not providing the person with the service. This is the only definition of "service-provider" in the Act, but the Equality and Human Rights Commission confirms a restaurant falls with the scope of Part 3: Equality law applies to any business that provides goods, facilities or services to members of the public. This includes a wide range of different businesses and services. These include: [...] restaurants [...] However all that is moot (but posted here for context) as Part 3 of the Act opens with caveats at section 28 which establishes that: (1)This Part does not apply to the protected characteristic of— (a)age, so far as relating to persons who have not attained the age of 18; [...]	The area is "closed" (not open), or "restricted" to alcohol consumption. Here is a memo reminding of alcohol restrictions, noting 36 CFR 2.35 which states that The superintendent may close all or a portion of a public use area or public facility within a park area to the consumption of alcoholic beverages and/or to the possession of a bottle, can or other receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage that is open, or that has been opened, or whose seal is broken or the contents of which have been partially removed. This was done in the case of the area, apparently a few years earlier (i,e, it used to be allowed and there was a policy change). The Gateway Nt'l Park website states that "Alcoholic beverages at Sandy Hook are prohibited", as are a bunch of other things. The motivation is part of the regulation, that the superintendent determined that (A) The consumption of an alcoholic beverage or the possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage would be inappropriate considering other uses of the location and the purpose for which it is maintained or established; or (B) Incidents of aberrant behavior related to the consumption of alcoholic beverages are of such magnitude that the diligent application of the authorities in this section and §§ 1.5 and 2.34 of this chapter, over a reasonable time period, does not alleviate the problem.	No A debt is created by a contract (among other ways not relevant here). A contract for a restaurant does not contemplate the creation of a debt, payment is to be contemporaneous with the service. Presuming that the customer was made aware that cash payment was not acceptable and that they chose to enter the contract, by ordering, then they accepted that term. Not abiding by it is a breach of the contract. Now, if the customer did not pay and the restaurant sued for the amount (plus damages) and won, that would be a debt for which cash must be accepted.	As described, no. Paying employees with benefits instead of money is called in kind remuneration. There are various limits on in kind payments around the world, including the US. Very generally, in kind payments are only allowed for particular industries and occupations, only allowed up to a certain dollar value, and only allowed as a certain fraction of the employee's wages. Furthermore, the value of the benefit can't exceed the actual cost to the employer - a meal that's priced at $7.25 on the menu is sold at a profit, and would be worth less than the menu price as in kind remuneration. So, given the scenario described, a restaurant employer could not replace 100% of their employee's wages with food sold for the same amount. It's too high a percentage of the wage paid as in kind payment, and the menu price equivalent of the wage would not have sufficient in kind value. A more detailed description of in kind payment laws can be found here. It's a rather long document that's not particularly well-organized, and is structured by describing various aspects of law in different geographic locations, rather than describing all aspects of the law in a location-specific manner. I was able to find US-specific law by searching the document for "United States".	First, no, given the wording of the question: "by demanding identity first". US courts have never held that citizens must immediately comply with non-emergency orders free of back-talk. Let's assume that the refusal is conditional: "I won't comply until you show me your ID". In most (?) jurisdictions, there is no obligation imposed on police to show ID, though I am excluding home searches. There is a policy requirement in Seattle (§7) that Employees may use a Department-issued business card that contains their name and serial number to satisfy the request for the information. Employees will also show their department identification card and badge (sworn) when specifically requested to do so. Exception: Employees are not required to immediately identify themselves if: An investigation is jeopardized A police function is hindered There is a safety consideration Massachusetts has a law saying that "Such identification card shall be carried on the officer's person and shall be exhibited upon lawful request for purposes of identification". In the domain of search and seizure law, the court reasoned in Doornbos v. Chicago, regarding a seizure by plainclothes police that Absent reasonable grounds to think that identification would present an unusual danger, it is generally not a reasonable tactic for plainclothes officers to fail to identify themselves when conducting a stop. The tactic provokes panic and hostility from confused civilians who have no way of knowing that the stranger who seeks to detain them is an officer... it is usually unreasonable for a plainclothes officer to fail to identify himself when conducting a stop or frisk As you can see, this identification requirement is tied to constitutional search and seizure limits for which there is voluminous case law regarding what is "reasonable". The scenario that you propose is fairly far from the kind of case identified in Doornbos: is the order from a uniformed officer in a police vehicle? That seems to be what you're describing. Now we must inquire as to the legality of the order. Picking on Washington state law, RCW 46.61.015 requires that No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any duly authorized flagger or any police officer or firefighter invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. RCW 46.61.021 requires a person driving to stop for a LEO, and to identify himself: failure to comply is a misdemeanor. There is no statutory provision that a person can refuse to obey these (or similar sections in the motor vehicle title) until the officer provides ID. A police officer (in Washington: and I suspect any other state) does not have unrestricted authority to give people orders, there are specific statutory circumstances giving police the power to order people to do things. Obstructing a police officer is a crime, but obstructing an officer is where one "willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties", and not "doesn't cooperate". There is a provision, RCW 9a.76.030 where A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer and the "knows to be a peace officer" clause implies either that the officer is uniformed, or has provided identification. Finally, we have "failure to disperse" when a person congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and (b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law. These laws are attuned to emergency needs, thus outside the penumbra of your scenario. In short, the primary question must be, when can police lawfully give you an order that you must obey, which narrows the matter down to traffic-related matters. The seizure must be reasonable: it is reasonable to require a person to stop for a uniformed officer. Reasonability does not entail that all officers must produce ID when effecting a seizure, but this may be the case with plain-clothes officers. Even when in Seattle with a departmental policy requiring officers to identify themselves, an officer's failure to identify does not render the seizure illegal.	If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries.	Yes. As long as a local or state ordinance is not in conflict with any section of federal statutes or federal authority as ordained my the US Constitution and current legal precedent in accordance with it, nor is unconstitutional, there is no reason a town cannot pass laws preventing this.
What could be the legal consequences of the "street justice" beating of a person by another? A pervert walks past some kids and sexually exposes themselves. They then walk towards the father of the children they just exposed themselves to, as words were exchanged. The father proceeds to exact some street justice and beats the pervert up. Could the father face legal consequences? Could the father use self defense as a defence against any charges? Such a situation is reported here. Since a state is necessary for jurisdiction, let's use Florida as an example.	Beating a person up is a crime in every jurisdiction. No privilege to commit assault is created if the person has offended someone, although self defense (or defense of others) is a defense, in case the person is beating someone up. It may be against the law to expose your genitalia in public in your location, and you may call the police to seek justice. In Washington, a first offense of indecent exposure to a person under 14 is a gross misdemeanor. However, the law only allows up to 364 day in prison, and not a beating, for violating the law.	But I don't see how it is connected, because there is no domestic violence, no child custody One does not need to be violent to violate an agreement. There was an agreement to resolve the situation with the house. You ex did not honour it. You can ask the court to convince him to honour it through a motion for enforcement. It's that simple.	Your daughter says of your son: "He hit me." She has made an allegation. Assume that the evidence shows that there is a red mark on her arm, tears and she and her brother were the only two people in the room at the time. This evidence is enough to establish a prima facie case. However, this evidence has not yet been tested. Now, for obvious reasons, we are going to assume that your family operates on an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial model of justice of so it is you who will be doing the testing. You might ask for a statement of the fact from your son. This will almost certainly contradict the evidence of your daughter because ... siblings. Assume that your son says they were arguing over a controller and that your daughter threw it at his head, he ducked and it bounced off the wall and struck her in the arm. So now you might cross-examine both the plaintiff and defendant to try to find any inconsistencies or other reasons to doubt their testimony. Or you might examine the controller for evidence of it being smashed into a thousand very expensive pieces. At the end of this process, you may prefer your daughter's version over your son's: if so, your daughter has met her burden of proof and is entitled to whatever remedy your Solomonic wisdom decrees. However, if you prefer your son's or find them equally plausible then she hasn't and justice requires a remedy in the other direction. This is because it was your daughter who had the burden of proof throughout. However, assume instead you son said: "I hit her but she hit me first". Well now he has admitted to the alleged facts and your daughter's burden is met but he is raising an affirmative defense ("I did it, but ...") rather than a negating defense ("I never did!"). The onus has now shifted to him to demonstrate the required elements of self-defense. Of course, unlike in the public legal system, self-defense is generally not a total defense withing a familial legal system and the best he can hope to do is mitigate the punishment and, vitally important in the interests of justice for children, ensure his sister gets punished too; because vengeance is more important than mercy.	tl;dr No, it won't be a viable defense. Background Touch has an established interpretation at common law. The common law is judge-made law. If an offense involving touch existed at common law, then the meaning of touch is "defined" by the judicial opinions themselves. As the comments have noted, you'll be able to find hundreds of years worth of opinions where judges have, by example, determined what qualifies as touching. Putting your hand on someone, yes. Spitting on someone, yes. Blowing from a distance, no. These examples make up the common law definition of touch. But how, you may ask, would the common law evolve to include new information? The answer is clear. Say Jill purposely hits Jack in the face with a shovel. When appearing before the judge, she says, "we have a new understanding of atomic proximity, so technically the atoms in the shovel never made contact with the atoms in Jack!" The judge will say, "that's interesting, but it seems irrelevant to what we're trying to accomplish with the law: Jack still had to go to the hospital. Judgment for Jack." Now the common law has incorporated the new information (...at Jill's expense). Touch isn't defined at the atomic level when interpreting a statute. Some offenses are defined, not by judges, but by statutes enacted by legislatures. If the language in the statute is ambiguous, courts have to interpret its meaning. This is often done by looking at the purpose of the statute or by looking at the plain meaning of the language. Statutory interpretation: purpose Where a court does not employ the plain meaning approach, it will often look for evidence of the drafter's intent. In this case, the court would ask what the purpose of a law like battery is. They'd probably conclude it has to do with preventing harm and offense. In fact, they probably included things like that in the statute itself. So they'd wonder if defining contact at an atomic level would help to prevent harm and offense; that seems unlikely. In so doing, the court may analyze the legislative history. It may look at events that happened around the time the law was enacted: did the legislature propose it because people were hitting each others' faces with shovels? It might even appeal to the state of the common law at the time the statute was enacted for the proper definition. Statutory interpretation: plain meaning First, it might help to look at an example from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). There the Court was tasked with interpreting some Second Amendment text. In doing so it said, "we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.' Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings." Id at 576-77. Statutory interpretation also makes use of this plain meaning approach. As stated by the Court, "where the language of an enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.” United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). This is bolstered by the practice of explicitly defining words with technical meanings in a definitions section of the statute. For example, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code employs a number of terms in a technical sense, and 9-102(a) defines 81 words that are intended to take on a technical meaning. Another example is the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. The statute doesn't have a technical definition for "physical contact." So under plain meaning we'd construe it in its common sense. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary (a favorite of U.S. courts) defines touch as, "to bring a bodily part into contact with especially so as to perceive through the tactile sense." That definition implies that tactile sensation is what triggers (2), not any atomic concept of proximity. If you're interested in further reading, proper interpretation of the term "physical contact" came up in the insurance contract setting in Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Busby, 219 Cal. App. 4th 876 (2013). united-states	Breaking and entering, just by entering a private premise without permission. Causing bodily harm, possibly grievous harm, depending on what consequences it has for the victim and how the jurisdiction defines grievous harm. A prosecutor might also insinuate that the defendant had a sexual motive, so they might also add some sexual assault charges In addition to criminal charges, the victim could also press civil claims as compensation for the physical injury and the psychological trauma they experienced from a stranger entering their home at night and drinking their blood. A possible defense which the vampire could use is to claim that they are no longer a human, so human laws do not apply to them. But this would be a rather dangerous strategy, because if human laws don't apply to them, then by the same argumentation human rights might not apply to them either. If they insisted on being tried as an animal, then the court could very well reason that the best way to deal with a dangerous animal that can not be controlled and can not be kept away from humans is to euthanize it.	Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.	Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.	Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction.
Are U.S. employers subject to Canadian employment law if they hire a Canadian to work remotely? Hypothetical Facts U.S. company ("A") hires Canadian worker ("B") to work as an unpaid intern. B never physically leaves Canada and does all her work by telephone, computer and internet. A has a physical presence in the U.S. only. The parties enter into an internship agreement that, among other things, (purports to) commit/s the entire arrangement to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Questions Is A or B subject to Canadian employment law? (Will either party get into trouble with the Canadian government?) If so, what enforcement (and/or punitive) mechanisms are available to the Canadian government to enforce their employment laws against A or B? Can B later (successfully) sue A in a Canadian court for back wages?	Is A or B subject to Canadian employment law? Canada and the relevant province(s) will decide in their courts if Canadian or US law applies. The USA and the relevant state(s) will decide in their courts if Canadian or US law applies. It would be open to the employee to bring an action in any relevant court; the court will then decide what law applies and if they have jurisdiction - that is part of what sovereignty means! A Canadian court can decide a matter using US law and vice-versa. Things that the court would take into consideration are if the company did business (outside this single arrangement) in Canada or was US exclusive, the number of other trans-national interns, if the arrangement was seen as a device for avoiding employment obligations in either jurisdiction. If one is subject to Canadian law then they both are. Will either party get into trouble with the Canadian government? Assuming that the arrangement is subject to Canadian law then the company would be obliged to pay wages and may be subject to fines for not having done so. If so, what enforcement (and/or punishment) mechanisms does the Canadian government have at their disposal to enforce their employment laws against A or B? B - nothing; they have not broken the law. A - an order to pay wages and fines. Enforcement may require a judgement in a US court; either by bringing the case in one the first instance or applying to have a Canadian judgement given effect in the US. Edit The OP has added the proviso that the document states that it subject to US law and jurisdiction. If it just says that, it is prima facie invalid - a contract cannot exclude the jurisdiction of any court and an attempt to do so renders it unlawful. However, if it said that it was subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction and law of, say, Wisconsin, then a Canadian court would consider the parties intent and the relevant Canadian national and provincial law and might decide that the proper forum is a Wisconsin court and refuse to hear the complaint. Things they will consider are that there will be Canadian and provincial laws that cannot be excluded by contract, the hardship changing the forum will have on the plaintiff or defendant, if the result (assuming the facts are proven) would be demonstrably different in a US vs. a Canadian court etc.	For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue).	Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.	In theory, yes; in practice no. At common law, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligent actions of an employee performed in the course of employment, and the employee is also liable to third-parties but can claim indemnity from the employer. The employer can sue the employee for breach of contract and win (see Lister v Romford Ice Cold Storage), however, such suits are rarely brought and even more rarely successful. This is partly because of the bad publicity such cases generate but mostly because many jurisdictions have introduced laws to stop them like the NSW Employee's Liability Act.	Under U.S. law, when you hire someone and they are injured while doing work for which you hired them, the ordinary tort law regime does not apply. Instead, you are in the worker's compensation regime, under which the employer is strictly liable for the injury. Whether the employee or the employer was at fault in any way (negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, or intentional) is largely irrelevant (except that worker's compensation insurance does not cover the employer's intentional harm to workers which is the employer's responsibility to pay on an uninsured basis). This applies to all injuries on the job, whether or not they are related to the work, and whether or not anyone involved with the employer actually did anything wrong. For example, an employer has strict liability for the injuries of a convenience store clerk sustained by the clerk in an armed robbery of the convenience store where the clerk is working undertaken by felon who escaped from prison hours before due to the carelessness of the prison guards. Usually, that injury is fully insured if the employer has the legally required worker's compensation insurance in place, but the penalty for not having it in place is most commonly that the employer has liability to the full extent, if not greater, than the employer's worker's compensation insurance would have if it was in place. Worker's compensation recoveries are limited to actual economic damages like lost wages and medical expenses, without regard to non-economic harms like pain and suffering and worker's compensation plans also have a very limited death benefit when the worker has no dependents. But these limitations on damages don't always apply when the employer fails to have worker's compensation insurance in place. Worker's compensation liability varies from place to place, but in most states it applies to independent contractors who have not put in place worker's compensation insurance for themselves as well. In your example, Fred has full liability for Barney's injuries. Uriah does not have liability for Barney's injuries due to his good faith belief that he was acting in self-defense or defense of others. But note that Fred's strict liability for Barney's injuries does not preclude a third-party from having liability as well, both to Barney (for damages for which there is not employer liability under the worker's compensation regime such as pain and suffering, and/or in the case of an intentional tort like the armed robbery of the convenience store, punitive damages), and to the employer/worker's compensation insurer for a subrogation claim to recover the amounts paid to Barney as a result of the third-party's negligence or intentional acts.	In Canada can employer force employees not to discuss wage? Not in Ontario. That would violate Section 74(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000: No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall intimidate, dismiss or otherwise penalize an employee or threaten to do so, (a) because the employee, (v.2) discloses the employee’s rate of pay to another employee for the purpose of determining or assisting another person in determining whether an employer is complying with Part XII (Equal Pay for Equal Work) See also Section 74.12(1)(a)(v.2). What if the employee signed a confidentiality agreement where they agreed not to discuss wages? The agreement would be void in that regard. See Section 5 of the same Standards: [...] [N]o employer or agent of an employer and no employee or agent of an employee shall contract out of or waive an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void. The allowed exceptions are any clauses that provide a greater benefit to an employee than the employment standard (see 5(2)).	If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.	As far as I know, no jurisdiction in the US relieves a person of their contractual lease obligations when they are required by law to leave the country. However, many (perhaps most) states require the landlord to make an effort to re-rent an abandoned unit, which reduces the size of the tenant's liability. Unless the landlord just gives up on the claim for $8K, you would have that liability, which could be collected through legal process. The landlord might do this in her jurisdiction, which would no doubt result in a default judgment (because you won't show up). Theoretically, she could also pursue you in your home country, but that is much more complicated, expensive, and subject to whatever discretionary dim view the local courts have of US immigration law, or other tenant-related laws (the courts would have to conclude that there was a wrong by the standards of that country). A variant of suing you in your home country is suing you in the US and having the judgment enforced in the foreign country, but that against depends on the legal system of that country and treaties between the country and the US. Since visitor visas are a highly discretionary legal entitlement, it's impossible to say "won't" w.r.t. the question of whether a visa application will be denied because of an unpaid monetary judgment. It's also impossible to say "won't" because the law can change at any time. With those caveats, there does not appear to be any concrete reason to believe that a visitor visa will be denied because you skipped out on a lease. A visa can be denied and one can be perma-banned for lying on interview questions, so the hope is that there isn't a question "do you have any money judgments against you in the US".
What prevents tourists visiting the U.S. from buying firearms? Imagine an ordinary foreigner, arrived with a simple tourist visa into the US. In the U.S., there is no personal identification document. Most of the U.S. people doesn't have a passport. What prevents a simple tourist to go into a weapon shop and buy a rifle?	18 USC 922(g) says that it is illegal for various persons to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. (5) refers to "being an alien", specifically one who has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))) with an exception as provided in subsection (y)(2), The (y)(2) exceptions covers foreign officials and law enforcement (not a typical tourist), and one who is (A) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes or is in possession of a hunting license or permit lawfully issued in the United States; which pretty much covers simple tourists, if not typical tourists.	with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.	TSA states TSA does not prohibit photographing, videotaping or filming at security checkpoints, as long as the screening process is not interfered with or sensitive information is not revealed. Interference with screening includes but is not limited to holding a recording device up to the face of a TSA officer so that the officer is unable to see or move, refusing to assume the proper stance during screening, blocking the movement of others through the checkpoint or refusing to submit a recording device for screening. Additionally, you may not film or take pictures of equipment monitors that are shielded from public view. Since it is not forbidden, the law doesn't directly say anything: your right to photograph and the absence of any prohibition from the 1st Amendment. So they may not punish you at all for photographing them.	This is a question with a subjective answer, not a legal one. "Should I have to turn in my gun" legally, nobody is forced to turn in their guns because of mental illness. There are fourteen states in the United State that have laws to be able to seize weapons from mentally unstable individuals under what is known as "extreme risk protection orders(ERPOs)", these states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. North Caroline only restricts mentally ill individuals from buying firearms, not from owning them. Please see Possession of firearms by people with mental illness for more information about different states laws on mental illness and firearm use.	Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.	Yes From the American perspective: U.S. law does not mention dual nationality1 or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to his or her U.S. citizenship. Source: U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs And from the British: Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries. Source: Gov.Uk 1Section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that “the term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Therefore, U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals. Non-citizen nationality status refers only individuals who were born either in American Samoa or on Swains Island to parents who are not citizens of the United States [Source: Dept of State, as above]	After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely.	According to the ACLU, there are certain questions you have to answer when entering the US, and in some states you may have to identify yourself when stopped and told to identify yourself. Nonimmigrant non-citizen may be required to answer questions about immigrant status posed by an immigration officer. Otherwise, you are not required to answer questions by police. A judge can order you to answer questions, but the police cannot. Also, "obstruction of justice" covers things such as destroying evidence, assaulting a process server, communicating with a juror, and can cover investigative demands by prosecutors, but not being uncooperative with police.
What comes first: the arrest, or the charge(s)? Forgive me if this seems like an asinine question, and please feel free to be as pedantic as possible if answering. I'm working on data modeling a piece of software and it's relevant to my data structure design. I appreciate any insight that can be offered. I am of the opinion that the charge(s) must exist before an arrest is made, i.e. one must be charged (by the police, or by another agency with the authority to make arrests) with something before they can be arrested, i.e. one is arrested on charges. I also realize that the charges can and do sometimes change (or disappear, for that matter) after the arrest, but for my purposes that is irrelevant. I am strictly concerned with the circumstances leading to an arrest and jail. The question also extends to summons and warrants. Charges must exist before one can be summoned or a warrant for the arrest issued. Am I looking at this the right way? Thanks in advance to anyone willing to take a few minutes to help me sort this out.	It can go either way. If detectives have been working to build a big conspiracy case against you, they might get charges filed before they roll up to arrest you. If a cop catches you mugging someone, they'll arrest you on the spot and charge you later.	In the US, people are not put in jail because they are "known for" committing a crime. Several things must happen, and at each stage there are ways for the process to be halted. Law enforcement must gather evidence that a crime has been committed by a particular person. There ids no duty to investigate every possible crime, so this will depend on the policy of the particular LE organization, and what evidence any investigation finds. If no investigation is made, no evidence will be found. A prosecutor (state or Federal) must decide to bring charges. There is no duty for a prosecutor to bring charges in every case where evidence is brought forward by law enforcement. A prosecutor is supposed to devote the limited resources of his or her office where it seems likely to do the most public good. Cases which probably cannot be won should not be brought. Moreover, most prosecutors are reluctant to bring cases which seem likely to do them political harm. The Prosecutor must formally bring the defendant(s) before a court to hear and respond to the charges (arraignment). At this stage the judge can dismiss the charges, but that almost never happens. The prosecutor must establish that there is probable cause to bring a case to trial. This can be done via a grand jury proceeding resulting in an indictment, an "information", a probable cause hearing, or a preliminary hearing, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of crime. For minor crimes, the prosecutor's sworn statement may be enough. There must be a trial, before a judge or a jury. If the defendant is found guilty, s/he will be sentenced under the appropriate law, which may include jail or prison time. There are various other stages to the process, but those are the major go/no-go steps in a US criminal proceeding. So it is possible in any given case that law enforcement has not tried to find evidence, or has tried but failed, or that a prosecutor has chosen not to bring charges. As to why any of that might have happened, it depends on the particular situation and its circumstances. There are always costs of time, effort, and money to pursue any particular case. If cops are looking for evidence of a celebrity's drug use, they are not looking for evidence in an embezzlement or murder case. If an assistant prosecutor is tying such a case, s/he is not trying some other case. Officials have wide discretion in how to allocate resources in such matters.	This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed).	There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.	Law enforcement officers can obtain information with a search warrant, which is a document issued by a judge or magistrate that authorizes them to search for specific information or evidence based on "probable cause" to believe that it will inform the investigation or prosecution of a crime. A court can also issue a subpoena at the request of a party to a proceeding before it. Since in most cases only the state can bring criminal charges before a court, an individual would have to bring a civil complaint before a court in order to even request a subpoena related to his complaint. Also, it is up to the court to enforce its subpoenas: It's not like a warrant where you can then pursue the items subpoenaed through force. If the subject of a subpoena doesn't respond you have to ask the court to compel the party, which means you have to bring your complaint before a court that has jurisdiction over the party you wish to subpoena. This can be difficult when it involves a third party – especially a third party that would rather ignore or object to the subpoena than hand over the information. I.e., if you can't convince law enforcement to investigate the crime, and you can't convince the company in possession of the data that it's in its interest to help you, then you would most likely be facing a steep legal bill to get an attorney to successfully obtain the information through civil process.	The above is not quite accurate. First, assault. The correct definition is "a threat or physical act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." Therefore, no attempt at a battery is necessary. Rather, simply making someone subjectively believe that you are about to commit a battery against them is enough for an assault charge. Please note the following two points. One, that apprehension does not mean fear. Apprehension means that the victim has to believe that the actor's conduct will result in imminent harmful or offensive contact. Two, it's not necessary that the victim believes such conduct will actually be effective - rather, he only has to believe the conduct is "capable" of making the contact. I can't tell if by "other security personnel" you mean, in addition to bouncers, say, security at concerts or if you mean private security guards, such as ones who guard warehouses or other businesses. Nonetheless, for the warehouse/business "guards," they do not have a special privilege above or beyond what any random person may do. That is, you may use force to the extent you reasonably believe necessary to prevent a felony, riot, or serious breach of the peace. You may use deadly force only if it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a "dangerous felony" involving risk to human life, including, for example, robbery, arson, burglary. However, if the private security personnel are operating under authority vested to them by local ordinance or the state legislature, then their rights (and also any attendant restrictions, such as those provided to citizens under the Fourth Amendment) would apply instead. So where's the difference? It comes about at the standard a situation must meet to allow use of deadly force. A police officer can use deadly force to effectuate an arrest based on a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed a felony involving the risk of physical harm or death to others (murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape or burglary) or if there is substantial risk that the suspect was dangerous to the point that he may cause serious physical harm or death to someone if the arrest were delayed. On the other hand, as a private citizen, you may only use deadly force when attempting to effectuate an arrest if the suspect did indeed commit such a felony. Police can base their action on a reasonable belief and even if that belief is wrong, they will be safe from prosecution. A private citizen actually must be right about the suspect having committed the requisite crime. No matter how reasonable the belief was of a private citizen regarding a suspect, if that suspect did not actually commit the crime, the private citizen who used such force will be subject to prosecution. Bouncers are afforded no more rights than private citizens. They can issue verbal warnings, ask a patron to leave the establishment, check identification, refuse entry, call the cops, protect bystanders from violence, break up fights, and respond with equal force if necessary. They may not strike an individual with a punch or kick, push or physically toss someone out of the establishment, restrain them using chokeholds or other submission techniques, or use weapons or pepper spray.	It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required.	This may be allowed, or prohibited, it all depends. At the federal level, there is no specific prohibition against asking this question, however it may be found to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act if the result discriminates in employment based on race. At the state level (in Washington), WAC 162-12-140 gives examples of fair and unfair pre-employment inquiries. W.r.t. arrests, it deems such questions as fair under limited circumstances: Because statistical studies regarding arrests have shown a disparate impact on some racial and ethnic minorities, and an arrest by itself is not a reliable indication of criminal behavior, inquiries concerning arrests must include whether charges are still pending, have been dismissed, or led to conviction of a crime involving behavior that would adversely affect job performance, and the arrest occurred within the last ten years. Exempt from this rule are law enforcement agencies and state agencies, school districts, businesses and other organizations that have a direct responsibility for the supervision, care, or treatment of children, mentally ill persons, developmentally disabled persons, or other vulnerable adults. See RCW 43.20A.710; 43.43.830 through 43.43.842; and RCW 72.23.035. In other words, asking just about arrests is unfair and illegal. You can look up the law of other states here. In California, you can't ask about an arrest until late in the process as part of an individualized investigation, and can't be an automatic "arrest? No job!" rule. In contrast, Arkansas has no prohibition against arrest as job disqualifier.
My hard drive data was lost during a software upgrade; can I sue? The recent system update named High Sierra from Apple Inc. encrypted my entire disk and resulted in data loss. They didn't inform me that the update would encrypt the entire disk and that there was a risk that it may fail; it did fail, and my data is lost. Is there a way to sue Apple?	By clicking "accept" on the software license, you waived your rights to sue for damages. But you can go to the support forums and make an issue of what happened; Apple - like most companies - doesn't like bad PR. Official Apple Support Communities	What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction.	First of all, you own the mobile phone, you do not own the software on it - you have a licence to that software that almost certainly includes terms allowing Samsung to change the software and/or revoke your license. Second, changing the software does not destroy the phone - the hardware is completely intact. You can present that hardware and, in exchange, receive a brand new working phone which has the added advantage that it won't spontaneously explode. Alternatively, if you are an idiot, you can install a non-Samsung OS and cause your bomb, sorry, phone, to work again. Third, Samsung is probably not liable for any consequences that flow from an inability to make phone calls in any event - their contract will almost certainly exclude it and a case in negligence would probably fail for lack of both a duty of care and/or lack of foreseeability. Alternatively, Samsung is aware of a real risk to the users of their phone and have gone to great lengths to get them back. Having reached a 93% return rate they have identified a way to make the remaining 7% completely harmless. It is arguable that if they can do this and don't, then they are being negligent.	Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator.	You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded.	What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.	What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying.	Patents are not that relevant in this case. Software patents are unenforceable in most parts of the world anyway. What matters here is copyright. Every work contract has a clause that everything an employee creates as part of their employment is copyrighted by the company. So using company-owned code to build an own project would be a copyright violation. There are also other legal tools in some jurisdiction which can be used against employees trying to misuse intellectual company property. But that's a topic for Law Stackexchange. Also, this isn't really related to a BYOD policy. Being able to bring your own device to work and then back home might make data theft more convenient, but isn't required. There are many other ways to steal sourcecode, like USB drives or uploading them to the internet. To prevent the first you would have to design your software development offices like a supermax prison facility with meter-high walls (so nobody can throw a device over it) and strip searches on everyone leaving the building. This is neither feasible nor reasonable for anything below matters of national security. To prevent the second, you would have to completely prevent internet access from developer workstations, which would greatly impede the productivity of any software developer. So most companies do not even try to physically prevent employees from stealing sourcecode. They rather rely on the legal safeguards and on maintaining a mutual trust relationship with their employees. It might seem counter-intuitive to some, but when you do not treat your employees like potential criminals they are in fact less likely to betray you.
Can I make a privacy policy on my own for free? I have the Problem that I want to start a web application which has access to the users files on dropbox and co. This involves saving some of the data local, e.g. the directory structure, access token, email addresses... I know that I have to provide detailed information which data I save and how I use it. But I am a poor student who don't want invest money into a lawyer to write me a privacy policy (this is just a simple project which I want to share, I do not plan to get paid for it) Is there any way I can do this privacy policy on my own? Is it possible to just create some “I save all your data“ policy which would of course be to much but it would include all data I save and so I would not miss anything in my policy? Does such a policy have to be in a specific form?	I know that I have to provide detailed information which data I save and how I use it. Yes, you should, if you are getting access to users' Dropbox accounts, which will contain all sorts of private data, copyrighted (and illegally copied copyrighted files), etc. You provide the detailed information to your users through a click-through Privacy Policy - TOS (Terms of Service) in your App, like any other App out there. Click wrap (Wikipedia) user agreements are legally binding in many jurisdictions. Even if you don't access files and information - such as personal information or files - you still need a clear TOS for your App, for both your users' and your own legal protection. But I am a poor student who don't want invest money into a lawyer to write me a privacy policy ... I do not plan to get paid for (this app)... Being a free or paid App doesn't make a difference when it comes to the TOS, if you need one, and if you need to pay for one to be drafted. But not investing money in a lawyer can be a critical mistake if your App will be distributed on the popular App directories like Google Play and iTunes and your TOS does not clearly and legally outline all possible usage and data polices. Lawyers have experience in covering all the bases. Is there any way I can do this privacy policy on my own? Sure, you can: https://www.google.com/search?q=privacy+policy+generator But you run considerable legal liability not having a TOS that correctly and legally addresses all users' privacy concerns and clearly outlines what you do to insure security. That's what lawyers are for. Is it possible to just create some “I save all your data“ policy which would of course be to much but it would include all data I save and so I would not miss anything in my policy? Sure, you can simply say I save all your data. But how can you be sure that you've haven't missed important policy details and scenarios that could result in legal action against you? Like how long do you save data? When will you delete it? How secure is it? Can the user ask for deletion? What happens if you get hacked? What about users in countries other than the US? Users under 18 years old? You must use arbitration for any disputes? And on and on. The considerable legal liability of using a non-professionally drafted TOS means you run the risk of getting sued. You have to decide if it is worth the risk.	As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself.	First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read.	This very much depends on where you are. Different jurisdictions have wildly different laws about this. Some places are very permissive. You can record a conversation that you aren't even a party to so long as nobody has any reasonable expectation of privacy. In others, affirmative consent is required from every party to a conversation before it's legal to record it. The laws run the entire spectrum. Some places allow you to record anything you're a party to without permission, but you can't record others' conversations. Some places require you to disclose, but not obtain explicit permission. Some allow you to record but restrict who you can disclose it to. Some allow you to record or ban recording only under certain circumstances. It's a really wide gamut of laws. Since you don't say where you are, who you're recording, or why, there's no way to really answer the question. Here's a good rundown on the United States. This Wikipedia article covers lots of different countries, but only with regard to phone calls.	In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient.	Of course, remote access tools and remote administration can be legitimate. But such tools also have substantial potential for abuse. You as the app provider might have a responsibility for ensuring security and safety of your system. In particular: consider whether other mechanisms are more appropriate for sharing pictures, e.g. a messenger app the user should always be aware when access is active, for example by requiring user interaction for starting a session during which access is allowed, and by showing a persistent notification while access is active the user should be able to withdraw access at any time before starting the session, the user should be informed about potential risks so that they can give informed consent the shared content should likely be protected via end-to-end encryption Scenarios that should be impossible, or at least prevented with reasonable safeguards: An attacker suspects their partner of cheating. The attacker installs a remote access tool on their partner's device and starts tracking it. Clearly, the partner being tracked will not have given consent here. A “tech support” scammer tricks the victim into installing the remote access tool and uses it to guide the victim into transferring money. Why you should care about such issues: If your app enables criminal acts, and you did not take reasonable precautions to prevent this, you might have some degree of liability. Apps that can be used as spy apps are likely to ran afoul of app store guidelines that you would like to distribute your app through. If you market your app in Europe, your app may only access information on the end user's device with the user's consent. Many of the safeguards suggested above (prior information, keeping the user fully aware of what is happening, making it easy to revoke access, no surreptitious tracking, no misleading users) are essential for obtaining valid consent. You as the app provider would need consent since you would act as the service provider / data controller.
