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What are the rules for intellectual property in science fiction? Okay so I am writing something that is like a chronicle of science, culture and technological progression in a popular sci-fi franchise. I don't expect my work to be published for many years. Right now I am just collecting ideas. However, I am nervous on what I will be allowed to do. I have 3 main questions If something appeared in that sci-fi universe prior to me re-iterating it; does that mean it's fair game for me to use? Its already used in that sci-fi universe but in a very obscure publication of it but once it's been used; can I use it again without any problem? Does intellectual law protect very specific plot concepts? I have a concept I thought of and like I said, I probably won't get published for several years. If someone publishes a story with that concept; can I still use it? Are you allowed to borrow names of different generic sci-fi inventions that aren't super-important to the story. I want to use a name for a piece of tech from Star Trek and I was wondering if that is okay. I won't say which franchise I hope to be writing for; but it's very big and quite popular. UPDATE: Basically I am writing a timeline of sorts in-universe of all technological, scientific, cultural, socioeconomic and historical achievements in that universe written from a in-universe point of view | If one is writing about a work of fiction, one may describe the work, and use terms from the work in doing so. One might write, for example: In Spaceman Sam the characters use "blasters" as weapons, while in Jack of the Galaxy "contragravity" is used to propel "aircars" These are facts, and copyright may never be used to protect facts. Moreover, such uses as reviews and criticism are particularly likely to constitute fair use under US law, or another exception to copyright under the law of some other country, even if some otherwise protected content is quoted. If something appeared in that sci-fi universe prior to me re-iterating it; does that mean it's fair game for me to use? If the "something" that appeared earlier is an "idea" or a name, it is indeed fair game. This is true whether it is obscure or well-known. In any case describing the facts of the fiction, even in detail, is generally not an infringement. If "re-iterating" something from an existing work in a new fiction involves an extensive quotation, or a detailed, point-by-point reuse of a fictional element, that might constitute infringement, unless fair use or another exception to copyright applies. Does intellectual law protect very specific plot concepts? No, it doesn't. A plot concept is an idea. In the US, 17 USV 103(b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Laws in other countries are similar on this point. This is sometimes known as the idea/expression distinction. This means that while the expression used to embody a concept is often protected by copyright, the concept itself never is. Are you allowed to borrow names of different generic sci-fi inventions that aren't super-important to the story. Yes. In fact even the names of fictional technological devices that are very important to a story may be, and often are, reused in different works by different authors. For example Ursula LeGuin used "ansible" as the name of a faster-then-light communicator, in fact an instantaneous communication device, in her "Hanish" series, particularly in The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, and The Word for World is Forest. (She wrote that the term was derived from the word "answerable".) The term and concept were reused by Vernor Vinge in "The Blabber" and A Fire Upon the Deep, and by Elizabeth Moon in the "Sassanek" series and more centrally in the "Vatta's war" series starting with Trading in Danger. Moreover, the names of fictional characters are not protected. An author might introduce characters with names borrowed from Tolkien, Heinlein, or other well-known (or obscure) fictional works. US Copyright Office circular #33 "Works not protected by Copyright" says that "names, titles, and short phrases" may not be protected by copyright, and will not be separably registered. However, if a character has not only the name of a previous character, but a detailed, point-by-point similarity in distinctive elements to a character in a protected work, that may be enough to make the newer work a derivative work, and thus be infringing if permission is not obtained from the copyright holder on the source work. The same is true of the detailed reproduction of a distinctive setting from a source work. But a mere name and broad, general description is not enough tom make a later work derivative. The more details are reproduced, and the more distinctive and specific those details are, the more likely the newer work is to be found distinctive. | Copyright does not protect the idea for a game, its name or title, or the method or methods for playing it. Nor does copyright protect any idea, system, method, device, or trademark material involved in developing, merchandising, or playing a game. Once a game has been made public, nothing in the copyright law prevents others from developing another game based on similar principles. Copyright protects only the particular manner of an author’s expression in literary, artistic, or musical form. Link https://www.copyright.gov/registration/other-digital-content/ | "Lightsaber" is a trademarked term, so it's gotta be called something else. The idea behind a lightsaber is older than Star Wars, anyhow idea are not protected by copyright. The actual design of such a weapon would be protected, but it would be a matter for the jury to decide if the supposedly-infringing design was a copy of a Lucasfilms-protected object, or that of the cover of Analog, Jan. 1969. The "setting" of the movie is completely irrelevant, all that counts is whether the object "copies" the plaintiff's design. In light of the earlier Wolfling design, it's not a foregone conclusion that all lightsaber-resembling objects are infringing. Available evidence indicates that you will be sued if you do it, so consult a really good IP attorney. | I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...). | Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA. | The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage. |
Fitness to plead - UK - what happens when the defendant gets better? Once a defendant has been found unfit to plead, found to have committed the act (via a trial of facts) and sentenced to hospital (via the Mental Health Act), can the case be reopened when the defendant becomes well again? I am under the impression that at some time the law was that the defendant was sectioned until he became well again. But now it just gets dealt with via the trial of facts. | england-and-wales Can the case be reopened when the defendant becomes well again? Yes See the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, and the related Crown Prosecution Service guidance: Section 5(1)(b) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 provides that where a person has a finding made that they are under a disability and that they did the act or omission charged, the court shall make: a hospital order (with or without a restriction order); a supervision order; or an order for his absolute discharge. Section 5A(4) of the same provides for an express power for the Secretary of State for Justice to remit for trial a person who becomes fit for trial while detained in hospital under a hospital order and a restriction order made under section 5(2)(a) Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. [...] Section 4A(2) Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 provides that a finding of unfitness will have the effect that the trial "shall not proceed or proceed further". Although the fitness to plead procedure can result in an acquittal, a finding that the offender did the act or made the omission charged is not a conviction and does not amount to the determination of a criminal charge. It does not preclude a full trial of the accused if s/he becomes fit to be tried: R v H [2003] UKHL 1. | For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that. | While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | In the third of your sources (Harassment act, section 5), near the end, it says: If the defendant breaches an order under section 5 or 5A of the PHA 1997 without reasonable excuse, she/he will be guilty of a criminal offence (section 5(5) PHA 1997). The penalty that may be imposed upon breach of the new section 5A restraining order is identical to that which can be imposed under section 5. (Emphasis added) In Item 2 of the first source (darlingtons.com) it says: If a person disobeys the terms of an Order of Court which carries a penal notice, he will have breached the Injunction. As to whether such a breach constitutes contempt, will be considered on a case-by case approach according to the particular facts of the given case. The seriousness of the breach, and the question as to whether such action undermined or ‘laughed in the face of the Court Order’ so as to be contemptuous, will be determined by the Court. In item three of this same source it says: If the Court considers that the breach was intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice, the Court has power to commit a person to prison, and/or impose a fine. In short it appears that the court is expected to use judgement on a case-by-case basis. Violation of a restraining order because the person subject to the order had to provide emergency medical or fire or rescue services, or otherwise provide needed assistance in an emergency, with no improper motive, would, I should think, not lead to any penalty for contempt. US practice also expects a court to exercise judgement when sentencing for contempt. | It is an unquestioned pre-American axiom, expressed in Latin as actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea ("the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty") which has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since at least the 17th century. It is thus presupposed in all criminal proceedings. It's not that a person only commits a crime with free will, it's that it is not deemed to be a crime if there is no free will. A person can be held at gunpoint and required to commit a criminal act: the person does indeed have free will to choose to be killed rather than commit the act, but the act is legally excused since dying is never held to be the only acceptable alternative to committing an otherwise-criminal act. | You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm. | england-and-wales Yes As well as the general offence of comtempt of court by publishing facts in breach of a court order, there are also two statutory provisions making it an offence if those facts reveal a person's identity (maliciously or not): section 1, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: (1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where a person is accused of an offence to which this Act applies, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed (“the complainant”) shall during the complainant’s lifetime be included in any publication. [...] The relevant offences are listed in section 2 (being rape and a number of other serious sexual offences). section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933: (1) No matter relating to any child or young person concerned in proceedings to which this section applies shall while he is under the age of 18 be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as someone concerned in the proceedings. (2) The proceedings to which this section applies are— (a) proceedings in a youth court; (b) proceedings on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated); (c) proceedings in a magistrates' court under Schedule 7 to the Sentencing Code (proceedings for breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation orders); (d) proceedings on appeal from a magistrates' court arising out of any proceedings mentioned in paragraph (c) (including proceedings by way of case stated). [...] |
In what states of the U.S., and under what conditions can a priest be compelled to testify of information a penitent disclosed to them? If the states where it is privileged, and may not be admissible in court are fewer, which states are they? Does it matter if information disclosed during priest-penitent communications had been known to the priest prior to the priest from another source? Or after? | The priest-penitent privilege exists in all 50 states in some form, as discussed in this article and this. In the US, in People v. Phillips (1813) this is a consequence of the Free Exercise clause (this is where the clause "sprang to life" in constitutional law. The statements excluded vary between states as discussed in this article, so Montana and Wyoming only recognize the privilege for "confessions", whereas New Jersey have a broader interpretation of the privilege. The privilege only exists w.r.t. communications between a clergy member and the accused, and does not apply to things that a clergy member may know about a person (but it's a separate question whether heresay is admissible, anyhow). | In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure. | Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. | Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR. | If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public. | The California jury instructions for the crime of perjury give more detail on what it means to commit perjury: it's not just that you make a statement that is false, you have to willfully state that the information is true even though you know it is false. If you have a belief that you will be convicted for perjury (or any crime) by testifying, you may invoke your 5th Amendment right (I assume you are not testifying as the defendant in a criminal matter). You might (theoretically: see below on immunity and perjury) be granted immunity from prosecution, in which case there is no 5th Amendment right to refuse to testify (you are not putting yourself in criminal jeopardy), and the court can order you to testify. Or, you might not be granted immunity and still be ordered to testify. The federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, also needs to be scrutinized. When ordered to testify, "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination", but it generally cannot be used against him: no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case However, there is an exception: except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. In other words, you cannot be immunized against a perjury charge. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 defendant refused an order to testify, on the grounds that they (allegedly) believed that the government's grant of immunity was not broad enough, i.e. that there were areas where they might be questions and forced to criminally implicate themselves. They refused, and were held in contempt. The opinion recognized that the 5th Amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used" (emphasis added). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, the court held that The Fifth Amendment does not relieve a witness from answering merely on his own declaration or judgment that an answer might incriminate him; whether he must answer is determinable by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and unless there is reasonable ground, as distinct from a remote or speculative possibility, to apprehend that a direct answer may prove dangerous to the witness, his answer should be compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 asserts that "the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (itself quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn): "the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct" Although the wording of the immunity statute does not allow immunity from prosecution for perjury, the 5th Amendment right can only be invoked against a real legal jeopardy. They can be compelled to testify, they probably cannot be immunized against a perjury conviction (certainly not at the federal level). We would need to know the entire circumstances of the case to be able to assess whether the "knowing to be false" part could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | There is no way to know for absolute sure. The statutes do not address the question, so one would look at the case law. There appear to be about a dozen wiretapping cases that made it to the court of appeals in Maryland, and none of them involve implied consent (e.g. where it is announced prior to recording that the call may or will be recorded – prior is mandatory). The probability is high that implied consent suffices, since the legislature did not specific require express consent and consent is not generally taken to mean express consent. One can and should hire an attorney who will give you a professional and considered (but not infallible) opinion, if it really matters. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. |
What is the apex court in the USA? In South Africa we have the constitution court which dedicates itself to constitutional matters. The US has a constitution like South Africa has but as far as I know no court dedicated to a addressing constitutional issues specifically ? How exactly is a decision about a constitutional matters made at a national level so all states are willing to accept it? Or is it just as simple as the supreme court in the USA is the con-court by another name? | The Supreme Court of the United States is our apex court. Its decisions on constitutional questions are binding throughout the country. It is not, however, limited to considering constitutional issues, as it may also consider appeals addressing questions of statutory interpretation and rules of procedure. In very limited cases, it may also sit as a trial court in cases where it has original jurisdiction. | Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004. | In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed a case that sought one dollar in nominal damages. I'm assuming you mean only claims involving money damages as a remedy, because there are many claims every year involving no literal money damages and the remedy sought is some other kind of relief (although such relief would still have practical or economic value). | India does not have a constitutional court, which is a term usually reserved for a court which has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions and is usually limited to deciding constitutional questions. India has a (mostly) unitary court system capped by the Supreme Court of India, but its jurisdiction is not limited to constitutional questions, and it is not the only court in India that can interpret and apply the Constitution of India. When a component of a decision decided by the Supreme Court of India is not necessary for resolution of the case before it, that portion of the decision is called dicta and is not binding precedent although it is still persuasive authority before lower courts as it is a good indication of how the Supreme Court of India would resolve a case in future litigation. The same distinction between portions of a ruling that are binding precedents and those that are mere dicta also applies in all other appellate courts in a common law legal system such as India's. Also, a portion of a court decision is not dicta merely because it is far reaching. A binding precedent can be broad or narrow in the deciding court's discretion. What makes "dicta" distinct is that it is literally "off topic" and not literally controlled by the potentially broad principles used to decide the case before the Court. What determines whether a part of the ruling is "off topic" is the exact scope of the issue that the court states that it is resolving. For example, if the Court states that it is resolving the question of "due process in an admiralty case" and remarks on due process in an ordinary non-admiralty case, the later remarks are dicta. But if the court states that it is resolving the question of "due process in a legal proceeding" then the same statement is not dicta. | The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is. | This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts. | No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction. | The first thing to note is that your question is kind of the wrong way around. US states are sovereign and generally have the ability to make any kind of laws they want, unless they violate some specific tenet of federal law or the US Constitution. You suggest, for instance, that arguments which are "culturally founded" have no place in the law, but that's just your opinion, and there isn't generally anything preventing a state from making law based on such things, should its elected legislature see fit to do so. (Indeed, one could argue that nearly all laws are in some sense "culturally founded", since they are based on some notion of what kind of behavior is or is not appropriate, and those tend to be culturally based.) So legally speaking, the states aren't, by default, obligated to give any sort of justification for the laws they made. The burden of proof is on the other side. Someone seeking to overturn those laws would have to convince a court that the laws violated some specific provision of the Constitution (or another superior law). If they couldn't convince a court of this, the law would stand. From what I have read, before the US Supreme Court's 2015 legalization of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the previous precedent was set in 1971 by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson. The decision itself is quite short and is worthwhile to read. Quoting Wikipedia's summary, the plaintiffs claimed that Minnesota's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated several provisions of the US Constitution: First Amendment (freedom of speech and of association), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), Ninth Amendment (unenumerated right to privacy), and Fourteenth Amendment (fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause and sex discrimination contrary to the Equal Protection Clause). The Minnesota court determined that none of the plaintiffs' objections were valid. Again, I'll refer you to the decision for the details, but the court mainly focused on their Fourteenth Amendment arguments (the others may have been addressed by the trial court, whose opinion I can't find online). They wrote: The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or invidious discrimination. They specifically rejected any analogy to bans on interracial marriage, which had been held unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia: But in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex. Baker appealed to the US Supreme Court, but his appeal was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question," without any further explanation. (Nobody quite seems to understand what they meant by that, but here is an essay discussing the situation in a little more depth.) The effect of the dismissal was that the Minnesota court's decision became binding precedent upon the whole nation - laws against same-sex marriage didn't violate those provisions of the Constitution. And that was how matters stood for 44 years until Obergefell. (Of course, there was nothing to stop individual states from deciding to allow same-sex marriage, and some in fact did so in the meantime.) You have suggested that laws against same-sex marriage were religiously motivated. This might suggest an argument that they would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs in Baker didn't raise that point, so it wasn't considered in the Minnesota court's opinion. I don't know whether any other courts have considered it; no such argument was mentioned in the opinion in Obergefell. |
When did the American and British naming conventions for legislation diverge? American laws seem to be named as, for example, the Trade Act of 2002, while British Acts of Parliament seem to use the same naming convention, except without the word "of" preceding the year? Did American legislation ever follow the British naming convention of today? Or did British legislation ever use "of" like the US still does? If so, when and what can the changes be traced to? | The naming conventions for legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom have evolved over time and have undergone various changes and adaptations. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific time when the naming conventions for legislation in the two countries diverged, as the process has likely been a gradual one. In general, the United States and the United Kingdom both have a long history of using names or titles to identify and refer to legislation. In the United States, legislation is typically given a short and descriptive title, such as the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" or the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act." In the United Kingdom, legislation is often referred to by its short title, which may include the year in which it was enacted, such as the "Companies Act 2006" or the "Bribery Act 2010." These naming conventions have evolved over time and have been influenced by a variety of factors, including changes in the political and legal systems of the two countries. It is likely that the naming conventions for legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom will continue to evolve and change in the future. | I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired. | The starting point of any analysis has to begin with asking what the scope of the Act's application is i.e. what acts fall under its remit and what does not. The question is whether Parliament intended the Act to apply to ANY alteration to the structure, or only a certain class of acts. Clearly it is not the former. With the latter then in mind, statements like that you pointed out merely acknowledge that the Party Wall Act does not cover every single conceivable alteration to a shared structure, as that statement has to be viewed in its entire context. You have left out the second half of the statement that stipulates the core principle of the Act, which is that the Act only imposes the req to serve notice only if, generally, the alteration would cause much structural change or damage. The de minimis threshold can be inferred from the list of activities covered under section 2. Notice that the general character of the listed activities envisage acts which are atypical (in the sense of just drilling holes etc.). This can also be inferred from Parliament's intent in its drafting of the Act as a whole. Also, it might just be common sense. | You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.) | The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web. | The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court. | Overview Generally speaking the Titles of Nobility clauses in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the U.S. Constitution, were aimed at barring hereditary grants of special privileges which is what it means by "Titles of Nobility". In particular, it was mostly aimed at preventing a monarchy from arising in the U.S. This said, there is extremely little case law directly interpreting the the Titles of Nobility clauses, mostly because neither the federal government in the United States, nor any state, has shown much inclination to grant titles of nobility. Most cases discuss the Titles of Nobility clauses in order to interpret other clauses of the constitution (usually in dissenting opinions as part of a parade of evils). A Titles of Nobility amendment to the U.S. Constitution was also proposed in 1810, but never adopted, although many conspiracy theories claim that it was adopted and is in force. This would have automatically revoked the citizenship of anyone awarded a title of nobility. As Wikipedia explains: It has been claimed that the Titles of Nobility Amendment became part of the Constitution. It was erroneously referred to as the Thirteenth Amendment in some early 19th century printings of the Constitution.2[9] Between 1819 and 1867 the statutory law code of Virginia included it as well.[10] The term "Thirteenthers" has sometimes been used in recent years to refer to those who mistakenly believe this amendment was ratified in the 1810s, and also for those who today wish to see this amendment adopted.2 This misconception has become significant because it is yoked with another misconception—that a lawyer's use of the word or abbreviation of "Esquire" after his name is a title of nobility acquired from a foreign power—and so some litigants and others have tried to assert that lawyers have lost their citizenship or are disqualified from public office. Consistent with the discussion below, the title "Esquire" for lawyers as used in the United States, is not a title of nobility because it cannot be passed on to the children of the people who hold it (in either English or American usage) and because it does not, in U.S. usage, at least, confer legal privileges on a hereditary basis. (In 19th century English usage, certain sons of nobles who do not have a noble title themselves were properly addressed "Esquire" and some minor privileges may go with that title, so in that context it may have historically been a Title of Nobility even though this has never been part of the American use of the term "Esquire.") Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "Nobility" as follows: In English law, a division of the people, comprehending dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons. These had anciently duties annexed to their respective honors. They are created either by writ, i.e. by royal summons to attend the house of peers, or by letters patent, i.e. by royal grant of any dignity and degree of peerage; and they enjoy many privileges, exclusive of their senatorial capacity. Letters patent still exist in both English and American law and primarily refer to document in the nature of a deed that transfers real estate from the sovereign to a private individual. The connection is that most (although not all) titles of nobility were personal rights incident to being the feudal owner of a parcel of land (the right to say who inherits land from an individual was originally entirely governed by law without the discretion of the owner to give it to someone else, but this was reformed gradually in the "early modern" period of English history and was fully reformed by the Victorian era except as to the titles of nobility historically associated with the land). Titles of Nobility are hereditary. An appointment to a position for life (the moral equivalent of a "Life Lord" in England or a Senator in the Canadian Parliament, or a federal judgeship in the U.S.) is not prohibited. But, no rights, other than citizenship or a right to an inheritance (in the absence of a will providing otherwise), that is hereditary may be granted. The Framers of our Constitution lived at a time when the Old World still tolerated in the shadow of ancient feudal traditions. As products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions among white men on account of their birth. See U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States"). Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 448 U.S. 448, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) dissenting opinion at Footnote 13 (overruled on other grounds). This case discusses citizenship issues. And similarly: Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a "legitimate purpose" for our Federal Government, which should be especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth. Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100. From its inception, the Federal Government has been directed to treat all its citizens as having been "created equal" in the eyes of the law. The Declaration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant of any title of nobility by the United States, see U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 427 U.S. 495, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) dissenting opinion at footnote 3. This case discusses illegitimacy discrimination. Some state constitutions use the phrase "no title of nobility or hereditary emolument, shall be passed," which emphasizes the hereditary component. Titles of Nobility confer legal privileges. Titles of Nobility in U.K. law at the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1789, among other things, conferred immunity to a trial by an ordinary jury and instead gave rise to a jury of one's peers (i.e. other nobles of the same rank or higher) if one was charged with a crime. This was enshrined in the Magna Carta of 1215 CE. This logic is still retained on a residual basis in U.S. courts-martial where a court martial proceeding of an officer can only be tried by other officers (who must be of equal or greater rank, if possible). 10 U.S.C. § 825. The historical link between the two concepts is that the British aristocracy derives mostly from grants of feudal rights to members of the conquering Norman army in 1066 CE proportionate to military rank and in accord with military hierarchy with modest modifications over time. The goal of the prohibition of Titles of Nobility was to prohibit titles of nobility that gave someone an unequal status in law in this fashion. So, a mere honorary recognition would be distinguished from a title that gave someone rank and privilege (on a hereditary basis). A dissent in the famous Dred Scott case, to which the birthright citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment enacted less than a decade later was a response, illustrates the concern: It is, in effect, whether the Constitution has empowered Congress to create privileged classes within the States, who alone can be entitled to the franchises and powers of citizenship of the United States. If it be admitted that the Constitution has enabled Congress to declare what free persons, born within the several States, shall be citizens of the United States, it must at the same time be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If this subject is within the control of Congress, it must depend wholly on its discretion. For, certainly, no limits of that discretion can be found in the Constitution, which is wholly silent concerning it; and the necessary consequence is, that the Federal Government may select classes of persons within the several States who alone can be entitled to the political privileges of citizenship of the United States. If this power exists, what persons born within the States may be President or Vice President 60 U.S. 578 of the United States, or members of either House of Congress, or hold any office or enjoy any privilege whereof citizenship of the United States is a necessary qualification, must depend solely on the will of Congress. By virtue of it, though Congress can grant no title of nobility, they may create an oligarchy, in whose hands would be concentrated the entire power of the Federal Government. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 15 L.Ed. 691, 60 U.S. 393, 577-578 (1857) dissenting opinion (majority opinion subsequently overruled and superseded by constitutional amendment). In this infamous case: The United States Supreme Court decided 7–2 against Scott, finding that neither he nor any other person of African ancestry could claim citizenship in the United States, and therefore Scott could not bring suit in federal court under diversity of citizenship rules. Moreover, Scott's temporary residence outside Missouri did not bring about his emancipation under the Missouri Compromise, which the court ruled unconstitutional as it would "improperly deprive Scott's owner of his legal property." The primary concern was that the United States not become a monarchy. In the debates of the Federal Convention Benjamin Franklin discusses his "apprehension" that the government of the States may "end in a Monarchy" and describes this possibility as "Catastrophe." See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (1927) at 53. John Dickenson, although noting the merits of limited monarchy, stated: "A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times-the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable." Id. at 56-57. Edmund Randolph noted that the "permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy," id. at 58, and argued against a single executive, regarding it "as the foetus of monarchy." Id. at 46. Conclusion Since a Kentucky Colonel, or a Prom King, or an Apple Butter Queen or what have you, are merely honorary without conferring legal rights and privileges, and are not hereditary, they do not constitute true Titles of Nobility in the constitutional sense. This is so even though a Kentucky Colonel is appointed by Letters Patent in a manner that apes the process by which Titles of Nobility were awarded in English law at the time that the Titles of Noblity Clause was enacted. | If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same. |
Does 8 USC §1409(a) grant citizenship or take away citizenship? If a person is born outside the US to a US citizen father and a non-US national mother, and the parents are not married to each other, then there are certain special requirements in order for the child to be a US citizen. Under 8 USC §1409(a)(3), one of the requirements is that the father must agree in writing to provide financial support for the child until they reach the age of 18. If all the conditions of 8 USC §1409(a) are met, then 8 USC §1401(g) applies "as of the date of birth" of the person, i.e., they are considered a US citizen from birth. Thus, the person's citizenship is conditional upon a particular act that must be performed before they reach the age of 18. As long as the father has written down somewhere, prior to the child's 18th birthday, that they agree to support the child financially until the age of 18 (or even just signed such an agreement written by someone else), this condition is fulfilled and the child is a citizen if all other conditions are met. If the child is over the age of 18 but has such a document in their possession that is dated before their 18th birthday, they can use it to prove that the condition was met and that they are a US citizen. However, if by the time the child turns 18 the father is still alive but has never made such a written agreement, then the child is not a US citizen. There are two ways to interpret the law: It grants citizenship. If, at some point between the child's birth and the child's 18th birthday, all the conditions of 8 USC §1409(a) are fulfilled, then the law grants citizenship to such child, and this grant is retroactive to their birth. (This interpretation raises the constitutional question of whether such a citizen would be eligible for the presidency.) It takes away citizenship. The child is born a citizen, but if the child reaches the age of 18 and the conditions have not been met, their citizenship is taken away by operation of law. It is constitutional for Congress to provide for the loss of citizenship of individuals who were born outside the US and not naturalized in the US. See Rogers v. Bellei. However, this interpretation seems less likely to me. I would normally think that if Congress had intended to write a law that takes away citizenship, they would be a bit more explicit about it. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a person who is still under the age of 18 and for whom the condition still could be met in the future could claim current US citizenship in e.g. removal proceedings. Which interpretation is correct? | Constitutionally, a person is only required to be granted U.S. citizenship if they are born in the United States. Any other form of citizenship is as provided by statute. So, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 makes some people citizens who would not otherwise be citizens in its absence. In that sense, it grants citizenship. Meanwhile, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(g) supports the proposition, which is a legal fiction in some cases, that someone is a "natural born citizen" of the United States, and hence eligible to run for President someday, and is retroactively considered to have been a citizen in the meantime for myriad other purposes, despite the fact that in the case of an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father, this right is not vested and could never come into being if the required actions aren't taken after the fact. Incidentally, this statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges. Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 420 (1997). So, while you would like to clearly distinguish between someone having citizenship granted and having citizenship revoked, Congress, in its wisdom, has not been so accommodating and has declined to clearly distinguish between the two interpretations. This statute is a bit like the question of Schrödinger's cat, who is indeterminately alive and dead at the same time until there is a measurement of its state, in quantum physics. A person with an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father is both a U.S. citizen from birth and always has been, and has never been a citizen of the U.S., until the situation is resolved with an actual determination of the question in accordance with the requirements of the statute. | The State Department is mischaracterizing the law, which requires only that the US citizen "bear" a valid US passport, not that the US citizen "use" the passport. This law, 8 USC 1185(b), used to have a fairly stiff penalty, and it used to apply only in time of war. When the wartime element was removed in 1978, so was the penalty. It now reads Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. If a US citizen attempts to leave the US without a valid US passport, there is a very small chance that the departure could be prevented by a CBP officer, but in the normal course of affairs the traveler would not even encounter a CBP officer, so the possibility is very remote indeed. There is nothing, however, that prevents a US citizen who also holds a passport issued by another country from using the other passport while also carrying a valid US passport. See also What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? at Travel and Can someone be penalized for an "unlawful" act if no penalty is specified? on this site. | The law doesn’t “defines a minor as a legal person below (some age)” It defines it as a natural person below (some age). | As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception. | The question mischaracterizes Texas law. Texas allows a common law marriage to be formally acknowledged in a document signed by the parties, for bureaucratic convenience and to end uncertainty. As clarified in the comments: this procedure isn't for couples who are "otherwise unmarried", but for those who are already married under common law (by living together as spouses, etc). And the date presumably can't actually be any date they choose, but only within the time period of their common-law marriage. In Texas, there is a common law marriage (per the link above) when you and your partner: are not already married, informally or formally, to anyone else at the time the marriage was created, AND both you and your partner were at least 18 years of age when the marriage was created; and you agreed to be married, AND afterward, lived in Texas as a married couple, and represented to others that you are married (“holding out” to others). These requirements, or some close variant of them, are typical of almost all common law marriage states. Common law marriages may be formed in the following U.S. states: Colorado: Common law marriage contracted on or after Sept. 1, 2006, is valid if, at the time the marriage was entered into, both parties are 18 years or older, and the marriage is not prohibited by other law (Colo. Stat. §14-2-109.5) Iowa: Common law marriage for purposes of the Support of Dependents Chapter (Iowa Code §252A.3) Otherwise it is not explicitly prohibited (Iowa Code §595.1A) Kansas: Common law marriage will be recognized if the parties are 18 or older and for purposes of the Divorce and Maintenance Article, proof of common law marriage is allowed as evidence of marriage of the parties (Kan. Stat. §23-2502; Kan. Stat. §23-2714) Montana: Not strictly prohibited, they are not invalidated by the Marriage Chapter (Mont. Stat. §40-1-403) New Hampshire: Common Law Marriage: "persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married." (N.H. Stat. §457:39) South Carolina: allows for marriages without a valid license (S.C. Stat. §20-1-360) Texas: Common Law Marriage in specific circumstances (Tex. Family Law §1.101; Tex. Family Law §2.401-2.402) Utah: Utah Stat. §30-1-4.5 While Texas provides a standard form for doing so, affidavits from each spouse, possibly filed in public real property records where the parties reside, would have the same effect. The use of a standardized safe harbor state approved form for doing this is a Texas-specific innovation. Common law marriage derives from English law, although it has since been abolished in England. The practice of formally documenting events and relationships that arise by operation of law with a signed instrument is a long standing one in all sorts of legal contexts. The Texas standard form Declaration would be prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it about the common law marriage of the parties, that would be hard to rebut. But, if someone had a legitimate reason to question whether they were actually married on the date stated (e.g. to overcome a claim of spousal confidential communications privilege) this could be overcome with evidence offered in an evidentiary hearing to the contrary (e.g. proof that the couple didn't meet until two years after the date recited). | I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down. | One official form of ID should be enough. Two pieces of ID is more than most people ever carry. And not selling to you because you’re black would be illegal discrimination. But that would be hard to prove. The most likely explanation is stupidity. Or lack of training. Might be an employee who is already deep into overtime, or just not mentally present. Some people go on auto-pilot and if you showed them an age card that isn’t accepted that’s fixed in their brain. Or maybe the passport photo doesn’t look like you. If it is an unusual form of ID like a 100% valid Japanese driving license, or a damaged passport, or a library card, those might be reasonably rejected. The best course of action would be to ask for the manager. The manager should either be able to give you a sensible reason why your passport is not acceptable, or give you the goods. And if not, your case for illegal discrimination is much stronger if a supposedly competent manager refuses to serve you. (Reading the other answer: Obviously if you are too young to buy the item, which is not true in your case, then showing 100 legal IDs wouldn't get you the item. And if you look so young that a reasonable person would think it's more likely that your ID is an excellent forgery than you being 18, they could deny the sale). | If an F-1 student in the US, gets married with a US citizen, how can he protect his money if a divorce happened in the future? Specifically if he has a plan to establish a company and run a business after he graduated, how can he keep all the rights and money/stuck/profit he will earn from his company and won't share it after a probable divorce? Should they wright something like "we promise we won't have any claims about each other's money after the divorce" before they get married? A prenuptial agreement is possible, and only an idiot or fool would draft one himself. An agreement drafted without legal representation would be highly likely to be invalidated in an effort to enforce it in the event of a divorce. Generally, both parties should have separate counsel. This must be accompanied by full financial disclosure by both parties, at least an opportunity to confer with legal counsel providing full informed consent regarding the rights given up in the agreement, and no undue pressure to sign it on the eve of a wedding. It cannot impact child support or child custody. It must also not be unconscionable to either spouse, either at the time it is executed or at the time of a divorce. If the company makes millions of dollars over the course of a ten year marriage, a court would not enforce the agreement according to those terms. In the case of an immigrant marrying a U.S. citizen, having a prenuptial agreement is usually a significant barrier to obtaining a spousal visa, which may be the only visa available after the marriage, on the grounds that this is considered a "yellow flag" that the marriage may actually be a sham for citizenship purposes only. A typical immigration officer who would read a post like this one or hearing an explanation for its purpose in an interview in those words would seriously consider denying a spousal visa or U.S. citizenship on the ground that the marriage is a fraud. The notion of a "probable divorce" in particular would almost certainly doom visa approval or a citizenship application, and would also, at the margins, make it less likely that it would be enforced at all. This is particularly true in the event of the very one-sided agreement proposed when you have a young couple that doesn't have established assets and children from prior marriages, or a pre-existing substantial amount of inherited wealth. Why else would a spouse agree to it? |
Using Other People's Recipes In a Video? I want to take other people's published recipes and then make a video out of them. So, say I find a recipe on some food blog or a different YouTube video, I want to take the recipe and record my own video of me making it, and upload it to YouTube. My understanding from the research I've done (see here and here) is that lists of ingredients are in the public domain (which I presume includes the amounts, and not just the ingredient names, but maybe I'm not understanding that properly), and while one may be able to copyright the instructions if they're significantly creative enough, it's unlikely, since that too is not creative enough to be warrant copyright protection. Therefore, it seems safe legally to take someone else's recipe, even I were able to monetize the video, but is it plagiarism (not necessarily copyright) to not cite where I got the recipe from? I'm also not asking about the real-word, "will they actually come after me," but rather the hypothetical, "could they." That is, would it technically be plagiarism, even if no one would want to take action against it. Lastly, less of a legal question, is it conventionally understood to be unethical or just bad practice not to cite recipes, even if it isn't illegal? | Recipes themselves are not protectable as intellectual property and a meal made with a recipe is, therefore, not a derivative work (because the meal is not derivative of the particular expression of the recipe which is entitled to protection). The precise expression of a recipe on a printed page is protectable, but that is all. Ideally, you wouldn't read or display the source of the recipe in your video. As the U.S. Copyright Registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) explains: How do I protect my recipe? A mere listing of ingredients is not protected under copyright law. However, where a recipe or formula is accompanied by substantial literary expression in the form of an explanation or directions, or when there is a collection of recipes as in a cookbook, there may be a basis for copyright protection. Note that if you have secret ingredients to a recipe that you do not wish to be revealed, you should not submit your recipe for registration, because applications and deposit copies are public records. See Circular 33, Works Not Protected by Copyright. Fashion designs have the same status. This is basically a legacy of a time when cooking and fashion design was done primarily at home by women in their households in the non-monetary economy and upper middle class men who served a judges and legislators didn't consider these ideas significant or economically meaningful enough to warrant legal protection. | A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question. | Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties. | The question as worded implies that if something is a parody it is automatically fair use or allowed in US copyright law. This is a myth. First of all, in a copyright context, the term "parody" is somewhat limited. In that sense, a "parody" is a new work which comments on the original (often but not always by mocking or ridiculing the original). A mere alternate version which modifies the form of the original, perhaps humorously, but not to comment on the original or perhaps on much of anything, is not a parody. A new work which modifies the original to comment on something else, but not on the original, is a satire. Of course many works may be both parodies and satires in this sense. See this law.se Q&A for extensive quotes from Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257 (The case of The Wind Done Gone vs Gone with the Wind) and discussion of what is and is not a parody in US copyright law, and when a parody is fair use. A parody, because it comments on the original, will often be found to be a fair use of the original. But not always. The full four-factor analysis must still be done, and the results are never certain until a court has passed on the specific case. See this law.se Q&A for more on fair use. I can't tell from the question whether the modified song is truly a parody in the sense used in copyright law. If not, it probably isn't fair use, although it might be for other reasons. By the way, a song written for a television show or video to be distributed commercially is a commercial use, even if a non-profit corporation is involved, and even if there is an educational purpose. Note that fair-use is a strictly US legal concept. Even if something is fair use under US law, it may be copyright infringement under the laws of some other country. | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder. | Under US law your proposed use would be considered copyright infringement of the film/TV copyrights unless it is considered "fair use." The evaluation for "fair use" defense can only be done by a Federal Court judge as part of a lawsuit. The judge will evaluate the fair use defense using a four part test that evaluates: (1) the purpose and character of your use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market. This is a very fact specific inquiry, so it isn't amenable to easy yes or no answers. However, based on your description your use wouldn't be very transformative under step (1) since you are using frames from the movie unchanged, and you are using it for commercial purposes as opposed to criticism/commentary/education. Nor does step (2) seem to favor you since the anime films are not heavily based in facts that you would be reusing/publishing. Step (3) would likely favor you since the amount of material taken is very small (1 second) compared to the work as a whole. Likewise, step (4) would also likely favor you since your use is unlikely to impact the commercial market for the original film/tv show. If you intend to rely on the "fair use" defense, then you should definitely hire an attorney who can give you an individualized opinion rather than the generalities I've provided here. As to other GIF users in the App Store, they may (1) have licensed the underlying content, (2) be blatantly infringing the copyrights for the content and hoping not to get caught, (3) relying on fair use (see above), and/or (4) claim DMCA safe harbor as a message board so long as user are the ones uploading the GIF content. | It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t. |
Legal Considerations When Self-Publishing a Book According to https://wordsrated.com/self-published-book-sales-statistics/, 300 million self-published books are sold each year. I am thinking about, in the future, uploading (i.e., self-publishing) two books to Amazon: (i) One that I re-typeset that I believe is in the public domain. (ii) One that I composed myself. I don't know who will appear as the publisher---perhaps, say, "ABC publishing" (if Amazon allows me to insert a name) or Kindle Direct Publishing. In any case, I am wondering if either I or KDP Amazon could get sued if, say, (i) someone wanted to contest my assertion that the first book is in the public domain; or, (ii) if someone did not like what I wrote in the second case and wanted to sue for whatever reason? Reasonably, can such occur; and if so, who would get sued---me or Amazon? If me, how may I protect myself? I would like to make the books available to the French and United States markets. | The vendor has available the DMCA safe harbor provisions if you decides to infringe someone else's book – the copyright owner notifies them that they don't have the copyright holder's permission, so they take the book down (independently the copyright owner sues you for infringement). There is a complicated procedure where they contact Amazon, Amazon tell you you've been accused of infringement and they take it down, they you can counter-claim that you have the right to distribute the book, then the owner files a suit against you). If Amazon doesn't comply with the DMCA formalities, they can be sued for contributory infringement. However: the copyright owner is the only person empowered to legally object – simply asserting that a book is "not in the public domain" carries no legal weight. If you are the copyright holder, but someone doesn't like what they can say, they can't do anything about it legally unless what you wrote is defamatory or is "illegal for you to publish" (you publish a fact that you cannot publish under a non-disclosure agreement; it constitutes a gross invasion of privacy...). The "whatever reason" matters very much. The consequence for you is that you will get sues and have to pay a bunch of money, plus the court will probably prevent any further distribution of the book. There are other sanctions in France, which I don't address here, for instance there are laws against publishing racist insults in France that don't exist in the US. | Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book. | Copyright law is not based on contracts, and does not require agreement. No one may distribute copies of a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright holder. For instance, in the US, both Persons A and F can be sued because Title 17, Section 501 of the US Code says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. (b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. Copyright infringement isn't an issue of violating terms you agreed to with a private entity. Your duty to not infringe copyright was imposed by your country's legislature, who does not require your personal agreement to do that. | All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests. | Under US copyright law, all works are protected by copyright except for US Government works. The concept of "public domain" is not legally well-defined, and is used colloquially to refer to government works, works whose protection has expired, works available to all, and works not copyrightable (such as scientific laws or old software). Under older copyright law, releasing a work without the copyright symbol effectively put the work in the public domain. One can simply say "I dedicate this work to the public domain", and that is typically taken to be enough. CC0 purports to do this (using more words). However, as far as I can tell, author rights under European law are so strong that it is simply impossible. Releasing works into the public law has to be consistent with other aspects of the law. If you grant an perpetual exclusive right to copy and distribute to a publisher, their right does not go away on your death (a right which they would not have with a real public domain work). A problem is that an author who makes such a dedication (a bare license) could revoke the license and reassert their copyright. They could be estopped from making that argument. As property, your heirs would inherit the copyright and could (try to) revoke the license. Presumably the courts would not allow them to pursue ostensive infringers. Nevertheless, your plan is neither trivial nor bullet-proof. | The relevant concept is dedicating a work to the public domain, that is, saying in the work something like "This work is dedicated to the public domain". I understand that this isn't entirely reliable in European civil law. The preferred alternative is to license it to the public. However, you have to decide how "free" you want the work to be made. The normal state of affairs, where you do nothing and just rely on copyright law, is that you have the sole right to allow copies to be made and derivative works to be created. Thus if someone were to make a derivative work based on your composition, they would need your permission: but then they would have the right what they created (such as a translation). If you just abandon your property right to the work, you impose no obligation on others, and a person can freely create a translation (which is now their property). If you execute the right public license, you can allow people to use your work as long as they include that license in their versions. A fairly common public licensing scheme is the Creative Commons licenses. That article gives a decent summary of relevant rights and how particular licenses correspond to configurations of permissions. I would say that the most difficult thing to do is to figure out what you don't want to happen, and pick a license that matches that interest. | A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain | In the US, due to free speech protections (i.e. the first amendment), it seems that the majority of lawsuits for negligent publication fail. It's worth noting that the author might be more liable than the publisher, since the publisher typically isn't expected to have the expertise to catch such errors. More cases and details can be found here. The only case I've found where a publisher was held liable for negligent publication of a textbook is the following. Note that it's somewhat old, and standards for products liability have likely changed since. D. Wallis, "Negligent publishing" Implications for University Publishers: On September 4, 1980, a jury in the U.S. District Court in Springfield, Massachusetts awarded C. Carter $100,000 in her suit against Rand McNally Publishing Company. C. Carter, an eighth grade chemistry student had been severely burned during a chemistry class while attempting an experiment described in a textbook published by Rand McNally. This experiment called for the use of methyl alcohol, a highly inflammable substance. The plaintiff argued, and the jury agreed, that her injuries were caused, in part, by the publishing company's negligent failure to adequately warn students and teachers about the dangerous qualities of these experiments. Rand McNally did not appeal the verdict. This case is of special interest to publishing companies because it is the first time a book had been considered a "product" and the first time products liability theory has been used to impose liability upon a publishing house for an injury caused by technical information contained within a textbook. In this case it's not clear whether the disclaimer was present or not. However, there is nothing magical about a disclaimer that would stop lawsuits from occurring, nor do they automatically protect against liability: The "disclaimer," although it will rarely be effective in shielding the publisher from liability if the court finds that the publisher breached its duty of care to the reader, is more likely to be effective by demonstrating that the publisher did not make any specific guarantees regarding the safety or reliability of the contents of the publication. |
Using a recipe in a YouTube video What is the legality in using a recipe in a YouTube video? Should I cite the cookbook I got it from (I would do it either way)? And should I get the author's permission to use it? What else should I be mindful to ethically and legally use it for content? | Copyright In most (all?) jurisdictions, copyright protects creative expression, not ideas. In united-states doctrine, that is known as the idea-expression distinction, but that concept is not US-specific. Therefore, the text of a recipe, an accompanying image, and other similar elements can be copyrighted. However, the functional parts of the recipe (the exact ingredients, proportions, timing of steps etc.) are not. If the Youtube video reads out the text of the recipe, then it would be a derivative work, but if the script of the video is rewritten in different words, it is not. Even further, the creative elements are only protected insofar as the same underlying idea can be expressed in multiple ways (merger doctrine). The typical example is software code where the level of similarity required to show infringement is high: computer code is text, but that text has to follow strict rules to be valid when run through the computer, and industry best practices mandate additional similarities. Recipes are more flexible than computer code, but they still follow a guiding pattern. Similarities of content that would be considered close paraphrasing (hence infringement) in a free-form context could be deemed to not be infringement in a stricter-form context. For instance, in france, taking the recipes from a children’s cookbook and putting them into another children’s cookbook (in different words but the same "for-children" tone) was deemed to not be infringement: Ces recettes prennent la forme classique et stéréotypée d’une énumération des ingrédients puis d’une description étape par étape des opérations à effectuer. Si (...) la formulation prend en considération le jeune public auquel est destiné ces recettes, cette caractéristique qui n’est au demeurant pas innovante comme le montrent d’autres exemples de recettes destinées aux enfants versés au débat par la défenderesse qui adoptent un ton similaire, ne suffit pas à leur donner une forme ou un contenu qui porte l’empreinte de la personnalité du rédacteur. Aussi les recettes en cause ne relèvent pas d’une activité créatrice originale, et ne sont pas de ce fait protégées au titre des droits d’auteurs. Those recipes take the standard and stereotyped form of a list of ingredients followed by a step-by-step description of the operations to perform. If (...) the choice of words takes its young audience into consideration, that characteristic (which is not new, as proven by other examples of children-oriented recipes shown by the defendant) is not sufficient to give it a form or content bearing the mark of its creator’s personality. As such, those recipes are not considered an original creative work, and are thus not protected by copyright. Source: TGI PARIS 3ème 2ème section 24 janvier 2014 RG 12/00188, cited at this link. Other intellectual property rights Trademarks protect brand image. If John Doe publishes John Doe’s Recipe Book with a recipe for John Doe’s cookies, and fills out the appropriate trademark paperwork, you are allowed to follow the same recipe to make cookies (or another recipe that produces similar cookies), but you cannot sell them as "John Doe’s cookies". You can say that you followed the recipe of John Doe’s book, but you can not say or imply anything that could make anyone think John Doe approved your cookies. Patents protect inventions, which are novel and non-obvious solutions to (usually technical) problems. I am not familiar enough to know if a particularly inventive recipe could be patentable (I guess not, but the answer might vary across jurisdictions). However, most recipes are new takes on old ideas (add more of that ingredient, less of that, have a different texture etc.). Those are certainly not patentable because they are "obvious" (which, in the context of patent law, means that anyone who has read all existing cookbooks in all languages could imagine the modified recipe). There are other, highly jurisdiction-dependent rights. For instance, in france, the shape and presentation of John Doe’s cookies could be protected under a "dessins et modèles" (sketches and models) clause. (For most recipes, it is trivial to modify the appearance of the final product enough to escape that kind of protection, so it is best thought of as an extension of trademark - you cannot sell John-Doe-looking-cookies even if you make clear they are not John-Doe-approved.) | This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer. | I see that channel offers playlists and "videos" of popular music by several artists. The one video I tried had the music with no accompanying video or images. The channel's about page says that then operator does not own the copyrights to the music and cannot grant others permission to play it. It is possible that the channel operator has obtained permission from the artists and is thus operating under a valid license. It is possible that the channel is committing copyright infringement, but the various copyright owners have not noticed the channel, or have noticed it but decided not to take action. There is no easy way for an outsider to tell which of these is correct. If the operator has not obtained proper permission, then it seems that this would be copyright infringement. If so, any copyright owner could send a takedown notice, use YouTube's own copyright complaint mechanism, or could file a copyright infringement suit. But nothing compels the owner to act if the owner chooses not to, it is entirely the owner's choice. I do not see that the US fair use or any other exception to copyright would be likely to apply here. If the owner brought suit and won (and a win seems likely to me, from what I can see), the operator would be liable for damages, which might be sizable, or mild. In the US at least the owner could also obtain a court order (injunction) requiring the operator to stop using the owner's copyrighted music. If the owner complained to YouTube, the site could add a "copyright strike" against the operator's account. After a few strikes (I think three) YouTube will cancel the account, according to its posted policies. Similar outcomes could face anyone else who posted or made available for streaming copyrighted content (such as music) without permission from the copyright owner. But again, everything depends on action by the copyright owner. If the owner chooses, for whatever reason, not to act, then nothing is likely to be done about the infringement. | Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | I am not a lawyer; I am especially not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; if you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. Idk. But probably not. The YouTube terms of service seem to prohibit this pretty clearly: You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player)... You agree not to access Content through any technology or means other than the video playback pages of the Service itself, the Embeddable Player, or other explicitly authorized means YouTube may designate. Now, were YouTube itself licensing the videos in question under the CC license, they might be prohibited from enforcing that term: You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. though I'm not sure if the language in question would apply. However, it seems likely that in most cases, YouTube is using the material in question under the license to which users agreed when they created their accounts, and therefore is not bound by the term in question. All that said, it's entirely possible that the clause in the YouTube ToS prohibiting downloading does not apply for whatever reason (unconscionable in a contract of adhesion, browsewrap agreement doesn't form a contract to begin with, it's superseded by either some other agreement (part of the API EULA, etc), it's contrary to some law in your jurisdiction, etc). Just to be very clear, though, there is no COPYRIGHT CONCERN preventing uses like the one you mentioned. | Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation. | Various elements could be legal, or not. For example, it is legal to require students to do things in order to pass a class. It is legal to require a student to write a program for a course (entirely, or in part). It is legal for a teacher to give a "group grade". It is not clear whether it is legal to require the student to assign copyright or license to the teacher / school – it may be legal to require a student to pay for their class, and copyright transfer might be valuable consideration for such a contract (assuming that there is a contractual relation at all as opposed to a statutory mandate – e.g. "high school"). If this is a public school, you can't make students pay for a mandatory class, therefore you cannot require assignment of copyright. It is very probably illegal for the student to access the educational records of other students, but the app could be developed with dummy data. |
Under what circumstances can a military officer relieve a superior officer of command? There seem to be at least a few crimes for which a lower-ranked officer can relieve a higher-ranked officer of command, most notably treason. While the lower-ranked officer would surely be highly scrutinized for taking such an action, it does seem a legal means of removing an officer of higher rank for criminal acts. What are those circumstances/crimes/accusations under which an officer of the United States Armed Forces can relieve a higher-ranked officer, without the involvement of an officer of higher rank than the one being removed? | Only in the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances” "conceivable" Respect for the chain of command is central to the armed services. As a result, lower ranked officers generally cannot relieve a higher ranked officers of command. Instead, they must work through the chain of command, taking their complaints to their superior's superior. To do otherwise is usually considered mutiny. As far as I know, the only service that has made formal provisions for this is the Navy. This makes sense, given that ships at sea may be out of contact for extended periods. The Navy regulations involving a subordinate can relieve a superior of command are found in § 1088. Relief of a Commanding Officer by a Subordinate of Chapter 10: Precedence, Authority and Command of the US Navy Regulations, issued by the Secretary of the Navy. Here is what that sections says: In the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances,” a commanding officer can be relieved only by the “next in succession to command.” The problem must be so “obvious and clear” that any “reasonable, prudent and experienced officer” could reach only a “single conclusion:” that leaving the officer in command would “seriously and irretrievably prejudice the public interests.” Unless it is a “undoubtedly impractical,” the subordinate cannot act “without the approval of…higher authority...” The subordinate can act only after “much careful consideration” and after an “exhaustive investigation of all the circumstances…” The decision “must be based upon…substantial evidence,” and supported by “the official views of others in a position to form valid opinions…” Any subordinate who relieves a superior will “bear the legitimate responsibility for…such action,” and “must be prepared to justify…” it. | This particular list of excluded branches seems to refer to those who are able to excercise whistleblowing protections through the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. It does not mean that employees excluded by these rules would be unable to whistleblow at all. Rather, the government channels through which they are able to seek protection are likely through a different office. In so far as I can tell, USOSC might restrict the FBI from protection services because they protect employees who go to the Media. FBI agents often handle classified material which would not be allowed to be disclosed to the media and many intel agency employees are required to submit any documents they intend to publish based off knowledge aquired from their employment for a pre-publishing review to make sure no classified material is leaked, and would thus limit the way the employee could whistleblow. Just because this particular office does not provide protection services to the listed employees, it does not mean there is an agency or department that does provide them (Usually the Office of General Inspector for the particular agency in question. While they are attached to the agency they cover, they are not within the chain of command of the agency itself and are independent to them.). For that reason, just because the rules that apply to most do not cover FBI Whistle Blowers, it does not mean an FBI employee cannot become a whistle blower. They just cannot use the services of USOSC in their whistleblowing efforts. | There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest. | There is an important distinction between moral duty and legal obligation. Even if an officer should arrest a person, given some moral standard, they are not legally obligated to do so. A test for legal obligation is whether an choice results in a negative legal outcome – is the officer sued or criminally penalized for acting or not acting? Unsurprisingly, the answer to the legal question is highly dependent on jurisdiction. I only consider US jurisdiction here (which incidently is not a single coherent jurisdiction, it is a phylum of jurisdictions), though some aspects of the answer extend to other countries. The clearest cases are obligations to not act in a certain way – prohibitions. Police may not beat a suspect in order to obtain information. Period, end of story, no discretion. There is a putative bright line that police cannot cross, namely violating an individual's rights, and that constitutes a major exception to the doctrine of police immunity. If X is a clearly established right, police cannot violate that right and if they do, they can be sued or even prosecuted. Sometimes courts "discover" a particular right in a certain case, so the individual (plaintiff in a civil case) may be vindicated but the officer will not be subject to legal sanctions, since LEOs are not held to be appellate court justices who can divine the future discover of a legal right. 18 USC 242 statutorily describes certain circumstances where a choice is criminally proscribed, and 42 USC 1983 allows for civil suits. This pertains to things that an officer does, saying what an officer does not legally have the discretion to perform an act. Now setting aside proscriptions where "you may not...", the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits civil or criminal actions against the government (including LEOs) unless a specific exception has been carved out. I recommend this (open access) journal issue on Discretion in Law Enforcement. There do exist statutory obligations to act imposed on LEOs, for example see this AG legal opinion from Florida, stating that A law enforcement officer, including a police officer, has a legal duty to provide aid to ill, injured, and distressed persons who are not in police custody during an emergency whether the law enforcement officer is on-duty or acting in a law enforcement capacity off-duty. A famous case regarding (non)liability for police inaction is Castle Rock v. Gonzales. In this case, police declined to enforce a Temporary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff's estranged husband (who then murdered the children). The Supreme Court observes that the Due Process Clause does not “requir[e] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors” and also noted the lack of express statutory obligation to enforce that law. In Everton v. Willard, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the question of whether discretionary police power authority to make or not make an arrest and whether a decision not to take an individual into custody constitutes a basic judgmental or decision-making function that is immune from tort liability and they do hold that the decision of whether to enforce the law by making an arrest is a basic judgmental or discretionary governmental function that is immune from suit, regardless of whether the decision is made by the officer on the street, by his sergeant, lieutenant or captain, or by the sheriff or chief of police There have been disagreements on sovereign immunity, for example Huhn v. Dixie Insurance Co., 453 So. 2d 70, which held that when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done (the relevant action was not arresting a person for DUI). As employees of the government, LEOs are subject to the over-arching rules of their employer. They may be ordered by their superiors to refrain from arresting a law-breaker during a riot, on the grounds that doing so will exacerbate a tense situation. The police department might be sued for such a decision, but it is unlikely that the government will be held liable for an essentially political decision. Likewise, enforcement of "no public camping" laws is highly variable, and the courts will most likely not sanction a city for not arresting homeless people who are camping on public property in violation of the law. | 2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 916(h): (h) Coercion or duress. It is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the accused’s participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act. If the accused has any reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the act without subjecting the accused or another innocent person to the harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. So, if your hypothetical soldier asserts they had a reasonable apprehension that they would have immediately suffered serious bodily injury if they didn't reveal the intelligence, then they should not be convicted by a court-martial, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not the case (Rule 916 (b)(1)). | The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat. | There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process. | england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop & Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop & Account provisions. |
Does the US judicial system treat the constitution differently to any other law? In france, there's a thing called the law-screen theory which states that a judge only applies the law, and not the constitution. If someone says they're being tried unconstitutionally, they can claim the law they are opposed is unconstitutional, raise what's called a priority constitutional question which is adjudicated by a special body, the constitutional council, not considered part of the judicial system. I know this is not the case in the US because the SCOTUS adjudicates both statutes and the constitution, but do all (federal) court work this way, applying both the law and the constitution ? I would also (but less) be interested in how that works at the state level, particularly in Louisiana which applies some of the Civil law legal system, akin to the french judicial system. | Every court in the United States from municipal traffic court to a state court to a U.S. District Court has both the right and the obligation to consider claims of unconstitutionality just like any other legal question that a case presents. Contrary to popular misconception, constitutional law issues are not the exclusive province of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, constitutional issues are only ruled upon in the first instance in the U.S. Supreme Court (or even in a direct appeal from a trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court) in rare and isolated cases. Usually, at least one trial court judge and at least three appellate court judges, and often more appellate court judges, have ruled upon a constitutional issue before the U.S. Supreme Court considers it. This is just as true in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, which have legal systems based upon the civil law legal system, as it is in other U.S. jurisdictions, which have a common law legal system. There is usually only one difference between a case in which the constitutionality of a statute is called into question and one in which it is not. When the constitutionality of a statute is called into question, many state and federal rules of civil procedure require or permit the attorney general of the state whose statute's constitutionality (or the U.S. attorney general when a federal law's constitutionality is at issue) to be joined as a party for the purpose of litigating that issue. This allows the court to receive arguments on the constitutional issue from the public's perspective as well as the perspectives of the parties. A few states also provide that appeals from trial court decisions finding that a statute is unconstitutional are directly to the state supreme court, rather than to the intermediate court of appeals as they would usually be in those states. Notably, the distinct treatment of constitutional issues in many civil law systems is not inherently a part of the civil law system. Constitutional courts are mostly a post-World War II constitutional innovation in the countries where they are found. For example, the "law-screen" doctrine and the existence of a constitutional court in France, is much younger than core of the rest of the civil law system in France, which invented the civil law system in its modern form more than two hundred years ago. Neither France, at the time Louisiana adopted its civil law legal system through the time of the Louisiana Purchase, nor Spain at the time that Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American war, had constitutional courts. Footnote Regarding Treaties Also, it is worth remarking that in Europe and much of the rest of the world, the function of protecting individual rights against government authority in a way that is entrenched so that it is not easily overcome by domestic legislation of a current political regime is accomplished through international treaties, rather than only through entrenched rights in a constitution as they are in the United States. Although even then, in many European countries, ordinary courts apply only domestic law and the country in question has to adopt domestic law to conform to the treaties. This treaty mechanism is not very effective in the U.S., because in the U.S., unlike most countries, an ordinary domestic law can override an earlier adopted and ratified international treaty. | The US Supreme Court has made some decisions that legal scholars, other judges, lawyers, and people in general have strongly criticized as mistaken, but none anywhere nearly as wild as the one suggested in the question. Many such, well let me call them "disputed", rulings have been later overturned by the court itself. A well known example is Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was overruled a few years later by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Many of the so-called Lochner era economic decisions were also eventually overturned by the Court itself. Some disputed holdings have been altered by changes in the law, State or Federal. Some have been overturned via a constitutional amendment, such as Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which is now held to have been overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Court did not come to that conclusion until early in the 20th century. Perhaps the most notorious case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) which held that a person of African descent could never become a US citizen, and that Congress was without power to prohibit slavery in any US state or territory. This is perhaps the most denounced decision of the US Supreme Court in its history (See the linked Wikipedia article for a few such comments.) This decision was undone de facto by the outcome of the US Civil War, and de jure by the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some cases have later been treated as "bad law" even though not formally overturned. An example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld the removal of US citizens of Japanese ancestry from the US Pacific coast during WWII, and their confinement in what has been described as a series of concentration camps. This has not been formally overruled, but in Trump v. Hawaii No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), Chief Justice Roberts wrote: The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution.' 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). [quoting Jackson's dissent in Korematsu] And some cases, although much disputed, still stand as good law. The case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), holding that Baseball continued to be exempt from anti-trust laws, federal and state, has been much criticized, but remains in force to this day. (See the section "Subsequent jurisprudence" in the linked Wikipedia article) Congress has not, so far, acted to limit the exemption, as the opinion indicates that it had the power to do. In short, a US Supreme Court decision, however "erroneous" or "absurd" commentators or the public may consider it, remains the law of the land until it is overturned or distinguished by the court, or made obsolete by changes in statute or in the Constitution itself. It the highly unlikely situation described in the question, John Doe would remain in prison until his sentence expired or he received a pardon. | The US Constitution has no bearing on the Nuremberg Tribunals The tribunals were not conducted under US law, they were conducted under an international treaty going by the snappy title of No. 251 Agreement by the Government of the United Kindom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Societ Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. This was signed for the United States on 8 August 1945 by Robert H. Jackson who later served as chief prosecutor on the tribunal. The laws of the United States allow three mechanisms for the US to join international treaties: treaties, congressional-executive agreements and executive agreements. I do not know what mechanism was used but AFAIK, no contemporary challenge was made that the US lacked the power to or hadn't properly acceded to the treaty. This is the extent to which US domestic law would be applicable. The US recognises that there are other laws and other courts than merely US ones and that their citizens may be subject to those laws and serve on those courts. Indeed, there are circumstances where US courts will apply foreign law to a case; when that happens US law applies to the procedure but the substantive law of the other jurisdiction is applied to the facts. There is no doubt that the legal basis of the Nuremberg Tribunal was suspect and controversial and this was recognised at the time as this April 1946 The Atlantic article demonstrates. However, there was never any doubt that US law (or UK, or USSR, or French law) was totally irrelevant. I suggest you ask a new question focusing on the role of "Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law" under international law. | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. | The English language does not have the equivalent of the French Academy to officially regulate questions of spelling, grammar, punctuation and word meaning. Jurists don't control how the language is used and for the most point don't bother to try to do so. Also, context almost always clarifies this particular ambiguity. | No The importance of following precedent, and the principle of stare decisis were inherited by the early US legal system from the British Common Law system, and have been taken as part of the natural order of the legal system by US courts ever since. This extends even to a court overruling itself. US Courts are notoriously reluctant to overrule their past decisions, even when current court members agree, However they will do so from time to time. The US Supreme Court in particular will flatly overturn previous decisions, especially on Constitutional issues, when it thinks there is no other way to achieve a proper outcome, although it often prefers to distinguish the prior decision without actually overruling it. I think the fastest and most extreme case where the US Supreme Court overruled itself was that of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the second flag-salute case. (This was also a particularly significant case.) This reversed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) a case on the exact same issue, only three years previously, and a vote of 8-1 on the first case became a vote of 6-3 the other way, with only one new Justice on the Court. Only Justice Frankfurter, the author of the fist decision, issued a dissenting opinion in the Barnette case, and no other Justice formally joined that opinion. | In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures. | No, but the USA is special! In COMPARATIVE LITIGATION RATES from HARVARD, JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS, the authors J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen argue that for routine normal cases, the US is no more or less litigious than anywhere else in the developed world, specifically, they make comparisons with Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the UK. However, they do say: Why, then, the American notoriety? It does not result from the way the legal system handles routine disputes. Instead, it derives from the peculiarly dysfunctional way courts handle several discrete types of disputes. In several discrete areas, American courts function in a manner one can only describe as disastrous. American courts have made the bad name for themselves by mishandling a few peculiar categories of law suits. In this article, we use securities class actions and mass torts to illustrate the phenomenon, but anyone who reads a newspaper could suggest alternatives. This strange and peculiarly American phenomena of courts making huge payouts for a small number of cases skews perception of risk and leads to, for example, US hotels dismantling water slides. |