Copyrighting a website I have a website that I want to publish, so I guess it's about time I get it copyrighted. The question is how? I've heard I can do it through www.creativecommons.org Here is what I found: Copyright is created automatically. In Cyprus as well as in the European Union and in most countries there is no process of registering and certifying copyright. In case of infringement of copyright, however, many are the ways which can witness and evidence in court the ownership of copyright. – http://ipcyprus.com/faq/ So does that mean I can't get the content of my website copyrighted?	A website itself cannot be copyrighted, but the content on it is. Copyright protection is automatic: when you write something, it is protected by copyright law, and that protection persists when you put it on a website. If you intend to sue someone for infringement of copyright, you may have to register the copyright (details depend on national law). Creative Commons is not a way of protecting your intellectual property, it is a way of selectively removing copyright protection (by granting permission to copy, under certain circumstances). In some countries, such as Cyprus, registration is not required; also, infringement is a criminal offense subject to a prison term up to 2 years and a fine up to 1500 pounds for a first offense. There are various differences between Cypriot and US law in terms of the registration, but basically the protection in the US is more limited for unregistered works. Under Article 4, as long as you are a citizen or resident of Cyprus, you are entitled to protection in Cypriot court.	Most countries have compulsory or statutory licences for exactly these situations. You enter a licence agreement with a collecting society, pay them licencing fees, and give them a record of the music you perform. They in turn then distribute royalties to the rights holders. The exact details of which licence you'll need depends on your country, the types of events you will perform at, the frequency of the events, the size of the audience etc. It may be the venue's responsibility to obtain the licence instead of the performer, or both the venue and the performer may need to. I don't have any experience of this, and if I did my experience would be useless to yours in the UK ;). But luckily the UK has an easy to find website which tells you just where you need to go. You will need to get a licence from an organisation called PRS for Music.	From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.	Copyright law is not based on contracts, and does not require agreement. No one may distribute copies of a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright holder. For instance, in the US, both Persons A and F can be sued because Title 17, Section 501 of the US Code says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. (b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. Copyright infringement isn't an issue of violating terms you agreed to with a private entity. Your duty to not infringe copyright was imposed by your country's legislature, who does not require your personal agreement to do that.	Because of the nature of online distribution, "watching" a show involves copying, so you need permission from the copyright holder to make those copies. You get permission indirectly, when you access a show via a legal licensee who has permission to distribute. A pirate site has no permission, therefore you cannot legally sub-license the show, and in so doing, you infringe copyright. The issue is not whether you "paid for it", it is whether you have obtained proper permission. Under copyright law, a rights holder can simply arbitrarily deny you permission to copy the work.	I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations.	Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.	You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.
UK: What constitutes reasonable consent for not allowing tenants to keep a pet? I'm currently renting a house in the UK and have been for 6 months now. The tenancy agreement states, you may: 'Not keep any cats or dogs on the property. Not keep any other pet, animal, bird, reptile, fish, insects or the like on the Property, without the Landlord’s consent, which will not be unreasonably withheld.' From my brief bit of research I understand this is technically an invalid clause anyway as cats and dogs shouldn't be excluded from the request for permission? Anyway I politely requested permission, via the estate agents, to own a green-cheeked conure parrot, with the obvious caveat that I pay for any (unlikely) damage repairs and/or cleaning at the end of the tenancy. They responded simply saying the landlord said 'no'. I of course replied asking for a reason why and the estate agent responded with 'The tenancy state no pets and they want to adhere to this.'. This was blatantly false and so I again pressed for a reason, this time quoting the clause in the contract itself, but they've conveniently not responded to that request. What are my rights in this situation? What would be the consequences to purchasing the parrot anyway?	Legal answer A blanket "no pets" clause is unenforceable, and would remove even the requirement for you to ask before keeping pets (ref:landlordlawblog). This is why the clause contract has the phrase "the Landlord’s consent [...] will not be unreasonably withheld". You shouldn't take this phrasing to mean that the landlord is happy for pets given certain conditions; rather the landlord doesn't want pets, but has used the letting agent's standard contract which has been written with advice from lawyers. Withholding consent with no explanation is unreasonable (see landlordlawblog ref above). The landlord simply wanting no pets, in and of itself, is almost certainly unreasonable. Given that you proposed damage repairs and cleaning, I am personally convinced that the rejection is unreasonable. That said, the landlord might be able to reasonably withhold consent on noise grounds (parrots can annoy neighbours!), but can only do so by stating that to you (which he hasn't done). (Im)practical answer 1 You can try fighting it out in the courts if you like. You could well win, but this will cost you money (and probably a lot of stress) and antagonise your landlord. The landlord will then want to get rid of you (both because you're doing something he doesn't want to the property, and because you took him to court). He'll want to get rid of you with the minimum notice possible; if you're in a fixed term, that's the end of the fixed term; if you're in a periodic tenancy it's probably 2 months. In theory landlords can't carry out retaliatory evictions. But your only chance of fighting a retaliatory eviction is... the courts! Cue more cost and stress. And it's very possible that the landlord might successfully come up with another reason to justify the eviction, e.g. "I want to sell the property", "I want to provide my nephew with a home", or if he tries putting the rent up and you refuse "I can get more rental income by re-letting the property". (Im)practical answer 2 You could just get the parrot anyway. The landlord won't find out until his next inspection, and even then will find it difficult to evict you in the middle of a fixed term for such a minor breach of contract... but that doesn't stop him evicting you at the earliest possible "no reason" eviction date. This would again be either the end of the fixed term or 2 months if you're on a periodic tenancy. And you wouldn't be able to fight this as a "retaliatory eviction", as there will be no registered disagreement between you. Practical answer Your legal rights and your practical options aren't the same thing, unfortunately. Your best option is probably to give up on the idea of getting a parrot.	As user6726 said, a contract to sign away statutory tenant rights is virtually never going to be enforceable. Tenancy is a situation that basically always involves contracts; the whole point of statutory rights is to limit the scope of these contracts. Waiving tenancy rights would be sort of like waiving minimum wage. "Consideration" doesn't change anything, because it's assumed when you're talking about contracts. A contract without consideration is void. However, while your example of consideration isn't really what "consideration" means, it is a possible exception to tenancy rights. Certain situations are generally excluded from statutory tenancy rights; for instance, being in the hospital for two months doesn't make you a tenant. RCW 59.18.050 (to go with user6726's Washington theme) also excludes Occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupy is conditioned upon employment in or about the premises. In other words: You can provide your employee with housing that they only keep as long as they work for you, and in that case they're not a tenant. A live-in housekeeper is a perfect example of this.	You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company.	Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble?	You can read about your rights as a California tenant at http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/catenant.pdf This is rather ridiculous: 1) No judge will evict someone for paying rent by mail. (I assume you have the new landlord's address.) 2) If the landlord cashes the check you mail then he's not going to be able to claim you didn't pay the rent. If he actually refuses to cash your mailed check then that's all to the good for you. 3) You can ignore any requirements imposed by the new landlord that aren't in the lease, just as the landlord could ignore any new requirement imposed on him by you. Even some terms in a lease can be ignored, because not all terms in a contract are legal. (This is especially the case in tenant-landlord law.) If you think there will be trouble then use certified mail.	You want a lawyer who accepts tenant-side landlord tenant cases, usually a solo practitioner or small law firm or legal clinic. Medium to large sized law firms usually don't practice that kind of law at all, or only represent landlords, as a matter of policy. The usual problem, however, is that lawyers are often too expensive relative to the amount in controversy to make sense to hire to fully represent you in a matter like this one. You might want to have a "limited engagement" such as a one time consult with a lawyer, rather than a full retention of a lawyer, over an issue like this one.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.	The possession is not adverse during the tenancy, so the clock does not run. If the tenancy contract ends or is violated for [appropriate length depending on location] with no reaction from the landlord, that is grounds for adverse possession.
Use of Microsoft Trademark in Product Name I am developing Add-Ins that extend Microsoft Office applications with additional functionality. As such, I am looking for product names to advertise these Add-Ins. Here's a very crude example of two such Add-In names/logos - one for Project and one for Outlook [LOGO] MyBrandName                 for Project® [LOGO] MyBrandName                 for Outlook® The first line is in large typeface and not using Microsoft's logos or anything like that. That said, the [for ProductName®] will be written in a small box that is roughly in the color of that product (i.e. a blue for Outlook; but not the exact same color code). I had a read through Microsoft's brand/trademark use guidelines: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/intellectualproperty/trademarks/usage/general.aspx You may not: use the trademarks in the name of your business, product, service, app, domain name, social media account, or other offering This is pretty clear. But the "App Guidelines" state: Your registered publisher name and everything about your app—name, logo, description, screenshots—must be unique and free of Microsoft trademarks unless (1) you’ve secured permission from Microsoft through a license or equivalent (though such licenses are not generally available in this context); or (2) you’re only using a Microsoft trademark (not including logos) to describe that your product is designed to work in conjunction with a Microsoft product or service and as long as your app logo and/or name (1) does not suggest/give the impression your app is actually published by, affiliated with or endorsed by Microsoft; and (2) denotes your own unique brand so as to clearly signal to users that there is no affiliation or endorsement by Microsoft. Now things are less clear. My only reason for the use of "Outlook" or "Project" as a small component of the logo's subtitle and product name is to signal to users its compatibility with said Office products. Of course, YANAL, but perhaps someone has some additional insights to share. I know that many businesses use this type of naming convention in marketing their products as being part of and extending the Office eco-system. I might add that these Add-Ins are intended to be commercial and that none of Microsoft's trademarks are used in domain names - just as a small addition below the logo as outlined above. The website, "About Dialog" and so forth, will all state that: Microsoft, Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Project and the Office logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. All other trademarks are property of their respective owners. Microsoft is not affiliated with [MyBrandName] and does not endorse this product. With the exact trademarks listed as here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/intellectualproperty/trademarks/en-us.aspx Question: is this use of Microsoft trademarks allowable? I appreciate that, unless an authoritative source can be found that pertains to Office Add-Ins specifically, it may be hard/impossible to definitively answer questions around the legality of this. If that is the case, perhaps someone can share some guidance around acceptable use and likelihood of Microsoft not taking kindly to a situation like this. With Office Add-Ins, the situation is such that they benefit the Office platform as a whole - after all, Microsoft has invested significant resources in opening-up its platform via the VSTO/Add-In API. Personally, I imagine no issues as long as such Add-Ins/products make it clear that they are not affiliated with or endorsed by Microsoft, and as long as such Add-Ins have their own brand identity that is clearly distinguished from that of Microsoft/Office (although they refer to specific Microsoft products as a means of signalling compatibility; like many Add-In developers already do). Add to that the fact that Microsoft's "App Guidelines" make this exact same point - just that these guidelines refer to "Apps" (probably Windows Universal Platform Apps) and not Office Add-Ins. Sub-question: can you imagine a worse scenario than Microsoft sending a Cease and Desist notice? In that case, I can imagine re-branding to "MYBRAND for E-Mail" as the logo/name and a textual reference to "The [MyBrand for E-Mail] Add-In for Microsoft® Outlook®.". If there is any potential of this constituting an infringement on Microsoft's trademarks, I will rather re-brand (before going live) my Add-Ins to "MyBrand for E-Mail", but would still like to use textual references to "[MyBrand for E-Mail] - the team management Add-In for Microsoft® Outlook®." (with the usual trademark disclaimer "[...] not affiliated with/endorsed by [...]" in the footer). Would this constitute an infringement?	Rather than saying "for Project®" which might fairly be interpreted to indicate an affiliation with Microsoft, you ought to say something like "intended to be compatible with Project® (not affiliated with or endorsed by Microsoft)." can you imagine a worse scenario than Microsoft sending a Cease and Desist notice? In that case, I can imagine re-branding to "MYBRAND for E-Mail" as the logo/name and a textual reference to "The [MyBrand for E-Mail] Add-In for Microsoft® Outlook®.". What is the worst case scenario? You could be sued by Microsoft for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and if you lost, forced to change your product name and to destroy all existing inventory, forced to disgorge all profits you have ever made from selling your product ever, forced to pay their attorneys' fees and costs (which won't be cheap) in addition to your own legal team, have your products seized and destroyed when imported by customs agents follow an ex parte court hearing (i.e. one you had no notice of) secretly brought by Microsoft, and forced to pay punitive damages equal to double the profits you made in addition to the profits themselves. You might not even be able to discharge the judgment against you by going bankrupt and the punitive damages would probably not be tax deductible. Microsoft has every right to do this even if you fully comply with their cease and desist letter. A criminal trademark prosecution would be unlikely in this fact pattern.	First, "I've seen some people say it is legal to do so but I want a second opinion." This is not a legal opinion. This is only in response to the question "Can you use (TM) on a product that is not Trademarked"? Second, you did not specify a jurisdiction. Since you mentioned Apple, I will assume USA. tl/dr: Yes, you can used the TM mark and no, it is not fraudulent. In the USA, there are three "trademark" symbols, (R), (TM), and (SM). (R) - (Registered) The federal registration symbol. This may be used only once the mark is actually registered in the USPTO. It my not be used while the application is pending. (TM) - (Trademark) / (SM) - (Service Mark) - According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office: If you claim rights to use a mark, you may use the "TM" (trademark) or "SM" (service mark) designation to alert the public to your claim of a "common-law" mark. No registration is necessary to use a "TM" or "SM" symbol and you may continue to use these symbols even if the USPTO refuses to register your mark. Those symbols put people on notice that you claim rights in the mark, although common law doesn't give you all the rights and benefits of federal registration.	I see no reason to doubt your conclusion; since it's not allowed by the license it's forbidden by copyright. As you figured it, you gain the right to use these tools by obtaining one of those 3 Visual Studio licenses. A Visual Studio Code license is free, so it makes business sense that it doesn't include a license for Microsoft C++ Build Tools. I.e. you can't claim it's an "obvious oversight", as there's a justifiable business reason.	Yes, that's true Common words are not trademarkable, as is a descriptive phrase, because a trademark needs to be distinctive. As the Netherland Trademark Office tells you, your mark can't fit in any of these categories: literal - Your tradename or logo must not literal describe or depict your goods or services. promotion - The trademark must amount to more than a value judgment alone. misleading They even have an FAQ about that! The trademark is descriptive - which is the most common reason. A trademark is descriptive when it describes the properties of the product or service or promotes these. For example: the words 'super fast bike' for the product category 'bicycles'. Please note: the wording here is not always in common usage. The trademark 'medi' is not listed in the dictionary as a common abbreviation for 'medical'. All the same, it is a common designation that consumers will understand right away in the discriptive sense. So, this type of trademark could also be descriptive and hence declined. Computerrepair is a literal description of what the business does, just like Biomild on a mild biological yogurt just describes it.	In the US, trademarks do not need to be registered. The owner of the mark can sue in state court for infringement of the trademark without ever registering. However, there is increased protection and specific benefits to registration. The US Patent and Trademark office (USPTP) PDF publication Basic facts About Trademarks says (on pages 10-11): In the United States, parties are not required to register their marks to obtain protectable rights. You can establish “common law” rights in a mark based solely on use of the mark in Principal Register provides a number of significant advantages over common law rights alone, including: • A legal presumption of your ownership of the mark and your exclusive right to use the mark nationwide on or in connection with the goods/services listed in the registration (whereas a state registration only provides rights within the borders of that one state, and common law rights exist only for the specific area where the mark is used); • Public notice of your claim of ownership of the mark; • Listing in the USPTO’s online databases; • The ability to record the U.S. registration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods; • The right to use the federal registration symbol “®”; • The ability to bring an action concerning the mark in federal court; and *The use of the U.S. registration as a basis to obtain registration in foreign countries. The USPTO is supported in part by fees from trademark applications, and obviously wants to promote registration. Registration involves fees, and time and expense in preparing the application. It often involves the services of a trademark lawyer. Many businesses find nit worthwhile. Whether it is a good idea for a particular business is an individual, fact-based, business decision, and I cannot advise on it.	You would want to establish trademark protection on the phrase "Ball Cube": copyright is not generally a good way to protect names or other short phrases. See, for example, Can I copyright the name of my band? from the U. S. Copyright Office, which notes that "names are not protected by copyright law." Furthermore, you're interested in preventing others from selling a similar object using a similar name, and that's precisely what trademark protection is for. The ball cube design would potentially be eligible for copyright protection, but you should be aware that this protection would not extend to elements of its design that originated in Rubik's Cube, because your design would be a derivative work.	This is fine. You can use initials, shortened names, common nicknames (Bob/Robert), omit middle names, and so forth without causing yourself any problems. Things can get more complicated if you sign by a name that is different from names that you normally use elsewhere - such as if you are called Christopher Smith and you sign as Donald Jones, having not used that name before - but there's no fundamental difference of principle. One example case is Scott v Soans [1802] 102 ER 539, where the defendant John Soans objected to the suit being made against "Jonathan otherwise John Soans". The Lord Chief Justice ruled that "Jonathan otherwise John" could be his name, and that if he'd signed a contract using that name then "what objection could be made to it?" There are several other similar cases from past centuries, some of which may no longer be reliable law since they turn on points of procedure that aren't relevant today, but the general thrust is that if you sign a contract under a certain name, then you can be sued under that name. (And you can sue other people using whatever name you like.) Mistakes in names can be corrected as part of the general process of contractual interpretation, called "rectification". This more often arises when dealing with company names, say when there are a half dozen closely linked companies with related names, and the issue is which one of them is actually meant to be named; there are some recent cases of this kind, such as Liberty Mercian Ltd v Cuddy Civil Engineering Ltd [2013] EWHC 2688 (TCC). Generally speaking, as Lord Denning said in Nittan v Solent Steel [1980] EWCA Civ J1023-4, We do not allow people to take advantage of a misnomer when everyone knows what was intended. Further, the doctrine of "estoppel by convention" means that if you sign a contract under whatever name, then act as if you were bound by the contract, you can't then wriggle out of it on the grounds that the name is not really your own. In Scots law, which includes certain doctrines imported from Roman civil law, there is a distinction between error in persona and error in nomine. The former means that you were mistaken about who your counterparty really was (such that you wouldn't have made the contract had you known the truth) and the latter means that you had the intended person but made a mistake about their name. The law of error in Scotland is not quite the same as in England and Wales, but in this case it gets to the same basic result: if you agreed on who was to be bound, that's what matters, regardless of the names used.	You can, and many authors and other creators of fiction do, use the names of real newspapers, real brands and products, and real people without obtaining permission from anyone. As long as those names are not being used to market or identify goods or services, the use cannot be trademark infringement. There idea that you cannot "defame the brans" is in fact much narrower than many people think, and than it used to be. Particularly in the united-states free speech rights often supersede protections against so-called trademark "defamation". In the US all of the examples in the answer by Jack Edwards would be clearly legal, an they probably would be in many other countries as well, if they appeared in a work that was clearly fictional. If a work mof fiction uses the name of a real person, and other identifying details that make it clear just which real person is being mentioned, and if statements that seem to be statements of fact, not opinion are made about that person, and if those statements are false and negative, and if a hypothetical reasonable person would believe that those statements are about the real person, not a fictional person, thereby harming that person's reputation, then if all that is true, the person might have a valid claim of defamation.
Is it likely to win back child support from biological father of a child whose conception was result of extramarital affair? Situation: A wife of a married couple had extramarital affair As a result, she conceived a child by the male she had affair with The fact that the biological father isn't the husband isn't known to either of 3 parties. Several years later (10, 15) the husband discovers the fact (and the fact is 100% provable due to DNA test performed for unrelated reason) that he is not the biological parent of the child He knows who the biological father is There is evidence that the affair occurred in the applicable timeframe (either electronic trail, or and the wife is willing to testify to the fact up to and including taking lie detector test). What are the chances of winning child support (back support, or ongoing), from the biological father, in such a situation? What factors would mainly influence this? If the answer depends on specific jurisdiction, it's New York City, NY, USA. The biological father has enough income to be able to afford child support.	The husband of the mother of a child is presumed to be that child's parent until that presumption is disestablished. In New York State, when a child is born to a married mother, a court may decline to consider DNA evidence when it is not in the best interests of the child to do so. In substance (although not exactly from a legal perspective), a failure to promptly contest the paternity of a child of a married mother gives rise to a de facto adoption. Article 5 of the New York Family Court Act in its definitions section, § 512, makes clear that it applies only to children born out of wedlock (and it too has an equitable paternity term at § 532). So, the statutory deadline in Article 5 allowing a child with no legally determined father to have a determination made at any time before the child turns age twenty-one does not apply to this case. Instead, this case is governed by New York Family Court Act, Article 4. New York Family Court Act § 418(a), which governs paternity cases where a child is born during a marriage provides that: (a) The court, on its own motion or motion of any party, when paternity is contested, shall order the mother, the child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA marker tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test shall be received in evidence, pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto. Any order pursuant to this section shall state in plain language that the results of such test shall be admitted into evidence, pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules absent timely objections thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and, if unrebutted, shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article five of this act. If DNA evidence is considered, the biological father will be determined to be the father, but if it is not considered, the husband will continue to be the legal father. A leading case exploring when the best interests of the child test prevails over DNA evidence from New York is In the Matter of Shondel J., v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. July 6, 2006). In a key passage, it states: Equitable estoppel is gender neutral. In Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH. (63 2 859 [1984], affg 95 AD2d 466 [3d Dept 1983]), we affirmed an order of the Appellate Division dismissing a paternity petition in which a mother sought to compel her husband to submit to a blood test as a means of challenging his paternity. We agreed with the Appellate Division that the mother should be estopped. As that court pointed out, the mother expressed no question about her child's paternity until some two and a half years after the child's birth. She had held the child out as her husband's, accepted his support for the child while she and her husband lived together and after they separated, and permitted her husband and child to form strong ties together. Estoppel may also preclude a man who claims to be a child's biological father from asserting his paternity when he acquiesced in the establishment of a strong parent-child bond between the child and another man. The rationale is that the child would be harmed by a determination that someone else is the biological father. For example, in Purificati v Paricos (154 AD2d 360 [2d Dept 1989]), a boy's biological father who did not seek to establish his paternity until more than three years after the child's birth, and who acquiesced as a relationship flourished between the boy and his mother's former husband, was estopped from claiming paternity. The courts "impose equitable estoppel to protect the status interests of a child in an already recognized and operative parent-child relationship" ( In re Baby Boy C., , 84 NY2d 91, 102 n [1994]). Finally, the Appellate Division has repeatedly concluded that a man who has held himself out to be the father of a child, so that a parent-child relationship developed between the two, may be estopped from denying paternity.2 Where a child justifiably relies on the representations of a man that he is her father with the result that she will be harmed by the man's denial of paternity, the man may be estopped from asserting that denial.3 . . . Given the statute recognizing paternity by estoppel, a man who harbors doubts about his biological paternity of a child has a choice to make. He may either put the doubts aside and initiate a parental relationship with the child, or insist on a scientific test of paternity before initiating a parental relationship. A possible result of the first option is paternity by estoppel; the other course creates the risk of damage to the relationship with the woman. It is not an easy choice, but at times, the law intersects with the province of personal relationships and some strain is inevitable. This should not be allowed to distract the Family Court from its principal purpose in paternity and support proceedings -- to serve the best interests of the child. This continues to be good law. See, e.g. In the Matter of Thomas T. v. Luba R., 148 A.D.3d 912 (March 15, 2017) (paternity by estoppel established when child at age four did not know biological father's name and had established a strong father-child-like bond with mother's currently partner citing Shondel). Under the circumstances, if any of the three parties: the mother, the husband, or the biological father, sought to prevent consideration of DNA evidence after ten to fifteen years of marriage during which paternity was not denied, it is very likely that the Court would agree and not change the legal paternity of the child. In this case, the biological father would not gain legal visitation rights and would not owe child support, and neither the husband nor the mother would lose their presumed parent status, nor would they be entitled to child support. If the husband, mother and biological father mutually agreed otherwise, the paternity by estoppel argument might be overcome and any issue of support would be governed by the mutual agreement (although a guardian ad litem for the child might be appointed sua sponte by the Court and have standing to object to the agreement on behalf of the child notwithstanding the mutual agreement of the other three parties). This would terminate husband's status as a parent and entitle biological father to visitation. But, otherwise paternity by estoppel would prevail. Incidentally, this statute and case law position is constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a man who conceives a child with a married woman does not have a due process right in establishing his paternity of the child, so any right that the biological father may have arises from statute and the common law, rather than from the U.S. Constitution. Michael H. v. Gerald D. (U.S. 1989).	If the purported husband (PH) has not attempted to enter the UK under false pretenses, and has not submitted documents containing false statements to the UK government, it is hard to see how he might be charged with a crime by the UK in connection with the invalid marriage. But since the PH is now said to have submitted an application for entry clearance based on the bigamous marriage, a marriage that it appears that he knew or should have known was invalid, he has submitted an official document based on a false statement. That is presumably an offense under UK law, and may well affect the PH's future immigration treatment. If the deceived wife has not knowingly made false statements to the UK government, it is hard to see how she would be charged in the UK. She would be wise to promptly inform the UK government that the marriage was invalid, to withdraw any statements or applications based on its validity, and to take legal steps to correct the record so that the marriage does not show as valid. This might be by annulment or some other procedure, probably depending on the law in the Bahamas where the purported marriage took place. (Under chapter 125, section 21(b) a prior marriage is valid grounds for an annulment or decree of nullity.) She might also want to notify the US authorities. The purported husband might have been guilty of bigamy in the Bahamas, depending on just how their law is written. Whether the authorities there will seek to extradite and prosecute him one cannot say.	A divorce settlement must be approved by the court. A Judge might well refuse to approve a settlement with such a provision in it, although I do not know of any law specifically barring such a term. But once the settlement is final, one party could certainly offer a separate contract to the other, under which one party would agree to remain outside the state (or metropolitan region, or county, or wherever) in return for an agreed recurring payment. There would be no compulsion to accept such a contract, but if the payment offered was large enough, it might be accepted voluntarily. However, if there was a child involved, and such a move would significantly hinder that child's contact with both parents, and this were not in the child's best interest, such a contract might be attacked as against public policy.	Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety.	If we restrict ourselves to legal options, he can hire a lawyer, which is what he should have done rather than "ordering a DNA test". As a general rule, the minute you get served with a lawsuit, you should hire an attorney, especially if you are a billionaire. He should not volunteer to get in this position by volunteering for the test. But given that he did let it get this far, and now it is a legal fact that he is the father of the child, his newly-hired attorney would try to put the best face on this mess that he can. It's not a foregone conclusion that a child would be entitled to $20M. Also, is that per month? The amount that the court would order depends on the particular state's law. I assume this is in Washington state since you didn't say otherwise (subsequent change of venue notwithstanding). The calculation is based on a maximum joint income of $12,000 per month. The mother cannot just quit her day job: the courts can impute income to her. I assume that she makes $3,000 per month, which is a low-ball figure. His obligation would be about $1180 / month, which works out to be about a quarter million total over the life of the support order. The courts do not have the authority to award $20M, nor do they have the authority to order a lump sum. They can award $1180, and this can be increased or decreased depending on circumstances. The attorney would also argue that he is legally not the father, because under the law, this is "assisted reproduction" since it does not the result of sexual intercourse, and mere sperm donors are not legally deemed top be parents. Incidentally, the benefit of "marrying rich" are distinct from the benefits of a rich baby-daddy. Child support is for the support of the child, not the benefit of the mother. The attorney could therefore persuade Mary to accept a lesser amount, no questions asked, to dispose of the problem. The net financial benefit of this dumbass scheme is probably substantially negative for her. A third option is to hire detectives to prove that this was a fraudulent action, which would lead to her imprisonment.	The relevant law in England and Wales is the Protection of Children Act 1978. Under section 1 of the Act, it’s a defense to distributing, showing, or possessing indecent images of children if you had a “legitimate reason” to distribute, show, or possess them. It’s also a defense if you had not seen the images, didn’t know they were indecent, and didn’t have any cause to suspect they were indecent. However, the 1999 case of R v. Bowden held that downloading a digital copy of an image counts as “making” an image. This is not subject to the “legitimate reason” defense by statute (although I don’t know if it’d count as “making” if you have no reason to know the contents, like if a computer repair shop backs up a customer’s hard drive without looking at what’s on the drive). However, it is explicitly still subject to defenses in sections 1A and 1B of the Act. 1A covers spouses and partners. If you are the spouse or partner of a child between 16 and 18, then with their consent you can legally make indecent images of them (although this doesn’t apply if anyone but the two of you is in the image). You can also possess those images with their consent and give them a copy. Section 1B covers criminal proceedings, investigations, etc., and was added after R v. Bowden. Because copying a digital image counts as “making” an image, it would generally be illegal for people to work with digital copies of indecent images even if done for a good reason. To avoid that, Parliament made an exception for making an indecent image when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate crimes, as well as for criminal proceedings anywhere in the world. Parliament also exempted the UK’s intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) when carrying out their duties. These are specific statutory exemptions, so they can’t really be generalized to “if you have a legitimate reason.”	For clarity, in a divorce case in New York State involving children, the judge typically decides: (1) child custody, (2) child support, (3) alimony, (4) division of the couple's property, and (5) allocation of attorney's fees and costs associated with the case. The judge also terminates the marriage if the jurisdictional requirements for doing so are met. In New York State, there is both no fault divorce and fault based divorce, and in a fault based divorce, the judge decides if fault was present. Divorces are handled by the New York State Supreme Court (not, as one might suspect, by the New York State Family Court), which is a trial court of general jurisdiction in New York State. In a fault based divorce, marital fault is considered with regard to issues of property division and alimony, but not with regard to child custody or child support. If you are married and your wife has a child during the marriage, in New York State, you are presumed to be the father of the child. You can bring a lawsuit to prove that you are not the father of the child, but the deadline for doing so is fairly short after the child is born. After five years this statute of limitations would probably have run. But, it sounds like the infidelity is not alleged to have caused the wife to become pregnant, so that isn't really an issue. The extreme levels you would have gone to in order to spite your spouse and your hostility towards her, make it unlikely that the court would award you full custody or joint custody, although it would be required to award you some parenting time so long as you were legally presumed to be the father. If you are legally considered to be a parent of the child, custody will be allocated in the best interests of the child, and child support will be awarded based primarily on your income, your ex-wife's income, and the number of nights that the child spends with each parent. In all likelihood, you would be awarded little parenting time given your conduct and statements, and full custody would be awarded to the wife who would get child support from you based upon your income. (Assets are rarely considered in child support awards.) If you sign assets over to your brother, the court will probably treat you as if you still owned those assets for purposes of property division upon the divorce. If your assets exceed those of your spouse, the court will probably award all remaining assets to your spouse and require you to pay a property equalization payment to your spouse to make up for your inability to pay a full amount to your pre-transfer share of assets to your spouse. If the transfer to your brother took place after the divorce was commenced, the court would probably also hold you in contempt of court and put you in jail. Your transparent efforts to divest yourself of assets, and your unsubstantiated claim of infidelity would not in any way reduce you alimony obligation to your spouse, if under the facts and circumstances, such as the length of the marriage and the relative economic means of the parties, the court finds that an alimony award is appropriate. Unsubstantiated claims of infidelity will only make the court treat you more harshly. Most New York State divorces are no fault divorces in which infidelity is irrelevant, but New York State does have residual fault based divorces which could count against your ex-wife in a variety of ways (although not with respect to child custody or child support). But this is only if you can prove the infidelity in court. In reference to the linked case in Spain, it is worth noting that a New York State divorce judge has much more power and discretion than a Spanish divorce judge. The New York State divorce judge is allowed to equitably divide the couple's property rather than merely adhering to formulaic community property rules, and the New York State divorce judge has contempt of court power which the Spanish divorce judge lacks.	According to http://info.legalzoom.com/divorce-am-responsible-kids-not-mine-20971.html Your stepchildren -- the biological kids, adopted children and stepchildren that your spouse acquired in another marriage or relationship before marrying you -- are usually not legally entitled to support from you after you divorce your spouse. However, if you signed a contract with your spouse agreeing to provide child support for a stepchild after a divorce, a court will likely compel you to honor the contract.
Can an alternative medicine practitioner be held legally responsible for a patient's death? First a little background, this issue doesn't affect me personally (I'm not a practitioner of alternative medicine or being treated by one). I read a slate article about a woman who was forgoing conventional medical treatment for breast cancer (which was treatable) In favour of some kind of vegetable based diet and imagining tying ribbons around various internal organs. It seems obvious to a reasonable person that continuing down this treatment path will inevitably lead to the patient's death. My question is this, once the patient dies, what is the criminal liability of the alternative medicine practitioner for treating the patient with a treatment that a reasonable person could clearly see would be ineffective?	Practicing medicine without a license or beyond the scope of your license (e.g. engaging in medical activities that your license does not authorize you to engage in, even though you have license to engage in some medical activities) is a criminal offense (e.g. Unlawful Conduct Of Practicing Medicine Without a License, Utah Code Ann. §58-1-501(1)(a) and 58-67-501) in most jurisdictions and is not protected by the privileges afforded to people practicing medically within the scope of their license (e.g. an exemption from laws criminalizing contact with intimate parts when done for medical purposes). Of course, fraudulently claiming to have licensure is also a crime over and above practicing without a license. Administering non-FDA approved medicines to cancer patients, for example, is a federal crime, even if this is done with full disclosure and good intentions. The approval process is described here by the Food and Drug Administration under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. (Similarly, a conviction was obtained in another case for distributing a hormonal weight-loss treatment without a license.) For example, in 2006, a naturopath in Wheat Ridge, Colorado was convicted of "theft, perjury, criminally negligent homicide, illegal practice of medicine and third-degree assault" for providing alternative holistic treatment to someone resulting in their death. Criminal negligence generally involves conduct sometimes also called "gross negligence" that is not just careless but is almost reckless given the serious potential harm that could foreseeable result (and in all cases that are prosecuted, actually did result) from the course of conduct taken. For example, while ordinary medical mistakes by a medical doctor such as confusing two drugs with similar names or putting the decimal point in a prescription dosage, causing harm to a patient, would not ordinarily result in criminal liability, coming into an operating room while too drunk to drive and without reviewing which limb of a patient needs to be amputated despite a clear indication in marker on the leg of a patient showing that fact, might constitute criminal negligence on the part of a medical doctor. Here, if the need for and possible benefits of conventional treatment for breast cancer with particularly clear, prescribing alternative diet based treatment and mental exercises while discouraging conventional medical treatment, might very well constitute criminal negligence on the part of the holistic practitioner. Similarly, a naturopath was criminally charged in Australia with "reckless grievous bodily harm and failure to provide for a child causing danger of death" for urging parents to discontinue medical treatments for a child in favor of a raw food diet, causing serious harm to that child almost causing the child's death. The naturopath admitted that she endangered the child with her medical advice and was ultimately convicted in that case. Liability would be fact specific. Does the person have a license of some kind? Are they within the scope of their license? Do they falsely convey the impression that they are licensed medical practitioners? Did their actions constitute the practice of medicine? But, often, in the fact pattern you describe, particularly if it is not "faith healing" protected by the freedom of religion, this would be a crime. Of course, this doesn't mean that a self-help remedy of murdering the holistic practitioner after the fact is legal. Civil liability for professional negligence and failing to meet the applicable standard of care for a person engaging in the kind of treatment conduct described is also possible. In other words, one can sue a naturopath of money damages for malpractice, just as one could sue a doctor for malpractice. As noted here: Alternative medicine providers can, of course, be guilty of malpractice if they perform their interventions below the commonly accepted standards of their own communities. They may also have liabilities for injuries caused by discouraging patients from seeking conventional care and, in some jurisdictions, for not recognizing when a patient’s condition is beyond the scope of their form of treatment and subsequently referring the patient for treatment by a medical doctor. The fact scenario in the Slate article would appear to implicate grounds for civil as well as potentially criminal liability.	Good Samaritan laws are not applicable to the facts Good Samaritan laws give a person civil immunity if they render aid in good faith and that aid turns out to do harm. For example, in a person incorrectly performs CPR in a genuine effort to save a life, Good Samaritan laws prevent them for being sued if the cause damage or fail to save the life. The legal paradigm in your facts is self-defence The doctrine of self-defence extends to the protection of others and allows the use of reasonable force to do so. If a jury considers that the choke hold was a reasonable response to the situation and the maintenance of it to the point of death was also reasonable then the defendant will be not guilty. There would be a lot of evidence around this and it’s difficult to see how this would go. However, for a more straightforward situation, if the defendant verbally challenged the attacker, the attacker persisted in the attack, the defendant struck the attacker, the attacker fell and cracked their skull and died, this is likely to be self-defence. Self-defence does not prevent prosecution. It is a defence that can be raised. Of course, if it seems likely that self-defence will succeed, that may be enough to dissuade the police/prosecutor from proceeding anyway.	Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit.	germany You have the duty to help others even if they cannot articulate that. There was a case recently where people stepped over an unconscious person to get money from an ATM, thinking it was a homeless person sleeping inside the rather warm entrance to the public bank building. Turned out it was a normal elderly customer who had a medical emergency. Three customers walked around them and did not get help. Only the fourth customer called an ambulance about 20 minutes later. The person died in hospital, doctors said the delay in treatment did not cause the death, the person would have died even if help had been available earlier. Police used the banks security cameras to prosecute all who had just ignored the person and "thought it was okay, they were just sleeping". Newspaper Article: For example Der Spiegel. The actual text of the verdict: AG Essen-Borbeck, 18.09.2017 - 3 Ds - 70 Js 654/16 - 252/17, 3 Ds 252/17 In this case it was monetary fines, but if the person had actively asked for an ambulance, like in your case, and were actively denied instead of ignored, I'm pretty sure that would have made it way worse for the defendants.	There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal.	In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	You cannot call yourself anything that is deceptive or misleading. Given that "Spiritual Councillor Practitioner" doesn't mean anything you should be OK. However, be aware that if you give advice in a professional capacity and people act on that advice to their detriment then they can sue you. That said, taking money from people for the provision of a service for which you do not have any particular qualifications may be unethical and could get you in some kind of hot water.
What are the circuits of law? I hear all the time that something is in the 5th circuit or the 1st circuit of [INSERT STATE HERE]. What exactly are the different circuits? How is law applicable based on the circuit?	A "circuit court" is a kind of court in a judicial system. It generally covers a large-ish area; the name comes from the fact that back in the days of horseback travel, judges would literally ride around a circuit to hold court. The exact meaning depends on the court system. At the federal level, the circuit courts are the main federal appeals courts. Each one covers multiple states (except the DC Circuit which just covers DC and the Federal Circuit which has subject-based jurisdiction). A circuit court normally hears cases before a 3-judge panel; that panel's decision is normally binding precedent in federal courts throughout the circuit, including on future panels of the same circuit. Panel decisions can be overturned by SCOTUS or by the circuit court sitting en banc (i.e. all the judges hear the case, not just 3 of them). Outside the circuit, a circuit court's decision is only persuasive precedent. At the state level, what circuit courts do depends on the state. In many states that have them, they're the most important trial courts, handling large civil cases and felony criminal cases. Some states have lower-tier courts to handle minor issues, in which case they might allow an appeal from the lower courts to the circuit court. This appeal might be like a normal appeal (where the higher court looks at the record from the lower court and only considers whether the lower court got the law wrong), or might be a trial de novo (where the higher court throws out the lower court's decision entirely and tries the case itself from scratch). It really depends on the state. If a state's circuit courts are trial courts, they generally don't set much of a precedent.	Both civil law and common law have civil codes, so that isn't the difference. It is common in civil law jurisdictions for these to be called civil codes and consolidated into the great big book of law. In common law jurisdictions, the civil code is scattered through legislation, regulation, administrative and case law and often not consolidated although, each piece of legislation typically deals with only one (or a related number) of topics. Adversarial vs Inquisitorial In a common law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to decide the dispute that the parties have brought to the court based solely on the arguments and evidence that they make. A judge who seeks their own evidence or decides the case based on a law the parties have not argued is making a mistake. The judge is free to say to the parties "But what about xyz law?" and let them make an argument about that but they would be denying the parties natural justice if they decided the case on xyz law if that law was not argued. In civil law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to find out the truth. They have inquisitorial power and decide the case based on all the evidence, the law that was argued and their own knowledge of the law. Precedence In common law jurisdictions, the cases decided by the courts are just as much the law of the land as the acts passed by parliament. When a court hands down a decision on a certain fact pattern, then all courts lower in the hierarchy must make the same decision when presented by a similar fact pattern. These are binding precedents. In addition, decisions of same level or lower courts (where not actually the ones being appealed) as well as decisions in "parallel" jurisdictions are persuasive precedents. A parallel jurisdiction is anything where the law is close enough that it makes sense to use it: Australian courts will tend to look first to other Australian states, then to England & Wales, Canada, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries then the United States of America and then to civil law jurisdictions. There is nothing nativist in this, it is just that these are the jurisdictions where the laws are "closest" to one another: partly because the courts have historically done this (which tends to lock the common law together), partly because there has been governmental will in creating harmonized laws in Australia (i.e. enacted in each state and territory but essentially the same law - often word for word) and partly because parliaments, when drafting legislation, nick ideas from other parliaments. If the Supreme Court of Western Australia has made a decision on a similar fact pattern under a similar law, a District Court judge in New South Wales had better have some damn good reasons for deciding this case differently but they wouldn't automatically be wrong if they did. However, if the precedent had been set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales than the District Court judge would be wrong to decide differently. Naturally, a lot of argument in common law courts is about why the facts of this case are sufficiently similar/distinct that the precedent should/shouldn't apply. Also, common law judgments emphasize the reasoning that led the judge from the evidence to the conclusion and include detailed analysis of the case each party presented - this is because they need to be understandable to a wide audience. Court hierarchy can be quite complex, this is the one for NSW, Australia: In a civil law jurisdiction, courts are not bound by the rules of precedence - each judgement is a first principles analysis of the facts and the law. This is not to say that civil law judges do not use other judgments in their analysis but they are not required to do so. Broadly speaking, the common law approach promotes consistency, the civil law approach promotes individualized justice.	Under United States copyright law, according to the Copyright Office, 206.01 Edicts of government. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. Referencing laws is even clearer: copyright doesn't protect referring to something like "Section 830 of the Penal Code of the State of California." Note that this is assuming that they remain within the US, where copyright law is a federal issue. Other countries don't all have the edict of government rule. If a place were to legally secede and become their own country, they would cease to be bound by US copyright law. They would get to decide if it was legal for them to do it or not; this is just like how it works between the UK and US (the UK claims copyright on its laws, but US courts will not enforce that copyright because it's incompatible with US law). Treaties complicate things, but the Berne Convention allows the edict of government exception. That said, seceding from the US unilaterally is both legally and practically impossible; seceding from a state is likewise generally going to be legally and practically impossible without permission from the state. So, it all depends on the agreements made. EDIT: To specifically address the model codes issue, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) was a case specifically about what happens when model codes are adopted wholesale into law. The Fifth Circuit (after initially finding that the model codes were protected) reversed en banc, finding that a model code produced for the purpose of being incorporated into law, and which has been incorporated into law, and which is then reproduced as the law of the place that incorporated it into law, is not subject to copyright. Veeck may not apply to cases where the law merely references the model code, or where the thing in question was not made to be incorporated into law (e.g. state laws referencing the Red Book valuation of a car didn't make the Red Book public domain). If both of those are true, it probably doesn't apply; if one holds but not the other, it's unclear. However, if the actual municipal code directly contains the text of the model code, and you reprint it as the law of that municipality (rather than as the model code), there is no copyright in the law.	"Precedent" refers to a finding of what the law is. A jury only finds facts, and operates (supposedly) within the meaning of the law as already established. All the jury reports is "yes" and "no" to questions of fact (with some reference to existing law): they do not report, at least in any official way "we interpret the law as saying X". So it would be impossible for a jury to "set precedent" in the case law sense. In a notorious case, they might "set precedent" in inspiring other jurors to act similarly, but this is not enforceable precedent in the way that case law precedent is. In the US, if the jury acquits the defendant, that is the end of the matter and there is no re-trial. As for the UK, I am not sure but I think that the prosecution being unhappy with the jury's decision does not create an exception to the double jeopardy rule.	It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.	The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact.	An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.	All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.
What is the legal term for the plea where the defendant admits the action but denies wrongdoing? My understanding is that: A "guilty" plea means the defendant admits that they have performed the action(s) in question and admits wrongdoing (hence "guilty"); while A "not guilty" plea means the defendant not only denies wrongdoing, but denies having performed the action(s) in question. What would be the name of a plea where the defendant admits to having performed the action(s) in question, but denies any wrongdoing? I thought this was nolo contendere, but turns out that means something completely different.	A plea consenting to entry of a criminal judgment, in general, without admitting that one is actually guilty of the crime, is called a no contest plea or a nolo contendere plea. Among lawyers it is often called an Alford plea, although in West Virginia it is called a Kennedy plea (in both cases named after court cases related to that kind of plea). A plea where a defendant admits to having performed the actions in question but denies any wrong doing is a sub-set of this type of plea. When a no contest plea is made reserving the right to appeal whether a crime has been committed if the admitted facts are true, this subtype of no contest plea is sometimes called a conditional plea. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the no contest plea in a conditional plea is withdrawn. See also here.	There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.	Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it.	The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her.	An appeal may be made by a plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or other interested party, so the term 'defendant' is not very useful; the party opposed to the Appellant (and served with the appeal) is usually called the Respondent. A contested appeal just means that the Respondent wishes to be represented at the appeal, presumably to fight it; most appeals are contested, but not all. Unlike a first-order case which may go by default, an uncontested appeal will still have to have some sort of a hearing; you are, after all, saying that a court decision should be set aside, and the Respondent's views are not necessarily relevant. It is, though, fair to say that an uncontested appeal will have a greater chance of success.	A prosecutor cannot make a change to a plea agreement after it is signed. That's why it has to be signed. If there is an error in it then it needs to be re-written and re-signed. No, your friend cannot get their conviction vacated over this. They can have it reversed and put back into pre-trial for a new determination (plea, trial, etc.). They need to speak to an attorney to understand if this is worthwhile or not. There really are very very few instances where a mistake in the legal system means you can get away with a crime.	england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.	This is, in effect a defense of mistaken identity, and an assertion that the person on trial is not in fact the person who committed the crime. It is not legally significantly different from a case where the defendant claims that a witness has identified the wrong person. Exactly how the defense would be conducted would depend on what evidence establishes that "Herschel Greenbaum" committed the crime, and what evidence establishes (or disproves) that the defendant on trial is that same Herschel Greenbaum. The purpose of a trial is to establish or fail to establish the guilt of the person actually on trial, normally the person present in the courtroom. (trials do not establish innocence in the US). "The defendant" is the person actually on trial, even if an incorrect name has been used in bringing the charge. In such a case people would need to be careful about evidence that applies to a person named "Herschel Greenbaum" but might not apply to the defendant actually on trial.
When is renunciation of citizenship effective from? Say a person is a dual UK/Australian citizen, and they decide to renounce their UK citizenship. They submit the required paperwork to perform an effective renunciation. What date will their renunciation be effective from (i.e, what is the earliest date from which they are no longer considered a UK citizen under UK law)? Is it: The date on which they sign their renunciation paperwork? The date their paperwork is posted? The date their paperwork is confirmed as being received? The date on which their renunciation is formally confirmed? ...or something else entirely?	According to https://www.gov.uk/renounce-british-nationality/after-youve-applied: After you've applied You’ll get a ‘declaration of renunciation’ if your application is successful. This will be your application form, officially signed and stamped. The date your citizenship or status stops will be shown on the form.	I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).	The UK remains an EU member state until 31st October 2019. Unless a further extension is requested and granted. (One is obligated to be requested if an agreement is not reached by the 19th Oct) At the time of writing, there have been no changes to identity document requirements for EEA (includes EU) or Swiss citizens visiting the UK - they can enter the UK with a valid passport or a national identity card issued by such a state. We don't know today whether that will change after March 2019.	Losing your passport is fine, happens all the time But that’s not what you are talking about, is it? You’re intending to deliberately destroy it. While destroying a passport is not a specific offence under the Act or the Rules, your proposed course of action is still illegal. The passport doesn’t belong to you. It belongs to India and deliberately destroying other people’s stuff is illegal. To get a new passport you would necessarily be lying and giving false information on a passport application is an offence. Of course, one wonders why your family are looking at your passport; just don’t show it to them.	Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them.	This should probably be handled under TUPE — The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 as amended by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. Those regulations apply to "a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity" Broadly, there must be some consultation but you cannot be forced to change the terms of your contract to your material detriment (for example, the date of the month you are paid might change, but your work and salary would not). This consultation should establish that there is no material detriment (carry on reading here). Regulation 13 provides (2) Long enough before a relevant transfer to enable the employer of any affected employees to consult the appropriate representatives of any affected employees, the employer shall inform those representatives of— (a) the fact that the transfer is to take place, the date or proposed date of the transfer and the reasons for it; (b) the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for any affected employees; (c) the measures which he envisages he will, in connection with the transfer, take in relation to any affected employees or, if he envisages that no measures will be so taken, that fact; and (d) if the employer is the transferor, the measures, in connection with the transfer, which he envisages the transferee will take in relation to any affected employees who will become employees of the transferee after the transfer by virtue of regulation 4 or, if he envisages that no measures will be so taken, that fact. (6) An employer of an affected employee who envisages that he will take measures in relation to an affected employee, in connection with the relevant transfer, shall consult the appropriate representatives of that employee with a view to seeking their agreement to the intended measures. If you refuse to accept the transfer you are deemed to have resigned (Regulation 4(8)), unless the "transfer involves or would involve a substantial change in working conditions to [your] material detriment", where you can be deemed to have been dismissed (Regulation 4(9)), and potentially unfairly dismissed. That would be for an Employment Tribunal to decide. But you cannot exit the successor company except in accord with your contract, including any notice period. The 2014 amended Regulations deal principally with the issue of redundancy after transfer, which is specifically allowed for "economic, technical or organisational reasons", such as the new company deciding to rationalise operations in a location 300 miles away from your normal base. In those circumstances you can be made redundant if you don't move with your job or accept redeployment. [This is what happened to me.] Note that every TUPE transfer is unique, and while yours will be subject to the Regulations, the wrinkles in your particular case (a) aren't present in your question and (b) will best be answered by a specialist employment lawyer, particularly as to whether any necessary changes to your contract are to your "material detriment".	"Intention to relinquish" means you actually meant to stop being a US citizen. In practice, the US assumes that normal people doing normal things don't want that. As described on the page you linked, there's an "administrative presumption" that you don't mean to give up US citizenship when you: become a citizen of another country, declare your allegiance to another country, join the military of a country that isn't at war with the US, or take a non-policy-level job with a foreign government. That means the State Department will assume you wanted to keep your citizenship unless you "affirmatively, explicitly, and unequivocally" say that you did not. In practice, if the issue comes up then the State Department will just ask you what your intention was and take you at your word. Unless you actually go to a US embassy or consulate and fill out a form saying "I do not want to be a US citizen any more," you don't really have to worry about it.	Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.
Are the limitations on freedom of contract in common law countries unbreakable? We normally have to adhere to regulations when: Buying labour (employment: minimum wage, parental leave etc.) Renting out property (tenancy: notice periods, property standards etc.) Selling goods (consumer guarantees) Offering online services (personal/data privacy) Etc. etc. We know that at least in some cases it is possible to break free from those restrictions. For example, instead of employing people we can do business with them i.e. have contract for services (as opposed to contract of service). We can put any bizarre privacy-related provisions in the EULA of our apps and websites (although I heard the EU regulations can override them). Perhaps we can try selling goods/services on the express condition that consumer guarantees do not apply. So, in modern common-law countries (say the Five-Eyes UK, US, CA, AU, NZ), how impossible is it to contract out of any regulation? To what extent is it common for the law to limit the freedom of contract and dictate what terms you can/cannot contract on? How challengeable/constitutional those limitations are? In most cases, is it just a matter of writing a good/smart contract to break free from the limitations, or is the freedom of contract just limited full stop?	You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts.	which of these conditions are enforceable (as in I could collect damages from a person for using the wrong plan)? The validity of the contract does not depend on the outlined conditions being that weird. These weird conditions are merely a way of saying that [almost] everyone is required to pay $10/month for using the website. What determines the validity of the contract is the issue of whether users knew or [reasonably] should have known the ToS. If the website does not contain functionality toward reasonably ensuring that users become aware of the ToS prior to using the website, it will be unlikely or impossible for the website owner to establish that a contract was formed. In terms of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 17-20, users' reasonable misunderstanding would preclude a finding of mutual assent on which contracts are premised.	Contracts are transferrable The default rule is that the rights and obligations that one person holds under a contract (your original bank) can be transferred to any other person (your new bank). This is only not the case where the contract is one for personal services (e.g. an employment contract) or where the contract explicitly proscribes or otherwise limits it. For example, if I run a dog walking business and you contract with me to walk your dog on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for 6 months then, at any time, I can transfer my obligation to walk the dog and my right to be paid by you for doing so to anyone else. I can do this by subcontracting (in which case the rights and obligations are still mine - I'm just using someone else to fulfil them), or by selling individual contracts (which is how debt collection businesses operate), or by selling the entire business. It would be completely normal that the contracts you agreed to when you opened your accounts would allow the bank to sell them. Check the terms and conditions.	There is nothing extraterritorial about these laws. If a company sells a good or provides a service to individuals based in the EU, then this good or service has to comply with EU laws. This concept is self-evident for physical goods that are produced anywhere in the world and then sold in the EU and the GDPR just applies this concept to services provided over the internet. The same legal concept also holds in all other major jurisdictions. The only thing that makes this more complicated for the GDPR is the actual enforcability of these laws but that is a technical issue not a legal one.	You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.	Not for normal correspondence There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement. How, or if, a company communicates with its customers about complaints will either be specified in the contract or up to the company to determine and advertise. For example, this site specifies “ will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered or sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by facsimile or e-mail; or the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service” - any other method of delivery (Whatsapp, Facebook, even their own chatrooms etc.) is not a valid method of service, if you use those methods, then legally, you have not communicated. So, if the company requires complaints to deal with by online chat, they can safely ignore any letter or email you might send them.	You can have agreements that are not contracts As such, there are not legally enforceable as contracts but may be enforceable under non-contract law. Examples of such non-contractual agreements include social agreements, statutory duties, memorandums of understanding, agreements to distribute cocaine etc. However, that’s not what you have here “No contract” agreements for things like internet or phone services are contracts - the “no contract” terminology is advertising fluff to indicate that the contracts are one-off or short term and don’t lock the customer into a long-term contract. The term “contract” is being used in a generally understood way as meaning a long-term binding commitment not in a strict legal way where virtually every commercial transaction is a contract	The EULA is in most jurisdictions a legally binding contract; there is plenty of case law that supports this. You can only be liable under a contract for breaching its terms and only to the extent that the other party suffers harm from that breach. Clearly, if you haven't read the terms then you are greatly increasing the chance that you will inadvertently breach them but not reading them would not, of itself, be a breach and I can't see what harm could flow anyway.
Can a company handle paying taxes and other bureaucracy work for a freelancer Pardon my terminology. I'm very much not a lawyer, but I used to watch Ally McBeal as a kid, so I think I got the hang of this. This is actually a subset of a vastly larger problem, so the arrangements may seem a bit weird. This is an EU question, but having any common law jurisdiction answers would certainly help, as would anything even tangential on this. We have the following legal entities: Main company X, located in either Ireland or Northern Ireland (UK) Accounting company Y, located somewhere in EU, could be the same country as X if that makes things easier. Freelancer A (and others), located somewhere in EU, ideally the globe. X has made a contract for service with A. X wants to lower the bureaucracy overhead for A, as it is essential for the business model for make it easy to join as a freelancer (think Uber). Ideally this would be as hassle free for A as having a contract of service with X. For this, X has two different models: 1) A sends X all the necessary paperwork. When A gets paid, X pays income taxes, pension payments, VAT and whatnot for A and sends the rest for A. 2) A sends Y the paperwork, X sends Y the full amount payable to A and the info required, Y pays the taxes etc and sends the rest to A. Are either of these (or modifications of those) possible without the relevant authorities interpreting this as a contract of service instead of as a contract for service as intended. It is worth noting, that even without X handling tax bureaucracy for A, it is not completely clear if the model would pass as a contract for service. Based on the IRS 20 questions on the subject 15 or so say it's for, 3 are indecisive and 2 say of. It would also not make any sense for X and A to have a contract of service relation (again, think Uber). EDIT: A few things to clarify: Our goal is not (necessarily) to minimize taxes for A, but to minimize bureaucracy overhead for working small sporadic gigs for the company Scope of A's work could range from anywhere from an hour to a few years Ideally A would just have to provide X (or Y) the required paperwork, then receive payments as if he would be an employee and not have to worry about taxes or social payments. Having an employer-employee relationship between Y and A is almost as bad as having it between X and A The main reason why we want to avoid employer-employee relationship is not tax optimization or avoiding social payments, but avoiding minimum wage regulations. This may seem quite exploitative, so I might need to open up the idea a bit more: The point of company X is essentially to provide a legal & software (latter one being our core competence and first one just a major obstacle) platform for collaboration between the mentioned 'independent contractors'. As a simplified example that wont catch many of the reasons why we need a legal platform as well: Freelancers A and B collaborate together to build the ultimate fart app. A handles the coding and clocks in 100h while B farts on mic for 50 hours, both work being deemed equally valuable. When the project cashes in, A will get 2/3 of the profits and B 1/3. A and B can also sell their equity to 3rd parties any time they want. This would be implemented by having a (quite exotic) contract for service between company X and independent contractors A and B. Now consider the two following scenarios: The app ends up grossing very little or nothing at all, meaning that hourly rate for A and B would be way below minimum wage. This would obviously mean a disaster for company X if the authorities interpreted the relationship as employer-employee, so that is why we absolutely need to steer clear of it. Freelancer C joins the project and does 10 hours of design work. Let's say that C his main source of income from a steady 9-5 elsewhere and does not really do freelancing other than this gig. While setting up a service company for A and B would possibly be an option (given that this is not their only collaboration under company X), the overhead for C would be completely unbearable.	This is a well established model in the UK. One route is the umbrella company. Y here would be the umbrella company. A would then either be providing services to Y or be employed by Y. You may be wondering what use it is if A is employed by Y. The answer here is that whilst A may not benefit from the tax treatment, X does not bear the burden of running PAYE etc. Further, because of regulations such as IR35, it may be that there is a doubt as to whether employment tax apply even if there is a contract for service. Essentially disguised employment means taxes are levied on the employer as if an employment existed; however, in this situation X has the comfort that if this arises they will (normally) fall on Y rather than X. Another route is the service company, where normally A himself will own it (or it is owned between A and A's spouse), take a combination of salary and dividends out (using two allowances if owned between spouses), and he will bill X or Y; companies exist which will perform all the necessary paperwork to do this (in which case Y is called a managed service company), as opposed to a personal service company (if A sets it up himself). It's not clear where you are based, but if you are based outside the UK (and possibly if you are inside the UK) there are accountancy companies that specialise in setting all this up.	Please note that I can't provide legal advice and consider the following as suggestions you can and should discuss with a lawyer of your choice: You are probably member of a tax-advisory association (Lohnsteuerhilfeverein). These associations can only advise its members on their tax declarations. Therefore you are indeed a member, not a "member". As a member you are presumably obliged to pay a yearly membership fee, and from your initial question I infer that the membership cannot be terminated before three years have passed. That and when you have to pay your fee is most likely provided for in the association's constitution. Payment of the fee does not depend on an invoice, because the requirements of § 14 UStG are most likely not met: the association is not a trader (Unternehmer), nor is a membership a performance (Leistung). Whether you have to pay a penalty depends on the wording of the section regarding the fee in the constitution. If your membership rights have been infringed by not giving you notice of the annual general meeting, this would not give you a defence or objection against the payment of the fee. You could report this matter to the competent watchdog (Aufsichtsbehörde) under § 27(1) StBerG, though: Aufsichtsbehörde ist die Oberfinanzdirektion oder die durch die Landesregierung bestimmte Landesfinanzbehörde. 2 Sie führt die Aufsicht über die Lohnsteuerhilfevereine, die ihren Sitz im Bezirk der Aufsichtsbehörde haben. That is either the Oberfinanzdirektion or the Landesfinanzbehörde in the German state where the association has its statutory seat.	Maybe, but maybe not; or, It all depends As with most questions about private foundations, the answer to your question depends on the details about: a) your specific situation; and, b) how exactly the IRS has interpreted the relevant tax code. To figure out what options you have, and which will work best for you, you need to talk to a tax attorney who has worked with foundations. That said, it seems to me that the natural way to accomplish your goal is by treating your work as a “direct charitable activity” of the foundation. “Direct charitable activities” are, as the name suggests, charitable activities that the foundation does itself, rather than paying someone else to do. The money used to pay for “direct charitable activities” does count against the distribution requirement. You really need to talk to a knowledgeable lawyer. In the meantime, you might find this survey of the relevant law, or this survey of what foundations are actually doing, useful. Talk to an attorney about “direct charitable activities”!	Yes. A company from one member state may do business in any E.U. state so long as it complies with local law in the course of doing so. For example, a Dutch company doing business in Germany must still pay German taxes and comply with German labor laws for its German employees. But, it doesn't have to form a German subsidiary to do business in Germany.	They provide a snail- and e-mail way to end the contract here. This will not eradicate the €50 that they say you owe, but you can sort that out separately. That email address might also respond to inquiries about the validity of the charge. At any rate, they also give a link to online dispute resolution per Art. 14, para 1 of the EU Online Dispute Resolution Regulations. GDPR does not give one the right to be deleted so as to avoid an existing liability.	If you have an agreement with a company that specifies "you agree to give me something of value, in case I give you something of value", you have a contract. In order for there to be a contract, there has to be actual acceptance of the offer. You can put out on a web page some contract stating those terms, and if you get positive acceptance of the contract (hence the standard click-through technology), then as long as you have done the thing promised, you can bill them for doing the thing promised. It's not clear what thing of value you are offering on the web page, since it's not "doing actual work". Them sending you an email isn't you doing something. One thing you could do is block all incoming emails, and for money you agree to unblock emails from registered subscribers. Just announcing that you will bill anyone for emailing you does not create a contract, because the emailer need not have even seen your announcement. This is why e-contracts need a click-through button. It's legal to request money, but there is no legal obligation for them to comply. That will be $10, please.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	The difficulty is that tips are, by statute, considered a form of wages rather than a form of self-employment income for the tipped employee for income tax purposes (in contrast, employers don't have to keep track of tips for minimum wage purposes, tipped employees just have an extremely low minimum wage+). (If it was self-employment income, withholding and paying self-employment tax which is paid in lieu of FICA taxes, would be solely the employee's problem and none of the employer's business.) A comment notes, probably correctly, that: If wages plus tips do not add up to the full regular (non-tipped) minimum wage, the employer must pay the difference. This is not well-enforced, however. So, employers have a duty to report to the IRS and withhold taxes from their best estimate of combined wages and tips in a manner authorized by IRS regulations. If they don't, the employers face stiff penalties from the IRS for failing to withhold taxes. There are tax regulations and other forms of official guidance governing when it is permissible to infer tips on cash payments in this fashion. It isn't truly "wage theft". The employee still gets whatever the actual tip is, and the employer still doesn't get the tip itself. Instead, what the employer does is withhold taxes for the benefit of the employee (and with respect to FICA an equal share of employer obligations withholding) based upon estimated wages and tips combined. The income tax withholding is annually reconciled (in theory anyway) against actual taxes owed on the annual tax return. If you maintain good records, you might get audited, but you'd probably win. If you maintain sloppy records or don't keep track at all, you'd probably lose in an audit. To reconcile the error in income tax reporting in federal tax law, the waiter files a 1040 with the W-2 from the employer. The waiter reports the amount withheld in one box. The waiter reports the correct amount of wages and salary and tips rather than the incorrect amount in the wage and salary box. The waiter files a supplement to the tax return page explaining the that W-2 is inaccurate. The waiter calculates tax and shows entitlement to a refund, and the IRS either writes a check or audits after which the IRS or if there is no agreement the tax court decides who is right. Cash tips should be logged daily by the waiter and regularly deposited. (I've done this before personally, with success in the audit process, in cases of erroneous 1099s for my personal taxes.) Reconciling errors in FICA withholdings is rather more difficult, but erroneous overwithholding still provides a benefit to the employee, and the employee's survivors, in the long run in that case. This is done in the form of larger Social Security benefit checks that are based on the inflated wage and tip estimate and the actual FICA taxes paid. If the employee actually receives more cash tips than reported by the employer and doesn't correctly increase the amount in a tax return, the tipped employee is actually engaged in petty tax evasion (and, in practice, excess cash tips are rarely reported). The circumstances under which a fixed percentage may be properly set and what it should be are too technical for an answer here. Systemically, the problem with the applicable regulations is that the inferred tip percentage is benchmarked against the tips paid on credit card payments, per IRS guidance and permission, but actually, customers tip at lower percentages of the bill when paying in cash than when paying via credit card. This is a flaw in the law, but it doesn't represent impropriety on the part of the employer.
Sue the government for damages caused by retaliation over non compliance? Lets say you're a college student with a passion for amateur chemistry. Your going to school to be a chemist. As such, you make legal purchases online for equipment over several years. At some point, the government finds your purchases suspicious. Federal agents come over to your home to investigate. During their interview, its mentioned that they would like to search your home. You object and they threaten to tell the university and your work place that you are a "person of interest" in a criminal investigation. If they were to follow through with their threat and you suffer damages in the form of getting kicked out of school and/or losing your job. Is it possible to sue the government? How would this be done?	No. You are a "person of interest" in a criminal investigation based upon a bona fide reasonable suspicion, even though they lack probable cause, and the government has not threatened to say anything that isn't true, so you have no cause of action against the government. You might have a claim against the school or your employer for wrongfully firing you (being a person of interest in an investigation isn't itself unlawful or even a meaningful mark of bad character), but you are probably an "employee at will" and thus may have no recourse against the employer other than to apply for unemployment benefits because you were fired without good cause. Your recourse against the school would depend upon the nature of that relationship.	We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.	In New Zealand, employers have a duty to take all practicable steps to ensure their workplace is safe for employees and for others who come onto the premises (Health and Safety in Employment Act s6). So if there was a wasp nest and they didn't do anything about it, presumably they would be liable. If it was a random bee, I doubt they would be liable, because they couldn't practicably prevent a bee flying in if, say, someone opened the door. The state would have to charge the company as HSEA is a criminal provisions act. If the plaintiff brought a claim based on the tort of negligence, they would have to prove that the company had a duty of care, breached that duty, the breach caused damage, and the damage was not too remote from the breach. The company does have a duty of care to their patrons. The standard for this is what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances. If they didn't remove a wasp nest they may have breached their duty of care. The breach will have caused damage (a wasp sting). It wouldn't have been too remote since had they removed the wasp nest, the person wouldn't have been stung. However if a random bee flew in, the company probably wouldn't have breached their duty of care, and if the court found that they had, the damage would probably be too remote or not have been caused by them directly.	There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are.	Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.	Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.	there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road.	Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).