Would sharing an unsolicited dick pic be considered "revenge porn"? Inspired by a California Tinder profile that said "If you send me an unsolicited dic pic, all my friends will see it and will laugh at you" Obviously, sending unsolicited nude pictures of yourself to strangers is itself potentially criminal and morally abhorrent. However, if the unfortunate recipient of such unsolicited dick pic chooses to share that image with third parties, does sharing this nude image without the sender's consent constitute illegal "revenge porn" under California law? Question inspired by California, but answers from other jurisdictions are welcome. | Probably not new-south-wales s91Q of the Crimes Act 1900 NSW makes intentionally distributing intimate images a) without consent and b) knowing they did not consent or being reckless as to consent. The person in question has been told that intimate images sent to this destination will be shared. Their sending them after this is probably consent. | If you recorded the clip, you have copyright on it, and distributing it (which includes posting it) without your consent is copyright infringement. However that is not a crime. You could sue, but that would be expensive and not quick. You could, if this is in the US, send a DMCA takedown notice. That this clip was recorded in your apartment or other dwelling would only matter if an invasion of privacy claim would apply. That depends on which US state is involved. In most states if it is available at all it applies only if the content would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person". Also, that is again a civil suit, not a crime. | According to Blackmail Overview :: Justia (emphasis mine): A blackmailer typically has information that is damaging to the victim, and uses threats to reveal that information in order to coerce the victim. Blackmail is considered a crime regardless of whether the information is true or false. The central element of the crime is the blackmailer’s intent to obtain money, property, or services from the victim with threats of revealing the information. So it's still a crime, at least in the US. But the enforcement problems are tracing the original emailer, which, due to (I assume) multiple email relay IPs, address spoofing, etc, and the big issue of identifying the actual individual who pressed the metaphorical "send" key on the bulk email script, the jurisdiction of that person, etc. As Ron pointed out, BitcoinWhosWho shows no one has fallen for it, even though millions of these emails get sent every day, gauging from the number that I get myself. | Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed. | You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence. | Yes, maybe australia In Australia, child abuse material is classified as the sexualised depiction of persons under 16 (or in some cases 18). This applies under both State and Commonwealth laws. Common charges in NSW will be possessing, disseminating or producing child abuse material under s 91(H) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Further Commonwealth offences can be found in circumstances where a communications carrier has been used for the purposes of delivering child abuse material. Within this field, there are subtle variations in circumstances. The court would need to decide if the pictures were a “sexualised depiction”. Context matters. I don’t know of any cases on point but convictions have been secured for sexualised cartoons of children and pictures of fully-clothed children in sexual poses. | You do need to know the location of both parties. U.S. Federal law (18 USC 2511(2)(d)), which prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communication, states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. California Penal Code 632 requires the consent of all parties to a confidential communication in order for the conversation to be recorded. The statute defines a "confidential communication" as follows: The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Once AT&T, or anyone else for that matter, states that the communication is being recorded, it is no longer considered a confidential communication requiring the consent of all parties in order for any party to record it. Part of the California Civil Jury Instructions for this code requires that the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overheard or recorded." You can see the full jury instructions here: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1809.html | According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case). |
Have I misread Hermesmann v. Seyer? Hermesmann v. Seyer (State of Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993)) To me, the opinion of the court implies A) Single mothers work too many hours for too little pay to raise a family, B) Fathers are in any state to help, and C) The state is not. This seems like a bizarre and cruel ruling. If all three were non-issues, fine, but even in the first world desperate poverty exists. Or do I misread the case? | Hermesmann v. Seyer (State of Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993)) is a case which held that a father could be civilly sued for child support in a case where the father was a minor when the child was conceived, and the mother had been criminally charged with statutory rape, or a similar criminal offense, for having sex with a person under 16 years of age. The decision does not state, or imply, anything about the relative earnings of mother and father, either in general or in this particular case. It does state that, as a matter of law, both parents are liable for child support, and may be required to repay taxpayer support previously provided. The Hermesmann decision is not particularity controversial, as it followed a number of previous decisions, which are cited in the opinion. Hermesmann has been followed in a number of subsequent cases, including DEPT. OF REV., BENNETT v. MILLER, a 1997 case before the Florida District Court of Appeal The decision quoted with approval In re Paternity of J.L.H., 149 Wis.2d 349, 441 N.W.2d 273 (1989) where the J.L.H court wrote: We reject appellant's assertion that because he was fifteen years old when he had intercourse with L.H., he was incapable of consent. The assertion rests on the argument that sec. 940.225(4)(a), Stats. 1979, created a rebuttable presumption to that effect. That statute pertains to the guilt of a criminal defendant, not to the civil rights or duties of the victim. Paternity actions are civil proceedings. State ex rel. Lyons v. DeValk, 47 Wis.2d 200, 203, 177 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1970). The presumption created by sec. 940.225(4)(a) does not apply in this proceeding." 149 Wis.2d at 355-57. ... If voluntary intercourse results in parenthood, then for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. This is true even if a fifteen-year old boy's parenthood resulted from a sexual assault upon him within the meaning of the criminal law." 149 Wis.2d at 360. The Hermesmann court wrote: The Kansas Parentage Act, K.S.A. 38-1110 et seq., specifically contemplates minors as fathers and makes no exception for minor parents regarding their duty to support and educate their child. K.S.A. 38-1117 provides, in part: "If a man alleged or presumed to be the father is a minor, the court shall cause notice of the pendency of the proceedings and copies of the pleadings on file to be served upon the parents or guardian of the minor and shall appoint a guardian ad litem who shall be an attorney to represent the minor in the proceedings." ... As previously stated, Shane does not contest that he is the biological father of the child. As a father, he has a common-law duty, as well as a statutory duty, to support his minor child. Keller v. Guernsey, 227 Kan. 480, 486, 608 P.2d 896 (1980); Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292, 298, 552 P.2d 979 (1976); Grimes v. Grimes, 179 Kan. 340, 343, 295 P.2d 646 (1956). This duty applies equally to parents of children born out of wedlock. Huss v. DeMott, 215 Kan. 450, 524 P.2d 743 (1974); Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 585, 211 Pac. 619 (1923). Under the statutory and common law of this state, Shane owes a duty to support his minor child. K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3503 does not apply to a civil proceeding and cannot serve to relieve Shane of his legal responsibilities towards his child. ... This State's interest in requiring minor parents to support their children overrides the State's competing interest in protecting juveniles from improvident acts, even when such acts may include criminal activity on the part of the other parent. Considering the three persons directly involved, Shane, Colleen, and Melanie, the interests of Melanie are superior, as a matter of public policy, to those of either or both of her parents. This minor child, the only truly innocent party, is entitled to support from both her parents regardless of their ages. ... ... the mother's conduct has no bearing upon the parties' respective obligations to support their child. Other courts have so held. In Weinberg v. Omar E., 106 App. Div.2d 448, 448, 482 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1984), the court held: [T]he mother's alleged fault or wrongful conduct is irrelevant under section 545 of the Family Court Act [citation omitted]. The primary purpose of a paternity proceeding is to protect the welfare of the illegitimate child and, accordingly, the mother's conduct should have no bearing on the father's duty of support nor upon the manner in which the parents' respective obligations are determined [citation omitted]. ... Nowhere does the law in this state suggest that the mother's "wrongdoing" can operate as a setoff or bar to a father's liability for child support. Under the facts as presented to this court, the district court properly held that Shane owes a duty of support to Melanie and properly ordered that Shane and Colleen were jointly and severally liable for the monies previously paid by SRS. | Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. No, this is not true. Mr. Grosz filed a lawsuit asking the court to force California to collect tax revenues. The lawsuit is still pending before the court without a decision on the merits. As the saying goes, anyone can sue for anything; their success is another matter. The apparent legal basis for standing is section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows taxpayers to sue against wasteful or illegal government spending: 526a (a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ... The Plaintiff has claimed that, allegedly, there is a mandatory duty to collect taxes and that failure to do so constitutes a waste. The court will decide if it will accept this argument and compel the collection. | I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case. | You will have to litigate this issue anew in the divorce. When there has been a major change in circumstances, issues related to custody can be relitigated, even if there isn't a remarriage. In this case, both the marriage and the fact that nine years have passed since the original order constitute a substantial change in circumstances. At the time the order was entered, there was an 18 month old with parents who didn't live together. The child is now 10 years old and has lived with both parents without regard to any custody order for at least seven years. These are completely different circumstances so custody issues must be revisited. As @mkennedy notes in the comments, it is even likely that the court or someone acting on behalf of the court would consider the opinions of the child at this point, which obviously wasn't possible the first time around. Generally speaking, the way that the "best interests of the child" standard that applies in a case like this one is interpreted is to come as close to maintaining the pre-divorce status quo as possible in light of the separation of the parents. The most relevant section of the Missouri Revised Statutes to this issue is as follows: § 452.410. Custody, decree, modification of, when Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, the court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it has jurisdiction under the provisions of section 452.450 and it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or sections 452.375 and 452.400, any custody order entered by any court in this state or any other state prior to August 13, 1984, may, subject to jurisdictional requirements, be modified to allow for joint custody in accordance with section 452.375, without any further showing. If either parent files a motion to modify an award of joint legal custody or joint physical custody, each party shall be entitled to a change of judge as provided by supreme court rule. | Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment). | The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary. | Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful. | The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%. |
Can you buy rights to airspace in the US? Say I am an astrophysicist setting up a location for an experiment involving measuring electromagnetic field strength from the ground. I can buy loads of land in the Mountain or Midwest regions of the country for my equipment, but I need to be sure I won't have aircraft passing overhead as they'll interfere with the data. Is there a legal channel by which to gain control of the airspace over a patch of property, assuming I'm willing to buy several million acres of land to cover enough area? | A property owner can give you an easement for the air rights of their property, which can allow you to put your own structure over their property or prevent them from putting a structure over their property (depending on the terms of the easement). For instance, a railroad might sell the air rights to an urban rail yard to a private developer so that the developer can put buildings over top of the yard. A high-rise owner might buy an easement for a neighboring property that bans them from building above a certain height in order to keep the views from the high-rise unblocked. However, a property owner can't sell you rights that they themselves don't have. The US government has exclusive sovereignty over US airspace, and there's a public right of transit through navigable airspace (defined as airspace above minimum safe flight altitudes). While the traditional rule was that a property owner owned their land up to infinity, with the development of airplanes this rule has been changed to significantly limit the rights of property owners. The FAA doesn't limit how tall a property owner can build (although too-tall structures can be declared hazards to navigation, which can cause issues with planning boards or insurance companies). However, if there are no obstructions, the airspace above 500 feet in rural areas (in built-up areas it depends on local obstructions) is open for pilots to fly through. The only way to get obstruction-free airspace restricted is to try to get the FAA to issue a flight restriction. If you're trying to get large swaths of airspace restricted, this is extremely unlikely to happen. | When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms. | Can you prevent the government from using your patent? The opposite is actually true. If you patent something, and it is felt to be potentially of national security interest, then they can take your invention for the nation, produce it, and prevent you producing it or sharing the design indefinitely (though it will be reviewed annually). This has happened to about 5000 patents so far. https://www.wired.com/2013/04/gov-secrecy-orders-on-patents/ Even where it is not of national security interest, and the government (or its contractors!) is not using it directly as covered in user6726' answer, they can still take your patent under the equivalent of eminent domain... well, I'll quote from http://patentplaques-blog.com/eminent-domain-excercised-on-patents/ During World War I, the military took all patents relevant to wireless technology and put them in a mandatory licensing pool. Anyone was then able to use the patents and the patent holders received royalties. The pooling of the patents led to innovations including the mass production of vacuum tubes and a national FM radio network. So, in short, the government can use your invention for its own purposes; it can prevent you from using it; and it can force you to give it to others. They don't do this too often, but if you're working in an area that you think will be of especial interest to them, it's something to be aware of. In general, they will compensate you somewhat for your trouble, but not as much as the open market could have. | The various governments invovled do use eminent domain. An authoritative website about roads, the American Road and Transportation Builders Association says - Between 2000 and 2016, the U.S. built an average of 30,427 lane miles of roadway per year, adding 63.4 square miles per year to the amount of land covered by roads. If all of it needed to be purchased and it was all in Los Angeles (2.7 million per acre) it does, coincidentally come out to 111 billion. Since it will not all be purchased by one entity - every state and the feds make roads and most of the land will be 1/10 of the cost of LA real estate, you will not find anything like that number in a Federal budget. | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | As the quote in your question notes (albeit in contrapositive form), Asimov's fiction may be made legally available for free download on the net with the permission of his estate. It is either that case that Princeton University's physics department (or whatever individual person or agency put up the story online) has obtained permission from Asimov's estate to distribute the story on their website, or they simply distribute it without legal permission, and Asimov's estate has not taken legal action to have it removed, which they may or may not choose to do in the future. Consider also that the Princeton distribution does not appear to have been meant to be in any way public: looking one directory level up (Princeton University Physics 115A and B: Physics for Future Leaders) shows a course overview with syllabus and lecture notes, without any apparent link to the story. Probably, it was put online for use exclusively by students taking that particular class, and the professor(s) just didn't put any controls to stop it from being accessible to anyone who knew the URL. This doesn't really change that fact that its public accessibility is, strictly speaking, copyright infringement, but it may be a favorable factor toward a finding that distribution outside of the class was innocent infringement, which can lessen (or, rarely, nullify) the penalty. (And it may be quite possible that distribution within the class was defensible under fair use/dealing, which considers educational context as a favorable factor.) | Yes they can You are approaching this from the wrong direction. Their right to enforce what you can and can't do doesn't come from radio-spectrum law; it comes from property and contract law. You are on their property subject to a license that they give you to be there. One of the terms of that license is that you won't set up or operate a wireless network. No doubt there are other things you are not permitted to do; for example, you may not be able to sell goods and services. If you breach the terms of the license then you are trespassing and they are within their rights to have you removed. In addition, if you are a student (or staff), this is probably one of the terms of your contract with the university. If you breach it, they can terminate your candidature (employment). Contracts can impose obligations on you that goes beyond what the law obliges you to do. Indeed, there is no contract if it only requires what is already required. | Can a court order a large asset to be sold if the defendent lost the case on a relatively small amount? Say a defendent owns land worth $200,000. The defendant lost the case and has to pay $9,000. He does not have any money to pay. Could courts order the land to be sold? In most U.S. law jurisdictions, yes, a high value assets can be ordered sold to satisfy a small money judgment or a small secured claim (i.e. a mortgage or the equivalent in real of personal property), subject to some exceptions that don't precisely target this concern but do alleviate it somewhat. Forcing a sale is mostly a decision made by the collection lawyer and the judge has very little discretion in the matter in most cases, so long as all formalities are observed. In most U.S. jurisdictions there are not minimum dollar amount of a debt that can be collected by execution and levy (i.e. seizure and sheriff's sale) on property of arbitrary value (although I am sure there must be at least one out there that does have a minimum dollar amount). Some kinds of property are completely exempt from creditors claims (e.g. defined benefit pension plans). Some kinds of property are protected up to a certain dollar amount of equity (most exemptions for household property and for homesteads, although a small number of homestead exemptions are unlimited). This allows courts and parties to disregard homes with little equity and low value personal property, focusing collection efforts on higher value property. There are also laws in some states require that creditors attempt to collect the debt from all other known assets with equity that can be collected through a formal process (other than a personal residence), before attempting to sell the personal residence (unless the debt is a voluntary mortgage or mechanic's lien on the personal residence and no other assets). There are several ways that the injustice of this can be avoided, if the debtor doesn't simply have the cash to pay off the debt. First, the debtor may be able to borrow the small amount of the debt owed from someone else to pay it off and avoid the foreclosure of the asset. Second, the debtor can take out a loan with the property as collateral to pay the debt, even if the debtor has few other assets. Third, the debtor can sell their own property to pay the debt probably producing a better price than would be obtained at a sheriff's sale. Fourth, someone other than the debtor and the creditor could bid at a sheriff's sale an amount closer to the fair market value of the property than the amount of the debt. Usually, the sheriff's sale price is still far below the fair market value, but it could be a lot more than the debt, and in those cases the excess goes back to the debtor. In some jurisdictions, bids for personal residences must be supported by appraisals that show what the fair market value of the property is and can't be less than that (apart from litigation costs and costs of sale). Fifth, someone could file for bankruptcy and negotiate a payment plan for the small debt in that context. |
Can Class Action Waivers actually be enforced? I'm in Texas, about to sign a new lease. They've sent it to me to e-sign, and there's no option to submit the lease without signing/initialing something. I'm not expecting to be part of a class action or anything. I just don't like the idea of waiving my right to it. Text reads: Class Action Waiver. You agree that you will not participate in any class action claims against us or our representatives. You must file any claim against us individually, and you expressly waive your ability to bring, represent, join or otherwise maintain a class action collective action or similar proceeding against us in any forum. You understand that, without this waiver, you could be a party in a class action lawsuit. By signing this lease, you accept this waiver and choose to have any claims decided individually. The provisions of this Par. 43 shall survive the termination or expiration of this lease. I saw this question. It's related but not the same--asks about arbitration. | Apparently, Yes in Epic Systems Corp vs Lewis the US Supreme Court wrote: The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written. See 9 USC §§2, 3, 4. The Act’s saving clause—which allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” §2—recognizes only “ ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress,or unconscionability,’ ” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 339 The US Congress could change this by repealing or amending the FAA, but has shown no indication of doing so to date. Consumer Contracts In AT&T Mobility Servs. v. Concepcion, he Court held that individual arbitration provisions in consumer contracts are enforceable and precluded parties to such contracts from bringing or participating in class action litigation. In Brian Griffoul v. Nrg Residential Solar Solutions the NJ Supreme court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to a lease by NJ residents of Solar Power equipment from a Delaware company, and held that a clause requiring arbitration, and one precluding class actions wore valid and enforceable. It wrote that: The [FAA] and the nearly identical [NJAA] enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration" as a mechanism of resolving disputes that otherwise would be litigated. (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 440) Arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract. Employment In Epic Systems Corp vs Lewis (May 21 2018) Employees challenged a waiver of class action suits as contrary to the Federal National labor Relations Act's section 7 (NLRA Sec 7). The court denied this contention, writing: The employees ask the Court to infer that class and collective actions are “concerted activities” protected by §7 of the NLRA, which guarantees employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” 29 U. S. C. §157. But §7 focuses on the right to organize unions and bargain collectively. It does not mention class or collective action procedures or even hint at a clear and manifest wish to displace the Arbitration Act. ... In another contextual clue, the employees’ underlying causes of action arise not under the NLRA but under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which permits the sort of collective action the employees wish to pursue here. Yet they do not suggest that the FLSA displaces the Arbitration Act, presumably because the Court has held that an identical collective action scheme does not prohibit individualized arbitration proceedings, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 32. The employees’ theory also runs afoul of the rule that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions,” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468, as it would allow a catchall term in the NLRA to dictate the particulars of dispute resolution procedures in Article III courts or arbitration proceedings—matters that are usually left to, e.g., the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Arbitration Act, and the FLSA. ... The Court has rejected many efforts to manufacture conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes, see, e.g. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228; and its §7 cases have generally involved efforts related to organizing and collective bargaining in the workplace, not the treatment of class or collective action procedures in court or arbitration, see, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U. S. 9. In the article ["Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Employers in Upholding Arbitration Agreements Containing Class Action Waivers"] this case is discussed. The authors wrote: The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch for the majority, resolved three cases that were argued together — Epic Systems Corp v. Lewis; Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris; and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA — in all of which an employee who had signed an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver sought to litigate Fair Labor Standards Act and related state law claims through class or collective actions in federal court. The Seventh Circuit in Lewis and the Ninth Circuit in Morris had sided with the NLRB and the individual employees; the Fifth Circuit had rejected the NLRB’s view in Murphy Oil. Siding with the Fifth Circuit, the Court’s ruling requires employees who have signed arbitration agreements with their employers containing class action waivers to take their disputes to an arbitrator individually rather than as part of a putative class or collective action. ... Notably, the Court’s opinion discussed Congress’ ability to pass new legislation to reach a different result. In fact, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reading her dissent from the bench, urged Congress to address the matter. Even if Congress does not act, the Court’s rejection of the NLRA-based challenge does not mean that class action waivers will now be enforced uniformly. The Court acknowledged the FAA’s statutory exception, which permits arbitration agreements to be invalidated “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” The Court held that exception inapplicable here because it includes only defenses that apply to “any contract” (such as duress or fraud), and the NLRA’s arguable attack only on class action waivers does not offer a general defense to contract enforcement. But general state-law contract doctrines such as procedural and substantive unconscionability have played a greater and greater role in disputes over arbitration agreements, and the Court’s decision does not affect those debates. This article and This one offer similar comment. See also hte Wikipedias article "Class action waiver" whre it is stated that: Class action waivers may be found on a standalone basis, though they are more commonly found as part of an arbitration clause, and when paired with such clauses, frequently include jury trial waivers ... the United States Supreme Court ruling in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis that such clauses are enforceable. Jurisdiction This answer is entirely US-Centric. The original question asked about a Texas agreement, and I have focused on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which largely governs such issues in Texas and other parts of the US. But similar issues arise in other countries, and this answer has not considered those. | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those? | Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement. | Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client. | Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? No, because the parties to the non-compete agreement were Employee E and company A, not the human who owned and sold A. What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? No. My rationale is that the decisions you describe result in a waiver of the non-compete clause. An employment relation between B and E never existed. Thus, the only vestige of B's non-compete rights binding E that could have been preserved stem from E's former employment at A. However, that vestige disappeared at the instant B --apropos of the hospital project-- waived its non-compete clause with N. Given B's waiver with regard to N, N's failure to establish a non-compete clause with E enables the latter to conduct business with (or accept employment at) the hospital. If anything, B would have standing to sue N for negligence or related torts. But neither B nor N has any viable non-compete claims against E. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best. |
Similar website to TheLawPages in the USA? I use a website called TheLawPages to research various crimes, and sentences given to offenders. It is an invaluable tool, especially because it allows me to pick the type of court, offence type, and even the age of the defendant. The output would show defendants that have pleaded, or been found, guilty and their subsequent sentence. Unfortunately, this website is only for offences and sentences in the United Kingdom. Are there any websites similar to TheLawPages for American criminal Law? Preferably, I would like to search by state and perhaps even at the Federal level. | The U.S. has no such website, at least at either the federal or the state level. It is possible that some local courts allow their records to be searched on that basis although I am not aware of any that do so. Probably the closest database to that in the U.S. accessible to the public is the non-governmental non-profit organization operated Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse for federal criminal justice records (and other federal government records). It has lots of data on federal government matters from a variety of sources but isn't quite as comprehensive or as easy to use as the website described in the question. The problem with that is that the federal courts handle only a small percentage of the criminal cases in the United States, and it is a highly skewed mix of cases (e.g. with lots of immigration cases but few ordinary "blue collar crime" cases outside Indian Reservations and federal parks). The information necessary to build such a website is largely a matter of public record, but no one has taken on the task of making such a website. In part, this is because the task is so daunting. While the federal courts have a comprehensive electronic database called PACER, each state has at least one separate court case data base system, and many states have trial court case databases only at the county level and not at the state level, or have different databases for different kinds of courts. Even in states that do have statewide databases, there are often some courts that aren't included. For example, Colorado's state courts are part of a single statewide database, but its municipal courts each have their own separate court by court databases. Some rural areas in the U.S. still keep trial court records in paper form only. The data has been gathered from time to time of important subsets of this kind of data, but it isn't publicly available. For example, a media consortia in Florida gathered information to examine the consistency of sentencing and the extent of racial discrimination in sentencing in Florida, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the United States gathers such information selectively to make sentencing decisions. Neither of those compilations, however, including making the raw data available to the public. Similarly, there is a separate private academic database that tracks case level state general jurisdiction trial court data in 75 of the largest urban counties in the United States (including state law felony cases). But, that database is only available to members of the academic consortium that maintains it (basically, professors at affiliated universities and other professors granted privileges to use it from consortium member professors). The Westlaw division of its parent company, and Lexis-Nexus collect some trial court level data on U.S. courts, state and federal, on a non-comprehensive, basically opportunistic basis, but don't have complete data from any jurisdiction (although Westlaw's federal data basis has a pretty significant share of reasoned federal trial court orders). Both of these services require paid subscriptions. In contrast, comprehensive databases of precedent making appellate court decisions at the state and federal level are widely available on both a commercial basis (with better search tools, headnote analysis, and correlations of the data like records of cases citing other cases and statutes), and on a non-commercial basis (with just the bare bones text of the cases). This is because this information is necessary to almost every lawyer and judge to practice law on a day to day basis. | I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60. | In the US, if a person enters a guilty plea, a judge may proceed to convict and sentence the accused without any form of trial. In the case of minor offenses with possible penalties of less than six months in jail, there is no US constitutional right to a jury trial. and the accused may be convicted and sentenced after a bench trial with no jury. In the case of infractions that are not criminal, such as many traffic offenses, a judge or magistrate may make a judgment and impose a penalty after a brief and often informal hearing. In some non-US jurisdictions, there is no right to a jury trial even in serious cases. In most such jurisdictions some form of due process and some hearing or trial is required for conviction. However, in various authoritarian regimes, people may be "convicted" of "crimes" without anything like a trial before an independent tribunal. In short, this depends on the nature of the case, and the laws of the jurisdiction involved. | Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland. | At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. |
What prevents a business from disqualifying arbitrators in perpetuity? In California, any party may disqualify a arbitrator within 15 days of receipt of their disclosure form. CCP 1281.91. The right to disqualify is absolute, may be exercised without cause, and an unlimited number of arbitrators may be disqualified. In a consumer arbitration, what recourse does the consumer have if the business decides to serially disqualify arbitrators in perpetuity? From Roussos v. Roussos, 60 Cal. App. 5th 962, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196 (2021): Section 1281.91, subdivision (b), provides, “(1) If the proposed neutral arbitrator complies with Section 1281.9, the proposed neutral arbitrator shall be disqualified on the basis of the disclosure statement after any party entitled to receive the disclosure serves a notice of disqualification within 15 calendar days after service of the disclosure statement. [¶] (2) A party shall have the right to disqualify one court-appointed arbitrator without cause in any single arbitration, and may petition the court to disqualify a subsequent appointee only upon a showing of cause.” As the Court of Appeal explained in Azteca, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at page 1163, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 142, the disqualification provision “confers on both parties the unqualified right to remove a proposed arbitrator based on any disclosure required by law which could affect his or her neutrality. [Citation.] There is no good faith or good cause requirement for the exercise of this right, nor is there a limit on the number of proposed neutrals who may be disqualified in this manner. [Citation.] As long as the objection is based on a required disclosure, a party's right to remove the proposed neutral by giving timely notice is absolute.” (Fn. omitted; accord, Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP v. Koch (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 720, 729, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 (Luce).) “[A party's] demand for disqualification of a proposed neutral arbitrator therefore ha[s] the same practical effect as a timely peremptory challenge to a superior court judge under section 170.6—disqualification is automatic, the disqualified judge loses jurisdiction over the case and any subsequent orders or judgments made by him or her are void.” (Azteca, at pp. 1169-1170, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 142.) However, “disqualification based on a disclosure is an absolute right only when the disclosure is legally required.” (Luce, at p. 735, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 869.) | CCP § 1281.6 provides that a party may petition the court for the appointment of an arbitrator, if the agreed method fails to appoint an arbitrator. Then under § 1281.91, one party may only disqualify without cause only one court-appointed arbitrator. In extreme cases, a party may also petition to move the case to court if the other party is engaging in other dilatory conducts rising to the level of waiving arbitration. Lerner v. Masterson: Petition to Appoint an Arbitrator If a party to arbitration engages in dilatory conduct and an arbitrator has not been appointed, the other party may petition the trial court to appoint an arbitrator under section 1281.6. “In the absence of an agreed method [to appoint an arbitrator], or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed fails to act and his or her successor has not been appointed, the court, on petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator.” (§ 1281.6.) Once an arbitrator has been appointed, the arbitration may proceed even without the participation of one of the parties: “If a court has ordered a person to arbitrate a controversy, the arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party ordered to arbitrate, who has been duly notified, to appear.” (§ 1282.2, subd. (e).) The Engalla court concluded a trier of fact could find that the defendant's pattern of delay, which was arguably unreasonable or conducted in bad faith, waived the arbitration agreement and allowed the claimants to proceed in court. (Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 984.) The court emphasized that “the delay must be substantial, unreasonable, and in spite of the claimant's own reasonable diligence. When delay in choosing arbitrators is the result of reasonable and good faith disagreements between the parties, the remedy for such delay is a petition to the court to choose arbitrators under section 1281.6, rather than evasion of the contractual agreement to arbitrate. The burden is on the one opposing the arbitration agreement to prove to the trial court that the other party's dilatory conduct rises to such a level of misfeasance as to constitute a waiver [citation], and such waiver ‘is not to be lightly inferred' [citation].” (Id. at p. 984.) | Unless your lease clearly denies the possibility of prorating, the emails are binding (and yes, emails count as in writing). The landlord ought to honor the conditions outlined in the emails, and it is not your fault that the manager was ignorant about his or her employer's/landlord's policies at the time the manager computed the prorated amount. Additionally, if the lease only speaks in terms of 20-day notice, then it implies that prorating may apply. It is possible that the lease contains language in the sense of when the notice becomes "effective". If so, that would require a more detailed review of the language therein, since even in that scenario you might prevail on the basis of the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here the difficult part seems to be that you are not in the US. Because the amount at issue is not high enough, the grievance/complaint would have to be filed in Small Claims court. And, as far as I know, the parties cannot be represented by a lawyer in Small Claims court. You might have to file your grievance once you are back in the US. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | Such a right would only exist if the legislature has created it by some act. Insurance is excluded under the class of covered contracts under The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (see schedule 2), and The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The only restriction on automatical renewal clauses under Consumer Rights Act 2015 is that the deadline for objecting to renewal cannot be unreasonably early (schedule 2, unfair terms); and in general, the terms may not be vague. Since there is no law restricting a contract from requiring written notice, or telephone notice, or whatever they demand, then it comes down to what the contract says. If it says "you must call", then you must call. | united-states In Colorado (which is an outlier among U.S state court systems), trial court judge in the state court system has a duty to rule on pending motions within three months, and if they do not, a litigant can, after providing certain notices to the judge and appropriate authorities in the court administration office move to have the judge's paycheck suspended until the judge rules. In practice, even most lawyers don't know that this rule exists. Those lawyers who are aware of this rule virtually never utilize it, out of the well founded belief that it only makes sense to do so if you are a client in a very time dependent situation whom you are certain the judge will rule against when the judge actually gets around to ruling and you want to get on to the appellate process quickly for the client. Even then, the prevailing assumption is that the judge will be prejudiced against litigant in all discretionary matters for the rest of the case, and that the lawyer for that litigant will be at a disadvantage before that judge for the rest of his or her legal career. Colorado has no similar duty for municipal court judges or administrative law judges (who are not administrative part of the state judicial branch), or for appellate court judges. Likewise, there is no such duty in federal court. In an extreme circumstance, a state court litigant could file a Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion (formerly called a writ of mandamus) with the Colorado Supreme Court seeking interlocutory relief from the excessive delay, and a federal court litigant in an Article III federal trial court could seek parallel interlocutory relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the trial court is located. But, either way, the likelihood of the relevant appellate court actually granting interlocutory relief for excessive delay by a trial court in addressing a pending matter is virtually nil, unless the case is one statutorily entitled to priority scheduling such as election law cases, protective order cases, and in Colorado state court, in certain civil cases involving very elderly parties. By way of example, I have had civil cases in which dispositive motions have been fully briefed and awaiting a ruling from a judge in both a general jurisdiction state trial court, and also in a different federal court, in which no ruling was forthcoming for more than a year after the matter was fully briefed. It isn't terribly unusual when appellate court rulings are released, to see that the oldest case ruled upon (often an appeal of a serious criminal conviction) that day was filed five or more years before the opinion is issued, even though once a trial court record is transmitted to the court (which typically takes three to six months), and there are typically only three or four appellate briefs to be filed plus half an hour of oral argument to conduct once the case is fully briefed for the appellate judges to consider before ruling. There are rare cases where proceedings can be even slower due to exigent circumstances. For example, I once had a limited jurisdiction civil case that went to trial over automobile repairs in which the presiding judge who had heard all of the testimony and taken careful notes from it had a serious health incident the evening after the last day of the trial, leaving him hospitalized for seven months, and in which it was discovered that the tape recorder that was supposed to have recorded the trial court proceedings that could have been used to create a transcript for use by another judge to rule on the case was broken and had recorded nothing. A year after the trial was completely and the judge had recovered and returned to work, we got the judge's ruling that he otherwise would have provided within a week (because that would have been his normal practice, not because he was required to do so) had he not been hospitalized. Needless to say, no one can tell the U.S. Supreme Court to speed up ruling on a matter in any binding way. There are some exceptions to this in U.S. criminal law trial practice at both the state and local and at the federal level, where there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial that if abridged results in the dismissal of charges against the defendant, and there are a few other deadlines of a similar character related to the post-conviction process. There is also a very short deadline in criminal cases, once a defendant is arrested, for the defendant to have a first appearance before a judge. | A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws. | This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard. |
What building code regulations may in-office beds violate in San Francisco? I read on https://fortune.com/2022/12/07/elon-musk-twitter-beds-facing-san-francisco-building-code-inspection/: San Francisco does not appear convinced that adding in-office beds isn’t a violation of building code regulations. What building code regulations may in-office beds violate in San Francisco? | Chapter 7 of the San Francisco building code sets forth a number of mechanical requirements on hotels, motels, dwelling units and so on (e.g. heating, security...). §709(b) in particular states that It shall be unlawful for any person to use or permit another person to use any of the following portions of a building for sleeping purposes: (1) A hallway, water closet or bath or shower compartment, slop sink room, or any room containing a gas appliance used or intended to be used for cooking purposes or containing an improperly vented gas appliance; (2) Any other room or place which does not comply with the provisions of this Code for a sleeping room, or in which sleeping is dangerous, or prejudicial to life or health by reason of an overcrowded condition; a lack of light, windows, ventilation or drainage; fire hazard, dampness or offensive, obnoxious or poisonous odors in the room or place. This is sufficient grounds, given a complaint of purported violation, to mandate an inspection to determine if there has been a violation. | I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black. | Utah uses the IFC Code with modifications (none of which apper relevant based on a seach for "extinguisher"). You describe your premisis as a "townhome" which suggests it is a free-standing house, if so the classification of your building would appear to be R-3 and fire extinguishers are not requires in that classification. If it is instead an apartment (more than 2 dwellings in the same building) then it is R-2 and fire extinguishers are required and would normally be the responsibility of the building owner. Notwithstanding, a building built in the 1980s should not have electrical faults: You might wish to persuade the landlord to conduct an audit of the electrical system since he will be out of pocket if the building burns down. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. | "Any perceived compliance or non-compliance of other developers’ apps does not have any bearing on the compliance of your own apps." Could this mean that Google Play's policies are applied differently for different developers or apps? No, it means that you can't break the rules even if others are breaking the rules or you think they are breaking the rules. I think it is worth noting that those apps are for the Indian market. I don't know which one you are in, but google will have different rules for different countries to comply with various regulatory requirements. | No. Just because some building is "owned by the public" or State, doesn't mean it's public property. A state's national guard installation comes to mind immediately. State workers' offices are not public places. Airport hangars/buildings/runways. You can't just go hang out in the DPW garages. | Zoning laws can be used to preserve the character of an area Presumably, the semi-rural area you live in is not known for its distinctive high-rise skyline. A height limitation can be a reasonable and sensible way of preventing the construction of a building that doesn’t fit with the overall character. A typical 2 storey dwelling can easily fit under a 30 foot limit, a 3 storey can if you are clever with the design - are there many 4+ storey homes in your area? In addition, most zoning ordinances have procedures to allow the applicant to request and have approved deviations for the rules. So, if you wanted to construct a 33 foot high house that might be OK, a 66 foot one not so much. I can’t see any basis for calling the law arbitrary or capricious. The fact is that high-rise buildings are out of character for acreage living, so it’s not arbitrary. And it has been developed with thought as to what it will achieve so it’s not capricious. Whether a particular decision on an application for an exemption is arbitrary or capricious will depend on the content of the decision. | The California Vehicle Code defines parking as: “Park or parking” shall mean the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading merchandise or passengers SF gives precedence to the Vehicle Code, but also defines parking here: To park or stop a vehicle, as defined in the Vehicle Code, or to cause or permit a vehicle to be parked or stopped, unless the context requires a different meaning. Stopping constitutes parking, and that is pretty much all there is to that, I am afraid to say. Being unoccupied or disengaged (shut off) isn't necessary. |
Do school zone knife exclusions violate the 14th Amendment? In the US, most if not all states have some kind of law(s) in place that prohibit the carrying of knives in school zones. While most states define a knife as a weapon by edge length, I can not find any legal definition of what constitutes an edge or what constitutes a knife as a weapon in regards to school zones. Many things that some people may call a knife are not weapons at all such as palette knives, butter knives, oyster knives, etc. Palette knives are even required school supplies for many schools that have an art program. Then there are things that look like knives, like nail files, letter openers, etc., which are not called knives, have no cutting edge, but which I've heard of people getting in trouble for purely on the grounds that they "look like knives". There are also many tools that have an edge sharp enough to potentially cut or stab but not things that people would call a knife, like keys, chisels, box openers, saws, screwdrivers, etc. Many of these tools are allowed on school property by maintenance personnel and are required class materials in certain courses like wood-working, and keys are literally carried by everyone who drives into or through a school zone. Then there are also "blunted weapons". "Wall-hangers" are decorative swords, daggers, etc. that look like they could be real weapons, but are blunted for safety, and so have no effective cutting or stabbing edges. Similarly, a fencing rapier also looks like a full length sword, but has been blunted and is required equipment on school campuses that have fencing teams. On top of all of this, a handful of states, such as Louisiana, don't even have edge length restrictions that differentiate a short-bladed "tool" from a long bladed "weapon". So the question is: with all the ambiguity and exceptions, are there any rulings in place that would allow a reasonable person of at least average intelligence to determine what constitutes the crime, and if not, could knife restrictions in school zones be considered void for vagueness under the 14th Amendment? | School administrators have the right to try to express the law in seemingly simpler language, but they do not have the right to enforce their misstatements of the law. The law of Louisiana does not refer to knives at all Carrying a firearm, or dangerous weapon as defined in R.S. 14:2, by a student or nonstudent on school property, at a school sponsored function, or in a firearm-free zone is unlawful... "Dangerous weapon" is defined so that it "includes any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm". The law does not exhaustively list the things that count as firearms or dangerous weapons, so every individual is held responsible for knowing what the courts have held to constitute "dangerous weapons". A novice interpretation (not relying on case law) might lead to the conclusion that a speargun is not a "dangerous weapon" (perhaps on the theory that it is used underwater to spear fish), but a reasonable interpretation of "dangerous weapon" suggests that it is a dangerous weapon because it can be used to kill a person. The same is true of a pencil, as well as a dog. You can turn to this article for an example of the dangerous weapon status of a dog, a propos Louisiana v. Michels, where defendant was "armed with a dangerous weapon". That court recited previous case law to the effect that "the dangerousness of the instrumentality because of its use is a factual question for the jury" State v. Munoz, 575 So.2d 848, 850 RX 14:3 also states that The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision which means that if faced with a novel application (dog, pencil, or speargun), the jury can decide based on "context and purpose", not just narrow words. The article points to a law review article by a lawyer involved in the 1942 codification of Louisiana criminal law that "the code was to be read as a civilian document, not a mere compilation of common law rules", thus the code is shorter and uses plain language. The article then reviews a number of previous rulings on the scope of "dangerous weapon", starting with Louisiana v. Calvin where it was ruled that teeth and fists are not dangerous weapons, even though you can kill a person with your fists. It therefore turns out that a "dangerous weapon" must be an inanimate object, under Louisiana law. A knife can be found to be a dangerous weapon, as reported in this opinion (deportation dependent on a prior criminal conviction for felony aggravated battery, specifically referring to R.S. 14.2(3) and deeming a knife to be a dangerous weapon). Since that conviction is no being appealed at the state level, details of the knife-usage are omitted, so all we know is that a knife was used. Insofar as box cutters were the essential weapons that brought about the airplane hijackings on 9/11, it is not unreasonable to at least consider that they are within the scope of "dangerous weapon" (I would not, but that's a matter for the jury). A butter knife or especially a pencil cannot reasonably be deemed to be "dangerous weapons". But there doesn't seem to be any case law specifically addressing these objects. If a pencil were actually used as a weapon, perhaps the jury might find that a pencil (so used) was a dangerous weapon. However, the question is about a law forbidding the mere possession of a dangerous weapon, eliminating how it was actually used from the calculation. It is extremely unlikely that I would get arrested for driving past a school with a screwdriver in my car. | The "how" part is, get the legislature to pass a law. LA. REV. STAT. ANN 15:542.1 says Any adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to, has been convicted of, or where adjudication has been deferred or withheld for the perpetration or attempted perpetration of, or conspiracy to commit, a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 or a criminal offense against a minor as defined in R.S. 15:541 shall be required to provide the following notifications (1) Give notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name, residential address, a description of his physical characteristics as provided in R.S. 15:542(C)(1), and a photograph or copy thereof to all of the following: (a) At least one person in every residence or business within a one-mile radius in a rural area and a three-tenths of a mile radius in an urban or suburban area of the address of the residence where the offender will reside upon release, including all adults residing in the residence of the offender Also, school superintendents, landlords, park superintendents. The law does not require ringing doorbells. The police do not actually follow convicts to make sure they do it. You would have to contact police and convicts who have some experience with this to know how it works practically: the law is what it is. | Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.). | No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation. | I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on. | RS 14:95.2 applies to everyone, and defines a particular kind of crime. The housing contract overlaps that law in a small way: the legislature did not make it a crime for a student to possess a firearm in his dorm room. But the university makes it a lease condition, in the same way that having a pet is not a crime, but is grounds for terminating the lease. | You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes? | In this context, the phrase "there are no equitable considerations that would require the court to reduce or deny reimbursement for the parents" largely refers to defenses to claims arising under the law of equity as applied historically in the chancery courts of England, and more recently, to claims of a type that would have been brought in equity courts if there were still a separate equity court system. Two of the more common equitable defenses are "unclean hands" and "laches". The equitable defense of "unclean hands" applies when the person seeking relief has engaged in misconduct of some kind in the same transaction. For example, if "the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement" because the student had previously been expelled for beating up another kid (especially if this had nothing to do with the reason that a FAPE is needed) or because the parents ignored a deadline for filing the application for a FAPE at their public school of which they had reasonable advanced notice, that student's parents might be denied reimbursement under the doctrine of unclean hands. The equitable defense of "laches" applies when unreasonable delay on the part of the person seeking relief causes prejudice to the person from whom relief is sought even in the absence of a date certain deadline or before a date certain deadline expires. For example, suppose that "the private school was an appropriate placement" but it had tuition three times as high as two other private schools in town. If the other two less expensive private schools had vacancies for months after the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement, but had no room for new students a week before school started leaving only the much more expensive private school with any vacancies, the request might be denied, or limited to the amount that would have been paid if the parents had applied to other private schools more promptly, under the doctrine of laches. Other equitable defenses include the duty to mitigate damages (e.g. there might be reimbursement for private school tuition, but not for late fees and interest that could have been avoided), impossibility and impracticability (e.g. no public or private placement is capable of addressing the fundamental problem that the child is in a catatonic state), acts of god/force majeure (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE because the school was destroyed in a hurricane and the school district had to shut down the schools for everyone for a semester), implied waiver or estoppel (e.g. after the student was denied a FAPE the student was enrolled for regular classes at that public school without complaint and without trying to find a private school placement), spoliation (e.g. the records needed to determine eligibility were intentionally destroyed by the applicant before the hearing), fraud as a defense and not a claim (e.g. the parents lied in their reimbursement application), payment (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE by two schools and already received reimbursement from another one and is not entitled to a double recovery), release or accord and satisfaction (e.g. a settlement agreement was already reached with the school denying reimbursement or agreeing to a particular reimbursement). |
A company want me to sign an NDA before I go to a job interview at their facilities I have been invited to a face-to-face interview at a company. Before going, I am "obliged" to sign an NDA. This is the private sector and an entertainment company. Why on Earth would I go into such a legal contract when I have no working relationship with a company? If they are uncertain about the information they divulge during a job interview, does not that tell unpleasant tales of their organizational and "hush hush" structure? I have never encountered this before and would like to hear your input. | Nobody forces you to go to the interview. Asking you to sign an NDA before entering their premises is totally legal and can be very reasonable. If you are hired to work on a new product, that competitors would love to hear about, an NDA for the interview would be expected. If you asked on workplace.stackexchange I’d recommend to apply elsewhere. Here I’ll say “totally legal”. | Does this mistake make the agreement invalid? No. Having worked at that company for six years already, it will be extremely easy for the company to prove that you clearly knew with which entity you were entering the contract. That is what matters in contract law. Thus, the discrepancy of name in te contract is inconsequential. This is similar to what I explained in this other answer. Are employment agreements for employees valid for share holders and officers of the company or should there have been a different one. In the U.S., there is no prohibition to that effect. What matters is that the parties' rights and obligations are stated and accepted with reasonable clarity. | Can you have valid Terms and Condictions when there is no entity mentioned? No, but the example you post is inapplicable because the terms clearly state in the beginning that the agreement is between "you" and "Binance operators". The latter is defined shortly thereafter. Thus, it certainly identifies the entity. A contract does not need to exhaustively list all information such as parties' registration(s) or domicile. As long as a reasonable person is able to grasp who are the entities entering a contract, that contract is binding and enforceable. If it cannot be ascertained from the contract who the counterparty(-ies) is(are), then neither party can prove that he and other entity(-ies) knowingly and willfully agreed to an exchange of considerations or promises thereof. Accordingly, nobody would have standing to sue others for breach of contract. | What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake? The contract is voidable unless the employer's subsequent conduct reinforces its legitimacy. The employee's attempt to take advantage of something he knew was a mistake contravenes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on which contracts are premised. South African contract law is not an exception to this: The law of contract underpins private enterprise in South Africa and regulates it in the interest of fair dealing. The employer can resort to records of prior communications between the parties to prove that the stated compensation was intended as yearly, not monthly. Even if those records are not available in a judicial dispute, the employee would have a hard time persuading a court that the salary that was agreed upon is 12 times --or exceeds by a factor of 12-- the market rate for a job position of similar type. | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. | I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content. | The requirement to make the code publicly available is binding on Olio, and on Olio's successor, Flex. Olio, by accepting the code under the GPL, had contracted with the original author of that code, one of the contract provisions being to make any modified code available publicly. If Olio fails to abide by that agreement, it is in violation of the license, and the original author could sue Olio for copyright infringement, or sue Flex as having bought the assets and liabilities. But the individual employees of Olio are not under any obligation to publish such modified code, as they were presumably not parties to the license deal -- Olio was. Therefore the NDA does not require them to violate any law or contract to which they might be parties. The NDA could probably not be used to prevent the employees from testifying if called in such a copyright suit. If the NDA did require an illegal action, it would be void. If it merely required a person to violate a civil agreement that could be settled for money, it might or might not be enforceable, depending on the exact provisions, its reasonableness under the exact circumstances, and the local law. | You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form. |
Has Anker broken the GDPR since the eufy camera has stored photo data in AWS without notifying users? Can a complaint be filed to the European Data Protection Supervisor, with the goal of having a lawsuit brought against Anker (in the context of its eufy products)? I am following the current issue about Anker and its eufy camera products and the storage of thumbnails (photos) on AWS servers. It has become clear that despite the official documentation stating that data is only stored locally, data has been stored on AWS servers. News report highlighting the issue. Can the complaint be filed and a lawsuit be created, because of this, since a) the potential misuse of eufy camera feeds, and b), because eufy has lied to its customer, article by The Verge. Has there been other similar cases of European Citizen "local data" found to be stored on cloud servers, and data been able to be accessed, despite the contrary having been claimed by a product maker (company)? To elaborate, so-called "local data" has been caught as stored in AWS cloud servers, article in CNET. Thank you for initial information and pointing me in the right direction. | The key issue here is the unauthorized collection of video thumbnails, not the use of cloud services. Under GDPR, every personal data processing activity has one or more controllers who are responsible for the activity, and every such activity needs a “legal basis”. With such cameras, the operator will typically be a controller, since they determine the purposes for which this camera is used. In this scenario, the operators – as part of their responsibility to conduct the data processing activity in a GDPR-compliant manner – had disabled any cloud features provided by the camera manufacturer. Despite this configuration, the camera manufacturer collected thumbnails and uploaded them to servers under their control. So, we likely have two distinct issues at hand: the camera manufacturer misled its customers about the privacy settings of the cameras. This is not necessarily a GDPR issue by itself. the manufacturer performed data processing activities in contravention of various aspects of the GDPR. Relevant aspects of the GDPR that might have been violated: the manufacturer did not have an Art 6 GDPR legal basis for this processing activity, such as a “legitimate interest” the manufacturer did not provide information per Art 13 GDPR to the people being monitored this way even if the cloud-based thumbnail processing were intended, this could be a violation against the Art 25 obligation to ensure “data protection by design and by default” depending on how the cloud storage services were configured, there might be violations against the Art 28 responsibility to contractually bind such vendors as data processors, or against the Chapter V rules on international data transfers Different actors might have different remedies against this violations: buyers of the camera might have remedies under consumer protection and product liability laws against the manufacturer data subjects of the illegal processing activity have remedies under the GDPR they can exercise their data subject rights against the data controllers, such as erasure of the thumbnails. However, this will be difficult to exercise in practice since the manufacturer will not have identifying information, and would then be free from having to fulfil certain data subject requests per Art 11 GDPR. they can lodge a complaint with a responsible supervisory authority, which would be the data protection agency in their EU/EEA member state (or the ICO in the UK). The EDPS is irrelevant here, since it is only the internal supervision authority for EU institutions. The competent supervisory authorities can levy fines. they can sue the data controllers, both for compliance (e.g. deleting unauthorized thumbnails) and for damages, if any were suffered. However, immaterial damages awarded for GDPR violations are typically fairly low, if they are recognized by the court at all. the right to judicial remedy (sue the controllers in court) and to lodge a complaint are independent. They largely pursue different remedies. Both can be used to seek compliance, but only supervisory authorities can impose fines, and only direct lawsuits by the data subjects can seek damages. | Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company. | Q1. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose sub-processing arrangements and the names of the organisations involved in this? "The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 2 This clearly states that the processor would need to make clear that they are subcontracting the services and get permission for this as part of the contract, but doesn't specify whether the subcontractors must be named and identified. Perhaps there is other prior existing subcontracting legislation that requires them to be named? Some procurement contracts as supplied by controllers may specify a list of nominated (allowed) sub-contractors or require the full identification of sub-contractors though I've not found anything in law that requires they be named other than as part of a specific contractual obligation. Q2. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose the country or countries where data is stored and processed? "Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: ... (h) makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 3(h) This clearly states the data processor must make available to the data controller all details required to demonstrate compliance. It's quite likely larger organisations may choose to make this simple for data controllers by supplying this information in the form of a completed Data Privacy Impact Analysis document. "Each controller and, where applicable, the controller's representative, shall maintain a record of processing activities under its responsibility. That record shall contain all of the following information: ... (e) where applicable, transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, including the identification of that third country or international organisation and, in the case of transfers referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), the documentation of suitable safeguards; ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 30 Paragraph 1(e) This clearly states the data controller must maintain a record of the country or countries involved if any of these are outside the EU, and so this information must be made available to the controller as stated above. | Article 32 of the GDPR requires companies to adequately secure their data when handling data belonging to EU citizens. This also applies to cross border scenarios where data is transferred between countries. Technically speaking, the GDPR doesn't set a standard for security: you don't have to encrypt your data, use AES or RSA encryption, or hash and salt passwords. It is your choice on how to secure your data, though the GDPR does mandate specific ways to secure data. However, not doing so opens yourself up to two consequences: The European data protection supervisor is tasked with the enforcement of regulations. A company can be forced to increase their level security if a valid complaint alleging that inadequate security measures are in place is made There is a significant amount of security risk, and if a data breach occurs, the GDPR allows authorities to levy heavy fines. Especially heavy fines may occur if it is found that the data was not securely stored. So the answer is: A complaint to relevant authorities can force the company to take action, or they will lose access to the European market. | It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK. | First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read. | european-union (germany, spain, uk) The cookie consent law is the ePrivacy directive, which was implemented as national laws by all EU member states (including, at the time, the UK). Later, GDPR changed the applicable definition of consent so that implicit consent is no longer allowed. A notice in fine print as in the given example is not sufficient to meet this definition of consent, so any non-necessary cookies set in that context would be a violation. But it would be the national ePrivacy implementation that would be violated, not the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR's famous 4%/EUR 20M fines are not relevant here. Instead, each country can set its own fines. In Germany, this would probably be up to EUR 50k (§16 TMG) though German law doesn't implement this aspect of ePrivacy correctly. In the UK, PECR penalties are determined by more general data protection penalty legislation. Notable instances of cookie consent enforcement include the Planet 49 (ECJ judgement, German BGH verdict) case which basically affirmed that yes, the GDPR's definition of consent applies. Thus, any case law regarding GDPR consent is also applicable to the issue of cookies. Furthermore, the Spanish AEPD has issued an interesting fine due to insufficient cookie consent, but due to much more subtle violations than the outright disregard in the given example. E.g. in the Vueling action (decision (Spanish, PDF), summary, listing on enforcementtracker), the Vueling airline's website had a consent banner but ultimately told the user to reject cookies via their browser settings. This violates the requirement that consent must be specific/granular, since the browser settings are all-or-nothing if they're available at all. The airline was fined EUR 30k, the maximum possible under applicable Spanish data protection law. But what kind of risks would some blog run into that just sets cookies without appropriate consent? If the service is outside of the EU, enforcement is difficult. I am not aware of cookie consent enforcement against non-EU services. National data protection authorities can investigate the violation and issue fines, subject to their respective national data protection laws. They generally only do this when there are lots of complaints. Some authorities like the UK ICO have indicated that cookie consent enforcement isn't a priority for them. Independently, individuals can generally sue the service for damages. Some lawyers might send out cease and desist letters to non-compliant websites in the hopes of collecting fees. So aside from the last point, the risk is likely somewhat low, especially for a smaller site. At this point, it is worth reminding that ePrivacy/GDPR doesn't require consent for all cookies, and is not just limited to cookies. It is more generally about access to and storage of information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by the user. Thus, functional cookies can be set without consent. However, consent does become necessary when cookies or similar mechanisms are used for analytics, tracking, or ads. Even though GDPR is involved, the cookie consent requirements apply regardless of whether the cookies involve any personal data. | Per GDPR Art 79, you can sue data controllers if you consider your rights to have been violated. Where you have suffered damages due to GDPR infringements, you also have a right to compensation per Art 82. However, your rights may not have been violate as far as the GDPR is concerned. Under the GDPR any kind of personal data processing needs a clear purpose, and that purpose needs a legal basis. One possible legal basis is consent, but there also are others (such as legitimate interest). Just because you didn't consent doesn't mean that your rights have been violated. Where processing is based on legitimate interest, you can object to that processing of your personal data – but your rights must be balanced against that legitimate interest (Art 21). If your friends post a photo and you only appear in the background, your friends' legitimate interest to post that photo likely outweighs your rights. In practice, suing Facebook because of GDPR infringement is not a sensible way to achieve the outcomes that you likely want. First, this is expensive. Second, it is arguable whether Facebook or your friends should be the defendant. Third, removal of existing data won't prevent the processing of new data in the future. It would be more sensible to treat this as an interpersonal rather than a legal problem, and to talk with your friends so that they don't include you in their photos that they would like to share online. I've focussed on photos because their situation is fairly clear. Voice snippets might not count as personal data when you are not identifiable in them. Personal assistant apps should not be listening continuously, but only start recording when a wake-word is recognized. |
When does money become money? (When is a debt "realized"?) A lot of taxable liabilities depend on the notion of when a monetary gain is "realized", but it is not clear to me how this is defined legally. For example, if a person sells stock, then the brokerage will credit the cash account of the client. The client does not actually have the money in the sense that the brokerage "owes" them the money, but since the brokerage can be viewed as sort of a bank, then the gain could be considered realized. So, take a different kind of debt. A gambler wins money at a casino, but just has chips. If the gambler keeps the chips, obviously the chips are not "money" so the gain cannot be said to be "realized". Now, suppose the gambler cashes the chips, but only to his account at the casino. The casino now owes the money to the gambler but has not paid it. The casino is not a bank, so the customer's balance is a commercial debt, not money. So, if you consider that to be a "realized" gain of money, does that mean any business credit is? For example, if a vendor issues a business a new credit for some reason, then is that gain "realized" as soon as the vendor notifies the business of the credit, or only when the business receives a check for the credit and actually deposits it in its bank account? For example, if I sell something to a business, they owe me the money for the good, but that is not a "realized" gain yet, until they actual pay me and the money is in my bank account. So, basically the question revolves around possession of money and whether one can be said to "possess" money owed by a bank, casino, other business, person, or whatever. One pretty obvious rule here is that only one person can possess the cash. So, either the cash belongs to me or the casino, not both, for example. If the casino is actually holding my money in a separate entitled account which is "mine", then I guess theoretically the money is "mine", but if the casino just considers my "account" to be just a ledger entry, then the cash does not really exist. It's just a debt they have to me, so it cannot be considered to be "realized". | In general, a liquid account, denominated in monetary units (dollars, pounds, euros, etc) from which the owner has the right to make a withdrawal at any time is treated legally much the same as cash. This includes a bank account and a brokerage 'cash" account. It will not include a mutual fund account denominated in shares of stock, nor a debt which is not collectable at will. When the proceeds of a transaction are depositd into such an account, I believe that the profit (if any)m has been "realized" and that a taxable event has occurred. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1001 a gain or loss is realized on the sale or other disposition, or exchange of property. Nothing is ssid about 'cash" or accounts with a signature authority. Under 26 CFR 1.1001-1: ... the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained. in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) The US Supreme Court wrote: Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of a taxpayer's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer "realizes" the gain or loss. The realization requirement is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1001(a), which defines "[t]he gain [or loss] from the sale or other disposition of property" as the difference between "the amount realized" from the sale or disposition of the property and its "adjusted basis." As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is "founded on administrative convenience." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 116 (1940). ... Section 1001(a)'s language provides a straightforward test for realization: to realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a "sale or other disposition of [the] property." The parties agree that the exchange of participation interests in this case cannot be characterized as a "sale" under § 1001(a); the issue before us is whether the transaction constitutes a "disposition of property." ... Neither the language nor the history of the Code indicates whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to count as a "disposition of property" under § 1001(a). Nonetheless, we readily agree with the Commissioner that an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are "materially different."... ... We start with the classic treatment of realization in Eisner v. Macomber, supra. In Macomber, a taxpayer who owned 2,200 shares of stock in a company received another 1,100 shares from the company as part of a *pro rata- stock dividend meant to reflect the company's growth in value. At issue was whether the stock dividend constituted taxable income. We held that it did not, because no gain was realized. ... In Phellis and Marr, we held that the transactions were realization events. We reasoned that because a company incorporated in one State has "different rights and powers" from one incorporated in a different State, the taxpayers inPhellis and Marr acquired through the transactions property that was "materially different" from what they previously had. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S., at 169-173; ... Taken together, Phellis, Marr, and Weiss stand for the principle that properties are "different" in the sense that is "material" to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent. Thus, separate groups of stock are not materially different if they confer "the same proportional interest of the same character in the same corporation." Marr v. United States, 268 U. S., at 540. However, they are materially different if they are issued by different corporations, id., at 541; United States v. Phellis, supra, at 173, or if they confer "differen[t] rights and powers" in the same corporation, Marr v. United States, supra, at 541. No more demanding a standard than this is necessary in order to satisfy the administrative purposes underlying the realization requirement in § 1001(a). See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S., at 116. For, as long as the property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow both the Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax bases Thus any exchange of property for other property which is in some significant sense different, such as interests in different mortgages of similar market value, or any sale of property causes a gain or loss to be realized.It does not matter in what sort of account the proceeds are held, or even whether the proceeds are in cash as opposed to some other sort of property. The beneficial owner realizes a gain or loss, even if s/he is not the legal owner. | It is currently legal to barter goods or services in exchange for gold or silver bullion in the United States. Gold and silver do not have to be registered or certificated, although a prudent person would usually seek evidence confirming their authenticity and it would be common practice to keep gold and silver in a repository such as a bank or Fort Knox, and to conduct the transaction via negotiable certificates evidencing ownership of the gold or silver (basically warehouse receipts whose transfer is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code) rather than to physically transfer the gold or silver, in a large dollar value transaction. There are been periods of time in the United States where this was not allowed, unless done by a state government (which has a constitutional right to do so), or by a local government authorized by a state government to do so. But those laws are not currently in force and haven't been for a long time. Transfers conducted with gold or silver bullion in excess of $10,000 per transferee per year, probably have to be reported to the same officials to whom a cash transaction in that amount is reportable on IRS Form 8300, because it is considered a collectible cash substitute, even though it is legal to do so and no tax is specific to barter transactions in gold or silver. IRS Publication 1544 explains the rule. | Let's say you have an actual contract where you give A something of value in consideration of which B gives you something of value. That way, the exchange is legally enforceable and is not just a cancellable promise. This is all written up clearly, and you become a creditor. One thing to bear in mind is that you may have to wait in line so that others are paid first. For example, taxes have to be paid, also secured creditors have to be paid. Nearly at the end of the list, unsecured creditors such as you are paid, and finally heirs can receive shares of what is left. I don't know what you mean by "recognizing" a debt, but what a financial institution could do is treat a debt as an asset, for the purposes of a loan. For instance, a bank might lend you $10,000 where you pledge your home as a thing of value that they can take in case you default on repayment. You cannot force a bank to accept a particular asset as collateral, so the answer to the "how" question is "by persuasion". Since your asset has an indefinite value between $0 and let's say $10,000, you would have to persuade the bank that there is negligible risk to them. In the case of property used as collateral, when you default the creditor can use the courts to seize your property and sell it, but they can't seize the property of a third party who owes you something, they would have to wait possibly for years for the third party to die and see what's left. Investment instruments might be used as collateral, but only if they can be liquidated reasonably promptly. The risk to the bank is extremely high, but if you are very persuasive, they might accept such a debt as collateral. | First of all, there is more than one legal sense in which the term a person's "estate" is used. You are using it in the archaic sense of all of the property owned by a living natural person, but this is not a contemporary use of the term. Normally, the term estate is referred to property that belongs to a dead person that is subject to probate, the property that belongs to a trust, or the property that was transferred to a bankruptcy trustee by operation of law upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. None of those modern senses of the word apply to this question. You are just asking about the extent to which a particular kind of debt (criminal restitution) can be collected from the person who owes that debt. Your tag also implies that you are particularly interested in New York law. The probate laws of the State of New York are codified in a portion of its statutes known as the EPTL (Estate, Powers and Trusts law), but as noted above, that is not relevant in this case. The criminal law provisions related to restitution, and the general rules applying to debt collection (spread across several of New York's statutes such as the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), the New York Penal Law, and the Civil Procedure Laws and Rules (CPLR)) are the laws applicable to your subquestions. 1) Mr. X has spent all the money and is broke. He can't possibly pay the $1 million. When he gets out of jail and (presumably) starts working again, how much of his income can he keep, and how is "excess income" assessed toward the $1 million debt? This involves the liability of Mr. X and not "his estate". If he goes bankrupt this debt would not be discharged if the proper procedural steps are taken. In general, restitution judgments can be enforced by the procedures set forth for collection of a civil judgment and also through the terms of any relevant probation or parole conditions (which would typically allow for incarceration for willful failure to comply with the conditions to the extent that Mr. X is able to do so with minimal due process protections). Civil judgments can be enforced through garnishment of amounts owed to you (such as bank account balances and wages) subject to certain exemptions from creditors (only some of which apply to restitution judgments) and through writs of execution against property owned by you (the process is quite different for tangible personal property v. real property). The general rule is that wages are exempt from creditors up to an amount equal to 30 hours times minimum wage or 75% of the total whichever is greater. There is usually no exemption for income as an independent contractor, businessman or for bank accounts (unless fully traceable to certain exempt assets). Certain kinds of property (there is a long list) are exempt from creditors as well (although certain kinds of assets are exempt as against some but not other creditors). 2) Mr. X has a house worth $1 million with a mortgage of $1 million (a civil liability). I have been told that a criminal judgment takes precedence over a civil liability. Is it true, as my friend asserts, that the $1 million crime victims will get their money before the mortgagee after the house is sold? This is also a claim against Mr. X and not his estate. Your friend was incorrect. A mortgage is a property interest that takes priority over an unsecured debt like a restitution judgment even if that debt may have special priorities in some circumstances. (This assumes that the mortgage is recorded before a "judgment lien" is recorded in the real property records of the county where the house is purchased or is recorded contemporaneously with the purchase of the house. If a judgment lien is recorded and then a mortgage is entered into and recorded later, the judgment lien would have priority.) 3) Mr. X has a house worth $2 million with a $1 million mortgage, and $1 million of equity. Is there anything (e.g. taxes) that will stand in the way of the house being sold, $1 million being paid to reimburse the crime victims, and $1 million to the mortgagee? Put another way, what is the order of reimbursment between victim, mortgagee, and other claimants such as taxes? To grossly oversimplify a complicated process with a variety of exceptions: The highest priority would be any outstanding liens for unpaid property taxes, Then sometimes all or part of a homeowner's association lien, then the first mortgage, then any other other liens junior to the mortgage that are not subject to a homestead exemption of CPLR Section 5206, because the homestead exemption was waived or to which it does not apply by law (e.g. mechanic's liens for work done on the property but not paid for and second mortgages), then the homestead exemption amount (paid to Mr. X) which in New York ranges from $75,000 to $150,000 depending upon the county in question which remains exempt for one year if kept segregated or reinvested in a new home (twice as much if the debtor is married), then judgment liens paid in order of recording which were recorded prior to the restitution judgment lien. The property interest in the house associated with judgment liens or other mortgages recorded after the restitution judgment lien foreclosed upon that burden the property (i.e. junior liens) are erased in a foreclosure, subject to a right of redemption set forth in in RPAPL Section 1352: Sec. 1352. JUDGMENT FORECLOSING RIGHT OF REDEMPTION. Where real property has been sold pursuant to a judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, and an action is thereafter brought to foreclose or extinguish a right of redemption in such real property, the judgment, instead of directing a sale of the property, shall fix the right of any person having a right of redemption therein or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien and shall provide that a failure to redeem or commence an action for the foreclosure of such mortgage or other lien within such time shall preclude such person having a right of redemption or the holder of such mortgage or other lien from redeeming such property or foreclosing such mortgage or other lien, and thereafter such person having a right of redemption or the holder of such mortgage or other lien shall be excluded from claiming any title or interest in such property and all title or interests of such person having a right of redemption in, or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien against such property shall thereby be extinguished and terminated. The claims would be paid out of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale net of the costs of sale. If there is money left over after all of these claimants are paid, it would go to the property owner, Mr. X. But, in your scenario with a $1 million mortgage and a $1 million restitution lien and a $2 million value, there would be no excess. If a properly bid sale price is not enough to pay the entire restitution judgment, the shortfall called a "deficiency" remains as a "deficiency judgment" that is still owed by Mr. X. Strictly speaking, the higher priority liens don't get paid from the sales proceeds (except the owner's homestead exemption amount), instead the foreclosure sale buyer takes the property subject to those liens and those senior lienholders have a right to foreclosure in turn if they are paid off. Also, procedurally, the value of the property net of higher priority liens and encumbrances is determined by the highest bid made at a sheriff's sale (with the foreclosing debtor allowed to use the amount of the lien as payment), not on the basis of an appraisal or prolonged sale via a realtor. Often there will be no bidder other than the creditor bringing the foreclosure. APPENDIX: Criminal restitution in New York State is primarily governed by N.Y. Penal Law Section 60.27 which reads as follows: Restitution and reparation In addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article, the court shall consider restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime and may require restitution or reparation as part of the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of an offense, and after providing the district attorney with an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the provisions of this subdivision, require the defendant to make restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby and, in the case of a violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, any costs or losses incurred due to any adverse action taken against the victim. The district attorney shall where appropriate, advise the court at or before the time of sentencing that the victim seeks restitution or reparation, the extent of injury or economic loss or damage of the victim, and the amount of restitution or reparation sought by the victim in accordance with his or her responsibilities under subdivision two of section 390.50 of the criminal procedure law and article twenty-three of the executive law. The court shall hear and consider the information presented by the district attorney in this regard. In that event, or when the victim impact statement reports that the victim seeks restitution or reparation, the court shall require, unless the interests of justice dictate otherwise, in addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article that the defendant make restitution of the fruits of the offense and reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss and, in the case of a violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, any costs or losses incurred due to any adverse action, caused thereby to the victim. In the event that restitution or reparation are not ordered, the court shall clearly state its reasons on the record. Adverse action as used in this subdivision shall mean and include actual loss incurred by the victim, including an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by the victim attempting to remediate the harm incurred by the victim from the offense, and the consequential financial losses from such action. Whenever the court requires restitution or reparation to be made, the court must make a finding as to the dollar amount of the fruits of the offense and the actual out-of-pocket loss to the victim caused by the offense. In making this finding, the court must consider any victim impact statement provided to the court. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding or upon request by the defendant, the court must conduct a hearing upon the issue in accordance with the procedure set forth in section 400.30 of the criminal procedure law. The provisions of sections 420.10, 420.20 and 420.30 of the criminal procedure law shall apply in the collection and remission of restitution and reparation. For purposes of the imposition, determination and collection of restitution or reparation, the following definitions shall apply: (a) the term "offense" shall include the offense for which a defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of the same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other accusatory instrument disposed of by any plea of guilty by the defendant to an offense. (b) the term "victim" shall include the victim of the offense, the representative of a crime victim as defined in subdivision six of section six hundred twenty-one of the executive law, an individual whose identity was assumed or whose personal identifying information was used in violation of section 190.78, 190.79 or 190.80 of this chapter, or any person who has suffered a financial loss as a direct result of the acts of a defendant in violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, a good samaritan as defined in section six hundred twenty-one of the executive law and the office of victim services or other governmental agency that has received an application for or has provided financial assistance or compensation to the victim. A victim shall also mean any owner or lawful producer of a master recording, or a trade association that represents such owner or lawful producer, that has suffered injury as a result of an offense as defined in article two hundred seventy-five of this chapter. (a) Except upon consent of the defendant or as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, or as a condition of probation or conditional discharge as provided in paragraph (g) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this chapter, the amount of restitution or reparation required by the court shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony, or ten thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for any offense other than a felony. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, if an officer of a school district is convicted of violating any section of article one hundred fifty-five of this chapter where the victim of such crime is such officer's school district, the court may require an amount of restitution up to the full amount of the fruits of the offense or reparation up to the full amount of the actual out-of-pocket loss suffered by the victim, provided further that in such case the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subdivision shall not apply. (b) The court in its discretion may impose restitution or reparation in excess of the amounts specified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, provided however that the amount in excess must be limited to the return of the victim's property, including money, or the equivalent value thereof; and reimbursement for medical expenses actually incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as a result of the offense committed by the defendant. Any payment made as restitution or reparation pursuant to this section shall not limit, preclude or impair any liability for damages in any civil action or proceeding for an amount in excess of such payment. In the event that the court requires restitution or reparation to be made to a person and that person dies prior to the completion of said restitution or reparation, the remaining payments shall be made to the estate of the deceased. The court shall in all cases where restitution or reparation is imposed direct as part of the disposition that the defendant pay a designated surcharge of five percent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to the official or organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law. The designated surcharge shall not exceed five percent of the amount actually collected. Upon the filing of an affidavit of the official or organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law demonstrating that the actual cost of the collection and administration of restitution or reparation in a particular case exceeds five percent of the entire amount of the payment or the amount actually collected, as the case may be, the court shall direct that the defendant pay an additional surcharge of not more than five percent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to such official or organization, or the actual cost of collection or administration, whichever is less unless, upon application of the defendant, the court determines that imposition of such additional surcharge would cause undue hardship to the defendant, or any other person who is financially supported by the defendant, or would otherwise not be in the interest of justice. Such additional surcharge, when added to the initial five percent surcharge, shall not exceed ten percent of the amount actually collected. If the offense of which a person is convicted is a class A, class B, class C, or class D felony involving the sale of a controlled substance, as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term "victim" as used in this section, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean any law enforcement agency of the state of New York or of any subdivision thereof which has expended funds in the purchase of any controlled substance from such person or his agent as part of the investigation leading to such conviction. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a law enforcement agency pursuant to this section shall be limited to the amount of funds expended in the actual purchase of such controlled substance by such law enforcement agency, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source, and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any law enforcement agency seeking restitution pursuant to this section shall file with the court and the district attorney an affidavit stating that funds expended in the actual purchase of a controlled substance for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding. Any law enforcement agency receiving restitution pursuant to this section shall promptly transmit to the commissioner of the division of criminal justice services a report stating the dollar amount of the restitution received. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 150.10, 150.15 or 150.20 of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term "victim" as used in this section, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean any municipality or volunteer fire company which has expended funds or will expend funds for the purpose of restoration, rehabilitation or clean-up of the site of the arson. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a municipality or volunteer fire company pursuant to this section shall be limited to the amount of funds reasonably expended or to be expended for the purpose of restoration, rehabilitation or cleanup of the site of the arson, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source, and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any municipality or volunteer fire company seeking restitution pursuant to this section shall file with the court, district attorney and defense counsel an affidavit stating that the funds reasonably expended or to be expended for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding. For the purposes of this subdivision, "volunteer fire company" means a fire company as defined in paragraph a of subdivision two of section one hundred of the general municipal law. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, when a person is convicted of harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the second degree as defined in section 195.11 of this chapter, or harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the first degree as defined in section 195.12 of this chapter, the court, in addition to any other sentence, shall order the payment of restitution to the person with a disability who was aided by such animal. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 155.25, 155.30, 155.35, 155.40 or 155.42 of this chapter, and the property taken is timber, the court may upon conviction, in addition to any other sentence, direct the defendant to pay the rightful owner of such timber an amount equal to treble the stumpage value of the timber stolen as defined in section 71-0703 of the environmental conservation law and for any permanent and substantial damage caused to the land or the improvements thereon as a result of such violation. Such reparations shall be of such kind, nature and extent as will reasonably restore the lands affected by the violation to their condition immediately before the violation and may be made by physical restoration of such lands and/or by the assessment of monetary payment to make such restoration. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 240.50, subdivision one or two of section 240.55, section 240.60, section 240.61, section 240.62 or section 240.63 of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term "victim" as used in this subdivision, in addition to the ordinary meaning, shall mean any school, municipality, fire district, fire company, fire corporation, ambulance association, ambulance corporation, or other legal or public entity engaged in providing emergency services which has expended funds for the purpose of responding to a false report of an incident or false bomb as defined in section 240.50, subdivision one or two of section 240.55, section 240.60, section 240.61, section 240.62, or section 240.63 of this chapter. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a victim pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to the amount of funds reasonably expended for the purpose of responding to such false report of incident or false bomb, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any victim seeking restitution pursuant to this subdivision shall file with the court, district attorney and defense counsel an affidavit stating that the funds reasonably expended for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding, except as provided for by section 3-112 of the general obligations law. Where a transfer of probation has occurred pursuant to section 410.80 of the criminal procedure law and the probationer is subject to a restitution condition, the department of probation in the county in which the order of restitution was imposed shall notify the appropriate district attorney. Upon notification by the department of probation, such district attorney shall file a certified copy of the judgment with the clerk of the county in the receiving jurisdiction for purposes of establishing a first lien and to permit institution of civil proceedings pursuant to the provisions of subdivision six of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law. | I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court. | In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that. | Would the court be able to order the gym to transfer said membership to a creditor? Or perhaps pay out a pro rate lump sum to the creditors in exchange for canceling said membership? Would it matter if the lifetime purchase is for something more substantial than a gym membership? I.e. do the rules change if you've contracted Hilton to provide you a free room in any hotel for the rest of your life? What happens varies a bit depending upon the kind of bankruptcy. In a Chapter 7, all property and contract rights of the bankrupt debtor vest in the bankruptcy trustee when the bankruptcy petition is filed, by operation of law, with certain exceptions. (Chapters 11, 12 and 13 which are reorganizations are conceptually more complicated and I won't address them at length. But, in a reorganization, the title to the debtor's property doesn't necessary vest in a distinct bankruptcy estate at a single moment in time and instead can continue to be owned by the debtor subject to various bankruptcy related obligations.) Certainly, a right to use a hotel for life, which is very close but not identical to a legal life estate in a time share, would be a bankruptcy estate asset and would be vested in the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy court is fairly limited in how it can adjust the rights of third-parties who are not creditors of the bankrupt, although it is not entirely without any authority to do so. It can invalidate "ipso facto" clauses in contracts that are triggered only upon bankruptcy, it can unwind preferential payments and fraudulent transfers made prior to filing for bankruptcy, the trustee can invalidate contracts that a third-party lien creditor could invalidate, they can declare restraints on the transferability of contract and property rights that are invalid under state law invalid, and so on. But, generally speaking, the property rights of a party are what they are defined to be unless a specific exception applies. In some cases, if an asset is not exempt from creditors claims, but is also not transferrable, the bankruptcy court could probably compel the bankrupt debtor to buy that asset back from the bankruptcy estate at fair market value, on some sort of financing terms that made it possible to do so, so that the creditors of the estate are not harmed by the lack of transferability. A fact pattern involving a membership in a Surf Club worth several hundred thousand dollars is explored in 2014 ruling in Feaster v. Surf Club, an adversary proceeding in a debtor-member's Chapter 13 bankruptcy, although it doesn't address all of the issues in this question. | Short Answer Does a secured loan create obligations beyond the collateral assets? The vast majority of the time it does. Long Answer The default rule is that security interests in assets other than real property is a recourse debt under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (a model statute that individual states can enact voluntarily) and the applicable common law (which is uniform almost everyplace except Louisiana and Puerto Rico). This means that deficiency judgments are allowed if the seized collateral is insufficient to pay the loan in full. It also means that the lender can sue on the debt without foreclosing the collateral at all if the lender wishes to do so. A note and security agreement can be made expressly "non-recourse" which limits recovery to seizure of the collateral and precludes a suit on the debt itself. A secured loan can also become non-recourse if the unsecured debt is discharged in bankruptcy, or if the deadline for filing a claim expires in a probate case. Neither bankruptcy nor the probate claims process extinguish the rights of a secured creditor in the collateral, even if the right to bring a suit on the debt itself is terminated. Special tax rules (that, in substance, disallow tax losses with no economic effect) apply to non-recourse debts (especially the special case of limited liability companies which are taxed as general partnerships but subject to special non-recourse debt rules). When filing a claim in bankruptcy, if the collateral is worth less than the debt, two claims must be filed. One secured claim in an amount equal to the value of the collateral and a second unsecured claim in the amount by which the debt exceeds the value of the collateral. In the case of secured debts in real property, most states mirror the personal property rule (which is very close to Uniform since every state, territory and district in the U.S. had adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governing security interests in property other than real estate). But in a few states (including California), security interests in owner occupied residential real estate (a.k.a. mortgages, liens, encumbrances, or deeds of trust) are truly, or in practice are, effectively non-recourse. Be aware also that there are a handful of isolated, mostly state specific but some federal exceptions. The most pertinent federal exception is for swap agreements and certain other kinds of derivatives (exceptions which are found primarily in the bankruptcy code) involving setoffs. There is a section of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 involving "strict settlements" that rarely applies except in pawn arrangements. There are also a number of statutory liens (mostly perfected by possession of the collateral rather than by a UCC-1 financing statement) that create a security interest in collateral by operation of law without a signed security agreement that are sometimes non-recourse (e.g. auto mechanic's liens in selected states). |
What happens if the legislature passes a new law that contradicts historical precedents? Do judges have the discretion to apply older laws or rulings, or do they have to follow the new legislation regardless? By historical precedents, I am referring to the common law that has developed over time through various judicial rulings. | The new law wins. That's rather the point of passing a new law-- the legislature wants to change the current law of the land whether that is based on statutes or court rulings. Of course, there are caveats. Prior judicial rulings may have relied on an interpretation of a source of law that supersedes the legislature in question (i.e. based on an interpretation of the state or federal Constitution or based on a federal law that supersedes the state law). In that case the new law would be found unconstitutional or ignored. Or the new law might have an ambiguous interaction with current law that courts would have to resolve. The new law might clearly make X illegal but there may be legitimate questions about whether it intended to make previously legal action Y illegal as well. It is, after all, very difficult to write a law that covers every possible fact pattern one would encounter in the real world. | The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time. | Both civil law and common law have civil codes, so that isn't the difference. It is common in civil law jurisdictions for these to be called civil codes and consolidated into the great big book of law. In common law jurisdictions, the civil code is scattered through legislation, regulation, administrative and case law and often not consolidated although, each piece of legislation typically deals with only one (or a related number) of topics. Adversarial vs Inquisitorial In a common law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to decide the dispute that the parties have brought to the court based solely on the arguments and evidence that they make. A judge who seeks their own evidence or decides the case based on a law the parties have not argued is making a mistake. The judge is free to say to the parties "But what about xyz law?" and let them make an argument about that but they would be denying the parties natural justice if they decided the case on xyz law if that law was not argued. In civil law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to find out the truth. They have inquisitorial power and decide the case based on all the evidence, the law that was argued and their own knowledge of the law. Precedence In common law jurisdictions, the cases decided by the courts are just as much the law of the land as the acts passed by parliament. When a court hands down a decision on a certain fact pattern, then all courts lower in the hierarchy must make the same decision when presented by a similar fact pattern. These are binding precedents. In addition, decisions of same level or lower courts (where not actually the ones being appealed) as well as decisions in "parallel" jurisdictions are persuasive precedents. A parallel jurisdiction is anything where the law is close enough that it makes sense to use it: Australian courts will tend to look first to other Australian states, then to England & Wales, Canada, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries then the United States of America and then to civil law jurisdictions. There is nothing nativist in this, it is just that these are the jurisdictions where the laws are "closest" to one another: partly because the courts have historically done this (which tends to lock the common law together), partly because there has been governmental will in creating harmonized laws in Australia (i.e. enacted in each state and territory but essentially the same law - often word for word) and partly because parliaments, when drafting legislation, nick ideas from other parliaments. If the Supreme Court of Western Australia has made a decision on a similar fact pattern under a similar law, a District Court judge in New South Wales had better have some damn good reasons for deciding this case differently but they wouldn't automatically be wrong if they did. However, if the precedent had been set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales than the District Court judge would be wrong to decide differently. Naturally, a lot of argument in common law courts is about why the facts of this case are sufficiently similar/distinct that the precedent should/shouldn't apply. Also, common law judgments emphasize the reasoning that led the judge from the evidence to the conclusion and include detailed analysis of the case each party presented - this is because they need to be understandable to a wide audience. Court hierarchy can be quite complex, this is the one for NSW, Australia: In a civil law jurisdiction, courts are not bound by the rules of precedence - each judgement is a first principles analysis of the facts and the law. This is not to say that civil law judges do not use other judgments in their analysis but they are not required to do so. Broadly speaking, the common law approach promotes consistency, the civil law approach promotes individualized justice. | The precedent is very clear and was accurately applied by the judge A treaty does not create domestic law and is only applicable to the extent that it is incorporated into domestic law. She extensively quotes the relevant precedents in the judgement at [42-49]. | Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes. | To be valid, a point of order generally needs to be made at the time of the possible Rules violation Exceptions are where the Rules violation violates the law, where it conflicts with a previously adopted motion (other than a motion to rescind that earlier motion), or where it violates a fundamental principle. Assuming your example doesn’t do any of those things, then the point of order is moot once the vote has been taken. | The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions. | I'd say it's more like a concurrence than a dissent. Justice Thomas isn't saying the Court should have taken the case; he's just raising question about the (implicit) reason the Court isn't taking the case. Most experienced observers will read the statement as a signal that he is open to reversing Raich and hoping that someone will bring the right case in which to do that. But in the end, t amounts to pure commentary and has no legal effect. The practice of filing these types of statements is not "normal," as the Court rejects probably more than 95 percent of the cases that come to it, and it does so without comment. But it is hardly unprecedented to see these types of statements, and I assume that every justice (except perhaps Barrett, given her recent arrival) has made similar statements. From a quick search, I can find statements from Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, from Roberts, and from Breyer. |
Who owns the IP for some software that I created in my spare time? Employee or Employer? I am employed as a designer in the UK by a UK employer. I do not work for a software company. On my own machine on weekends I created my own software that I believe my employer would benefit from. I pitched my software to my employer with the intention that my employer could use it for free, support with its future development, and share revenue from future external sales. My contract with my employer however states the following: "Any process or invention which is discovered or made by an employee or intellectual property which arises during the course of their employment is, and shall be, the absolute property of the Company...." This aligns pretty well with Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (legislation.gov.uk) which states: (1)The author of a work is the first owner of any copyright in it, subject to the following provisions. (2)Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work [F1, or a film,] is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work subject to any agreement to the contrary. So whether the IP of this software belongs to me or my employer appears to boil down to the definition of "during the course of their employment". Based on Mei Fields Designs Ltd v Saffron Cards and Gifts Ltd [2018], the following tests where used which fell in favour of Mei's employer. (a) the terms of the contract of employment; (b) where the work was created; (c) whether the work was created during normal office hours; (d) who provided the materials for the work to be created; (e) the level of direction provided to the author; (f) whether the author can refuse to create the work/s; and (g) whether the work is ‘integral’ to the business. In my case, my answers to the above would be as follows: (a) In line with England and Wales law. (b) At home (c) Outside normal office hours (d) I provided all materials to carry out the work (e) I had no direction from my employer (f) I chose to do this work, and initially didn't tell my employer about it so there was nothing to refuse. (g) It would be useful for the business. I wouldn't say it was integral (essential or fundamental) Based on the above, who owns the software, me or my employer? | Based on the contract language quoted in the question, and the facts stated there, it would seem that the employee owns the copyright on the software. It would seem that the software was not created "during the course of employment." However, when the employee offers it to the employer free of charge, the employer may well want to own the copyright and any other related IP. The employer might want the employee to sign an agreement transferring the copyright. Or the employer might simply treat the software as belonging to the employer. Asserting and enforcing the copyright against the employer might be difficult. Insisting on even a token payment would help establish thst the copyright belongs to the employee, or gettign the employer to sign an acknowledgement of the ewmployee's copyright would have a similar, bnt even stronger effect. | Yes, the original designer (or the designer's employer) would have a legal right to the design, insofar as it included protectable design elements. Copyright on the design of "useful" products is limited, and the exact limitations vary from country to country. However, it might be hard for the designer (or the company for which the designer works) to prove that the creation was original, and was not an actual leak. But if the designer or company has retained sufficient evidence to convince a court, then a suit could be successful. Such a possibility makes me doubt that Apple or a similar large company would do that. The risks are too great when a design of their own creation would probably be quite good enough for their purposes. But that is all speculation. | In the US, code that you write in the course of employment is the property of your employer. Otherwise, anything that you create is your property. The gray area is things that you write during your employment but not in the course of your employment (hence the terms of the employment contract are vital). Something that you write before becoming an employee is not "in the course of employment". However, if you use that code in the in the course of employment, you invite the argument that in fact the code was written in the course of employment. That argument can be squelched if you have an agreement with the employer that acknowledges that you are licensing your code to the employer in exchange for ... some consideration. It could be $1, or a similar unit of currency. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. | This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement. | My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee. | This could be a problem if the consultancy agreement contains a provision that assigns to the client any copyright in any code created by the consultant. That is why there should be no such provision. In the absence of such a provision, the consultant owns the copyright in the code, so it would be impossible for the consultant to infringe that copyright. Even so, copyright protects a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The idea of an "analyze data" class containing a "read data" function is not itself subject to copyright protection. It could potentially be patentable as a "process," but it would fail to meet the criterion of novelty. It would also fail to meet the criterion of non-obviousness. On the other hand, a software developer cannot (without permission) copy source code that is protected by copyright simply by changing the names. Changing the names would constitute the creation of a derivative work, and the right to create derivative works is also protected by copyright. | If you are subcontracted, then some other company is going to use the code that you wrote, and since you were not paid for it, you are the copyright holder. A letter to that company's legal department might work wonders. |
Is it legally possible for a tenant to replace their landlord? I was wondering if a tenant feels their landlord has wronged them, if there could be any legal argument, even an unusual one, that if a person has established a residence somewhere to some non-trivial extent, they have some inherent right or claim to that as their residence or home, and it may be possible to remove the landlord rather than the landlord removing the tenant. Eviction is really common so in general I think tenants own property like any other situation, for example, a company can fire employees, a hostel can kick out a guest, and so on. Still, are there any interesting examples of this happening? One could be some kind of community outreach / movement or special legal circumstance to allow someone to stay. Another could be some way of having some third party or organization purchase the property from the landlord. | Is it legally possible for a tenant to replace their landlord? Generally not. The landlord-tenant relationship flows from the landlord's ownership of the property and the tenant can do nothing to change that (short of buying the land from the landlord in a voluntary transaction). If the landlord were a government agency, the tenant could petition the government to put a different employee in charge of managing the lease, and if the landlord were a trust it is barely conceivable that the tenant could assist some other party in removing the trustee and replacing the trustee with another trustee (particularly if the trust was a charitable trust or the tenant was also a beneficiary of the trust). But, generally speaking, this is not possible. | From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement). | If the tenant were alive, you couldn't stop them from taking away their personal property, could you? No matter how overdue the rent was. Nor could you deny them access to the property, except through formal eviction. AFAIK the estate generally has the same rights that the decedent did. So if the tenant would have had the right to remove their property, then their estate should have that same right. I'd be concerned about legal risks to you if you try to withhold it - I wouldn't want to do so without having advice from my lawyer that it was okay. (Answers on this site are not legal advice and most of the users are not even lawyers.) The decendent's personal property should now be part of their estate, so if it has any value, the representative should have to sell it if necessary to settle their debts. Thus even if you release the property, some of its value may still come back to you. Of course, if the decedent had other debts, and their assets don't cover them all, you may not be able to recover everything you're owed - that's one of the risks you run when you decide to become a landlord. In particular, the personal representative is not obligated to pay off the overdue rent out of her own pocket. | In most common law jurisdictions, yes. The new owner would be bound by the lease just as the old owner was. | By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable. | The old terms apply ... ... until the landlord gives notice and ends the lease - then the tenant has to get out. This is not inconsistent with the requirement to “execute all revised rental agreements upon request” - unless and until new terms have been agreed, there are no “revised rental agreements”, once there are, the tenant can be requested to (and must) execute them. There seems to be a misapprehension that this term gives the landlord a unilateral right to change the terms - it doesn’t. However, if the landlord wanted to formalize the month-to-month arrangement that is created under the old lease with new documents (or any other mutually agreed arrangement), then the tenant is obliged to sign it. | You would need to know the landlord's reasons for refusal in order to determine their reasonableness or otherwise. If there is a dispute about this (i.e. They think they are reasonable and you don't) you can seek a court order requiring the landlord to accept the sublease or alternatively, that since the landlord has breached the contract, you are entitled to terminate it. Hire a lawyer before you do this. | It’s not a problem Is there any reasonable prospect that you or the landlord would argue in a dispute that you are not the tenant? No. Is there any reasonable prospect on all the available evidence that such an argument would succeed? No. Therefore, no problem. Where this can be a problem is if someone commences legal action in the wrong name (e.g. the landlord sues “Travis Parks” instead of “Parks Travis”] and there is a summary judgement (if there is a hearing the mistake will be sorted out). A judgement cannot be enforced except on the named person. It can also be a problem if the lease is in the name of a company. Because companies are ‘virtual’ people, they can only act through agents and their name (and number in some jurisdictions) is the only thing that identifies them. |
Why does practice direction 55A begin with 55.3? Practice direction 55A seems to begin at 55.3. Why are there no Practice Direction 55A rules 55.1 and 55.2, or where are they? | There is no need for Practice Directions in this instance as the three previous Part 55 Rules (i.e. Coronavirus – temporary provision, Interpretation, and Scope) do not require one. | This appears to be a fairly straightforward construction. Section 9(2) and 18b share a number of requirements, so 18b points back instead of repeating them. But not all requirements are shared. In particular, requirement 3 (covering pensions) does not apply to newly-graduated students. That's not strange since students are not paid wages. Also, they're not subject to the 5 year residence permit requirement. As for "sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly.", this covers waivers to these requirements. | From the Highway Code: Rule 112 The horn. Use only while your vehicle is moving and you need to warn other road users of your presence. Never sound your horn aggressively. You MUST NOT use your horn while stationary on the road when driving in a built-up area between the hours of 11.30 pm and 7.00 am except when another road user poses a danger. Law CUR reg 99 Rule 195 Zebra and parallel crossings. As you approach a zebra crossing ... do not wave, flash your lights or use your horn to invite pedestrians across; this could be dangerous if another vehicle is approaching be patient, do not sound your horn or rev your engine as this can be intimidating ... Rule 214 Animals. When passing animals, drive slowly. Give them plenty of room and be ready to stop. Do not scare animals by sounding your horn ... | Because the ordinance does not say "and from each entrance", it cannot be interpreted to mean that the signs must both be visible and readable anywhere in the area as well as being visible and readable from the entrance. The use of distinct prepositions in the conjuncts means that the notice requirement can be satisfied by different signs: it's not that a sign has to have both properties. | The FCC has clarified their stance on this: ... were we mandating wholesale blocking of Open Source firmware modifications? We were not, but we agree that the guidance we provide to manufacturers must be crystal-clear to avoid confusion. So, today we released a revision to that guidance to clarify that our instructions were narrowly-focused on modifications that would take a device out of compliance. The revised guidance now more accurately reflects our intent in both the U-NII rules as well as our current rulemaking, and we hope it serves as a guidepost for the rules as we move from proposal to adoption. Essentially, Open Source firmware modifications are allowed, the modifications are disallowed are things like excessively increasing signal strength. | It's based on the date the letter was received, not the date it was mailed. Since it's certified, it's not received until somebody signs for it, which starts the clock. The actual date isn't possible to calculate from the information on hand. The delivery receipt would have the date it was signed for, it would be prior to the end of the 30th calendar date from that date. Edit... Your new "twist" results in void service and doesn’t require action by the HOA. Certified mail is a service of the USPS, hand delivering or email does not legally count as "certified mail". If a contract requires service by a specific method (e.g. certified mail), then delivery by any other means is invalid and of no effect. | Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation. | Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is. |
Is it okay to admit to the police that you were speeding? Are there any benefits? I know the normal advice is "don't say more to the police than you have to," but what if: They tell you they pulled you over for speeding You know you were speeding The officer almost certainly has enough evidence to prove you were speeding In this case, what benefit could there be to not admitting that you were speeding? Is there any benefit to admitting it? | Maybe. In many but not all situations, the police have a certain latitude in how they charge an incident. In many but not all socieities, speeding is seen as less morally repugnant than, say, theft or tax evasion. "Can happen to anyone, oops," the excuse goes. So a credible expression of remorse might cause the police officer to issue a caution or verbal warning instead of a ticket. Unless you are in a place where there is a grossly antagonistic relationship between the police and the citizens, or where the police department relies on fines for funding. | Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that. | Here is a link to the relevant Texas Statute: Title 7, Subtitle C, Chapter 545, Subchapter A: Sec. 545.351. MAXIMUM SPEED REQUIREMENT. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing. Combine that with: Sec. 545.352. PRIMA FACIE SPEED LIMITS. (a) A speed in excess of the limits established by Subsection (b) or under another provision of this subchapter is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful. This section mentions, as an example, among other points: (2) except as provided by Subdivision (4), 70 miles per hour on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district, including a farm-to-market or ranch-to-market road; What this means is that if you are driving over 70 miles per hour on a type of highway mentioned in (2) above then you are, by legal definition, driving at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and prudent. When you are cited for speeding you are not charged for driving at a specific speed in an area posted at another speed. You are cited for violating a broader law, such as in Texas, driving in an unreasonable or imprudent manner. The mention of the speed is merely a recordation of the facts that support the state's case against you. Let's take the proposal to demonstrate the speed is too low to its logical conclusion. You plead not guilty and it comes out during testimony that you weren't driving 80 but really 85. The judge will still find you guilty of the underlying charge as the facts in the case still support that finding. I have personally witnessed mistakes in tickets result in dismissal. Those mistakes have, however, been related to other facts about the case though: time of day, date of offense, etc. I've also witnessed people attempt to claim a lower but still illegal speed. For example, "I wasn't going 85 I was only going 80." These resulted in findings of guilt. | He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse. | This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough. | No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal. | Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No | The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence. |
Can I legally sync and save YouTube comments on my website I own a YouTube channel and a website that belongs to it. On the website, I am also displaying the YouTube videos. For various reasons, I want to create a plugin to sync the comments on my YouTube channel with my website. This would mean saving those comments in my database. Are there any legal implications to this? Privacy problems maybe? Can I get into trouble? Im from Europe, The Netherlands | Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site. | No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though. | The Moonlight Sonata itself is well out of copyright. Most countries have copyright terms equal to or less than 70 years after the author's death, 1827 in the case of Beethoven. However, particular performances of the Moonlight Sonata may be under the copyright of the performer or even the arranger. Also, downloading from Youtube is against their terms of service. Overall, using the Moonlight Sonata is fine, just make sure you find a good legal source for it. | This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer. | Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website). | This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney. | Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing. | You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be. |
How is Seditious Conspiracy distinguished from ordinary robbery? Seditious Conspiracy is defined as: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to [...] or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof [...] So if Alice is driving a government-owned car and Bob and Charlie decide to steal it at gun-point, are they guilty of seditious conspiracy? Does it matter whether they knew the car to be government property? | We look first to the Hutaree prosecution of 2012, US v. Stone where defendants were charged with seditious conspiracy: Specifically, the Government charges Defendants with conspiring to “oppose by force the authority” of the United States Government. Essential to that charge, Defendants must have agreed to oppose some positive assertion of authority by the United States Government; mere violations of the law do not suffice. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 693 (1887). In Baldwin, SCOTUS found (emphasis added) that All, therefore, depends on that part of the section which provides a punishment for ‘opposing’ by force the authority of the United States . . . . This evidently implies force against the government as a government. To constitute an offense under the first clause, the authority of the government must be opposed; that is to say, force must be brought to resist some positive assertion of authority by the government. A mere violation of law is not enough; there must be an attempt to prevent the actual exercise of authority. | There is a slim chance that it is truish, depending on whose law you are asking about, and also depending on the facts (if the drug was in a baggie, it's unclear; it is was mixed with the soda, it's clear and it's true). As far as I know, the "baggie in can" theory has not been put to the appellate test (perhaps that is evidence that the can does not count). However, in the case Chapman v. US, 500 U.S. 453, defendant was convicted of the sale of LSD-laced blotter paper, and was sentenced accosting to the 5.7 gram weight of the blotter paper, not the 50 milligram weight of the LSD that it contained. SCOTUS upheld the sentencing based on the higher weight, holding that "The statute requires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when determining the appropriate sentencing for trafficking in LSD", because the statute is stated in terms of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" (here, 21 USC 841, are some of the current laws, which repeated use the formula "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of"). The question that would arise is whether a can containing a bag of something is a "substance" or "mixture". The ordinary meaning of "mixture" precludes that interpretation, but of course you also have to look at the legislative history to determine what Congress's intent was in writing these laws. Saying that a can with a bag is a "substance" is also counter-intuitive, but not as plainly unreasonable as calling a can and a bag a "mixture". In Chapman, the court observed that "Congress clearly intended the dilutant, cutting agent, or carrier medium to be included in the weight of those drugs for sentencing purposes", but again you might interpret "carrier medium" as referring to something other than "the means of carrying the drug" – "carrier medium" is not statutorily defined, and its "plain meaning" is broad (but also note that the statute doesn't mention "carrier medium"). In its ruling, the court appeals to "the history of Congress's attempts to control illegal drug distribution", and a careful study of all of the pertinent documents for this case might definitively rule in vs. out an interpretation that the weight of the container is to be included. An obvious ludicrous consequence of including container weight is that if you are arrested for possession of a trace amount of a drug, found in your car, the weight of the car is to be considered and you get life in prison. It is plausible that the officer has a vague acquaintance with the Chapman-type ruling, and has misapplied the law, thus he has a good-faith belief that his claim is legally correct (thus he did not lie, he was simply wrong). Perhaps some DA has pursued the "drug plus can-weight" theory, but I doubt that has happened. | Charlie may or may not be guilty of murder or of attempted murder. It depends upon his intent and knowledge, which the question doesn't flesh out sufficiently to evaluate. Why did Charlie bodyslam Bob? The reason matters a lot. Did Charlie know that the building was on fire? Was Charlie trying to kill Bob? Was the thing that Bob knocked his head upon an intended result of the bodyslam, or an intervening cause? Did Charlie's initially less culpable act and his knowledge combine to create a duty to rescue and what offense (probably not murder) would it be if a death resulted from a failure to rescue? Alice is likely to be guilty of murder, but on a felony-murder theory, rather than on a transferred intent theory. In most, but not all, states if you are in the process of committing one of an enumerated list of specific felonies that pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as arson, you are guilty of murder in the event that anyone (even a co-conspirator) dies as a result of your felonious course of conduct, whether or not you intended that a death result. Alice might have been able to purge her felony-murder liability if she had tried to put out the fire and save Bob once she realized that he was in danger, under the exception to felony-murder for renunciation of a course of felonious conduct, but she didn't even try. The doctrine of transferred intent in a murder case usually applies when you intent to kill one person and instead end up killing someone else. But, Alice didn't intend to kill anyway, so this doctrine does not apply. Alice's best defense would be that the death was a result of the attack by Charlie, rather than by the fire, which she would merely have to establish a reasonable doubt regarding. But, ultimately that would be a weak defense for her. | If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.” | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 | In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless. | Nothing is typical Investigators have wide discretion on how (and if) they pursue an investigation of an alleged crime. When they make an arrest is part of that discretion. Making an arrest starts all sorts of clocks running on the legal process and investigators may not want to do that for all sorts of legitimate reasons. | We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law. |
Does freedom of religion extend to witchcraft? Someone in my discord server told me the following after someone made an offensive joke to her. I try to be tolerant with people of different backgrounds. I am pagan and I practice witchcraft. I understand SW are a part of the Navajo culture, but they intertwine in paganism. I am offended because that is not a creature to joke about. In paganism just like the Navajo culture it is a relentless witch who practices one of the darkest shades of magick. Even if I wasn’t pagan and got offended, when someone asks you to not make fun of something in another culture. It’s best to not make fun of it. The thing is back during the ancient times, people were wrongly executed for witchcraft. But since this person explicitly says she practices witchcraft, would the freedom of religion protect her or would she be on the government's kill list? | Actually, there is not a government kill list, that is just a meme. The First Amendment says (starts) "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...". That means a number of different concrete things: there shall be no laws prohibiting any religion, or preferring a religion, not may there be laws impeding or promoting the practice of a religion. The government therefore cannot reward or punish a person for believing in skin walkers, nor for turning themselves into a coyote (if they can do it). The old practice of burning witches at the stake is illegal, similarly at least under current understandings of the law it would be illegal to punish those without a religion with a fine or death. The aforementioned person can thus practice witchcraft – up to a point. One cannot get away with murder by claiming that they are just practicing the Ásatru ritual of blót. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah is an example of how the government can not restrict a religious practice (banning animal sacrifices of a particular religion), Employment Division v. Smith is an example of a neutral prohibition which happens to impinge on a religion (outlawing certain drugs limits a religious practice). | united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority. | Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: "hate speech" based on race, religion, disability and "homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation" was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime ("to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt" based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination. | Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 held that "A party's religious belief cannot be accepted as a justification for his committing an overt act, made criminal by the law of the land". Employment v. Smith 494 US 872 applies this to criminal acts, holding that "The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use" and "the [Free Exercise] Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons". Likewise Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 508 US 520 "a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability" (the ordinances were not narrowly taylored, unlike murder statutes). Thus laws against murder do not become unconstitutional when one proclaims a religious basis for violating the law, since they are religiously neutral and are there for good reason. | No rights are absolute. In particular, Charter s. 1 specifies rights are "subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Generally speaking, when rights are infringed the courts will consider it a justifiable infringement if it serves a substantial purpose while proportionate, rational and minimally infringing (Oakes test, though there's a heap of subsequent case law refining the test). While the exact order text isn't yet available, determining constitutionality would typically be a detailed analysis a judge would have to perform after hearing arguments from parties to a case (I assume the order will eventually be published here). In my own opinion, I would imagine such an order without appropriate medical exemption would be unconstitutional. It would seem to be disproportionate to deny freedom of movement to a presumably very small number of persons who could do little to remedy their medical condition. As a similar example from another province, a Quebec court ruled that a Covid-19 curfew requiring people to remain inside at night would not apply to homeless people due to discriminatory and disproportionate effect. Assuming the order to be similar in nature to existing BC orders on gatherings and mask-wearing, I would imagine lack of religious exceptions to be constitutional, as those orders have already been challenged and upheld against religious objections (though I believe appeals are still possible). The nature of the identified infringements against religious groups was considered reasonably proportionate, rational and minimal enough when weighed against the legitimate governmental need to contain the spread of Covid-19. P.S. The Canadian Bill of Rights has in practice been largely superseded by the Charter. Furthermore, it is completely inapplicable here as it is a federal statute with no effect on provincial matters. | Any country is their own sovereign There is no international law that demands any state to allow anyone free speech of all kinds. Remember that your rights end where the rights of others [incl. society] begin. And in Germany, the right of the society is defined as being not subjected to the symbols of illegal organizations, especially ones that try to violate the liberal democratic basic order Also, Germany is not alone in banning the sentence or the accompanying gesture. They are also illegal to various degrees in Austria, Switzerland, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, and Sweden. It also can be illegal in the US, if disturbing the peace. The sentence is an identifier for a banned organization The sentence is certainly illegal if spoken to express certain things. However, it is legal to be used for example in art (films) and is commonly found in lecture material, as one example of how the nazi party identified. But how? People are often confused, but the rule is actually somewhat easy: If you display any symbol of a banned, unconstitutional organisation (under § 86a StGB) like any of the logos of the Nazi Party and spiritual successors (those with a red bar: banned!) or even the PKK, then you are acting in an illegal manner. And unless you have an exception to claim, the determination can be done entirely on a factual basis by looking at the circumstances. Indeed, the mens rea requirement is so minimal (because the law is written in a way that there is none needed!), that posting photos of a swastika tattoo can get you convicted for jailtime Exceptions However, I mentioned exceptions. Those are in § 86a StGB(3), pointing to $ 86(3)&(4) [eng]: (3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 gelten nicht, wenn die Handlung der staatsbürgerlichen Aufklärung, der Abwehr verfassungswidriger Bestrebungen, der Kunst oder der Wissenschaft, der Forschung oder der Lehre, der Berichterstattung über Vorgänge des Zeitgeschehens oder der Geschichte oder ähnlichen Zwecken dient. (4) Ist die Schuld gering, so kann das Gericht von einer Bestrafung nach dieser Vorschrift absehen. (3) Subsection (1) [and (2)] does not apply if the propaganda material or the act serves civic information, to prevent unconstitutional activities, to promote the arts or science, research or teaching, reporting about current or historical events, or similar purposes. (4) If the degree of guilt is minor, the court may dispense with imposing a penalty under this provision. That is why we have swastikas in German school books, as those tell about the horrors of nazi germany. That is why the logos can be found in research material and history books analyzing the use of the symbols in different countries. That's why the news outlet filming the demo where people yell Heil Hitler show that footage without precautions (unlike those that fly the banned symbol!) That is why you can have the film Inglorious Bastards with all its Swastikas and people yelling Heil Hitler, but its advertisement material was specifically altered to not show those. However, until August 2018, computer games were not accepted as arts. This is why the German versions of Wolfenstein that did get a german release before had been altered to remove Swastikas and voice lines. But the "Sozialadäquanzklausel" had been applied to computer games in August 2018, and the games got (after some other hoops) re-released in their international version on 22nd November 2019. How come some ideologies are banned?! Germany's equivalent of a constitution is the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Its first 20 articles (not paragraphs or sections!) prescribe the rights of any person. The very first and most important one is, and the very first sentence of it makes clear what the very guiding principle of all other laws has to be (emphasis mine) before any of the other basic rights are enumerated. Art. 1: Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. Art. 1: (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. This is the most absolute right anyone can have. There is no provision in any way that would allow (or make it possible!) to strip or reduce the human dignity and every human being, living and dead, has it. Violations of human dignity have been used quite often to repeal laws, such as several incarceration methods or when cuts to the social security system would prevent someone to live a life that would be without dignity. Human Dignity is the measure that can be used to cut all other rights. In fact, it is explicitly the foundational principle of all german laws, that rights are not granted beyond where other rights start and that nobody has any rights when it comes to harming the constitutional order derived from the Grundgesetz (emphasis mine): Art. 2: (1) Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt. (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. Now, where comes freedom of speech? Only in Article 5, and it is absolutely not absolute but has defined limits (emphasis mine): Art 5:(1) Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu äußern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht start. (2) Diese Rechte finden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutze der Jugend und in dem Recht der persönlichen Ehre. (3) Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der Treue zur Verfassung. Art 5: (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Parties and organisations that can't abide by the other rules of law because of their ideology will get banned based on that. In the case of the nazi ideology, it's quite simple: The core idea of Rassenlehre and its believe in Untermenschen is so deeply dehumanizing that there can't ever be a way to get that in line with the very first (as well as 2nd and 3rd) Article of the Grundgesetz. Or to quote the words of Amon: Nazi ideology denies dignity to some humans, goes against the liberal-democratic order, and therefore cannot enjoy the usual protections. Rule of law is still maintained because restrictions to the freedom of expression are codified in law, and violators will get a fair trial. You see, you simply don't even have an absolute right to disseminate your ramblings, because the Basic law itself points to the general laws that ban the dissemination of certain materials. This is how § 86 StGB can ban any propaganda material for organizations and § 86a StGB subsequently bans their symbols, including gestures and slogans. | Can a state declare: "any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted," which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling). | You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons. Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an "official" capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so. It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane. |
Are Satanists legal in the US? I heard that Satanists in USA are legal and are even represented in the counsil of the churches and have "study books" used in school. In Russia there is a law that acts which are done to harm somebody other are illegal. Does the US have a similar law? If so, would the courts consider Satanism harmful and thus illegal (based on the fact that Satan's purpose as he is described in certain religions is to harm and the purpose of Satanists may be to follow Satan as described in certain religion)? | There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal. | It is illegal in Morocco to possess or distribute pornographic material of any kind. This includes nudes of the hypothetical Vietnamese girl. | It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance). | In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation. | If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola. | This is a hard question, but a good question. The following relates to the issue from the perspective of the USA. You ask "...if the US wants to invade France, can they officially declare war by...", You have to make clear what you mean by "can". If you mean whether or not the US has the physical ability to do this, then of course they do. If you mean whether they are allowed, then this is another question. When you ask whether something is allowed, then you have to make reference to a moral code or a law that determines what is and what isn't allowed (legal). Normally each country will have laws that govern what is and what isn't legal for it's citizens to do. That hard part is how this applies to nations. There are two sides to the question. (1) What are the leaders allowed to do under their own laws, (the domestic laws) (2) what are countries as entities allowed to do? (the international laws) It sounds a bit like you are asking about the second thing. Here treaties govern what is and what isn't "legal". However, usually when someone breaks a law, other entities have the power to enforce that law and decide (judge) whether the person has broken the law. The question is: who decides whether a country has broken a treaty or an international law? And if a law is broken, what exactly can be done about it? This is hard to answer. Consider for example the conflict in Ukraine. Here many will argue that Russia has piratically invaded Ukraine. There should be war between the nations. But Russia denies this and other world powers have done little beyond imposing sanctions. This illustrates how hard it is to deal with this question. One question that comes up is what the purpose of international treaties are if a country can just violate them without much consequence. Pointing out two points about this. (1) If, for example, a president wants to convince his/her own congress that the country should engage in war, then it makes a stronger point if you can show how the country you want to engage has violated international trities. (2) After you have won a war, you might want to prosecute the leaders of the loosing power. Here you will stand stronger if you can make references to some international law that existed before the conflict started. This second point is illustrated in the Nuremberg principles. Here it was exactly stated that "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." According to the US constitution "Congress shall have power to ... declare War". That means that historically Congress has the power to decide where to wage war. The War Powers Resolution says, for example, that "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities ...". Note that this doesn't mean that the US has do formally declare war before going to war. Example: The Iraq War was authorized by Congress, but there never was a formal declaration of war. It is interesting that you ask about the timing for when the declaration should be given. The Japanese wanted to deliver their declaration of war just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But because of issues with decrypting the message from Japan to the Japanese Embassy, the declaration wasn't delivered until after the attack. Remember also in all of this that the winning party to a conflict, usually decides what was and wasn't legal! One good reference for more on all of this is the report by the Congressional Research Service called "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications". Here you can see more on what I have tried (and failed?) to say above. |
Can players and coaches be held criminally liable for actions that they take beyond the scope of their game? Back in 2012, the NFL charged the New Orleans Saints with running a bounty system from 2009 to 2011 with the stated goal of knocking out opposing players via injury thereby improving their odds of winning their games. Ultimately, Bountygate, resulted in the league handing down some of its most stringent punishments and fines upon some of the guilty parties. Based on the investigation completed, it appears that there was substantial evidence to support charging blame towards members of the coaching staff, general management, as well as several defensive players (estimates are between 22-27 players) whom had contributed towards a fund to provide payouts for injuries dealt to opposing teams. This article indicates that criminal charges in the US are unlikely given courts preference to defer to leagues to be self-regulating, however, the article notes that conduct far outside of what the player can expect might see prosecution. Does the opposing team running a bounty system rise to that level, especially given that the NFL Constitution specifically prohibits payment bonuses based on performance against an individual player or team? The rules of football do promote a physical, high-contact sport that has a high probability of injury, however, the league has made rule changes to reduce the risk of injuries in a lot of scenarios. Given that opposing players are presumably playing with those rule changes in mind and presumably not trying to deliberately tear another player's ACL and furthermore there being video and audio recordings of coaches promoting tactics to deliberately violate those rules (deliberate targeting of opponents' heads), could a prosecutor file criminal charges against these players and coaches with assault or conspiracy? Furthermore, what court would have jurisdiction if charges were filed? | Generally, yes Can players and coaches be held criminally liable for actions that they take beyond the scope of their game? Yes. For example, Todd Bertuzzi was convicted with assault causing bodily harm for punching Steve Moore. Since that event happened in British Columbia, it was a British Columbia court that had jurisdiction. In 2000, Marty McSorley was found guilty of assault for slashing another player in the head with his stick. This also happened in British Columbia: R. v. McSorley, 2000 BCPC 116. The judge quoted an older case, saying: Patently, when one engages in a hockey game, one accepts that some assaults, which would otherwise be criminal, will occur and consents to such assaults. It is equally patent, however, that to engage in a game of hockey is not to enter a forum to which the criminal law does not extend. To hold otherwise would be to create the hockey arena a sanctuary for unbridled violence to which the law of Parliament and the Queen's justice could not apply. The judge recognized that there is an "unwritten code of conduct agreed to by the players and officials" including norms of fighting, but that McSorley's actions were outside of those norms. Even a slash directed at the upper shoulder area was too risky (that it might miss, and instead hit the head) to be covered under any consent. A rugby player was convicted of manslaughter when he aimed to "Pile drive [an opponent] hardest I could into ground" and ended up causing his death: R. v. C.(C.), 2009 ONCJ 249. The judge noted that consent will be implied "with respect to force that is outside the rules but within the scope of the accepted standards by which the game is played." He also found that "[t]he defendant intentionally applied force that was outside the rules of the game or any standard by which the game is played. [The deceased] did not explicitly consent to that force and I am satisfied beyond any doubt that no such consent can be implied." The issue will be what degree of contact and force was consented to. The factors often cited come from R. v. Cey, 1989 SKCA: the game of hockey involves a continuous series of assaults. Obviously, most of the body contact is consented to merely by the decision to participate in the sport. To determine at what point this consent disappears is not an easy task, but it must be identified in order to determine when a player moves from conduct calling for the imposition of a penalty into conduct which involves a criminal assault calling for a criminal conviction and sentence The conditions under which the game in question is played, the nature of the act which forms the subject-matter of the charge, the extent of the force employed, the degree of risk of injury, and the probabilities of serious harm are, of course, all matters of fact to be determined with reference to the whole of the circumstances. In large part, they form the ingredients which ought to be looked to in determining whether in all of the circumstances the ambit of the consent at issue in any given case was exceeded. Bountygate seems trickier The rest of this is opinion and is less well researched. I do not believe the above theory of liability (assault vitiating implied consent) is easily applicable to the circumstances of of Bountygate. First, I am not sure this theory of assault is applied in the United States. Second, it seems to me that there would be near insurmountable evidentiary hurdles in establishing that any particular tackle was motivated by an intent to injure (normally, ulterior intent is irrelevant for assault, but it seems to be a factor in considering whether implied consent has been vitiated in the sports context). However, there may be some kind of conspiracy-based offence available. Given that the offence would have happened entirely in the United States, it would be state or U.S. federal law that would apply and I will need to leave it to another answer to fill in the details of this theory, if it would indeed be viable. | An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to. | Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter. | An assault is carried out by a threat of bodily harm coupled with an apparent, present ability to cause the harm. There is no need for physical contact in an assault, all that is needed is the threat and the apparent, present ability. The drill sergeant was behaving in a threatening manner and had an apparent, present ability to cause harm; he was guilty of assault. Consensually engaging in a legal contact sport lacks the threat of bodily harm; that is to say that the bodily harm is a risk of the sport but it is not the object of it. Of course, an illegal sport where death or maiming is an inherent part would leave the participants open to assault (and battery) charges - you cannot agree to do illegal things. What is necessary to constitute the threat and the apparent means depends on the whole of the circumstances. A person throwing water when they had threatened the victim with acid is most certainly assault. Pointing a replica pistol at someone who doesn't know it is a replica constituted the threat and apparent means in one action. | There are only two arguments you can make: The match making website did something wrong. I don't see how you can make this argument unless you have some reason to suspect they actually did something wrong. Strict liability applies. I think this fails for two reasons. One is that no theory of strict liability that I know of would apply to this situation. The other is that this is precisely the kind of risk that a user of the site should be protecting themselves from because it is much easier to detect fraud when you have extensive contact with someone than when you just operate a matchmaking service. So absent some evidence they did something wrong, such as ignoring specific warning signs from this particular user, there is no way such a suit could succeed. | tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky. | Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition. | Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives. |