What field of law would I specialize in for cases dealing with technology? I am considering getting into the field of law. I am currently an engineer and technologist. What field of law would I need to specialize in to get cases that deal with technology?	Patent law, especially patent prosecution (writing patent applications and working with the US Patent & Trademark Office to get those applications granted), is the most common area of law for scientists and engineers to enter. Patent prosecution does not require a law degree, but does require a science or engineering undergraduate degree. On the other hand, patent litigation (going to court over alleged infringement of granted patents) and other technology-focused areas of law (e.g., IP transactions) do generally require a law degree (and not a technical degree), and so you would have to spend a good deal of time and money on law school.	Most advice that a lawyer gives is subjective; facts are objective but opinions are always subjective. What a lawyer does when they advise a client is typically called a "legal opinion". The reason it is subjective is that, as Dale M said, there are numerous variants that go into an opinion, and reasonably trained professionals (attorneys) can disagree as to the outcome of a specific factual predicate. Often times, case outcomes will differ based on the application of the facts to the law, so much so that the case outcome can differ based on the choice of words a witness uses, or even the way a judge interprets the law. This is why unlike truly objective discipline such as mathematics, where there is a right and wrong answer, no lawyer can ever say a case will definitely go one way or another. It will always be dependent on perception, which is the very definition of subjective. So, whoever indicated that lawyers don't give subjective advice was simply misinformed. They do. What they try not to do is make value-judgments, saying that things are good or bad; rather, they are trained to indicate whether something is illegal or not, or likely to get you sued or not. However, these are all legal opinions.	Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? No. Not based on what you've posted. Go to the definitions to see how engineer is defined. It may be they are talking about actual structural engineers or environmental engineers, where if you're wrong people die. But based on above, you can't use the word engineer unless you're licensed as such. Is there even a license for computer engineer? This seems more like it could be a term of use but not actually descriptive of what you're doing. IDK. You'd have to see the definitions and exceptions. Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? Yes, your CV is supposed to say what you have done, and learned and especially published (lest it's just a resume), but the answer as far as promotional materials, is NO. This, because you don't post your cv on your ad's and if you put that, you will likely be found to be trying to pose as a licensed professional based on a technicality. If that happens the licensing authority will probably censure you by disallowing a license when your qualify. If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately,(of course, but you'd also have to divulge the fact that you are not licensed and cannot act in that capacity) Would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? It could be if the person reports that you are soliciting work as an engineer w/out a license. It's like a person who went to law school, passed the bar, but never got sworn in. They cannot solicit business as a lawyer. Unless there is a license for being a computer programer, there is nothing barring you from using that terminology. You could be, that if you look up the definition prior to the statue, that it says something like "for the purposes of this section the term engineer means…", In which case it doesn't even apply to you.	The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right).	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.	It's virtually never going to be as complex as you're imagining. First, because in the vast majority of cases, the vast majority of lawyers will only be dealing with one body of law: either federal law or the law of the state in which they practice. A lawyer in Maine, for example, is likely to deal almost exclusively with contracts, torts, crimes, etc. that are controlled only by the laws of the United States or Maine. In the vast majority of the remaining cases, lawyers will only be dealing with two bodies of law: those of their home state and federal law. There may be conflicts between the two, but the law has developed a variety of doctrines for determining which rules control -- most notably the Erie Doctrine -- and they will have learned both bodies of law before passing the bar. And even when there are multiple parties from multiple jurisdictions, the lawyers will still rarely need to know the substantive law of more than one. To use your example, a contract dispute involving parties from multiple states will rarely require a lawyer to understand the contract law of every jurisdiction involved. Before the court ever gets to interpreting the contract, it will first consider the "choice of law" question, meaning that it must determine which state's laws control the contract. Once that question is answered, the court will proceed to determine the questions of formation, breach, and damages using the laws of the jurisdiction it has selected. So in your hypothetical, the court may conclude that because the contract was signed in New York, New York law controls. So it applies New York law, and the other states' laws become largely irrelevant. Second, the choice-of-law question may not even come up, because well-drafted contracts will include a choice-of-law provision, where the parties simply agree that the contract should be interpreted using the laws of California, or New York, or Delaware, or wherever. Third, even when there is a need to apply the law of multiple jurisdictions, it is often not as difficult as you're imagining, because so much of law is largely harmonized across the states. Much of the work in this area is spearheaded by the Uniform Law Commission, which has drafted widely adopted legislation governing, for example, sales of goods, leases, negotiable instruments,bank deposits, letters of credit, title documents, investment securities, secured transactions, trusts, trade secrets, partnerships, child custody, and arbitration. Undoubtedly, there are occasions where strange circumstances or bad legal advice lead to incredibly thorny procedural questions about choice of law, but only a very small share of lawyers will need to know many seriously divergent bodies of substantive law from multiple jurisdictions, and even then, it will likely be limited to two or three jurisdictions at the most.	None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.	Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.
How to self-learn law today, like those lawyers in the past who never went to law school? One can simply read law textbooks and judgements of legal cases, but what else?	If you simply want to acquire knowledge in law, reading is the most effective way. Even law courses (at least where I am from) consists of tons and tons of reading. Read, read, read. Usually the items are: Legislation (i.e. the actual law). If you are attending an Intellectual Property class, you will be assigned to read Copyright laws. In a Criminal Law class you will read the laws about prosecution, and legal definitions of various crimes. Textbook / lecture slides. They will provide a laymen explanation of the concepts and terms you come across in the legislation, along with simple examples. Legal cases. These are especially important in a country where Common Law is in practice. Here is a fact: you cannot learn every aspect of law. There is simply too much. That is why there are lawyers who specialize in contract, accident compensation, land dispute, etc.	If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.	Here is a substantial collection of interpretive canons; this article discusses rules vs. canons. This article discusses contract interpretation from both the perspectives of drafting and litigating. These are all from the perspective of common law systems. This article (in English) and this chapter (English, paywall) reminds us that French contract law is different, to which I would add this which focuses on the French subjective theory of contracts – starkly distinct from the common law theory. This page (en français) will probably be of most interest to you. The 2016 modification to the civil code added art. 1190 (and other articles) which says Dans le doute, le contrat de gré à gré s'interprète contre le créancier et en faveur du débiteur, et le contrat d'adhésion contre celui qui l'a proposé which is contra proferentem. The Latin name is not officially assigned to this law, and being a new addition to French law, it's too early to tell if it will be so named in French legal practice.	In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!	While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.	SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand.	Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."	Why is it against the law to practice law without a license? Most, if not all, jurisdictions have decided to implement a law that requires such a licence (or similar) to ensure that practitioners are properly authorised, regulated and competent in the best interests of the administration of justice and to maintain a high standard of professionalism. Any shortcomings can then be addressed either by law or the relevant regulating body.
Does the copyright on a song's lyrics apply if the song is translated into another language? You've all heard about the happy birthday ruling. This spun off a discussion in our office (none of us are lawyers). If I copyright the lyrics to a song in English, does the copyright apply if the lyrics are translated into another language?	Yes because the translated song is a derivative work. 17 U.S. Code § 103 (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works Derivative works is defined in § 101 A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation... FWIW, § 102 says (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories... (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;	Yup, copyright statutes and case law cover these situations. In Canada, look at at Copyright Act Section 30.7: It is not an infringement of copyright to incidentally and not deliberately (a) include a work or other subject-matter in another work or other subject-matter; or (b) do any act in relation to a work or other subject-matter that is incidentally and not deliberately included in another work or other subject-matter. The US doesn't have this in statute, but some defendants used a fair use defence, some successful, some not. (http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/04/cindy-incidentally-the-incidental-inclusion-exception-in-canadian-copyright-law/) If you're using a piece of art as part of a tutorial, or being illustrative of a point, or subject of commentary, review, or criticism, that may be fair use or fair dealing.	The English translation is a copyrighted work While the original Greek is public domain, the English translation is a new literary work with its own copyright running for 70 years after the author(s) death(s). The French translation of the English work would require the permission of the author(s). A French translation of the original Greek wouldn't. This assumes that the translation was not simply mechanical; like running it through Google translate. A purely mechanical translation lacks the originality required to create a literary work - an English translation obtained algorithmically is a copy; just like a zip file is a copy.	A song with the same melody and different lyrics is a derivative work. It does not matter whether the song is to be sung for money, or not. The copyright owner still retains the rights to the melody, and can deny anyone permission to use it in a derivative work. Furthermore, using the derivative song to make a statement does not restrict or reduce the rights of the copyright holder. Refer to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), below. See: Derivative work Derivative works can be created with the permission of the copyright owner or from works in the public domain. (...) The copyright for the derivative work only covers the additions or changes to the original work, not the original itself. The owner of the original work retains control over the work, and in many circumstances can withdraw the license given to someone to create derivative works. And: Why is parody considered fair use, but satire isn't? As the Supreme Court explained in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” Also: Mechanical license Within copyright law within the United states, such mechanical licenses are compulsory; any party may obtain a license without permission of the license holder by paying a set license fee, that as of 2018, was set at 9.1 cents per composition or 1.75 cents per minute of composition, whichever is more, which are to go to the composition copyright holder. (...) In American law, US Code Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 115(a)(2) states: "A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work ..." thus preventing mechanical licenses being used to make substantially derivative works of a piece of music. (...) For example: Puff Daddy wants to sample the opening riff from “Every Breath You Take” by The Police. (...) He is free to hire musicians to reproduce the Police's sound, but he cannot copy from any phonorecord with only a mechanical license.	Yes Written contracts do not have to be written in any particular language or character set. Purely visual contracts are used and are legally binding. If a pictorial term is ambiguous it is resolved by the court the same way as a textual term would be.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.	Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe.	The text of an ancient manuscript would indeed not be covered by copyright. A translation into a modern language normally would be protected by copyright. (Unless it is purely a machine or algorithmic translation.) The formatting of a publication could ber protected by copyright, but only if it includes some significantly original element. (In the US, and in many but not all other countries, only original works or original aspects of works may be protected by copyright. Thus where the copyright is for format the format must include an original element or elements.) If the format was a normal one for the type of publication, ther would be no original content to protect, and so no copyright at all. A work alleged to infringe a copyright on the format would need to be shown to have copied an original element or elements of the prior publication's format.
Is it illegal to continue using oAuth tokens after a user asks to remove them? We have an app that allows users to connect their CRM. The CEO wants to "fool" users into making them believe that they can delete the OAuth tokens so that we don't have access to their data anymore. However, the CEO wants the dev team to continue using those tokens in the background and read the user's data. I'm the lead developer, and I have concerns about the legality of what he's asking. I don't want to be guilty by association. This is a pre-seed startup in the United States. Also, the CEO wants to download all of the CRM data from our users and re-sell it to other users. For example, if Lyft were to connect their CRM to our tool, the CEO wants to use that data to sell it to Uber and vice-versa. He claims this is legal because users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? Are there any policies that we or I should be aware of before rolling out this solution? We also request users to connect their business emails (Gmail and Outlook) to our tool. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database in plain-text. Are there any policies or regulations that I, as a dev lead, should be aware of? Edit: There is no "legal" department, we have investors, and some investors have asked about the legality, and the CEO keeps saying "we're covered" He claims that he hired three firms to go over legal issues, but he refuses to share the name of the firms with me. He always evades the question with things like "Let me handle that."	The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.	You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you.	Fairly easily. You want to use their API. They give you the conditions for using it. As long as their conditions aren't illegal or unreasonable, you need to adhere to them to use their API. Is it illegal to not include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name? Almost certainly not. Is it an unreasonable term? Almost certainly not. If you want to include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name, you can try - but you can't then use their API.	Yes, your transaction history is your personal data. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. Your transaction history relates to you, and you're definitely identifiable for the bank. You have access to the transaction history to the app, which would probably satisfy Art 15 GDPR. You do also have a right to data portability under Art 20 GDPR which allows you to get your data in a machine-readable format – but strictly speaking this right only applies to data you provided yourself. You could try to explicitly invoke this right. Your GDPR rights must be satisfied without cost. Your bank almost certainly does provide machine-readable API access, in conformance with the open banking mandate from the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2, Directive (EU) 2015/2366). The Directive requires your EU member state to have passed a law that gives you “the right to make use of services enabling access to account information”, if you're already using online banking. However, the exact details of that right will depend on the laws in your EU member state. You might already be able to connect to your transaction history via Open Banking software such as GNU Cash.	Yes, but it doesn't matter. This answer discusses gdpr implications. Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable person. The GDPR has an extremely broad concept of identifiability, also covering indirect identification using additional information and with the help of third parties. Even just being able to single out one data subject, i.e. being able to distinguish different users from another, counts as identification. If you already have a concept of user accounts, any information that is linked with the user accounts and somehow relates to those users would also be personal data. Since you have distinct push tokens per user, it seems like this criterion would be met. Additionally, those unique tokens might be directly identifying by themselves. The GDPR does not allow for semantic games like “it only identifies the device, not the user”. The key here is that the definition of identifiability does not hinge on your intentions, but on objective capabilities: if you or someone else who can come into possession of this data were to attempt to identify the user (such as singling out users from another), would they be reasonably likely able to do that? Since most devices are single-user, being able to identify a device would imply that you're reasonably likely to also identify users. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean you're forbidden from using that data. It means that you'd have to comply with GDPR rules, if you're otherwise within scope of that regulation (e.g. if you're EU/UK-based, or are targeting your services to people who are in UK/EU). For example, basic GDPR compliance steps include having a clear legal basis for your processing of personal data (such as necessity for performing a contract to which the data subject is party, or necessity for a legitimate interest, or consent), providing a privacy notice, and taking appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to ensure the compliance and security of processing. For example, TOMs regarding these push tokens could involve encryption, access controls, and a plan for installing security patches in order to prevent data breaches. Using push tokens is already a good measure in this context, since they are effectively pseudonymous and prevent linking additional information via that token (two sites/apps pushing notifications to the same person will have entirely different tokens). However, the push notification provider (e.g. Google, Apple, Mozilla) can resolve the pseudonymous tokens and link them to a person, indicating that these tokens are ultimately identifying (even if you can't perform that linking yourself). Note that if GDPR applies, then other EU/UK rules might apply as well. For example, sending electronic messages (such as emails) is subject to anti-spam rules (EU: ePrivacy, UK: PECR). These rules apply regardless of whether personal data is involved. Since the rules are not technology-specific, it is likely that regulators would consider user-visible push notifications to be equivalent to more well understood technologies like email and SMS.	Just at the offset this does not constitute legal advice, just some opinions I have on this point. Technically, you would not be prohibited to generate speech and use it however you like. Under normal circumstances any output generated by the system that does not contravene the service agreement would be your intellectual property. This would include the text and speech generated. Once you go about the request limit you would naturally be required to pay, but until that time you can use the service as a paying customer. Just to clarify this point I would like to make reference to the service license agreement, clause 3, which make reference to the following prohibitions: (a) copy, modify, create a derivative work of, reverse engineer, decompile, translate, disassemble, or otherwise attempt to extract any or all of the source code of the Services (subject to Section 3.4 below and except to the extent such restriction is expressly prohibited by applicable law); (b) use the Services for High Risk Activities; (c) sublicense, resell, or distribute any or all of the Services separate from any integrated Application; (d) create multiple Applications, Accounts, or Projects to simulate or act as a single Application, Account, or Project (respectively) or otherwise access the Services in a manner intended to avoid incurring Fees or exceed usage limits or quotas; (e) unless otherwise set forth in the Service Specific Terms, use the Services to operate or enable any telecommunications service or in connection with any Application that allows Customer End Users to place calls or to receive calls from any public switched telephone network; or (f) process or store any Customer Data that is subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations maintained by the Department of State. Unless otherwise specified in writing by Google, Google does not intend uses of the Services to create obligations under HIPAA, and makes no representations that the Services satisfy HIPAA requirements. If Customer is (or becomes) a Covered Entity or Business Associate, as defined in HIPAA, Customer will not use the Services for any purpose or in any manner involving Protected Health Information (as defined in HIPAA) unless Customer has received prior written consent to such use from Google. Similarly, as specified here: Customer will not, and will not allow third parties to: (i) use these Services to create, train, or improve (directly or indirectly) a similar or competing product or service or (ii) integrate these Services with any applications for any embedded devices such as cars, TVs, appliances, or speakers without Google's prior written permission. These Services can only be integrated with applications for the following personal computing devices: smartphones, tablets, laptops, and desktops. In addition to any other available remedies, Google may immediately suspend or terminate Customer's use of these Services based on any suspected violation of these terms, and violation of these terms is deemed violation of Google's Intellectual Property Rights. Customer will provide Google with any assistance Google requests to reasonably confirm compliance with these terms (including interviews with Customer employees and inspection of Customer source code, model training data, and engineering documentation). These terms will survive termination or expiration of the Agreement. You should also take a look at this and this. However, as per the terms of the agreement the speech generated would be your intellectual property, unless otherwise specified. Good luck!	You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack.	While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.
illegally aquired information in Sweden In Sweden can information illegally acquired by an unconnected person be used in the prosecution of crimes? Say a person stole a laptop, found evidence of illegal activity on it and gave it to the authorities saying he stole it. Could it be used against the owner? Further are there any special classes of information that change the answer? Like say medical or financial data, child porn or terrorism.	It most likely can be used (there is no "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine). Drawing on this analysis (I can't locate Nytt juridiskt arkiv 1986 online). (Rättegångsbalken, SFS 1942:740) Chapter 35 Section 1 (35 Kap.) allows free "sifting, submission, evaluation" of evidence. Evidence can be rejected as insignificant. Specifically (following the analysis paper), The Swedish legal system does not prescribe that it is forbidden to present an item of evidence which the party has got hold of while breaking the law. Neither is the court prevented from ascribing such a proof a great value. In one instance, blood was illegally drawn (only a doctor or registered nurse may legally draw blood). The Supreme Court ruled that The fact that the blood sample was drawn by a laboratory assistant does not imply such a divergence from the Code of Judicial Procedure that it can be seen as a violation of the Instrument of Government Chapter 2 Section 6. Neither has any of the Swedish fundamental principle of law been set aside in a way that prevents the submission of the blood sample. "Surplus information" obtained by coercive means can also be used as evidence (i.e. information obtained incidentally, not related to the crime in question). Some limitations seem to have been recently imposed, taking the form on tightening warrant requirements and data retention.	Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished.	Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.	No. In the United States, lying is not a crime. Unless it is done: under oath (in which case it's called perjury) or to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation (in which case it's called obstruction). There are also the civil torts of slander (oral) and libel (written) if someone lies and damages the reputation or business interests of a person or company. Collectively, and without distinction, these are called defamation. Lying also has a close cousin — the civil tort of fraud — which usually applies to inducement into a transaction or a contract. There are also consumer protection statutes (federal and state) that deal with truth in advertising, truth in lending, lemon laws, etc. But those are primarily civil statutes and the last two are pretty far afield from your question. But none of that applies to the Facebook case you described. So, no.	Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".	It is almost certainly illegal. I was unable to find UK provisions but the penalties for stealing an Australian passport are 10 years imprisonment or a fine of up to 1,000 penalty units (at time of writing a penalty unit was $170 so, $170,000) (Section 32(4) of the Australian Passports Act 2005). Under this law, the crime is knowingly having it in your possession when you know it isn't yours. Obviously, normal familial relationships would not be prosecuted (i.e. one member of the family carrying all the family's passports). Certainly, if the true owner asked for it and the possessor refused, that would trigger the crime. Furthermore, it is completely pointless - all the original owner has to do is report it stolen and apply for another one.	I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference.	In general As Dale M explained, if you give the money to someone who is not obviously authorized by the business to accept money and sell stuff in exchange, you have not entered into a valid sales contract. That means you are taking things without permission. Therefore the shop could sue you for any damage this causes (maybe you took something the shop did not want to sell, or the person at the information desk was not an employee and ran away with the money). However, whether this constitutes a crime such as theft will depend on jurisdictions. Germany In Germany, for example, it would probably not, because by definition a theft requires "intention to take posession in violation of the law" (StGB §242). You could argue that you did not intend to violate the law, because you paid the required amount, and only gave the money to the wrong person by mistake. Of course, I cannot guarantee that will convince the judge... England and Wales Similarly, the law in England and Wales defines "theft" in section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; [...] Furthermore, section 2 says: A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— [...] (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or [...] So, similar to the situation in Germany, you could argue in court that you intended to buy the item legally, and believed that the shop would be okay with that.
Algorithm (pseudo)code in academic papers -- what is the copyright/license status? When you see an algorithm described in pseudocode in an academic paper, what are you legally allowed to do with it, from a copyright and/or licensing standpoint? Could you legally just copy-paste this into your own program and then fix the minor differences without anyone's permission? Assume: The "pseudocode" is very close to being real code... e.g. it might say x := x^2 when the equivalent real code in your language might be something like x = x**2. The publication is (obviously) copyrighted as usual, but nothing is specifically said about the code. There are no patents on the code. I'm not asking about patents here.	Pseudo-code written down somewhere is protected by copyright, even if the article containing it doesn't say anything about the pseudo-code contained in it (i.e. doesn't mention "this too is copyrighted"). For example, let us assume that the following isn't actual compileable / executable code in some extant programming language: procedure bubbleSort( A : list of sortable items ) n = length(A) repeat swapped = false for i = 1 to n-1 inclusive do /* if this pair is out of order / if A[i-1] > A[i] then / swap them and remember something changed */ swap( A[i-1], A[i] ) swapped = true end if end for until not swapped end procedure It does nevertheless constitute an expression of an abstract algorithm. If it can be copied and pasted, it is an expression. If you run this through a filter to create executable code in some language, you will have created a derivative work (and possibly one with no copyright protection, if the conversion is totally automatic). If you read the lines and say "Ah, I know what that would be in Pascal", that has the modicum of creativity required to make your conversion protected, but you've still infringed the underlying work. On the other hand, a logical flow chart, which is a picture of the abstract idea of what to do, is copyright-protected only as a graphic object. If you look at it and it inspires you to write pseudo-code or actual code, you are not copying the flow chart.	If Alice, Bob, and Cassandra are working on the program and releasing it as a joint work, the copyright statement should reflect it: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice, Bob, Cassandra If, on the other hand, Bob and Cassandra are taking advantage of the "modify" clause of the MIT license to create derivative works, the copyright statements are required by the license to be separate: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice Copyright (c) 2017 Bob Copyright (c) 2017 Cassandra	The web site appears to be interacting with a copy of the MIT-licensed code, which I will call "M". Neither the site nor the code that displays the site is a copy, but if a copy of M is on Bob's server, it might be considered to be a part of the code that supports or "powers" the site. In general, calling a separate program does not make that program part of the calling program. Bob must make sure that the local copy of M contains the required copyright notice and "as-is" notice. As Bob is "using" and not "distributing" M, that ends his obligations. It would be good practice and courteous of Bob to include on his web page where M can be invoked "Powered in part by M, written by {M-author}" or some similar notice, but the MIT license does not impose any such requirement. A license could impose such a requirement, but MIT does not.	Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.	My remarks pertain only to US Law. Laws vary in other countries. Subject matter eligible for copyright protection in the US must be expressive and creative. To the extent data are merely measurements of observable fact in the world, they are not copyrightable. It may be that the presentation or interpretation of data is eligible for copyright protection (for example, artwork used in charts, graphs, graphics, etc., that is expressive and creative), subject to various equitable use provisions (in particular Fair Use, which is still a legal grey area). The methods by which data are gathered can be considered IP, but is the domain of patents. Methods are not copyrightable (17 USC 102(b)).	In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.	Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*]	How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.
Is it possible to become a lawyer if you have a criminal record? My partner wants to study law and do a law degree but has a extensive criminal record. Is it possible to become a lawyer if you have a record? If they decide to go through with it, would they be treated differently in the law community?	Is it possible to become a lawyer if you have a record? Yes. But, it is also possible to refuse to admit someone to the practice of law based upon a criminal record. The decision is made by a "character and fitness" committee of a state's bar admission system after someone has finished law school and passed the academic part of the bar exam. If one state doesn't accept someone based upon a criminal record, another state could make a different decision. Your partner might be well advised to confer with experts on the issue to determine the likelihood that their particular criminal record would be a problem before making this huge investment of time and money and effort. If they decide to go through with it, would they be treated differently in the law community? Probably not. Nothing advertises to the legal community that someone has or does not have a criminal record. You are either admitted to the bar, or you are not. Your character and fitness application is private. If somebody finds out, that could impact how the person who finds out acts, just as it could in any other pursuit. But, someone would not be justified in treating a lawyer with a criminal record differently, for example, in case management issues or discovery plans, than someone without a criminal records, except in cases where national security clearances are required (a tiny subset of legal practice).	Possibly. I wonder if you mean "convicted" rather than "arrested"? There is no way that he will be "arrested" because you don't accompany him ("arrested" is when he taken by the police before a trial). On the other hand, if he plans to call you as a witness for the defence, then your absence may mean he is convicted at his trial when otherwise he would be found innocent. The final possibility is that you might act as a character witness after conviction, and your absence may mean he is sent to jail rather than fined. It may be possible for you to write a witness statement describing what happened, and to have this notarized. On the other hand, the prosecution may well want to cross examine you. I am pretty sure you can write a character witness statement (saying, if true, that it's a first offence and that you have forgiven him, etc) and get it notarized. That might persuade a court to be lenient. I think you (as a couple) need to talk to his lawyer.	A lawyer for either party can claim, during argument, that an adverse witness is not credible, for any reason or none. Often the lawyer will point to matters disclosed during cross-examination, claiming that they are contradictions, show bias, or otherwise indicate lack of credibility. Or the lawyer could point to elements of the primary testimony which the lawyer claims are implausible. If there has be evidence of a prior conviction, the lawyer could refer to this. A lawyer may in general ask a witness about prior convictions. Criminal convictions are generally matters of public record, and can be researched. It is not usual to present reputation or credibility witnesses for any person except the defendant, and failure to do so, even for the defendant, does not lead to any automatic assumption of lack of credibility. Not does the appearance of such a witness grant an automatic assumption of credibility. But a lawyer may point out reasons for thinking a witness not credible. Ultimately it is up to the finder of fact, often a jury, to decide what weight to give the testimony of each and every witness, based on the impression that testimony made, as well as any argument from the lawyer. This is one reason why courts are reluctant to overturn factual assessments by a jury: the reviewing court does not see and hear the manner of a witness and what it may indicate about credibility.	The evidence will almost certainly be inadmissible And, of course, you will be disbarred and never work as a lawyer again, you might also go to jail for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Whether the person is convicted or not will depend on the strength of the other evidence the state has. In the notorious case of Lawyer X, Nicola Gobbo was acting as a barrister for a number of Melbourne underworld figures while simultaneously acting as a police informer. A number of those convicted have successfully appealed their convictions on the basis that they didn’t get a fair trial. In their judgement on AB (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym); EF (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 58 the High Court said: But where, as here, the agency of police informer has been so abused as to corrupt the criminal justice system, there arises a greater public interest in disclosure to which the public interest in informer anonymity must yield. EF's actions in purporting to act as counsel for the Convicted Persons while covertly informing against them were fundamental and appalling breaches of EF's obligations as counsel to her clients and of EF's duties to the court. Likewise, Victoria Police were guilty of reprehensible conduct in knowingly encouraging EF to do as she did and were involved in sanctioning atrocious breaches of the sworn duty of every police officer to discharge all duties imposed on them faithfully and according to law without favour or affection, malice or ill-will. As a result, the prosecution of each Convicted Person was corrupted in a manner which debased fundamental premises of the criminal justice system.	(Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account)	Ensuring that you are compliant with all laws is a notorious problem. For example, nobody has successfully enumerated even the number of criminal laws under the U.S. (federal) code! There's a book that delves into this problem called 3 Felonies a Day. The title alludes to the (unverifiable) suggestion that a typical person unwittingly commits three felonies a day. (There is some discussion of that claim on Skeptics.SE ... and regular amusement published at https://twitter.com/CrimeADay.) In practice, you can look for safe harbors. Obtaining and following the advice of a licensed lawyer offers some indemnification. For example, if you are part of an institution you can vet your planned activities with its ethics and/or legal counsel. If those activities are later found to have violated a law then that approval could conceivably (but not certainly) transfer liability to the institution.	You don’t need to hire an attorney If you like, you can represent yourself. Just like you can build your own house, repair your own car or amputate your own limb. You only need to be a lawyer if you are representing someone else. However, there is a saying that goes: A person representing themselves has a fool for a client. Your lawyer is a professional, you aren’t. They know what to do when the other side says “Objection, facts not in evidence” or how to correctly fill out, file and serve a pleading; do you?	Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.
Is there reliable intellectual property protection in overtly international markets? Say I have a device I wish to sell to airlines. This device provides incredible value for commercial flights, and I'd like to start a business selling it. I have a problem. Where do I patent my device, when given the information in the patent, anyone can recreate and manufacture the same device in a country that doesn't conform to the same intellectual property standards, and then compete with me by selling my device to those same airlines? Commercial aviation is perhaps the most international industry in existence, with the possible exception of shipping, so how could I ever make a device for the commercial aviation industry without fear of being outcompeted by copies outside the jurisdiction of my patent protection?	First, even if your competitor is operating outside the jurisdiction of your patents, you also have protection from the use and import of the infringing products, not just the manufacture and sale. For example, if you have a US patent, your patent would allow you to sue airlines using your product in the US (e.g., flying into, out of, and/or within the US), even if they bought the product from a foreign competitor. Suing potential customers isn't as attractive as suing your competitors, but at least you would have that option. Further, it is possible to apply for a patent in multiple countries (e.g., through the PCT process), although it can get expensive to try to obtain protection in a large number of countries. You can try to target the main jurisdictions in which your product would be made, sold, or used. For example, you could apply in the US, China, and various European countries (through the EPO).	There is a history of "giving away patents", which allows the original grantor to foster innovation instead of stifle it. Here are some examples: Sealand Industries - ISO Shipping Container Patented the standard shipping container, then gave away the patent royalty free, allowing a revolution in ocean going shipping. Annually it is estimated that $440 billion are shipped through these containers. Tesla - 200+ patents Elon Musk announced that the company "will not initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technology.". Toyota - Hydrogen Fuel Cell Patents Released 5,680 patents related to hydrogen fuel cells Toyota also released a lot of patents related to development of the Prius The grant of a patent provides the ability for the grantor to pursue infringement lawsuits against companies or individuals, but it does not obligate them to do so. You can give away your patent, open it up to broad licensing, or just openly state that you will not enforce any action related to the lawsuit similar to how Tesla did it.	To make a safe, legally-compliant and industry-compliant biomedical device, one must build that device to a certain set of standards. How do I find out what those standards even are? For one, start reading: http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/default.htm The FDA is one of the primary regulatory bodies that you will work with in terms of the development and potential marketing of a device. There are many documents and contact links, such as for information on standards, inspections, third-party reviews, existing device databases, workshops, etc. Especially relevant from the Division of Industry and Consumer Education (DICE): The Division of Industry and Consumer Education (DICE) answers questions (by phone and email) from the medical device industry .... In addition, DICE develops educational resources for the FDA website to help the medical device industry understand FDA regulations and policies. Your conclusions and decisions may lead you to other government bodies, such as the Small Business Administration, the US Patent Office, and similar offices in other countries if you go that route. And, because you are potentially entering into a field and endeavor that has huge liability for yourself and your business and possible investors, it's not a good idea to trust the judgement of the general public on a site like LSE; there are many private medical and legal consultants available by Google that could act as as consultants and leads for such a project.	Yes. The AusPat database is an excellent source for looking for Australian patents. I did a quick search for "card game" and came across 276 results fitting those keywords. Not all involve the classic generic-52-card-deck format, but some do. A good example - and one that seems similar to your idea - is "Modified blackjack game using non-standard blackjack card values", by Davinder Signh Sandhu. There's no direct link to it from AusPat.1 So yes, you can patent a card game in Australia. At the moment, I don't have enough information to answer your other two questions. 1 I found a similar American patent with more information, though I have no proof that the two are in similar formats.	For purposes of determining inventorship, the location the invention was made in is irrelevant. Before the AIA, the location of a publication or other public knowledge was relevant (in the U.S. vs outside the U.S.) The AIA did away with that distinction. Pre AIA 35 USC 102 had two reference to "in this country". Post AIA there is no distinction made as to where the prior art was known or used or on-sale. I think this makes the provisions you are looking at moot, at least in terms of patentability. Before AIA, adding in the space provision would make a use in space a use in the U.S. and therefore potentially prior art. Now it is potentially prior art without any issue of having happened in the U.S. PRE AIA 102 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless — (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or POST AIA 102 [a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless— (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	If you are producing and selling it, that is an absolute bar to patentability by anyone else (this is known as prior art). So if you are using it very publicly before they file, they can't get the patent.	As a preface, every company must have a team of lawyers who interpret the rules and who know the practice of the Treasury Department, so that the company doesn't violate the rules and end up in big trouble. A company has to decide whether some action is worth the risk (meaning, knowing what is it worth to them, and what are the risks). There is a long FAQ from Treasury which tries to interpret the rules. A simple answer to the question is that a company might decide that the risk is too great, even if many or most specialists in the legal issues don't agree that there is an assumed risk. 31 CFR 560.204 states: Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran is prohibited, including the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any goods, technology, or services to a person in a third country undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that: (a) Such goods, technology, or services are intended specifically for supply, transshipment, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran; or (b) Such goods, technology, or services are intended specifically for use in the production of, for commingling with, or for incorporation into goods, technology, or services to be directly or indirectly supplied, transshipped, or reexported exclusively or predominantly to Iran or the Government of Iran. Reducing the verbiage, exportation of technology to Iran is prohibited. It is thus not a stretch to think that exporting technology to Iran is prohibited for a US person or company. It is possible to obtain a license to export to or from Iran, see 31 CFR 560.501 ff.. It is completely not clear what it takes to get a license: I suggests that differences between US companies may relate to whether a particular company has a license to export. There are also prohibitions targeted at specific individuals and organizations. Transactions over the internet can be risky, because a website cannot compel a user to truthfully identify themselves, and "E.O. 13599 requires U.S. persons to block all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, unless otherwise exempt or authorized by OFAC", and absolute blocking is an extreme form of due diligence. The political questions as to the wisdom of the sanctions are appropriate for Politics SE.