Can you defame a profession? Suppose someone publishes the statement "All lawyers are thieves." Obviously, this is not true; there most likely are some lawyers who are also thieves, but certainly not all. Would it be possible for any lawyer to sue this person for defamation, either individually or in a class action? | united-states https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/who-can-sue-defamation One of the elements of defamation is that the statement must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. Accordingly, defamatory statements about a group or class of people generally are not actionable by individual members of that group or class. There are two exceptions to this general rule that exist when: the group or class is so small that the statements are reasonably understood to refer to the individual in question; or the circumstances make it reasonable to conclude that the statement refers particularly to the individual in question. See Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 564A (1977). The article suggests that the cutoff for a "small group" is about 25 people. (They cite an interesting example from 1952: Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). A store had a sales staff of 25 male and 382 female employees. The defendant published a book asserting that "most of" the male sales staff were homosexual, which I suppose was per se defamatory in 1952, and that the female staff generally were prostitutes. The court held that the men had been defamed but the women had not.) So since there are more than 25 lawyers in the world, "all lawyers are thieves" would not defame any individual lawyer. I don't believe that class action suits for defamation are permitted at all. I can't currently find a source for this, but I also can't find any report of such a case having been heard. | united-states The rules on what constitutes defamation under US law are fairly straightforward. For a statement to be defamatory, it must be: A statement of fact (not opinion); that is False; and Communicated to at least one other person (the law refers to this as "publication" but it does not mean just being in print, any form of communication will do); and Harmful to someone's reputation, so that people think less of the person because of the statement, or are less inclined to do business with or associate with the person. There are some exceptions to point 4, kinds of statements where harm is assumed. Such statements are called "defamation per se". But even in such cases evidence of harm is often included in a defamation suit. The exceptions include: Accusing a person of a crime, particularly a serious crime; accusing a person of dishonest business dealings; accusing a person of incompetence in the person's job, trade, or profession; traditionally, accusing a person of having a sexually transmitted disease (this may no longer apply in some jurisdictions); traditionally, accusing a woman of sexual immorality, that is of having sex before marriage or outside of marriage (this also may no longer apply in some jurisdictions). The plaintiff (person bringing the suit) must at least allege (claim) points 1-3, and point 4 unless the claim is for defamation per se. The plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to confine the court of all but point 2, falsity. In addition, (in US law) if the plaintiff is a public official, or a "public figure" then the plaintiff must also allege and prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term). This means that the plaintiff must show that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Actual malice is usually hard to prove. The actual malice standard derives from the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to that case there was no federal law of defamation, and no constitutional dimension to US defamation cases. A statement of opinion, such as "I think product A is a better value than product B" can never be defamation in US law. Nor can a provably true statement. Nor can a statement that is essentially true, even if it contains minor errors. (None of these are true in all countries.) Some states still maintain the traditional split between libel and slander, with libel being written (or in some places broadcast) defamation, and slander being spoken. In other states the two have been merged into a single action of defamation. When they are separate, libel tends to carry larger damages, and slander may not recognize defamation per se, but require proof of damage to reputation. Some people are said to be "defamation proof" meaning that their reputation is already so bad that nothing can harm it further. Taking care to research facts, particularly negative statements about people, helps avoid defamation in general, and makes proving actual malice much harder. Keeping written records of such research is also a good practice. It is good if negative statements are supported by multiple reliable sources. It is also good practice to make statements of opinion clearly statements of opinion, not statements of fact, and to make statements of fact only when supported by research with citable reliable sources. Following such practices will make defamation suits less likely, and less likely to succeed if any are brought. | Yes lawyers do this. quite often in fact. There are professional and publicity reasons of course, that should suffice to not give bad advice and harm your career. But there is also a legal reason. Lawyers are responsible for the advice they give (as most professionals). If they give bad advice, they may be liable for damages! | I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer. | If your statement is true, it is not libel. But if it is false, it is libel. It does not matter if you directly name him, what matters is if he can be specifically identified by others. Not all others, but at least some others. | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). | Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case. | Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics |
How drunk is too drunk? How does the law reconcile being drunk in sexual assault vs other crimes? One thing that concerns me about sexual assault court cases is the following: In sexual assault cases: an intoxicated person is said to be unable to give legal consent to intercourse. In other criminal cases: an intoxicated person cannot use drunkenness as a defense against their actions. I find it contradictory that a person who is unable to make decisions about their own sexual behavior due to intoxication may still be held accountable for criminal acts committed during that time. Surely, if a person cannot make decisions about their own body while intoxicated, they should also not be held responsible for crimes committed during that same time period? How do prosecutors typically handle cases involving alcohol? Is there a specific threshold for determining when someone is too drunk to be held responsible for their actions? Do prosecutors rely on blood alcohol level tests to determine a person's level of intoxication, or do they make a judgment based on the circumstances of the case? | I will use Washington law to lay the landscape for a rape charge. First degree rape is sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion, either with kidnapping, (apparent) threat of a deadly weapon, beating the victim, or feloniously entering the building of vehicle where the victim is. This is not the case under discussion. What does potentially apply is second degree rape, which is sexual intercourse by other types of forcible compulsion, or (b) When the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, or various similar descriptions of diminished capacity (a developmental disability plus perpetrator supervisory authority, etc). Subparagraph (b) is crucial here, and we turn to the definitionL "Mental incapacity" is that condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the influence of a substance or from some other cause. Also to be clear on "forcible compulsion", "Forcible compulsion" means physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped In the case of intercourse with an intoxicated person, the government must prove that the victim's condition prevented them from understanding the nature or consequences of intercourse. Now compare the law in Minnesota, otherwise analogous, but with a different definition of "mentally incapacitated" (subd. 7): "Mentally incapacitated" means: (1) that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration; or (2) that a person is under the influence of any substance or substances to a degree that renders them incapable of consenting or incapable of appreciating, understanding, or controlling the person's conduct. (italics indicate the differences of interest). The second clause in the Minnesota definition states the same idea as the Washington definition, but also adds "inability to control" as a form of incapacity. The first clause states a different standard of inability, lowered from "incapable of deciding" to "lacking judgment", but only when the condition arises without the person's consent. The point here is that prosecution and conviction do not just depend on a generic and universal concept of "consent", it very much depends on the exact words selected by the legislature in establishing these laws. Minnesota's legislature made one set of choices, Washington's made another. The Washington legislature made another choice when it came to intoxication: per RCW 9a.16.090, No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state. So an voluntarily drunk person cannot defend themselves saying "I was drunk, I didn't know what I was doing", but intoxication can be relevant to the important question of "knowledge" as an element of culpability. This is a principle of law specifically set by the legislature. Prosecutors don't decide based on a hypothetical "how drunk" scale, instead they compare the facts with what the applicable law says. There is no "knowingly" requirement for prosecution for rape, therefore one cannot argue that because of intoxication the accused "lacked knowledge" of their act owing to intoxication. Being intoxicated according to the .08 driving standard does not (generally) render a person incapable of understanding "intercourse". | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | There are no small sexual assaults Indecent assault/sexual assault/sexual touching Different jurisdictions have different definitions but, wherever you are, the behavior you describe is a criminal offense and the appropriate course of action is to report it to both your employer and the police. The fact that the perpetrator is under the professional care of the victim does not change this although, if the positions were reversed, this would be an aggravating factor. That is, assuming you are willing to make a statement to the police and, ultimately, testify before a court. It may not come to that - the police may not press charges. You can also civilly sue for the damage you have suffered. Work Health and Safety Your employer has an obligation to provide a reasonably safe workplace. If this is a not uncommon occurrence then they should have analyzed the risk and determined appropriate mitigation strategies and trained you in these. Have they? | united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be "plain error" (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say "I object" that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was "harmless", which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings. | I assume you mean to ask whether the guilt of the victim affects the validity of a crime-of-passion defence. canada In Canada, the only crime-of-passion type defence is provocation, today codified at s. 232 of the Criminal Code. Provocation is only relevant to a count of murder. If the person who committed what would otherwise be murder "did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation," then the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. Current codified defence: victim must have done something that would be an indictable offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment One of the statutory requirements for a successful provocation defence is that the victim must have conducted themselves in a way that "would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment." This is an objective element of the defence, not dependent on the perception of the accused. One court has found this limitation to the defence to be unconstitutional (R. v Simard, 2019 BCSC 531). However that court would still require that the "conduct of the victim [to be] of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control..." The common law and the previous codified defence also required provocative conduct by the victim Both the common law and the pre-2015 codification of the provcation defence required that the victim's provocative conduct be "of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control" (R. v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55 at paragraphs 24-35). Burdens for establishing this defence The provocation defence is an "air of reality" defence (R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, paragraph 57). This means that there is an initial evidential burden on the accused. There must be evidence on the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable properly instructed jury to acquit (or, in the case of provocation, to convict of manslaughter instead of murder). Once the accused meets this burden, then the defence is properly in play and will be successful unless the Crown disproves any element of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. | I'm not sure a case of harassment could be made out (it would depend on the circumstances in which you purportedly did those things or threatened her, except for touching her. Sexual assault The Sexual Offences Act 2003 defines sexual assault as: (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) he intentionally touches another person (B), (b) the touching is sexual, (c) B does not consent to the touching, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents. To your questions: What is the law on a 16 year-old doing the things listed above with a 14 year-old? Same as the above, except what would happen if it was made out that there was not consent? For sexual assault, it is presumed that if the person is between the ages of 13 and 16, they do not have the capacity to consent. That is - if there is no proof of consent, you are guilty of the offence, if the requisite mens rea - intent - to touch them can be proved. For everything else - it might amount to harassment but that is probably a stretch, I don't see the elements being made out. However, there are certain limits to what people can consent to - you can't consent to someone murdering you in most jurisdictions, for example. ... what would be the best way to go about disproving (in a court scenario) that I did all of these things? You do not have to disprove that you did these acts - it is the job of the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond reasonable doubt that you have done so. You can present evidence that satisfies an evidentiary burden that you did not do these acts, such as not being able to do so (by being in another place), or not intending to do the act. However, you would need to prove that you had consent and believed she was 16 or over to stand a reasonable chance of escaping conviction for the above crime, if prosecuted. As Martin has said - you need to get a lawyer for the right answer here. | No. It means the existence of reasonable doubt is in doubt... One cannot conclude the question of guilt in either direction, so one must try again to see if a different jury can answer the meta-question, to then answer the legal question of guilt. ... or is not being addressed If only one person is voting against the consensus, or as many as are allowed by the jurisdiction, they are overruled. That's the allowance made for bias that has somehow reached the jury despite the filtering done beforehand. If more people are voting against the majority so that consensus is not possible, it is potentially because someone has made up their mind on the question of guilt regardless of what (some significant part or the weight of) the evidence indicates, defeating the purpose of the trial and providing all the evidence. A person not accounting for all the evidence can't be said to have reasonable doubt of guilt, since the doubt may be excluded by the remaining evidence. Similarly, guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be supported by only partial evidence, as exculpatory evidence may be among the part not accounted for. ... or cannot be addressed by that jury at all. Finally, a jury split on the decision of how to weigh the evidence cannot claim either to have or to have dismissed reasonable doubt, because they cannot agree on what a reasonable doubt is, in the first place. | Rules about self-defense in the US vary from state to state, but generally a person can raise a defense that they legally used deadly self-defense if they had a reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm, with some exceptions (exactly how these are worded changes from state to state): A person often cannot claim self defense if they are already committing a forcible felony (but it depends on the circumstances) A person cannot claim self defense if they are the aggressor in a fight or took aggressive actions toward another person who then attacked them. So, with that in mind, let's assume that Person A has a valid deadly self-defense claim against Person B. When considering self defense, the question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have feared death or grievous bodily harm. So, the exact sequence of events matters. Consider the following four scenarios: C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, C pulls out his gun and points it at A before A turns to him and points his gun in response C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls out his gun in response C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, C pulls out his gun and they stand off C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls his in response In some of these situations, A may be considered the aggressor against C even though he had a valid self-defense claim against B. In others, a jury may find that a reasonable person in C's position would not expect A to shoot them just because they shot an attacker, and therefore C is the aggressor by drawing on A. This all assumes a hypothetical where these people exist in a void, things like their relationship, the situation around the three subjects, and any other relevant facts could be introduced and considered in the analysis. In theory, a situation could exist where both sides have a valid self-defense claim against each other, the third example possibly being that situation. |
Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? According to this article in Newsweek, people are calling for Amy Coney Barrett to recuse herself from the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case because she has strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups. While these people are probably right that she is biased, this still seems a little odd to me. Barret does not have ties to 303 Creative LLC itself, or to anyone directly involved in the case. She just has ties to people with strong opinions on the issue, which seems like something that would apply to many judges in many cases. Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? | Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? Not really. Supreme Court justices decide unreviewably whether or not to recuse themselves from cases, informed by general canons of judicial ethics which guide their decisions even though they are non-binding on Supreme Court justices. There is a strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from particular cases in which the justice was involved as lawyer prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice. There is also a fairly strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases where they have a strong, personal, and particularized to them (as opposed to general to people of their class and situation) financial interest (e.g. from cases involving companies in which they have large investments or family members who are top managers). In the example given of the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case, her strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups would normally not be a ground for recusal. General strong policy dispositions are normally not a basis for recusal. But, if instead, she were an investor in (or even a long time regular customer of) 303 Creative LLC, she would probably recuse. | The custom is that the person who brings the case is named first. This will be the plaintiff in a civil case. But when the plaintiff wins, and the defendant appeals, the case in the appeals court may have that person (often referred to in older cases as the "defendant appellant") named first. More recent practice is to keep the name of the case the same. But it used to be considered a separate case with a separate name in some jurisdictions. In any event, this is merely a custom, and not a law. The court has discretion to name cases as it chooses in its judgements, and if a court chooses for whatever reason to follows a practice that differs from the usual one, that is the name of that particular case. Without a full citation or a link, so that the actual opinion could be consulted, three is no way to know what reason, if any, there was for the order of parties in the particular case mentioned in the question. A quick Google search did not turn up the case. | Two reasons that spring to mind: The Respondent wanted the appeal to proceed so that they would have definitive case law from a higher court. That is they thought they would win and, quite possibly, the appellant thought they would win too. Rolling the dice on a losing proposition is not so bad if you have no skin in the game so the Respondent is encouraging the appeal. Its a commercial PR decision - it looks bad in the press if you use your money and power to prevent someone from pursuing their legal rights. This way, they can put their hand on their hearts and say "we gave them every opportunity to prove us wrong". | I'm not convinced that there is a U.S. Supreme Court case with such a clear holding. For example: May a private entity running a public access channel ban speakers based on the content of their speech—something a government entity running the same channels could not do? Yes, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion in Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck (2019). Why? Because the First Amendment doesn’t apply to private entities in this instance. You may be looking for one of the cases discussed in Halleck which notes (in the official syllabus) that: "A private entity may qualify as a state actor . . . when the entity exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 352 [1974]. The Court has stressed that “very few” functions fall into that category. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 158 [1978]. Per the official syllabus in the link above, Jackson held that: The convergence between the actions of a state and a heavily regulated private utility company do not rise to the level of state action if the utility company has a partial monopoly in providing electrical service and uses a procedure that the state utilities commission finds to be appropriate under state law in terminating service to customers. As the linked material explains: A private entity performing a public function can be classified as a state actor, but merely being regulated and overseen by the state does not equate to performing a public function if the company is managed by private actors. In this decision, the Court placed limits on the public function doctrine, which otherwise could have grown into a massive exception permitting the inference of state action. Thus, heavy state regulation of a private entity still doesn't constitute state action which can violate a constitutional right, in this case, even though if the state has had greater control over the nominally private entity (e.g. appointing its board of directors), the private entity's actions would be state action. Per the official syllabus in the link above, the primary holding of Flagg Bros. was that: A warehouseman's proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage, as permitted by [New York State's Uniform Commercial Code] § 7-210, is not "state action," and since the allegations of the complaint failed to establish that any violation of respondents' Fourteenth Amendment rights was committed by either the storage company or the State of New York, the District Court properly concluded that no claim for relief was stated by respondents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In reaching this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that: The challenged statute does not delegate to the storage company an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign. Other remedies for the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors (which is not traditionally a public function) remain available to the parties. Though respondents contend that the State authorized and encouraged the storage company's action by enacting [the statute], a State's mere acquiescence in a private action does not convert such action into that of the State. In other words, enactment of a state statute authorizing private action is not state action that can violate a constitutional right. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare | Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. | Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this! | NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory. |
Are exhibits presented in order of importance or the order they'relisted? Are exhibits listed in the order they appear or in order of importance? I'm following the sample format on my county's "self-help center" for pro se litigants, and the example is for another type of case. It has a section for presenting the facts, and under that section (I. FACTS), I list all the relevant facts to the case. The purpose is to refute the libelous claims, so I provide the backstory of what actually happened, leading up to this person creating their libelous content. Thus, while it seems that the main libelous story would be "exhibit A," that doesn't come in until further down the list. So is "exhibit A,", in my case, a relatively minor piece of evidence refuting an unflattering and false portion of the story, but unrelated to the main allegation (which is libel per se). Or is "Exhibit A" or "Exhibit 1" the libelous material and Exhibit B, the next most important piece of evidence, regardless of the order its presented in the list? | I agree with @INaki Viggers that: There is no "formal" rule on that, but it is common for exhibits to be labeled/listed in the order they are referenced in the pleadings and briefs. But, for exhibits to be presented at a trial or hearing, the most common approaches are to list exhibits in order of anticipated presentation, in order of subject matter topics, or a combination of both. However, there is no penalty other than a possible loss of narrative flow, for using another order. It isn't uncommon to put late added exhibits at the end to avoid having to renumber them if you are in a time crunch. | canada The Crown's duty to disclose all materials and information, inculpatory or exculpatory, unless clearly irrelevant, does not extend to Crown "work product." The "work product" privilege means that "notes and materials that involve the thought process and strategic or tactical considerations of Crown counsel in the preparation and presentation of its case" are not within the mandatory disclosure requirements. See Dudley v. British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 328. However, the Crown will present its case first. It will present an opening statement laying out the theory of the case and explain the relevance of the evidence it will be presenting. It will call all of its evidence first and then close its case before the defence presents its case. Also, [t]he Crown must not be allowed to change the case it has presented once the accused has begun to answer the Crown’s case R. v. G. (S.G.), [1997] 2 SCR 716, at para 38 | Yes, this happens with some regularity. In the absence of timely notice, courts should generally permit the alibi testimony, assuming that prosecution will not be surprised or prejudiced by the late notice and that the lack of notice was not the result of bad faith. But when that's not the case, courts can and definitely do exclude alibi testimony: State v. Reed, 155 Ohio App.3d 435 (2003) ("The record demonstrates that the prosecution was unaware of Reed’s alibi, and it had no opportunity to investigate the claim. Thus, the state would have been prejudiced by Reed’s unanticipated alibi testimony, and Reed has made no showing of excusable neglect or good cause for his delay in providing notice. In light of Manns’s failure to appear at trial and Reed’s last-minute change in trial strategy, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the alibi evidence." United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1076 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The better practice is generally to hear an alibi witness. However, the district court maintains discretion in such matters, and it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the testimony in this case.") People v. Grant, C050172, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3356 (Apr. 25, 2006) Assuming the government is subject to reciprocal discovery obligations, a defendant's due-process rights do not preclude the exclusion of alibi witnesses as a sanction for failing to give timely notice. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants."). | The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts. | Is truth the ultimate defense to a defamation lawsuit in the USA? Truth is an absolute defense to defamation lawsuits in modern U.S. law (this was not always the case historically) as a matter of constitutional law in every state. In some kinds of defamation lawsuits (but not all kinds of defamation lawsuits), "actual malice" which means knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, must be shown, so even a negligently stated falsehood is not actionable in those special kinds of defamation cases (mostly cases with public figure plaintiffs, media defendants, and/or case involving matters of public concern). Does a defamation defense vary between states? While most aspects of defamation law are mandated by the U.S. Constitution and a shared common law tradition, there are some slight and subtle differences between the states in defamation law, mostly concerning defamation suits by non-public figures against non-media defendants concerning matters that are not a matter of public concern. This impacts whether "actual malice" must be shown and can influence the burden of proof in defamation cases. Statutes of limitation for defamation suits also vary significantly between states. Even if the release of truthful information results in permanent career damage (i.e. loss of job, reputation, etc.) to someone, the truth would protect the author from a defamation lawsuit, correct? Yes. Keep in mind, however, that a defamation lawsuit is a suit for damage to one's reputation caused by a false statement. Sometimes disclosures of truthful information constitute an actionable tort other than defamation, however. For example, there would potentially be a civil action against someone who had signed a non-disclosure agreement for revealing truthfully information that the person sued contractually agreed not to disclose (e.g. the terms of the settlement agreement in a court case with a non-disclosure/confidentiality term, or the recipe for a restaurant's secret sauce that is a trade secret). Similarly, a doctor who revealed confidential patient medical information that was true could be sued. But, usually, in the absence of a particularlized confidentiality duty, truth is an absolute defense. | I am not aware of any cases with a fact pattern at all like this in which there has been an injunction against an individual publicizing accusations against a company. In each of the cases Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer; Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse; TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2004); Cleary Bldg. Corp. v. David A. Dame, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Colo. 2009)' Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir.2000) an individual put up a "gripe sit usign teh trademark of the company or something close to it, as a URL. Courts held this was not trademark infringement adn ther was no reason to enjoin such sites. More recently "companySucks.com" sites have been created to host complaints about {company}. Atempts to shut these downishe bottom." using trademark law have largely been unsucceaful. See this page for more on this. The first amendment makes it hard to shut down such sites, as they are on "matters of public concern" the "actual malice" rule makes defamation cases tough. | A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal. | Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581. |
In the US, is it legal for me to commercially advertise a photograph that I took myself of a bottle of Coke? Where would I find in https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html for example or other legal text whether it is legal for me to publish my photograph of a bottle of Coke for use to sell that bottle of Coke in my advertisement that I created, all commercially? | Yes it would be legal to do so. A full analysis would look at trademark law (where the bottom line is that the use of the Coke mark is not misleading since you are selling bona fide Coke), and copyright law. Whether it was non-infringing or fair use, is a closer call, but there is little doubt that one way or the other, this would be legal. | Unfortunately the answer is a vague "it depends." Commercial versus non-commercial is not clearly defined in actual law, and is usually up to the specific license to define what it considers to be commercial use. If you were putting them on your business cards, then it's just being used for advertising and whether it's commercial use is a bit controversial. If the license explicitly prohibits the use of the work in advertising, then the license should explicitly mention that and should not rely on the term "commercial use" to cover or protect it. Creative Commons ran an excellent study on commercial versus noncommercial use back in 2009: Defining “Noncommercial” - A Study of How the Online Population Understands “Noncommercial Use” In the United States, for example, the Copyright Act does not define a copyright owner’s rights in terms of commercial or noncommercial use. Instead, copyright law sometimes attaches legal significance to whether a use is “commercial” or “noncommercial” or whether a user is deemed to be a commercial or noncommercial entity, However, rarely are the terms defined, and the law offers no specific guidance on how to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial uses or users of copyrighted works. If you were putting them on a business card you were making for the client, then that would be more clearly identified as commercial use because you're using it in something you are selling for a profit. What your client will be using them for is not relevant, because you're the one selling them to the client and you need to have the right to be able to do that. | Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test. | The simple way is to post a picture of you and the widget to a site like Flickr. A more expensive way (but with rather more weight) is to get a Notary to certify they saw you and the widget on January 9th. Both the above provide evidence you had access to the widget before January 10th, but neither prove you owned it. For that, you would need a dated (possibly even notarized) bill of sale or similar - but if you acquired the widget via a gift, that won't work. A signed witness statement from the giver would probably serve (and the statement could legitimately be created when you are prosecuted). None of the above are unforgeable - but you don't need that. Depending on how the law is written, you will only need to show ownership on the balance of probabilities, or you might only need to show reasonable doubt that you didn't own it on 9th January. | The band's logo can be protected by both copyright and trademark. The band's name is probably only protected as a trademark. Trademark would not apply to your personal use, because to infringe a trademark, you need to "use" the mark, and "use" in trademark law generally means selling an item that has the mark on it. As far as trademark law is concerned, no sale means no infringement. Copyright protects the exclusive right of the owner to copy a "work" (it's much more complex than that, but we don't need to get into the details here). Copyright probably applies because you would "copy" the logo, which under copyright law is something only the copyright owner can do (absent authorization from the copyright owner). You would therefore theoretically be infringing copyright by copying the bands logo on a shirt or something you want to wear yourself. That said, while I agree with the first answer that fair use may apply in theory, there would never ever be such a complex discussion about fair use in this case... because in fact there's absolutely no chance an individual would get fined or sued for having copied a band's logo and name on something he/she wants to wear his/herself. Getting sued by the band The band will not notice. If you're lucky enough to meet the band (or somebody close to the band) in person while you are wearing your garment, they would either not notice or not care. At worst, they'll ask you where you bought it in case they suspect you bought it from someone who illegally sells fake merch. Even then, all of this seems very unlikely. If you are extremely unlikely and the band notices it and sues you (and finds a lawyer to take a case like that to court), my inclination is to think the judge would be extremely mad with the band (and its lawyer) for losing the court's time with such a trivial matter. No judge would allow lawyers to waste the court's time pleading such a complex thing as fair use in a case like that. Getting fined The police would not notice either, because the only time the police cares about copyright is when somebody makes a complaint (nobody would make a complaint about you), except when they seize containers full of copyright infringing stuff (that is destined to be illegally sold for profit) in a port or at a border somewhere. The only possible scenario where I could imagine that there would be legal consequences is if you wear a t-shirt with the bands logo in a YouTube video (or in a picture) where the only thing that you see basically is the bands logo on your t-shirt. Even this scenario is extremely far fetched, but let's say the video becomes popular and the band notices. Well, the likeliest scenario is that they would file a DMCA notice and get YouTube to take down the video, with very little chances that there would be more important consequences to you. Have fun! | The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture. | You can basically take pictures of anything from your property if it is "public" (i.e. easily visible from your property). People on the road are in public, and have no reasonable expectation of privacy. The basic restrictions on photography are (1) you cannot trespass (you aren't), and (2) you cannot take pictures of certain government operations (e.g. airport border crossing – certain aspects of government prohibition may require lawsuit to rein in government policy that is at odds with the 1st Amendment; also secret military installations, for which there is specific law, 18 USC 795). Commercial exploitation of people who you photograph is strongly protected in California, and that is it. | It would probably not be defamation unless it was obvious that it was somehow a very direct metaphor for a real situation. You must, at a minimum, be implying something about reality for something to be defamatory. This would be quite a stretch. You might, however, be liable for commercial appropriation of someone's identity and owe them compensation in much the same way that you have to pay a model damages if you use model's picture for a commercial purpose. The appropriation need not be limited to the physical aspects of someone's appearance and might include also, for example, distinctive use of language or aspects of personal history and life. |
How to handle local sales tax for online sales regarding unincorporated city/town limits I have a client Located in Louisiana performing online sales inside Louisiana which is in a destination-based sales tax state. I have run into an issue where they are using the town name from the delivery address to collect town sales taxes; however, some towns have unincorporated zones where the residents use the name of the closest town for address reasons, but they are technically outside of town limits meaning that the sales tax should not apply to them. Below is a map of one such town where the red-dotted line is the town limits, but the yellow line represents the unincorporated zone where people use the town's name in thier address. Due to how these lines fall, how do destination-based sales tax states expect sales tax to be collected when the City and Zip code of an address can not be used to determine if a particular address is inside of a local tax area? | There are vendors providing software to facilitate this sort of task. Avalara is perhaps the best known, but I don't have any experience with it and couldn't say whether it's actually any good or not. But the bottom line is that in a destination-based sourcing regime, sales taxes must be computed based on the address of the destination, not city or ZIP code associated with that address. As Avalara has noted, this is a giant hassle, but it's nonetheless the current state of the law. Of course, this assumes the seller has sufficient nexus with Louisiana to trigger a duty to collect sales taxes in the first place. From the question, it is not clear whether this is true. | In New York State, towns are not "part of" cities; they are distinct political entities with their own separate borders, and they do not overlap or contain each other. You can see on this map (Wikipedia but I couldn't find an official one that was as easy to read) that the Town of Henrietta and the City of Rochester are separate. In fact, they do not even share a common border (the Town of Brighton is in between). The laws and municipal code of the City of Rochester do not apply in the Town of Henrietta, nor vice versa. Henrietta has its own Town Code, linked from its official website, but I could not find any regulations on towing vehicles from private property, nor in the Code of Monroe County in which the Town is located. So I would assume that New York State law applies. | Failing to pay a required tax is both a civil and a criminal offense. In a case like this, the buyer should have known that there was something suspicious going on, and so had a duty to look into things. In any case ignorance is not a legal defense to an accusation of non-payment of a tax properly due. By the way, it is not a question of a court learning something, but of a tax official, The tax official could refer to matter to a prosecutor, who could bring charges and take the matter to court. However, relatively minor tax issues are most often handled as civil matters with a tax penalty or fine being imposed, and even if it were handled as a criminal matter (unusual for a first offense) the Judge would have the option to impose only a fine. The California sales tax rate on autos is currently 7.25%, so the tax due would have been something less than $725. The Californium Sales And Use Tax Law section 6476 specifies a penalty of 6% of the tax due but not paid. However, this applies to: Any person required to make a prepayment pursuant to Section 6471 who fails to make a timely prepayment ... That would normally be the seller. Remember these taxers are normally collected by the seller from the buyer, and the seller, particularly one whose business is such sales, must make regular payments to the state. I have not found a law or regulation specifying a penalty rate for the buyer in such a situation, but it is probably a similar rate. Note that a later section specifies a 10% penalty instead of 6% when the non-payment is negligent or willful. The official page "Sales And Use Tax Regulations" from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (CDTFA) summarizes a number of regulations and sections of law, particularly Regulation 1703. It reads in part: (c) (1) (B) Other Late Payments. A penalty of 10 percent of the amount of all unpaid tax shall be added to any tax not paid in whole or in part within the time required by law. (c) (1) (C) Vehicles, Vessels and Aircraft. A purchaser of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft who registers it outside this state for the purpose of evading the payment of sales or use taxes shall be liable for a penalty of 50 percent of any tax determined to be due on the sales price of the vehicle, vessel or aircraft. (c) (3) (A) Negligence or Intentional Disregard. A penalty of 10 percent of the amount of the tax specified in the determination shall be added to deficiency determinations if any part of the deficiency for which the determination is imposed is due to negligence or intentional disregard of the Sales and Use Tax Law or authorized regulations. Generally, a penalty for negligence or intentional disregard should not be added to deficiency determinations associated with the first audit of a taxpayer in the absence of evidence establishing that any bookkeeping and reporting errors cannot be attributed to the taxpayer's good faith and reasonable belief that its bookkeeping and reporting practices were in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Sales and Use Tax Law or authorized regulations. (c) (3) (C) Fraud or Intent to Evade. A penalty of 25 percent of the amount of the tax specified in a deficiency determination shall be added thereto if any part of the deficiency for which the determination is made is due to fraud or intent to evade the Sales and Use Tax Law or authorized regulations. In the case of a determination for failure to file a return, if such failure is due to fraud or an intent to evade the Sales and Use Tax Law or authorized regulations, a penalty of 25 percent of the amount required to be paid, exclusive of penalties, shall be added thereto in addition to the 10 percent penalty for failure to file a return. Fraud or intent to evade shall be established by clear and convincing evidence. (c) (3) (E) (8) Relief from Penalty for Reasonable Cause. If the Board finds that a person's failure to make a timely return, payment, or prepayment, or failure to comply with the provisions of section 6074 of the Revenue and Taxation Code is due to reasonable cause and circumstances beyond the person's control, and occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care and the absence of willful neglect, the person may be relieved of the penalty provided by sections 6074, 6476, 6477, 6480.4, 6511, 6565, 6591, and 7051.2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code for such failure. Any person seeking to be relieved of the penalty shall file with the Board a statement under penalty of perjury setting forth the facts upon which the claim for relief is based. Section 6592 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, providing for the relief of certain penalties does not apply to the 10 percent penalty imposed for failure to make a timely prepayment under section 6478 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The page lists contact info for the CDTFA I cannot judge which of these regulations would apply to the case describes in the question -- they are generally aimed at failures by the seller. But it looks as if 10% to 50% of the tax originally due would be a likely amount. Penalties, fines, and jail terms imposed should not depend on citizenship or immigration status t all. Response to PS First of all, the IRS is not a court. Courts are not law enforcement agencies nor prosecutors in the US. Secondly, this is a state tax, not a federal tax, and the IRS will not be concerned. The California tax authorities may be. (They are not courts either.) The page "Tax Guide for Purchasers of Vehicles, Vessels, & Aircraft" from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (CDTFA) reads: However, if you purchased a vehicle without completing registration and paying the use tax to the DMV, you must pay the use tax directly to the CDTFA. You can report your purchase of a vehicle and pay the use tax by using the CDTFA's online services and selecting the option to File a Return or Claim an Exemption for a Vehicle, Vessel, Aircraft, or Mobile Home under the Limited Access Functions. Your tax payment is due on or before the last day of the month following the month of purchase. Penalty and interest charges will begin to accrue once the due date has passed. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute. | Whether GDPR applies does not depend on the country of residence. Instead, GDPR applies to a non-EU site or service if the data controller offers products or services to people in the EU (see Art 3(2) GDPR). This depends solely on the behaviour and intent of the data controller / the provider of the website – compare also the discussion of the “targeting criterion” in EDPB guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR. While your proposed measures might not be entirely ineffective (in that they document an intent to not serve people in the EU), they are both unnecessarily restrictive and overly lax. For example, they would unnecessarily prevent EU tourists in the US from registering but would nevertheless allow US tourists in the EU. For the targeting criterion, it matters whether the data subject is in the EU at the time of the offer, not at all what their residency is. Even if a person who is currently in the EU registers with your service, that doesn't necessarily mean that you are targeting people in the EU. Instead of implementing signup restrictions, a better strategy might be to clarify in the copy on your website that you are only targeting the domestic US market, not the European market with your services. I have discussed this in more detail in an answer to “How can you block GDPR users from US based sites?” If you have a site where GDPR doesn't apply, and you receive a GDPR data subject request, you shouldn't deny it on the basis that the user must have lied – instead you can deny it on the basis that GDPR just doesn't apply to you. | Because the prohibition of selling to a resident of another state isn't a state law, but rather a Federal law. ATF explains May a licensee sell a firearm to a nonlicensee who is a resident of another State? Generally, a firearm may not lawfully be sold by a licensee to a nonlicensee who resides in a State other than the State in which the seller’s licensed premises is located... In addition, a licensee may sell a rifle or shotgun to a person who is not a resident of the State where the licensee’s business premises is located in an over–the–counter transaction, provided the transaction complies with State law in the State where the licensee is located and in the State where the purchaser resides. [18 U.S.C. 922(b)(3); 27 CFR 478.99(a)] | You will have to pay import toll and taxes. There is no way around that unless you get only tiny deliveries, and that would be tax evasion. Atop that, make sure your wares are declared properly and are not regarded as counterfeit or not importable. Fashion products might require to follow some special rules on ingredients that are allowable. You can get the information you need at your customs office or at the customs office website |
Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? What would be the effect of the United States ratifying a treaty that is incompatible with its constitution? | Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) ("The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) ("It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids."); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’") (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty."). | The answer to your question, strictly in terms of whether they have the capacity to authorize states to violate international humanitarian law is yes. However, it is highly unlikely. It takes only one permanent member to veto such a resolution. Moreover, UN Charter Article 24(2) states that: ... the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations ... and International Humanitarian Law would certainly be considered a principle of the United Nations. So, are they capable of passing a resolution in violation of International Humanitarian Law? Sure. Is it likely to happen? Almost certainly not. Having said that, if this happened, it would be a novel area of law, and while currently, international law suggests it would be binding and legal, it is possible that sanctions could be imposed if such a resolution were passed by the Security Council. | Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the "Admissions Clause": New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not "this shall not be done", but rather "the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so". | is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either. | The UDHR does not create enforceable rights. It is aspirational and not self-executing. This said, calling a legally recognized relationship a "civil union" rather than a "marriage" does not inherently violate the UDHR any more than using the Mandarin or Swahili word for marriage instead of the English one would. A marriage is just a bundle of rights and responsibilities, the UDHR does not tightly constrain what must be included in that bundle, and it is surely the substance rather than the mere terminology that matters for determining if rights have been violated. Something fairly described as marriage must be available to all, but a rose by any other name would be just as sweet. Civil law countries already distinguish between legal marriage, which basically is a "civil union" and religious marriage, which is deinstitutionalized. | The U.S. Constitution - Article 1, Section 10 is titled "Powers Prohibited of States," and it reads: No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. The title of the section, Powers Prohibited of States, tells us that this clause is directed to the states and prevents the states from enacting any state laws that retroactively impair obligations and rights between two contracting parties. In New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co, the court held that a law passed by the state legislature must be the cause of a contract's obligations to have been impaired in order for relief to be sought under this clause. The Heritage Guide to The Constitution has a good article explaining the history of this clause. A central provision of the Northwest Ordinance, which established the Northwest Territory, stated: In the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, previously formed. While operating under the Articles of Confederation between 1777 and 1789 when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, some state legislatures were passing laws relieving well-connected people from debts for which they had contracted. As the Heritage Guide explains, the obligation of contracts section was added to the clause of the Constitution which prevented states from printing money and making treaties. Initially, the clause was meant to prevent state legislation that retroactively changed the terms of private contracts. But as cases worked their way through the courts, the Supreme Court eventually set that standard that the obligation of contracts clause also prevented states from undoing contracts to which the state was a party where the obligation of the contract had been completed. (As opposed to breach of contract claims for uncompleted contracts.) Ogden v Saunders, in 1827, held that the obligation of contracts clause doesn't apply to contracts that did not exist at the time a statute was passed. Those states with their own Obligation of Contracts Clause may have had them before the U.S. Constitution was written (Virginia's original constitution was enacted in 1776) or may have added them as an amplification of the prohibition found in the U.S. Constitution. | Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America, beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White, the reference made to the concept of "perpetual union" found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham. | It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant. |
Is the term "evil" defined in law? An infamous clause found occasionally in software licenses is: The Software shall be used for Good, not Evil. This clause has been discussed in many places, including Software Engineering Stack Exchange and Open Source Stack Exchange. While a lot of people don't seem to like this clause, I wanted to step back and analyze the idea of "evil" from a purely legal perspective rather than the social milieu of the open source community. To that end, is the term "evil" a proper term in law with a distinct meaning? One idea I had was to interpret it as a synonym of "unlawful" or maybe "criminal". The other idea is to understand it more in the sense of legal positivism, where socially-defined "good" and "evil" are distinguished from legally-defined "lawful" and "unlawful", and so a particular act might be "good" but "unlawful" or "evil" but "lawful". Neither of these definitions seems satisfactory. The problem I have with the first definition is that it adds unnecessary complexity to what should be more simply expressed as "This software is not to be used for any unlawful purpose." or "Committing any felony or gross misdemeanor with the software shall constitute a breach of the license agreement.". It also likely places someone who commits an unlawful act as minor as forgetting to add coins to a parking meter on the same level as a cackling comic book supervillain who gets off on bombing orphanages, which seems disingenuous. The problem I have with the legal positivism definition is that it empowers a court to define social rules, which it is not designed to do. For example, some people (based on their beliefs) might characterize using scheduling software to manage abortion clinic appointments to be an "evil" use (and thus a breach of the license), while others might take the opposite perspective and claim that using the same scheduling software to plan anti-abortion protests or manage the shifts of law enforcement officers investigating suspected clandestine abortion clinics are "evil" usages forbidden by the license. I'm interested in either an analysis of the meaning of "evil" in a general legal sense (in any jurisdiction in which the term might have been given a specific meaning or been interpreted by a court) or a sense restricted to software licenses, if such has ever been done. Discussion: As hinted at by respondents and commentators, I do see a distinction between acts that the vast majority of reasonable people would see as "clearly" evil such as ethnic cleansing, slavery, or rape and acts where the evil-ness or lack thereof is a valid point of debate, such as abortion, marketing habit-forming drugs, or not eating vegan. An answer might cover this. For example, is determination of whether a questionable act qualifies as evil a question of law for the judge or a question of fact for the trier of fact (e.g. jury)? Are the personal moral beliefs of the software licensor and/or licensee relevant? For example, if I have a personal moral belief (not shared by most of the members of my community) that eating at Burger King is evil because they buy from factory farms but I nonetheless use scheduling software with a "no evil" clause to schedule a lunch date at Burger King, am I in breach of the license? If the software's owner/licensor is a highly devout Catholic who considers any form of birth control to be pure evil but I (the licensee) disagree, is my act of using the software to facilitate an otherwise lawful condom purchase a breach? I do recognize that none of the situations I described above are likely to land me inside a courtroom due to practical matters. That is why my question is about the nature and definition of "evil" for legal purposes rather than advice for any specific situation, license, or use. I know what "love" means, but what does "evil" mean? | While not defined, in common law systems, there is a concept of Malum in se which can be translated to "Wrong or Evil in itself" and is used to describe criminal actions that are wrong because they are immoral as opposed to criminal actions that are wrong because they are prohibited (Malum Prohibitum). As an example, Murder is considered Malum in se while driving on the wrong side of the road is Malum Prohibitum. Malum in se thus is a crime because the action is immoral. | This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard. | Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy). | The First Amendment does indeed guarantee the freedom to express any idea or viewpoint, the limitation being incitement to immediate lawless action, recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps (many free speech cases have been about criminal restrictions on speech, this applied even to a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). There isn't a clear line that distinguishes "advocating violation of the law" and "inciting to immediate lawlessness". Saying "(You should) shoot The Man whenever you see him" would be protected expression, but "There's a cop, somebody kill him" would be incitement. It also has to be a "credible" incitement, so saying "Kill him now!" to a room full of pacifist nuns would not constitute incitement. Things said to an angry mob would be more along the lines of incitement. | South Park did the EULA gag, and such an agreement would be unenforceable as unconscionable. NDAs, on the other hand, are conscionable, but a EULA isn't an NDA. There isn't a specific statute that you can point to that either makes such a no-criticism agreement explicitly legal vs. illegal, so the case would have to be based on common law justice-style arguments. People v. Network Associates is a relevant case, where a clause requires permission to publish benchmarks or reviews of the software. The court found against the publisher. However, the restrictive condition was not part of the license agreement, which included a merger clause that declared the license agreement to be the whole agreement. The publisher had some hand-waving about mention of "rules and regulations" which they argued nullified the merger clause, where the court did not accept the argument. So for the moment, you need to decide whether disparaging a product is that important to you; or, become a legal pioneer and win a case in court. There is a bill, the Consumer Review Freedom Act under consideration (passed the Senate) which might change that, if it becomes a law. It pertains to a written, oral, or pictorial review, performance assessment of, or other similar analysis of, including by electronic means, the goods, services, or conduct of a person by an individual who is party to a form contract with respect to which such person is also a party and restricts a contract with standardized terms— (i) used by a person in the course of selling or leasing the person's goods or services; and (ii) imposed on an individual without a meaningful opportunity for such individual to negotiate the standardized terms. which says that that kind of contract with that kind of provision is void. | In the vast majority of countries (both common law and civil law), statutes are interpreted in a manner that reflects the intend of the drafters of the statute a.k.a. legislative intent, when it is possible to reasonably determine what was intended. There is a canon of statutory interpretation in almost all legal systems that provides that absurd or nonsensical interpretations of legislative language are to be disregarded in favor of those that reflect the likely intent of the body passing the law, even if the literal and technical reading of the words does not state precisely what was intended. Thus, if there is a clear grammatical, punctuation, or spelling error and the intend meaning can be discerned from the language of the law, the larger context of the law, or extrinsic evidence such a legislative history and public discussion of the reasons for enacting the law in the first place, those clues will be used to interpret the legal effect of a law. Could this mean legal consequences or would I be safe as I "bought nothing illegal"? No. Ignorance of the law is no excuse even in cases where the interpretation of the law calls for the courts to ignore minor errors in legislative drafting. You would have an argument, but where you can state "in fact 'Scolopendra gigantica' does not exist and they most likely meant 'Scolopendra gigantea'." The likelihood that you will face legal consequences is great. Also, in this particular example, keep in mind that biological species sometimes have more than one accepted Latin name, or once had a different name than the currently accepted name. For example, in this case, "gigantica" and "gigantea" are different grammatical inflections of the same Latin root word, and really are the same word in the same way that "geese" and "goose" are different tenses of the same word in English that refer to the same genus of birds. If a scientist discovers a new type of centipede and names it 'Scolopendra gigantica', would it be illegal immediately? The judges would look at all of the facts and circumstances and decide if the new species was within the scope of what the law intended to ban. But, the mere fact that the word is the same would not make the law apply to it. In the same way, suppose that a law had an exemption and didn't apply to animals in the town of Zootopia where many exotic pets are naturally common in the wild because a failed zoo released them into the area. But, given that context, the town of Euclid could not make itself exempt from the law by renaming itself Zootopia after the former town of Zootopia was disincorporated after its residents were all eaten by lions. If it was illegal to own a 'Scolopendra gigantea' due to that law and a scientist now names a new centipede 'Scolopendra gigantica' would that immediately legalize the 'Scolopendra gigantea'? No. For the same reasons discussed above. Footnote Re Similar Issues With Controlled Substances Laws This said, the issue you discuss does come up, and sometimes wins and sometimes loses, in the case of laws regulating controlled substances (i.e. illegal drugs). One of the reasons that this comes up is that the proper names of chemical substances in organic chemistry is not, as it is in biology, arbitrary. The name of an organic chemical is determined from looking at which atomic elements in which combinations with what kinds of bonds to each other are present. Given a chemical diagram of an organic chemical, every organic chemist would give it the same name, even if they've never discussed it, and likewise, you could ban an organic chemical that has never been observed or synthesized in real life and it would be illegal if it ever was synthesized. These statutes have usually been interpreted strictly to apply only to the named chemicals, but usually include an additional statutory section that either ban "analog" chemicals that are intended to or do have the same biochemical effect as the banned chemical, or allow an administrative agency to add new chemicals to the list without legislative action. Still, complications do come up even then because many lawyers and legislators become lawyers or politicians because they couldn't become doctors or engineers, because they flunked organic chemistry. (Joking aside, almost 50% of college students in the United States taking organic chemistry for the first time fail the course. This and first semester calculus are the most frequently failed college courses in the United States.) The Florida Cheese Ban For example, Florida recently classified a chemical present in many kinds of ordinary cheese as a controlled substance, which would in theory make every grocery store owner and millions of Floridians felons. Florida probably meant to ban high concentration synthetic extracts of that chemical administered as a drug, but didn't do anything to say so. But interpreting the statute to have that meaning was harder in that case since the same statute applies to many, many different drugs and the interpretation of the statute would make the ban on the chemical found in cheese make sense, would not make sense for the other drugs on the list. But, Florida courts may ultimately end up ignoring the addition of that chemical to the list based upon the canon against absurd interpretations, at least on an "as applied" case by case basis where the literal meaning of the statute would make millions of Floridian felons for violating this law. The Grand Junction Conviction For Possession Of A Legal Drug Another case came up in Grand Junction, Colorado where a woman was prosecuted by a government lawyer for possession of a controlled substance for possession of a chemical named in the indictment, and her government provided public defender had his client plead guilty to the crime. The woman tried to explain that this made no sense since its was an ordinary prescription drug, but the prosecutor, her own lawyer and the judge didn't believe her, and her public defender told her she was certain to be convicted anyway. (It isn't clear if she actually had a prescription for the drug, but even if she didn't, it wouldn't have been a crime.) So, she took a plea deal and was sent to prison to serve a medium length incarceration with work release sentence, instead of the medium length prison sentence she could have received if she went to trial, was convicted, and received a typical sentence for that conviction. The problem was that the chemical she was indicted for possessing in violation of the controlled substances act wasn't actually on the controlled substances list and wasn't an analog version of a controlled substance. There was also no reason to think that the drug he was convicted of possessing which had no pleasurable psychoactive effect was ever intended by the legislature to be banned or regulated. About a year later, in the year 2005, when this issue was ultimately discovered, a different criminal defense lawyer brought a post-conviction challenge to the conviction on the convicted woman's behalf, and the convicted woman was released with the conviction vacated, because the crime she was indicted for committing and convicted of didn't exist. Allysan Isaac, 24, was held nearly a year in work release for something that a judge said Tuesday was not even illegal. "You were incarcerated for a case that was not a crime," said Mesa County District Judge Brian Flynn, who presided over the case. Flynn, the prosecutor and Isaac's defense attorney were unaware last year that the offense she was charged with was not a violation of the law. No one had noticed that a prescription drug found in Isaac's possession, an anti-anxiety medication called Buspirone, is not a controlled substance. ... District Attorney Pete Hautzinger said he had "no idea" why Isaac had been charged with and convicted of something that wasn't a crime. The defense attorney who represented Isaac in the first case was also baffled. "I don't have an answer," assistant public defender John Burkey said. "Nobody caught it. The police were saying it was a controlled substance." (Source quoting from and citing an article I read and confirmed the story from in the Rocky Mountain News, a now defunct newspaper. Corroborated here.) Incidentally, even though this woman was horribly wronged because of this wrongful conviction, the prosecutor and judge had absolute immunity from civil liability for the wrongful conviction, and criminal liability requires knowledge that you are committing a crime. The government likewise had no duty to compensate her for her wrongful incarceration because her rights weren't intentionally violated by anyone as required by civil rights statutes. She may have had a claim for legal malpractice against her own lawyer, for which negligence can be a basis of liability. Even that would have been a difficult case to win, however. This is because she would have to show that the public defender violated the standard of care of a reasonable lawyer by relying upon law enforcement's claim that a substance was a chemical banned by the controlled substances act which is a question of fact upon which expert witnesses could reasonably disagree. There is nothing in the public record to show that she pursued such a claim, but a private settlement reached before the case was filed wouldn't be revealed in that way. So, it is possible that a private settlement was reached in a legal malpractice case against her public defender that never actually resulted in a case being filed in court. | Short answer? No, the WTFPL offers no protection. A software license is a contract between the software vendor and the end user defining the terms and conditions under which the end user is permitted to use the software. Often, traditional software licenses contain terms that limit the vendor's liability. For example: "End User accepts the risk that this software will initiate computational conflagrations." It may also limit the end user's right to sue, by requiring binding arbitration, or by requiring them to sue in a particular court in a particular state. Whether and to what extent these clauses are enforceable is moot here, because the WTFPL doesn't contain them. Think of it this way. If you sign a contract with me to buy my house, and then you set fire to my car, you can't wave the house contract at me and say, "This is a legally binding contract, and it doesn't say I can't set fire to your car!" It doen't say that you can, either, and so it's not relevant to the lawsuit I'm going to bring against you for the damage to my car. Contracts are only relevant to a lawsuit if they contain a clause relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit. The WTFPL contains no clauses in which the end user agrees to do or not to do anything, and therefore cannot be a defense against him or her doing, or not doing, anything at all. | Does using the courts in this way violate any law other than the individual sanctions for improper suits? Not really. Such an organization would probably have to be classified as some form of non-profit other than a 501(c)(3) in most cases, however, since politically motivated litigation usually doesn't qualify as a charitable purpose. In particular, is there any way to go after the money being fundraised for an activity that seems on its face to be of fraudulent intent? (I.e. filing cases with 0 chances of winning just to be able to dupe people into thinking their money can be used to help win an unwinnable fight?) No really. If they took money and spent it on the personal benefit of people related to the founders that might be fraud. This is essentially what happened in a non-profit purportedly established to help pay for a border wall. But using the money for a stated purpose of the entities that outsiders see as futile is probably not fraud or a violation of state regulation of entities that are not for profit. If there was such a way, would it be the state or federal government pursuing the case, or could any private actors have standing? A state attorney general's office generally has broad supervisory standing to confirm that entities which are not "for profit" are conforming to state law and their governing documents. Donors might have private causes of action for fraud if there were fraudulent misrepresentations made to secure funding that both the state AG and the Justice Department could also enforce criminally. But, the conduct described does not appear to be fraudulent. |
When does a retail flight simulator, or racing game, need to license aircraft or vehicles from their manufacturers? Supposing someone (whether an individual, small company like an indie game studio, or large game publisher with an established legal department (EA, Microsoft, etc)) wants to make a flight simulator product - or generic car racing game - featuring aircraft or vehicles from real-life (say, a Boeing 737 in a flight-sim, or Ford Focus in a rally-racing game)… Is it always required to obtain a license to use the aircraft/vehicle maker’s trademarks, even when used strictly nominatively, with attribution? My understanding is that nominative use does not require a license. …and to model an in-game/in-sim vehicle based on a real-life vehicle’s technical performance statistics? (But not necessarily its visual appearance or aesthetic likeness) My understanding is that technical specifications and performance/handling statistics are not “protected” by any IP law (besides database-rights, which don’t apply in this case). …and to have a recreation of a vehicle’s visual appearance or aesthetic design? My understanding is that in most cases this is required because the design of a car is copyrighted - but this doesn’t seem to be uniformly applicable in all situations: obviously the devs/publishers of Gran Turismo are going to license car designs from Ferrari and Porsche, but e.g. in games built on parody or satire, that such a license likely wouldn’t ever be given - but isn’t necessary due to legal protections for satire. But where is the line drawn between irreverence and satire? Why or when should the law distinguish between those types of games? What about military aircraft in flight simulators? There are plenty of serious, non-satire, games and simulators using the names, likeness, and specifications of dozens or more real-world aircraft, including aircraft for which are probably un-licensable due to their classified nature (such as the comprehensive set of enemy aircraft in EF 2000 and other flight sims from the early 1990s when formerly-Soviet aircraft makers were simply too culturally detached from western game-makers, assuming they could even be contacted at all, or even had legal departments concerned with media IP rights at all). …and what about megaprojects like 80,000+ tonne aircraft carriers or SSBNs that don’t have a single contractor or conceivably any copyright over their overall aesthetic design? | It is not per se necessary to license objects depicted in a video game. A 2020 court case has decided that the same rules apply to video games as to other forms of art. Just like you don't need to license every car on the road every time you take a picture of said road. Most court cases that are brought against non-licensed use of vehicles claim something other than simple use of the design, such as false implication of license or use of a trademark. Military vehicles enjoy less protection than civilian ones. The works of the US Federal Government, for one, are not copyrightable. The design of military vehicles is also a lot more functional rather than artistic. To claim copyright protection for a vehicle design, one would have to prove that the design wasn't driven by function - which is something military contractors for large projects definitely aren't hired to do. A carrier's or SSBN's shape, for instance, isn't copyrighted at all, because it's necessary for their performance. However, there are elements of real-world objects that would be protected by copyright against depiction in games. An accurate and detailed depiction of non-functional elements can be a copyright violation. Cases have been brought against artist tattoos on human models. A complex vinyl decal on a car can also be copyright-protected against depictions, but only to the extent that its depiction isn't necessary to keep the vehicle recognizable. For a big studio, licensing the vehicles can be simpler and cheaper than risking a need for a potential legal defense. It can also provide help from the manufacturer in recreating a detailed design, such as drawings and 3D models. But it is not strictly necessary. | The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage. | IP in Game Rules Game rules and other game "mechanics" are not protected by copyright. They are considered to be "ideas, methods or procedures". 17 USC 102(b) provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. If the wording of the rules is not the same, and no art or visual design was copied or imitated, the fact that the gameplay is the same does not afford any copyright claim. Claims of Similarity A comment from the OP says: I seek clarification on whether claiming the game is similar to the original would infringe on the original game's intellectual property. If the maker or distributor of the new game states that it is similar to the old game, something like "This is a Flower version of Monopoly." would that be any sort of IP infringement? Such a statement would in no way infringe any copyright. Would it infringe the trademark rights on the mark "Monopoly". That is harder to say. The key question in a trademark case is whether the use of a mark, or of words or images that refer to or suggest a mark, would cause reasonable people to falsely think that the new product or service is endorsed, sponsored, or approved by the makers of the old, or to falsely believe that the new product or service comes from the same source as the old one, that is, is made by the same firm or the same people. Whether a particular statement of similarity would do that is a question of fact, and would depend on the details of the statement and the overall presentation of the new game. But a disclaimer can and often does avoid a potential trademark infringement issue. A statement something like: FlowerPoly is not endorsed, approved, or sponsored by Hasbro, the makers of Monopoly, and holders of the trademark on that name. FlowerPoly was created by a completely different group of people. One should not rely on the reputation of Monopoly when deciding to purchase or play FlowerPoly. It would be wise to have the exact details of any statement of similarity, of any disclaimer, and of the name itself, reviewed by a lawyer with experience specifically in trademark law. In general, merely suggesting a similarity is not trademark infringement. Specifically, comparative advertising is not infringement. For example, a new drink could advertise that "NewCola is better than Cokle." That would not be an infringement of the trademark "Coke", because it makes clear that the products are different, and come from different sources. | The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience. | You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code. | This is an amusing idea, but ultimately it seems frivolous: How does one establish the physical presence of a corporation in a car? Yes, corporations have some of the legal rights and liabilities of people, but they are not people. And there are plenty of rights a person has that a corporation does not. For example (at present) a corporation can't be a party to a marriage. The closest a corporation comes to any corporal presence is the address listed of their agents. | Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board. | Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork. |