Establishing Ownership of a Sink Drain In Wall - Condo in California I wanted some help on one particular part of a "case" I'm putting together to present to my HOA. Long story short, I had a leak in my wall from a drain line from my kitchen sink. It damaged the unit below me a little bit. In my mind, this was unquestionably HOA domain because the leak was within the wall (behind the studs). The HOA reviewed the CC&Rs and found a tidbit about "leaks between units" being the responsibility of owners and stuck me with the bill. I (and they) apparently did not have the Condominium Plan on-hand so I got it repaired since I didn't have much ammo to argue with them. I've since obtained the condo plan and it pretty clearly places the ownership of "sewer lines" on the HOA. What I want is a little help exploring the legal definition of the term "outlet" though, as it grants an exception for "outlets within units". I just want to make sure they can't turn it around on me, especially since the wall in question is a wall in the middle of my unit and the condo plan only shows the four outer walls. This is my "case" so far: (Copy/paste with some mods) Per [the HOA president] meeting email, he points out this from the Regulations: “ the HOA not being responsible for water leaks between units or interior damage.” This is in reference to sections in the CC&Rs and Regulations that were discussed at the 12/7 HOA meeting with reference, in part, to the leak that occurred from a drain line in my wall. There was confusion stemming primarily from the fact that the CC&Rs don’t specify one way or the other, in short, “who owns the pipes” in their text. Jonathan reviewed the documents and essentially took it as implied that since leaks between units are the domain of owners, then pipes that leak are the domain of owners too. The notion that the pipes and drains in the walls belong to the individual owners did not sound correct to me though, for a few reasons, but essentially it "didn't sound right". At the time, Jonathan invited me to review our Condo’s documents if I disagreed with the conclusion. Here’s my findings: Jonathan’s analysis hinged primarily on this portion of our “Rules and Regulations”: LEAKS BETWEEN UNITS Please be aware that damages to adjoining units are the responsibility of the unit owner where the leak originated.... The main question this raises is “What is defined, in concrete terms, as a Unit?” There is some guidance in the Rules & Regs themselves a few pages earlier, laying a general rule that a “Unit” is inside of a “unit” bounded by the surface of walls, floors, etc: It notes some exceptions and is self-referential, so let’s see about getting a more authoritative answer on what a Unit is. This can be found in the CC&Rs: 1.43. Separate Interest or Unit. Separate Interest or unit, which shall consist of a “Residential Element", a “Garage Element”, and either a'“Deck Element” or a “Patio Element", shall mean a separate interest in space as as defined in Section 1351 (f) of the California Civil Code. Each Separate Interest or Unit shall be a separate freehold estate, as separately shown, numbered and designated in the Condominium Plan. In interpreting deeds, declarations and plans, the existing physical boundaries of the Unit or a unit constructed or reconstructed in substantial accordance with the Condominium Plan and the original plans hereof, if such plans are available, shall be conclusively presumed to be its boundaries rather than the description exPressed in the deed Condominium Plan or Declaration, regardless of settling or lateral movement of the building and regardless of minor variances between boundaries, as shown on the Condominium Plan- or defined in the deed and Declaration, and the boundaries of a building as constructed or reconstructed. The main part of this is that units are defined on the Condo Plan. This is where my analysis came to a grinding halt for weeks as I tried to figure out, well, what and where is the condo plan? In short, it is a map with the specific graphs and definitions for who owns everything. It’s supposed to have been part of what I received from our management company but I confirmed it wasn’t included, and further, that they did not have a copy of it when I asked them to look. I eventually went a little more granular and asked “What exactly do I legally own?” in an effort to find it and though to check my Deed: redacted :) [It referenced the Condo Plan by instrument number at the County]. I obtained a copy from the County Clerk Recorder’s office using this information. It has some diagrams and the like, but the most important part is in the first few pages, in the “Definitions” section: Here we find the final word on what is a “Unit”, therefore my direct responsibility to maintain, and what is “Common Area”, therefore the HOA’s responsibility to maintain. As you can see, “all sewers” are specifically called out as common area, as well as “water pipes” etc. This is further supported by the earlier assessment that anything that is not within the “surfaces” of a unit is also common area. Which, coming back to the CC&Rs, places it squarely in the domain of the HOA, which is responsible for …”repairs… of the Common Area”: [you get the idea and I don't have enough SE rep to post more links...] To reiterate, What I want is a little help exploring the legal definition of the term "outlet" though, as it grants an exception for "outlets within units". Other observations and feedback on my legal reasoning is welcome as well though :)	You have to take the General Notes part in its full context. The relevant clause says The term “Common Area” as used herein means all portions of the Project except the Units, and without limiting the generality of the forgoing, all structural projections within a Unit which are required for the support of a Condominium, gas, water pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations of the structures wherever located (except the outlets thereof when located within the Units)… The most proximal expression is "wires and other utility installations", so construing "outlets" as covering gas, water, sewers, ducts etc. would be contrary to the interpretive principle known as the Last Antecedent rule. Nothing in the context requires a broad-scope interpretation of the "outlet" exception. This being in the US, courts would use ordinary English usage to understand what an "outlet" is, that is, even if "you could argue" that something is an outlet, the term "outlet" is used in the context of buildings to refer to an electrical outlet. The way this works is that you would need to get an expert witness to testify as to the common meaning of "outlet" in this context. There are two approaches to doing that. One is to get testimony of a contractor, as to what they mean when they say "outlet". However, contractors speak a special language (and not consistently so), and it's dubious that either party of a contract could have understood "outlet" in a special way shared by contractors. So the other approach (exemplified by Heller) is to call on a language and usage expert. A DIY approach is to google things like "sewer outlet", "electrical outlet" and so on, to see if you get many hits. You do not have a sewer outlet in your unit. You might have a water outlet if you work on cars and brought one inside the unit, but clearly context dictates that that is not relevant. The way courts resolve these matters is to determine what the ordinary meaning of a term is, and set aside specilized and technical meanings. See for example Nix v. Hedden where SCOTUS ruled that a tomato is not a legal fruit, because scientific definitions notwithstanding, a tomato is clearly a vegetable in common usage. Note that I am specifically addressing the question you posed, about "outlets". IO believe that attention to "outlets" is misguided. Focus should be on the regulation about "the HOA not being responsible for water leaks between units or interior damage", which is what they are invoking. By your description, the hole in the pipe which constitutes the source of the leak was behind the wall. The problem is that "between units" can have two very different meanings, one being "from one unit to another", and the other is "which takes place in the area that exists between units". Since you do not own the area behind the walls (presumably: property descriptions can be less than totally clear), there was no leak from one unit to the other. There was a leak which took place in the space between units. The definitions for the project clearly indicate that such behind-the-wall stuff is "common area". If a breech in the drain pipe occurs outside the wall and leaked into the unit below, that would be a leak outside the common are, and would be a leak between units in the "from one to the other" sense, although the water would have to pass through the common area. But if it originated on the other side of the wall, it originated in the common area which is always present between units. Suppose, being devil's advocate, that you own not just the stuff inside the walls but also the stuff behind the walls, up to the next unit's walls. But if you apply that analysis of property boundaries, then the adjacent unit's property is the stuff inside his walls and between, up to your walls, so unless you are very special, you don't own the area between the walls. So to reiterate, "outlet" is a irrelevant. What matters is the interpretation of "leak between". Under neither interpretation of that expression is a leak behind the wall the responsibility of the person "upstairs".	To be able to sue the appraiser, he would have to have a duty to you. If he was hired by a bank, his duty is to the bank and not to you. Assuming that you directly hired the appraiser, then you would have to check the contract for limits on his liability – a clause that says "you waive your right to sue me for (certain) mistakes". Now supposing that you haven't waived your right to sue, you almost certainly cannot sue for misrepresentation, unless for some reason you can prove that he knew that he was lying to you. Your best bet is arguing that his mistake was negligent. You would have to establish that the first figure was incorrect (a disagreement in figures does not establish which figure is correct). A discrepancy between county records and an appraiser's estimate can be explained by numerous non-negligence related facts (unpermitted modifications of the structure, for example). Suppose that the source of the discrepancy is inclusion of finished basement space in the earlier appraisal, or perhaps measurement error. Then you would have to prove that that error involved a lack of professional care, which implies certain professional standards (not just your feeling that the error is egregious). This article explains the ANSI guidelines. The standard tends to increase square footage because it is measured from the outside. Then you would have to establish that you were damaged by the earlier figure. The law doesn't allow you to sue because someone does something that bugs you, you have to have suffered damage. You don't say how you were harmed – I presume the problem is that the buyer's bank is not willing to lend that much money, where you relied on an earlier incorrect estimate of square footage in advertising the house and setting the price. You may have contributed to the problem by relying on that estimate when you knew or should have known from the government records that the size is something less. There is some possibility of legal recourse, but it's not obvious (so gather all of your facts and talk to your attorney).	We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree".	You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause.	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.	do I have a case against them in small claims court? Yes. Your description altogether indicates that there is --at least-- an implicit contract between you and the roommates. That implicit contract is palpable from the roommates' subsequent conduct, which includes --but is not necessarily limited to-- their excuses and promises. Although there is no written contract between you and the roommates, evidence that you have paid utilities in full places on your roommates the burden of disproving the default (and common sense) presumption that bills would be split among all four roommates. Your landlord can testify via an affidavit what he knows about that arrangement and/or what he informs each new roommate on the issue of how utilities are paid. You might want to email your roommates a reminder [to pay you] in such a way that prompts them to reflect their excuses/promises/admissions in writing. The terms of their written response might evidence an oral agreement. In the alternative, the roommates would have the burden to prove that they paid you, or that you promised to cover their utilities for free. The former scenario is precisely why a reasonable payer typically requires --or should require-- a receipt when making payments (as opposed to the payee when receiving them). Regardless, your description suggests that your roommates would be unable to prove either scenario. Also the landlord could include in his affidavit that the roommates have defaulted on their rent payments as well. If the landlord refuses to produce an affidavit, you can always visit the court where eviction proceedings are taking place and obtain copy of the relevant records. With those records you would evidence the roommates' pattern of lack of payment. Although obtaining copies from the court makes your landlord's affidavit somewhat unnecessary, it is in the landlord's best interest to cooperate with you because (1) it would be unreasonable for him to alienate himself from the only tenant who honors his lease, and (2) he might need your cooperation as witness at some point. Even if the roommates were successful in proving that there was neither a verbal agreement nor an implicit contract but only "unfounded expectations" on your part, you could ask for a ruling in equity in case your claim of breach of contract fails. In terms of mere "expectations", it is much more reasonable for you to expect them to pay their share than for three three individuals to presume an unrelated roommate will cover their utilities for free. The latter just departs from common sense and common practices. how do I prevent this from happening again with future roommates? Strictly speaking, it is impossible to absolutely prevent that situation from occurring again. However, you may take the following precautions to reduce your exposure. Have your roommates sign an agreement that reflects each party's obligations and deadlines. Your agreement should also state that it is each roommate's responsibility to keep his/her receipts --or akin evidence-- in case a dispute for non-payment arises. This would streamline the production of evidence if the matter ends up in court. Consider whether or not asking each party for an aval or endorser is practicable. This provides some sort of "insurance" of roommates' default risk. Lastly, do not wait for a party's debt to accumulate that much before taking legal action. The longer you wait, the unlikelier you are to recover that money because the party may go broke or simply disappear. Moreover, keep in mind that if a party's debt exceeds the maximum amount handled in Small Claims Court, your litigation will become more involved because it would have to be in a court of general jurisdiction (meaning a circuit or district court).	Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.	Am I required to help purchase this property for the HOA? Your HOA (homeowner's association) can do what it governing documents permit it to do. It is highly unlikely that there is a statutory prohibition against it doing so. It is quite common, for example, for an HOA to temporary take ownership of units. when the owner of the units had defaulted on their HOA assessment payment obligation, and the HOA forecloses on its lien for unpaid assessments (especially when the units is low in value, like a separately owned parking space or storage unit). Typically, an HOA might want to own vacant lots so that it can control how that vacant lots are developed to prevent an undesirable use of those lots, or to reserve space for the construction of common areas such as community gardens or lawns or HOA facilities, in the future. Normally, such a power would be expressly stated, or would be expressly prohibited, in the governing documents. If the HOA governing documents are silent, typically one would look to the general statutes governing organizations of its type (e.g. non-profit corporations, if that is how the HOA is organized). Most general statutes of this type would permit such a purchase (and a subsequent sale of the lots) if the vote required by the governing documents to purchase (or sell as the case may be) of real property have been complied with by the board. If so do I have any land and title rights to said property? This would normally be spelled out prominently in the governing documents of the HOA. As a practical matter, the HOA would be in exclusive control of the property and would have exclusive responsibility for maintaining and paying for obligations arising from the property, all of which would be paid out of HOA assessments along with any revenue that the land generates. In some HOAs land and title of common areas and other real estate and property of an LLC is legally vested in the HOA entity as a corporate owner of it, and you own membership interests in the HOA. This usually increases the economic value of your membership interest, but has little other direct impact. In some HOAs (which are called "condominiums" when using that term in the strict rather than in the colloquial or broad sense) land and title of common areas and other real estate of an LLC is held as an undivided tenancy in common interest of all HOA members in proportion to their assessment percentage, with the HOA having an irrevocable power of attorney to manage it on behalf of its members, although, in practice, the differences between these and corporate ownership of common areas and other HOA real estate is almost nil. Sometimes, rather than an irrevocable power of attorney, the HOA is a trustee over the common areas and other real estate which are beneficially owned by the members as tenants in common, instead.
What is a difference between Pro Se and Pro Per? What is a difference between Pro Se and Pro Per, in the United States legal system? From my understanding, both terms mean a party representing themselves. I read on https://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/what-is-the-difference-between--pro-per--and--pro--45336.html: Pro Se is usually used in federal court. Pro Per is usually used in state court. If the statement is accurate, why, and is there any other difference?	There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them.	Generally, a managing member of an LLC cannot speak for the LLC in court. The LLC needs to hire a licensed lawyer to do that. The general rule is that entities may not represent themselves "pro se" through non-lawyer officers and must have a licensed attorney represent them in any court matter (in practice, a court will usually allow an officer or manager to write a letter to the court asking for a brief extension of time to a deadline to obtain a proper lawyer, even though that is logically inconsistent). If an entity does not hire a lawyer, a default judgment will enter against it. In other words, a CEO or manager or managing member of a company isn't allowed to speak for it in court. This rule is almost universal in the world of legal systems descended from English common law, although sometimes there are narrow statutory exceptions. The manager of an LLC is a person to whom legal process may be directed to begin a lawsuit, but that isn't the same as representing the LLC in court. Wyoming does have an exception to the general rule for small claims court cases at Wyoming Statutes § 1-21-202(b), which states: Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 33 of the Wyoming Statutes, in small claims court, the state, governmental entities, natural persons, corporations, partnerships, associations or other organizations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in person or through authorized employees, with or without an attorney, provided that if an attorney appears, the opposing party is entitled to a continuance for the purpose of obtaining an attorney of its own. Keep in mind, however, that small claims court only governs claims of $6,000 or less, and only in cases where the Plaintiff has elected to file a suit using small claims court procedures. I note that this question is tagged "small claims court" but it isn't clear from the circumstances set forth in the question whether this is merely a claim for a small amount of money or is truly a claim that was filed using the special small claims court procedures in which an attorney is not required. Wyoming Statutes § 33-5-101 et seq. is the law regulating attorneys which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law that is the basis for the general rule at Wyoming Statutes § 33-5-117 which states: It shall be unlawful, and punishable as contempt of court, for any person not a member of the Wyoming state bar to hold himself out or advertise by whatsoever means as an attorney or counselor-at-law. This statute isn't perfectly clear on its face, but is understood to codify the universal common law rule so it isn't ambiguous in any way.	No, but the USA is special! In COMPARATIVE LITIGATION RATES from HARVARD, JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS, the authors J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen argue that for routine normal cases, the US is no more or less litigious than anywhere else in the developed world, specifically, they make comparisons with Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the UK. However, they do say: Why, then, the American notoriety? It does not result from the way the legal system handles routine disputes. Instead, it derives from the peculiarly dysfunctional way courts handle several discrete types of disputes. In several discrete areas, American courts function in a manner one can only describe as disastrous. American courts have made the bad name for themselves by mishandling a few peculiar categories of law suits. In this article, we use securities class actions and mass torts to illustrate the phenomenon, but anyone who reads a newspaper could suggest alternatives. This strange and peculiarly American phenomena of courts making huge payouts for a small number of cases skews perception of risk and leads to, for example, US hotels dismantling water slides.	No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]."	The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.	Custom is more important than the law AFAIK there is no legal requirement to provide concessional pricing for any goods or services. Custom dictates that this is more common for services than for goods but, for example, cinema’s often don’t provide concessional pricing for blockbuster movies.	Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A.	Why the highly formalized language of "Now comes..."? "NOW COMES" is traditional ("Comes Now" is actually more common even though it is even more formal and awkward), a bit like "WHEREAS" in contracts. Modern legal writing disfavors this wording in the first sentence of a legal document and I usually omit it unless I know that the judge is very old fashioned. These days, when a lawyer is in front of a court in person, the lawyers starts to speak about something by saying "May it please the court" (another traditional phase emphasizing deference to the fact that the judge can throw you in jail if you are rude without a trial in a courtroom). But, people used to say, "NOW COMES" instead and that phrase stuck in written form. Why the seemingly random capitalization? The capitalization is not completely correct in your example. Some people have the bad habit of capitalizing every word that they think is important, which is not proper in English. (For what it is worth, in German, all nouns are capitalized.) Petitioner should be capitalized because it is being used as a proper noun in lieu of someone's name. Court should be capitalized here because the rule is that the word Court is capitalized when you are talking about the court that you are in, but in lower case when you are talking about another court's rulings. Enter was improperly capitalized. Petitions is improperly capitalized. (In general, probably as a residual of the fact that English is a Germanic language, verbs are almost never capitalized unless they are defined terms or are the first word in a sentence.) Order is capitalized when it refers to a particular order that already exists, but should be in lower case here when it is referring to an order that is being requested in the future.
Realtor broke contract without notifying I have been in the process of buying a house for the last months and my realtor had been acting strange as she kept arguing for the Seller. Now First off I live in PA so Dual Agency is allowed, however we have an explicit contract that says if Dual Agency were to occur that her employer would appoint a separate Realtor to represent the buyer. This did not occur Now when signing the final loan paper work, previous paper work did not have realtors signatures in them at time of signing, I see that mine is listed for both buyer and seller. It also turns out that the initial estimates given were dramatically off for closing costs and monthly payments provided by the realtor with even the property taxes being incorrect. I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this?	I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.	You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.	You signed the contract It does not have to be “shown” to you, it just has to be available. You say it was “on the back side”; providing you had the opportunity to turn the paper over, it was available to you and it doesn’t matter that you didn’t see it or read it - that’s your problem. If they deliberately disguised the fact that the contract had two sides or actively prevented you from looking at the back, there might be a way out. But, as stated, it seems you just didn’t look.	I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.	If you were given a non compliant notice, you haven’t been given notice You can stay as long as you like or for 4 months after they give you the correct notice. The landlord’s legal obligation was to give you 4 months notice: not his agent, or the Queen, or some guy he was chatting with at the pub. Whether that causes other people with other contracts problems is a matter for them to work out, it’s none of your business. However, … The management agency is the landlord’s agent. That means, as far as you are concerned there is no legal difference between what they do and what the landlord does. If either of them had given you a valid notice, it is as though the landlord had done so. However, if the landlord says something to the agent, from your point of view, the landlord is talking to themselves. If the landlord has sold the property, it comes with any existing leases. If the landlord has promised vacant possession and can’t deliver it, then they have broken the contract with the buyer and the buyers can sue your landlord for damages or possibly terminate the contract or both. If that happens, and it was a result of the agent’s negligence, the landlord can sue the agent.	The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done.	The date and location of the signature merely documents when/where the signature was made, and doesn't have a lot of legal significance for ordinary contracts. This information is probably only useful if you need to argue that you could't have signed the contract because you weren't in that town on that day. Despite this small lapse your contract is perfectly valid, in particular you are required to make any payments that are part of this contract. It doesn't make sense to get this corrected. However, if any actual information (for example, you address) changed, then you should notify the gym to update the information.	If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.
Patent infringement I am developing a portable water filtration system , but I don't want to patent the design or the technology as I want the technology to be an open-source hardware and software technology. So let's assume that I released my product on a certain date for sale , let's assume that the date is 18th March 2018 , but as I made my hardware's design to be open-source , so anybody can copy it. So is it possible that somebody could patent my design and sue me laterwards for patent infringement even when my product sale started before the other person's patent application's date and that over the fact that my technology is completely open-source?? And is there any open-source hardware licence available ??	A person can only patent their own original invention. If the technology which is the subject of the patent existed before it was filed, then the patent is not enforceable. This is called prior art. Note that the rights to a patent can always be placed in the public domain. Patent just means "make obvious" in Latin. So, if you obtain a patent, that does not necessarily mean you are blocking other people from using the technology. There are also various established ways for publishing your technology to guarantee that it is in the public domain.	The word "use", for purposes of trademark law, is a term of art meaning it is used in a way that may be a violation of law if not licensed. Not all uses of trademarks are violations. Similarly, there is a difference between using the name of a company and the brand of products or services sold by that company. In any case, using a trademark or trade name to REFERENCE a company or brand is not a trademark infringement. For instance, I don't need any license to tell you that I own a Dell or HP or Apple product, or that my software will run on a Dell or HP or Apple product. The use of a logo is, however, more sensitive and likely to require detailed legal analysis, if not an actual license.	Copyright infringement requires copying. The inventor could very reasonably invent a device without any reference or even knowledge of the artistic depiction in the Portal games. If the inventor hasn't copied anything, they aren't infringing copyright. Also, with respect to 2d depictions of 3d objects, only architectural drawings are protected in that way: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_in_architecture_in_the_United_States With respect to your patent question, Valve hasn't publicly disclosed how to make a Portal gun, so an inventor of a Portal gun would not be blocked from patenting it. You can't get a patent without describing how to actually make the invention.	Yes, patents expire. The term is generally 20 years, but a patent can expire earlier if the owner fails to pay the scheduled maintenance fees. 35 U.S.C. § 154, 35 U.S.C. § 41 The patent owner could grant you permission to make, use, or sell the invention. This isn't the same as getting permission to call it your own, and it is completely separate from copyright.	It's not software; it's a "method," which is a type of process. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 35 USC §101 (Software would be a particular program employing this process, written in a particular programming language and run on a particular hardware platform.) To be protected by patent, an invention must be novel and non-obvious. The patent office doesn't get too deeply into questions of obviousness, however; these will come up when a patent's validity is challenged, for example in court, generally in response to an accusation of patent infringement. If you believe the invention is obvious, and that you could prove that in a court of law, you can use the invention secure in the knowledge that you will prevail when IBM comes after you for patent infringement. If you don't have very deep pockets, however, you might want to think twice about pursuing that strategy.	They don't actually claim to have a patent. Lots of people license a patent, and then they are using "patented technology". The only effect of this statement is: If you want to copy their product, you better find out what patent they are licensing, otherwise you might be in legal trouble. And their statement means you should have known that your copy of their product is covered by some patent, so you lose some defenses if you are accused of using a patent without license. And of course many customers think if something is patented then it must be good. Which is not true obviously. But logically who owns the patent doesn't make a difference to that, so their statement isn't misleading IMHO.	You can write anything you want (basic First Amendment protections): the question is whether one would be liable for damage that arises from what you're written, or whether you can distribute what you've written. Distribution may be restricted, thanks to the Commerce Clause (hence FDA regulations, which figure prominently in the analysis). Most software writers are not medical practitioners, and vice versa, and what the software writer does is implement something described by a competent medical practitioner. It is logically possible that a med. practitioner might also try to write software (no problem) and distribute it (possibly a problem); or, a software writer might read up on something on Wikipedia and try to implement it (again, no problem) or distribute it (possible problem). Damages can be sorted into two categories, implementation errors and scientific errors, and having ruled out deliberate sabotage, we are left with negligence. If the software writer failed to use suitable care in writing code that sums a set of numbers, the software writer has been negligent. If the person purporting to have the qualified scientific knowledge mis-states the formula, that person has been negligent. It is possible for many parties to be negligent (the programmer failed to be diligent in understanding the software requirements; the medical professional failed to adequately explain what was required of the program). The FDA does regulate medical devices, and "device" is construed pretty broadly (condoms are non-exempt class 2 medical devices). There is FDA guidance on medical software which makes it clear that the device manufacturer shoulders the regulatory burden. Anytime you manufacture a tangible thing (which is within the scope of FDA regulation for medical devices), you have to have the thing approved. Many (most?) medical devices implement software, and are thus within the scope of FDA scrutiny. It is not illegal to write software that ends up being implemented in an unapproved medical device, but the unapproved medical device itself is illegal. It is reasonably likely that purported medical software (not a gadget with software build in) would be held to be a non-exempt device. To know if something is exempt, you would look at the exemptions list, and determine that your program (or thing) is not on or implied by anything on that list. The visual acuity eye chart is a class 1 exempt item, as is the manual toothbrush. There is no way to specifically look for things that are only software, or that contain software, so the search through the list would have to be guided by knowledge of the subject area. Canada is helpful in explaining when software is a regulated medical device. This is non-probative w.r.t. US law but gives you an idea what is likely to be considered a "device". Under Canadian law, the software would be clearly a regulated medical device. The FDA has a power-point that attempts to say something about the matter which warns you that you are on your own and "You will need to go back to study and use the source regulatory documents" to make the determination. Eventually, slide 13, they hint that if you intend the software to be used in diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, then it is a device (so, yes, the aforementioned software would be a device, and probably not exempt from regulations). General purpose software (word processors, web browsers, communications software, etc.) are not indented to be used for a regulated purpose, although they can be so used, and thus they are probably not subject to FDA regulation. There is a murky relationship between regulatory approval and liability. Being approved by the government does not convey immunity to negligence suits (see Wyeth v. Levine), but being approved can have weight in determining whether a party was negligent, since regulatory scrutiny ostensibly filters out errors that could have been caught. Federal approval does not preempt state tort law, as the court ruled. Regulations pertaining to medical devices hold for anything that qualifies as a device, and is not defined (negatively) in terms of disclaimers. If you sell a medical device but label it saying "this is not a medical device, it is not created by a competent medical practitioner", that doesn't make it not a medical device. Unfortunately, what counts as a regulated device is based on intended use, and there is an obvious connection between disclaimers and intentions. Taking MS Word as an example, MS does not as far as I know say that "Word is not intended to be used as a medical device". It can certainly be used to diagnose, teat, and prevent medical conditions, but so too can a screw driver or pretty much anything else. The number of non-medical uses vastly outweigh the medical uses, so it would be deemed not to be a regulated device. A program which prescribed a set of prayers to be uttered in case of illness would be subject to First Amendment override of any FDA regulations. Quack medical devices are prohibited (that's why there is regulation of devices in the first place), but discerning the fine line between permitted actions based on nutty beliefs and forbidden actions is not easy. The FDA also has guidance on the distinction between "Complementary and Alternative Medicine", which does not clearly state that, for example, a software reading of your cakra-energies based on a computer program's questions is not a medical device. They do say of mind-body medicine (mentioning yoga, biofeedback and tai chi as examples) that "CAM practices in this domain would not be subject to our jurisdiction under the Act or the PHS Act", but then say "any equipment or other products used as part of the practice of mind-body medicine may be subject to FDA regulation, depending on the nature of the product and its intended use" (hence a yoga-enabling program may be subject to regulation).	Yes - patents are not for results but for devices and processes that can achieve the result. An airplane and a helicopter can have similar results; more than one medication helps to reduce blood sugar levels.
Can one person be charged for producing the (inherently dangerous and possibly contraband) murder tool used by someone else? If Person A manufactured a poison, and it was given to somebody else by Person B, without Person A's knowledge, what could Person A be charged with? I am writing a novel for NaNoWriMo and I have set up this situation as a driving force for the mystery. I am just unsure what crime the police could charge Person A with (if not murder, which they suspect he committed). My first instinct was involuntary manslaughter, but it doesn't seem to fit correctly, and I am unsure how to proceed, as my background is not in law.	Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit.	If the pill contained a harmful or noxious substance, this is battery, which is a crime in Lousiana ("the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another"). There is a specific crime in LA, battery of a teacher, which is dealt with somewhat more severely than non-teacher battery. It is not a crime to observe a crime being committed and not warn the victim, but it is a crime to aid the commission of the crime (for example to help the perp remove the lid, to supply the drug). Under section Title 17, a teacher battered by a student can file a school-system internal complaint which may lead to the student being expelled (this is ultimately covered by district-specific procedure). This is independent of criminal charges.	I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it.	Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable.	It is premature to judge the particular case because the facts are not all available. But we can address the general principles. The Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(a) sets out the general principles clearly. A person has the right to self-defense against unlawful force. But, the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. But more specifically under (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat However, there is a further condition that force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take Then finally, §3.05 says that this goes for people using force in defense of others. The short version is that the common law right to resist illegal arrest has been supplanted by a statutory requirement to submit to police authority, for example in California and New York. In Ewumi v. Georgia, defendant was illegally arrested and physically defended himself, which resulted in a battery charge and conviction. The battery charge was overturned because the arrest was illegal ab initio. If one resisting an authorized arrest, where an officer's force is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm, the question is whether a reasonable person would find it necessary to resist in self-defense. It is unusual for the courts to find that to be the case. Minnesota law says that reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction: (a) in effecting a lawful arrest Other sections say that a person who is not a public officer may use force to effect an arrest, or, "(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person". Being arrested by the police is not an offense, and none of the other justifications for use of force apply.	They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both.	If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.	The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence).
What is the legal status of "warrant canaries"? A warrant canary is a repeated claim by an individual or organization that they have not been served any warrants with an attached gag order. The idea is that you can say whatever you like if you have not been served such a warrant, but if you are ever served a warrant you simply stop publishing your warrant canary. Attentive listeners or readers would infer that you have been served a warrant, contrary to the intent of the gag order. The EFF gives an overview of these warrant canaries here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/warrant-canary-faq What legal theories would support or harm the case of anyone attempting this technique?	The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.	Yes new-south-wales A non-exhaustive list: At common law, a police officer can arrest without warrant any person the officer reasonably suspects has committed a felony. A private citizen can arrest without warrant only where a felony has actually been committed. Both police officers and private citizens can arrest without a warrant a person who commits a breach of the peace, or where it is reasonably believed that the person is about to commit a breach of the peace. In NSW a police officer’s common law duty to take a person before a justice as soon as practicable after arrest has been replaced by a statutory scheme introduced by the Crimes Amendment (Detention After Arrest) Act 1997. Under Part 10A police may detain a person for investigation for 4 hours, or for a further period not exceeding 8 hours if a warrant to extend the investigation period is obtained. Police can detain people 'for their own good' - for example, an intoxicated or drug-affected person; private citizens can't. Police can stop and search a suspect before an arrest on reasonable grounds; private citizens can't. Police can give directions to the public (the 'move-along' power); private citizens can't. Police can demand a person's name and address; private citizens can't. Police can demand disclosure of the identity of a driver and passengers in a motor vehicle; private citizens can't. Police can stop and search vehicles (including the road block power); private citizens can't. Police can conduct forensic procedures; private citizens can't. Police can conduct customs inspections (as can customs officers); private citizens can't. Police can search for internally concealed drugs; private citizens can't. Police can execute search warrants; private citizens can't. etc.	The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."	They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what. That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal.	In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.	was the idea that all searches and seizures, reasonable or otherwise, require a warrant? No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This means that unreasonable searches are prohibited. A prohibited search can't require a warrant because the search is prohibited. If a warrant was issued for an unreasonable search then the warrant was issued in error.	I'll use California penal code 837 as an example, though most other states have similar statutes: A private person may arrest another: For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence... 839 says: Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him therein. Generally, someone making an arrest is allowed to use "reasonable force" to effect the arrest. The question then becomes, is the act of interrupting a football game a public offense? Once a fan at a football game enters the field, assuming it is a violation of the license granted to the fan, they are trespassing. These fans are often drunk when performing their midfield dance so that is another public offense for which they could be arrested. Once arrested, the interloper must be turned over as soon as possible to a magistrate or peace officer. The person making the arrest is always subject to being sued. It is a question for a trier of fact to determine if unreasonable force was used in effecting the arrest. My guess is that in most of these cases security simply ejects the exuberant fan from the premises and the fan never looks back. If a lawsuit were to be filed it would be based on unreasonable force being applied during the arrest. California penal code 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Certainly, one could be charged with assault in effecting a citizen's or private arrest but it would go back to the definition of reasonable force and what force was necessary to effect the arrest. If someone resisted arrest I think it more likely that that person could face an assault charge.	UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.
Has somebody gotten major prison sentences in the US for simply deserting their post? Bowe Bergdahl deserted his post in Afghanistan. Originally facing the possibility of a life-sentence, prosecutors ultimately attempted to give him a 14-year sentence. This seems like an absolutely horrific and barbaric way to punish soldiers who, for whatever reason, felt compelled to leave their post (in this particular case, apart from suffering from a mental disorder, Bergdahl seemingly wanted to reveal some bad things happening in his unit). My question is, has anybody ever been actually given these large sentences, simply for leaving their post? Note: desertion to the enemy is of course an entirely different matter. Here, we are simply talking about the act of walking away, of not wishing to be part of something anymore. I would even go as far as saying that a person who does this is, more often than not, doing it in good faith, probably due to having witnessed wrongdoings and wishing to distance themselves from it.	Eddie Slovik was executed by firing squad for desertion during World War II (the only U.S. solider to have the death sentence carried out for desertion during the war). He requested from his commander an assignment behind the front lines, was denied, and took it upon himself to leave his post, walk to the rear and presented a note to a cook there confessing to the crime of desertion. Hundreds of U.S. soldiers (on both sides) were executed during the Civil War for desertion, or "simply walking away." Ebenezer Leffingwell was almost executed during the Revolutionary War for "running away from where the firing was, with every mark of fear and trepidation." This case is complicated by the fact that, after first being told to return, Leffingwell made a feint to do so then tried to desert again. After Col. Joseph Reed again "admonished" him with the broadside of his saber and instructing him back to the fight, Leffingwell turned and attempted to fire his weapon at his superior, though it failed to discharge. General George Washington approved the sentence, and Leffingwell received a last minute pardon after his grave had already been dug and the firing squad had lined up. To answer your title question, there is this quote from Wikipedia: The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, although this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. serviceman has received more than 24 months imprisonment for desertion or missing movement post-September 11, 2001 It also highlights § 885. Art. 85 from the 2012 edition of US Manual for Court Martial: Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.	The probable answer is right there in the article: the Kim Dotcom case has been a PR coup but a legal disaster. Mr Dotcom has not, at this time, been jailed and it may have become apparent to US and NZ law enforcement agencies that he probably never will be! It is really, really easy to accuse someone of committing a crime; it can be really, really hard to prove it beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law. So after initiating a case that has turned out to be a total disaster, why would you expect them to do the same thing a second time?	IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.	In the US, the details are determined at the state level. The term "abandonment" is used very broadly, and can include a situation where a parent leaves a child without making contact for a period of time (which may result in termination of parental rights, but not a punishment). "Abandonment" as it applies in Washington state is explained here. There is what is known as a "safe haven" law, which allows a newborn (under 72 hours old) to be transferred (anonymously) to a qualified recipient (health care employee, medic, etc.), and not be liable under the criminal laws. This does not include dumping the infant in the snow. Under RCW 9A.42.020, the parent would be guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if their action "causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life" (note that the law is not specific to children), and this is a class B felony. There are multiple grades of mistreatment, so if the action "creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury" or "causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms", this is 4th degree mistreatment, which is a misdemeanor. There are, in parallel fashion, laws against abandonment of a dependent starting at RCW 9A.42.060, punished as a class B felony down to a gross misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for a class B felony is $20,000 and 10 years in prison, and for a simple misdemeanor it is 90 days and $1,000. In case death results, the discussion could move to the homicide statutes. Homicide by abuse is when, with extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person. and this is a class A felony. If a person "recklessly causes the death of another person", this is manslaughter in the first degree (class A felony), but if it is "with criminal negligence", it is manslaughter in the second degree (a class B felony). Manslaughter charges are predicated on there not being an intent to kill. If the intent was to actually kill the child, this would be first degree homicide, where the punishment is life imprisonment. Additionally, first degree homicide can be found if "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". State v. Edwards is a relevant case, where a person was charged with both second degree murder and homicide by abuse, and the issue came up that "extreme indifference to human life" is not a self-evident expression. It turns out that case law in Washington interprets this, as applied to first degree murder, as meaning "indifference to human life in general", not "indifference to the life of the specific victim". After a lengthy review of principles of judicial interpretation, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the first-degree murder definition of indifference, that is, it is up the the jury to decide what constitutes extreme indifference, for homicides other than 1st degree murder.	Yes. Although there are numerous child-protection laws, there is nothing specific for (beggar) children in this scenario so it would fall within Criminal Force, an offence contrary to section 350 Indian Penal Code: Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent ... or intending ... or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other. The punishment for which may be found at section 352 Whoever ... uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment ... for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. For completeness "Force" is described by section 349 as: A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling... [A substance could be, for example, a broom handle or a pan of water] Also, for completeness there's the alternative of Assault under section 351 if no force is used.	In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412	The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat.
What happens when court orders issued by different countries contradict each other? Two recent examples have prompted me to wonder about this: In the Equustek case a Canadian company has gained an injunction in the Canadian courts ordering Google to remove certain material worldwide. Google now has an injunction in the US blocking the enforcement of this injunction in the US. In the Microsoft case the US government is seeking a warrant forcing Microsoft to hand over some emails related to a drug investigation. The emails happen to be stored in Ireland, and Irish law (following the EU) prohibits the release of private information to a third party. The Irish law is likely to be even more stringent with the implementation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). So what happens when a company is legally required to do something by one country when it is also legally prevented from doing it by another? Are there any general principles here, or is the company just going to have to decide which country to be held in contempt in? Does this legal hazard also apply to individual employees? Might we see Microsoft executives having to choose between US and European arrest warrants for contempt? I realise that the Microsoft case is still pending appeal to the US Supreme Court, but if the Court rules in the government's favour then this is going to be a real question.	These situations do come up (and incidentally, this is nothing new, it has been a difficult and recurring legal issue since at least the 18th century), and they really suck to be in, and often there aren't easy answers. There are a lot of legal doctrines out there that are designed to avoid a hard clash of conflicting court orders and to prevent someone from suffering contempt of court sanctions when they are in this bind. Generally, litigants caught in this bind look for these outs. For example, when particular property or records are at issue, often the person in question will "interplead" the property placing it in the jurisdiction of a court to resolve and out of their hands. There is a doctrine called in custodia legis which provides that once something is in the custody of a court that another court may not exercise jurisdiction over it. The entire sub-field of civil procedure pertaining to jurisdiction and venue is designed to avoid these conflicts. U.S. law has a whole sub-field a statutes and legal doctrines like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine designed to prevent these conflicts from coming up when they arise between federal and state courts. One of the most important legal doctrines is that a person cannot be punished for contempt of court for failing to do something that the person being held in contempt of court does not have the ability to do. One argument, which doesn't always work, is that once you are subject to a legally binding court order that has been served upon you that you may not legally defy that court order in order to follow the order of a court which cannot override the decisions of the court issuing the first order. Usually, contempt citations are directed at individual employees or agents rather than at entities. For example, in a dispute over Indian Trust Funds against the United States government, contempt citations were brought against the Secretary of Interior personally and could have sent that individual to jail for not complying. One way the an individual can get out of the order relating to an employment or professional duty is to resign from office and thus deprive oneself of the ability to perform the order. But, the short answer is that there is no one simple legal rule for resolving these situations, and the litigants stuck in these situations look for every available legal argument to resolve it until it is resolved.	Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here.	You may not have a clear understanding of patents. They are 99.9%* territorial. A patent issued by the USPTO is the only patent relevant to the making, selling, offering for sale, importing, or using a patented product in the U.S. And the same for all other countries. Of course U.S. companies not only file for U.S. patents; they also file for German, Chinese and any other places they see fit and have the funds to pursue. Likewise, Chinese companies file with the USPTO for U.S. patents. If a filing by by company A in any country occurs before a filing by company B in any country and A's filing makes B's not new, then B should not a patent in whatever place it has filed. Also, merely getting a patent does not violate someone else's patent, a product can infringe a patent. Actually a product can infringe many patents from many patent owners. And having a patent doesn't automatically allow for the production of a product practicing that patent. (the 0.1% is for odd corner cases at sea or involving importing of components of patented items)	Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data.	Have you approached Google? Your contract with Google has a dispute resolution procedure (I’d link to the Canadian terms but I can’t find them). Generally a court will not entertain your claim unless and until you have followed the procedure you agreed to.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	This is not illegal if the transaction has any relationship to the foreign country (this limitation is called the minimum contacts test). These agreements called choice of law or forum selection clauses are routinely honored. It usually isn't illegal for a clause to exclude a United States court as a forum as to the parties to the contract. The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971), a source often relied upon by courts regarding common law rules upon which they have no binding precedents, states that: [T]he parties agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. This doesn't actually divest the U.S. courts of jurisdiction over the case, but does mean that if you bring the case in a U.S. court in circumstances where there is no reason that the clause isn't valid and applicable, that your case will be promptly dismissed, possibly with an award of attorney fees and costs against you for trying to evade a valid contractual provision. The law concerning the scope of a choice of forum clause's application, and who decides that question, can be somewhat involved, but in particular cases, where the existence of a binding contract is undisputed and no exceptions to the general rule upholding these clauses is present, the enforcement of a choice of forum clause is often uncontroversial. As Wikipedia explains (in the forum selection clause link above): In Future Industries of America v. Advanced UV Light GmbH, 10-3928, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City affirmed the dismissal of a case that sent the parties to Germany because the forum selection clause made German courts the exclusive forum. By contrast, the same court in Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 08-1358, affirmed the refusal of the lower court to refer the parties to Ireland because the clause was not exclusive, and the litigation continues in America. The state of New York has a statute expressly dealing with those circumstances under which a New York court may not dismiss a case on the grounds of forum non conveniens if the parties' contract provides that the agreed upon venue is a court in New York and if the transaction involved an amount more than $1 million. Currently, a U.S. Circuit Court split is emerging over whether forum selection clauses in a contract supersede pre-existing arbitration clauses in regulatory membership rules, such as FINRA. Statutory exceptions may apply in some cases. For example, under U.S. law, a provision allowing a debt collector to bring suit in consumer debt collection cases outside the place where the consumer debtor resides is void as a matter of public policy under the Fair Debt Collection Act. But, as a general rule, such clauses are not prohibited. Two of the leading cases upholding such clauses in U.S. law are M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 92 Sup. Ct. 1907 (1972) (discussed in this law review article) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). And, although both of these cases were in the specialty of admiralty law there is no reasoning in these cases confining the holding of these cases to a maritime law setting. More law review treatment can be found here.	A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt.
Can the recipient of a digital message legally publish the message? It's pretty commonplace these days for people to take screenshots of text messages (or messages on other platforms) and post them online for the general public to see - be it on Twitter, Facebook, what have you. Regardless of the commonality of it, however, I'm wondering if it's actually legal to do so in the United States? It seems that there could be a number of potential issues here: Invasion of privacy (assuming the sender hasn't given permission to the recipient to do so) False light (out of context, the texts could be misconstrued) Copyright (as I understand, recipients have ownership of the physical message, but not the content - and messages are only content with no real physical side) Do any of these ideas hold merit?	Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability.	We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.	Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time.	The user can always claim that. Whether such a claim will be believed is another matter. A party to a contract with a "wet-ink" signature can claim that it was forged or that the signer was impersonated. But such claims are hard to prove, particularly if they are not true. The answer to the question in the title is that terms are binding if the user freely agrees to them, and if they meet the conditions for a legally binding agreement in the relevant jurisdiction. The question in the body is more about what evidence will establish this. Suppose the code behind a web-site is so designed that no user is allowed to proceed without affirmatively accepting the ToS, and the operator can demonstrate this. That will be persuasive evidence that the user did accept the terms. If the site logs the consent in a database along with a timestamp that would be further evidence. A journaling database provides an audit trail of changes, which would be further evidence. Evidence of other users that the site always worked that way, and of coders that the code had never permitted a user to proceed without accepting the ToS might also help. Backups of the DB stored with a 3rd party including the consent logs would also provide evidence that the timestamps were present and unchanged. A hash of the log can be stored on the blockchain. The site could also send a "registration accepted" email to the user (if the user has provided an email address) which could include a mention that the user had accepted the ToS. Such an email would be reserved in the logs of the senders and receiver's email providers, and could be retrieved as evidence. Ultimately it will be a question of what the finder of fact believes, if the matter goes to court. And as user Amon says, the US standard is preponderance of the evidence (that is, the evidence is at least a little bit stronger on one side. This is sometimes loosely expressed as more than 50% or 51% or better proved, but courts do not in fact measure degrees of proof in numbers), not absolute proof.	Multipage contracts, like any multipage texts, will likely bear some level of originality and so they will have a copyright owner. Absent a license allowing you to reuse the text, you will not be allowed to do so. The fact that you were a party to a contract represented by the text does not change your position: your contract does not have anything to do with the copyright of its text, therefore you still need to honor the copyright as if you were not a party to the contract. It is not uncommon that the copyright will be owned by the lawyer who drafted the text. Your business partner who supplied it would have employed/contracted one. Or, the lawyer could have provided the text to your business partner together with the copyright (less common). Why wouldn't fair-use be at play here? Don't you already get the permission to copy and modify the contract from the original party when they send it to you? (Is such right only limited to original execution?) The original party, whether it is the copyright owner or just a license holder, can send the text to you for possible copy and modification in the course of executing the contract with that party only. The copy that you receive is provided solely with the express purpose to make you an offer (so that you know the terms of the contract) and give opportunity to suggest modifications i.e. make a counter-offer. To reuse the text with another party you need a permission/license from the copyright owner. Fair-use won't play here because you'd be using the text for the purpose it was created for—executing contracts—as opposed to, say, writing a research paper on language/phrases used in legal documents. Does it at all invalidate the agreement itself if the party that supplied the contract doesn't actually own the copyright to it? After all, if you're not legally allowed to have a copy of the text that specifies the terms of the contract, how would it be possible to adhere to such terms? Most contracts do not even need to be in writing. The text will be just one of the evidences if your contract, not the contract itself. No matter whether you obtained the text legally or not, it still does its job as evidence. Whilst you may well be sued for the copyright infringement, in no way will it affect the validity of your contract, which will still hinge on those well-known 6 elements having nothing to do with the copyright of the text.	The length of a literary work doesn't determine if its use is fair use. Copyright does not cover names, titles of works, catchwords/catchphrases/advertising slogans etc. or lists of ingredients (like in a recipe or chemical instructions), however, the procedure can be copyright. The work must also be original. If the tweet copies something that already exists then there is no copyright in the tweet - if the thing that is copied has copyright protection then the tweet itself may be a violation. That said, assuming that the Tweet enjoys copyright protection, the owner will be the author: presumably the owner of the Twitter account. For anyone else to legally use it, the use must be either: Licensed by the copyright owner Fair use (USA) or Fair Dealing (most everywhere else in the English speaking world) For Item 1, the Twitter terms of service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). In case you don't know what that means, Twitter gives you this plain English summary: Tip: This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets on the Twitter Services available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. So, you can get permission from the copyright holder or from Twitter. Well, Twitter has given permission: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. Providing you use their API, you can "reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the ... Content ..." Therefore, fair use/dealing considerations are irrelevant.	If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;	I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.
California's Leonard Law - to what extent does it apply at religious schools Here's the full reference in the California legal code. The main section: (a) A school district operating one or more high schools, a charter school, or a private secondary school shall not make or enforce a rule subjecting a high school pupil to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside of the campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of the California Constitution. There's a clause related to religious schools: (c) This section does not apply to a private secondary school that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. In my layperson research most references I found blanket discount the entire section because of clause '(c)', saying the entire section (known as Leonard Law) doesn't apply to religious schools. To me that doesn't seem correct. Yes, at a catholic school students couldn't hold a "pro-abortion" rally on campus because abortion is inconsistent with a tenent of the church. On the other hand, a rally in support of a teacher or student that was just dismissed (or expelled)... there's nothing there that goes against the tenents of the religion.	Clause (c) says that while schools cannot generally restrict otherwise legal expressions by students, a school run by a religious organization can restrict such speech in terms of its tenets. It then becomes a matter of fact to be proven in court that the church has a particular tenet. So if you are asking whether it is correct that the religion exception is narrowly limited to contradictions of the religion's tenets, that is correct.	Merely encouraging people not to vaccinate via educational and political communication without purporting to provide individualized medical advice is probably not the practice of medicine and protected by the First Amendment's protections for freedom of speech, rather than constituting medical malpractice. Also, many anti-vax individuals (I couldn't quote a percentage) do so out of religious conviction and are protected not just by the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, but also by the free exercise component of the freedom of religion under the First Amendment. Generally speaking, it is harder to find a legal grounds for disregarding the free exercise of religion than it is to find a legal basis to regulate otherwise free speech. For example, commercial speech is subject to more rigorous regulation than private political and educational speech, which is why there are no private businesses taking anti-vax positions in their advertising. The theory is that courts are not in a good position to make general determinations of the truth of policy positions or statements about general truths as opposed to what happened in a particular transaction or occurrence. This is in part because a ruling by the right court at the right time can preclude the correctness of its determination from being revisited indefinitely and from time to time, accepted conventional wisdom and scientific consensus at one time are revealed later on to have been wrong with more discussion and investigation. I think that this is unlikely to be the case in the vaccination area, but the whole point of the First Amendment's protection of these kinds of issues is that we can't know in advance what will continue to be widely accepted and what will turn out to be mistaken. But, if someone in a medical diagnosis and treatment profession (e.g. M.D., D.O., physician's assistant, or nurse), were to advise a patient in a capacity as a medical care provider not to vaccinate, and as a result that person's child got sick from a disease that vaccination could have prevented, there probably would be medical malpractice liability. A somewhat similar issue arises when health insurance companies or government agencies set rules on providing care. In those cases, it isn't uncommon to have a physician or other medical professional placed on a committee or in an office such as medical director, with that person making the call and exposed to liability although not in the same way as a treating medical professional. A case about a month ago found malpractice by an insurance company's medical director (the company was United Health) to be a huge liability for both the medical director and the insurance company.	I'll start with a list of issues presented and also note at the outset that the question correctly notes that both the school district (which is an entity distinct from the county), and the superintendent of schools, are protected from civil liability to a significant extent by the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is outlined here. Two specific provisions bear particular note: an exclusion of liability for someone who has reported a suspected child abuse case, and immunity for a school teacher who acts in good faith with regard to supervision, care and discipline of students. 1. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has no prior history of serious misconduct? Short of malice directed at a victimized student there is no liability under state law. There is also no well established constitutional right violated that could give rise to civil rights liability. Students commit crimes against each other all of the time and school officials are almost never responsible for those crimes. 2. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has a history of prior serious misconduct? The legal standard is the same but the practical analysis might be more fact intensive. Still, outright malice directed towards a victim would pretty much be the applicable legal standard and is unlikely to be present in this case, absent awareness, for example, of conditions of probation or pre-trial release after the first case that weren't enforced. 3. Is a public school in the U.S. permitted or required by law to advise parents of students at the school that student transferring into the new school has a history of violent criminal conduct? Juvenile justice law and educational privacy laws profoundly limit the extent to which a public school, or its officials are allowed to disclose that a student transferring into a school has a history of violent criminal conduct. There is no clear duty of the public school in the U.S. to disclose this fact broadly. 4. Is a statement by a superintendent to parents in a public school district that transgender girl does not pose a threat to cis-gender girls in restrooms an actionable fraud (and does it matter if there is a history of prior misconduct by a particular student in this case of which the superintendent was aware)? The statement is not, in general, false. If it was made after knowledge of this particular student, that might be a different matter, but as noted above, there are severe legal limitations on what the board is allowed to say. It isn't inconceivable that the school board or superintendent could have said more than it did to at least some people. But there isn't a clear legal duty to do so. It also isn't clear what the superintendent actually knew when he made a report to the school board even tough the information should have been shared with him. It is possible that only a lower level official in the school system had actual knowledge at that time. 5. What crime, if any, did the father of the first rape victim commit for trying to warn the parents about someone who attacked his daughter? This is partially speculation, but the father appears to have been arrested for the manner in which he acted disturbing the peace, speaking out of turn, and refusing the leave a meeting when requested, rather than sharing the information per se. 6. Did the school superintendent commit a crime somehow connected to the second rape by concealing the risk posed by the student in question? The school superintendent has a duty to report child abuse to authorities and failure to do so (if it was not done) would be minor crime. My impression of the fact is that the first rape was reported to juvenile justice system officials and resulted in action being taken. So, it does not appear that this duty was breached. According to the article: The boy was arrested and charged for the first assault in July but released from juvenile detention while prosecutors waited for DNA rape kit evidence to come back. Loudoun County Commonwealth's Attorney Buta Biberaj says at the time they had no reason to believe the boy should have stayed in juvenile detention. “If that case had gone forward and we were not able to substantiate beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that were made by the victim, he would've been out anyway,” she said. “The best decision was made with the facts that were known." This does not, however, give him criminal liability for a subsequent rape of one student by another in which he had not involvement sufficient to constitute criminal conspiracy to commit sexual assault which was the case here. 7. Does the school board have defamation liability for calling the father of the victim of the first rape a transphobe? No. The school board has sovereign immunity from suits for money damages seeking to establish liability in relation to statements made in their official capacity, apparently in good faith. It also isn't clear that the statements made were actionable in the first place, or that such statements were even made by them. The school board also does not appear to have had actual knowledge of what happened until a decisive school board meeting after the second assault. 8. Does the public have any power to remove an appointed official such as the superintendent in this context? No. The political remedy is to elect a new school board that would select a different superintendent.	That statute, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in US v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, does not define desecration. Case law on point is not forthcoming since there is no enforceable law on the topic and as long as the First Amendment holds, we can't test laws prohibiting flag desecration. The general meaning of the word is to treat disrespectfully, irreverently, or profanely, and that clearly is not the case in the present usage. A different statute yet to be written might outlaw "any modifications of the flag" (and would suffer the same fate as 18 USC 700), which could be technically violated in the application of a thin blue line to a flag.	The key limiting factors are the language: and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. And, also, the context of the term "belief" in the statute in conjunction with religion which is defined in the same section, which suggests that in this context it is intended to be understood as the kind of belief that constitutes a core worldview for a person, even if it is secular (e.g. Confucianism or a Stoic philosophy of life), rather than isolated particular ideas about factual things. There is also considerable room for judicial interpretation over whether, for example "effect of" is limited to an "effect" reasonably derived from the "conduct" in question. Still, in general, the U.K., has higher standards mandating civility in dealings with others than the U.S., and there is lots of conduct barred by the Equality Act of 2010 which would not be barred under U.S. law, for example. The closest analog in U.S. law is really the tort of "outrageous conduct" also sometimes known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress."	The question didn't mention marital status, but since states formally recognize that relationship it's helpful to start there. tl;dr: The Supreme Court decided state laws that required a woman to notify her spouse were unconstitutional. Thus it's unlikely there'd be grounds for suit. Background The central mechanism of Roe v. Wade (U.S. 1973) was a balancing act between what it decided was a 14th amendment right to privacy and the state's interest in both the health of the woman and the potentiality of life. Because Roe explicitly recognized a state interest, Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1982 that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period. It also mandated parental consent for minors (with some exceptions) and spousal notification. This reached the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Casey (U.S. 1992). There, the court upheld most of the Pennsylvania law (reinforcing its statement in Roe that a state does have an interest) but struck down the spousal notification portion. To do that, it determined the appropriate test was whether a state was placing an undue burden---a significant obstacle---in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability. It reasoned that: state regulation impacts a female's liberty more than male's during pregnancy (by way of biology) if a man and woman disagree, only one can prevail not all women are equally impacted by a notification mandate (for reasons of domestic violence, etc.) Combining this with the notion that women do not lose any constitutionally protected liberty upon marriage, it decided spousal notification would be a significant obstacle and thus an undue burden. In other words, unmarried women don't have spouses to notify, so placing a notification requirement on married women creates an additional burden that the court found undue. To get back to the question, the father certainly has a right to file a suit against the female (...and it happens from time to time). However, it likely wouldn't go far. Since unmarried women were the baseline in Casey, it's unlikely there'd be grounds for either married or unmarried fathers to sue their female partners. This comes up frequently under the moniker of "Father's Rights," which has gained less traction in the U.S. than in other countries. That said, Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would allow fathers to proceed against abortion providers.	You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.	First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.
How long does it take to evict a tenant in Georgia for not paying rent? Various websites describe the tenant eviction process (e.g., http://www.ajc.com/lifestyles/understanding-the-eviction-process-georgia/peHyJ7mMgYEDVns0NXWPVI/). The eviction process includes going to court. The websites are silent concerning the amount of delay going to court adds (waiting for the court to schedule a court date and waiting for that date to arrive and actually getting the court order to evict). About how much delay does the court hearing process typically entail? Assume we are talking about Atlanta, Georgia and the renter has no legally compelling reason for not paying the rent.	Short Answer Typically, about four weeks in an uncontested case and six weeks in a contested case, although this depends to some extent upon how business the relevant courts are at the time. Long Answer The time limits break down as follows into different parts of the process: Minimum time from formally demanding possession to being legally allowed to bring suit in this situation. This is almost certainly set by statute. In Georgia, there is no waiting period for this part of the process when rent is not paid as agreed. A lawsuit can be filed the same day that a demand for possession is made by the landlord. OCGA § 44-7-50. The time from serving a lawsuit on the tenant to the time that the tenant is required to respond in court. This is almost certainly set by statute or court rule. In Georgia this is seven days from service of process. OCGA § 44-7-51. Georgia, like most states, allows "nail and mail" service by posting a notice on the premises and mailing a notice to the last known address of the tenant, after some reasonable effort has been made to personally service the tenant or any other adult resident, so this step will typically take about seven to ten days. The time from an appearance in court or court filing by the tenant objecting to the eviction to the time that a hearing is scheduled, in the event that the tenant raises an objection (which is easily done, even if there isn't ultimately a legally valid defense to raise). There may be a legal deadline for this in the statute or court rules, although it can usually be waived. This can also vary based on how many cases are pending relative to the number of available judges, something that usually varies seasonally. Georgia does not have a fixed time period for this step, but "Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues." OCGA § 44-7-53. The time from an order of eviction as the conclusion of an eviction hearing until the sheriff or marshall actually carries out the eviction that has been ordered by the court. This is almost never a matter of public record or a legal mandate, and it would typically vary seasonally and over the course of a month as the staff available to carry out evictions is pretty constant, but the demand for evictions has monthly peaks that flow from month end leases and rental payment due dates, and seasonally with the end of school years and the end of calendar years being particularly busy times when delays are greater. Sheriffs have also been known to intentionally stall in holiday seasons. This part of the process in Fulton County is set forth here. The total time is the sum of these four times. Most evictions lawyers in the area would know what is typical for (3) and (4) and would also have a good grasp of how likely it is for a tenant to assert a defense (if the tenant does not, part (3) is skipped and a default judgment for eviction is entered on the appearance date). In my area (in Colorado), (1) is three days, (3) is usually about two weeks and (4) is usually about one to three weeks, but as noted above, your experience in Atlanta, Georgia could easily vary based upon how busy the courts and the marshall are at that time. According to this website, in Georgia, it is customary to allow 3-10 days for step 1 even though it is not legally required, step 3 is typically one to two weeks, and step 4 is typically about two weeks. It is also possible to extent step 2 by one week from one week to two weeks with a procedural tool that most lawyers are aware of in Georgia. So, you are typically looking at about four weeks in an uncontested case and about six in a contested case from notice to actually having people removed.	This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.	The onus lies on the landlord The landlord is the one asserting a right (to evict), therefore, they bear the onus of proving that they have that right. The court will look at the evidence both parties have that the notice was served. For the tenant this is likely to be brief testimony that they never received it. For the landlord, they will testify as to how it was served (personal service, mail etc.) and provide evidence that supports that testimony (photos of them handing it to the tenant, receipts for mail etc.). Please note that only some types of service are valid and laws around service are highly technical. The court will give weight to the evidence (decide what they believe and what they don’t, who they find reliable and who they don’t). The onus in a civil case is “the balance of probabilities” which means if they find the landlord’s version more likely then the notice was served. If they find the tenant’s more likely or both equally likely, it wasn’t.	There's a lot of variables here, as many leases are built in different ways within the leeway allowed by law. You will want to contact a local lawyer to see how you can mitigate the damage to yourself, and contact your landlord and see if you can re-negotiate the lease. If the landlord doesn't want to re-negotiate, you're probably facing eviction if you can't come up with the full rent by yourself; many leases don't allow non-related adults to live on the premises if they're not on the lease (this can also result in eviction). However, your roommate will also get an eviction record and be responsible for any damages if the lease survives long enough to cause an eviction. Actually having a random person move in from Craigslist might also cause your roommate to suffer additional liability if they're not allowed to sublet their lease agreement, which many leases do not allow (landlords like knowing who's living on their properties). Having them move in might cause both you and your roommate to be evicted. You probably don't have any rights to sue your roommate until actual damages occur (in other words, after you've already been evicted). You should speak with your landlord as soon as possible to get a new lease. An eviction record will cause problems for your roommate as well, so you might urge them to consider staying long enough to get things sorted out legally. When you ask your landlord, simply ask something like, "My roommate wants to move out. What are my options?" They will tell you what they are willing to accept.	Can I just not renew their contract and go back to my place in 2 months or do I still need to give them 6 months' notice? Short answer: 6 months' notice Long answer: I'm assuming this is a fixed-term Assured Shorthold Tenancy. Unless a landlord is going down the Section 8 route where the tenant has broken the tenancy agreement, they will need to serve a "Section 21 Notice" under the Housing Act 1988 requesting the tenant to leave a property. The Act has been amended to extend this notice period to 6 months, and any fixed-term tenancy that ends during that period will roll over to a periodic tenancy until the end of the notice period. This is the relevant extract from the government's website: Section 21 notices requiring possession of a property under an assured shorthold tenancy Landlords can only use a Section 21 notice to ask their tenants to leave their property: If the notice expires at or after the end of the fixed term. During a tenancy with no fixed end date - known as a ‘periodic’ tenancy. From 29 August 2020, a Section 21 notice must give tenants at least 6 months’ notice of the fact that the landlord requires possession. This give some more detail about s.21 Notices.	Before you go changing locks, you might want to hire an attorney. There is law in Ohio that governs "such" relationship, which are typically landlord-tenant relationships, but might not be strictly construed the way you'd prefer. In a classic landlord-tenant relationship, it is illegal to change locks on a tenant, and if you want a tenant booted out, you have to go through the court process and get the court to order an eviction (carried out by the sheriff). A landlord-tenant relationship need not involve a written lease, all that matters is having an agreement. On the face of it, it looks to me as though you agreed to let your son live there, and his attorney would no doubt point to whatever benefit you received from allowing your son to live there as "consideration" in this verbal (vague) contract. The exact terms of that contract don't matter: what matters is that state law limits what you can do. You can read ORC here on the topic of evictions. Actually physically removing a person is a crime (battery), so definitely don't do that. Lockouts have been illegal since 1973. You no doubt can show the court that your son is now effectively a trespasser, but he clearly did not break in without permission, so the bottom line is probably a visit to the court (unless a letter from the attorney resolves the matter). Alternatively, it could be simpler and cheaper to just go directly for the court process. There are professionally-written manuals for about $20 that spell out the procedures, and an attorney is not actually required to evict someone. You can just treat the situation as a standard landlord-tenant process, give the required notices (using legalese in a notice may well be sufficient). If you do have to file in court, there are a couple hundred bucks of fees associated with filing. It takes time. There is a 3 day notice requirement on your notice, after that you can file the complaint and a hearing is scheduled after that (county dependent: I hear it's about 3 weeks in Franklin). Defendant can stretch that out for a week or so by asking for a continuance to seek legal counsel, but eventually you will prevail unless the judge is too warm-hearted and orders family counseling (you never know, these days). They you apply for the "red tag", the bailiff posts it within a few days, and that gives him 5 days to leave. If that doesn't work, you call the bailiff for the physical removal, and they probably respond within a couple of business days.	Assuming you have a six-month Assured Shorthold Tenancy, you don't have to give any notice at all. As long as you are not in occupation after the end of the tenancy (which means moving out before it ends), that's it. For example, this page from Shelter says: The general rule is that the tenant can leave on the last day of a fixed-term tenancy without giving notice, and this will end the tenancy.[2] If the tenant remains even a day longer than the last day of a fixed-term tenancy, a statutory periodic assured shorthold tenancy will arise, which the tenant can end by serving a valid notice to quit. [2] Right d. Flower v. Darby (1786) 1 T.R. 159; Cobb v Stokes (1807) 8 East 358. This is extremely bad news for landlords, who don't (necessarily) get any notice that they have a void. In general, I would say you ought to give a month's notice (full disclosure, I am a landlord), on the other hand, if they haven't fulfilled their responsibilities perhaps not (but you may have an exaggerated idea of their responsibilities). If you do this, don't expect to get a good reference from your landlord! (Which is going to make it harder to find somewhere else to live). You should also anticipate difficulties in recovering your deposit (you are legally entitled to it back, but that doesn't mean your landlord can't be difficult about it - possibly even requiring you to sue for it). I have just noticed the second part of your question. If you do nothing (in other words, stay in residence), at the end of your Assured Shorthold Tenancy you will switch to a periodic tenancy. The landlord can't force you to switch to another six-month contract, but on the other hand, if you don't, they are perfectly entitled to give you two months notice. If they are smart, they will give you this notice now, so that you can only stay for two months on the periodic tenancy. Note that the letting agent has an incentive to get you and the landlord to sign another contract (they can charge the landlord a fee for it), so they may not be being entirely honest about whether a periodic tenancy is an option. (On the other hand, a poor landlord may be more interested in locking a tenant in for six months.)	Overview The question sates that "stuff" was left behind on the day that the lease was terminated. It does not saw whether the tenant notified the landlord of this stuff, much less sought permission to leave it. It does not say when or if the tenant removed the stuff, how much stuff there was, or whether the landlord would have had to remove it before the premises could be cleaned and rented to a new tenant. The exact provisions of the lease are going to matter a great deal here. Chapters 91 and 92 of the Texas Property Code cover statewide laws on residential leases and landlord-tenant relation in Texas. These may be supplemented by county or municipal or other local laws, which may impose additional obligations on either party. In many areas the effect of the Texas law depends on what agreements there may be between landlord and tenant, particularly the provisions of any lease. Texas Property Code Texas Property Code 91.001 covers notices of termination of a lease. It provides that: (b) If a notice of termination is given under Subsection (a) and if the rent-paying period is at least one month, the tenancy terminates on whichever of the following days is the later: (b)(1) the day given in the notice for termination; or (b)(2) one month after the day on which the notice is given. ... (d) If a tenancy terminates on a day that does not correspond to the beginning or end of a rent-paying period, the tenant is liable for rent only up to the date of termination. (e) Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) do not apply if: (e)(1) a landlord and a tenant have agreed in an instrument signed by both parties on a different period of notice to terminate the tenancy or that no notice is required; or (e)(2) there is a breach of contract recognized by law. A failure to remove the tenant's belonging and leave the dwelling in "broom-clean" condition may well be "a breach of contract recognized by law." Code section 92.104 provides that: (a) Before returning a security deposit, the landlord may deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease. (b) The landlord may not retain any portion of a security deposit to cover normal wear and tear. Code section 92.109 provides that: (a) A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit. (b) A landlord who in bad faith does not provide a written description and itemized list of damages and charges in violation of this subchapter: (b)(1) forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security deposit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises; and (b)(2) is liable for the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit.