Is alcohol considered a date-rape drug? What if both parties were intoxicated? Background context Date rape is said to occur when one person uses drugs to incapacitate another person and then engages in sexual intercourse without their consent. It is generally understood that using pharmaceutical drugs to incapacitate someone for the purpose of sexual assault is a clear-cut case of date rape. However, what about the use of more common benign substances like alcohol? Can alcohol be considered a date-rape drug in certain situations? Question about this How does the law treat alcohol in cases of date rape? Is it treated in the same way as other pharmaceutical drugs, or is it handled differently? What happens in cases where both parties were under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of a sexual encounter, and the victim accuses the perpetrator of sexual assault? | canada In Canada, there are the separate offences of: sexual assault (premised on lack of consent, no matter by what means consent is lacking; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20) and administering a stupefying substance. If someone were to use a "substance such as everyday alcohol" (I would reject the premise that this is "benign") for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault, this would be an offence under s. 246 of the Criminal Code. Section 246 makes it an offence for a person, "with intent to enable or assist himself or another person to commit an indictable offence" to administer or cause any person to take a "stupefying or overpowering drug, matter, or thing." The Court of Appeal for Ontario has accepted that the element of administering a stupefying thing could be established by oversupply of alcohol. They have said that alcohol is a "stupefying substance" (R. v. Vant, 2015 ONCA 481) and can support a conviction under s. 246. "Date rape" has no legal significance and even criminologically, misframes the circumstances in which people experience sexual assualt. Further, your premise that intimate partner sexual assault "usually happens when someone uses narcotics to drug another into an unconscious state" is not supported by the evidence. While this is a criminological point, rather than a legal point, it is important context for understanding such crimes. This 2005 study estimated that 4.6% of intimate partner sexual assaults were facilitated by surreptitious drug use. These two fact sheets describe the variety of circumstances, completely unrelated to incapacitation by drugs, in which people experience intimate partner sexual assault/violence: Fredericton Sexual Assault Crisis Centre Info Sheet; Centre for Research & Education on Violence Against Women & Children Backgrounder on Intimate Partner Sexual Violence. | If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one. | Assuming that this wasn't a planned murder or assault, the most serious charge would be vehicular homicide. In the US, this is governed by state law, but states are not radically different in whether this is a crime. In Washington, under RCW 46.61.520, vehicular homicide is a class A felony, punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine The crimes is defined as causing death while driving (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502; or (b) In a reckless manner; or (c) With disregard for the safety of others. and such speeding is highly likely to be found to constitute the element of recklessness. There are also hit-and-run charges, which is a class B felony (10 years and $20,000). A person can be found guilty of both charges, and the judge can apply the prison sentences consecutively, meaning you add them up, rather than serve the jail time at the same time (in this case, essentially dispensing with the hit-and-run term). The law is written so that a killing is a crime, and if you kill two people that could be two charges (the question is whether there is a single act or two – most likely there was a single act in this particular case). There is no state where recklessly killing a person while driving is legal. First degree murder could be considered under 9A.32.030 if a person "Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". That kind of charge was applied to the Charlottesville driver, but it is highly unlikely to be applied to even the most extreme speeding. The actual penalty imposed depends on the sentencing laws of the state. In Washington there is a complex calculation based on the severity of the crime (16 degrees – vehicular homicide is level 11), prior criminal history, whether there are multiple convictions (vehicular homicide and hit-and-run). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances can also be considered to compute the actual sentence; I don't see any way for a non-specialist to guess what the actual penalty would be in this case. | The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions. | Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police. | In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney. | Unfortunately, the police are correct The limit on filing a civil claim (a lawsuit where you seek monetary compensation) is before you turn 40. If you were 11 in 1985 then it is too late to sue your assaulter. For criminal prosecution, the law was changed in 2016. Prior to the change, the limitation was the same as for civil cases. After the change, there is no limit but only if the offence was committed on or after 1 January 2017. Assuming that your reference to Kelly is to this guy - the alleged offences were committed in the 1990s and the prosecutions are under Illinois, Minnesota and Federal law (the Federal crimes alleged are not the sexual assault of a minor). Each state has it's own rules. | This depends on how you define drug. One possible and often attested origin of the word drug is middle low german droge waere "dried wares", which targets dried herbs and spices. Making such dried herbs is generally legal (except when the plant it is made from is illegal in the first place, see making controlled substances below). The more modern use is short for "pharmaceutical drug" as in any kind of medicine. To be allowed to create medicine, you need a (state) license as a pharmacist and FDA approval of your drug to be allowed to make your drug, so no, you can't make it at home, you need an FDA approved process in a laboratory or plant. You might also need a license from the current patentholder. Some chemicals that can be pharmaceutical drugs also used in other ways, or on their own. As Chemicals other laws might apply: Nitroglycerin is a heart stimulant and an explosive as well as an intermediate for producing other materials. It's production and sale is regulated as an explosive. Some raw materials are regulated too due to how they can be used or what danger they pose. The colloquial term drug is shorthand for illegal/controlled substance. Because the possession and manufacturing of such substances itself usually are illegal out of very very strict bounds, manufacturing it even without intent to use or sell it at home is, of course, illegal as you breach the extremely tight bounds of the law here. The intent is not part of a possession° crime but as an aggravating factor. You'll be convicted for illegal manufacturing & possession of a controlled substance under the Controlled Substance Act - or the applicable state law, maybe even both as Double Jeopardy does not apply to the same offense breaking the laws of two sovereigns (state and federal). Also, intent is not defined by what you want to do in drug law, it is defined by the amount you have - if you have more than a personal dose, it's automatically intent to distribute. Read further here There are at times exceptions that allow for pharmaceutical studies to create and/or use controlled substances in a very limited manner. |
Is it considered kidnapping if an underaged teenager willingly goes with someone else without the permission of their parent or guardian? I have often read about kidnapping charges being brought against a non-custodial parent during divorce or against an individual when a teenager runs away from home with their respective boyfriends or girlfriends. In criminal law, are the wishes of a minor typically taken into account or are they not considered at all until they reach the age of 18? Would non-violent incidents like this even be considered kidnapping at all in the court of law? | canada Summary The child's will or consent is relevant to a plain kidnapping charge. The child's will or consent is not relevant to abduction charges. This answer presents Canadian law for this body of offences, divided based on who is doing the taking (because of the specific offences created for abduction by a parent). Parent or guardian taking In Canada, a parent or guardian taking a child from the other parent implicates sections 279, 280, 282, and 283 of the Criminal Code. If the child is held against their will, this supports the offence of plain kidnapping under s. 279. This is an indictable offence (the higher of two categories of offences in Canada). Very young children will not possess the capacity to consent. Older children, even those younger than 14, may be capable of consent (see the discussion at paragraphs 401-417 of R. v. Al Aazawi, 2021 ABPC 155). If the child taken is under 16, the offence of abduction (not necessarily by a parent or guardian) of a person under 16 is available (s. 280). For this offence, the consent of the child is not relevant (explicitly stated at s. 286). It is considered an offence against the parent or guardian. If the taking is by a parent or guardian of a child under 14, then this supports an offence under s. 282 (abduction by a parent in contravention of custody or parenting order) or s. 283 (abduction by a parent in the absence of a custody or parenting order). Again, under these offences, the consent of the child is irrelevant (explicitly stated at s. 286). Sections 280, 282, and 283 create hybrid offences, punishable either by indictment (higher category of offence) or as a summary offence (lower category of offence). Often the age and circumstances of the taking may support multiple overlapping charges. See e.g. M.M. v. United States of America, 2015 SCC 62. That was an extradition case in which the corresponding Canadian charges were both s. 280 (abduction—by anyone—of a person under 16) and s. 282 (abduction by a parent in contravention of a custody or parenting order). Prosecution directives for this family of offences is available. E.g.: From the British Columbia Crown Counsel Policy Manual From a directive of the Attorney General published in the Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook Taking by someone other than a parent or guardian The same plain kidnapping offence will be available (s. 279) as will the offence of abducting a person under 16 (s. 280). However, there is an additional offence of abduction of a child under 14 (s. 281), also a hybrid offence. Again, the consent of the taken person is not relevant for the abduction offences (see s. 286), and the circumstances that give rise to an abduction offence are broader when the taken person is under 14 than when the taken person is merely under 16. A comparison of the elements of these two closely related offences can be found at paragraphs 17-24 of R. v. Gibson, 2018 BCSC 1869. Visualized Age of child Person taking Section < 14 parent/guardian s. 279 (if against will), s. 280 (general abduction), ss. 282, 283 (abduction by parent) < 14 non-parent/non-guardian s. 279 (if against will), s. 280 (general abduction), s. 281 (abduction by non-parent) < 16 anyone s. 279 (if against will), s. 280 (general abduction) any age anyone s. 279 (if against will) A defence Section 285 provides: No one shall be found guilty of an offence under sections 280 to 283 if the court is satisfied that the taking, enticing away, concealing, detaining, receiving or harbouring of any young person was necessary to protect the young person from danger of imminent harm or if the person charged with the offence was escaping from danger of imminent harm. | There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department. | Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation). | In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force. | From a US perspective, in a word, "no". Firstly, "presumption of innocence" is in a trial, not in police interactions. Being arrested does not violate the presumption of innocence. Police do not need any reason to interact with you or ask you questions. Police can arrest you if they have probable cause to suspect you have committed a crime, but this is not always necessary. More on this later(in the fourth section). Secondly, I wouldn't describe requesting to see your ticket, or any document as a "violent communication", in general. It may be rude or insulting, but not violent. (Also "violent communication" is not a legal term. The closest legal terms, verbal assault and threatening communication, are also not this.) More over, there is no indication of am implication of lying in this request. Thirdly, there are many situations in which possessing a document or credential is not sufficient; one must legally display or present them upon request. For example, multiple occupational licenses such as liquor licenses and barber/cosmetology licenses require that the licenses be prominently displayed; whereas, in California at least, a vehicle driver on a public road must not only possess their driver's license and proof of insurance, they must produce them upon the request of any law enforcement officer (Source: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffvr18). Fourthly, there are situations in which you can be legally searched and questioned without reasonable suspicion. Examples of this include boarder searches and sobriety checkpoints. Sources: (US Supreme Court rulings): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Martinez-Fuerte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_Police_v._Sitz A note on sources: bdb484 and I have opposing court case sources. My sources have binding precedent over all courts in the US, save the US Supreme Court, whereas theirs don't have any binding precedent, but are more directly on-topic. | The child does not have a legal right to determine how Iowa's compulsory education law is obeyed. The first section of the law says that the custodian of a child who is of compulsory attendance age shall cause the child to attend some public school or an accredited nonpublic school, or place the child under competent private instruction or independent private instruction and no other provision gives the child veto power. However, on the upper end, a child "under sixteen years of age by September 15 is of compulsory attendance age", with thus turning 16 during the school year being subject to compulsory education until the end of the school year". Let's say that the child turned 16 on Labor Day, then the compulsory education law does not apply. Still, until the age of majority, parents have the custodial right to make decisions in the best interests of the child. That right can be terminated, see Chapter 600a. Under certain circumstances, a child can petition the court for emancipation, which means that they will be treated as an adult under the law, and can therefore exercise their own judgment and live with the consequences. You would look at 600A.8 to see the grounds for termination – an objection "I don't like their choice of school" will not qualify. | What is emancipation of a minor? As I understand it, in some states in the US, a minor (i.e. younger than 18) who is at least 16 years old, can petition the state for emancipation; i.e. legal separation from their parents, and allowed to enter the world as a legal adult, despite being younger than 18. However, in order to be granted this, the minor must prove that they are capable of supporting themselves financially, that they have somewhere to live, and a few other things. This is true in some places, but not others. There are two different concepts for emancipation under U.S. law, and most states follow one or the other. One concept is that emancipation is a factual reality that exists when a minor is self-supporting or supported by a spouse or significant other, and not living in the household of a parent. In states that follow this concept, such as Colorado, a court ruling that a minor is emancipated is simply a finding of fact about what is, rather than a grant of permission. Another concept is that a minor is, as a matter of law, not emancipated until a court grants minor permission to deviate from the status implied by their age. My understanding that this is the concept used in California. In these jurisdictions, emancipation is granted only after an good faith attempt to give notice to the parents and a hearing, and involves an assessment of the capacity of the minor to be self-supporting without parental assistance and involvement. The question is focused on this concept, but it is not the only one and it is probably a close call as to which approach is the majority rule in U.S. states. Even in "permission" states, however, entering military service or marriage usually results in emancipation as a matter of law without any formal court proceeding. Common fact patterns There are certainly cases in which the fact that a minor is married or living in the household of a significant other as a stay at home parent would establish emancipation. Another fairly common fact pattern would be a employee whose employer also provides housing. Another fairly common fact pattern is a situation in which the whereabouts of the minor's parents are unknown and the minor has, somehow, been managing. Sometimes you see this when a minor's parents die and the minor goes on in an isolated wilderness area, for example. Adoption is indeed not an option Adoption is not possible without a termination of the rights of the parents (or at least one of them in the case of a stepparent adoption). The legal guardianship option The preferred arrangement when living basically as a child in a supportive adult's household would usually be a guardianship, to the detriment of the parent's role in most decision-making for the minor, rather than emancipation. Here are some quotes from a recent case from Colorado (In re Interest of A.D., 2023 COA 6 (January 19, 2023)), with that fact pattern: ¶ 2 L.D. is the sole living parent of A.D., one of her three children. A.D. was sixteen at the time of the guardianship proceeding. Although L.D. and A.D. once shared a healthy relationship, it deteriorated dramatically during the summer and fall of 2021. This deterioration gave rise to Petitioners’ request for — and the district court’s grant of — an unlimited guardianship over A.D. We turn to that history now. ¶ 3 In June 2021, A.D.’s car was vandalized while parked in front of the family home. A.D. and his mother had a heated argument about why it happened and who was responsible for cleaning it. Upset by this conversation, A.D. went to stay at his girlfriend’s house. Although he soon returned home, A.D. ran away from home five more times following disagreements with L.D. ¶ 4 In early July 2021, L.D. gave A.D. an ultimatum: he could (1) go to military school, (2) attend therapeutic boarding school, or (3) abide by her house rules. A.D. ran away again that night, but this 2 time he spent over a month away from home, staying with his girlfriend, couch surfing at friends’ homes, or sleeping in public parks. ¶ 5 On August 7, 2021, A.D. was taken to the emergency room after appearing to overdose while partying with friends at a park. The hospital made a mandatory report to the Department of Human Services (DHS). Once A.D. was stable, L.D. and V.T. (L.D.’s longtime colleague and family friend) met with a DHS representative to discuss next steps. L.D. agreed that, given the hostility between A.D. and herself, and between A.D. and his two siblings (who both lived with L.D.), it was in his best interest to stay with Petitioners. ¶ 6 On September 8, 2021, A.D. drove Petitioners’ car to L.D.’s house for his first night back since early July. When he arrived, L.D. became extremely upset that he had driven there. In her mind, A.D.’s operation of a car — and Petitioners’ facilitation of it — violated their agreement that he not drive until certain conditions were met. The next morning, without notice to Petitioners or her son, L.D. called the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and withdrew her permission for A.D.’s driver’s license. The DMV revoked his license the next day. ¶ 7 A.D. became enraged when he learned that his mother had revoked her consent and subsequently sent a series of angry texts to her. L.D. then blocked A.D.’s number, thus preventing A.D.’s calls or texts from coming through to L.D.’s phone (though texts came through on her computer). ¶ 8 On September 24, 2021, DHS facilitated an “adults only” meeting with L.D., Petitioners, and DHS representatives. That meeting resulted in three shared priorities: (1) Petitioners were to provide regular updates about A.D. to L.D., who would, in turn, communicate with Petitioners before making decisions affecting A.D.; (2) A.D.’s license would be reauthorized within thirty days once to-be-defined conditions were met; and (3) A.D. would be allowed to be on the high school wrestling team, which all parties agreed was good for him. ¶ 9 Over the next month, Petitioners regularly emailed L.D. updates on A.D. L.D. provided few, if any, responses to these updates. Petitioners also sent L.D. a proposed plan for A.D. to get his license back, but L.D. did not respond. ¶ 10 On October 20, 2021, Petitioners filed their petition for appointment as A.D.’s guardians. L.D. objected to the petition, sought dismissal of the action, and requested attorney fees. ¶ 11 On November 8, 2021, Petitioners requested that the court appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent A.D.’s interests. Over L.D.’s objection, the court appointed a GAL pursuant to section 15-14-115, C.R.S. 2022, after concluding that, owing to their disagreement over the guardianship, the parties could not represent A.D.’s best interest in the guardianship proceedings. The GAL represented A.D.’s best interest throughout the litigation, and the court also instructed the GAL to provide a report about whether L.D. was “unable to exercise her parental rights.” ¶ 12 On November 14, 2021, before Petitioners filed their reply, L.D. — without consulting Petitioners or A.D. — revoked her permission for A.D. to wrestle the day before the first day of practice. Why she took this sudden action is unclear: L.D. testified it was because A.D. was not maintaining passing grades, while another witness testified that she wanted “leverage” over him to participate in family therapy. Regardless, A.D. was devastated by the timing and nature of this action. ¶ 13 While these motions were pending, Petitioners continued to care for A.D. Petitioners asked L.D. for permission to talk to A.D.’s teachers, coaches, and doctors about how to better care for him. Yet from August to early December 2021, L.D. refused to grant Petitioners permission to engage with these individuals. She ignored or outright refused to allow such communications until December 8, 2021, when, after repeated requests from a DHS representative, she allowed Petitioners to attend — but not participate in — a meeting with A.D.’s teachers. ¶ 14 L.D. also resisted Petitioners’ requests for financial support for A.D.’s care. To her credit, L.D. provided A.D. with $25 per week for groceries. These funds came from A.D.’s $1,800 monthly survivorship benefit, which was established following the death of A.D.’s father when A.D. was three. Petitioners knew the benefit existed and requested more financial support. L.D. did not respond to these requests. ¶ 15 Except for the text exchange between L.D. and A.D. following the revocation of L.D.’s consent for A.D.’s license, L.D. and A.D. never communicated directly. Instead, all such communications went through Petitioners or DHS. ¶ 16 Consistent with section 15-14-205(1), C.R.S. 2022, the district court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ guardianship motion. The hearing spanned two days, with both sides calling numerous witnesses. ¶ 17 In a written order, the court granted Petitioners an unlimited guardianship over A.D. In so doing, the court concluded that Petitioners had proved by clear and convincing evidence that L.D. was, consistent with section 15-14-204(2)(c), “unwilling or unable” to care for A.D. and that the guardianship was in A.D.’s best interest notwithstanding his mother’s opposition to it. The linked appellate court decision then goes on to conduct legal analysis and affirms the trial court's ruling as correct. The official syllabus of the case summarizes that part of the opinion as follows: A division of the court of appeals reviews the guardianship appointment for a minor under section 15-14-204(2)(c), C.R.S. 2022. In so doing, the division adopts the analytical framework outlined in In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2010). Applying that framework to section 15-14- 204(2)(c), the division concludes that the moving party must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is (1) “unable or unwilling” to exercise their parental rights, and (2) the guardianship is in the best interest of the minor notwithstanding the parent(s)’ opposition to the guardianship. Moreover, in entering such an order, the court must articulate the “special factors” it relies upon to justify this interference with parental rights. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Utilizing that framework here, the division concludes that the court did not err in appointing a guardian for the minor. | I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.) |
Have there been any efforts to standardize the definitions of "Attempted Aggravated Assault" and "Attempted Murder"? As far as I know, the key difference between "Attempt Aggravated Assault" and "Attempted Murder" is whether or not the prosecution can prove that the perpetrator intended to kill someone. However, the requirement for proving intent has led to a lot of inconsistency in how these types of violent crimes are classified in practice. Has there been any effort in any legal system to standardize the difference between attempted assault and attempted murder? For example, by creating a specific category for attempted violent crimes, perhaps calling it a "violent attempt at harm"? | united-states The Model Penal Code (by the American Law Institute) is a standardized code that individual states can draw from. Many states' criminal law is based at least in part on this code. The MPC provides definitions for aggravated assault, murder, and attempts. In general, crimes do not fit into a neat taxonomy structure with more severe ones being strict subsets of less severe or less specific ones. Sometimes, the definitions, or the manner in which offences are charged in a particular circumstance, will create such a relationship, but this is not inherent in the structure of the code. Other statutes do define umbrella terms that might be relevant to what you're thinking of. For example the Armed Career Criminal Act provides for sentencing enhancements after numerous convictions for "violent felonies." That term has been interpreted several times by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether it captured specific state crimes. | The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, "and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter." | Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the "outside of reach" rather than "outside of claim of reach" situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care. | The mere presence of a conditional isn't a determining factor, but the context of the conditional can be a contributing factor in determining whether the threat is true or not. See a more recent publication from 2003 for a better understanding of those factors. I definitely wouldn't rely on anything from the 1600s as a reliable source. Back in the old days a threat was essentially the same as an assault, but nowadays we often view threats and assaults more distinctly and have crafted more specific laws to address them. Just as an "arrest" was once used to describe a seizure of any kind regardless of the duration, more modern case laws have established distinctions between arrests (full-custody seizures) and detentions (temporary, short-duration seizures). Since most jurisdictions in the US now have a separate statute for addressing threats in order to distinguish them from assaults, we have to read the exact verbiage of each state to determine whether it covers the particulars of the threat. Here are a few examples. Note the similarities and differences in each: Arizona: Threatening or Intimidating Texas: Terroristic Threat New York: Menacing As you yourself pointed out, simply making a threat isn't necessarily mala en se, and there are times where the law explicitly allows for people to issue threats, particularly when it comes to defending themselves, another person, or their property. For example, in Arizona, ARS 13-407 allows a person to issue a threat of deadly force to defend their property against trespassers, but does not allow them to actually use deadly force to do so. This means that Arizonans who find themselves in a situation where they feel it necessary to issue a conditional threat to an intruder ("leave my property right now or I'll shoot you"), must understand that the threat is empty unless the intruder shifts his focus from mere trespassing to harming a person. (The bad guy doesn't need to know this though, and all the better if he doesn't.) Even though the threat is empty according to the issuer's knowledge, it is still a threat, albeit one that the issuer is legally entitled to make. In this situation, the threat to use deadly force is decriminalized, not because it contained a conditional, but rather because it was explicitly authorized by law. In practice, many jurisdictions, especially ones with high crime rates, have arbitrarily decided to triage threats cases based on whether they include a conditional statement or not. After all, if you have 1,000 cases a month and a team of only 30 prosecutors, you have to prioritize the cases that are easiest to prove. With that in mind, many prosecutors offices have provided direction to their law enforcement partners to only submit cases that include unconditional threats. Those agencies in turn train their officers to ignore any threats cases involving conditional threats, perpetuating the misunderstanding that a conditional automatically negates a threat as being a true threat. There are literally thousands of cases where offenders have had their convictions upheld for crimes involving conditional threats. Just think of robbery/carjacking: A man walks up to a victim in a parking lot and says "give me your car or I'll kill you. Despite containing a conditional threat, there isn't a prosecutor or jury in the country that wouldn't instantly recognize this as a true threat and an element of robbery/carjacking. Conditional Intent to Kill is Enough for Federal Carjacking Conviction. | Legal Context This kind of argument is often called a "defense of others" defense which is available in every jurisdiction of which I am aware. Almost every state has a specific description of when this is permitted as part of their criminal code, usually in a general principles section at the beginning, or in the sections pertaining to crimes of violence. Some details vary from one state to another, but none of the facts presented in this hypothetical really push the envelope in terms of distinctions between one state's law and another. Most of the differences involve situations when the use of deadly force is allowed. For example, states differ regarding when deadly force allowed to prevent a burglary of your home or business which is in progress, particularly if it is possible to avoid a use of deadly force at all by retreating in a manner that puts you at no one at any significant risk of bodily injury. But, the scenario presented does not appear to involve the use of deadly force (although the definition of "deadly force" can be slippery and lead to some subtle variations in what is permitted from state to state). Another common nuance of variation between states involves the circumstances under which physical force or deadly physical force is authorized to make a citizens arrest, but this situation is also not implicated by your hypothetical. Once Thug is beat up, the scenario ends without any effort to detain Thug until the police arrive. Generally speaking, a defense of others defense that justifies a use of force under criminal law will also not give rise to civil liability in a lawsuit for assault and battery as opposed to a criminal prosecution for it. A Sample Defense Of Others Statute The pertinent section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016), strongly influenced by the language of the Model Penal Code (which never adopted in full by any state but highly influential stylistically in how U.S. criminal codes are drafted) is very typical of the majority rule regarding the defense of others and reads as follows (emphasizing the language relevant to the scenario in the question): § 18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204 ; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He is the initial aggressor; except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. Analysis of the Hypothetical Facts Is Paul guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug, or would self-defense or some other standard defense apply? Paul is probably not guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug because a defense of others defense justifies his actions. Paul is using physical force to defend a third person (and presumably himself as well once once he is involved in the fray) from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by Thug, and generally, under those circumstances Paul may use a degree of force which Paul reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. Paul is most vulnerable in this scenario on the question of whether he reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was reasonably necessary for the purpose of defending Emily and himself from Thug's unlawful use of physical force, or whether he went further than what was reasonably necessary for a few minutes that left Thug "incapacitated and thoroughly bloodied". For example, suppose that Paul had already caused Thug to try to flee the scene after the first minute at which point Thug was slightly bruised and afraid of Paul, but was not at all incapacitated. But, suppose that despite this fact that Paul, awash with adrenaline from the fight, continued to pummel Thug for a couple more minutes as Thug repeatedly tried to flee the scene only to be dragged back by Paul. Suppose that Paul continued the fight after it was no longer necessary because Paul wanted to punish Thug for his mistreatment of Emily and to discourage other people from trying to attack Emily in the future, even after Paul knew that there was already no real risk that Thug himself would continue to use unlawful physical force against Emily no or in the near future. Under these circumstances, which aren't inconsistent with the hypothetical facts, if this extra couple of minutes caused Thug to be much more badly injured than he otherwise would have been if Thug had been allowed to flee after the first minute, then Paul could still be guilty of assault and battery, even though his actions were legally justified for the first minute of the fight. There is no indication that either Paul or Emily provoked the attack on Emily, or that either Paul or Emily was the initial aggressor, or that this was actually a pre-agreed dueling situation. So each of these circumstances which would be exceptions to the general rule that the defense of others is justified do not apply to this case. There is likewise no indication that Paul used "deadly force" as opposed to mere "physical force" in handling the situation. It is likely that Paul would have committed a crime if he had shot and killed Thug instead of beating him up, if Paul knew perfectly well at the time that he was capable of beating up Thug and making Thug go away for good as a result without resorting to a firearm, unless the attack on Emily was severe enough for Paul to reasonably believe that the attack was putting Emily at a real risk of serious bodily injury. | Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it. | JeffUK has quoted the relevant law. However the question then becomes "what is an 'offensive weapon'", and "what is a lawful excuse?". Almost anything can be classified as an offensive weapon if you can use it as a weapon. See https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q338.htm A lawful excuse is something like "I am going to play baseball, which is why I have a baseball bat". It is emphatically not "I want it for self defence". Specifically, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offensive-weapons-knives-bladed-and-pointed-articles cites Patterson v Block [1984] 81 LSG 2458 – carrying a weapon for defence can still amount to intent to cause injury So the answer to the OP's original question: Is it legal for a private citizen to carry any kind of weapon for self defence purposes in the UK? is "No". | canada Maybe it is unsatisfying, but there is no bright line test. The statutory language The Criminal Code says: The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law. Some judicial expressions "[A] precise and satisfactory definition of the actus reus is perhaps impossible." And "[n]o abstract test can be given for determining whether an act is insufficiently proximate to be an attempt." See R. v. Cline (1956), 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.): The consummation of a crime usually comprises a series of acts which have their genesis in an idea to do a criminal act; the idea develops to a decision to do that act; a plan may be made for putting that decision into effect; the next step may be preparation only for carrying out the intention and plan; but when that preparation is in fact fully completed, the next step in the series of acts doen by the accused for the purpose and with the intention of committing the crime as planned cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as remote in its connection with that crime. The connection is in fact proximate. Here is a summary from R. v. Root, 2008 ONCA 869, citations removed: [96] The authorities have yet to develop a satisfactory general criterion to assist trial judges in making the crucial distinction between mere preparation, on the one hand, and an attempt on the other. We leave the determination of where on the continuum the conduct lies to the common sense judgment of trial judges. [97] The distinction between preparation and attempt is a qualitative one involving the relationship between the nature and quality of the act said to constitute the attempt and the nature of the substantive offence attempted in its complete form. [98] To determine on which side of the preparation/attempt divide an accused’s conduct falls, a trial judge should consider the relative proximity of that conduct to the conduct required to amount to the completed substantive offence. Relevant factors would include time, location and acts under the control of the accused yet to be accomplished. [99] Relative proximity may give an act, which might otherwise seem to be mere preparation, the quality of an attempt. Further, an act on its face an act of commission does not lose its quality as the actus reus of an attempt simply because further acts are required, or because a significant period of time may elapse before the completion of the substantive offence. [100] To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, the act of an accused need not be the last act before the completion of the substantive offence. To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, an act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to amount to more than mere preparation to commit it. This requirement of proximity, expressed in the divide between preparation and attempt, has to do with the sequence of events leading to the crime that an accused has in mind to commit. To be guilty of an attempt, an accused must have progressed a sufficient distance (beyond mere preparation) down the intended path. An act is proximate if it is the first of a series of similar or related acts intended to result cumulatively in a substantive crime. |
Is "use of force" the same thing as "use of physical force"? Are there examples of types of force that are not physical? According to the dictionary, the definition of rape is the following: Unlawful sexual activity and usually sexual intercourse carried out forcibly or under threat of injury against a person's will or with a person who is beneath a certain age or incapable of valid consent because of mental illness, mental deficiency, intoxication, unconsciousness, or deception. My question focuses around the usage of the term "forcibly". In this context, is "use of force" and "use of physical force" synonyms? Are there any other notable instances of non-physical force in the legal system? Be advised that my question is not about sexual assault - that was just an offhand example of a violent crime. | No and yes respectively Force in general refers to acting under a compulsion. Physical force is specific that the compulsion arises from violence or physical power. Examples of non-physical force include: Legal obligation: the witness was forced to answer the question. Blackmail: the victim was forced to pay the ransom to the hacker. Contractural: after his car fell in the river, he was still forced to make the payments. Ethical: despite vowing to never have children the tragic death of her brother forced her into the unexpected role of mother to her niece and nephew. | Is mere accusation without evidence other than testimony of the accuser, grounds for arrest in the UK? It depends on the circumstances, especially when dealing with non-recent allegations where independent and corroborative evidence may be difficult to locate and/or recover, but in my experience it is very rarely an option to arrest soley on the say-so of one complainant unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It's also fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a prime example of when it can go horribly wrong. Also, no-one can "call the police and have someone arrested" in the united-kingdom - the police are under a duty to carry out a "proportionate investigation" in to allegations of crime and then make their own minds up on how to proceed based on the available intelligence and evidence. Focussing on england-and-wales, the most commonly used power of arrest* is at s.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which, along with PACE Code G, requires an officer to: Reasonably suspect that an offence is being, has been or will be committed. On a scale of 0 to 10 - with 10 being total knowledge and 0 being no opinion at all - suspicion may be as low as 2 or 3 whereas belief starts at 7 or 8. And reasonably believe an arrest is necessary. One commonly used mnemonic for the Necessity Test under s.24 is: ID COP PLAN: Investigation - prompt and effective investigation of offence or conduct Disappearance - prevent prosecution being hindered by disappearance of a person Child / Vulnerable person - protection of Obstruction of highway Physical injury to themselves or someone else Public (in)decency Loss or damage to property Address not know Name not known I cannot say why the officer did not make an arrest in the OP's case. I surmise that he did not deem it necessary based on the above mandatory criteria but rather considered that a voluntary attendance interview would be the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances and information available to him at the time. *There are other statutory and common-law powers of arrest, but they all follow the same procedures as above | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | If the conditions at s.17 and s.24 PACE 1984, and PACE Code G are satisfied for the offence of rape then there is no requirement for a warrant. Once the suspect is in police custody he may be further arrested for suspected harrassment if any of the necessity criteria are met - this will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. An either way offence is, for these purposes, regarded as an indictable offence. A constable does not need to physically see an offence being committed, but he must have (a) reasonable grounds to suspect an offence has been committed (b) reasonable grounds to believe an arrest is necessary (c) the requesit belief to satisfy s.17 PACE 1984. All this will come from conducting a proportionate investigation in to the allegations. | TL;DR No Context Let's look at what the Act actually says: 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. ... (4)A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if— (a)it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or (b)it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities. ... And let's look at what the Cheshire Police actually say: You/they may be in an emotionally abusive relationship if your/their partner: ... Punishes you by withholding affection ... You/they may be in a sexually abusive relationship if your/their partner: ... Has ever forced or manipulated you into to having sex or performing sexual acts ... Demands sex when you're sick, tired or after beating you ... Ignores your feelings regarding sex. Discussion The Act requires the behavior to be engaged in "repeatedly or continuously" and it must have "a serious effect", meaning it must cause "serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities". The withholding of sex of itself does not have "a serious effect" as defined. As part of a broader pattern of emotional "controlling or coercive behaviour" within the broad context of "withholding affection" it could be a factor in evidence but the law recognizes an absolute right for anyone at any time to refuse sex (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s4). The latter part of the Cheshire Police's advice draws from this. | The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense. | Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else. | Yes, but the difference is in nuance, not substance Illegal means “not according to or authorized by law” and lists unlawful as a synonym. Unlawful means “not lawful” with illegal as a synonym. So, by definition, they mean the same thing and can be used interchangeably. Illegal does carry a slight hint of being more egregious than unlawful and would be more often used of criminality than of a parking offense but it’s not wrong to use them interchangeably. |
Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to different charges in the same case? For example, consider a serial killer who sexually assaults their victims before killing them. For the sake of argument, let's say that the prosecutors are not able to successfully charge the serial killer with murder the first time around. Later, investigators discover that the victims were raped before being killed. Could the prosecutors bring a new criminal case against the original perpetrator for rape, or would the principle of double jeopardy protect them from further prosecution? | Double jeopardy does not apply to different offences [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... The Supreme Court has held that it means what it says - murder and rape are different offences and so the double jeopardy clause is not triggered. However, if an offence requires that the same elements (or a subset of them) be proved, then they are the same offence. So, for example, both murder and rape normally incorporate the elements of common assault - a person acquitted of either murder or rape cannot subsequently be charged with common assault. Further, the principle of res judicata applies to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Therefore any fact or issue of law that was decided in the first trial cannot be reagitated in the second. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | Generally speaking if it is substantively unconstitutional for the government to punish a certain kind of criminal conduct, then this provides a basis for a "collateral attack" on the conviction to set it aside (in a post-conviction motion in state or federal court), even if the criminal defendant serving a sentence has already appealed the conviction directly (i.e. to the court of appeals and all higher appellate court that review that court of appeals) to the fullest extent possible and lost. But this is not self-executing. Someone has to file a court case on behalf of the person incarcerated to make it happen. It does not generally entitle the criminal defendant to compensation for wrongful incarceration or to a return of fines paid, although it would end the authority of the state to incarcerate the individual going forward or the compel that individual to pay the balance of unpaid fines. There might be a right to have the case sealed, but the ruling does not automatically remove the conviction from the criminal record of the defendant. And, getting the case sealed is likely to be harder in the circumstance where all of the sentence for the unconstitutional offense has been fully served. When a past conviction does not meet the standards of current law from a procedural context, in contrast, this may be raised in pending direct appeals, but is rarely something that can be brought up in a post-decision collateral attack on the conviction unless certain other exceptions apply (e.g. sometimes if a collateral attack pending before the decision is still pending at the time of the decision or in certain extraordinary cases involving due process concerns that cast deep doubt on the validity of all convictions obtained by that means), and even in cases where it is set aside, does not pose a double jeopardy bar against a new prosecution for the crime that meets the appropriate procedural standards. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the proper treatment under these rules of its holding that non-unanimous juries were an unconstitutional manner by which to convict someone of a felony, which is a procedural rule, but may fall within the exception that makes the new rule retroactive anyway. For cases on direct review, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past Justice Harlan's habeas approach was first adopted by a plurality in Teague v. Lane and then by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh. Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court criminal convictions, the general rule is that new rules of constitutional interpretation—those not 'dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final'—will not be applied. However, [a] new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 'watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Put another way, a new rule will be applied in a collateral proceeding only if it places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to prescribe or constitutes a new procedure[ ] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court extended the holding of Teague beyond the context of federal habeas review, such that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, state collateral review courts must give retroactive effect to that rule in the same manner as federal courts engaging in habeas review. As a result, at least with regard to the first exception, the Court has held that the Teague rule is constitutionally based, as substantive rules set forth categorical guarantees that place certain laws and punishments beyond a state’s power, making the resulting conviction or sentence . . . by definition . . . unlawful. In contrast, procedural rules are those that are aimed at enhancing the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant’s guilt. As a consequence, with respect to a defendant who did not receive the benefit of a new procedural rule, the possibility exists that the underlying conviction or sentence may still be accurate and the defendant’s continued confinement may still be lawful under the Constitution. In this vein, the Court has described a substantive rule as one that alters the range of conduct that the law punishes, or that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Under the second exception it is not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of a trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. From here. | Generally (at least in the US), you cannot file criminal charges unless you are a prosecutor. Criminal charges are brought by the state on behalf of society as a whole; the goal of criminal charges is not to help or compensate the victim, it's to punish the offender and benefit society. The victim will often obtain restitution payments, but they are pretty much bolted on to a procedure not focused on compensating the victim. For instance, if the AG decides to drop charges (which they can do at any point), the charges are dropped. Instead of picking one or the other, you can do both. After the criminal case, if you want, you can file in small claims. You can't collect double, but since they have totally different purposes you don't have to do one or the other. | No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit. | It would depends on the laws of the particular state, since each state has its own laws pertaining to voting. The law in North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §163-275(7), says that it is unlawful For any person with intent to commit a fraud to register or vote at more than one precinct or more than one time, or to induce another to do so, in the same primary or election, or to vote illegally at any primary or election The corresponding jury instruction says what it means to have an intent to commit a fraud: Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. You arrive at the intent of a person by such just and reasonable deductions from the circumstances proven as a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily draw therefrom. Specific intent is a mental purpose, aim or design to accomplish a specific harm or result. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant voted more than one time in the same election event, the (name election event or contest),and that defendant did so with the intent to commit a fraud, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty The prosecution would presumably construct an argument that the defendant intended that is vote be counted twice, and if they can prove that intent, then the jury should convict. Defense could argue that the intent was based on a reasonable belief that their absentee ballot was not counted thus disenfranchising defendant, and defendant acted with the lawful intent that their vote be counted, once. Because NC law contains procedural provisions to filter out double-voting, defendant can reasonably have a non-criminal intent, even if they are mistaken about the efficacy of those safeguards. However, the Ohio law does not carry an intent element: (A) No person shall do any of the following: ... (2) Vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election by any means, including voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by regular ballot at the polls at the same election, or voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3509. or armed service absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3511. of the Revised Code at the same election; This doesn't even require that you know that you are voting twice. So it depends on the particular law of the state. | This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions. | Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future. |
Blackmail is illegal, but how is that enforced in practice? As I'm sure you are aware, blackmail is illegal. However, I am curious about how this would be enforced in a real-world scenario. Could any lawyers provide some insight on this? For example, if I killed someone or my company is committing significant fraud or tax evasion, and someone threatens to reveal this information unless I help them with something, this would be considered blackmail. However, if you were in this situation, what could you even do? Report the person to the police and potentially face consequences yourself? What are the practical implications of blackmail being illegal? | Canadian law defines a crime of extortion, but not blackmail. An alternative theory of "blackmail" is that it is coercion. This is the law against extortion in Canada. We start with the definition of extortion, §346 (1) Every one commits extortion who, without reasonable justification or excuse and with intent to obtain anything, by threats, accusations, menaces or violence induces or attempts to induce any person, whether or not he is the person threatened, accused or menaced or to whom violence is shown, to do anything or cause anything to be done. To simplify, one person makes another person do something using threats, accusations or violence and doesn't have a good reason to do so. A parent can altruistically threaten to write a child out of their will if the child doesn't stop taking heroin: that's a good reason, so that is not extortion. If you threaten to turn a murderer in to the police unless they give to $1,000, that is extortion. However, the law also provides that "A threat to institute civil proceedings is not a threat for the purposes of this section". It is legal to threaten to sue the pants off of a person if they don't settle for some cash reward. The wording of the law is very broad and it's not obvious from the wording of the statute where the line is drawn. These guys give a number of examples of acts leading to convictions: A teenager who said he would bring an AK-47 to school and shooting people unless he was compensated for his damaged vape; A man who was found to have implied violence by asking for money and stating that ‘things will get a lot worse’, and ‘if you can’t pay with money you’ll have to pay with something else’ if he didn’t receive it; Three men who were accused of threatening, harassing, intimidating, and extorting a man who tried to start a new chapter of a Montreal-based Motorcycle club; A man who allegedly committed acts including arson, telephone threats, molotov cocktails, and paintball-gun shootings against his former business associates; A man who threatened to post nude pictures of people on social media unless paid; A man who pretended to be a photographer and threatened to send nude pictures to family or pornorgraphic magazines unless sexual favours were granted; A person who threatened to sell a story to a newspaper unless the victim paid a sum of money (the story regarded the victim’s recent conviction); A woman who threatened to send a letter to another woman’s employer unless the other woman repaid a debt she owed As they say, "the threat must go beyond what a reasonable person in the accused’s situation would view as a legitimate means": the issue is dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In case you murder someone or commit tax fraud, and another person threatens to turn you in if you don't {pay them / mow their lawn}, the law takes the position that you should turn yourself in, provide the evidence to the police, and the police will prosecute the other person for extortion. There is no "I was blackmailed" get out of jail defense. One practical implication of the law is that you can't extort a person because they committed a crime: instead, you are expected to just turn them (and the evidence) in to the police – that's your civic duty. You can also hold your tongue: what you can't do is extort the other criminal. | "Revenge" is not a legal concept. If you injure someone other than in self defence or for another legal reason than you are committing assault. Hence dangerous booby traps for trespassers are illegal, so anything that might cause injury, however minor, is definitely out. That includes itching powder. However I would make an analogy with anti-climb paint. This allows you to use a paint that damages clothing provided you put up warning signs. So if you were to leave a parcel coated with anti-climb paint or containing a bag of paint or glitter rigged to spill it over the person opening it then that would be legal as long as there was a warning that tampering may cause property damage. (Note "spill", not "squirt" or "splash": anything ejecting paint or glitter under pressure might get it in someone's eyes, causing injury). So your friend could put a notice up saying that unauthorised tampering with parcels could cause damage to property and then put out parcels that might do exactly that. Your friend could also put a GPS tracker in a parcel to try to find out where they are going. Update Here is someone who did this. The BBC story does not mention any legal issues for him. A former Nasa [sic] engineer spent six months building a glitter bomb trap to trick thieves after some parcels were stolen from his doorstep. The device, hidden in an Apple Homepod box, used four smartphones, a circuit board and 1lb (453g) of glitter. Mark Rober, who is now a Youtuber, caught the original thieves on his home security camera. [...] The former Nasa engineer said: "If anyone was going to make a revenge bait package and over-engineer the crap out of it, it was going to be me." | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law. | Generally speaking, what isn't illegal by law is legal. It's possible for law enforcement agencies to share crime rates, maps, and their data, but within any laws regarding access and sharing of that data. Such crime data may be publicly available, but that depends on local and state laws. The local or state agency would have to enter into a legal licensing agreement - if local and state laws allow such sharing - with the GPS company to provide the data, update it, and reasonably assure that it is accurate. The more realistic reason GPS systems might choose to not show crime data may be public relations. If a GPS user lives in an area that has been objectively identified by data as having a higher than baseline crime rate, i.e. for carjackings, that user may not be very happy with that designation. Worse, what happens to public relations when data errors show an area is wrongfully identified as high crime? What kinds of lawsuits could result? Real estate agents suing since bad data from a GPS unit soured the sale of a house? | You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole. | No. It is illegal to hire someone to kill someone else. Even if the killer enjoys diplomatic immunity, the person hiring the killer has committed a crime. As to your last paragraph, that is properly a separate question, but the answer is that they can't do it because murder is illegal. | Although your "title" may not of itself have legal force, that doesn't necessarily mean you can do as you please in every situation without fear of liability. For example, if you falsely claim to be a medical doctor or lawyer, you could find yourself liable for civil damages to defrauded clients; you may also violate criminal laws. (An anonymous bureaucratic form probably won't create that problem, because as another answerer pointed out nobody really cares or pays attention to titles most of the time. But stranger things have happened; and by "form" you could mean "tax form" or some declaration made under penalty of perjury. Lawyers generally avoid blanket "that's fine" answers, because there are almost always many ways that it might not be fine.) |
How will the Trump administration ban TikTok, and are there any limitations on the use of these mechanisms against other companies? Background context The Trump administration recently announced plans to ban the social media app TikTok. The administration claims this is for national security reasons, alleging that TikTok is an agent of the Chinese Communist Party. TikTok denies these claims and has provided statistics about American ownership and employment. As a result, TikTok is currently for sale in the financial markets, with potential buyers including Microsoft and other tech giants. Question about this What specific legal mechanisms will the Trump administration use to enforce the TikTok ban? What conditions must be met for the executive branch of the government to use these mechanisms to ban TikTok, and can these mechanisms be used arbitrarily by the President or future Presidents? Do the same laws apply to domestic companies? Is it possible that these mechanisms could be used in the future to select winners and losers in the tech industry at the President's personal discretion? | The authority for the ban is laid out here: all that is required is putting the company on the Commerce Department's entity list. More specifically, under 50 USC 1701 there must be an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat If that condition is satisfied (and it has been: we have the emergency), then 50 USC 1702 grants POTUS broad economic powers, including prohibiting transactions in foreign exchange, or any kind of transaction involving any right regarding any property. Under that order, one implementational step for putting a company on the list is an executive review involving the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies There must be a determination that the transaction involves information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and that the transaction "is a threat". This last requirement is the tallest hurdle that a Twitter-ban would face, namely establishing that Twitter is controlled by a foreign adversary. | You can put anything you like in a ToS document, but not everything you might put there will be enforceable. By posting something on the web, you are inviting anyone to read it. In some jurisdictions that may include the right to make and store a personal copy, although not multiple copies or a copy for commercial use. You can taker technical measures to prevent automated access and automated downloads (scraping). There was a case (hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019)) in which access restrictions were held binding in a US court, but in that case the site owner had notified the would-be reuser (a competitor) directly. The laws on this sort of thing may differ from country to country, and are not as well-settled as older parts of the law tend to be. The question asks: can I list in my terms of service that all users acknowledge I own their posts ... The only way in which the host could "own" the posts would be if the users transferred copyright to the host, or granted the host an exclusive license. Under US law this would take a written and signed document. Clicking an "I agree" box or button might constitute a valid signature. A statement that "by using this site you agree ..." would pretty clearly not. You might prohibit bots copying from your site and posting duplicates, but to prohibit users re-posting their own messages elsewhere is harder, legally, and leas reasonable in my view. Under US law you could not actually file suit for copyright infringement until you had registered the copyright, but that is not true in many other countries. | First, read the definitions of defamation and libel be sure you understand them: Defamation | Wex Legal Dictionary | Cornell. Yes, posting to Twitter and Reddit is publishing, and people can post provably false facts on those services and defame someone in a civil law sense. But Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Electronic Frontier Foundation) mostly protects those services from defamation claims based on statements made by users of such a service. (Things are different if the case is criminal as a result of clear threats of violence, terrorism, etc.) ...what are the steps for them to exact damages in a civil court case? Find a lawyer, convince him/her to take the case, and file suit. if you don't know the person's real name, your lawyer will have to sue "John Doe" and point that out in the suit (and subpoenas) with the alleged Twitter handle or Reddit user name. How would a person compel Twitter/Reddit/etc to disclose the ISP information on their account? Read the various legal aspects of each service, i.e. Twitter Legal FAQs and User Agreement - Reddit and others. Your lawyer can explain that you can only try to compel them to disclose the IP and the ISP used with a subpoena during your lawsuit. How would a person compel an ISP to disclose the subscriber information (address, name) on the IP address? Since most ISPs protect their customer data, you will probably have to subpoena the ISP during your lawsuit. But your ability to do this can depend on if the ISP is a private company or a government entity, such as a university. State laws may come into play. Is obtaining the ISP subscriber's information enough to bring a lawsuit against them? Would they able to argue they didn't post the messages and bear no liability, even if it originated from their network? If it originated from an open wifi hotspot, would the proprietor bear responsibility at this point? Yes, you can sue an individual with such information; but there's no guarantee you'd win. Sure, because they can claim anything, such as someone else was using their computer or IP. No, owners of hotspots are generally not liable, and they protect themselves with TOS you agree to when you use the hotspot. Can the extensive legal costs of pursuing the case to it's conclusion be added to the damages sought easily? Legal costs can possibly be added, depending on jurisdiction. But seeking damages and actually winning them through a jury verdict are completely different things. | The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument. | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. | If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database. | The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. |
Do countries that are not members of the Berne Convention still enjoy the benefits it provides? The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, usually known as the Berne Convention, is an international agreement governing copyright, which was first accepted in Berne, Switzerland, in 1886. Although widely recognized around the world, there are still some countries that are not signatories to the Berne Convention. For example: Palestine, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, etc. What would happen if an Iranian artist or designer's work is plagiarized by an American company, would they still be protected by the Berne Convention? What if the aforementioned creative individual later moves to a country that is a member of the Berne Convention? Would there be retrospective application? | No The Berne Convention requires member states to afford copyright protection equal to their own to works from other member states. A work first published only in non-member state(s) and by citizen(s) of non-member state(s) is not required to be given such protection but such protection is not prohibited either. A work can not acquire copyright retrospectively if it didn’t have it on creation. | Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database. | copyright will cover the names and graphics of games The names of games are not protected by copyright, nor by patent. The names could be protected by trademark. Note that trademarks are specific to a country: what is trademarked in one country may well not be in another. Almost all countries have a way to search their trademark registries, often online. However in some countries, including the US, use of a name in commerce will confer some protection even without registration. What will be considered a "mechanic"? for example MTG have specific mana system, if someone will be creating a game with same idea but will refer to it with other names such as "Ember" instead of "Fire" will it violate the patent? Game mechanics are not protected by copyright. This includes all the procedures and rules of the game. The text used to express those rules may be protected, but often it is not if it is the most obvious way to describe the mechanics. For example, in chess there are different pieces with different moves. That could not be protected by copyright, even if chess were a new game. In bridge the winner of each trick leads to the next. That could not be protected by copyright either, even if bridge were a new game (and contact bridge is just new enough that it could in theory be under copyright still). How do i know if certain patents are applied and when they expire? Most games are not protected by patent, but some are. Patents, like trademarks, are specific to a country. Each country has a way to search its list of active patents. Note that patents have a strict tiem limit, and they normally cannot be extended or renewed. I believe that the limit of a patent is currently 20 years in most countries. (It used to be 17 years in the US.) If a game is patented in Country X and someone is printing the same game but with different art and names in country Y, will the one who print in country Y could be exposed to a lawsuit? Unless the game is also patented in country Y, there will be no grounds for an infringement lawsuit inn Y. But importing the game into X may be patent infringement, and could expose the importer to a suit. | Yes Such a work might well still be protected by copyright after 50 years. The time that copyright protection will remain in force depends on the country where the work was created (normally where the author was living). In some countries it will also depend on when the creation occurred. In many countries such protection lasts for 70 years after the death of the author. Under US law recent works use the "life of the author+70 years" rule. Works created before 1978 may be protected for 95 or 120 years after creation, depending on the circumstances. See This well-known chart for details. If the work is protected by copyright, preparing a new derivative work, or performing or distributing the original or a derivative work are all copyright infringement, and the owner could sue. This is true whether a fee is charged or the work is performed or distributed for free. Exploiting the work for commercial profit might increase the amount of damages available, however. If the author has not published or exploited the work for 50 years or more, the author might not choose to sue, but that is entirely the author's decision. The author would have the right to sue, and given the facts as described in the question, to collect some damages. There is not enough information in the question to guess how large the damages could be. In the US 17 USC 504 provides for statutory damages, which the court has significant discretion on the amount of, with no proof of economic loss. Specifically this law says: (c) Statutory Damages.— (1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work. (2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in section 118(f )) infringed by performing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance of such a work. In short, the mere lapse of 50 years does not make the unpublished musical work free for use without permission. | Details depend on the juristiction. For that, consult a lawyer if you plan to publish your app anywhere. But generally, even simple texts from exercises can be covered by copyright. Compare song lyrics, which are not much longer (and might not involve more creative thought than a good exercise ...). For vocabulary lists, it gets more tricky, but those can be covered as well if the assembly of the list was a creative effort. So if you simply list the 1,000 most common worlds in English and their translation, you are possibly fine, but if the words are divided into units and lessons, that's creative work. | A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain | The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far. | There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan". |
Is informal written consent, such as through text messages or email, legally binding? For this question, let's assume the contract is for common goods and services. First hypothetical scenario: I meet a plumber on an online marketplace, like Facebook or Craigslist, and he writes that he will fix a problem in my bathroom. He guarantees that he will pay for any unexpected damages that might happen during the repairs. Second hypothetical scenario: I hire a local graphic designer to create a logo for my new business. In an email, the designer agrees to transfer all copyright claims to the work once they have been paid. This agreement is made through email, not a signed written agreement. Are the promises made in either of these cases legally binding? | Contracts don’t have to be in writing Generally, there are specific exemptions. For example, in some jurisdictions, copyright transfers have to be in writing. Written contracts do not have to take any particular form Again, in general, some specific contracts may need to be in particular forms or explicitly deal with particular matters. Writing doesn’t mean ink on paper Of course, ink on paper is “writing” but so is an email, a text message, a Facebook post, a photo, a comic book. In law, writing simply means a semi-permanent record. Signatures are not required Unless, of course, they are in the specific circumstances. Your examples The plumber’s promise is both binding and unnecessary - the plumber is responsible for his own negligent acts and omissions even without such an agreement. On the other hand, if you promised not to hold him responsible, that promise would be binding. The designer’s agreement to transfer copyright is binding even where such agreements must be in writing because it is in writing. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. | does the email chain above set out a legally binding contract, would it stand up to the test in a court Generally speaking, yes, unless you signed a "more formal" contract thereafter. The more formal contract would supersede the email chain. Furthermore, the subsequent conduct by both parties evidences the existence of a contract. The fact that you have been provided with the service and that you have been charged for these ~12 months evidences the formation and existence of a contract. is the breach of contract sufficient to give us grounds to terminate the contract? Yes. To substantiate a claim of breach of contract, you will need to provide evidence that the "24/7/365 support line" is missing or unacceptably subpar in that it has caused you losses (such as downtime and consequent impact on your operations), or that such pattern of service disruptions would subject your company to imminent risk of losses if you were forced to stay in the contract for the remaining ~24 months (obviously, you will need to establish that this item or feature is not just incidental to the contract). | First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret. | Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company? Because a sender's opportunism regarding the bizarre contents of the autoreply preclude a finding that there is a meeting of the minds. Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., "Yes, I agree to the contract") was an autoreply? It mostly depends on the element of authorization to set up the autoreply that way. If the person who wrote the autoreply was authorized by the user of the email account to set it up that way, the contract binds the user. This form of blind and reckless formation of contracts is an extreme scenario of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). The contract might be null and void as unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and/or on other grounds. But a wide range of scenarios would fall short of warranting a nullification of the contract. (Disclaimer: I am affiliated with the linked site.) | First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob." | We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission. | It might maybe be enforceable under contract law. One party offers something of value (information) under the condition that they get something of value (non-disclosure). Obviously there has to be agreement in advance of disclosure. The matter is even clearer-cut when the information is protected by privacy laws, therefore conditional consent makes the difference between invasion of privacy and not. Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 is a case where information was disclosed to reporters, provided that his identity be kept confidential. While the reporters agreed, they nevertheless published plaintiffs name, and he got fired. He sued (fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract), and ultimately won (under the theory of promissory estoppel). |
Does an individual's use of a tool or weapon affect their claim of self-defense? Consider the following hypothetical scenario: A person is at home when a robber, who thought the apartment would be empty, enters. The home owner kills the robber in a subsequent exchange. It is not specified whether the robber was armed or unarmed. Question 1) Can the home owner claim self-defense if they killed the robber without using a weapon, such as punching or kicking? Question 2) Can the home owner claim self-defense if they killed the robber using a non-lethal weapon, such as pepper spray or a taser? Question 3) Can the home owner claim self-defense if they killed the robber using a lethal weapon, such as a hunting rifle or crossbow? I want to know about self-defense in relation to the criminal code in Canada or the United States. | To provide an initial answer, without getting to the specific of the 51 statutory standards for self-defense in U.S. states and the exact Canadian standard, as applied to your examples, I'll make some general observations: Self-defense is a justification for doing something that would otherwise be illegal (intentionally using force against someone else). Self-defense justifications include a sense of proportionality. It isn't proper to use more force than is reasonably necessary to achieve the defensive objective. There are basically two levels of self-defensive force: Deadly Force and Non-Deadly Force. Preventing some crimes and harms is statutorily justified to do using deadly force (e.g. to prevent a murder). To prevent other crimes and harms statutes only justify the use of non-deadly force (e.g. to prevent shoplifting). The exact list of crimes in each category varies somewhat. Historically, for example, there have been some U.S. states that have authorized the use of deadly force to prevent a rape that does not put the life of the victim at risk, and others that have not authorized the use of deadly force for that purpose (I don't know if that is still the case). Typically, law enforcement officers are also authorized to use deadly force in some circumstances in which a non-deputized civilian could not. As a practical matter, a use of force that causes death is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if the means used are not inherently deadly in all circumstances. Meanwhile, a use of force involving the use of a "deadly weapon" such as a firearm, is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if it doesn't actually kill someone. But both of these "presumptions" (and I am using that term loosely in this answer, rather than with its precise legal meaning), can be overcome with relevant evidence. Mildly shoving someone with hemophilia (or tossing a dish full of peanuts in the face of someone with a severe peanut allergy), without knowing that this person suffers from this condition, is not a use of deadly force within the meaning of laws justifying self-defense, even if it actually ends up causing their death. Similarly, proving that you intended to and did, shoot out the tires of someone's car, or shot their foot, instead of shooting to kill, would not always constitute a use of deadly force for purposes of statutes justifying the use of force in self-defense. Getting to the specifics of the question, the majority rule would be that the use of deadly force is justified in most circumstances to prevent a home invasion burglar from harming you or other people in the residence, and to repel the home invasion burglar from the residence, although some jurisdictions would qualify this in one respect or another. The case that the use of deadly force is justified would be stronger if the home invasion burglar was armed than if he was not, and would be stronger if the homeowner was not physically competent enough to be confident of an ability to dispatch the invader in a non-deadly manner. If deadly force was justified in that circumstance, it wouldn't really matter how you killed him, nor would it matter that you intended to kill him to defense your home and the people in your home. If the law only authorized the use of non-deadly force in the circumstances, for example, because the burglar had seized an envelope full of cash and was fleeing the house, so you were really only using force to protect your property, rather than to protect your home or the safety of the people in it, at that point, then the analysis would get tougher. If you intended to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, the weapon you used wouldn't matter. You intended to use deadly force, the force you used caused the intended death, and you did those things even though the law didn't authorize you to do so in those circumstances. If you didn't intend to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, but you ended up killing him anyway (so that you didn't have a prohibited intent behind your actions), then the question would be whether your intent and belief that your actions would not kill him was reasonable under the circumstances. If you caused his death with your bare hands, or with a less lethal weapon (in truth, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon), your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be more likely to be seen as reasonable. If you caused his death with a lethal weapon, your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be less likely to be seen as reasonable. If the jury (or a judge in bench trial) didn't believe you were reasonable in your use of force which you didn't intend to be deadly, then the jury (or judge as the case might be) would not allow a self-defense argument to prevent them from convicting you of some kind of homicide crime. So you would probably be convicted of some form of homicide (perhaps heat of passion manslaughter), although you might still not have the requisite intent for first degree murder in circumstances like that (so that your self-defense argument might end up providing you with an incomplete defense). | It depends on the jurisdiction but, very broadly speaking, the person might be ill such that: they did not know what they were doing or that what they were doing was wrong (insanity) their ability to understand their actions or make a reasoned decision or self control was highly impaired but not to the degree of insanity (diminished responsibility or perhaps provocation) they were unconscious when they acted (automatism - e.g. an offence committed while 'sleep walking') Clearly they lack the same culpability as a person with "good mental health", who consciously committed a criminal offence, knowing it was wrong. That does not mean the ill person can 'get away with it'. Claiming diminished responsibility as a defence to a murder charge may mean the person will instead be tried for manslaughter, which is also punishable by imprisonment. Depending on the circumstances a court (and subsequent people in authority) might be persuaded that the person is so dangerous they must be indefinitely detained and treated without their consent. Doesn't this sort of allow psychiatrists to make up the law, because they can decide if something is considered a mental condition? Just because a psychiatrist comes along doesn't mean the court will do what the psychiatrist says is best - the court will hear both sides of the argument, establish the facts, interpret the law and deliver a verdict. Some people would argue that someone who would commit such crimes (such as rape) couldn't possibly be in their right mind. Certainly, but so far as I'm aware that defence is very rarely used and never successful. | Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit. | The mere presence of a conditional isn't a determining factor, but the context of the conditional can be a contributing factor in determining whether the threat is true or not. See a more recent publication from 2003 for a better understanding of those factors. I definitely wouldn't rely on anything from the 1600s as a reliable source. Back in the old days a threat was essentially the same as an assault, but nowadays we often view threats and assaults more distinctly and have crafted more specific laws to address them. Just as an "arrest" was once used to describe a seizure of any kind regardless of the duration, more modern case laws have established distinctions between arrests (full-custody seizures) and detentions (temporary, short-duration seizures). Since most jurisdictions in the US now have a separate statute for addressing threats in order to distinguish them from assaults, we have to read the exact verbiage of each state to determine whether it covers the particulars of the threat. Here are a few examples. Note the similarities and differences in each: Arizona: Threatening or Intimidating Texas: Terroristic Threat New York: Menacing As you yourself pointed out, simply making a threat isn't necessarily mala en se, and there are times where the law explicitly allows for people to issue threats, particularly when it comes to defending themselves, another person, or their property. For example, in Arizona, ARS 13-407 allows a person to issue a threat of deadly force to defend their property against trespassers, but does not allow them to actually use deadly force to do so. This means that Arizonans who find themselves in a situation where they feel it necessary to issue a conditional threat to an intruder ("leave my property right now or I'll shoot you"), must understand that the threat is empty unless the intruder shifts his focus from mere trespassing to harming a person. (The bad guy doesn't need to know this though, and all the better if he doesn't.) Even though the threat is empty according to the issuer's knowledge, it is still a threat, albeit one that the issuer is legally entitled to make. In this situation, the threat to use deadly force is decriminalized, not because it contained a conditional, but rather because it was explicitly authorized by law. In practice, many jurisdictions, especially ones with high crime rates, have arbitrarily decided to triage threats cases based on whether they include a conditional statement or not. After all, if you have 1,000 cases a month and a team of only 30 prosecutors, you have to prioritize the cases that are easiest to prove. With that in mind, many prosecutors offices have provided direction to their law enforcement partners to only submit cases that include unconditional threats. Those agencies in turn train their officers to ignore any threats cases involving conditional threats, perpetuating the misunderstanding that a conditional automatically negates a threat as being a true threat. There are literally thousands of cases where offenders have had their convictions upheld for crimes involving conditional threats. Just think of robbery/carjacking: A man walks up to a victim in a parking lot and says "give me your car or I'll kill you. Despite containing a conditional threat, there isn't a prosecutor or jury in the country that wouldn't instantly recognize this as a true threat and an element of robbery/carjacking. Conditional Intent to Kill is Enough for Federal Carjacking Conviction. | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. |