I don't like the payment methods offered by my landlord. Do I still have to pay rent? Recently, a friend of mine signed a two year rental agreement with a small mom and pop rental place. At the time of signing, they offered credit cards as a way of paying, but a credit card is not explicitly mentioned in the contract as a method of payment. However, three months ago, they notified my friend that they are no longer accepting credit cards as a payment method for rent (their processor changed rules or something). They switched entirely to ACH drafts only. However, my friend doesn't want to use ACH drafts as he already authorized them to charge his credit card. And he refuses to give them his ACH information, despite repeated notifications from the landlords. He claims that they stopped collecting rent, not that he stopped paying it. This brought into my mind some very interesting financial and legal questions. His entire premise is: He entered into a contract to pay because he liked the payment methods offered That payment method is still authorized, but the company no longer accepts it Therefore he authorized a payment, but the company isn't collecting Therefore he is off the hook for repayment AND doesn't need to add a new method of payment My question is: Is the onus for repayment on the lessor or the lessee? aka Is a lessee required to repay a lessor in a manner the lessor accepts? Or must a lessor accept any payment method from the lessee? Is not liking the payment methods accepted a valid reason to expect to be let out of a lease contract? I feel like my friend is in the wrong here, but I'd love case law or US law examples to prove that he still owes the money!	If your friend thinks he can live there for free due to his unique interpretation of contract law, he is mistaken. He'll get evicted if he doesn't pay rent, and likely end up with a judgement against him for unpaid rent. At its core, a rental agreement ensures that in exchange for paying rent, he may occupy the property. You can argue up and down about payment methods, but the fact remains he must pay rent in order to live there. Your friend MAY have an argument that he could move out and not be subject to penalty for breaking the lease because the payment terms changed. He'd have to give notice and would still owe for the time he occupied the property. There's just no way he can live there for free. He may find this out the hard way.	To put it as nicely as possible, you're not being very smart by threatening to make the house guest's predicament the worst mistake they ever made. Drawing up a notarized contract with a financial penalty is ludicrous and likely simply illegal in terms of contracting for something that is against the law. Beyond that, any threats you make to against house guest could be grounds for them to file a civil suit against you, either for eviction or physical harm, and you'll end up in court rather than simply getting the house guest to leave. An Unlawful Detainer applies if there is verbal or written lease, and as such you would have to go through the formal eviction process. But if this is a simple house guest issue, with no lease or rental agreement in the past, and they are not a family member with some legal right to be in the house, law enforcement is the way to deal with it. It's very simple: set a move out date and say you will call the police or county sheriff if they don't move out on that date. If they don't leave and you do call the police or sheriff, simply say you have a house guest who won't leave, i.e. a trespasser. Law enforcement will come out and you will explain the story; they will likely make the determination that you are the property owner and the guest is indeed not welcome. Law enforcement will tell the guest to leave or be arrested, as per Florida Law - Chapter 810. You can call the police or county sheriff ahead of the move out date and determine the appropriate laws; and get advice on what you might need to do on the actual move out day. If the house guest has property, law enforcement will stand by at that time while they retrieve their property, or make arrangements for them get it at a later date, with or without law enforcement.	Can the HOA compel payment? Yes, at least from the standpoint of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. That is because the resident obtains some benefit(s) from the HOA's activity & expenses, such as the maintenance of common areas and other items that advance the common good of the community. However, a drastic or arbitrary increase in invoices might not be enforceable, especially if these are unreasonable. The HOA would need to persuade in court that the resident accepted or would have knowingly and willfully accepted such drastic change. HOA bylaws: Are they enforceable absent a contract? If by bylaws you mean something other than bills, the question would depend on the substance & scope of those bylaws as well as the HOA's/resident's jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that a written & signed contract is oftentimes unnecessary. There is the notion of "implicit contract" to refer to rights and duties that can be inferred from the parties' conduct and the expectations that can be inferred therefrom. This notion of implicit contract is common in situations where there is no written document that reflects the parties' intent in the relation they willfully enter.	Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.	Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud.	Here is the Illinois Landlord and Tenant Act, and here are the Chicago Residential Landlords and Tenants ordinances. Neither set of law addresses application fees. So it would have to be covered in whatever agreement you have with the agent (assuming you paid the agent), or with the landlord (if you paid the landlord). Fees for a credit history check are generally not refundable since they are actual costs incurred by someone, no matter what the outcome is. Check the forms you signed, like this one, to see whether they explicitly say that the fee is not refundable.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	Yes, they can. How would they enforce it? It seems like the HOA would have to be able to request to see the tenant's credit report, background check, proof of income, and rent checks to make sure the rules are being followed. The HOA might have to make a rule giving it the right to audit members on pain of a fine or something. What is to stop the HOA from making the requirements arbitrarily high to effectively prevent renting? (Minimum credit score set to 850, for example.) Nothing. It could ban renting entirely. This comes with one important caveat. If the rental restrictions have the intent or effect of violating fair housing laws, the regulations may be void as contrary to public policy. In some cases, a total ban on renting would expose the HOA and its members to less risks than a rule that does this by implication or via selective enforcement of the rules. Basically, this means that regulations designed to bar renting based upon protected categories under the particular acts that apply (e.g. race, disability, sex, marital status, religion) would be invalid. Also the HOA has to get its members to approve the rule and not repeal it. If the rule is so draconian that it reduces the fair market value of units, the members may decline to adopt such a rule or may get rid of it.
Is it legal to sell food stamps in New York? Sometimes I see people selling food stamps. Is that legal? What about other government benefits? Can they be bought and sold legally?	Looks like trafficking food stamps is a felony. USDA report - http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/foodstamp.PDF Federal Statute: 7 USC § 2024(b)(1) (Hat tip @NateEldredge comment)	You can't. In order for an action to be enforceably prohibited for everybody, there has to be a law to that effect, enacted by the government. Your local legislature will not make it a crime to discuss peanut butter, generally or specifically with you. In some countries, such as the US, such a law would be unconstitutional. Your only hope is to offer something of value to others, subject to the condition that they not discuss peanut butter with you. For example, you offer every person $1 million if they refrain from discussing peanut butter with you. But you should get a lawyer to draft this agreement, since maybe you want them to also refrain from discussing peanut butter in your presence. Also, the contract needs to have a clause where you are forced to pay out (is this a lifetime restriction – whose lifetime?). This might motivate people to not discuss peanut butter with you, but not everybody will care about the putative reward. Also, there are billions of potential claimants out there, so you need a really big escrow account.	Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.	The state health codes applicable to food are here esp. ch. V and here. The primary focus of those health codes is preventing the introduction of toxic substances or pathogens. There is obviously no law against serving meat, nor is there any law against half-and-half pizza. The only possible prospect for a health law addressing your interest would be via the allergy avenue (yes, you do not allege to be allergic to anything – my point is that even if you did, this would not help your cause). There are some provisions regarding training and informing when it comes to "major food allergens", which however is defined as Milk, EGG, FISH (such as bass, flounder, cod, and including crustacean shellfish such as crab, lobster, or shrimp), tree nuts (such as almonds, pecans, or walnuts), wheat, peanuts, and soybeans or proteins derived from the above. Note that mammal meat is not included (it may be an individual allergen, but it is not a statutory major food allergen). Even if you wanted to sue, you would have a very hard time establishing that you were damaged. First you would have to establish that they have a legal obligation to serve you "vegetarian food" (crucially undefined). You might be able to establish that they made such a promise. Now we have to determine whether a reasonable person would conclude that a pie with half-meat and half non-meat is clearly not vegetarian food. I do not believe that there is secular case law addressing this, so the courts would resolve this by determining whether there is a reasonable means for a vegetarian to eat part of such a pizza – obviously, yes, only eat the cheese part (leave wide margins). So there is no legal recourse for getting what you want: there are still ample political options.	Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.	In the US at least, discrimination is legal (and sometimes even required) unless it is discrimination against specific, protected characteristics, and even then it is sometimes allowable if it is "necessary". Income, whether of an individual or that individual's family, is not in any list of protected characteristics. As such, discrimination upon it is fully legal.	It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this.	I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.
Is Citizen-Based Taxation Constitutional? The U.S. is currently one of two countries in the world that imposes taxes on all her its citizens regardless of where they live or where they earn money from. The other is Eritrea. Considering that one of the primary grievances which sparked the American Revolution was "taxation without representation", Citizen-Based Taxation is quite ironic. There are no elected representatives for American citizens abroad and their interests are almost never considered. From a constitutional perspective, is it legal to force a U.S. citizen living abroad and earning a living abroad to pay taxes to the U.S. despite having no representation, and receiving no benefits in return - in addition to being deprived of the basic freedom to expatriate (the tax and filing requirements are so onerous for Americans abroad it is in most respects unfeasable to live abroad. Those that do are overwhelmingly not compliant). What are the arguments for and against?	I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.	This is tied up in the concept of sovereignty - nation states have control over their territories and citizens and they recognise the right of other nation states to do likewise. The USA, China (Hong Kong) and Panama are all sovereign states, they each decide what the law is within their own territory and they can’t tell each other what to do; they can ask, however, that’s what diplomats do. If a HK domiciled company provides HK based servers then they have to comply with HK law irrespective of where their customers are located. The USA could pass a law requiring US companies (like ISPs) to keep logs of traffic to and from HK servers but they cannot force a HK company to do anything, unless and until it operates in a place where the US has jurisdiction which means both the right and the ability to enforce their law.	Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not.	This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.	According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case).	As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.	The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.	The conservative argument that the Dreamers law is unconstitutional is that it ascribes equal protection to non-US citizens under the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment lays out clearly and explicitly that only US born or naturalized citizens have equal protection. If anyone makes that argument, it's an extreme fringe. The 14th Amendment does not prevent states from giving equal protection to non-citizens. In fact, in general, the 14th Amendment means states are required to give equal protection to non-citizens. See Graham v. Richardson: The Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It has long been settled, and it is not disputed here, that the term "person" in this context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens, as well as citizens of the United States, and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 118 U. S. 369 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 239 U. S. 39 (1915); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. at 334 U. S. 420. It's also settled that illegal immigrants are fully entitled to equal protection of the laws. See Plyler v. Doe: That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction -- either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States -- he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish. The dissent to Plyler also agreed that illegal immigrants are entitled to equal protection of the laws: I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically "within the jurisdiction" of a state. However, as the Court concedes, this "only begins the inquiry." Equal protection does not mean people in different situations must be treated identically. States are limited in their ability to discriminate against lawful permanent residents (Richardson), but there are situations where discrimination is appropriate (Foley v. Connelie, which held that a state can require police officers to be citizens). It's often considered reasonable for states to discriminate against illegal immigrants, but Plyler held that it was unreasonable to deny children the right to attend school because they were illegal immigrants. At the federal level, Congress has broad authority to discriminate against non-citizens (one reason states are fairly limited here is so they don't interfere with federal authority). The question in the case mentioned in the comments, DHS v. Regents of the University of California, was whether the Trump administration's decision to end DACA was legal. One argument raised was that it violated the Equal Protection Clause because it disproportionately hurt Latinos and was motivated by prejudice against them. The Court held that the claims of a prejudicial motivation were weak and that the disproportionate effect was just because illegal immigrants are disproportionately Latino. The Court didn't explicitly say "you can constitutionally make immigration policies that discriminate against illegal immigrants," but that's so obvious that no one seriously thinks otherwise. What the Supreme Court did not rule was that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to illegal immigrants. They held that it didn't ban this particular policy change, but that's not particularly surprising. They certainly didn't hold that DACA was illegal because it violated the Equal Protection Clause by protecting non-citizens. No one even bothered to address that claim.
Can I safely ignore the requirement to delete an electronic review copy on fair use grounds? I write reviews of books and other materials for a scholarly journal. Printed books I receive are traditionally marked as review copies in order to prevent them to be sold on the used books market, but never have I seen the demand to delete my paper copy upon reviewing. Increasingly, the books are sent not as paper versions, but as electronic files, such as a PDF attached to an email. For most of the materials I receive for reviewing, there is an accompanying notice that says that the copy may only be used for the purpose of reviewing and not shared with others, which is fine with me. However, some of the materials (depending on the book publisher) come with a notice that demands that I must delete the electronic review copy once finished writing my review. This I find places an unreasonable burden upon me. I would certainly prefer to ignore the journal's stipulation to delete the review copy. My arguments for considering it void are: (1) I generally find said stipulation to be stated in the same email that contains the review copy as attachment. By the time I have read the clause, already several copies, including automated backup copies, will have been made of the review copy on several mail servers and backup servers, which are not completely under my control. Making sure to delete all these copies places an onerous and potentially unfulfillable burden upon me. To reject the contract for being impractical and putting me in legal jeopardy would at this point entail having to perform the very act that I feel incapable to perform: the reliable deletion of all copies of an email attachment that has been sent to me. Hence the clause would put me into an infringement trap. It must therefore be void under these circumstances. (2) Traditionally, reviewers in academia get to keep review copies for their personal reference. This makes sense, not least because the review itself becomes a published work of its own, which is open to public scrutiny. If, e.g., someone in a letter to the editor of the journal criticized my review to be inaccurate (or perhaps even defamatory), having lost access to the review copy might render it difficult, if not impossible, for me to answer to such criticism of my own work (or to wage a veracity defense against libel charges against me). The ability to defend my own work in any case establishes my legitimate interest in keeping the review copy within my reach. Disallowing this does not only breach with long-established custom in academic publishing, but also infringes upon my ability to preserve my reputation, including by making it potentially impossible to exercise my right to obtain and adduce evidence against libel charges. Therefore, I believe I can ignore the stipulation to delete on fair use grounds. A place of jurisdiction is not stated anywhere in my agreements with the journal; in the case I have in mind, the book publisher is US-based, the journal is published in some European country, while I, the reviewer, may reside anywhere in the world. As a reviewer, I do not know the contract that the book publisher has made with the journal. It appears likely that the book publisher has granted the journal permission to use the electronic files only for the purpose of review and demands it to delete the copies it keeps after finishing the reviewing process. Let us further assume that this contract is silent on how to deal with copies prepared for and transmitted to reviewers.	The (journal) publisher's interest is presumably to comply with conditions imposed by the copyright owner: CUP might demand of Elsevier that their reviewers delete electronic copies of books after the review is finished. In keeping and using the work (and perhaps freely distributing that copy), you have violated CUP's copyright (assume that CUP holds the copyright). Therefore you can be sued. Elsevier can also be sued. What is not clear is how many people can sue you (and whether you can sue anyone). It would depend on whether you were informed of the deletion requirement before you agreed to review the work. If you were led to believe either that you would get a paper copy of the work, or at least would be able to retain and use the electronic copy for your own use, the journal publisher does not have the option of rewriting the terms of that agreement after the fact. If you reasonably relied on them granting you permission to keep the work, they can't sue you. You might even be able to sue them, insofar as getting a free copy of an expensive book in exchange of writing a review is a standard academic business deal. On the other hand, if they told you in advance that you'd have to delete the review copy, then that is the end of the discussion. If you didn't read the agreement, that too is the end of the discussion. It is not clear what recourse the rights holder might have against you. You have no contractual relationship with the book publisher, and the journal publisher is not the agent of the book publisher so the book publisher is not bound by the errors of the journal publisher. Because you are expected to know that all IP requires permission of the rights holder to copy and since you know that the journal publisher is not the copyright holder, you are on thin ice in assuming that the copyright holder has granted you permission to copy the work. Indeed, even agreeing to review a work in electronic form is a dubious proposition, without suitable legal assurances that the rights holder has granted permission to make the required copies. If a journal buys a physical copy of a book, it can lend or give it to you to write a review, and no permission is required wrong the book publisher. To review an electronic copy, permission from the book publisher is required. You might try defending yourself against an infringement suit under the fair use doctrine, since the underlying purpose of "fair use" is precisely to allow book reviews. If the journal publisher was negligent in not informing you of the copyright conditions imposed on them (which they are supposed to impose on you), your infringement may be innocent, and you might only have a small liability. You could sue the journal in case the book publisher sues you – the journal publisher has a duty of care to you. Technically speaking, you're in trouble once you download the illegal copy, and technically speaking, you infringe copyright every time you read the work. Digital content is, or should be, distributed under some license (a contract between you and the rights holder), otherwise it is illegal to receive or use the work. Hence various public licenses grant permission to copy, subject to various limitations: the use may not be commercial; the work may not be redistributed; the work may not be altered; the work may not be redistributed in exchange for money, or some something of value... The teeth that digital licensing has is that if you copy and use a work contrary to the terms of the license, you do not have permission (the rights holder has granted conditional permission). Copyright law gives the rights holder the exclusive right to authorize making any copies, and in order to use a computer file, a number of copies are made (by various programs). The basic protection is that "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work". Copies are statutorily defined as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed." One or more "derivative works" (with no added creative content) are created in getting from a pdf file to a computer screen. In §117, Congress created an exception to general copyright protection, whereby one can make "another copy or adaptation" of a computer program provided Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful. This exception only covers computer programs, and not data files, and as the Copyright Office says You are not permitted under section 117 to make a backup copy of other material on a computer's hard drive, such as other copyrighted works that have been downloaded (e.g., music, films). It is also important to check the terms of sale or license agreement of the original copy of software in case any special conditions have been put in place by the copyright owner that might affect your ability or right under section 117 to make a backup copy. There is no other provision in the Copyright Act that specifically authorizes the making of backup copies of works other than computer programs even if those works are distributed as digital copies. I say that "technically", it is infringement if you open and process a digital file that you do not have permission to copy (via a license), because that is what the law says, and no court case has deemed that Congress intended something entirely different. It is notoriously difficult to establish legislative intent. Since Congress did articulate narrow exceptions in similar cases (computer programs, also secondary transmissions of performances and display of works, and did not include any exception for copies made by computer programs in the course of "using" a protected work, but could have, we can conclude that Congress did not intend to create such an exception. One might point to other facts to argue that Congress did intend that. At present, I believe that the Supreme Court would uphold the letter of the law, but there is really only one way to find out. That is, at any rate, the basis for the copyright holder pursuing an action against you (or, you and the journal). Even without any prior notification of a requirement to delete, they can still tell you that you must delete the work. They probably could not successfully force you to delete the work in a court of law, but there are many other things that they can do that boil down to the fact that you must delete that copy of the work. Blackballing, for example.	There is a good chance that the letter in question is in the public domain. Prior to 1978, the copyright laws were very different. Also, if it was published in 1963 or earlier and there was an initial claim of copyright but the copyright was not renewed, it would also be in the public domain. A convenient table summarizing when various pertinent categories of works enter the public domain can be found here. It might be possible to construe depositing the work with the Library of Congress as either a "publication" of the work (which if it happened before 1964 would put it in the public domain), or as a relinquishment of the copyright to the public domain, although I am not a specialist familiar with the legal effect of different forms of donations to the Library of Congress and it could depend upon the facts and circumstances of that particular donation to the Library of Congress. If worse came to worse, I imagine it might be possible to seek a declaratory judgment that your use was a fair use with substituted service on the heirs, and seek a default judgment, although that would not be optimal. The general problem that you face is that the work in question is what is called an "orphan work". Many other countries have special procedures to allow the use of orphan works, but the U.S. has resisted such legislation except for a narrow exception applicable only to libraries and archives at 17 U.S.C. § 108.	The following answer is based on US-law. I am not a lawyer; this is not legal advice. If the book you read is in the public domain* you should be fine. Otherwise what you are doing is copyright infringement and probably not protected by fair use*. One of the rights granted to copyright holders is to control derivative works, and transference to different mediums, which is what your recordings would be. Under US law, whether an instance of copyright infringement is fair use is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, weighing four points: the purpose and character of one's use the nature of the copyrighted work what amount and proportion of the whole work was taken the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of the copyrighted work In my non-lawyer evaluation, point 1 depends on what you do in your video (unless you monetize your Youtube video, in which case it is likely to be decided against you), but if you are merely reading the book out aloud, it is unlikely to be in your favor (although it may not be against you as an "educational tool"). Point 2 depends on what is being read, with a informative work (e.g. a textbook) being more likely to be fair use than a creative work (e.g. a novel). Point 3 depends on how much and what proportion of a work you use; since you are presumably reading a whole book, this would most likely be ruled against you. Point 4 would almost certainly be decided against you, as you are essentially creating an unauthorized audiobook. In summary, you can read a book aloud. You can record your reading of it for your personal use. You should NOT upload it to Youtube, or other sharing sites. Note that different countries have differing rules on when a book enters the public domain, and since the internet crosses borders, multiple rule sets may apply.	Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.	We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.	An affirmative defense In the US, fair use (17 USC §107) "is an affirmative defense" (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994)). It need not be raised unless the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's activity would otherwise be infringing. When fair use is raised as a defense, the burden is on the defendant to prove the elements of fair use. A four-factor balancing test Here is the text of 17 USC 107: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. "Congress meant §107 to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication." (Campbell, quoting from H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476). Factor 1: Purpose and character of use The statute explicitly lists several purposes which would weigh in favor of a finding of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research. However, that list is only illustrative, not exhaustive. Commercial use weighs against fair use. Nonprofit use weighs in favor of fair use. Parody is another purpose which greatly affects the analysis, especially as it interacts with factor 4. Factor 2: The nature of the copyrighted work "[T]he scope of fair use is generally broader when the source of borrowed expression is a factual or historical work" (Campbell). "[I]nformational works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to productive use by others, are less protected than creative works of entertainment." (Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) Factor 3: Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole "The extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use." (Campbell) For example, full reproduction of an entire work was allowed in Sony. However, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), taking just 300 words from a 7,500 word excerpt of President Ford's memoirs was not found to be fair use because it took the "heart of the book". The amount and substantiality of the taking is judged with respect to the original work. How much of the original was taken? "A taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work. As Judge Learned Hand cogently remarked, 'no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.'" (Harper & Row) Factor 4: Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work If the use new work takes the place of the original, thereby decreasing its market or value, that weighs against a finding of fair use. However, parody or criticism, simply by decreasing the value of the work it is critical of, does not suffer the same fate. "The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop. [...] [T]he law recognizes no derivative market for critical works." (Campbell) Parody and criticism might decrease the value of the original, not by taking its place, but rather, by saying something negative about it. Protection of that type of speech is one of the goals of the fair use defense. Transformativeness The four factors are not to be "treated in isolation, one from another." "All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright." (Campbell) However, the court recognizes that "[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation", "to what extent the new work is transformative". "[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use." (Campbell) Case-by-case analysis "The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." (Campbell) In general, it is not possible know ahead of time whether a fair use defense would be successful in a particular case. Example cases Perhaps the best way to learn how the courts apply these four factors is to look at example cases. The US Copyright Office hosts a Fair Use Case Index that lets you browse by subject matter and jurisdiction. Stanford hosts a smaller collection of examples.	how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes.
Is it legal to track users of pirated software? I'm making a piece of software right now, and I'm just doing it in my free time, so I'm not too serious about it. I want to make a version of the software and put a tracker in it that interfaces with Google Analytics. That will allow me to track things like country of origin, OS information, and hardware specs. I won't be able to see anything that is personally identifying or be able to single any one user out. Anyways, I want to upload this modified version of the software to Pirate Bay, just to see what percentage of my users are pirating my software. I don't want to go after them, I don't really care that they're pirating it. I just want to see if there are any demographic differences between piraters and non-piraters. This brings up privacy implications. Do I need to disclose that some sort of tracking is or may be happening in my software? If so, what do I need to disclose? I live in the US, but since it's online software, people from other countries are bound to download it. Is there anything I need to do to account for that? UPDATE: I didn't realize that by uploading it myself that it would make this no longer piracy, but it doesn't really matter for my purposes. I have no intention of coming after these people. I just want to gather some data on piracy for my own curiosity (I know this seems weird but I'm fairly laid back about this piece of software)	Building off @DigitalFire's answer, I looked into the TOS related requirements that Google Analytics puts out and I found this on Google Analytic's TOS: You will have and abide by an appropriate privacy policy and will comply with all applicable laws relating to the collection of information from visitors to Your websites. You must post a privacy policy and that policy must provide notice of your use of a cookie that collects anonymous traffic data. Apparently, Google themselves also requires you to notify users when you are using their service to track people (That's pretty good of Google). Here is a simple example of what a privacy policy would look like. There doesn't appear to be any issues with laws in other countries either. For my purposes, I'll just implement an agreement that pops up during installation that users will have to accept.	It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed.	I drafted this answer many days ago but did not complete it. My intention is to define red flag notice. However, I'm hitting Submit because I think it's a good question and hope this will inspire other answers. It seems like your immediate question, regarding the DCMA notices which Google is forwarding, is not a legal question. It is a question that can only be answered by Google and is dependent on their practices. Frankly though, it seems to me that Google search results might not be important based on the purpose of your proxy service. However perhaps your user base has evolved. You are a service provider under 17 USC 512(k)(i). If you aren't we need to clear that up! As for the copyright holders, you haven't received notice complying with 17 USC 512 (c)(3)(A)(i-iv). As such you don't have notice. Even if these notices don't qualify then we argue about whether you have red flag notice - based on facts and circumstances. (See Grokster) EDIT TO ADD: 17 U.S. Code § 512 - Limitations on liability relating to material online is one of the sections created by the DMCA. It is sometimes referred to as the safe harbor. You can read about it on Wikipedia® page for the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act. If you read that Wikipedia® page you will see a short section on Red Flags. They say it as well as I could: [In addition to notice from a copyright holder, the second way] that an OSP can be put on notice that its system contains infringing material, for purposes of section 512(d), is referred to the "red flag" test. The "red flag" test stems from the language in the statute that requires that an OSP not be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The "red flag" test contains both a subjective and an objective element. Subjectively, the OSP must have knowledge that the material resides on its system. Objectively, the "infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances." The reason that notice is important is that the safe harbor provided is only available if you do not know that infringing is happening. Plaintiff's prove knowledge through the letter or through red flags. I am glad that you asked about Grokster, because that was the wrong case! The case to look at is Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, (2nd Cir., 2012). The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or “subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of infringement. In other words, you lose your safe harbor protection if you know of facts and circumstances that would lead an ordinary person to know that infringement is happening. So the question for you is - do the letters forwarded by Google mean that you have knowledge and are outside of the safe harbor? Well that's the question that lawyers fight about! In fact Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir., 2013) is all about that fight. If you read that case you will see that Fung was doing a bunch of shit that totally made it completely obvious that he was infringing. And he was earning money directly from it. He was screwed from the start. Now again, this does not really help you with the google blacklist problem, but it should help you understand what you need to do as a service provider to not be complicit in copryright infringement. You really should read the Fung case and 17 U.S.C. § 512 - they will go a long way to help you understand the analysis a court will apply. EDIT Regarding your legal exposure, I always assume that a cease and desist letter will precede a lawsuit. With that said, only you know how much infringing is coming across your server. Fung made his money directly from the infringement. He attracted website visitors specifically because of the infringement. He had emails and other documents proving this. Diebold is interesting because they attempted to use copyright to control the spread of their emails. First the court said no commercial harm and no diminishment of value of the works. Then the court found that the stuff wasn't even subject to copyright. This is obviously not a typical case. But it sounds like you see yourself as OPG in this case. I don't see how you can become a plaintiff against bona fide copyright holders who follow the links as far as your server. As I understand it, you are a reasonable target of the the notices, that's the result of running the proxy. However, I might be getting out of my technical depth here. As I intimated earlier, you might need to seek out some strategic advice regarding dealing with Google and the specific steps you might take to stay in the right side of their enforcement.	A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.	Yes, you do. But you should not base your claim primarily on copyright, but just on the license contract you agreed to. It's typically much easier to prove that a party did not fulfill its part of a sales contract (here: Pay the agreed amount) than to prove violation of a copyright you own. Also, you then only need to sue one guy, and not care about every platform your game might be hosted on. This is particularly difficult here, since they have not done anything wrong. It's not their fault that the publisher didn't properly pay the programmer. They (very likely) got their copy of the game legally. For details, you should consult a lawyer. We can't give you detailed legal advice.	Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please.	The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.	You have misunderstood the MIT license. The MIT license requires you to include a copy of "the above copyright notice and this permission notice" in "all copies or substantial portions of the Software." However, this is not the same as requiring you to offer the Software under those terms, and in fact the MIT license explicitly permits you to sublicense the Software under different terms ("including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software"). If you had to offer the Software under the same terms, then the sublicense right would be extinguished, so that cannot be the correct reading of the license. Therefore, you can do exactly what you describe, releasing the software under the GPL. In other words, you have to include the permission notice, but you are expressly permitted to wrap it in terms that state "these permissions don't apply to you, dear end user, but only to people who go and download the original from the upstream source." That's what "sublicense" means. The Free Software Foundation, which publishes the GPL, agrees with this analysis (although they recommend avoiding the phrase "MIT License" because MIT has offered software under other licenses).
Is it legal for a company to require an extra software license for a backup? I work for a company that has purchased a software license for software that is needed to make our company run smoothly. We'd like to create a backup of the server in case of hardware failure, however the company we bought it from says that creating a copy of the software on the server is illegal and is instead asking for an insane amount of money for an additional license to create a backup on our own hardware.(Backing up the database for the program isn't an issue with them, just the software itself) I understand that under U.S.C Title 17 § 117 that if we owned the software we'd be able to create a backup, however because we're just licensing it this might not apply. In case of a hardware failure they would reinstall the software on another server and restore the database backup however this would be only doable during business hours and would take longer than us doing it ourselves. Is it legal for them to deny us the ability to create our own backup and instead have to rely on them?	If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.	There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.	Can anybody create their own license? That is to say, can I for example create my own license under which I can license software? Yep. It's just a contract granting rights to use a copyrighted work. You can write your own contracts, so you can write your own software license. It's just often recommended that you don't, because common licenses are more well-understood, and inexperienced drafters may make errors that could result in problems, such as unintended restrictions, failing to restrict things that were intended to be restricted, or creating provisions that aren't enforceable in some/all jurisdictions. Can you mandate how a software will be released? Yes. Many software licenses, including GPL, do. The restrictions you describe in your example sound similar to CC BY-NC-SA. Also, would the following clause even be legal? Using this software you agree that any work and intellectual property based on or created with this software will be under the [INSERT_NAME_LICENSE] license, even after any and all code from this software is removed in a future update, or even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up I'm not entirely certain, but "even after any and all code from this software is removed in a future update, or even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up" seems, in my opinion, unlikely to be enforceable—especially "even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up." How would you differentiate a complete rebuild from a totally new piece of software? More broadly, once your copyrighted code is no longer in the product, there's nothing for them to license from you. It's hard to imagine how you'd be able to claim that you're harmed by someone releasing a new version of a product that used to contain your code under a different license. Without harm to you, there's nothing for a court to redress.	If it was illegal to make the entire copy, it is illegal to copy half the file. See also, e.g., Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) In response to the question of whether moving it to someone else's servers makes a difference: it is the act of copying, not the possession of the copy, that is the violation of copyright law. As for the copy a service assists someone to make, contributory liability would be the issue. You don't need to be the person making the copies to be contributing to the infringement--material contribution to the copying process and knowledge of infringement run a serious risk of creating contributory liability. If seriously considering such a service as a business model someone would need to consult a copyright expert with technical knowledge or pay counsel with technical knowledge for a good bit of time to do some research. There are major civil and criminal consequences if the industry or the government decides to go after a service doing this, so legal expenses would be a significant and important cost of doing business that would significantly increase barriers to entry. In addition, the service would likely be in violation of its agreement with storage vendors, who would want to minimize their legal exposure and might well discontinue the service when they learned what it was doing.	None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.	There is something called the exhaustion doctrine that says that once the holder of a patent sells a patented device, they have relinquished control over that particular instance of the patent implementation. Anyone who legally purchases this hardware has the right to run whatever software they want on it, as long the software is otherwise legal (software designed to defeat DRM would be an example of software that is is not legal).	The difference between commercial and non-commercial software use is about as clear as it gets, outlined by the definitions in the license above. One makes money, the other doesn't. There is no gray area. Your intent or expectations for a project may seem to alter the difference between the two and add a gray area in your mind, but they don't. Once you are a commercial user, buy a commercial license and/or upgrade the non-commercial license to commercial. That's the legal angle; and what is illegal and what is unethical are not always the same. If you still feel like your intent does make a difference and you feel unethical about using a non-commercial license - because you are building a community and hoping/planning on making money - buy the commercial license to begin with.	You are concerned that your application is somehow a derivative work of MariaDB and therefore subject to the GPL. It's not totally clear to me whether that is the case or not. But it doesn't matter, because you are not distributing MariaDB itself (or any other part of your application). You're running it on a server which users are connecting to remotely. From MariaDB's licensing FAQ: Internal usage is free The GPL license only affects code that you distribute to other parties. Internal usage within an organization is totally free and not subject to any conditions. There is no such thing as 'internal distribution' that would restrict the usage of your code by requiring it to be GPLed. Connecting to a remote service that runs MariaDB (or any other GPL software) in the background is also free. For internal programs for which you own all the copyright(s), there is essentially no risk in using GPL software. The argument you can use in your defense is that if the software became GPL as part of the distribution, you as the copyright holder could immediately revert your part back to its original copyright. No one has the right to require you to reveal or redistribute your code to the outside of your organization even if you would have distributed it internally linked with GPL software! If your lawyers are concerned about distributions of software linked with GPL libraries between different legal entities within your organization, you can solve this by distributing your components and the GPL software separately, and have your other entity combining them. You can also switch to use the new LGPL client libraries. The use you have described in your question clearly falls into this case, and the presence of this FAQ item clearly demonstrates that the MariaDB developers intended to allow you to do this. The Free Software Foundation (the people who wrote the GPL) agree with this position for both unmodified copies and derivative works. Technically, you don't need a license to "use" a piece of software at all, assuming you have lawfully obtained it. But you're concerned about the possibility of creating a derivative work, for which a license is required. Fortunately, the GPL doesn't care about derivative works so long as they are not distributed.
Defendant compensation for job salary Does the government have to compensate the money one could have earned while on trial? For example: Jim is a full-time employee at a gas stop in the US, and is paid minimum wage. He is the only source of income for his wife and three kids. Suddenly, police officers trace a dead body back to his garbage can, and he is taken into custody. He is not able to post bail, and since he does not have the funds to hire a decent lawyer to defend him, the government provides him a third-rate lawyer, he is indicted and the trial lasts five months. The verdict is not guilty, and Jim is released. Is Jim entitled to compensation by the for the salary he would have earned had he not been on trial?	Most U.S. states provide zero compensation of any kind in this situation, although there are a few states that are exceptions. (Far more states provide compensation from conviction to release for a wrongfully convicted person.) Even in those few states that provide compensation to acquitted defendants, the compensation is typically set by statute and is frequently much less than what a middle class person would earn and certainly does not capture the full extent of the defendant's economic loss.	This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.	If someone was charged with 15 counts of a crime but was only indicted on 2 counts, can the prosecutor introduce evidence at sentencing of charges that the person was not indicted on? In federal court, yes. This has been the case since Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) which held that evidence such as counts and conduct upon which the defendant was not charged or indicted may still be considered in a sentencing hearing. Since U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the prosecutor can even introduce evidence at sentencing of charges upon which the person was acquitted by a jury. See generally here. This remains good law although it is controversial both in academic writing and in political discussions and among many sitting federal judges. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor constitutional provisions related to evidentiary matters (e.g., the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) apply at sentencing. Therefore, the court may consider hearsay and other types of information that would not be admissible during a trial. However, the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission has stated that information considered by a court at sentencing must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the court “must — for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” In resolving factual disputes, the court ordinarily applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. From here. The quote above cites the following authority: FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“This Court has long recognized that sentencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and that ‘[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246– 247 (1949). Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider ‘concerning the [defendant's] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a), which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ § 3553(a)(1).”). USSG §6A1.3(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B). USSG §6A1.3, comment.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that due process does not require sentencing factors to be proved by more than a preponderance of the evidence). Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 states (emphasis added): Rule 1101. Applicability of the Rules (a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before: · United States district courts; · United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges; · United States courts of appeals; · the United States Court of Federal Claims; and · the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. (b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: · civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; · criminal cases and proceedings; and · contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily. (c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding. (d) Exceptions. These rules — except for those on privilege — do not apply to the following: (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility; (2) grand-jury proceedings; and (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: · extradition or rendition; · issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; · a preliminary examination in a criminal case; · sentencing; · granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and · considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. (e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules. Given the immense personal importance of a sentencing hearing which can exercise discretion over a range of many decades of possible prison time, and which is frequently the only meaningful opportunity for a person who is easily proven guilty to distinguish himself or herself from other defendants, it is really very stunning and counterintuitive that this is the case. And if so isn't that denying the defendant his or her due process because that person was not indicted on those charges? Under current U.S. Constitutional law, the maximum sentence that can be imposed must be based upon convictions by a jury or judge based upon charges upon which indictments were brought, which were proved beyond a reasonable doubt based upon admissible evidence. The leading case in support of this proposition is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But, at sentencing, the judge's exercise of discretion up to the maximum sentence established at trial may be made based upon a preponderance of the evidence and that evidence is not subject to the same procedural safeguards.	In practice this is rarely done in the US. There have been cases of employment contracts with automatic increases tied to the CPI (Consumer Price Index) or some other measure of inflation -- I believe at one time a number of union contracts specified this. Employer and employee could certainly agree on any such formula. But in the absence of any explicit provision for such a link, and an agreed formula for the resulting salary, I think a stated salary would be interpreted as a fixed sum, not subject to change until an explicit change is made. Fixed wages are the almost invariable custom, and in the absence of any explicit provision for an automatic inflationary change, I think a court would assume a fixed amount, if it came to a court case.	From a legal point of view, what are my chances of keeping the money based on the above information? None, unless a period of more than 3 years (§195 - Standard limitation period ) has past before the return request was made. §812 - Claim for restitution - German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB) (1) A person who obtains something as a result of the performance of another person or otherwise at his expense without legal grounds for doing so is under a duty to make restitution to him. This duty also exists if the legal grounds later lapse or if the result intended to be achieved by those efforts in accordance with the contents of the legal transaction does not occur. §818(3) would also not apply (where you no longer have the money), since you have acknowledged that the reception of the money was incorrect (i.e. you spent it knowning that it was not yours) §818 Scope of the claim to enrichment ... (3) The liability to undertake restitution or to reimburse the value is excluded to the extent that the recipient is no longer enriched. ...	If a person is wrongfully deprived of money (or something else of value) for a period, that is damage, even if the money is later repaid. The victim might have used the money in some profitable or advantageous way during the period when it was taken. But the victim need not prove exactly how s/he might have profited, it is enough to show that the victim was wrongfully deprived of something of value. Of course, there are other elements to fraud. There must have been a lie or deception, on which the victim reasonably relied. There must have been intent that the victim so relay. The deception must have been material and must have directly caused or led to the damage. (Or have gotten the Fraudster a benefit that would not have been provided had the victim known the truth.) But assuming that all the elements of fraud are proved, restitution, even full restitution with interest, does not excuse the fraud. However, as a practical matter, if offered full restitution on condition of a release or an agreement not to prosecute, many victims will choose to take it, preferring their money back, perhaps with interest, to a legal case, even a winning one.	Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not.	Because of the appeals process. By settling now he: Gets the money now rather than in 2-3 years when the appeal finishes Gets $31 million rather than whatever the appeals court decides (which may be considerably less)
What's the point of prohibiting leading questions when unfavorable answers can result in witness being declared hostile? From what I understand, during direct examination: It is assumed that the witness you called is favorable to your case, so you cannot ask them leading questions (in order to avoid coaxing them into giving the answers you want). However, if the witness ends up being not favorable to your case, then you can have the judge declare him to be a "hostile" witness, therefore allowing you to ask leading questions. But then, what in the world is the point of prohibiting leading questions by default? If they're giving you favorable answers already, then you don't need to ask them leading questions. And if they're not, then you can ask them leading questions anyway, so what was the point of prohibiting that in the first place? I don't really understand the logic.	if the witness ends up being not favorable to your case, then you can have the judge declare him to be a "hostile" witness, therefore allowing you to ask leading questions. This is not really accurate. A typically case where a witness would be called a "hostile witness" for leading question purposes would be a case where the plaintiff calls the defendant or someone closely affiliated with the defendant as a witness. The nature of the relationship and not the actual content of the testimony determines if someone is a hostile witness. Neutral third parties are not "hostile witnesses" for this purpose even if their testimony if not favorable to your case. The relevant Colorado Rule of Evidence which tracks the federal rule which is the model for the vast majority of states describes the rule as follows: RULE 611 Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation (a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. (b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. (c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. A typical, run of the mill, example of a hostile witness who is not necessarily an adverse party or strictly identified with an adverse party would be the uncle of a criminal defendant, called by the prosecution, who is appearing to testify by subpoena because he was unwilling to testify voluntarily. See, e.g., Vigil v. People, 415 P.2d 863, 864 (Colo. 1966). Before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, a variety of precise relationships to a defendant that would qualify you as a hostile witness were set out by rule or statute, and the Federal Rules of Evidence liberalized the practice of examining hostile witnesses with leading questions by making it a general standard, rather than a more detailed rule.	It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.	A courtroom is not a podium A court is a forum for resolving a specific dispute. Testimony is restricted for a number of reasons the most all encompassing of which is relevance. For testimony to be admitted it has to go to the issue in dispute. For a person charged under the laws of, say, India, it cannot be in any way relevant what the laws of, say, China have to say about the issue. Similarly, for a person charged with a Federal crime, state law is irrelevant (and vice-versa). There is no free speech issue here because testimony is given only for the purpose of resolving the case. If it’s not relevant to that you can’t introduce it and, if you persist in trying the court can hold you in contempt.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	An individual does not have authority to "issue" a restraining order. In the U.S. only judges can issue such orders. The guidelines and policies for obtaining a restraining order vary by jurisdiction, although in the end a judge can issue any order he wants. So in theory you might be able to find a judge who will issue an order for any or no reason. In practice I'd be surprised if many judges would abuse their office to gratuitously harass people in this fashion, though there are probably a few amusing/disturbing examples out there to the contrary.	The only bright line regards the First Amendment. 18 USC 1512 articulates a line that is not to be crossed, but it is not clear where the line is as regards speech (subsection (a)(1) sets forth a bright line, viz "kills or attempts to kill", irrelevant to the present question). Otherwise, the remaining categories fall into three subtypes: (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to.. (c) Whoever corruptly— (d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from— These laws address communications addressed to witnesses, w.r.t. testimony. Case law e.g. US v. DiSalvo, US v. Murray all indicates that the forbidden threat must be addressed to an individual who might be a witness, whereas the above statement is not addressed, it is merely uttered (there is no clearly-intended recipient of the utterance). Similarly, 18 USC 1503 forbids "corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavor[ing] to influence, intimidate, or impede" a judicial officer, but this requires there to be a threat made to a specific judicial officer.	You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel.	Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court.
Removal of an Attorney General The President nominates the Attorney General, and is responsible for seeing that the Attorney General faithfully upholds his duty to execute the laws of the land. The Attorney General is subject to the policy direction of the President, and serves at the President's pleasure and discretion. Why then, when the Attorney General is derelict in his duties, does it take the House to charge him and the Senate to try him, for him to be removed? Can't the President simply fire him?	Yes, the President can just fire them, or more commonly, request their resignation. The provision for impeachment by Congress exists in case the President doesn’t do what the President should do.	Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.	The Department of Justice's Office of the Pardon attorney says yes: Under the Constitution, only federal criminal convictions, such as those adjudicated in the United States District Courts, may be pardoned by the President. In addition, the President's pardon power extends to convictions adjudicated in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and military court-martial proceedings. Like other felonies committed in the District, murder charges are adjudicated by federal prosecutors in the Superior Court, so they would fall within the scope of the presidential pardon power, as interpreted by the DOJ.	Under the Constitution, the president has to be a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for 14 years (relevant in the early years), and 35 years of age or older. Any action to preclude a candidate has to be based on these qualifications. Art. II of the constitution spells out the powers of the executive branch. His primary power is to carry out laws enacted by Congress, therefore executive orders have to be based on some statute, or specific Constitutional authority (e.g. as commander-in-chief). No law allows the president to nullify the fact that Biden is a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for many time 14 years, and 35 years old. Congress has not passed a law declaring that Biden has been previously impeached and removed from office (another way to stop a person from being elected). There being no such authority, an order to that effect would not be legal. In addition, executive orders give orders within the executive branch, and the executive branch isn't in charge of certifying the next president: POTUS cannot give orders to the House of Representatives, or to the Supreme Court.	Doesn't the last statement contradicts the first one? Are agencies controlled by the President or insulated from his control? These statements aren't contradictory. They just reflect a somewhat complex reality (although the new post-Scalia ultra-conservative supermajority on the U.S. Supreme Court has pushed the notion of a "unitary executive", a long time conservative goal, that casts doubt on the constitutional validity of the structures discussed below that previously went unchallenged). Especially starting around the time of the New Deal (the 1930s), Congress started to vigorously utilize the concept of an "independent agency" such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Service Board (formed in the 1970s), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and myriad other "alphabet agencies." (The Federal Reserve Board was one the first). Congress also experimented with structures like that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI) whose director serves for a seven years term, even though the director is a single person rather than a collective board. Generally speaking, these agencies are run by the Presidentially appointed and U.S. Senate confirmed directors or boards with appointee who serve for fixed terms. As Presidential appointees, they are ultimately controlled by the Presidency as an institution, even if not by the current sitting President. But, since these appointees have fixed terms of office and aren't merely employees at will who may be fired on demand by the President like cabinet secretaries, these appointees have some measure of insulation from direct Presidential direction on a day to day basis in the minutia of decision making. How much control of The President is enough for a textualist to accept Chevron doctrine? What if he could hire them but not fire them? What if he could suggest them what to do but not order them what to do? The Chevron doctrine really has nothing to do with the amount of authority that the President exercises over independent agencies and the civil service. Instead, the Chevron doctrine is a separation of powers doctrine that provides that courts should defer to the executive branch (which is ultimately directed by the President, who has near absolute authority over agencies in some cases, and less authority over agencies in other cases), rather than interpreting laws from a blank slate, in cases where a federal agency has adopted an authoritative interpretation of a federal law that is not precluded by a fair reading of the statue in question, even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently in the absence of federal agency input. The Chevron doctrine tilts the balance between courts and the President in favor of the President, making the President stronger than the President would otherwise have been in the absence of this doctrine. (And, keep in mind that all regulations and litigation of the federal government goes through the Justice Department, which the President does directly control, to a great extent, even when agencies are independent and have significant autonomy.) The authority of the President to direct tenured civil servants who are not political appointees who can be hired and fired at will, or with U.S. Senate approval, is an entirely different issue with far less of a constitutional dimension until the last couple of years when a conservative supermajority captured the U.S. Supreme Court and has tried to push the non-textual and non-originalist "unitary executive" doctrine.	It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant.	The policy of the Justice Department is that the President of the United States can not be indicted. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-us-president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 All federal prosecutors are part of the Justice Department and that means the guidelines for them say it is prohibited. There is not an actual law saying you can or can't indict the president. The idea is that impeachment is the right way to handle presidential wrongdoing, because the president shouldn't be distracted and he could be charged after leaving office or if he was impeached. The president can be investigated though and some have. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-13/trump-nixon-five-times-the-fbi-went-up-against-the-president/9539192	Perhaps. The relevant law is assembled into notes on 3 USC 102. The original act of 1963 defines President-elect in this manner: (c) The terms 'President-elect' and 'Vice-President-elect' as used in this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. There is no specific statutory provision directing the Administrator of the GSA to ascertain who is that President-Elect. The administration is apparently taking a position similar to that taken by the Clinton administration, that states determine who has been elected, and the states have not officially determined who has been elected: nor has a candidate conceded. If a court orders the Administrator to make the ascertainment, I expect that the administration would appeal the ruling up to the Supreme Court. This letter, addressed to the Administrator, gives the legal rationale.
Temporary Tenancy Agreement Until Estates are Settled I find myself in an unusual position. My wife and I were renting a house from her father, and he recently passed away without a will. Her father has no wife, and 3 natural children (all over 18). The estates are in the process of being settled but it's likely to take a long time. Until then, we intend to continue living in the house. Is it possible to get some kind of temporary tenancy agreement or something that basically says we can continue to live here until a formal arrangement is made with the estate? Something the 3 children would sign? Is this even necessary? The house has a mortgage on one third of it under her fathers name. And all the children know we live here and expect us to stay. We all live and operate in the UK.	Assuming it's an assured shorthold tenancy (which it will be unless the tenancy agreement says otherwise), the tenancy continues until the tenants give notice, or the landlord gives notice and the tenants leave voluntarily (and failing that, when a court forces them to leave). If no-one gives notice, and the tenants are still present once any fixed term ends, the tenancy continues as a "rolling" tenancy until it's ended as described above. A tenancy agreement stays in force even if the owner of a property changes (whether by purchase or inheritance). So to summarise: by default, nothing changes, and the tenants have the same right to stay that they had before. See, for example, this article, or this one.	Bob's will leaves everything to Abby. Bob has a brokerage account solely in his name with no TOD on the account. Bob then dies. It is my understanding that for Abby to get the money, you have to go through probate. Am I right about that? Yes, this has to go through probate. I have been told that when you are leaving everything to a spouse you can skip probate. I am thinking that is wrong. You are correct. This said, in a very small dollar estate (e.g. $20,000, with the actual dollar amount varying state by state), some states allow you to transfer assets by affidavit rather than via the probate process, if the sold heir at all and will beneficiary are the same and there are no unpaid creditors with a claim against those funds. New Jersey has two sets of small estate procedures for estates under $50,000. The cutoff is sometimes $10,000, sometimes $20,000, and sometimes $50,000 depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the simplified process sought. It isn't clear to me that they apply in cases where the decedent has a will and therefore is not intestate. Small Estates General Summary: Small Estate laws were enacted in order to enable heirs to obtain property of the deceased without probate, or with shortened probate proceedings, provided certain conditions are met. Small estates can be administered with less time and cost. If the deceased had conveyed most property to a trust but there remains some property, small estate laws may also be available. Small Estate procedures may generally be used regardless of whether there was a Will. In general, the two forms of small estate procedures are recognized: Small Estate Affidavit -Some States allow an affidavit to be executed by the spouse and/or heirs of the deceased and present the affidavit to the holder of property such as a bank to obtain property of the deceased. Other states require that the affidavit be filed with the Court. The main requirement before you may use an affidavit is that the value of the personal and/or real property of the estate not exceed a certain value. Summary Administration -Some states allow a Summary administration. Some States recognize both the Small Estate affidavit and Summary Administration, basing the requirement of which one to use on the value of the estate. Example: If the estate value is 10,000 or less an affidavit is allowed but if the value is between 10,000 to 20,000 a summary administration is allowed. New Jersey Summary: Under New Jersey statute, where as estate is valued at less than $50,000, a surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, may present an affidavit of a small estate before the Superior Court. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit, the surviving spouse shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. New Jersey: New Jersey requirements are set forth in the statutes below. TITLE 3B ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES–DECEDENTS AND OTHERS 3B:10-3. When spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner entitled to assets without administration. Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $50,000, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner upon the execution of an affidavit before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the assets are located, or before the Superior Court, shall be entitled absolutely to all the real and personal assets without administration, and the assets of the estate up to $10,000 shall be free from all debts of the intestate. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit as provided in this section, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. The surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall state that the affiant is the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner of the intestate and that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $50,000, and shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, and specifically the nature, location and value of the intestate’s real and personal assets. The affidavit shall be filed and recorded in the office of such Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.1; 2004, c.132, s.77; 2005, c.331, s.24; 2015, c.232, s.1. 3B:10-4. When heirs entitled to assets without administration Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $20,000 and the intestate leaves no surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, and one of his heirs shall have obtained the consent in writing of the remaining heirs, if any, and shall have executed before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the intestate’s assets are located, or before the Superior Court, the affidavit herein provided for, shall be entitled to receive the assets of the intestate of the benefit of all the heirs and creditors without administration or entering into a bond. Upon executing the affidavit, and upon filing it and the consent, he shall have all the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate and may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, the names, residences and relationships of all of the heirs and specifically the nature, location and value of the real and personal assets and also a statement that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $20,000. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.2; 2004, c.132, s.78; 2005, c.331, s.25; 2015, c.232, s.2. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S. 46:14-7 and R.S. 46:14-8 to take acknowledgments or proofs.	The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other.	Possibly In most contracts, the parties sign in their capacity as people (or agents for other people). However, some contracts are signed in the capacity as the owner of a piece of land and the contract transfers with the land. The liability rests with the current owner and, if unpaid, creates a lien over the property. These are particularly common in contracts with utilities or where the contract involves the a structure on the land. Surprise, surprise, the situation you describe involves both. You need to refer back to your contract for the land as these types of contracts are usually disclosed (unless they are a function of local law because everyone just knows - I don't know anything about Pa. law on this) and the original contract with the gas company. Your settlement may have also involved you paying a figure to purchase the gas in the tank as at the date of settlement. For example, in new-south-wales, council rates and water rates attach to the land as a matter of law and the vendor pays the purchaser for any amount they have paid in advance (or vice-versa if they are in arrears). Electricity and piped gas don't; the vendor ends their account on or before settlement and the buyer opens a new account on or after settlement and each pays for their own use. Propane for portable bottles doesn't but for fixed installations does as a matter of contract with the gas company.	I assume that the loan was legal, in light of rule changes pertaining to non-borrowing spouses. If so, there is really no recourse other than to repay the loan. This article explains the current options / restrictions in an understandable manner, but of course it is too late to do anything about it. If there was actually fraud or coercion in the loan, or if the elder party was mentally incompetent, there might be some legal recourse, but we don't have any evidence of fraud, coercion or incompetence here.	You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.	Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner.	If this is a typical private sector tenancy, then it would initially be a fixed-term one year'assured shorthold tenancy' a type of assured tenancy. The Housing Act 1988 says: If an assured tenancy which is a fixed term tenancy comes to an end otherwise than by virtue of— (a) an order of the court of the kind mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) or any other order of the court, or (b) a surrender or other action on the part of the tenant, then, subject to section 7 and Chapter II below, the tenant shall be entitled to remain in possession of the dwelling-house let under that tenancy and, subject to subsection (4) below, his right to possession shall depend upon a periodic tenancy arising by virtue of this section. So if the tenancy was not renewed then it would be replaced with a periodic tenancy. This has different rules to the fixed-term tenancy. Whether renewing the tenancy is necessary or not depends on whether either party strongly prefers the fixed-term tenancy to the periodic.
Can a President of the United States be arrested for previous crimes? Recently, the FBI decided not to recommend prosecution of Hillary Clinton, and as of 12:00 noon EST Clinton is projected to have lost her bid for POTUS. However - if the FBI had recommended prosecution and Hillary had won the election, what would the result have been? I don't know how the US legal system works, but if it would have taken time for her to be convicted, she could have been sworn in as POTUS before being imprisoned, if guilty. Could she have been arrested after she was sworn in? Or does the POTUS have immunity?	There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.	First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap.	An accused would be arrested for the purposes of arraignment ("even a scheduled arrest is still an arrest"). That does not entail that the accused would be held in custody pending or during trial. Many commenters are of the view that Mr. Trump would be released under his own recognizance without bail. Reference: AP News.	If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations.	The relevant part of the 22nd amendment to the US constitution says: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. The question is dues "more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President" mean "more than two years of any single term ..." or "more than two years of any and all such terms taken together". The former is closer to the plain meaning of the text, but the latter is almost surely what Congress intended, given the history of the 22nd. There is no case law, because there is no case in which a person has been elected VP and become president in two or more different terms. Indeed there is no case of a person who, having become president on the death or resignation of a president, then ran again as VP. There is no telling how a court would rule in such a situation, but I rather suspect that the 10-year limit interpretation would be upheld.	Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.	Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.).	While the point made by user6726 is not wrong with respect to this particular statute, it doesn't address a more basic point about how the supremacy clause works. Federal criminal laws govern punishments for federal crimes in the federal criminal justice system. Federal prosecutors bringing federal criminal charges against criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system can and do secure death penalty sentences against criminal defendants in states where there is no state death penalty. One recent case where that happened was the Boston Marathon bombing case where a defendant was sentenced to death in federal court for the crime for violation of a federal criminal statute, despite the fact that Massachusetts has no death penalty of its own. This is not a supremacy clause issue. No state law had to be changed or invalidated because of the existence of the federal law. States law governs how the state criminal justice system works, not the federal criminal justice system. When we say that a state has abolished the death penalty, we mean that it has abolished it in the state criminal justice system. This doesn't absolutely foreclose the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed in that state on federal charges, although it does make it far less likely that the death penalty will be imposed. Partially, this is because "blue collar" crime is handled by the states. Partially, this is because out of comity and a concern that juries in states without a death penalty are less likely to vote for a capital sentence, federal prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty in a state without capital punishment than in a state with capital punishment. For example, there are 2,902 people on death row as of 2016, in the U.S. Almost 98% of death penalty convictions that have not yet been carried out were obtained in state courts. Only, 62 involve civilian death penalties imposed in federal courts (mostly in states that have the death penalty) and another 6 involve death penalties imposed in military courts (mostly in states that allow the death penalty or abroad). All of the other cases arose in state courts.
Can an owner ban a person from a property when a contract is in place? Recently I angered the owner of a UPS Store that I have a contract and service agreement with. He canceled my service agreement. He also declared I was banned from the property for life. The problem I'm facing is I have packages en route. According to our contract after termination or end of the service agreement, I can choose to have the packages stored at a daily rate for periodic pick-up or forwarded at my expense. In keeping with the contract and not wanting an irate person to have my new address, I told him, I would like any packages that arrive to be stored at my expense. Can he really ban a patron with a contract that obligates him to serve the patron? In case it matters: there has and will be no violence there have and will be no threats (by me) this occurred in California Thanks! Update I'm including the contract, because of the inquiries. I don't wan't it to distract from the actual question in the title, regardless of whether my situation is deemed different. Contract	He can probably cancel your contract for cause and ban you. If he does so, you can send someone else to get the packages, forward them to someplace other than your home, or retrieve them with a "civil assist" coordinated with law enforcement.	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).	Yes. Contracts do not excuse a site from obeying the law, and the law requires sites to obey court orders. "It violates my contract with a third party" is not a valid reason to disobey a court, and disobeying a court order is contempt. On the other hand, contract law (at least in the U.S. and U.K.) says that contracts that violate the law or public policy are invalid, and so you could not win a breach of contract suit if the defendant could not legally comply with the contract. Now, a contract might require the company to attempt all possible legal ways to get the court to revoke its order, or to avoid the order in the first place (for instance, if Google does no business in China, a U.S. court might not excuse them from a contract because they capitulated to the Chinese government). However, when push comes to shove, private contracts are lower priority than court orders.	Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.	If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice.	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.
Defamation, Slander, and Infowars I was reading an article today where one of the victims of the Los Vegas shooting was saying that he was being harassed and threatened by people who buy into the conspiracy theory that no one died in Vegas, that crisis actors were hired. This got me thinking, could such a victim (or all of the victims in a class actions suit) sue Alex Jones based on defamation or slander since he's the purveyor of this conspiracy (well, I suppose the most popular). This question could also be posed of the Sandy Hook Massacre or even the 9/11 terrorist attack as Alex has said the same about those events.	Alex Jones has been sued for defamation; see Alex Jones Retracts Chobani Claims to Resolve Lawsuit - The New York Times The basis of the lawsuit were the reports published on Infowars (the website and YouTube) that said the (Chobani) factory in Idaho, which employs refugees, was connected to the 2016 sexual assault of a child and a rise in tuberculosis cases. The reports were promoted on Twitter under the headline “Idaho Yogurt Maker Caught Importing Migrant Rapists” and were spread widely online. The suit was settled and Alex Jones retracted the stories because those "facts" about Chobani and its owner, Hamdi Ulukaya (Wikipedia) that were published by Jones - sexual assault of a child and a rise in tuberculosis cases - were provably false. There were no proven cases regarding sexual assault, or documented rises in tuberculosis cases in Idaho or caused by the yogurt. Such libel impacted Chobani's business and Ulukaya's reputation, so he sued Jones. Evidently the lawsuit was settled before going to trial, because Jones broadcast that “The tweets and video have now been retracted and will not be reposted. On behalf of InfoWars, I regret that we mischaracterized Chobani, its employees and the people of Twin Falls, Idaho, the way we did.” Those false reports were published - on a website, on Youtube and Twitter - and that satisfied the requirements of libel, which is the publication of provably false facts. Libel is a written or published defamatory statement, while slander is defamation that is spoken by the defendant. (Public figures have a higher threshold of proving libel; they must prove actual malice. Ulukaya may or may not be considered a public figure.) For a full outline of defamation, see Defamation, Slander and Libel \| Nolo.com Unless Jones has retracted the provably false facts he has (allegedly) published about Sandy Hooks and 9/11, or somehow noted that they were his ideas or theories and not provable facts, or that he was simply retelling the facts he had been given, he could be sued. The lawsuit above cited Jones' previous contentions that the Sept. 11 attacks were orchestrated by the United States government and that the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., was a hoax concocted by those hostile to the Second Amendment. so he does have a record of commenting or reporting on those incidents. Jones has also Apologized for Promoting ‘Pizzagate’ Hoax (The New York Times), possibly because he was threatened with a lawsuit. And so he does appear to have a Modus operandi (Wikipedia) for this style of reporting and retracting stories. Jones or anyone else could be sued if they published what he called facts about the Las Vegas victims that were provably false. That would depend on the facts of the case: the victim(s) and the people or news sources that allegedly libeled the victim(s) by publishing the "facts."	In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?	It's impractical to say what the law of Guyana was in 1978, but we can substitute criminal law from 1998 and assume that there would be substantial overlap. Suicide is still a crime, as is murder and while many people committed suicide, many also died at at hands of others. Whether or not Jones committed any murders, he was an access before the fact, and can be treated as a principal (Title 3), and for conspiracy to commit a felony (murder). Under §96, conseling or aiding in suicide is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. The Heaven's Gate suicides took place in California, where suicide is not a crime. However, it is a felony to aid, advise, or encourage another to commit suicide. As a backup, following the model of Michelle Carter's conviction (appeal denied Mass Supreme Court, petition to SCOTUS, cert denied), he might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, although prosecutors would have had to think of that angle (encouraging suicide is not a crime in Massachussetts, thus the need to be creative in prosecution).	There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal.	If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.	Yes, it's actally happened. Several outfits have filed cases by the hundreds, and they were even literally photocopies. And it works rather well, until one victim stands up for what's right - and then the house of cards comes tumbling down. Molski For instance, due to a minor ADA issue (toilet paper roll 2" too low etc.) poor Jarek Molski was injured using the bathroom... in hundreds of restaurants, many on the same day, and hundreds in the same week. On one hand, hundreds of defendants simply paid Molski off, raising about a million dollars. On the other hand, the first defendant to actually fight back was able to uncover the hundreds of other cases, and the obvious fraud. The court swiftly ruled that Jarek Molski is a vexatious litigant and can file no more lawsuits, except by asking permission (presenting the facts to a judge and the judge deciding that there's really a worthy case there). The lawyers which represented Molski are likewise barred from representing anyone in an ADA case. Their law firm, likewise. Righthaven Another group of lawyers set up a law firm specifically to sue the owners of "BBS's" / internet forums / Q&A sites such as StackExchange, whose public users had pasted up copies of newspaper articles into the BBS. They Bought the "right to sue" from copyright owners such as newspapers - Righthaven didn't own the content, just the "hunting license" to go after people who infringed on the content - with the content owners getting a cut of proceeds. They too filed hundreds of "madlib" lawsuits. In fact their lawsuit engine was so automated that they 'accidentally' sued journalists writing about Righthaven - (who quoted material from the entirely public lawsuit papers themselves - complaints are public by definition unless sealed by the courts.) Needless to say, Righthaven had never heard of DMCA Safe Harbor, or hoped the forum owners hadn't. Again it worked: hundreds "paid up". Molski and Righthaven carefully chose "settlement offer" numbers ($5000-ish) that would be slightly cheaper than raising a legal defense ($6000-10,000). In the USA, each party pays their own legal bills - there's no concept of "loser pays" unless the other party's conduct is outrageous. It's so rare that when I had the pleasure of doing so, the court told us to take the standard garnishment forms, cross out "defendant" and hand-write "plaintiff" :) And again, the first defendant to actually stand up to Righthaven in court, asked the court to knock Righthaven to the moon, which the court gleefully did. RIAA / MPAA BitTorrent is a file-sharing network with no central hub. It breaks files into thousands of "chunks". Users collect chunks from hundreds of other users until they have the whole thing. Part of the social contract of BitTorrent is that people who download also upload (seed) to share the chunks they have gotten so far. People who refuse to upload are called leeches. RIAA and MPAA are the trade associations of the music and movie industries, respectively. They searched for BitTorrent (pirated, they claim) copies of their members' music and movies. They then "leeched" those copies with modified BitTorrent software that recorded the IP address of the "seeder". They took the IP address to the owning ISP, and demanded the customer identity. Then they sent out "pay-us-or-else" letters by the tens of thousands, and filed suits by the thousands. The argument was that the seeder had pirated the music, and that the ISP account holder was financially responsible for that activity, neither claim 100% reliable. This campaign has been supported by the courts, because RIAA/MPAA were very careful of their legal footing. But I only mention this because another gang of lawyers was paying attention, and they had their own ideas. Prenda "Law" This gang of lawyers correctly guessed that if users panicked at an RIAA/MPAA demand letter, they'd really panic if the topic was pornography. So they set up a law firm specifically to apply RIAA/MPAA's techniques to porn. (one wonders if they paid RIAA a royalty). But they were much more outrageous and careless. For instance, rather than partner or purchase legitimate porn content, they worked with porn stars like Sunny Leone to create shell companies who, unbelievably made original content specifically as bait to ensnare BitTorrent users. Again, this situation only works until someone stands up for what's right: then it all falls apart. This ended much, much worse than Righthaven or Molski. The civil judges were so offended they referred the matter out for criminal prosecution. The organizers got 19 years in prison between them.	There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law.	They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue.
When must a document be kept confidential? I applied for a job and received an offer. The offer letter and employee contract state Please note that the details of your compensation are to remain strictly confidential. and Employee represents and agrees that he has received a copy of this Agreement to keep for his own records. Employee further agrees to maintain the confidentiality of and not disclose the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement, except as otherwise provided herein. Since I would be moving to the US for the work, I would like to consult with friends and family. Does this mean it's illegal for me to show them the offer letter and terms of employment I received? I never agreed to keep these confidential. Are such terms legally binding, even if you didn't sign anything? Does showing this to close friends or relatives constitute a breach?	Some states (including California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, New York and Oregon, per the website below) have recently passed legislation outlawing pay secrecy requirements. Check online to see if the state you will work in is among them. Also see http://www.npr.org/2014/04/13/301989789/pay-secrecy-policies-at-work-often-illegal-and-misunderstood and https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/Pages/Proposed-State-Laws-Address-Pay-Secrecy.aspx	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.	To preface my answer, this aspect of UK law is unclear at best and I try to set out general principles where available. If you are acting in a private sphere, then the recording of conversations are unregulated, however this is only for personal use – i.e., should you desire to make notes on what was said for your reference at a later date. Should you wish to share it with a third party, then you would need consent from all participants or be able to demonstrate that it would be in the public interest. If you are acting as an employee or a company, then the situation changes. Firstly, you need to check your contract, whilst this does not constitute a crime, it may be against the terms of your employment. Secondly, a company can only make recordings without knowledge under statutory conditions, such as to establish facts, ensure regulatory compliance or demonstrate standards that are achieved or need to be achieved by training. It is a general principle that conversations recorded without consent are inadmissible in court, particularly in terms of a criminal proceedings. In civil matters, it similarly follows the concept that a claimant should come to court with clean hands. However, judges are usually more pragmatic in civil cases and if parties are aware of the existence of the recording, then it often be subject to usual rules of disclosure, though this may open the creator of the recording to subsequent litigation regarding the illegality of the recording under Data Protection Act or others.	Bonded labor is illegal in India, but enforcement is lax. Read Right against exploitation in Fundamental rights in India. The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions, namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour)... As per law, they cannot make the contract binding if it relates to bonding of the laborer. But a general contract may stand in court if they have made you sign the contract and paid the duty to government for the contract. This contract will be mild form of Bonds/begar-contracts. As per the requirements of the contract, usually they will ask you to give them your original documents and degree certificate. Do not do that. That will give them control, and it's illegal. From personal experience, such companies are phonies and they want to exploit you. Visa thing is a scare. As per they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter; they might do that, and so you will not be able to show experience. You can file a lawsuit against them. (But you know it's a waste of time in Indian courts) As per first three things you mentioned: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal. It's not a contract. Do not provide them your actual signatures. Make a strange signature so that you can later argue that it's not your signature. But think about the consequences: You are going to that (probably shady) company, do you think they will hold any of their promises later, at all. Think: Will the company stay in business until your bond is over? Then how will you get an Experience certificate? That ends the answer. A few suggestions I'd suggest finding a different job. I'd suggest talking to a lawyer. It's cheaper than your life being screwed up. I'd suggest talking to your family about it. Nothing written here constitutes legal advice. Talk to a lawyer to get a legal opinion on the matter.	Contracts do not have to be written and signed on pieces of paper, except in a few cases specified by law. Writing style (ordinary style of talking vs. high-register formulaic language) does not affect the validity or a writing in contract law. You do have something in writing. What matters most is what he actually said (exact words, not your belief of what it must have meant), and how it relates to any existing contractual obligation. For example if the message says "You're fired, turn your badge in at the desk. I'll think about giving you two weeks pay", that's not an enforceable promise. But your existing contract might say "You get 2 weeks severance pay when we fire you", and that can't be walked by by saying "I'll thinking about it". And it also depends on whether there are any laws mandating severance pay (but California does not have any mandatory severance pay law).	An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.	Contracts A contract is not a piece of paper; it is an agreement intended to be legally binding between 2 or more people and it may be verbal or written or a combination of both. That said, where a person has signed a document knowing that it contains contractual terms, in the absence of fraud that person is bound by the terms: it is immaterial whether the person signing reads the document or not. So there are two reasons why a signed contract would not be binding: the person did not know it contained contractual terms fraud. It is in the second case that the validity of the signature would matter. Fraud would have to be proved: it would not be sufficient to say "I did not sign that"; the person would need to demonstrate that a fraud has been perpetrated. Signatures Particularly today, with the ability to scan a signature it is trivially easy to affix anyone's signature to anything. However, a party to a contract is entitled to rely prima facie on the validity of the signature. A person would have to provide evidence that it was not their signature or had been affixed without their knowledge or consent. A court would look at the entire circumstances surrounding such a claim; if a person had, up until the dispute, acted as though they had signed the document then a court would probably not countenance an argument that they hadn't. It is always possible to construct contrived circumstances where this or that could happen but, in reality, they are extremely rare. Unless you are dealing with a con-artist, you can trust the signature; if you are dealing with a con-artist, you have bigger problems. See, the President has endorsed this answer:

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