Why does digital copyright appear to be less effective than physical copyright? I frequently hear on the news about enforcement of patent infringements on physical products, such as various types of wrenches, machinery, and toys. However, I cannot recall a situation where an online business has been sued for creating a product that is almost identical to another product. For example, in the case of video game app offerings for phones, whenever a new trend emerges, a multitude of copycat products seem to follow. Initially, I thought this was because the rate of ripoffs is so high that the original creators are unable to file claims as quickly as new copies appear. However, I have also observed that large corporate groups, such as Ketchapp and Voodoo, often have entire portfolios consisting of slightly modified versions of popular products created by competitors. It is difficult to understand how this is feasible, and copyright law for digital services seems to be less effective than for physical products. Please keep in mind, I am not from a legal background and am simply curious about this. | Patents protect inventions, Copyright protects artistic or literary creation Software does not qualify for patents. In some jurisdictions but by no means most, algorithms and business processes can be patented. Software, both the literary (code) and artistic (UIJ) work, is protected by copyright which prevents copying the expression but not the idea. So software writers can take inspiration from other software but can’t copy it. So, things that look like copyright infringement often aren’t but things that look like patent infringement often are. Patents last for a short time (10-20 years) and take a lot of investment of time and money so their owners are incentivised to commercialise them quickly and on a large scale. Copyright lasts for a long time (life of the creator(s) + 50 years minimum depending on jurisdiction) and come into existence automatically. In general, it is easier to create a literary or artistic work than a novel invention. So, patent owners are more incentivised to protect their IP than copyright owners. | What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere. | Copyright infringement requires that you actually copy elements from an earlier work produced by a different author. If you created a similar, or even identical, work independently, it is not copyright infringement. When considering whether or not infringement has occurred, the court is likely to consider whether the defendant could reasonably have had access to the plaintiff's work. If the court finds that they could have, then the defendant would be required to produce evidence of original authorship. Consider the My Sweet Lord/He So Fine case, where the court found the defendant had subconsciously copied the plaintiff's song. Had Harrison been able to produce evidence of original authorship, the judgment could have been different. In your example, it is unlikely that an suit in copyright infringement could be decided against you, as you've stated the text is generated randomly. However, more evidence of this randomness might be required to support your case. Of course, whether a computer or automated process can produce works independently is still questionable; I'm not aware of cases that have tried this. The US Copyright Office has said that Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable. Of course, whether this has a bearing on your particular scenario is undecided, and I'm not sure how it would be decided. It is almost certain that the worst case outcome would be an injunction requiring you to cease publicising the product, or perform reasonable checks prior to publication to ensure that the product of your program infringes on works; it would be unlikely that you would have costs ordered against you, especially if the program is truly random, and the random text was given as much, or more, publicity than the coherent text. | If you use the reviewer's code, or code derived from it (e.g. if you just changed a variable name) then they own the copyright on that part of the software. If the reviewer describes a solution which you implement, or if you re-implement the code from scratch while taking ideas and methods from the reviewer's code, then you own the copyright on that code. However if there are only a few ways to implement something in code then the code is not creative and hence cannot be copyrighted. For example the regular expression in the question you link to is (as far as I can tell) the only correct solution to the problem: any programmer addressing the problem will have come up with that RE. In this the position is akin to a database of phone numbers: while the collection may be copyright (depending on whether selection or arrangement required creativity), the fact that Alice Jones has the number 012345 is not copyrightable, and neither is the alphabetical arrangement of names. Where it gets messy is the boundary between the two. The requirement to detect 4 or more repeated digits in a credit card number could be implemented in a number of ways, but whether there are enough of these to qualify any particular solution as "creative" would be a matter of fact for a court to decide. | Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html | Don't get hung up on unauthorized resale. That only prohibits unauthorized resale. Authorized resale is ok. From http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1854-copyright-infringement-first-sale-doctrine: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). Since the first sale doctrine never protects a defendant who makes unauthorized reproductions of a copyrighted work, the first sale doctrine cannot be a successful defense in cases that allege infringing reproduction. | Fair use is a four-factor test. Whether the use is commercial is part of just one of the four factors. Fair use is determined on a case by case basis, and it would be rather silly to assume that everything a user could post would be covered by fair use. Rather than just rely on the possibility of fair use, you may want to utilize the DMCA protections. Doing so can protect you from copyright liability for the user-generated content. You will have to register a DMCA agent, and expeditiously respond to takedown notices and counternotices. | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). |
Why is Oklahoma divided into three districts? The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit hears appeals from the district courts of the states of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. With one exception, each state is a single federal district, for example the District of Colorado. Oklahoma, however, is divided into an Eastern, a Northern, and a Western district. Why? Are the federal courts of Oklahoma busier than those of the other states? The obvious answer is population, but Colorado is substantially more populous than Oklahoma. Nor is the population of Oklahoma more dispersed than, say, that of Kansas. How did this happen? Is there a reason for it? | Oklahoma Territory and The Indian Territories were set on the road to statehood by the Oklahoma Enabling Act: §13 of that act stipulated that two judicial districts would be created, where The Indian Territories would be the Eastern District and Oklahoma Territory would be the Western district. This is an ancient-enough political act that we can't say why Congress decided to give the constituent parts separate courts, however legal issues regarding tribes are different from other aspects of federal law, so it would be sensible to have a specialized district for special cases. In 1925, Congress reorganized the two districts into three. I think that is as far as one can go with the legal aspect of the question, but there may be a historical political explanation | No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits. | if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU The European Union is by no means a homogeneous area of law. I will assume france because it is the one I am most familiar with, but bear in mind that much of what follows might not apply to Spain/Germany/etc. The USA is a federal state. In particular, Louisiana law is heavily influenced by civil law for historical reasons. Other states and federal law do, however, follow more or less the same general principles. in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not The first part is true. Common law usually hold the principle of stare decisis according to which precedents are binding. That means that the holding of a court binds the same court to rule the same way on similar matters raised later. I would note, however, that courts can be... let’s say "creative"... in finding ways to differentiate the case at hand from the previous one, when the judge is motivated to do so. The latter part is false, or at least, exaggerated. It is true that courts in civil law are not bound by previous holdings; an appeal that raises as its only argument "the court’s decision in my case was different from that in another case without offering any differentiation" would be rejected. However, there is the concept of jurisprudence constante where repeated precedent is highly persuasive. In practice, even simple precedent is persuasive. Furthermore, lower courts are bound by the holdings of higher courts, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions. (That’s more or less the meaning of "higher court".) in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition That is a distinction between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. The distinction does not exactly map to the civil/common law systems, but in practice the criminal part of civil law systems is often inquisitorial whereas common law systems are often adversarial. I will first note that the "inquisitorial" part where the judge conducts investigations is vastly overblown. That only occurs in complex cases that require extended investigations with more coercitive powers (for instance seizing documents etc.) Wikipedia says: In 2005, there were 1.1 million criminal rulings in France, while only 33,000 new cases were investigated by judges.[5] The vast majority of cases are therefore investigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of [the equivalent of district attorneys]. The numbers sound plausible to me, but here’s the ref it gives if you want to check (which I did not bother to do). The most visible part of the distinction is the way witnesses at trial are handled. In an adversarial system, the parties will ask to cite certain witnesses. There are pre-trial motions to exclude certain witnesses for certain reasons, but parties have a wide latitude of which witnesses they want to call. Each witness will come labelled as to which party asked for its appearance. At trial, the witness will be asked questions by the party who called them (direct examination), which will usually take a long time and include nondisputed background information (who are you, for how long have you worked with the defendant, etc.). Then, the opposing party will ask questions (cross-examination), emphasizing points that cast doubt on the witness’s reliability (because they are lying, because they do not remember well, etc.) or on the other parties’ narrative (highlighting details that were conveniently "missed" in direct examination). In an inquisitorial system, witnesses are chosen by the judge. Parties can ask to have witnesses added to the list, but the list does not come with labels that X is coming from the prosecution, Y from the defense. When a witness is called, the judge will ask most of the questions at the start, before giving the floor to the parties. Roughly speaking, the judge does the direct examination, and parties do a cross-examination afterwards. Note that in many cases the parties will ask few or no questions - high-profile cases that you read about in the media are abnormal in that respect. In particular, an inquisitorial-system court maintains a list of expert witnesses, which are called when technical points are required. That expert is paid by the court, not by the parties (however, when one party requests an expertise and the other party opposes it, the requesting party has to pay the cost upfront - they will shift it to the other party if they win the case). That is very different to the adversarial system of having each party introduce testimony by an expert they commissioned and paid. distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system I am not sure I understand that question. It is true that "private" (tort) law operates in an adversarial system both in civil-law and common-law. Therefore, one could argue that the distance between civil-law’s criminal system (inquisitorial) and tort system (adversarial) is higher than between common-law’s criminal and tort systems (both adversarial). However, that is in my view a highly artificial distinction. The distance between practice areas within a single (common law or civil law) jurisdiction is large in any case. You would not want a lawyer specialized in drug-dealing cases to take your case about sexual harassment or unlawful dismissal, and vice-versa, in any jurisdiction. | I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case. | It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional "qualification" on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow "register" as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean "anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born". The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree. | Probably not Maryland gave consent by ceding the land that became DC back when DC was first formed. Virginia had originally ceded a matching piece of land, which would have made the district a neat square 10 miles by 10 miles. Decades later, the Virginia General Assembly voted (in February 1846) to request the return of Alexandria in a process known as retrocession. On July 9, 1846, Congress voted to return all the area that had been ceded by Virginia. Since then, the district has consisted only of the land originally ceded by Maryland. When Article IV Section 3 says "by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states" it means by joining two states into one new one, or by cutting off parts of two of more states and making them a state -- doing either of those requires the consent of the states involved, but not an amendment. Article I Section 8 could be satisfied by creating a smaller district, perhaps just the Mall and the public buildings surrounding it, including the White House and the Capitol, but no residential areas. In any case nothing in Article I Section 8 mandates the creation or retention of a Federal district. It could be argued that making DC a state would require the consent of Maryland, which once included that land. Or it could be argued that Maryland's original cession left it with no further authority over that land (I favor the latter view). But no consent of Virginia would be needed, because none of its original land is included in the current district. In any case, Article IV Section 3 seems to give Congress this power, with no need for an amendment, only possibly for Maryland approval. So it appears that the primary body that would have to approve statehood for DC would be Congress. Whether approval from Maryland would also be needed is unclear -- probably not. No other body would need to approve. However, there is no case law on the matter, and such a move might well be challenged by those who would not want DC to elect two senators. | The other answer is incorrect. In fact, the question you're asking turns on the meaning of the phrase "the whole number of electors appointed." This could be interpreted either way, and as far as I know this ambiguity has never been considered by a court or by congress. It would only matter under the following conditions: Some states appoint fewer electors than the number to which they are entitled. The candidate with the greatest number of votes has more votes than half the number of electors actually appointed, but less than or equal to half the number of electors that should have been appointed. One way to look at this ambiguity is that it depends on how you parse the structure of the amendment. It could be either: a majority of (the whole number of electors) (appointed) a majority of the whole number of (electors appointed) In the first case, "appoint" refers to the sentence in Article 2 that specifies, determines, or "appoints" the number of electors. This reading is supported, for example, by the first definition of appoint at Merriam-Webster online, which is to fix or set officially, as in "to appoint a trial date." However, if you look at Article 2, it says Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. Here, appoint is used in its second sense, to name officially. This suggests that a failure by any state to appoint any elector to which it is entitled reduces "the whole number of electors appointed" because some available places in the Electoral College have not had anyone appointed to fill them. I favor the second interpretation, but I suspect that if the conditions outlined above actually did arise, Congress would choose the politically expedient interpretation. That is, if the candidate with the most votes was of the party in control of Congress, they would take the second interpretation, and if that candidate of the other party, they would take the first. I further suspect that the courts would not get involved. | As I understand it one of Scotus jobs is to mediate inter-state litigation. Did this happen with equal regularity over the years or was this something that happened mainly when the union was new? You are right the Supreme Court of the United States is the venue for state vs. state disputes. Though I would be careful to differentiate "inter-state" litigation from "stave vs. state" litigation. These disputes did happen regularly over the years yes, but with differing success as the strength of the Federal Government and Supreme Court increased*. In general state v. state cases are not too common, and generally deal with issues such as land and border disputes or questions. *(See as a partial reference this video where when NJ sued NY over a land dispute, NY effectively ignored the Court/ the Court didn't hear the case in 1832. Whereas in the 1990s NY did not ignore it https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgZ1f4ACZBQ) For background the relevant provisions of the Constitution and statute are as follow: U.S. Const. Article III: Sec 2: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii 28 USC Sec. 1251 (a)The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States. (b)The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1)All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, > consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2)All controversies between the United States and a State; (3)All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1251 For a recent/ current state v. state case see Mississippi v. Tennessee: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o143.html concerning territorial matters/ water rights. Is it therefore at least in theory possible for two states to have contrary laws and scotus be forced to make a value judgment contrary to state law to resolve some dispute? Generally no, unless the state law is impermissible under the United States Constitution or otherwise preempted by federal law for example. But the Supreme Court wouldn't really rule on "contrary" state laws, most cases are concerning federal laws or land matters. Also, unless there is a matter of Federal Law ("federal question") or the state v state controversy under Article III the Supreme Court doesn't have jurisdiction to rule on state matters (again unless a "federal question" is involved). Can scotus decide not to hear inter-state litigation in the same way it often does with constitutional matters or are they forced to mediate because there is no other way to settle such matters? Yes, they can choose not to hear state vs. state cases. Rule 17 of the Supreme Court Rules regards "Procedure in Original Action" https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/rule_17 in which the Court "Court thereafter may grant or deny the motion, set it for oral argument, direct that additional documents be filed, or require that other proceedings be conducted." Though, and I will note for completeness in answering your question, some current Justices believe it is not discretionary. See below: 155, ORIG. TEXAS V. PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. The State of Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot. Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins: In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction. See Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. ___ (Feb. 24, 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue. https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf |
Why was Ağca tried and imprisoned in Italy? Mehmet Ali Ağca tried to kill the pope in 1981 in Vatican City. For this, he was tried and convicted by an Italian court, and served time in an Italian prison. Why Italian? What did Italy have to do with the case? | Because, although the Vatican does have its own laws, it does not make any economic sense to have a full enforcement system. Most of the crime is pickpockets on the public square. Italy already has a police and prison system and can easily handle the one or two more cases a year that are above petty crime: Under the terms of article 22 of the Lateran Treaty, Italy will, at the request of the Holy See, punish individuals for crimes committed within Vatican City and will itself proceed against the person who committed the offence, if that person takes refuge in Italian territory. Persons accused of crimes recognized as such both in Italy and in Vatican City that are committed in Italian territory will be handed over to the Italian authorities if they take refuge in Vatican City or in buildings that enjoy immunity under the treaty. Vatican City has no prison system, apart from a few detention cells for pre-trial detention. People convicted of committing crimes in the Vatican serve terms in Italian prisons (Polizia Penitenziaria), with costs covered by the Vatican. Source In case it isn't obvious: Italy is the country that fully surrounds the Vatican. The Vatican is inside Italy and has no borders with any other country. It also shares other systems with Italy, for example it is the only independent country without its own airport. When you are there, there are no borders. You do not notice when exactly you enter Vatican territory. The police patrolling are Italian police. People speak Italian. Nobody will ask you for a passport. You just turn a street corner and, suddenly, you've crossed into the Vatican. | In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge. | There is not uniformity of law on this question, which is usually decided in the period after a death, but before a will is admitted to probate or an executor is appointed (typically in three to five days). As a result, the legal jurisdiction (usually a country or sub-national state or autonomous region) involved matters a great deal. For example, Italy used to presume that you did not want organ donation if you didn't execute a document during life saying that you did, and now has the opposite presumption. Similarly, many jurisdictions used to give a blood relative priority over a same sex partner, but now recognize a civil union or same sex marriage as having priority over a blood relative. Some jurisdictions give you some say over, for example, whether your body's organs will be donated or your body will be used for medical research. Some have formal documents that can be drafted and there are such things as "negative" provisions that are documents saying who cannot do something with your body. Other jurisdictions, as user6726 suggests, have a fixed priority system for determining who is next of kin and that applies strictly. Needless to say, a critical issue is how any such directive would be enforced. Obviously you, being dead, can't do that, and documents don't simply crawl out of desk drawers and walk themselves into court houses after your death either. Your wishes will never be enforced unless someone takes it upon themselves at the critical moment, to take action, and in that case, local law determines under what circumstances that person's statement regarding your wishes will be honored. Often, the person who might step up to take action doesn't learn of your death and of the location of your body until it is too late. If you die in circumstances where your identity is unknown, or where no relatives can be located and no directives can be located, some public official or whomever else ends up in possession of your body (often a corner) will have to decide for themselves what to do without your input. | Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one. | The closest case to this is Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742 (1970): We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady' case, there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty. In Brady, had he not entered a guilty plea, he would have been risking the death penalty. The court recognized: It may be that Brady, faced with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty, and thus limit the penalty to life imprisonment, rather than to elect a jury trial which could result in a death penalty. They upheld the plea: Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, and we have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful. So, even in the case where the risk of a death penalty may have motivated a guilty plea, the plea has been upheld. All of the above is with respect to actions of the prosecution. In any case, the main test is whether the defendant entered a plea voluntarily and intelligently. | In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not? |
Does IIED (emotional distress) apply to infidelity and if no, why not? I found this interesting corner of law called IIED (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intentional_infliction_of_emotional_distress To a layman's eye, infidelity seems to fit neatly into 4 bullet points of stated definition at this link, if intent can be shown: It's an act It is generally considered outrageous It's well known that infidelity victims are likely to suffer mental health effects (I even saw mentions it's equivalent to PTSD) Conduct clearly causes the distress. If this is the case, can IIED get applied to a spousal infidelity, and if not, why wouldn't it? I'm looking ideally for a case where it was requested by the accuser, and the court either allowed it thus setting a precedent, or gave an explanation for rejecting it. Since "well in this case, I don't see enough evidence that causing emotional distress was a purpose of defendant, merely an unfortunate consequence" is an obvious rebuttal, I'm hopefully looking for a more interesting case, such as where there is evidence proving that accused had anticipated emotional distress and it was a desired goal. Jurisdiction is USA. And just to clarify, this is specifically regarding "intentional", not "negligent" ED. | Does IIED (emotional distress) apply to infidelity and if no, why not? Generally speaking, infidelity falls short of liability for IIED. Clark v. Clark, 867 S.E.2d 704 (2021) appears to be one recent exception, but that is because there the defendants' conduct allegedly entailed more than mere infidelity, such as "sen[ding] at least one email to Plaintiff in which Defendant Barrett told Plaintiff she "was a bad mother, that [she was] uneducated... [she] was a bad wife," and that Plaintiff came "from an unsuccessful family"" (quotation marks in original), conduct that the court seemed to associate with elements of Watson v. Dixon (i.e., frightening the plaintiff, humiliation, etc.), cited in the preceding paragraph of the Clark decision. The difficulty for prevailing on a claim of IIED generally lies in proving that "the defendant's conduct was [...] so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society", Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 207 (2012). The notion that infidelity "is not tolerated by civilized society" is hard to establish. For instance, many people do not very often distance themselves from a co-worker, friend, or acquaintance merely on grounds of that person being known to cheat on that person's spouse or partner. Also the fact that adultery is hardly ever prosecuted despite being prohibited in a jurisdiction's penal code reflects the extent of societal and governmental tolerance to infidelity. | The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable. | There are only a few areas of law of which I am aware that U.S. law treats people who are engaged to be married differently (although perhaps with more thought I could expand the list). Fiance(e)s come under a special immigration status when applying for a visa. There is a body of law related to whether an engagement ring is an absolute gift or is conditional upon being married (this is not uniform from state to state and I don't recall what the majority rule in those cases is under the common law). In South Carolina, ownership disputes over engagement rings are litigated as breach of promise to marry actions. Pre-marital agreements governing a future marriage can be made by people who are engaged (although a post-nuptial agreement is also equal in effect in most cases). People who are engaged, like spouses, are generally considered to be in a "confidential relationship" with each other which imposes higher duties with respect to fairness in their dealings with each other than strangers, but generally less high duties than fiduciaries. While not strictly arising from the status of being engaged, adult cohabitants are generally agents for service of process of each other at their shared home, and are often considered to have a legally significant relationship for purposes of domestic violence statutes (usually related to either domestic violence crimes or temporary restraining orders). I am not familiar enough with the law of France to fully answer the balance of the question, which someone more familiar with that law can expand upon. But, there is similarly a special immigration status in French law for a fiance(e). And, French law, in a flourish so romantic it could scarcely be any other country's law, also allows people who are engaged a right to marry after one of them has died in certain circumstances: "The legislation that allows posthumous marriages stems back to when a dam burst in 1959 and killed 420 people in southern France." It was most recently invoked in 2014 when a grieving French woman was granted permission by the French President to marry her former fiancé, who tragically died in 2012, just a month before they were due to wed. To be eligible the bride to be had "to convince the President of France that her’s was a special case and that her love for Michael went beyond the grave. It took four letters to the president and 20 months of waiting, desperately hoping for a positive response." The President's discretion in this matter is somewhat similar to the pardon power in U.S. law. This French law was also invoked in 2009. The law in question is set forth at Articles 171 of the French Civil Code. In English translation this states: Article 171 The President of the Republic may, for serious reasons, authorize the celebration of the marriage if one of the future spouses is dead providing a sufficient gathering of facts establishes unequivocally his consent. In this case, the effects of the marriage date back to the day preceding that of the death of the spouse. However, this marriage does not carry with it any right of intestate succession to the benefit of the surviving spouse and no matrimonial regime is considered to have existed between the spouses. I am aware of one documented case where a court entered a post-humous marriage in the United States between people who were engaged, but I am not familiar with any legal authority actually authorizing that action. | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | Well, it is hard to prove a negative, but the answer seems to be: No, you do not need to be engaged. For example, the article Prenuptial Agreements in the United States from the International Academy of Family Lawyers tries to give "an overview of this rather complex area of American family law and estate planning", yet contains not mention of engagement at all. If being engaged were relevant, it would likely be mentioned. Similarly, the "Frequently Asked Questions about Premarital Agreements" on lawhelp.org do not mention engagement. Also see Does being engaged (to be married) carry any legal significance? for information on where being engaged does or does not matter legally. | is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct & statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all. | In the US, it stems from some statute, such as RCW Ch. 71.05 in Washington state, which starts by stating the rationale for the law, and which are to protect the health and safety of persons suffering from behavioral health disorders and to protect public safety, and prevent inappropriate commitment of persons living with behavioral disorders and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from involuntary commitment etc. The various laws in this chapter make it possible to commit a person to a mental institute or to undergo involuntary therapy. There is a separate chapter, RCW 71.34, applicable to minors. In general, this law calls for professional evaluation and treatment, without legislating science. The trigger is generally evidence of a tendency towards serious harm or grave disability, with a requirement that the action be requested by a certain kind of behavioral professional. There are not many hard-coded limits on what can be ordered: while RCW 71.05.215 "has a right to refuse antipsychotic medication", that right is overridden when "it is determined that the failure to medicate may result in a likelihood of serious harm or substantial deterioration or substantially prolong the length of involuntary commitment and there is no less intrusive course of treatment than medication in the best interest of that person". Along with the legislation cited, there are also regulations which don't require legislative action (they are "empowered" by the statutes), which could specifically forbid a treatment, but again choice of treatments are left to the professional. In some other jurisdiction, it's possible that a certain treatment would be explicitly outlawed. | Can I sue If I was served a real burger after requesting a veggie burger I agree that this inquiry significantly overlaps with the post of which this one is marked by NuclearWang as possible duplicate. Thus, the answers (such as why breach of contract is inapplicable) and comments provided there largely apply here. I will only address the slight differences. I walked up to the cashier and asked was this a veggie burger? He said no. I stated that it was I ordered. He said he would make a new burger. A claim of fraud would fail in court because you will be unable to prove that the restaurant knowingly misrepresented to you (that is, despite knowing it to be false) that it was serving you a veggie burger with the intention that you would rely on that representation. Two hints indicate that the restaurant didn't act with that fraudulent intention: (1) When asked, the cashier told you that yours was not a veggie burger; and (2) he promptly indicated his intention to mend their mistake by telling you that he would make a new burger. A claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) would also fail. You wrote: After we left, my daughter who was still in the restaurant stated that they started laughing at my husband and I. The fact that the employees waited till you and your husband left reflects that they refrained from intentionally inflicting any emotional distress. A significant factor that will favor them is the fact that they stopped laughing once your daughter asked them why they were laughing: My daughter asked why were they laughing, when her parents were in the car sick from eating meat. They stopped laughing. Even if you genuinely feel disrespected by their subsequent laughter, there are no legal remedies because their laughter insofar an expression was neither obscene nor disparaging nor threatening/harassing. Laughter can be an understandable way, and possibly a psychological need, to relieve the stress from a situation like this in a context of hours of hard work in exchange for low wages with which to pay their bills. Moreover, the same fact [that they waited till you and your husband left] contradicts the allegation that they laughed "at" you. Strictly speaking, the restaurant could viably sue your daughter for defamation if the restaurant incurs any losses (including court-ordered sanctions against the restaurant) as a result of falsely attributing to it the hostile or belittling behavior implied by the particle at. By this I intend to illustrate how certain actions under pretext of extreme "sensitivity" can backfire. People elsewhere are victims of much worse misconduct or offenses that have detrimental effects and long-lasting ramifications. The court system is --if only in theory-- intended to redress wrongs which are more serious than a mistaken order at a burger restaurant. |
Why isn't FBI's access to our data against the right of privacy? In many blogs, it's said that your search history may get you in jail, like Can Your Internet Search History Get You Arrested and Internet Searches That Could Get You Arrested. Seems that FBI can have access to our online data. Why isn't FBI's access to our data against the right of privacy? What's even worse is that they may abuse their access for other conspiracy purposes. Is there a system to prevent the FBI from utilising their access for some vicious plot? To avoid technological distinctions, assume for the sake of this question that the searches take place in the US using a United States internet service provider, using a U.S.-based search engine, not using a VPN. | Firstly, because there isn't an explicit Constitutional "right to privacy", per se, and even if there was (and there are arguments that several constitutional provisions amount, in aggregate, to a right to privacy), that it wouldn't be absolute, in the same way that freedom of speech and of the press are not absolutes. Indeed, the closest thing to a right to privacy, the 4th Amendment, has explicit caveats: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis mine). Thus reasonable searches and seizures, especially those authorized by a warrant, are constitutional. Furthermore, even in light of a constitutional right of privacy derived from this statue, depending on how the "search history" is compiled, the 4th Amendment might not even apply, due to the Katz doctrine, also known as the "open fields" doctrine. Basically, the 4th amendment (as far as searches goes) does not apply to things that are publicly observable; while this would protect a literal "search history" compilation (baring a reasonable search), the searches themselves are public queries, broadcasted over the internet. Anyone watching could compile them into a "search history" themselves. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | 1a - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their MIB (online or by phone). And I don't mean MIB.com. I am looking for government website that would reference something like MIB, i.e. for instance Federal Trade Commission website references annualcreditreport.com There isn't one. The right to medical information is a right you have vis-a-vis individual heath care providers and insurance companies that have your medical information. The U.S. government does not have access to this information and doesn't facilitate you getting this information, except that you could sue in federal court to get it if the person required by law to provide it to you didn't give it to you. (The fact that the U.S. government does not have access to individual health information is one of the reasons that major medical research studies that capture a sample of the entire population of a country for a given time period are often done instead in foreign countries that have comprehensive medical records databases. In the U.S., the best possible alternative is often to look at the medical records of servicemen and veterans who received government provided health care, or to create very large voluntarily long term studies of populations such as doctors and nurses.) Even in the case of credit reports, the government website merely ends up directing you to a private sector website maintained by credit reporting websites and is not a government website. 1b - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their other personal records (online or by phone) You can apply to the U.S. government via one of the IRS websites to get transcript of your past tax returns for a certain number of years. You can apply to the Social Security Administration to get your earnings history for Social Security purposes and I think that can be done from their website or by telephone. There is a U.S. government website called PACER at which you can get copies of all non-sealed filings in all federal court cases, and all filings in court cases to which you are or have been a party. There is U.S. government website at which you can ascertain whether or not a building, including your home, is in a flood plain. There is a U.S. government website that allows you to locate people who are currently incarcerated in federal prison. There is a U.S. government website that allows you to review census data from time periods when almost everybody is dead. I believe that old immigration records can also be accessed in this manner. There is a phone number at the Veteran's Administration where veterans can ask about their personal veteran's benefits. I'm not sure if that have a website from which they can do so yet. Last time I checked, a long time ago, they didn't. There are several websites and phone numbers that federal employees can access to get their personnel record type information. This is absolutely not a comprehensive list. It shouldn't be hard for you to research yourself the current web address for these sites which changes fairly often anyway. You can get many other kinds of information from the U.S. government that is about you via the Freedom of Information Act (a.k.a. FOIA), but generally speaking, this information isn't available via a website or by phone. Usually, you have to request it in a written letter or application unless a new website allowing you to do this that I don't know about has been created recently. | There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction. | You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different. | Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy). | This would be unauthorized access to a computer. The offence is found in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Note that this is a criminal offence, approaching the police about it might be the best way of handling the situation (if you want to go that route, and also, I'm not a lawyer). | In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split" |
Is a US Government order to a private media company to suppress an article/story a violation of the First Amendment? I'm trying to better understand this comment (and its implications): In a pure hypothetical (so as to avoid any speculation on whether or not it happened), if the US Government were to be found to have ordered a private media company to suppress a story (or stories), would that kind of behaviour constitute a violation of the first amendment, and if so, what are the possible consequences (e.g. is the a range of penalties)? | This page lists the highlights of case law regarding prior restraint and the First Amendment. Two pertinent cases are New York Times Co. v. United States, where the court held that despite the potential harm of publishing the revealed information, the prior restraint doctrine was more important (the government cannot prohibit speech before it happens). Reno v. ACLU affirms that even if a publication might cause harm to a class of people, that (limited) harm does not justify universally prohibiting the speech. There is no criminal penalty arising from the government censoring speech. A civil lawsuit – "section 1983" – is possible against an official who illegally attempts to suppress expression contra the First Amendment. The award might be just a dollar if the person so oppressed cannot prove actual damage. Technically, the sky is the limit, and it just depends on how outrageous the jury finds the government's action. If the government were to order suppression of opposition to its policies, we could easily be in the territory of world-record awards for violation of civil rights. | In the united-states, those actions would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Andy has a constitutional right to speak freely about essentially whatever he wants -- including Mary's criminal conduct -- unless his speech falls into one of several narrowly defined categories, none of which would apply in this case. And because Mary has already put this information out on the Internet, it is likely not sufficiently private to support an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the unfortunate reality is that complainants, police, prosecutors, and judges frequently ignore First Amendment protections. Indeed, many states have laws against "cyberstalking" and "telecommunications harassment" that are incredibly broad, and that clearly apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment. For instance, Ohio's telecommunications harassment statute makes it a crime to send an e-mail "with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person." This means that many people who engage in First Amendment-protected speech end up getting prosecuted anyway. If they pay for a good lawyer who knows how to properly raise a First Amendment defense, they may escape any penalties. But because most defendants do not have those resources, and because many lawyers are unaware of the First Amendment implications of such prosecutions, most defendants in such situations likely end up being convicted despite behaving perfectly legally. In the united-kingdom, though, the situation is very different. Even if Mary is breaking the law, and even if Andy limits himself to strictly factual information about what's he's learned about her conduct, he may still be held civilly liable. Mary may also be able to pursue Andy criminally for harassment if his e-mail causes her substantial emotional distress, and civilly for "harassment by publication." The fact that this information is already public is likely not going to go very far in changing the analysis. Andy's best course of action is therefore to play it safe by keeping his mouth shut. Doing so has both legal and nonlegal benefits: He avoids exposure to the hassles of defending himself from criminal charges and he gets some time to examine the resentment, jealousy, paranoia that makes him want to humiliate his "friend." | Chris Cuomo is wrong: the media are not different. For details, see this column by First Amendment specialist Eugene Volokh. My original answer was also wrong. Well, not wrong, but irrelevant. My answer was irrelevant because the hacked emails Cuomo was talking about do not involve national security. By focusing on the national security angle, I answered a question nobody asked. To make matters worse, in his comment on IKnowNothing's answer, A.fm. politely pointed out my mistake fourth months before I made it. | I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case. | Can he name a particalur one, like Linkin Park? Or that would be considered non-allowed type of advertising? Generally speaking, that does not constitute unlawful advertising. Public figures are allowed to broadcast their preferences on issues that are more sensitive than topics of music. There might be few, rare exceptions where something like this would be outlawed, but most likely that has to do with a regime's censorship of specific bands or music styles rather than with a general prohibition. | To examine this further and answer your question, we need to look at Copyright (and fair use) as well as Defamation. Alas, I am unsure as to how taking legitimate headlines from around the world and attributing their source is 'fake news' - but I'll accept that it's 'fake news' for the purposes of exploring this topic. A lot of the potential (or motive) for a person or company to litigate against you will be context specific and detailed to how you have used their work and portray their journalists and characters - misquotes etc. As an exception to British copyright law, fair dealing is governed by Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which outlines three instance where fair dealing is a legitimate defence: If the use is for the purposes of research or private study; If it is used for the purposes of criticism, review or quotation; Where it is utilised for the purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) However, where you may come into problems is: A statutory definition for fair dealing does not exist; it will always be a matter of fact, degree and interpretation in every fair use case. Nor is there a percentage or quantitative measure to determine fair dealing. The Intellectual Property Office lists the key factors used to determine the validity of whether a particular dealing with a work is fair as follows: Has the use of the work impacted negatively on the market for the original work? If the creator or owner has lost potential revenue through the re-use of their work, it is not likely to be fair. Was it reasonable and necessary to use the amount of work that was taken? Also: Fair use for parody, caricature or pastiche The UK copyright law on fair use of works for the purposes of creating a parody or pastiche is also listed in Section 30A, Schedule 2 (2A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. References to all here. Guidance from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) states that fair use needs to be “fair and proportionate” and does not protect an individual from any other rights an author may have. Those other rights may involve claiming defamation if this material creates fake news and uses the names of real journalists or companies etc - and if they allege that your AI fake news has caused serious harm in any way to their reputation - they could sue you for breach of the Defamation Act 2013. All of this is entirely contextual however as to how your AI might display or make fake news and how Google caches it and displays it - and if it could be portrayed as 'real' or believable for example. You are also doing this at a time where 'anti fake news' law is evolving... and even though you say it's fake news for AI experiment purposes - it's a growing field of concern for many. (see here) Copyright law is a vast and evolving area - and nothing is clear cut. It really depends if a major news company didn't like what you were doing and took exception to it and issued challenges on many areas of law based on that. | The first amendment to the US constitution says: Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; [...] This constitutional hurdle is a very high obstacle to preventing the media from publicly saying something that is detrimental to the interests of the US government. Giving people the freedom to say "our government is wrong" without being afraid of repercussions is the reason why this amendment exists. And yes, freedom of speech includes the freedom to be wrong. When someone makes false claims in public to sway public opinion, then it's the responsibility of their peers to point out those falsehoods and let people decide by themselves who to believe. The government can of course also engage in counter-speech, for example by holding a press conference where they address claims made about them and present their side of the debate. But it is not the job of the government to use force to suppress falsehoods, because the government can not be expected to be impartial in this matter. The government not suppressing public discourse is one thing which separates libertarian states like the United States from authoritarian states where uncomfortable speech is suppressed. There are a couple exceptions. But as long as Carlson doesn't make any statements which are defamatory, obscene, fraudulent, violate copyrights or explicitly incite physical violence, the government's hands are tied. | The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law." |
How do you prove a fact at issue in litigation? Many questions on this site ask some variant of the question: "how does one prove something in court?" Paraphrasing a few: How do you prove that someone forged your signature? How do you prove that you didn't misuse a product? How do you prove money went missing? How do you prove somebody accepted an EULA? How do you prove that you owned an object before a certain date? How do you prove ownership of a pseudonym? Generally, how do you prove a fact in issue in litigation? | Special regimes For some kinds of questions there are special presumptions or forms of evidence that are specified by statute. For example, in Canada and the United States, registering a copyright creates presumptive proof that the copyright exists and is owned by the registrant. In Canada, breathalyzer results are conclusive proof of the blood alcohol concentration if certain conditions are met. Some of these regimes are not subject to challenge: they are legal facts even if they are not objectively true (e.g. the breathalyser results). Others create presumptions that can be overcome by contrary evidence (e.g. copyright ownership). The default: present relevant evidence, including testimonial evidence But outside of special regimes, you prove a fact by introducing evidence. The default is that all relevant evidence that bears on a material fact is admissible. Evidence is relevant when, if is were to be accepted, it would make the fact in issue more or less likely to be true. Evidence comes in many forms: testimony of the parties or witnesses, documentary evidence, physical evidence, expert opinion evidence. If you are wondering, "How do I prove X?" Ask yourself, why do you believe X? Or, how do you know X? Or, how has the event X left its mark on the world? Whatever has led you to believe X probably is the evidence that you would want to introduce to the court to help prove X. Perhaps you saw X: you can tell the court you saw X. Perhaps you took a photo of X: you can present that photo in court. Perhaps you have a receipt for X: you can show that receipt in court. Perhaps X is a proposition about your own actions: you can tell the court about those. Obtaining the evidence Evidence can be obtained from the other party during the discovery process, or from third-parties using subpoenas, subject to objections relating to relevance or privilege. Not all (potentially) relevant evidence is admissible However, some evidence will be inadmissible despite it being potentially relevant. I will only present a few categories, some very general and some more specific: hearsay (unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay exclusion), privileged material (unless it is a case-by-case privilege or a discretionary privilege and the person seeking to admit the evidence demonstrates to the judge that it should be admitted), sexual history evidence of a sexual assault complainant when it will be used to support an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge or is less worthy of belief (this is because it has been recognized as not relevant for this purpose), material that was obtained in contravention of the Charter and where the court has decided that the remedy for the Charter violation is exclusion of the evidence (in the United States, there is stricter, exclusionary rule), there are many more. There are also some meta-rules about the evidence that may be used to impugn a witness's credibility, themselves at trial to provide evidence, but for now I am leaving those out of this fairly summary answer. Weighing the evidence The trier of fact (the judge or a jury) then is to weigh all the admissible evidence, including by weighing the witness and party testimony according to its credibility and reliability after testing through cross-examination, to come to a conclusion on the ultimate question(s) at issue. | How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? Testimony under oath is evidence. Judges resolve "he said she said" situations every day on a routine basis with witness testimony alone by judging the credibility of each witness before them. See also an answer by @Jen about the subject of how things are proved in court in general. In the appropriate case, testimony under oath with no other corroborating evidence can even support a murder conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It can certainly suffice to prove marital fault in a civil lawsuit for a divorce. If the judge finds that witness testimony under oath between more than one witness is irreconcilably different, and each witness is equally credible, and that it is impossible to tell which person is telling the truth, then the person seeking relief from the court has failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain relief from the court. But, this is rare. Usually, when witnesses are both testifying under oath and disagree about what happened, the judge will find that one witness is more credible than the other. And, in truth, while people certainly do lie in open court under oath, and probably are more likely to lie in that situation than when speaking to someone not under oath outside of a courtroom, most of the time, people don't lie and the testimony of all of the witnesses are consistent with each other subject to limitations based upon what they could perceive from their perspective and the limitations of imperfect memories. This could come down to demeanor in court, hesitation in answering, "tells", inconsistencies in their testimony, corroboration from other evidence and other witnesses (e.g. what someone said to a friend or wrote in a diary at the time), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime of deceit in the past, use of language that suggests coaching about their testimony, or common sense judgments about whose story seems more plausible under the circumstances of the parties in front of the judge. | "become yours" - Which court are you in? The court of the schoolyard? If you're in real court, then You would need to sue, to quiet title When a bona-fide dispute as to ownership exists, a case can be brought before a judge to resolve ownership definitively. The axiom of a quiet title action is that you must notify all parties who could possibly have an interest. Really, notification is 7/8 of it, because by the time you arrive at a "quiet title" action, most likely they either lost interest or are gone. And the crux of "Notify" is that your efforts to notify the party are to the standards of the court. You are a hostile party, noting your interests are in conflict with theirs. (we must fairly assume they want their iPad back; you want to take the iPad). Thus, it is obvious you will prefer to fail in your efforts at contact, and you will do a bad job of it, possibly on purpose. Since parties in a lawsuit are responsible to serve all documents on each other, courts have very high standards for that. And these standards are tested and gamed all the time. I even had a clever plaintiff do it to me! (we were expecting both the appeal and the dis-service). The crux of document service is you hire a licensed, third-party independent process server. A process server is naturally good at skip-tracing (think "Dog: the Process Server") and is accustomed to finding people who are actively hiding. (because some people think they can avoid consequences by evading service. That's a loser's game generally.) So, when you show up in court and they aren't there, the judge will ask "did you serve them?" And then you say "yes", name the company, and if needed call the process server to the stand, and the server reads out of their notebook all the things they did to search for the counterparty. | A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | The user can always claim that. Whether such a claim will be believed is another matter. A party to a contract with a "wet-ink" signature can claim that it was forged or that the signer was impersonated. But such claims are hard to prove, particularly if they are not true. The answer to the question in the title is that terms are binding if the user freely agrees to them, and if they meet the conditions for a legally binding agreement in the relevant jurisdiction. The question in the body is more about what evidence will establish this. Suppose the code behind a web-site is so designed that no user is allowed to proceed without affirmatively accepting the ToS, and the operator can demonstrate this. That will be persuasive evidence that the user did accept the terms. If the site logs the consent in a database along with a timestamp that would be further evidence. A journaling database provides an audit trail of changes, which would be further evidence. Evidence of other users that the site always worked that way, and of coders that the code had never permitted a user to proceed without accepting the ToS might also help. Backups of the DB stored with a 3rd party including the consent logs would also provide evidence that the timestamps were present and unchanged. A hash of the log can be stored on the blockchain. The site could also send a "registration accepted" email to the user (if the user has provided an email address) which could include a mention that the user had accepted the ToS. Such an email would be reserved in the logs of the senders and receiver's email providers, and could be retrieved as evidence. Ultimately it will be a question of what the finder of fact believes, if the matter goes to court. And as user Amon says, the US standard is preponderance of the evidence (that is, the evidence is at least a little bit stronger on one side. This is sometimes loosely expressed as more than 50% or 51% or better proved, but courts do not in fact measure degrees of proof in numbers), not absolute proof. | Short Answer Is there any realistic situation where a court decision might hinge on producing the original physical paper certificate? Yes. But there are alternative options to prove the same thing, even then. A copyright registration certificate is not like a dollar bill or an original promissory note, where a copy isn't as good as the original, even though it can be slightly convenient to have the original in hand. Or are they just souvenirs that I can safely shred? If you scan them and then shred them, nothing horrible will happen. In the rare worst case scenario where the fact of your registration is disputed by a stubborn defendant in a copyright infringement lawsuit all of the way up to trial, you could get a replacement certified copy from the Copyright Registrar, or you could prove your registration with other evidence. Long Answer Registration is not required for a copyright to come into being in U.S. law. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 408(a). But it is a condition precedent (i.e. a requirement that must be met prior to taking action) to certain legal remedies. 17 U.S.C. § 412. So, proving your registration is usually one element of your infringement claim in a typical copyright infringement lawsuit. In that lawsuit, if you actually go to trial, you need to prove that the copyright was registered in a timely fashion, if the other side won't stipulate to that fact. But it would be rare for a defendant who had been presented with a copy to insist that the fact of registration be proven at trial because being that stubborn is likely to piss off the judge unless they can successfully prove that you have faked your claim to have a registered copyright, which is something that almost no intelligent lawyer in a copyright infringement lawsuit wants to do, since judges have broad discretion on so many issues, even in a jury trial. The easiest way to prove the fact that your copyright was registered on a particular date is to offer up a certified government document like the ones that you have in your office into evidence as an exhibit (typically, one of your very first exhibits in your infringement case). This is because an official government certificate is exempt from the hearsay rule, is "self-authenticating" ,and its contents are admissible if not barred by another rule of evidence (which it almost never would be). The legal reason for keeping these paper documents is to get that evidentiary benefit at trial. See Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8) (exceptions to the hearsay rule), 902 (self-authentication) and 1005 (admissibility of public records). Of course, mostly, these fancy certificates are issued as a matter of pride and ego and customer satisfaction. Prior to an actual trial or evidentiary hearing in a copyright infringement lawsuit, a copy, supported by your declaration under penalty of perjury that the copy isn't a fake, would be the usual way to establish your registration in documents that are e-filed through the federal electronic e-filing service called CM/ECF rather than presented in person on paper anyway. Typically, pretrial document disclosure is done via an electronic transmission of scanned copies as well. In practice, it would be quite rare for a defendant in a copyright infringement lawsuit to insist that you prove up your registration at trial, rather than just stipulating to it. Indeed, it is you who might not want to stipulate in a jury trial, just so you can flash an important looking document in front of the jurors right at the start of the trial for dramatic effect. But you don't have to do that. Ultimately, if the defendant really did insist on proof of your registration, you could get a new certified copy from the Copyright Registrar (which wouldn't be quite as pretty, but would have the same legal effect) for a small fee without too much advanced notice, or you could introduce your scanned copy into evidence and authenticate it through, for example, your testimony on the stand under oath that you scanned the original and that it is a true and correct copy of the original. You also might want to keep a paper copy because it will still be around if all of the relevant electronic records are destroyed or inaccessible for some reason. But if that happens, copyright infringement may be the least of your worries. | Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not. | This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed). |
In what cases is a U.S. Federal Executive Official named in a lawsuit in their official capacity as a defendant and when is the US itself named? I was curious under what situations the United States is named as the defendant in a lawsuit as opposed to when a U.S. Federal Executive Official (or agency) is named (in their official capacity) as the defendant? Further, in cases the U.S. government is the plaintiff what determines whether the named plaintiff is the United States, Executive Official, or agency in the lawsuit? Take for example NFIB v. OSHA, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Collins v. Yellen, or the recent Biden v. Nebraska cases. In these specific examples is there any particular reason why was OSHA named as opposed to the U.S. or the agency official, the CFPB was named instead of the Director, or Biden as opposed to the U.S. Is it determined by statute and/or the enforcing official? Or generally what determines these features? Thank you. | There are two main main circumstances in which individual officials are named. One is where the relief sought is non-monetary and the official has the ability to provide the relief, such as a habeas corpus action, which names the warden of the facility having custody of the individual bringing the action, or an action to has an official interpret a statute in a particular way by someone regulated by the statute. Usually, it is an action for an injunction, declaratory relief, or a writ compelling an official to do or refrain from doing something. The other is a Bivens action seeking to hold a government official responsible for misconduct in money damages, akin to a Section 1983 lawsuit against a state or local government official, although this is arguably not an official capacity lawsuit. Until the federal rules of civil and criminal and appellate procedure were amended in the late 20th century, interlocutory appeals from a judge's decisions (i.e. from orders entered before the case was completed) were structured as lawsuits brought by the appealing party against the judge in his official capacity seeking a writ under the All Writs Act, ordering him to change his order. But, this procedural nuance has been reformed in the federal courts and many state courts which instead now provide for these requests for relief to be structured as appeals of an order just like a final order, but under a different court rule authorizing certain interlocutory appeals. Cases brought in the U.S. Court of Claims seeking money damages from the United States where sovereign immunity has been waived or does not exist are brought against the United States. Claims in U.S. District Court seeking a refund of tax money paid are brought against the United States. Cases seeking to adjudicate title to property in which the United States government may have an ownership interest are brought against the United States. Counterclaims in cases brought by the United States against a person are brought against the United States. Cases against a specific independent government agency (e.g. AMTRAK a.k.a. the National Railroad Passenger Authority, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Postal Service, or the CFPB) are brought against the agency, either if the government agency in fiscally independent of the U.S. government as a whole so money damages come from the agency alone, or where there would be an official capacity suit if the person who could afford relief was a single governmental official in charge but for the relief requested only the multi-member board running the entire independent agency can make the decision, or in a counterclaim to an action brought by the agency against someone. It is better practice not to sue an agency or office of the United States which is not an independent agency, for example, the U.S. Justice Department, when the United States should have been the defendant. But, often this defect in naming a defendant is overlooked when someone sues, for example, the Justice Department for money damages in the U.S. Court of Claims for failure to pay a court reporting invoice, or sues the IRS in District Court seeking a tax refund, if it doesn't lead to any confusion. Agencies of the United States proper without separate corporate existence may not sue each other (e.g. the Justice Department may not sue the Labor Department), although this has been attempted more than once in some high profile cases by federal government attorneys who aren't very sharp when it comes to procedural issues, to the consternation of the judges involved. I'm not sure that there is any one convenient place where this is written down. Instead, it is spread piecemeal over case law in many different places. There are also probably special cases and exceptions that I haven't mentioned, but the cases I've mentioned are the most common and obvious ones. Perhaps one of them explains NFIB v. OSHA, for which I have no good explanation. | No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it." | united-states Sort of. Most particular courts have a chief judge, a position that is paid slightly more than that of a usual judge for a huge additional burden of administrative work managing the court house (e.g. courtroom assignments, policies on implementing case assignments, overseeing the jury system, security measures, hiring court clerk's office and court building staff, reviewing court budgets, deciding whether to close the courthouse for weather or pandemics and the like, etc.). In Colorado, there is a state appointed panel for each court that in connection with an outside private contractor evaluates judges periodically and prepares a report recommending or not recommending their retention in periodic retention elections, and there is a separate appointed panel that investigates allegations of judicial misconduct. In many other states, some or all judges have to run for re-election when their terms end and the voters decide if they should stay in office. Sometimes judges in these states are nominated by the appropriate level of one of the major political parties. In the federal courts, since judges serve for life and there is far less discretion to discipline them, Congress is the main supervisor in the sense of having the power to "fire" a judge. Trial court judge's substantive legal decisions are subject to review by courts with appellate authority over their court on a case by case basis. For courts of general jurisdiction, direct review of their cases on appeal is vested in an intermediate court of appeal in all but a few small states. For courts of limited jurisdiction that handle smaller civil disputes and/or misdemeanor criminal cases, direct appellate review is usually vested in the courts of general jurisdiction above it. In each state, the state judiciary as a whole has at its pinnacle a highest court, usually called the state supreme court, although a few states call it something else. It is the final court of review in the appellate process. It also has the authority to intervene in particular judicial decisions that would not ordinarily be ripe to raise in an ordinary direct appeal (e.g. questions about whether allegedly attorney-client privileged or other privileged evidence must be disclosed), including the authority, in rare cases to order that a judge in a case that was appealed be removed from a case. The federal court system and some larger states vest this authority in intermediate appellate courts as well. State supreme courts also have general administrative authority over the judiciary as a whole. The state supreme court (primarily through the chief justice of the state supreme court) in its administrative capacity handles budget issues, formulates court rules, prepares annual reports on the judicial branch, lobbies for state funding, is responsible for auditing lower court finances, makes IT decisions for the state judiciary as a whole, and makes myriad other policy decisions, although it does not directly supervise judges in the way that a line manager in a government agency would supervise that manager's subordinates. | The short answer is "yes". There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required. | No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal. | No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A. | The answer by Dale M is basically correct but has some details wrong. US Courts of Appeal Recall that in the US Federal system the circuit courts are the "Courts of Appeal", that is the middle level of the system, above the district courts, but below the Supreme Court. In the early days of the US, each Justice of the Supreme Court was assigned to one circuit, usually consisting of several adjacent states. The Justice spent roughly half of each year "riding circuit". The Justice would stop at two to four places in the circuit, where Federal district courts were located.The justice would sit together with one of the district court judges in those places, in the courthouse that would be otherwise used for the district court. That Two-judge panel would constitute the session of the Circuit Court. The places where the circuit court was held were usually state capitols or other large towns or cities. The Justice would not stop at every small town along the way. (I recently read The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-1835, Which describes the practice in detail. Travel was quite wearing on the Justices. During the actual Supreme Court term, they lived in a boardinghouse in Washington DC, usually the same house for all the Justices. Cases were often discussed after hours at these boardinghouses. The Chief Justice often made arrangements for the coming year's accommodation. The Justices' wives did not normally join them in Washington nor on circuit.) This practice persisted until 1912, but had ceased by the early twentieth century. It stopped in some Circuits sooner than others. There are now permanent judges assigned to the Courts of Appeal, which is now their proper formal name, but the areas over which they have jurisdiction are still known as circuits, and the courts are informally still called the Circuit courts. In fact the judges of the Courts of appeal are often where Presidents look when there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Each circuit still has a supervising Justice assigned to it. That Justice handles certain "emergency" appeals from the circuit court, either ruling on them at once, or relaying them to the full Supreme Court. English Assize Circuits In England, before the US existed, judges rode circuit. These assize circuits were defined by statute in 1293, and remained in use until they were replaced by the Crown Court in 1972 under the Courts Act 1971 Western US In the West and Mid-west of the US during the nineteenth century, some state courts (not federal courts) rode circuit in areas where the population was not dense enough to support a full time stationary court. The Judge was often accompanied by a group of lawyers, whom would take on the various cases that awaited the judge. However, these courts are not what is usually meant by "circuit courts" in US usage. These judges did often stop at a relatively large number of small towns, often county seats or comparable locations, where a county courthouse might exist. This practice stopped at different times in different areas, but it was obsolete by the early twentieth century. | This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer. |
Death Threats on the Internet I recently read a bunch of stories about people making shooting/bomb threats on the internet and being arrested for it. These are often written in a matter-of-fact way. But I know I have also seen people also make death threats in a joking context, and I am just wondering if even these people are putting themselves at a great risk, were the FBI contacted. For example, If someone tweets, "Found an olive in my subway sandwich, gonna go [COMMIT CRIME TO SUBWAY]." What about something like this which I remember seeing? Or what about death threats to individuals? I know people, especially women, talk about getting death/rape threats online. Would the police actually do anything about these cases, if it's a person being threatened and not a school or other building? | I don't think there is any way to determine the magnitude of the risk. It is certainly a federal crime – 18 USC 875(c). The FBI doesn't publicly disavow the possibility of an investigation in cases that you might think are hyperbolic speech. There is the case of Elonis v. US, who was investigated and prosecuted for "making threats" – focusing on the statutory language transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat Defendant argued that threat "conveys the notion of an intent to inflict harm", but the court disagreed with both prosecution and defense w.r.t. a mental state requirement in the statute. The court explores various scienter requirements, and concludes that there is a mens rea component to the crime (this is not a strict liability crime). The basis for the appeal is that defendant wanted an jury instruction read saying that "the government must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat", and what the jury was told was that A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual The court rejected importation of the negligence-law "reasonable person" standard, when the question for criminal law should be "awareness". The standard for conviction is that "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal". As for investigations, law enforcement can investigate the possibility that a literal threat corresponds to an awareness in the utterer's mind that this is a real threat. When the prosecution makes the case in court, they would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in the defendant's mind, he intended to make a true threat. Based on the snippet that you posted, there is reasonable doubt as to there being a true threat. | It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody. | Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office. | Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules". | These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information. | It's important to keep in mind that charges don't really tell us much about what crimes actually occurred. Sometimes cops file charges that aren't justified; sometimes they don't file charges that would be justified. There can be lots of reasons for the gaps between the evidence and the charges. My best guess is that the officers involved don't have quite as much information about his intent as they'd like to have when they go in front of a judge to argue for keeping this guy locked up. If they're going to hold him for attempted murder, they'll need to present evidence about what he was thinking and demonstrate that he intended to cause the officer's death (ARS 13-1104). That's possible, but it's a lot tougher than what they'd need to show for aggravated assault, which only requires a showing that he "intentionally [placed] another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury." (ARS 13-1204) They'll probably bring him up on murder charges, but they probably don't lose much by just booking him now on something easy to prove but serious enough to justify holding him, and then letting a grand jury indict him on the most serious charges. | This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed). | Start with the premise that Person A has so far engaged only in speech, which is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. So unless the speech is for some reason unprotected, the police should not involve themselves. This of course begs the question of whether this speech is protected. The First Amendment does not protect "true threats," which includes "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). So the question for the police is whether Person A's texts were meant to communicate a serious intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. Removing First Amendment protection won't be as simple as letting B testify that he truly felt threatened, as the question is whether A meant to communicate a threat. But that also means that for A, it won't be enough to simply deny any violent intent, so the "nothing illegal" disclaimer won't be enough. In the end, this is a question for a jury to decide, should the case ever reach that far. The jury would essentially be asked to engage in mind-reading, determining what A was thinking when he sent those texts. The jury should be instructed to take several factors into consideration when it makes that decision, including the "context" of the remarks (the explicit disclaimer of violence helps A), the "conditional nature" of the threat (the three-strikes langauge helps A), and the "reaction of the listener" (calling the police hurts A). Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Practically speaking, if B were to call the police, I'd expect them not to investigate, unless they were awfully bored. If they decided to, I don't think there would be any actionable violation of A's rights, given their obvious inability to divine A's intent based solely on B's account. A court would likely allow them to investigate, but I doubt a prosecutor would allow them to bring charges based on the facts you've described. |
What happens to judges that are discredited with respect their legal actions? What happens to judges that are discredited with respect their legal actions? Are there adverse professional consequences? The subject at hand is a US District Judge. I'm not asking about a judge who is caught in some extracurricular activity, e.g. one having an affair outside of marriage but about judges who clearly abandoned logic and precedent, especially in favor of politics. | The judge's decision is reversed or vacated, and then she continues being a judge as though nothing happened. There are essentially no consequences available for federal judges, with the exception of impeachment. | Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual. | If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error." | When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be. | It isn't 100% clear from the question if a case has been filed in court, or someone was just planning on filing a lawsuit, which is an important fact. It seems like the ex filed a court case and you hired attorneys who responded. If there is a court case filed, that can't just be abandoned until all the i's are dotted and t's are crossed in the eyes of the court. The lawyers can't quit unless the court gives them permission to do so. Usually, lawyers are entitled to be paid for all of the work they do and out of pocket charges they incur in a case, until it is wrapped up, even if some wrap up work happens after the event that determines the final outcome of the case like your ex deciding to abandon his arguments. But, otherwise, if there isn't a pending court case, you normally have the power to tell your lawyers to stop everything and give you the moment left (if any) in your retainer. At first read, it almost sounded as if your lawyers are willing to do that, but are warning you that your ex might continue to be a problem after the lawyers quit and that if that happens, it will be more costly and time consuming to start all over dealing with the threatened lawsuit that your ex made, than it would be to get it over and done with now. But, upon closer inspection, it seems that there is a pending lawsuit and that this is the issue. | There are two primary parts to the question. The first is, is it a violation of the due process clauses to deprive you of property or liberty without following the law: the answer is, it is. If you did not violate any law, you cannot legally be punished. That does not mean that you understand the law correctly, e.g. you may not be aware that non-payment of child support or writing rubber checks is grounds for license suspension. The second part is, can they follow a secret process where you are not informed of the charges or the results of the legal proceeding? That too is a requirement (known as procedural due process), see this article. You must be made aware that your license is subject to suspension and has been suspended. Your attorney would have to advise you, based on the details of your specific circumstance, whether your procedural due process rights had been violated. For example, if you write a rubber check, you will be ordered to appear in court (there's your notice). If you fail to show up, they can suspend your license. However, under F.S. 322.251, they do have to "notify" you that your license was suspended. The law says that Such mailing by the department constitutes notification, and any failure by the person to receive the mailed order will not affect or stay the effective date or term of the cancellation, suspension, revocation, or disqualification of the licensee’s driving privilege. This kind of "we sent it" definition of giving notice is probably universal in the US: no jurisdiction allows the "I never got it" defense. | The judge would reject the defendant's guilty plea and proceed to trial. This is a common part of a plea colloquy, which is a standard (often scripted) conversation that occurs between the judge and a defendant who is pleading guilty to ensure that the plea is voluntary and made with knowledge of its possible consequences. It seeks to ensure that the defendant is aware of what they're charged with and the consequences of their plea, and that they were not improperly pressured into pleading guilty—for example, because they felt that their lawyer wasn't doing a good enough job. This is required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11, which requires that: Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement) Many (possibly most/all) US states have similar rules. For example, Pennsylvania law states that "The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and shall not accept it unless the judge determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered." Examples of scripted questions to establish this include: Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this case by your attorney, Mr./Ms. __________? Are you satisfied with the services of your lawyer? [ Mr./Ms. defendant ], are you satisfied with the representation you have received from [ Mr./Ms. defense counsel]? If the defendant answered that they were not satisfied (and continued to give that answer when informed of the consequences of doing so, as occurred in the below example), the judge would reject the guilty plea and proceed to trial. It's remarkably difficult to find a case in which anyone has actually done this. The only one I could find was this New Jersey case in which the "defendant would not agree on the form that he was satisfied with defense counsel's work." The judge informed the defendant in various ways that this would lead to the plea being rejected and proceeding to trial: Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. ... The only other thing I can do is schedule you for trial, Mr. Cuevas, which you are entitled to. Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. I can't take your plea after you're telling me that you're dissatisfied with your lawyer. If I can't take your plea because it's not appropriate and it's not legal, the only other thing I can do is schedule the case for trial. | In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures. |
Can one's personal electronic accounts be forced to be made accessible in a civil case like divorce? If there's a criminal case, the police can get a warrant to access someone's electronic communications without the suspect's consent. What about a civil case (if it makes a difference, let's say divorce as the question arose from thinking about that topic). If person A sues person B, and their lawyer says "there's evidence that B did something bad, in B's email" (in case of divorce, probably adultery evidence), and person B's layer says "they made it up", can A's lawyer - or the judge - demand and enforce access to B's email, social media or other electronic communications? Jurisdiction is US, if a state matters let's say NJ | Yes. There is both a duty to disclose and permit inspection of certain records (e.g. those that adversely affect either party's case or support another party's case) and a right for the court to demand access to other specific records. In england-and-wales the applicable rules are found in Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example: Standard disclosure 31.6 Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only– (a) the documents on which he relies; and (b) the documents which – (i) adversely affect his own case; (ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or (iii) support another party’s case; and (c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction. Specific disclosure (1) The court may make an order for specific disclosure or specific inspection. (2) An order for specific disclosure is an order that a party must do one or more of the following things – (a) disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; (b) carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; (c) disclose any documents located as a result of that search. Party's control 31.8 (1) A party’s duty to disclose documents is limited to documents which are or have been in his control. (2) For this purpose a party has or has had a document in his control if – (a) it is or was in his physical possession; (b) he has or has had a right to possession of it; or (c) he has or has had a right to inspect or take copies of it. Right of inspection 31.3 (1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except where – (a) the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; (b) the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it, or (c) paragraph (2) applies. (2) Where a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of document disclosed under rule 31.6(b) – (a) he is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but (b) he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. Inspection and copying 31.15 Where a party has a right to inspect a document– (a) that party must give the party who disclosed the document written notice of his wish to inspect it; (b) the party who disclosed the document must permit inspection not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the notice; and (c) that party may request a copy of the document and, if he also undertakes to pay reasonable copying costs, the party who disclosed the document must supply him with a copy not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the request. And, in case there's any doubt that this applies to electronic records: Meaning of document 31.4 In this Part – ‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded; | There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order. | It's not clear whether you mean that the entire agreement is carried out by text message. If you have a paper or electronic document stating what the parties will do, that is the agreement, and signatures are a conventional form of proof that there is an agreement. A handshake or a verbal statement – or text mesage – could also serve as evidence of the agreement, though there could be problems with the quality of the evidence (e.g. how do the witnesses know which piece of paper you agreed to). There is not a huge body of law surrounding text messages (and apparently none regarding text messages and contracts). We know that a text message is not a "printed receipt" (Shlahtichman v. 800 Contacts), and that a text message is a "call" w.r.t. the Do-Not-Call law (Campbell-Ewald Company v. Jose Gomez, Keating v. Nelnet). The closest that I have been able to come in terms of a decision about whether a text message is "written" is Commonwealth v. Mulgrave 472 Mass. 170, which states that While Massachusetts appellate courts have yet to approve admission of text messages or any other writing under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule... The wording "any other writing" implies that the court believes text messages to be "writing", which of course it is if you look at the plain meaning of the word "write". Contracts can be formed and signed by email: 15 USC 7001 states that a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form....a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation so the fact of electronic writing does not make the contract non-written. There must be a venerable and well-known rationale behind the written / oral asymmetry, which presumably has to do with the volatility of memory which would be front and center in a dispute about oral contracts. FRE 1001 "clarifies" that a "writing" consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set down in any form, and that a "recording" consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent recorded in any manner. 15 USC 7001 also states that An oral communication or a recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an electronic record for purposes of this subsection except as otherwise provided under applicable law So a recording of an oral contract would be useful to prove that there was an agreement, but would not change the fact that the contract is oral. | No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape). | What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles. | Generally they don't. If the conversation was made while there was a third person present, the person can be a witness at trial. Unless the witness is impeached, the witness's statement may be sufficient for you to meet your burden of proof to show the statement was made, because the burden is just a preponderance of evidence in most civil cases. Note that, the existence of a statement is not sufficient to prove breach of privacy. The context surrounding the statement is important. If you intend to record communications from the landlord in the future, please check with your jurisdiction's laws regarding recording of communications. Many jurisdictions (such as California) only permit a private communication to be recorded when all parties give consent. Not only an illegally recorded conversation is inadmissible as evidence (with the exception to rebut a witness), it is also a crime to do so. Some other jurisdictions in USA allows one party to record the conversation without obtaining consent from the other party. | You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency. | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. |
Why is "standard of living" a consideration in divorce asset division? Why is "standard of living" a consideration in divorce asset division for adults at all, if children aren't involved? In my layman's mind: Nobody is entitled to a "standard of living". Just because you lucked out to marry a high-net-worth or high-earning individual, it should not "entitle" you to live the good life in perpetuity after you stopped being married. This is separate from the idea that a spouse may have contributed to said high-earning status by supporting their career, which is a far valid - but a wholly separate - reason in divorce court. For example, I assume a judge can apply "standard of living" idea even if the wealthy spouse can show that the wealth/income didn't change upwardly during the marriage; and that the spouse didn't contribute economically at all, due to paying for hired help to do house chores, and no children resulting etc... It seems like a moral hazard, in that it encourages lower income earners to trick higher income earners into marrying them under false pretenses, just to divorce them after a couple of years for a big payout in raised standard of living, or to simply not be a good spouse since they won't suffer in the divorce. Ideally, I'm looking for an authoritative answer to "why", for example a reason given by a judge establishing precedent, or a politician proposing the law that passed which establishes the idea). However, a solid legal analysis would also be good. UPDATE: Just to clarify - the question isn't asking why there is spousal support/maintenance in general. It's asking very specifically, why "established standard of living" is the criterion used to decide the amount. In other words, if a spouse is used to a billionaire lifestyle, why is the support aimed at perpetuating that same expensive lifestyle, as opposed to being a modest livable amount (say, mode or median or average wage). | A brief explanation follows. The Code of Hammurabi articulates the first form of alimony: If a man wish to separate from a woman who has borne him children, or from his wife who has borne him children: then he shall give that wife her dowry, and a part of the usufruct of field, garden, and property, so that she can rear her children. When she has brought up her children, a portion of all that is given to the children, equal as that of one son, shall be given to her. She may then marry the man of her heart In the Middle Ages, English ecclesiastical law mandated that a husband still has an obligation to support his wife even when they are separated (recall that divorce was not possible). This carried over to the US. As discussed in this article, there was a view (articulated in Bradwell v. Illinois by Justice Bradley that "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender .... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator". The basic rationale at the time was that the wife had a right to support as a consequence of the marriage, and would continue to exercise that right were it not for the conduct of the husband (by law, someone was at fault, and if it was the husband, he would have to compensate his wife). When no-fault divorce became a possibility in the late 60's, concepts of alimony were re-worked, so that alimony was no (usually) longer a permanent property right, and in its place there developed a desideratum of "maintenance" allowing the spouse with lesser economic power to maintain a diminishing property right. See this 1973 version of Washington's replacement-for-alimony law, which includes "The standard of living established during the marriage" as the law now does. Because this is established by state law in the US, and state legislatures aren't infamous about keeping close track of legislative debates, I don't think there are any surviving records of the rationale of the author of these bills. In fact, this law was drafted a few years earlier by The Uniform Law Commission – there may be some record of their discussion. [This article][5], written after the law was passed, takes note of the history of contractual concepts being applied to marriage (e.g. the territorial legislature enacted a measure that "marriage is declared to be a civil contract"), from which perspective one expects there to be compensation for breach of contract. | Whether or not the estate has an obligation to pay the mortgage is really dependent on the terms of the estate plan and the solvency of the estate. The fact that someone is on the deed to a property (whether a deed of gift or a transfer on death instrument) that automatically passes upon death of the original owner to a relative has little or nothing, really, to do with the estate plan. While it may have been part of the person's ultimate plan for the disposal of their assets in life and at death, that is different than being part of the actual estate plan, which deals with the disposition of assets upon death, setting out the wishes of the deceased as it pertains to all property. There are lots of people who end up in this position, even though the original person on the deed did not intend to purchase or leave the other any property. It happens a lot when say a child does not have adequate credit to secure a mortgage to buy a home, but has the money to pay a mortgage. So, in that scenario usually a parent or grandparent will put the mortgage in their name (the other will live there and pay the mortgage) and then in the event the "helper" dies, they have it pass to the other at death, either thru a "TOD" or a "joint tenancy", so that in the event they die intestate, or if the will is challenged, there will be no question who owns the house...the equity in it, anyway. It (the instrument) is its own separate entity, not subject to the will except to the extent the deceased makes it subject (I'm getting to that part). Like a life insurance policy, that pays on death but is not subject to any terms of the will, it can stand alone since deed is its own instrument, separate from any wills or trusts. Under federal law, the mortgage must be allowed to remain in effect without changes when it passes from one person to another because of a death. This negates any due-on-sale clause in the mortgage. Who pays for the remainder of what is owed, however, generally depends on the deceased's will. The will might stipulate, for example, that the heir receive the home, free and clear, with the estate to pay all monies due. In this case, the executor will either use liquid assets, or sell other non-liquid assets in the estate to pay off the mortgage. Other times, it will say that the heir get the equity, plus X amount of dollars, which the heir can put toward the home's mortgage or not. If the will is silent on the issue, it is the responsibility of the heir/person to whom the property transfers (they needn't even be an heir) to pay the mortgage upon its normal term due, or sell the property to satisfy the debt. In the event the property is worth less than the remaining mortgage, the bank will usually take the house in "deed in lieu of foreclosure" rather than seek overage from the estate. | Education level is not an FHA protected category. However, whenever you give one broad group preferential treatment over another, you'll raise eyebrows. Someone might argue, for example, that while your incentive does not explicitly mention a protected category like race or sex, it might disproportionately impact one group in a protected category over another. In fact, the Supreme Court in 2015 addressed this question in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project. They found (albeit by a 5-4 vote) that disparate impact could, under certain circumstances, be the basis for a discrimination claim under FHA. The Wikipedia article on this subject is informative. As for your case, it really depends on what you are trying to accomplish with the policy, and what you reasonably predict it will do. For example, given that in most areas, white people more often have graduate degrees than black people, then if this policy did in fact end up advantaging white tenant over black tenants, someone might claim that you are in effect discriminating on the basis of race. I would not want to be on the defending end of that claim. In general, if you want to be safe from FHA's wrath, you need to evaluate each applicant on their individual merits as a tenant, not their membership in some group. Whenever you treat one person differently from another person, you should have a reason that clearly derives from your business interests as a landlord, and you should write it down. Legal questions aside, it seems like a really bad idea to offer incentives like this. I can't imagine it achieving any legitimate business goal, and I can easily imagine it making tenants or applicants feel cheated and devalued. And when people feel cheated and devalued, even if they haven't legally been wronged, they often seek legal redress. Or slash your tires. The fact that grad degrees would not be required under your policy isn't relevant. In the eyes of the FHA, any disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category is discrimination. The only real question here is whether this is disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category. | You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court. | canada Courts have generally recognized that there is no "checklist." Courts will look at a multitude of indicators "of the sorts of behaviour that society, at any given point in time, associates with a marital relationship" (Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492). [The indicators] include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. (M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 59.) Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist. (Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124). | The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right). | In practice this is rarely done in the US. There have been cases of employment contracts with automatic increases tied to the CPI (Consumer Price Index) or some other measure of inflation -- I believe at one time a number of union contracts specified this. Employer and employee could certainly agree on any such formula. But in the absence of any explicit provision for such a link, and an agreed formula for the resulting salary, I think a stated salary would be interpreted as a fixed sum, not subject to change until an explicit change is made. Fixed wages are the almost invariable custom, and in the absence of any explicit provision for an automatic inflationary change, I think a court would assume a fixed amount, if it came to a court case. | It depends. An agreement of the type you describe is called a post-nuptial agreement or marital agreement. These agreements are not prohibited, but are subject to heightened scrutiny. In determining if it is valid, courts consider financial disclosure, an opportunity to consult a lawyer, and a voluntary non-coerced agreement in writing, as well as a requirement that it not be unconscionable when signed or when enforced. Strictly speaking, while alimony can be eliminated in this manner and divorce attorneys' fees and property settlements can be managed in this manner, child support cannot be eliminated in this manner, although some agreement as to what constitutes payment in kind of a child support obligation that is currently existing can be reached. Modification of child support requires court approval since the child's rights are implicated and the child is not competent to agree. In the circumstances you describe, I do not think that any of the agreement would be upheld as it would likely be found to be flawed both substantively and in the process by which it was agreed. This is particularly true because New Jersey is quite hostile to post-nuptial agreements relative to most states and generally only permits them when there is evidence that the marriage was nearly moribund or the agreement was entered into in connection with a reconciliation. In general, some of the considerations that apply in New Jersey are that: If the agreement was oral and enforcement is sought of a promise to convey real estate, there must also be compliance with the statute of frauds. The court may have to resolve disputes over the terms of the agreement. The court must consider whether the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into were fair to the party charged. The terms of the agreement must have been conscionable when the agreement was made. The party seeking enforcement must have acted in good faith. Changed circumstances must not have rendered literal enforcement inequitable. This approach remains good law in New Jersey and has been enforced in a manner that is quite skeptical of these agreements. See, e.g., Kriss v. Kriss, A-3255-15T3, 2018 WL 1145753 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 5, 2018). Many others states are more inclined to uphold such agreements. |
How does "sexual desertion" get determined by the court? I was reviewing a link supplied by a helpful user regarding my earlier question, listing various legal grounds for divorce in New Jersey, and found this interesting tidbit: 4. Desertion Desertion is a potential cause of action in the event that your spouse has abandoned you physically, ... , or sexually, as in refusing to engage in a marital relationship. How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? I'm interested in the question in general, but if a specific jurisdiction is needed, let's assume New Jersey, US. | How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? Testimony under oath is evidence. Judges resolve "he said she said" situations every day on a routine basis with witness testimony alone by judging the credibility of each witness before them. See also an answer by @Jen about the subject of how things are proved in court in general. In the appropriate case, testimony under oath with no other corroborating evidence can even support a murder conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It can certainly suffice to prove marital fault in a civil lawsuit for a divorce. If the judge finds that witness testimony under oath between more than one witness is irreconcilably different, and each witness is equally credible, and that it is impossible to tell which person is telling the truth, then the person seeking relief from the court has failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain relief from the court. But, this is rare. Usually, when witnesses are both testifying under oath and disagree about what happened, the judge will find that one witness is more credible than the other. And, in truth, while people certainly do lie in open court under oath, and probably are more likely to lie in that situation than when speaking to someone not under oath outside of a courtroom, most of the time, people don't lie and the testimony of all of the witnesses are consistent with each other subject to limitations based upon what they could perceive from their perspective and the limitations of imperfect memories. This could come down to demeanor in court, hesitation in answering, "tells", inconsistencies in their testimony, corroboration from other evidence and other witnesses (e.g. what someone said to a friend or wrote in a diary at the time), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime of deceit in the past, use of language that suggests coaching about their testimony, or common sense judgments about whose story seems more plausible under the circumstances of the parties in front of the judge. | Resolving Conflicting Injunctions This happens from time to time, frequently in cases involving child custody with dueling cases in different states, at least until recent legislative changes (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act), which set forth clear rules calculated to leave only one court with jurisdiction to enter orders in almost all cases. The very first case I worked on as a student in a law school clinical program involved this kind of jurisdictional standoff. There is no fool proof way to prevent this, although parties will often forcefully ask the court not to have contradictory injunctions imposed upon them, and courts will often take these arguments seriously. And, the parties will usually parse the language of each order to determine how both can be possibly be complied with at once. Also, impossibility is a defense to being held in contempt of court for violating an injunction, and this tends to favor honoring the first entered of contradictory injunctions since the first is not impossible to comply with but complying with subsequent orders may be impossible. When push comes to shove and the appeals in each case don't change the result, usually the case keeps going up the appellate court ladder on an emergency basis in each contradictory case until it the deadlock is resolved, or until a court with jurisdiction over all courts involved intervenes. But, as you note, there is no definitive way to prevent the highest court in the land from having a deadlock (which can happen even when there are an odd number of judges if a judge recuses). In many state supreme courts, and in appellate courts outside the U.S., deadlock in a tie breaker court is often avoiding by having a process to appoint lower court judges a substitute judges in a higher court when there is a potential for deadlock in that court. But, the U.S. Supreme Court has no such process. The Ongoing Policy Debate There is on ongoing debate in federal public law practice (i.e. in cases in which the government is a party) over whether national injunctions of the type that have been issued in the DACA case and the Muslim ban cases in the current administration are proper, or not on jurisdictional grounds (but, the propriety of the injunction is generally not a defense to being held in contempt of court for violating it). These injunctions bind the United States government, which is a single entity over which the court has jurisdiction, but the dispute is over whether these injunctions should be allowed to benefit non-parties who are similarly situated to those before the court (the prevailing rule at this time), or whether the parties seeking an injunction against the United States government only have standing to obtain relief for themselves personally, in the absence of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which has procedures calculated to protect the interests of members of a class who are not personally before the court. The "conservative" position is that "national" injunctions against the United States should not be allowed outside of class actions, which would reduce the potential risk of conflicting orders, but would allow the United States government to proceed with conduct that had already been judicially determined elsewhere in a case against the same defendant to be unacceptable and illegal conduct. The status quo of allowing "national" injunctions is also important to allow a court to have the power to grant relief to individuals whose current location is not known perhaps, for example, because the United States government has concealed this information. For example, a national injunction allows a district court to grant relief to a parent whose child has been removed from the parent improperly to an unknown location in the juvenile immigration detention system for which the U.S. government lost track of 1,400+ juveniles due to poor record keeping. | This is what we mean when we say something falls between the cracks. Sorry for that. First off, in the United States, family law is not federal, it is individual to each state. This means there is no federal agency or official charged with enforcing family law. When it comes to marriage and divorce, the federal government and their border agents are after those seeking to gain benefit through fraud (i.e., attempting to attain status through fraudulent marriage). Likewise, they don't have formal cross-jurisdictional protocols controlling the right of the US government to demand personal, private family law records from other governments. Nor do they have the means to pursue that. What this means, in practical terms, is that no family law judge sitting in the US has authority, interest or means in international marriage and divorce beyond those cases initiated in their court. I hope you read that slowly and carefully. Ask me if you need clarification. I suspect that you have a very specific cause in mind that necessitates you being in possession of a divorce decree. And I get the impression that you and your ex-spouse are in agreement and working together to solve this. You might find it valuable, at this point, to take a step back a little further into history. Let's consider your marriage. You two know you got married. I suspect that your friends, loved ones, and hopefully family know you got married. Then there is that clerk somewhere in Denmark (who records more than 100 marriages every week) who knows you got married. Theoretically. Possibly. Maybe. You've been residing in Russia for some years now, and the Russian government doesn't know you are married. Marriage is illegal there. So, in actuality the Russian government, if asked by some official of some other government, can only state with truth and authority that it is certain that you are NOT married. At the same time, some US federal official decides to investigate the most highly unlikely case ever. Someone is trying to gain entry, not by claiming marriage but by hiding a marriage. (ridiculous!) So, with a budget of zero, and the authority to match, goes from country to country demanding that they open up the (extremely) private records of family courts in search of the evidence he needs. When they ask him to demonstrate cause, he boldly tells them that his sharp mind is cause enough. They agree and give him cups of tea as he searches through the private affairs of their residents. It is never-ending, but he is proud to be working to stop the flood of unwanted divorced persons trying to gain entry to the USA. - - - - You get the picture. Also, consider the option of an international divorce. I would provide a reference here, but a simple Google search will yield many providers. It is expensive and time-consuming, but an available option. I'd rank it last. There are also varied laws by jurisdiction - internationally. I'm not expert enough to know of any jurisdictions that might not require extended residency. I suspect some won't. I am confident, on the other hand, that there are several that you might access with relative short windows of required residency. This Wikipedia article should give you a good start. You are also maybe a little fast in dismissing Denmark as a possible venue. European Union states, at one time, experienced a tangled mess regarding family law across jurisdictions and specifically divorce. In 2003, however, the EU implemented Regulation 2201/2003 providing for conferred jurisdictional competence by way of exception in cases involving applicants for divorce similarly situated to you. And now jurisprudence, in a wonderful show, is beginning to catch up with regulation and public sentiment on the matter. The provisions seem complicated, but they are definitely outside the abilities of a couple of Russians who have managed to get this far. Here's a starting point to get the ball rolling. Aside from those three solutions, you might be stuck. You would be ill-advised to seek some creative solution outside of the law. And I struggle to think of anything that might work. Unfortunately, justice and law are often connected by a mere thread, and sometimes not at all. You are left to forge ahead on behalf of others, who enjoy the fruits of your labour. For that, you have our gratitude. And while I am no expert on the fight for justice, There is this man - an American, who is. He wasn't gay, so much as black. Be he figured out a lot regarding justice. There are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all." -Martin Luther King Jr. I salute you. | The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court. | in washington state can a divorce case last 32 months Yes. There is no limit to the possible duration of a divorce case, especially where at least one represented party has any money. This report showcases various instances of divorce proceedings that have lasted longer than the marriage itself because lawyers dragged the case for as long as they want. Being in Washington or New Jersey makes no difference. Your description, including the mention that your "helper" from the divorce packet babysat your kid, suggests that you have been scammed. If you want to get divorced, it is in your best interest to learn about divorce & procedural laws of your state and then take the helm of your proceedings. You did not specify the conditions of the divorce packet you purchased. It is therefore unclear whether the packet provider has any duty toward you in the direction of an attorney-client relation. That being said, your husband as the adversary in the proceedings has no obligation to inform you about proceedings if he already notified the person representing you in court. | This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know. | united-states In the United States, divorce is a matter of state law, and each of the 50 states has slightly different laws. But in general, it is not true as a matter of law that divorced women are awarded everything but "a mattress and a TV". A small number of states, of which the largest are California and Texas, are community property states. In such states, all property acquired during the marriage is generally divided equally according to the value of the assets. The majority of states, however, follow what is called "equitable distribution". In such states, assuming the divorce goes before a judge (most divorces don't), the judge must determine a fair distribution of the assets acquired during the marriage. As an example, in the state of Illinois, this division should be based on factors such as: the effects of any prenuptial agreements the length of the marriage each spouse's age, health, and station in life whether a spouse is receiving spousal maintenance (alimony) each spouse's occupation, vocational skills, and employability the value of property assigned to each spouse each spouse's debts and financial needs each spouse's opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income either spouse’s obligations from a prior marriage (such as child support for other children), contributions to the acquisition, preservation, or increased value of marital property, including contributions as a homemaker contributions to any decrease in value or waste of marital or separate property the economic circumstances of each spouse custodial arrangements for any children of the marriage the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has physical custody of children the majority of the time, and any tax consequences of the property division. (The exact legal phrasing of the statutes can be found in 750 ILCS 5 if you're curious.) In practice, this may result in a partner who has stayed home with the kids for 10 years getting a larger share of the shared property; such a person may have difficulty re-entering the workforce because of their lack of recent work experience. Similarly, if it is desirable to have the couple's children remain in the family home, and one partner will be receiving primary custody (perhaps because they have spent many years at home bonding with the children), then the family home may be awarded to that partner. In such circumstances, the judge may also award the other partner a larger portion of the assets than they would otherwise receive, to compensate for the loss of equity. In practice, given gender norms within Western societies, it is more likely that a woman will stay home with the children, have worse economic prospects after divorce, and be awarded primary custody of any children. An equitable distribution would therefore favor the woman under the above criteria. But the law itself does not discriminate by gender. If a heterosexual couple divorced where the woman had been the primary wage-earner and a man was the homemaker, the distribution of assets might well favor the man. | Prior to 2010, New York was the last state to have only fault based divorce. In 2010, the fault based grounds for divorce were retained, but a no fault ground for divorce was added and has become very popular. In a no fault divorce: All that has to be proved and stated in your divorce papers is that the marriage has been “irretrievably broken" for at least six months. One spouse must state this under oath. With respect to this point: Alice has asked Bob to leave their shared house, but he refuses and maintains residence at the property. The judge will almost certainly at the very outset (probably within a month or two, quite possibly in a matter of days) order one spouse out of the house in temporary orders if either spouse objects to continued cohabitation. Temporary orders at the outset of a divorce establishing a provisional status quo with separated parties is routine. In a divorce, title to the residence is pretty much irrelevant, and so are the wishes of the adults unless they agree. There is no presumption in favor of either party, i.e. neither for or against Bob, and neither for nor against Alice, in a temporary orders hearing, based upon who filed for divorce or who lived there at the time of temporary orders. There is, however, a very strong imperative to not have people who are getting divorced cohabiting when one or both of the parties doesn't want to cohabit. Cohabitation would only in the most extraordinary case be imposed on a party who opposed it during divorce proceedings. The judge looks at the facts and circumstances and decides for one or the other without considering at all who filed for divorce, and without seriously considering what either of them want (if they don't agree). Once a divorce has been commenced, everything is up for grabs without regard to who filed for divorce. Usually, temporary use of the residence if awarded to the primary caretaker of the children if there is one, so that the children's lives can be disrupted as little as possible. But, a judge in a temporary orders hearing has immense discretion. For example, Rudy Giuliani wife was granted occupancy of his official residence as Mayor of New York City during one of his three divorces: "Giuliani moved out of Gracie Mansion by August 2001 and into an apartment with a couple he was friends with." What can Bob do to stonewall the process? Not all that much other than insisting on disputing all matters to be resolved in the divorce and taking them to trial. Bob can't prevent the divorce from happening and can't do all that much to slow down the process any more than insisting on taking everything to trial does. Generally speaking, efforts to unjustified efforts to delay the process and the inevitable will be penalized and it is unethical for Bob's lawyer to use such tactics. If it is apparent to the judge that Bob is trying to stonewall, this will be perceived as defiance of the court's authority in a case where the judge has massive discretion to make a determination on the merits. This is unwise, although there is no specific consequence that could necessarily be assigned to this kind of perception. What happens if he refuses to sign the divorce papers? A process server delivers the papers to him, and then a judge decides how to resolve the disputed issues related to custody, property, child support, alimony, and attorney fees. Bob's consent is not required for anything. Bob could speed things up by agreeing to various things, but only so much. If those consequences are highly detrimental, what is his next course of action after delaying as long as possible? And then what are the consequences from that action? (Continuing on until he is out of options) Fighting for the sake of fighting rarely produces an optimal outcome. Delaying as long as possible is almost never the best strategy. If Bob litigates needlessly, he is likely to see most of both side's attorney fees allocated to him and to get a custody arrangement that is rigid in a way that will be detrimental to him in the long run. What is the ultimate outcome? Can Alice unilaterally force a divorce? Yes. What are the conditions of such a divorce likely to be? (alimony, the house, other property, etc) An equitable but not equal division of property, a parenting time and parental responsibility order that a judge finds to be in the best interests of the children, child support based upon child support guidelines with statutorily allowed adjustments if any are present, and alimony based on many factors but mostly duration of the marriage and the relative incomes of the parties. The specific award could vary significantly even in case where the lawyers present exactly the same facts to two different judges in the same courthouse, without either judge committing reversible error. This is a hypothetical and I am interested in the United States law as a whole, but if necessary I will specify New York State to establish a concrete jurisdiction. For what it is worth, New York is somewhat atypical. But the broad outlines of no fault divorces are reasonably similar. One factor that makes New York State divorces different from some no fault states is that marital fault can be considered in some cases in the substantive decision on the merits. But this is no applicable in the case of this question where, by assumption, there is no marital fault present. |
Countries with similar sexual offences Laws to Germany? I will start by saying that my research into German law is incredibly limited, and I am just following news articles on the topic. I of course apologise if I have fallen for fake news! My understanding is that prior to 2016, Germany had some outdated rape laws. This meant that no did not mean no, and the victim would have to demonstrate injuries from self defence. I also think that a victim being too drunk to consent was not enough for the police to bring a rape prosecution against someone. Is this correct in terms of date and facts? When did Germany officially implement this law, as I think that just because a law is changed does not mean it is implemented immediately? A good example to clarify my above question is that in Spain the age of consent was changed from thirteen to sixteen, however it took another few years to be implemented. Last but not least, I was curious as to whether any other countries still have similar laws to Germany regarding the points I covered earlier, namely: no not meaning no, and being too drunk to consent not being a crime? | […] that prior to 2016, Germany had some outdated […] laws. […] The changes of November 9, 2016, BGBl. I 2460 ff, were brought forward under the impression of the 2015 NYE spike in reported sexual assaults. Particularly incidents around the Cologne train station/cathedral area were widely received. […] outdated rape laws. No, there was no change in the subsection concerning rape. Only editorial changes were made, now following the “new orthography”, less pompous wording/update to today’s parlance, and change in numbering. This meant that no did not mean no, […] If I ask you to “touch me down here” and you say “No” and I take your hand regardless and, without (physical) resistance from your side, place it at the respective location, then it’s sexual assault now, because you said “No”. Previously, it would have required force, e. g. grabbing your hand, to constitute a criminal offense. […] the victim would have to demonstrate injuries from self defence. […] Legally – what the law says – it is not necessary. You will not find a single reference in the law “the victim must demonstrate injuries”. However, successful persecution will be difficult in a he-said-she-said situation. If the court cannot be convinced, it will decide in dubio pro reo (i. e. acquit the accused). This is a general issue of criminal prosecution, though, but people get particularly agitated if it is concerning sexual self-determination. It is notable that a change in law does not bring improvements in that regard. […] a victim being too drunk to consent was not enough […] Previously, there was “in a defenseless situation”. Courts (not the police) interpreted this mostly restrictive. Being drunk does not automatically mean being defenseless (and arguably some people even like drunken sex/having sex while on drugs). Now there is an additional alternative “taking advantage of a person’s physical or psychological condition causing a significant impairment in forming or expressing his will, unless he gives his express consent”. This is a shift toward a subjective assessment of criminality. A sexually very experienced person is well-versed in his capability of giving consent to sexual interactions, whereas a sexually-inexperienced person exhibits “significant impairment” at an earlier level. It is yet to see how courts deal with that. […] When did Germany officially implement this law, […] The changes took effect the next day, on November 10, 2016. Technically, there’s no “implementation period”. However, on November 10, 2016, no lawyer could have definitely answered, for instance, the question “What is a legal definition of ‘against apparent wish’?” | It depends on the jurisdiction but, very broadly speaking, the person might be ill such that: they did not know what they were doing or that what they were doing was wrong (insanity) their ability to understand their actions or make a reasoned decision or self control was highly impaired but not to the degree of insanity (diminished responsibility or perhaps provocation) they were unconscious when they acted (automatism - e.g. an offence committed while 'sleep walking') Clearly they lack the same culpability as a person with "good mental health", who consciously committed a criminal offence, knowing it was wrong. That does not mean the ill person can 'get away with it'. Claiming diminished responsibility as a defence to a murder charge may mean the person will instead be tried for manslaughter, which is also punishable by imprisonment. Depending on the circumstances a court (and subsequent people in authority) might be persuaded that the person is so dangerous they must be indefinitely detained and treated without their consent. Doesn't this sort of allow psychiatrists to make up the law, because they can decide if something is considered a mental condition? Just because a psychiatrist comes along doesn't mean the court will do what the psychiatrist says is best - the court will hear both sides of the argument, establish the facts, interpret the law and deliver a verdict. Some people would argue that someone who would commit such crimes (such as rape) couldn't possibly be in their right mind. Certainly, but so far as I'm aware that defence is very rarely used and never successful. | Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved. | I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on. | european-union (germany, spain, uk) The cookie consent law is the ePrivacy directive, which was implemented as national laws by all EU member states (including, at the time, the UK). Later, GDPR changed the applicable definition of consent so that implicit consent is no longer allowed. A notice in fine print as in the given example is not sufficient to meet this definition of consent, so any non-necessary cookies set in that context would be a violation. But it would be the national ePrivacy implementation that would be violated, not the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR's famous 4%/EUR 20M fines are not relevant here. Instead, each country can set its own fines. In Germany, this would probably be up to EUR 50k (§16 TMG) though German law doesn't implement this aspect of ePrivacy correctly. In the UK, PECR penalties are determined by more general data protection penalty legislation. Notable instances of cookie consent enforcement include the Planet 49 (ECJ judgement, German BGH verdict) case which basically affirmed that yes, the GDPR's definition of consent applies. Thus, any case law regarding GDPR consent is also applicable to the issue of cookies. Furthermore, the Spanish AEPD has issued an interesting fine due to insufficient cookie consent, but due to much more subtle violations than the outright disregard in the given example. E.g. in the Vueling action (decision (Spanish, PDF), summary, listing on enforcementtracker), the Vueling airline's website had a consent banner but ultimately told the user to reject cookies via their browser settings. This violates the requirement that consent must be specific/granular, since the browser settings are all-or-nothing if they're available at all. The airline was fined EUR 30k, the maximum possible under applicable Spanish data protection law. But what kind of risks would some blog run into that just sets cookies without appropriate consent? If the service is outside of the EU, enforcement is difficult. I am not aware of cookie consent enforcement against non-EU services. National data protection authorities can investigate the violation and issue fines, subject to their respective national data protection laws. They generally only do this when there are lots of complaints. Some authorities like the UK ICO have indicated that cookie consent enforcement isn't a priority for them. Independently, individuals can generally sue the service for damages. Some lawyers might send out cease and desist letters to non-compliant websites in the hopes of collecting fees. So aside from the last point, the risk is likely somewhat low, especially for a smaller site. At this point, it is worth reminding that ePrivacy/GDPR doesn't require consent for all cookies, and is not just limited to cookies. It is more generally about access to and storage of information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by the user. Thus, functional cookies can be set without consent. However, consent does become necessary when cookies or similar mechanisms are used for analytics, tracking, or ads. Even though GDPR is involved, the cookie consent requirements apply regardless of whether the cookies involve any personal data. | This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed. | Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement). | (Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account) |
Can one be liable to pay an agreed sum if they break a promise? Bob wants Alice to share a computer file with him. This could be a photo, a video/audio recording etc. — anything that only Alice has and that Bob craves a copy of. The copyright ownership shouldn't necessarily be a factor (other than it is not Bob's). Alice says: okay, I'll share the file with you, but you must not share it with anyone and not upload anywhere. If you break this promise, you'll pay me $1m. Bob says okay, deal. But later he flaunts the file on the Internet and openly admits breaking the promise. Can Alice get a court order that Bob pays her $1m? Note that Alice may not necessarily have suffered any quantifiable damages — the file could be just her discreet but private photo which she just didn't want to publish. Alternatively, she could have: the file could be her forthcoming music album, a movie script, a book to be published etc. | Assuming there is a contract (and it is not clear that there is), this is a purported liquidated damages clause. Alice is trying to dictate what Bob will owe her if he breaches his promise to not share the file. However, there are limits on what can be stipulated in a liquidated damages clause. Super Save Disposal Inc. v. Blazin Auto Ltd., 2011 BCSC 1784: The enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in an agreement engages two competing objectives: freedom of contract versus the right of the courts to intervene in a given case to relieve against an oppressive or unconscionable result flowing from enforcement of the liquidated damages term. It is well settled that the enforceability of such a term turns on whether it is a genuine pre-estimate of the expected loss that a party will sustain in the event of a breach of contract or a penalty clause so oppressive or unreasonable that equitable intervention is justified to prevent an injustice. Judicial interference with a liquidated damages provision will be justified if enforcement of the term results in payment of a sum which is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach Oppressive liquidated damages clauses work against a person's freedom to breach and the possibility of efficient breach. Perhaps if the file were a trade secret like the Coke recipe, the $1,000,000 might be a genuine pre-breach estimate, but without much more information about the nature of the file, I predict a court would find the $1,000,000 to be extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach. What follows is less researched. If it is not a contract then I think it is at best a licence, which would make Bob's agreement to pay $1,000,000 a free-standing unenforceable promise. I also agree with Matthew's position on the possibility (and limitations of) a claim in promissory estoppel, especially in jurisdictions following Waltons Stores or similar reasoning. | In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost. | The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony. | Addressing the question of programmer liability, generally speaking, a person who creates something that others use to infringe on copyright is not liable is liable if there are non-infringing uses for the thing (Sony). They can be liable if they intentionally contribute to infringement, viz Grokster one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. End-user liability is different. In order to legally download (watch) anything, you have to have permission from the rights-holder, and from the site operator. The site operator will have terms of service according to which you can access material: if you violate those terms, you are infringing on copyright (you didn't do what the permission to copy required of you). If the site-owner knowingly distributes material without permission, he is an infringer and you have no legal license to copy (watch) that content, so you too are an infringer. If the site-owner unknowingly distributed material without permission and generally complies with the DMCA safe harbor requirements, he is not an infringer but you the user are. Congress has not created an innocent-infringement defense where you can defend yourself against an accusation of infringement by proving that you didn't know that the material was distributed without permission (there is an option to reduce liability for statutory damages to $200 in case of unknowing infringement, but not make all liability go away). | It is hard to say: this article sketches the legal landscape. So-called deep linking that bypasses the main page for a site is not believed to be infringement, following the reasoning of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146. The URL itself does not have the bare minimum of creativity required for copyright protection, and storing a URL on a computer is not storing the contents that it refers to, so no copy was made in violation of copyright law. It is unlikely that competing theories would develop in other US districts (there don't appear to be any at the present). However, such a link could create secondary liability for infringement, see Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, where a party "has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement". If I link to a file on a pirate website, I am secondarily liable for that infringement. However, if I link to a legally-uploaded file which the author did not intend to make public, there is no infringement. Copyright law requires permission of the copyright owner, which is more than just "explicit denial". The problem is that a person can put a file out there and not say one way or the other whether you have permission to copy the file. The US Copyright office says that "A copyright owner must have expressly or implicitly authorized users to make retainable copies of a work by downloading, printing, or other means for the work to be considered published" (let's not care at the moment whether it is important to be "published"). The court may infer implicit permission from a copyright owner's conduct, but there is no rule "if it's on the internet, you've granted permission". A rights-owner may make a valiant but insufficient effort to block access to the work (except via a password), so in that context, the courts would infer that the rights-owner had not given permission, therefore the copying is infringing and you have secondary liability for your direct link to the material. | If you have sufficient grounds to fear that someone is about to infringe on one of your rights, you can go to court to obtain an injunction against that person. This is a court order to refrain from some particular action. In many cases, the point of this is just to have the legal debate on whether the anticipated action is actually legal or not before it happens rather than after. However, the punishment for violating the injunction is set by the relevant judge based on how important it is to dissuade the target from actually doing the thing, and how extensive the punishment needs to be in order to achieve this. After a few rounds of your guy doing the copyright infringement, getting an injunction against him doing it again should be quite straight-forward. And if he violates that, it would be reasonable to ask for a significantly higher fine next time, and then more, and more. Injunctions could also involve preparatory actions, eg prohibit the guy to even approach a computer, if this is deemed necessary to prevent reoffending. | Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test. | While it seems like a simple question, the answer is somewhat complicated. As is frequently the case for "white collar" misconduct, There are several civil and criminal legal theories that could be applied, depending upon the nature of the offense, at both the federal and state levels (e.g. how was it done and what is the relationship of the offender to the victim). The penalty will generally be specific to the legal theory under which punishment or compensation is sought. One of the more obvious ones (if the stolen files are legitimately classified as trade secrets) is violation of the state's trade secret law: If a court finds that a defendant has unlawfully taken a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following penalties and remedies: Criminal Penalties: Unlawfully taking a trade secret (defined above) constitutes the crime of larceny in Massachusetts and is punishable by up to five years imprisonment, or by a fine of up to $25,000 and up to two years imprisonment. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30. Damages: A court can make a defendant pay money damages to the plaintiff in an amount up to twice its actual damages. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42 Injunctive Relief: Massachusetts law gives a court the power to restrain the defendant from "taking, receiving, concealing, assigning, transferring, leasing, pledging, copying or otherwise using or disposing of a trade secret, regardless of value." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42A. It appears that a court could order you not to publish a trade secret if it found that you had unlawfully taken it from the plaintiff. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution may limit the court's authority to do so, however. Another would be a civil action for conversion of intellectual or intangible property, or a criminal action for theft or sale of stolen goods. Depending upon the means by which the files were obtained, it might implicate common law fraud and criminal fraud offenses (including wire and mail fraud), and state and federal laws involving computer crimes. Another legal theory could be tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with business prospects. Less aggressively a common law constructive trust could probably be imposed on the digital files and the proceeds from them, and the person receiving the proceeds of the stolen files could be sued for unjust enrichments/restitution. In many cases, it would be a civil and criminal federal copyright law violation (if the victim owns the copyright and the files are copyrightable material). The proper offenses and hence the available remedies, would depend to a significant extent both legally and from a practical and litigation tactics perspective, on the means by which the digital files were obtained. |
How can I find out if sample files in a copyrighted software are free to use? I am using the demo of a program called EC-Lab (electro-chemistry software platform). They have a Demo version available on the web and inside the program they include sample files. They is no license agreement accepted during the installation process. I have tried to find any licensing description once installed, but there is no info inside the program or in the Program Files(x86) folder. They do not reply and probably won't really know whether those are free to use or not. What would be a way to find this out? Would normally just test files be considered non-proprietary? | One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess. | It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works. | Written down computer code is subject to copyright. If you do not have the permission of the owner to copy it you are breaching their copyright unless your use constitutes fair use/dealing. | These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission. | This could be a problem if the consultancy agreement contains a provision that assigns to the client any copyright in any code created by the consultant. That is why there should be no such provision. In the absence of such a provision, the consultant owns the copyright in the code, so it would be impossible for the consultant to infringe that copyright. Even so, copyright protects a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The idea of an "analyze data" class containing a "read data" function is not itself subject to copyright protection. It could potentially be patentable as a "process," but it would fail to meet the criterion of novelty. It would also fail to meet the criterion of non-obviousness. On the other hand, a software developer cannot (without permission) copy source code that is protected by copyright simply by changing the names. Changing the names would constitute the creation of a derivative work, and the right to create derivative works is also protected by copyright. | No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs). | If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database. | Software licenses are protected by copyright, meaning that you need the author's permission to copy them. One way to get permission is to buy a license, since many of them are for sale. Sometimes (e.g. CC licenses) a license to copy the license is granted. You can also read and understand what is in a license, and use that knowledge to write your own. This is different from copying the license, since what you are extracting from the existing licenses is the ideas, not the specific expression. |
In France, is it legal to practice target shooting on your own land? I can find a lot of information about hunting on your own land, and my land would qualify for that. However, I don't have a hunting license and I'm in fact more interested in target practice / sport shooting. I do of course have a sport shooting license and legally registered weapons. My land does have a good hill as backdrop and it's large enough and over 150 meter away from the nearest dwelling. In the country of France, is it legal to practice target shooting on my own land, or only at an official gun range? | Not with that license Your post makes clear that you have a sports license, not a hunting license. In that case, it was delivered in accordance with R312-40 of the code de la sécurité intérieure: Peuvent être autorisés pour la pratique du tir sportif à acquérir et à détenir des armes, munitions et leurs éléments (...): 1° Les associations sportives agréées (...) 2° Les personnes majeures (...) Sauf dans le cadre des compétitions internationales, ces armes ne peuvent être utilisées que dans les stands de tir des associations mentionnées au 1° du présent article. A license to acquire and own arms, ammunitions and related elements (...), can be granted to: 1° Accredited sports associations (...) 2° People older than 18 (...) Except within the framework of international competitions, those weapons can only be used in shooting ranges of associations mentioned at 1°. | Gun control laws The moment you enter the 12 nautical miles zone of a country, you need to abide by its weapon laws. Most functioning large-caliber and fully-automatic weapons are not allowed in civilian hands globally. The moment the ship leaves the 12 nautical miles zone, the country law of its flag applies, so unless you happen to start in the US with a duly registered curio/relic deck gun with proper stamps... you'll have a hard time being allowed to have the thing on board in the first place, and entering any other country's water is pretty much violating their gun control laws and gun import laws. Ship hulls don't support them. That deck gun there is a type of Bofors 40mm L/60 twin mounting - 40x311mmR. That means, its installation weighs upwards of half a ton, as that's the smallest carriage setup according to Wikipedia. Navweapons helpfully provides gun weights of roundabout half a ton per gun. That puts the minimum weight at about that of a PAK 40, but as Navweapons tells us, a US Mark 1 Twin clocks in at 4.4 to 5.8 tons including guns. All on the one mounting spot. With the bulk they are, no fiberglass ship hull could support that much load on the gun's small footprint. It needs a steel-hulled superyacht to even bear the deck load of such an installation. If your ship is the size of a coastguard or navy vessel, it probably is such a ship redesigned, a commercial fishing boat (similar specs), a cargo vessel, a large cruise vessel, or built to your specifications from the ground up. | There are many regulations to consider, for the firearms themselves, the permits needed by potential customers, and licensing you will need as a business dealing with firearms and ammunition. Start with the Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/search?q=firearms I.e., https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479794/Guidance_on_Firearms_Licensing_Law_Nov_2015_v16.pdf | Laws on self-defense vary greatly from nation to nation. Generally, one cannot hunt down a hypothetical threat but one can defend against an actual threat or even a mistakenly assumed actual threat where no actual threat exists. Alice set it up so that Bob would feel threatened. In many jurisdictions, the self-defense defense for homicide rests on the state of the mind of the suspect, insofar as it can be determined, and failing that on a "reasonable person" standard. Presumably Bob genuinely felt threatened by Charlie and says so afterwards. "I thought he/it/whatever was trying to harm me. I didn't know it was a harmless actor." Just how much harm Bob needs to make self-defense stick varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It could be fear of imminent, serious bodily harm, or fear of being victimized in any sort of crime (stand your ground laws). As the comment by user6726 points out, just protraying a zombie or whatever isn't enough, there has to be threat to Bob. Bob cannot hunt Charlie down because Charlie "is" an evil lich or whatever. Bob can defend himself against attacks by Charlie and (in some jurisdictions) against intrusions by Charlie in his property. So it makes a difference if Bob hunts in his own backyard or further afield. The well-documented and extensive efforts by Alice and Darren to fool Bob should support Bob's statement. Say the court/jury believes that it was reasonable (or at least "not entirely unreasonable") for Bob to be afraid. Since the perceived self-defense would apply even if Bob thought the attacker was human, thinking that it was non-human should make little difference. Except that it would further showcase the degree to which Bob was fooled to see a threat. If the whole endeavor by Alice and Darren broke laws, the death might fall into felony homicide in some jurisdictions. This one could come to technicalities because Bob wasn't their accomplice. Otherwise, Darren's track record might prevent the two from being charged for negligent homicide. Consider the well-publicized cases where either the police or civilians shot unarmed people, and say that they thought the victim was armed and a threat to them. If doesn't matter if the victim drew a gun or a wallet, it matters if the shooter can make his or her fears plausible enough. | The general story is that one state does not have jurisdiction over an act carried out in another state. The Wiki on state gun laws claims that ownership in Illinois requires a permit, but the law is here, and in fact the law addresses possession and acquisition, but not ownership, for example 430 ILCS 65/2: No person may acquire or possess firearm ammunition within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Department of State Police under the provisions of this Act It is legally immaterial that the word "Owner" is in the name of the card. It is likewise claimed that Massachusetts requires a license to own a gun, but from what I can tell the requirements pertain to licenses to possess or purchase, and not just to own. So there seems to be no impediment to actual ownership in the US. | Rules about self-defense in the US vary from state to state, but generally a person can raise a defense that they legally used deadly self-defense if they had a reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm, with some exceptions (exactly how these are worded changes from state to state): A person often cannot claim self defense if they are already committing a forcible felony (but it depends on the circumstances) A person cannot claim self defense if they are the aggressor in a fight or took aggressive actions toward another person who then attacked them. So, with that in mind, let's assume that Person A has a valid deadly self-defense claim against Person B. When considering self defense, the question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have feared death or grievous bodily harm. So, the exact sequence of events matters. Consider the following four scenarios: C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, C pulls out his gun and points it at A before A turns to him and points his gun in response C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls out his gun in response C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, C pulls out his gun and they stand off C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls his in response In some of these situations, A may be considered the aggressor against C even though he had a valid self-defense claim against B. In others, a jury may find that a reasonable person in C's position would not expect A to shoot them just because they shot an attacker, and therefore C is the aggressor by drawing on A. This all assumes a hypothetical where these people exist in a void, things like their relationship, the situation around the three subjects, and any other relevant facts could be introduced and considered in the analysis. In theory, a situation could exist where both sides have a valid self-defense claim against each other, the third example possibly being that situation. | “Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen. | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't |
Access to information from supermarkets In a criminal investigation, do the police have access to shopping information / do the police do research that far? In case of any police officer requesting data from recently bought products (for example walmart), can they get security camera footage of the time those items were bought? | In addition to compelling a store to produce evidence such as video footage, via a search warrant as described by bdb484, police can request access to information in the possession of such information. The store may voluntarily comply with the request, or not. Especially in the case of online transactions, there may be a privacy guarantee that information about a customer's transaction will not be revealed to a third party unless required by law (ergo, a warrant), but security camera recordings are not protected by such guarantees. | Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree. | If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question. | Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest. | There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card. | So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | united-states In the US, the default rule is that your home is your castle. In general, nobody, not even the police, can enter your home without your permission. The main exception to this rule is that police do not need your permission if they have a search warrant to search your home. To get a warrant, the police must convince a magistrate that they have good reason (ie, "probable cause"), such as a gps track, to believe they will find evidence of a crime if they search the house. The police in your hypothetical are in a similar situation to police who are tracking the gps signal from a "bait car/bike/phone/tablet/package." (A bait car is a car/etc that has been fitted with a camera and gps tracker, and left out as bait for thieves.) As long as the car is in public view, the police do not need a warrant to search it and arrest the person driving it. However, once the bait car is out of public view, where the police can no longer see it, they need a warrant to go in and recover it, even if they can see it on the tracker. (See, for example, the instructions for bait car programs from the Eugene and Reno Police Departments.) (For phones, which may not be in "plain view" even if the thief is, the police use ring programs to make the phone ring. Hearing a phone respond to a ring program gives them probable cause under the "hearing" version of the "plain view" doctrine.) Bottom line: In the US, the police need a search warrant. Since search warrants take time and effort, police may be unwilling to get a warrant for something as low valued as a phone. If the police can't or won't help, there are various options for privately enforcing one's rights. These range from the legal -- knocking on the door and confronting the thief -- to the illegal -- left to your imagination. |
Are dropservice suppliers liable for any damages to customers? I wanted to ask a question about the dropservice business model. We have 3 figures, the customer, the supplier and us. Dropservice is a business model in which we can have services delivered to our customers by outside suppliers (such as freelancers) If the supplier causes harm to the customer (such as in the case of unsavory advertising campaigns) who is responsible? Since he was the one who provided the service, he should be responsible for anything he causes to the customer. How can we wash our hands of all the mistakes the provider can do to our customers? | it depends There's Alice, who wants some service. There's Bob, who offers it. And there's C-Corp, which offers to connect people that seek service with those that offer it. The liability of C-Corp depends on many factors. Some that came up: Is Bob's service needing a license of sorts? C-Corp might be liable if they were warned that Bob lacks such or C-Corp represented that Bob had the license but did not. Is C-Corp getting a fee for referral/payment services only or do they manage or contract with Bob in some way or another? If C-Corp manages Bob or has a work contract with them, they might be akin to a Builder that hires various contractors and who is liable to the buyer of the building and to whom the contractors owe liability for their work. If they just provide the connecting and payment service, that's not as easy, but they still might be liable to some degree. What does the contract say? If they only provide a listing service like LinkedIn and specifically disclaim and point out that all listings are the contractor's making, they might be totally immune and have no liability. | One analysis is in Bow Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. v. Murray, 2006 ABPC 366, by Judge O'Ferrall (now Justice of the Court of Appeal of Alberta). The defendant sat on a motorcycle, positioned it fully upright, and when he returned the motorcycle to rest on the kickstand, the bike crashed to the floor. There were three potential paths to liabilty argued, none successfully: negligence (for example, if the defendant had repositioned the kickstand at any point—there was no evidence of this) trespass to goods (but this would have required intentional or negligent treatment of the good) contract (which would have required a clear "you break it, you buy it" policy with express statement that the customer would be liable even for non-negligent damage—there wasn't) Context mattered. Liability might be made more strict more easily in a china shop. The judge wrote: in the end, this case must turn on the presence or absence of negligence because, at least in the circumstances of a motorcycle shop, a “break it, you buy it” arrangement would have required an element of fault on the part of the breaker, absent a very clearly communicated term that the customer pays irrespective of negligence. There being no such term and negligence having not been proven, I find the Defendant not liable. In so doing, I considered the china shop analogy. It may be that in a china shop one could infer that the customer pays for broken items irrespective of fault because there is no need to touch the item in order to make the purchase decision. But in order to make an informed purchase of a motorcycle, the purchaser must try it on for size and the fact that he must do so makes it much more difficult to infer a no-fault promise to pay for damage howsoever caused. | Can you be liable for damages? Under Tort Law, yes. Let's assume someone developed a virus based on your code. The virus caused millions of dollars of damage. The plaintiff (software vendor) can argue that: You have a Duty of Care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee are likely to injure your neighbor Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) (UK) The concept of Duty of Care is also found in U.S. law, for example in MacPerson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), which established that negligence does not require a contract. Breach of Duty: A reasonable person can foresee that the "proof of concept" can cause harm. The act of releasing code, therefore, falls short of the expected standard. If you are a IT professional, it is going to be difficult to defend this point. There is a causation relationship between your code release and the resulted damage. You are liable for negligence. Damage: It is likely that users will sue the software vendor for their loses. The software vendor will then sue you, since because of you, the software vendor has to compensate to its customers. This, of course, depends on what exactly did you release to the public. For example, if significant effort is needed to convert your "proof of concept" to an actual exploit, and you have provided a workaround to avoid this vulnerability, you may defend yourself by arguing that the cause and effect linkage is too remote. So I must keep the report private? What if the software is open source? Not really. You should take reasonable measure to ensure that your "proof of concept" is not an actual exploit, and a hacker needs considerable time to develop a functioning malicious software. CVE is a platform where vulnerabilities are publicly shared. What if you have given the vendor reasonable time to fix the vulnerability? It does not matter (to you) if time has been given for the vendor to fix the vulnerability. It does matter for the vendor, because if something happens later, the vendor is liable for knowing the problem well in advance and have not allocated the appropriate resources to correct the problem. To demonstrate a vulnerability exist does not require instruction of how to utilize this vulnerability. For example you can record a video showing the effects of the hack. Here (Wayback Machine; original link is dead) is an interesting read about Motorola taking matters into their own hands after they discovered a vulnerability on the Xerox CP-V system and Xerox did not patch the problem. | In Austria they have a law about "Kreditschädigung" (website from the Austrian government, "credit damage") translated by Google as: Because of credit damage, a person is liable to prosecution if he or she asserts incorrect facts and thereby harms or endangers the credit, the acquisition or professional advancement of another person. A prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to 360 daily rates is provided for the offense of credit damage. If you setup a webpage which lists things which might harm somebody's business, you have to proof that every single claim you make is correct (not just your individual experience). So if you have solid proof for each of your claims of your Q&A, you might win a probable law suite. The way you wrote it, it might be difficult to proof because it seems to be your personal experience. See also here for details. (in German). | You claim for the damage you suffered If you owe me $130 for unpaid wages, I sue for $130. If you wrote off my $130,000 car I sue for $130,000. If you burnt down my $130 million building, I sue for $130 million. If you did (in my estimate) $1.3 billion damage to my reputation I sue for $1.3 billion. Of course, I will have to prove that the damage was suffered - some damages are easier to prove than others. Whether the defendant can pay it is irrelevant to the suit. Of course, if there is a judgement that is more than the defendant’s net worth then any excess is “wasted”. At least commercially. However, commercial return is only one factor involved in deciding to launch a suit. Others include: seeking a precedent making a statement of principle vengeance | The question is a little confusing because it’s unclear why any of the payments should be refunded. If A has not provided the services, and B wants a refund, then B can sue A for breach of contract. A assigned its right to be paid to C, but it cannot assign its obligations to C (this would be a novation rather than an assignment, which would require both B and C’s consent). If C also agreed with A to perform A’s obligations to B (a subcontract), then A could sue C for any damages A was liable to pay B, but B cannot sue C directly. If A regrets its decision to assign the contract for £1, and wants to recover larger payments made by B to C in discharge of B’s contractual obligations to A, it can’t. A shouldn’t have assigned the benefit of the contract to C. If B has not paid, B can be sued under the contract which still exists between A and B. C can file this claim as assignee of the contract. While A could also potentially file the claim, it would be inconsistent with the assignment for A to receive any benefit from it, which would be held on constructive trust for C. | It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain. | When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints. |
Could Scotland Hold an Independence Referrendum Under The Claim of Right? The Scottish Claim of Right makes clear that the people of Scotland are Sovereign, not Westminster. However, under the rest of UK law, Westminster/Parliament is Sovereign. Given the Supreme Court has ruled that the Scottish Parliament can't hold a referrendum on Scottish Independence without Westminster's permission, could the Scottish Government choose to overrule this (or at least attempt to) by asserting the Claim of Right? I assume I'm misunderstanding something here, because this isn't a route I've heard anyone suggest and I don't expect something this obvious would have been missed. So what am I missing here? | The Scottish Claim of Right makes clear that the people of Scotland are Sovereign, not Westminster. Not so much. It establishes principles of parliamentary monarchy... (for example) That the chargeing of the leidges with lawborrowes at the Kings instance and the imposeing of bonds without the authority of Parliament and the suspending advocats from their Imployment for not Compearing when such bonds were offered were Contrary to Law That the putting of Garisones on privat mens houses in tyme of peace without their Consent or the authority of Parliament is Contrary to law ...while inviting William and Mary to accede to the Scottish throne: The said Estates of the Kingdome of Scotland Doe resolve that William and Mary King and Queen of England France and Ireland Be and be Declared King and Queen of Scotland To hold the Crowne and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome of Scotland To them the said King and Queen dureing ther lives and the longest liver of them and that the sole and full exercise of the regall power be only in and Exercised by him the said King in the names of the said King and Queen Dureing ther joynt lives And after ther decease The said Croune and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome to be to the heirs of the body of the said Queen which failing to the Princess Ann of Denmark and the airs of her body which also failing to the aires of the Body of the said William King of England And they do Pray the said King and Queen of England to accept the same accordingly ... That for redress of all greivances and for the amending strenthneing and preserveing of the lawes Parliaments ought to be frequently called and allowed to sit and the freedom of speech and debate secured to the members In other words, it provides that the monarchy is not absolute, and that its power is circumscribed by parliament. One thing it certainly does not do is circumscribe the power of the Westminster parliament, which had no power in Scotland before the Acts of Union of 1707. Before then, the Westminster parliament was only the Parliament of England. The Acts of Union provided, in part, That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be Represented by one and the same Parliament to be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain With that act, the Parliament of Great Britain assumed the role of the Parliament of Scotland. As a consequence, the Claim of Right Act of 1689 grants power to the Westminster parliament rather than circumscribing its power. To the extent the people are sovereign, this sovereignty is vested in their representatives in Westminster. On the other hand, if you're talking about the 1989 claim, that document has never had or claimed any legal force. | Consequence? Yes. Unintended? Not so much. Source Sources of Parliamentary Privilege In new-south-wales, Parliamentary Privilege derives from Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 (no, 1688 is not a mistake) which provides: ... the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. What are "proceedings in Parliament"? "[P]roceedings in Parliament" is defined by case law. In Canadian and English jurisprudence, the definition includes things done outside Parliament in the furtherance of Parliamentary business such as correspondence, and press releases. The leading cases are Roman Corp Ltd v Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas Co Ltd and Re Clark and Attorney-General of Canada for Canada, and Rost v Edwards for England and Wales. Australian case law is split. The leading case is Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chatterton in the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court where Zelling AJC held that privilege applies to restatements by an MP outside Parliament of things said inside, possibly including answering questions about those things in an interview. Prior J rejected this and Jacob J didn't address it. That's one win, one loss and one DNF for those keeping score. For the Federal Parliament, the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 defines "proceedings in Parliament" as: ... all words and spoken acts done in the course of, or for purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House or of a committee, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes: (a) the giving of evidence before a House or a committee, and evidence so given; (b) the presentation or submission of a document to a House or a committee; (c) the preparation of a document for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of any such business; and (d) the formulation, making or publication of a document, including a report, by or pursuant to an order of a House or a committee and the document so formulated, made or published The northern-territory has similar legislation. In Laurance v Katter, there was a judicial split in the Court of Appeal in the Queensland Supreme Court about whether this definition was unconstitutional. Pincus JA held that s 16(3) was incompatible with the implied freedom of political communication. Following the High Court's decision in R v Richards; Ex part Fitzpatrick and Browne, Fitzpatrick P held that s 16 could not be invalidated or read down to accommodate the implied freedom of political communication. Davies JA read down s 16(3); in his view, the section was enacted merely to make it clear that parliamentary privilege applies not only where a member or witness is sued but also where evidence is sought to be tendered; in both cases, the privilege applies only where the parliamentary proceedings would be impeached or questioned. Davies JA then held that this was not the case in these proceedings. The High Court gave special leave to appeal this decision but the matter was settled before the appeal was heard. So, the exact boundaries of Parliamentary privilege in Australia remain uncertain. However, a prudent journalist should assume that it extends not just to statements made in the House or before a Committee but to statements about those statements made outside by the MP or their staff. Who has the privilege? The privilege belongs to Parliament, not any individual MP, and can only be waived by Parliament. It cannot be invalidated by the courts due to the doctrine of separation of powers. Australian parliaments take the attitude that the waiver of privilege is a procedural matter about their own internal workings and does not require legislation. In England and Wales, legislation has been passed that allows an MP to waive privilege over their (and only their) statements but no such law exists in Australia. Effect of Parliamentary Privilege There are two limbs to Parliamentary Privilege: It provides absolute immunity to the MP (and possibly their staff) for statements made under privilege. That is, following Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 2) [2021] FCA 950, anything and everything that is under privilege is completely inadmissible in court. By legislation in each Australian jurisdiction, qualified immunity is provided for the "fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings. Thus, a media organization is protected from liability for defamation in respect of the publication of a fair and accurate report of parliamentary proceedings unless the plaintiff can establish that, in publishing the report, the media organization was actuated by malice." The Federal and Northern Territory legislation appears to go further and may provide absolute immunity but that has not been tested. Actuated by malice Malice in law does not mean what it means in everyday English. It means, with respect to defamation, that a statement was made either knowing that it was untrue or with reckless disregard for its truthfulness. In other words, you were deliberately lying, or you made no effort to find out if you were lying. Within the context of Parliamentary Privilege, you cannot rely on the truthfulness of statements made in Parliament to establish that what you reported was the truth. The existence of the statements might be admissible, for example, to establish if privilege attaches to them but the content of the statements themselves has no probative value. In some ways, this is like a hearsay statement: you can testify that the statement was made (if that's relevant) but you cannot testify that there is any truth-value to what was said. Therefore, if you make a nasty remark (that goes beyond "fair and accurate reports") and your only reliance on the truthfulness of your statement comes from things under Parliamentary Privilege then you have no defence to a defamation claim. So, accusing someone of perjury for what they said to a parliamentary committee rather than just reporting what they said is clearly actuated by malice: it may be true but you know that you can't prove it's true - that amounts to reckless disregard for the truth. Consequences The purpose of Parliamentary Privilege is to allow MPs to vigorously advance the interests of their constituencies (i.e. us) without the fear that they will be called to account for what they say in either a civil or criminal court. It has been argued that some uses of Parliamentary Privilege are an abuse, particularly where they subvert the operations of the judiciary or law enforcement such as by naming suspects, defendants, and witnesses or where the statements would be defamation but for the privilege. However, if they are, it is for the Parliament to discipline the MP by sanction or expulsion, or for the electorate to do so through the ballot box. Such discipline is rare, partly because no one wants to unleash a weapon that could be turned upon themselves but mostly, because Parliament is loath to interfere in the electorate's right to choose their own representatives even if they are wankers. This privilege is clearly at odds with the principle of free speech and inhibits the ability of media outlets to editorialise on matters covered by privilege. This consequence is not unintended, rather it is a deliberate trade-off of one pillar of democratic life against another. | The change in the royal title came about following the Imperial Conference of 1926, when the various governments of the Empire agreed that "the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions" were "autonomous Communities ... equal in status". The Conference declined to pursue developing any kind of Imperial Constitution, preferring instead to draw out a few specific consequences of that agreement. In the Balfour Declaration, section IV(a) asks for legislation to change the King's title. There is also a longer discussion in V(a) about treaties, which affects the examples that you give in the question. Both of your 1930 examples follow the recommendations in this Declaration. The convention on conflict of nationality laws is entered into by the King, with the governments of his realms separately represented and enumerated. It lists two plenipotentiaries "For Great Britain and Northern Ireland". The omission of "the United Kingdom of" is not material, much like talking about "the Kingdom of Sweden" versus just "Sweden". The agreement on Bulgarian financial obligations is between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and various other governments. They both refer to Northern Ireland rather than Ireland but differ in form because they use the different structures of a treaty between sovereigns and an agreement between governments. As noted in the Declaration, prior usage was not always obvious to interpret, because of confusion about whether (say) Canada was meant to be bound by a treaty entered into in the name of the King of Great Britain. Likewise, R v. Jameson [1896] 2 QB 425 is an important case on extent of legislation to British possessions - in the past, it was not always explicit whether an Act was for the UK only, and this had to be deduced from context. In debate on the 1927 Act in the Commons, the Home Secretary Sir William Joynson-Hicks (as he then was) said: It is clear that it is a misnomer to continue to talk of "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland." Quite obviously, since Southern Ireland has been granted Dominion Home Rule, there is no such thing as "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," but there is still "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." Consequently, after full consultation and interviews with the representatives of Northern Ireland, with the Government of Northern Ireland, it has been decided to ask the House to alter the title of Parliament- and to make it "The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." and: Certain portions of Ireland have, as it were, slipped out of the United Kingdom, and we now call it the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but it is still the United Kingdom, and this is still the Thirty-fourth Parliament of the United Kingdom. It is clear that he - on behalf of the government - saw the Act as sufficient to change anything already defined in statute which needed to be changed. (It was also debated whether the Great Seal needed to be renamed as well, etc.) The change to the name of the country did not need statutory authorization in contexts where the old name was not required by statute. Diplomatic formulae are not statutory and so aren't mentioned here; the royal prerogative is already enough for the treaty language to be as envisaged going forward. British passports also changed in 1927 to using "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" in place of "and Ireland". At the time, passport issuing was entirely on the basis of the royal prerogative, without any legislative regime. Various other official publications, like statistical reports, used the new name going forward. Some other provisions in the Declaration were given effect in the Statute of Westminster 1931. This should be seen as part of a continuing effort to let the legal situation follow the policy (Commonwealth nations are equal autonomous peers) which itself followed the facts on the ground (the UK government could no longer expect to rule them directly). So there was not precisely a "flag day" when the UK's name changed, but there was a process of recognizing that the name ought to change, some wrangling over how, and the fairly rapid implementation of the change in 1927, at least on the part of the UK government itself. | There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan". | You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.) | You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right. | See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3. | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. |
Is Nanoblock not in violation of LEGO's patents because their product is incompatible with and not the same size as LEGO's product? Nanoblock is an interlocking brick toy similar to LEGO. They have an article on their website that describes their toy and compares it to LEGO. It makes the following claim: You may wonder if there is a patent infringement case against Nanoblocks for making a copycat product similar to LEGO. The answer is no. To avoid a patent claim, Nanoblocks are not compatible with LEGO. Nanoblocks are about one-quarter of the size of LEGO blocks. Is it true that Nanoblock is not in violation of LEGO's patents because their copycat product is incompatible with and is not the same size as LEGO's product? | There are two very different laws in play here. Patent rights and trademarks. One cannot violate a patent on Lego bricks, because they have all run out a long time ago. The Wikipedia article has a relevant section on this. Therefore it is very legal from a patent point of view to produce compatible bricks (and there are several companies that do). More complicated is the trademark aspect. Lego tries to sue everyone that attempts to sell its bricks with the statement "lego compatible" or something similar, and the use of the name "Lego" as a name for the bricks in general is contested (sometimes successfully, sometimes less so), even though that is quite common in colloquial speech. The Canadian supreme court ruled "Trademark law should not be used to perpetuate monopoly rights enjoyed under now-expired patents" Bottom line: You may produce lego-compatible bricks, but you must not name them like that. It's probably best you just don't use the name "Lego" at all. | Ideas are not protected by copyright, only arrangements of words are protected. If you "rephrase" by only a minor change of wording, leaving much of the wording intact, that is still a copyright infringement unless an exception such as fair use or fair dealing applies (and that seems a bit doubtful in this case). If you "rephrase" so that the wording is quite different, even though the idea is the same, there is probably no infringement. Copying elements of computer code or other IT commands that are essential to making an example work is not infringement. Where there is only one or a very small number of ways to naturally express a fact, copying such expression is not infringement, as facts are not protected by copyright. Adding examples but keeping significant wording unchanged is still likely to be infringement. | The general rule under united-states law is that copyright is infringed when a copyrighted work, or any part of it, is copied or distributed without permission, or a new derivative work based on the copyrighted work is created or distributed without permission. There are several exceptions to this. There is, for example, a specific right to create a backup of a computer program to which one has lawful access. The best known and widest exception to copyright in US law is "fair use". What use is a fair use is a highly fact-driven question: It cannot be answered in general, except by quoting the statutory provisions. There are no exact rules for what is and is not fair use that apply in all cases. There have been several detailed discussions of fair-use on this site, including https://law.stackexchange.com/a/66608/17500 not long ago. Note that fair use is a strictly US concept, and does not apply under any other country's law. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright, which will cover some of the same cases as fair use, but not all of them, and will get to results by different routes. If hashes were distributed separately, to confirm the authenticity of a program, they would probably not be protected by copyright for lack of originality. Under US law, and particularly the Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) case there must be a "minimal degree" of creativity for something to be protected by copyright. The decision said: Many compilations consist of nothing but raw data—i.e. wholly factual information not accompanied by any original expression. On what basis may one claim a copyright upon such work? Common sense tells us that 100 uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status when gathered together in one place. ... The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding why facts are not copyrightable: The sine qua non of copyright is originality. Since a hash or other digital signature can be computed automatically from the document to be signed (indeed that is its value), it is not creative and copying a hash alone would not be an infringement. Whether this would be true of other metadata depends on the exact nature of that data, and the degree of creativity that it represents. Without specific facts no judgement can be made, and making that kind of very specific judgement might be beyond the scope of this site. A comment said: Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, ... I would put it that every part of a work is copyrighted, but some copying does not amount to infringement. Extracting facts and rewording them so that none of the expression is copied is not infringement. Extracting a completely non-creative part of a work and reproducing it is not infringement. Copying a limited amount for use in a review or commentary is often fair use, and fair use is not infringement. Video Games There is nothing in US law specific to video games. There is little that is specific to computer software, although the right to make a backup copy is protected. A good deal of case law has focused on the issue of temporary copies made while running a program, which does not seem relevant to this question. Other cases have focused on the protectability of user interfaces, and of APIs, also not relevant here. whether a work is packaged as a single file or as many related files should not affect its copyright protection. (I know of no case on that specific issue.) Whether copying a part of acomputer file is infringement or not would depend on the purpose of the copying, and on the effect or potential effect on the copyright holder, and perhaps on other factors. Copying a non-creative hash, as a way of detecting whether a file is modified or not, does not seem likely to be infringement, unless the holder could show harm, but no one knows for sure how a court would rule in such a case. Copyright does not protect facts, but it does protect the way in which facts are expressed, unless there is only one or a few such ways available to express such a fact. Copyright also may protect the selection and arrangement of facts, except where the arrangement is "obvious". Placing facts in alphabetical order (as in a phone book) or chronological order (as in a timeline) has been held to be obvious and not protected. International Standards The question and a comment ask about international standards for copyright. In effect there are none. The only significant international agreement on copyright is the Berne Copyright Convention. That is a treaty to which almost every nation belongs, thus rendering the Universal Copyright Convention and other international copyright agreements obsolete. But the Berne Convention leaves details to national copyright laws. The making or authorizing of copies, and the authorizing of derivative works are part of copyright in every Bern-compliant country. Berne provides for exceptions to copyright, but leaves the details to national law. Moreover, there is no intentional court in which copyright claims can be made. Anyone wishing to sue for copyright infringement must do so in the courts of some specific country, and so all the case law which defines details on what is and is not infringement is national, not international. It should be noted that a copyright holder may sue in any country where infringing actions have occurred. When an allegedly infringing work is distributed over the web, that often means that a plaintiff may sue in almost any country, although enforcement will be limited if the defendant has no presence and no assets in the chosen country. Thus the copyright laws of multiple countries may be relevant to a particular case. | According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case). | This would be fine for two reasons. First, this is not what copyright is for. It's not that this exists, so nothing like it can- it's that someone worked on this, and that work shouldn't be used by someone else without their consent. Your work is not derivative of the effect from the film. Second, Marvel doesn't have a copyright or trademark or someone turning into particles. I don't think such a thing can be and even if it was, they're certainly not the ones who created it. For example, Undertale used it 3 years before and that was a reference to many classic 8-bit games. | "Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI. | My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses. | The idea for an app is not subject to copyright. Only the artifacts of the app itself (sourcecode, images, texts, sounds, etc.) can be. So if one only copies the idea and creates their own version of all the other assets, then they are not violating copyright. However, in some cases, ideas can be subject to patents. But patents on software are tricky. First of all, only new ideas can be patented. When a supposed new idea was already published before, then that's called "prior art" and you can not patent it. Then getting a patent means a lot of investment in money and time (which is very different from copyright which you get automatically the moment you make something copyright-worthy). So not everything that could theoretically be patented gets patented. And then, many jurisdictions do not recognize software patents at all, and those which do have different limits on what is and is not patentable when it comes to software. This means patents are rarely a concern when copying the app idea of someone else, but not never. And another possible concern is the third pillar of intellectual property: Trademarks. This protects the name of the app. Trademark law oversimplified forbids to create a competing product with a name which might confuse customers. So if you created StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople and I create StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople - Simplified Edition, then I would be violating your trademark, because my product name sounds as if it was your product, when it is in fact an unrelated product with a similar purpose. |
Child kidnap - Enforce return to country of origin of children visiting the USA Scenario: A divorced US citizen (call him "parent A") living abroad plans a trip to the US with their and "parent B"'s child (under 18 yo). Before leaving the country of origin, A shares a trip schedule with B, and B approves them leaving the country of origin. However, parent A does not return to the country of origin, kidnapping the child to permanently live in the US. Question: Are there any legal means parent B can take before the trip to ensure the return of the child to the country of origin? If it matters, assume parent B is not a US citizen. Note: I'm aware of the Hague convention. But it only offers a remedy after the fact, and, to my understanding, the procedure requires a huge sum of money and could take more than a year in some cases. I'm looking for something similar to requesting a warrant in advance that will trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule. | How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to "ensure the return" or something that will "trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule." So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: "He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application." 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 ("Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information."); 2010 ABPC 410 ("I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father."); 2021 ONCJ 440 ("Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly."); 2020 ABQB 434 ("either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party"); 2017 BCSC 1463 ("The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.") | In the US, the details are determined at the state level. The term "abandonment" is used very broadly, and can include a situation where a parent leaves a child without making contact for a period of time (which may result in termination of parental rights, but not a punishment). "Abandonment" as it applies in Washington state is explained here. There is what is known as a "safe haven" law, which allows a newborn (under 72 hours old) to be transferred (anonymously) to a qualified recipient (health care employee, medic, etc.), and not be liable under the criminal laws. This does not include dumping the infant in the snow. Under RCW 9A.42.020, the parent would be guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if their action "causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life" (note that the law is not specific to children), and this is a class B felony. There are multiple grades of mistreatment, so if the action "creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury" or "causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms", this is 4th degree mistreatment, which is a misdemeanor. There are, in parallel fashion, laws against abandonment of a dependent starting at RCW 9A.42.060, punished as a class B felony down to a gross misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for a class B felony is $20,000 and 10 years in prison, and for a simple misdemeanor it is 90 days and $1,000. In case death results, the discussion could move to the homicide statutes. Homicide by abuse is when, with extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person. and this is a class A felony. If a person "recklessly causes the death of another person", this is manslaughter in the first degree (class A felony), but if it is "with criminal negligence", it is manslaughter in the second degree (a class B felony). Manslaughter charges are predicated on there not being an intent to kill. If the intent was to actually kill the child, this would be first degree homicide, where the punishment is life imprisonment. Additionally, first degree homicide can be found if "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". State v. Edwards is a relevant case, where a person was charged with both second degree murder and homicide by abuse, and the issue came up that "extreme indifference to human life" is not a self-evident expression. It turns out that case law in Washington interprets this, as applied to first degree murder, as meaning "indifference to human life in general", not "indifference to the life of the specific victim". After a lengthy review of principles of judicial interpretation, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the first-degree murder definition of indifference, that is, it is up the the jury to decide what constitutes extreme indifference, for homicides other than 1st degree murder. | in washington state can a divorce case last 32 months Yes. There is no limit to the possible duration of a divorce case, especially where at least one represented party has any money. This report showcases various instances of divorce proceedings that have lasted longer than the marriage itself because lawyers dragged the case for as long as they want. Being in Washington or New Jersey makes no difference. Your description, including the mention that your "helper" from the divorce packet babysat your kid, suggests that you have been scammed. If you want to get divorced, it is in your best interest to learn about divorce & procedural laws of your state and then take the helm of your proceedings. You did not specify the conditions of the divorce packet you purchased. It is therefore unclear whether the packet provider has any duty toward you in the direction of an attorney-client relation. That being said, your husband as the adversary in the proceedings has no obligation to inform you about proceedings if he already notified the person representing you in court. | Minor children can, in theory, sue their parents, in many countries, as long as they can prove a cognizable harm. The simplest case is where a parent commits a crime against the child, such as rape; this would also include embezzlement. "Abuse" is a term used in laws, for example RCW 26.44.020 (Washington state), but that sense of "abuse" doesn't include e.g. "overbearing behavior" or "obnoxious politics". If a child is disabled and the parents taunt the child for that disability, it is possible that the child could sue to terminate parental rights. The case is even clearer if the parent fails in their parental obligations to the child. Lgbtqia child rights are less well-defined. The background assumption is that the parent has the exclusive right to determine the child's upbringing, which includes things such as political beliefs, religion, and matters touching no family and sex. Norway is one of those countries with relatively few restrictions on "how you live your life", and they are considering a law against "conversion therapy", but there is presently no law prohibiting a parent from denouncing their child's lifestyle. It is possible that Barnevernet (child protective services) could intervene in a particular case, but they would not sue a parent on behalf of the child unless the parents actually violated the law. | Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds. | The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts. | Generally, in non-emergency situations, the state with jurisdiction over parenting issues related to children including relinquishment and adoption is vested in the courts of the "home state" of the child. A child's "home state" is defined by statute by a coordinated definitions set forth in parallel laws at the state (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act in 49 states) and federal (the Parental Kidnapping Prevent Act) level. This definition of "home state" provides a fairly precise definition of something that approximately matches your intuition regarding the state where the child resides in most cases. There is also an international treaty with a similar home state definition. The state where the child was born ceases to be relevant at the point at which that state ceases to be the child's "home state". But, once a state's courts take jurisdiction over parenting issues for a child, the barrier to divest that state of jurisdiction is higher than it would be if there was no prior litigation. So, the state establishing the child support decree would often be the "home state" in the fact pattern set forth in this question. I will refrain from discussing the substantive law of voluntary relinquishment following an acknowledgment of paternity and payment of child support at length in this post as it is beyond the scope of what was asked. Suffice it to say that this is generally disfavored and is sometimes impossible. Also, the actions that could lead to involuntary termination of parental rights (even for mere non-support) also often have parallel felony criminal sanctions associated with them. | What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes |
If I made a detailed plan to kill one person, then change my target at the last minute, was the murder premeditated? Let's say I've spent years setting up the perfect murder to kill person A. Then, when the time comes, I learn some information that makes me realize I'd rather person B died than person A. Thus, at the last minute, I swap out the murder victim, but use the otherwise detailed murder plan to kill B. I am clearly a murderer, but was the murder premeditated, because I used a premeditated method, or was it not premeditated since I wasn't planning to kill B until the last minute? I know transferred intent applies if I was trying to kill A and killed B instead, which would make the murder premeditated. But in this scenario I explicitly changed plans to only target B. I'm not sure if the premeditation for killing A transfers when I never actually followed through with an attempt to kill A. So, what kind of murderer am I? | It's still premeditated murder because you made a decision to kill and then acted on it. "Premeditation" doesn't require detailed planning or an extended period of time between the decision and the action; it just requires some amount of time in which you could have changed your mind after thinking that you want to kill a person -- in some cases, even as little as a few seconds between the act that provoked the murder and the murder itself. There are many ways of defining the term, but the Supreme Court has accepted instructions that tell jurors to find premeditation if there was a "second thought" about whether to proceed with "a preconceived design to kill." Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). So even if you are literally talking about a minute of time between the decision to kill B and the execution of that plan, the murder is sufficiently premeditated to support a conviction for first-degree murder. | The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence). | Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction. | If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one. | Can you be punished for planning a crime and what constitutes "planning"? The intent to commit certain classes of crimes is punishable. That being said, there is a difference between intent and a mere wish. Intent is inferred from statements or circumstances indicating that a person's actions were (or are) devised toward knowingly committing the underlying crime. The Black's Law Dictionary defines intent as "[D]esign, resolve, or determination with which [a] person acts. [...] [M]ental action at its most advanced point [...]. It is the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about to be done" (brackets added). By contrast, a wish that goes no further than fantasizing or expressing "I want to do this" usually is inconsequential from a legal standpoint. One exception to that relates to promoting offenses such as terrorism, murder, and arguably pedophilia. Even if it is proved that the person making those expressions has no propensity or intent to indulge in the criminal conduct he depicts, the expressions themselves might encourage others to do so. That encouragement makes it more difficult for a government to prevent those crimes from being committed and to identify the perpetrator(s). | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. | So each government has jurisdiction of the crime if and only if it occurs within their borders. In addition, the Federal Government can take a crack at any crime any where in the United States, though typically they only do so if the crime involves crossing state lines (kidnapping over state lines, ect). At the maximum, suppose for arguments sake Alice fatally shoots Bob while Bob is standing at dead center of the Four Corners Monument (the only place in the United States where four states meet). This means that one act of Murder has been committed in four seperate states, so Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona can all claim jurisdiction over the case and each prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder. Additionally, the Federal Government may step in and also prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder (though they are more likely not too. The Feds rarely prosecute crimes after the State UNLESS the State did something horribly wrong... I.E. Utah let her go because Utah is crazy). Additionally, the monument marks the dividing line between the Navajo Nation and the Ute Tribe, both semi-autonomous Native American Tribes that have their own recognized court systems, so they could conceivably charge Alice with First Degree Murder. So in total, the most amount of times someone can be charged for the same crime due to cross-jurisdiction is 7 times (Four States, 2 Tribal Governments, and one Federal Government). In likely hood, a few of these guys will pass because it's a waste of effort. If Alice gets the death penalty in Arizona, Colorado can't kill her a second time. It's important to note that each government gets exactly one trial so Alice can't be convicted twice in Arizona. A more realistic example occurred in the D.C. Beltway Sniper Case, where the perpetrators were tried in both Virginia and Maryland but only for the crimes committed within those states. VA got first crack because they had (and eventually carried out) the Death Penalty. Maryland tried both for insurance in case the VA cases got thrown out for reasons. The Feds found this satisfying and decided not to press their charges. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). |
Proving ownership of a pseudonym Suppose I have written a literary work (an article, some source code, etc.) and published that work under a pseudonym. Suppose also someone else is infringing upon my copyrights and I want to sue them because they are not responding to more friendly requests to come in compliance with the license. The question is, in what ways can I prove to the courts that I am in fact the copyright holder (i.e. I have a better than 50/50 chance that the court holds that I am the same person as referred to by the pseudonym mentioned in the copyright line). In case it matters, I have not bothered to register my copyrights with any copyright office and I am interested in jurisdictions that follow the Berne Convention. | If the suit is to be filed in the US, the first step is to officially register the copyright. No US copyright infringement suit can be brought until the copyright has been registered. The registration process includes a formal declaration as to who the author is (or authors are). (I believe this statement is made under penalty of perjury.) Once the registration issues, the certificate of registration is admissible evidence of the facts stated in it in a us court. Indeed 17 USC 410 (c) provides that: (c) In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court. In other countries, the testimony of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit is itself evidence that the work was created as stated. In either case, it is possible for the defendant to challenge the assertion and claim that s/he is the actual author. Showing when and where the work was first published can usefully corroborate the plaintiff's testimony. Having included a copyright notice in the initial publication may be of value, but if the notice only lists the pen name, it is not of much value. Records of the platform on which a work has been published may help in verifying the identity of the author. So may the testimony of others who saw or read the work, or who were told about it by the author. An author's own copies may be of value, if they carry a timestamp, as computer files generally do. But computer timestamps are not usually secure. Timestamps on email generally are reasonably secure, and could establish that the content existed and had been transmitted on a specified date by a specified person. But none of this will matter unless the defendant claims that the plaintiff is lying in claiming authorship. Unless that happens, the plaintiff's testimony will usually settle the matter. A person whose work seems to have been infringed would usually be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright suits. Such a lawyer could advise if it is wise to bring suit at all, and if it is, what evidence will probably be needed. | There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction. | (Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this. | There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses. | As @amon stated in a comment, copyright requires creativity. If the author of a tool wants to claim copyright on the output of that tool, then that output must contain something that required the creativity of the tool author. For a tool that just re-indents its input, the output is created from the input with a mechanical, non-creative, transformation and the output does not contain any creative content that wasn't already present in the input. For that reason, authors of such tools can't claim any copyright on the output. For a tool like bison, which was mentioned in the comments, the output contains a measurable amount of creative content that was not present in the input, but which was provided by the authors of bison. For that reason, the authors of 'bison' do have a copyright claim on the output of the tool (for which they give a broad permission to use). So, the basic question becomes, how much of the (creative) content of the output can be traced back to the tool itself and not to the input that the tool processed. For linters/formatters, that is likely to be very little. For code generators, it can be anywhere between very little and all of the output. The license restrictions on the code produced by the tool itself are by default the same as the license restrictions on the source of the tool, but the tool author can choose to apply any other license to the tool code that ends up in the output. If the output of the tool is, at least in part, dependent on an input file, then the authors of the input file also have a copyright claim on the tool output (as their creative work influenced the output), so the tool author can not claim exclusive ownership. The usual situation is that for tools that don't add creative content to the output, the author explicitly states that the don't have any copyright claims on the output. For tools that do add creative content, that content might be released under very permissive conditions (like, "you can use the output as a whole for any purpose, but you can only separate out the code that comes from the tool's codebase if you adhere to the <X> license") | The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now. |
How does a country that doesn't recognize same-sex marriage deal with same-sex couples in situations where the couple make decisions for each other? For example, say Alice and Barbara legally married in some country where same-sex marriage is allowed. They then go to a country where same-sex marriage is not allowed. While there, Alice is run down by a car, rendered unconscious, and hospitalized. Barbara, being the next of kin, would "usually" get to decide what medical procedures Alice should undergo. But they are in a country where same-sex marriage is not recognized. Does Barbara still get to decide what medical procedures Alice undergoes? I imagine this must have happened before, but I'm unable to find results for this with a Google search (e.g. there doesn't appear to be anything relevant in this link), hence I'm asking this question. If this varies between jurisdictions, I'm interested in all of them. If there is enough variation that the question becomes too broad, assume the UAE. | The authorities ignore Barbara Typically. Before the recognition of same sex relationships in australia, but after decriminalisation of homosexuality, people who were in that position were simply ignored. “You say you’re the next of kin? No, you aren’t. F#@k off.” Before decriminalisation, you kept your mouth shut because you didn’t want to a) go to jail, or b) get bashed by the cops. The latter remained a risk for many years after decriminalisation. Note that this is still the situation in many countries today. | A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself. | The first step is for the parents of the child to seek a court order for child support. This would be based on your friend being the actual father, and the non-mother not having adopted the child (extinguishing the obligations of the father). Many states, but not Michigan, have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act which covers assisted reproduction, but even in those states, this does not constitute assisted reproduction. The "agreement" is legally invalid (surrogate parentage contracts are unenforceable), and that, folks, is why you should hire an attorney rather than devising a legal theory on your own. This article summarizes the various paternity laws of Michigan. Under the Paternity Act, this may be a child born out of wedlock, if the child is a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage where the meaning of the last expression would have to be determined by the court. Probably the court would say "this child is not the 'issue' of the marriage", given legislative intent. Under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, unmarried parent can by signing a statement "define" the parentage of a child, but the statute is specifically limited to a man acknowledging paternity, and cannot apply to a lesbian couple. The clearest statement of the law of parentage for lesbian couples in Michigan is Lefever v. Matthews where (just one year ago) the court held that both of two women were parents – but in that case, the eggs came from one of the women and they were implanted into the other woman. An important distinguishing feature is that in this case, the woman at a statutory disadvantage sought parental rights, whereas your question is about a legal parent seeking to avoid a legal obligation to the child. Courts generally do everything possible to protect a child's right to support by the parents. The prospects that an actual father could avoid that obligation are slim. | It is not obvious that is it illegal in Washington state. Everett WA has local ordinances against "lewd conduct" (there are versions of this at the state level and in most municipalities). Having sex and masturbation are included in the class of "lewd acts", and are also included in "sexual conduct". An activity is "obscene" if three things are true. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest and when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. I think having sex or masturbating could pass these two tests. The third condition is that the act explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of... [sex, masturbation, or excretion] The prohibition is more narrow: A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he or she intentionally performs any lewd act in a public place or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public. If lewd conduct were completely illegal, you could not excrete or have sex withing the city limits. Now we have to turn to the definition of "public place": an area generally visible to public view, and includes streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether moving or not), buildings open to the general public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them, and businesses contained in structures which can serve customers who remain in their vehicles, by means of a drive-up window Focusing not on the probable intent but on the words, it is primarily defined as "an area generally visible to public view". Your house qua building is probably generally visible to public view, as is a public toilet or hotel. The inside of your bedroom is probably not generally visible to public view, nor is the inside of a toilet stall. While the building is probably a public place, a closed stall within the building does not meet the definition (nor does a hotel room). It might however qualify under the clause "or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public". The statute does not give a definition of "observe", but under ordinary language interpretation, observation may be seeing or hearing. Silent sex, masturbation or defecation might not qualify as being public. Obviously, excretion in a stall of a public bathroom cannot be a lewd act, presumably because the average person does not generally consider ordinary excretion as appealing to the prurient interest: but there could be contexts where it does. Another avenue for prosecution is the Indecent Exposure state law which is when one intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. It is totally non-obvious that sex or masturbation in a toilet stall is "open". There is a slippery slope regarding quiet sex or masturbation w.r.t. knowing that the conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. Because the contexts where sex and masturbation are not clearly spelled out by statutory law, the matter would depend on how courts had interpreted previous cases. There have been arrests in Washington of people having bathroom sex, but I don't know if anyone has ever or recently-enough been convicted for having quiet sex out of view in a toilet stall, or similar place. There is a potentially applicable case, Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wn. App. 64, which seems to involve public sex, and the conviction was overturned because the complaint was defective, in not including the element "that the defendant must know 'that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm'". It is not clear from the appeal what the act actually was – it probably was for public nudity. There is also an decision by the state appeal court division 3 (not publicly available) in Spokane v. Ismail which, in connection with a charge of public urination declares that "A toilet stall is not a public place. The center of Riverfront Park during the lunch hour is a public place", in connection with an ordinance just like the Everett one against public lewd acts. | Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956. | canada Courts have generally recognized that there is no "checklist." Courts will look at a multitude of indicators "of the sorts of behaviour that society, at any given point in time, associates with a marital relationship" (Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492). [The indicators] include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. (M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 59.) Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist. (Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124). | The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right). | The legislation simply provides a novel conversion process for same-sex couples to convert their civil partnership to a marriage, with a date retroactive to the commencement of their civil partnership. See the regulations and the provision of the legislation allowing for this process to be created. There are no restrictions on access to marriage based on the sex of the couple. Any couple can still get married outside of the conversion process, even while in a civil partnership. |
Is it legal to be buried in your yard? Is it legal to request your relatives to burry you in your yard, if you don't want or you can't afford a grave at a public cemetery(and you don't want to be incinerated)? | united-states Once a body is cremated it is generally no longer subject to the laws related to dead bodies. But the disposition of a corpse that is not cremated varies greatly from one U.S. state to another. The Washington College of Law has a website called the State Burial Laws Project that summarized the relevant laws for many U.S. states. As the example of New Hampshire illustrates, however, lots of those laws pertain to preservation of interred remains once they are lawfully interred (i.e. to the preservation and protection of burials). Another multi-state survey has been prepared by Nolo. For example, in Colorado: Where can bodies be buried in Colorado? Most bodies are buried in established cemeteries, but there are no state laws in Colorado that prohibit burial on private property. Burials on private property must be recorded with the county clerk within 30 days. (Colorado Revised Statutes § 25-2-111.) The county recorder or coroner should be able to supply you with a form you can use for this purpose. The funeral director or person who has custody of a dead body must get authorization to dispose of the body (including burial or cremation) before doing so, usually from a county health unit or coroner. (Colorado Revised Statutes § 25-2-111.) Note that local governments may have additional rules governing private burials. Before burying a body on private land or establishing a family cemetery, you should check county and city zoning rules. Where can we store or scatter ashes after cremation in Colorado? In Colorado, there are few limits on where you may keep or scatter ashes. Ashes may be stored in a crypt, niche, grave, or container at home. If you wish to scatter them, you have many options. Cremation renders ashes harmless, so there is no public health risk involved in scattering ashes. Use common sense and refrain from scattering ashes in places where they would be obvious to others. Scattering ashes in an established scattering garden. Many cemeteries provide gardens for scattering ashes. If you're interested, ask the cemetery for more information. Scattering ashes on private land. You are allowed to scatter ashes on your own private property. If you want to scatter ashes on someone else's private land, it's wise to get permission from the landowner. Scattering ashes on public land. You may wish to check both city and county regulations and zoning rules before scattering ashes on local public land, such as in a city park. However, many people simply proceed as they wish, letting their best judgment be their guide. Scattering ashes on federal land. Officially, you should request permission before scattering ashes on federal land. As with local or state land, however, you will probably encounter no resistance if you conduct the scattering ceremony quietly and keep the ashes well away from trails, roads, facilities, and waterways. You can find guidelines for scattering ashes on the websites for some national parks. For example, the website of Colorado's Rocky Mountain National Park offers a downloadable application for a permit to scatter ashes in the park. Scattering ashes at sea. The federal Clean Water Act requires that cremated remains be scattered at least three nautical miles from land. If the container will not easily decompose, you must dispose of it separately. The EPA does not permit scattering at beaches or in wading pools by the sea. Finally, you must notify the EPA within 30 days of scattering ashes at sea. The Clean Water Act also governs scattering in inland waters such as rivers or lakes. For inland water burial, you may be legally required to obtain a permit from the state agency that manages the waterway. Scattering ashes by air. While there are no state laws on the matter, federal aviation laws do prohibit dropping any objects that might cause harm to people or property. The U.S. government does not consider cremains to be hazardous material; all should be well so long as you remove the ashes from their container before scattering. Colorado's laws are mostly aimed at preventing a body lawfully buried in a backyard from leading to a potential criminal investigation of a death that did not involve a crime by making it easy to match the body to a death certificate. But, most jurisdictions regulate the means by which bodies can be disposed of to some degree. For example, outside San Marcos, Texas, and possibly a few other isolated places, a practice that is traditional in some kinds of Tibetan Buddhism and among the Parsi people of India is called "sky burial" is not permitted. Historical Note In the early Neolithic era (e.g., in the Vinca culture), dead bodies were frequently buried underneath the decedent's house. In the early Bronze Age, cremation became a litmus test for Indo-European linguistic and cultural expansion in Europe, Central Asia, West Asia, and South Asia, although this practice faded after many centuries when this was the norm, and internment (i.e. burial) came to be the norm again. Cremation then tended to become more common in urbanized areas starting in the classical Greco-Roman era in Europe. This urban-rural divide between cremation and internment rates largely persists to the present, driven by the scarcity of land and the tendency of people not to live in the same place for multiple generations in urban areas, and the abundance of land and stability of families over many generations in rural areas where farming is predominant. But internment also tends to be less common in places with permafrost or ground that is frozen for much of the year, in places with very thin soils over bedrock, and in places with stable populations (e.g. Louisiana) that are immersed in wetlands where dry ground is scarce and rot sets in very quickly (crypts and cremation are more common in these places). | Note: All links in Spanish (sorry). Regardless or your father being or not the legal owner of the home, the issue at play is that of alimentos1. This is an obligation between some family relationships to help each other so if family member (the alimentista) is in dire need of help (i.e., needs the help to survive) the others have the obligation to provide the help. The relatives of the alimentista affected are, in order: The couple, always when married and only when expressly agreed upon for non-married couples. Descendants: sons/daughters and grandsons/granddaughters. Ascendants: parents and grandparents. Brothers: Only when indispensable and the minimum amount. The order determines who of all the family members is under obligation to provide the help; in case of multiple people in the same category the amount is to be divided between them in function of their income. The amount of the help is not fixed and will depend of the circunstances of the situation2; and it is possible to provide by providing the needs(shelter, food) directly. Now, until when does a father/grandfather need to provide alimentos to a son or daughter? Certainly until s/he is 183, as this is the date of full age in Spain, but it is usual to consider that the obligation exists while the alimentista is studying and lacks of his/her own means of subsistence. That is not a "free rider" situation, as alimentos may be denied by several reasons: Obviously, because the person that should provide the help does not have the means to do so without endangering his own subsistence. The alimentista gets his/her own means of subsistence. Any of the causes that would make the alimentista unable to inherit from the person providing the help4: attempted murder, coercion to change their will, and other grave crimes. The alimentista does not do enough to get his/her own means of subsistence. If a judge decides that the alimentista son/daughter is neither studying nor seriously trying to get a job, the help can be revoked. Judges seem to be progressively taking a harsher stance against descendants who refuse to do their part. The article quotes the case of a 19 years old guy whose claim to the pension was denied. As a side note, rejecting to pay alimentos is another of the causes that would cause the person doing it to lose any right to inheritance from the alimentista. If for whatever the reason you do not qualify for alimentos, the details of the agreement between your father and your grandfather for the home become relevant5: If your father has formally rented the house then your grandfather position is not relevant, as your father has all of the rights6. If your grandfather allows your father to live in the house without paying rent, then it is your grandfather rights as owner against your father rights as an occupant. No idea about the outcome of that situation. UPDATE: You still do not tell about your grandfather stance about the issue, which is important. If your grandfather agrees with your father7 then the only way to stay at home is that of alimentos. What you describe is a situation of either precario or comodato, where your grandfather allows the use of the home without compensation. The differences are: precario is for an undefined time. comodato is for a defined time/use (e.g. for X years). Now, I have to suppose that you are not part of the agreement so it is just between your father and grandfather. That makes it your father's dwelling, and beyond alimentos he cannot be forced to share his dwelling with you. But if this is a situation of precario (which is what most often happens) your grandfather has the "nuclear option"8 of threatening to evict your father, as it is a relatively easy (in the legal sense, not the personal one) procedure. In a situation of comodato your grandfather could not evict your father until the conditions of the cession expire, making threats somewhat weaker. As a final note, and given how specific this answer has become: I am not a lawyer, you have not provided enough specific info, and this is not legal advice. Talk to a lawyer. Maybe a lawyer will check the agreement and it will turn out that your father is paying rent by performing some service, voiding the precario aspect. Maybe with the details provided the lawyer can find a way to an agreement that is more amenable to all. Talk to a lawyer. Shut up. The issue at hand may be stressful, and sometimes it might be tempting to boast to your father about the issues of alimentos or precario. Don't. If there is something to be said about that, let your lawyer do the talking. Try to stay calm. Consider the effect of your actions before taking them. While there is nothing wrong with talking to a lawyer, going beyond that and beginning a legal battle with members of your own family is most of the times an ugly affair. It could easily have an effect for a very long time in your relationship with most of your family, even with those who are not directly implied. Try to stay calm. 1 Literally, "foodstuffs", but when used as a legal term it includes other basic needs. 2 There are some official guidelines but judges seem to have freedom to follow them or not. 3 I believe that there are some exceptional reasons to lose such right before becoming 18 (e.g., sons condemned of attacking their fathers and the like) but I have no specific data about those. 4 As a side note, in Spain last wills do not allow the "donor" to distribute the goods freely, as some porcentajes of the inheritance must obligatory be provided to descendants and widowers. 5 Of course, in the case that your grandfather wanted to oppose your father's decision. 6 Since one of the legal reasons to end a rent agreement is to provide a home for a first degree relative, your grandfather could expel you from your rented home to give it to your father, but not the other way around. 7 And "agree" does not mean "Is happy with the decision" but "Will not go to the court to challenge your father decision". 8 Which is a very relevant analogy, because it could be almost as damaging to your family as a literal nuclear bomb. | There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass). | It might be illegal, depending on where you are. If it is known to the person who owns the vehicle occupying your space prior to doing so that wheelclamping may be the result, then the common law doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to a willing party, harm is not done") would lead to a conclusion that one who knowingly places themselves in a situation where harm may befall them is not entitled to bring a claim of tort against the other party (in the United States assumption of risk is a similar doctrine, but doesn't apply here because wheelclamping is an intentional act). In your situation, this means that the owner occupying your space cannot bring a case in tort against you. While it is generally applied to harm to people, there is precedent (albeit in British case law) for the doctrine to be applied to vehicles, and specifically, to the situation you describe - see Arthur v Anker and Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest. While cases from other jurisdictions are not binding, I have not been able to find any similar cases in the United States, and so it is possible that such cases will be persuasive. Note that this is highly jurisdiction-specific, and there may be laws in your state that make it unlawful - at least one high-profile case involving a McDonalds and its parking lot operator cites California law authorising only law enforcement to impound vehicles, and considering wheelclamping such an act. However, I have not been able to find the record of a judgement on this matter. It is also likely that if the payment you request is excessive, the owner would be able to seek relief, in the form of reducing the payment owed to a reasonable amount. However, if the parking space was not marked in some way to signal that it was reserved for use, then the owner of the vehicle may be entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages from a court. This would be on the basis of, if you only wheelclamped the car and declined to remove the wheelclamp upon the owner's request, the tort of detinue. But, if you attempted to request payment from them, then as Dale mentioned in his answer, you have committed extortion (wheelclamping is actually listed as a crime of extortion). | OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children. | If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase. | Zoning is controlled by the municipality (and possibly state, given where KC is) so you would have to check the rules for the municipality of interest and look at the specific zoning designation (e.g. RP-OE, R-2, MXD). Here for example is a page of code from Overland Park, which tells you that RP-4 land can be used for a private park, but agriculture is not a listed permitted use. You might argue with city hall over whether a giant garden is agriculture, and you might even win the argument (if it is a garden where you don't harvest product). Private / non-commercial is not likely to be the controlling factor over agricultural use. | I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." |
Why can gun shops sell guns in areas with ordinances restricting them? In Chicago/Riverdale(Cook County) there are local ordinances against owning "assault-style" weapons, yet there are multiple firearms dealers in these cities/villages. Does the banning of firearms not apply to the sellers? Does anyone who buys a weapon from here and walks out of the store immediately commit a crime based on ownership alone? Chicago Ordinace Wikipedia Reference It shall be unlawful for a person to import, sell, manufacture, transfer, or possess an assault weapon. Definition Of Assault Weapon Cook County Many places in cook county sell rifles with muzzle brakes and telescoping stocks which makes a weapon classified as an assault rifle. Eagle Shooting Range in Cook County,IL sells what cook county classifies as assault weapons. If you take a look at the weapons on the sale floor here here you will see rifles with telescoping stocks and muzzle brakes. I am a local to this area, there are many different weapons that meet the requirement to be classified as an "assault weapon" (based on the definition). They are open about these sales too, if you were to call up this store and ask them do they sell a Springfield Saint Edge, they will tell you yes. | §Sec. 54-212 of the ordinance states (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine in Cook County So if the gun is an assault weapon, it is not legal to sell. That ends the legal inquiry. Beyond that, we can only conjecture as to possibilities, for example (1) you may be mistaken in your assessment of some particular firearm, (2) the authorities don't know yet so haven't taken action or (3) they do know and they have taken action. Your link did not lead to any obvious things that count as an assault weapon, perhaps you could be more specific. | If the train operator allows it, yes, you would be permitted to do so. There are no laws specifically against the carrying of bows and/or arrows, nor is a licence required for their purchase. Bows can be carried openly with less issue, but arrows (because of their ease of use as a weapon) should be stored securely and safely, because this protects you and others from accidental injury; it prevents others using the arrow as a weapon; it is affirmative evidence for a defence of lawful purpose, if you are accused of carrying an offensive weapon. The latter is the greatest risk you may face from a legal perspective, so you should follow best practise similarly to firearms and ammunition: store and transport the bow and arrows safely, securely, separately. | In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out. | The grain of truth is what you've read is that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 19 says No person shall, by intimidation or force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of any person This is referenced in a compendium of state laws loosely subsumed under the notion of "blacklisting". In Arkansas, this would be writing, printing, publishing, or circulating false statements in order to get someone fired or prevent someone from obtaining employment; in Indiana it is using any means to prevent a discharged employee from obtaining employment. The Massachusetts law only prevents use of intimidation or force to prevent a person from getting employed. In other words, "blacklisting" is not the same thing in all jurisdictions. | Examples Detention: A person suspected of a felony can be detained at gunpoint (and, in many jurisdictions, subject to "citizen's arrest"). A more clear example is when you encounter someone committing a felonious assault. You can brandish your gun and order them to stop. If they do stop, then you cannot shoot them unless there is no alternative to preventing them from inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Defense: If you reasonably feel that another person poses a real and grievous physical threat, you can brandish a gun in defense. A common example is the slight woman followed into a vacant alley by a large man. She can brandish a gun to keep him at bay, but she cannot shoot him if he is not making explicit threats and (supposing one accepts the "Tueller rule") makes no aggressive motion within 21 feet of the woman. Law One helpful explanation of the distinction, by a MO attorney citing the MO Supreme Court: While deadly force can only be used to meet the threat of deadly force, the threat implied by brandishing is justified by a low level threat. “When a person has reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of another a design to inflict a great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished he is justified, and has the right, ‘to avert such apprehended design,’ and in proper circumstances the right of attack may be essential to the right of self-defense.” More detailed analysis can be found of California Penal Code 417 (California's law against "Brandishing," which is similar to brandishing laws in most states): [I]f you were lawfully defending yourself or defending another person, California's self-defense laws will excuse your otherwise criminal act. You lawfully act in self-defense or in defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or another person is about to suffer imminent harm, and you fight back with no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. I.e., sometimes it's enough to say, "Stop!" But sometimes it's necessary to present a gun for the bad guy to get the message. Additionally: Simply drawing or exhibiting a weapon isn't enough to justify a conviction for 417 PC. In order for prosecutors to convict you of brandishing a weapon or firearm, you must do so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. The same law review provides illuminating comparisons with the related offense "Assault with a Deadly Weapon" (ADW — CA 245 PC). | Are minors allowed to possess handguns in Oregon? Yes, with exceptions, although they may not purchase or own handguns, and are not permitted to conceal carry handguns. Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.470 prohibits any person from intentionally selling, delivering, or otherwise transferring a handgun to anyone under 21 years of age, ORS § 166.470(1)(a), except the temporary transfer of any firearm to a minor for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.470(3)(b). The other primary statute that is relevant is Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.250 which also provides that minors may possess any firearm temporarily for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.250(2)(a)(B). But, despite this general rule, a minor may not possess a firearm if they are under 18 years of age, and while a minor, committed the equivalent of an adult felony or a misdemeanor involving violence, within four years of being charged with possession. ORS § 166.250(1)(c). (Source). | Yes, that would be legal, indeed required According to the Michigan Dept of the Treasury: Individuals or businesses that sell tangible personal property to the final consumer are required to remit a 6% sales tax on the total price (including shipping and handling charges) of their taxable retail sales to the State of Michigan. Sales of electricity, natural or artificial gas and home heating fuels for residential use are taxed at a 4% rate. Michigan does not allow city or local units to impose sales tax. According to the official Michigan State Sales Tax Handbook Groceries and Prescription Drugs are exempt from sales tax, but prepared food is not. This includes restaurant food, and would, I think, include drinks served in a bar. When I worked in a Michigan restaurant and bar about 40 years ago, sales tax was charged, to the best of my memory. | The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question). |
Can someone tell me what this document is saying? Context: I purchased some land and paid cash for it in full and owned it without any kind of lien. We then proceeded to begin the process of building a house. Secured a builder and a construction loan. As part of construction loan, we used the property as security for the loan. Due to the economic situation and rocket-ship-like rising mortgage rates, we backed out of the project and paid off the loan. We received this today from our bank. I know little law jargon, but it sounds like we are giving the bank our property. That doesn't make sense to me though. Can someone kindly explain this document to me? | The document involves the bank cancelling the deed of trust (i.e. basically the mortgage) that you gave to the bank for the loan, because it was paid in full. In a deed of trust, the legal fiction is that you transfer the property to a trustee for the benefit of the bank. The bank was a grantee of an equitable interest in the property and a beneficiary of the trustee of the deed of trust. You were the grantor in the original transaction, giving the property to the trustee of the deed of trust, in which the bank and the trustee were grantees. Now, the bank is the grantor giving back to you what you gave up when the deed of trust was created, and you are the grantee of the rights that the bank acquired under the deed of trust. This is a routine document with nothing that seems to be amiss or needs to be clarified. It just means that the deed of trust is gone and that the property is now free and clear again. Depending upon local real estate practice, it may need to be recorded to establish that fact in the public record. | we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself. | The second paragraph is an invitation for people who don't want to follow the terms of the GPL (e.g. who want to incorporate it into a larger closed-source work, or make closed-source modifications) to contact XXX for a less onerous (but more expensive) license. That would require that XXX have full rights to the software, that they did not for instance incorporate others' GPLed code. It would be a stretch to read the second paragraph as attempting to limit the first paragraph, particularly given the "please". | If it looks like a gift and sounds like a gift and there is no evidence that it should not be considered a gift, well, what else could it be? Given the value of a house and depending on jurisdiction, there may be a gift tax involved. This is normally an obligation placed on the giver, not the receiver. It is unlikely to be a concern to you but a separate check would be wise for your own sake. If all ownership documents are clear that you and you alone own (and pay regular costs of, and maintain) the house, it is extremely unlikely that any private individual can take it away from you, regardless of their relationship to you. There doesn't appear to be any legal basis for their claims; they are hoping you will bow to social and emotional pressure. Your best course of action is to call their bluff. Request a written statement (ideally through their lawyer) that identifies the reason for their claims of ownership or otherwise why the property should be transferred to them (ideally checked by your lawyer) and proceed from your lawyer's advice. | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). | The landlady is trying it on. The purpose of a deposit is to protect the landlord from being left out of pocket by: damage to the property rent arrears Reasonable wear and tear does not constitute damage. It seems unlikely that the stiff tap is as a result of damage. The hob is not so clear cut: the landlady could argue that it was damaged, albeit by accident, and the cost of repair taken from your deposit. If she insists that the only remedy is to replace the hob, she should make an appropriate deduction to reflect the fact that it is several years old and will be replaced by one that is new (thereby gaining her some value). It would be reasonable for you to expect to see the written report from the gas inspector who has condemned the whole hob in that case. But I find it hard to believe that: the plastic knob cannot be replaced doing so would make the hob unsafe, if the knob can be removed for cleaning it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. Your liability is to return her to the position she would have been in had the damage not occurred. If that means replacing a removable plastic part instead of the whole hob, that would be a reasonable remedy. | It primarily depends on the title that you have to the house: are you "joint tenants with right of survivorship". This could have happened when you bought the house; it also could have been done after the fact in various ways. In that case, the house is outside of your wife's estate (which, under the circumstances, is divided between children and you). The lender might be confused about the status of the property, but they might be right, so the question is, what is your legal "interest" in the house, that is, does the title document say "tenants in common"? Assuming that the property is not recorded as JTWROS, then there are two matters to attend to. First, the lender may need to be satisfied, somehow, that they aren't taking a risk by refinancing when you aren't really the full owner. The second is clarifying actual ownership. Estates Code 201.0002-.003 govern intestate succession with a surviving spouse, where the dividing question is whether it is a community estate or not, which then implies shares for children. In that case, the children are part-owners, so you need their consent to e.g. sell the house (that is, this is a complication that needs to be fixed). Basically, you have to get a lawyer, and straighten this out. | I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer. |
How does one prove paternity if the father has an identical twin? Lets say Alice gets pregnant and claims she slept with Bob and he is the father. She wants a paternity test to prove it. The problem is that Bob has an identical brother, Billy, who has the exact same genetics. A paternity test can prove one of them is the father, but not which one she slept with. Presume that Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? | Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two. | united-states Bob could do any number of things to try to convince someone to prosecute Alice: call the prosecutor's boss, or the district attorney (or their equivalents in DOJ if it's a federal crime), or his elected representatives; he could also go to the media, or post on social networks... But if none of that works, the article is right: Prosecutors can't be legally compelled to prosecute someone Crime victims don't have any rights to control whether a prosecution happens—the government is the plaintiff. A prosecutor can even file charges over a victim's objections. Federal law and some states have Crime Victims' Rights Acts, which do grant some rights. But note the particularly relevant exception in that law: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction. This is also a separation of powers issue: the executive branch has the exclusive right to determine how the laws are executed. Neither the legislature nor the judicial branches can compel the executive to prosecute someone. Note that none of this affects Bob's civil remedies: he can still sue Alice for damages. But that won't result in her ending up in prison. | If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? An eleven year old child really has no say in the matter. A judge in a custody case may consider what the 11 year old has to say but is unlikely to give it much weight. (In contrast, a judge is likely to give a lot of weight to the views of a child who has a job, who is doing O.K. in school, and is a year or two from becoming a full fledged adult.) This is up to his parents to resolve absent circumstances not present here (e.g. the child has made bona fide allegations of child abuse, or the parents are both incarcerated). And, if the parents can't resolve the dispute, it is up to a court in a case where parenting time is at issue (probably either a legal separation or a divorce in this case). For example, while (as noted below) the police will not generally drag a child kicking and screaming to the other parent without a court order, if the child is at his father's house, the father can absolutely drag the child kicking and screaming to the child's mother's house, no matter how much the child doesn't like it. Moreover, while the father will not be violating any law, if he does not do that, a child custody judge is likely to look dimly upon a parent who intentionally withholds visitation from another parent without good cause, when the court considers what kind of child custody arrangements to put in place. And, the court has extremely great discretion in these matters. The judge is also likely to be pretty unhappy with both of the parents for failing to be capable of communicating or cooperating over child rearing related issues, because they are apparently so focused on not getting along with each other over their issues with each other. In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? It is not generally illegal for a married parent in a situation where there is no child custody order in place to have that parent's child with them over the objection of the other married parent. Absent a court order to the contrary, the police will probably call this a "civil matter" and will be unlikely to take any action until there is court guidance, absent exigent circumstances like evidence of recent not previously adjudicated claims of child abuse or neglect. The way to resolve this would be with a court filing of some sort seeking to resolve the parenting time issue, if necessary, on an emergency basis. Post-Script Whether or not the parents want to end the marriage, this situation is long overdue for court intervention. I've had couples who "pull the trigger" too soon, but this would not be a case of that type. Either the father or the mother needs to find a solicitor (if at all possible to afford that) and get the court system involved. If there is a breakdown in communications over matters related to the child, and the child is not cooperating in the face of an ambiguous parenting situation involving two parents who can't communicate about their child, the situation is out of control. Prompt court action could prevent a more negative outcome in the future by creating stability and structure in the situation. | The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime. | It is not as simple as the witness just making the assertion that they are the killer. They will be subject to grueling cross examination to break their story. If the victim was killed at a specific time, perhaps the prosecution can prove the witness was somewhere else at that time, and therefore lying. (No Opportunity) If the victim was killed with a specific weapon, perhaps the prosecution can prove that only the accused had the weapon, and the witness had no access to it, and therefore lying. (No Means) If the victim was killed in a specific way, perhaps the witness doesn't know any of the details of how the crime happened, and therefore is not credible. (No Knowledge) If the accused's DNA is found at the scene, and their shirt is covered in blood, and the witness has no corroborating evidence against them, then the witness is likely lying. (No Evidence) If the witness claims he is the murderer, the prosecution can inquire as to why he killed the victim. The real murderer had a reason: Perhaps money, power, hatred, passion, etc, that the witness may not be able to provide. (No Motive) Planting doubt in the mind of a jury is an effective defense. But lying about who did what, when, how, and why it is not as easy as you suggest. | "Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060. | The simple way is to post a picture of you and the widget to a site like Flickr. A more expensive way (but with rather more weight) is to get a Notary to certify they saw you and the widget on January 9th. Both the above provide evidence you had access to the widget before January 10th, but neither prove you owned it. For that, you would need a dated (possibly even notarized) bill of sale or similar - but if you acquired the widget via a gift, that won't work. A signed witness statement from the giver would probably serve (and the statement could legitimately be created when you are prosecuted). None of the above are unforgeable - but you don't need that. Depending on how the law is written, you will only need to show ownership on the balance of probabilities, or you might only need to show reasonable doubt that you didn't own it on 9th January. | Does the said law (or any other law or treaty) prohibit Indians to get the pre-natal gender screening test done outside India (in any country where this is legal)? YES, in theory but I cannot find any relevant case law where this has been considered by the court. Section 23(3) of the Pre-Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994 (PCPNDT) creates the offence for non-medical practitioners etc: Any person who seeks the aid of any [medical practioner etc] or any other person for sex selection or for conducting pre-natal diagnostic techniques on any pregnant women for the purposes other than those specified in sub-section (2) of section 4, he shall, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees for the first offence and for any subsequent offence with imprisonment which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. And section 4(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction for any offences committed by: any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India... Normally, criminal justice action would only be considered once the parties returned to India, but note that section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 allows for trials in absentia. However I cannot find any relevant case law to say whether this has actually happened in this type of scenario. |
What is the right daily rate for annual leave in the UK when unspecified in employment contract? tl;dr I had an amount of annual leave at the end of my contract and I want to determine the daily rate for payment in lieu of the untaken days of annual leave. My employer initially paid half the rate that I expected, then made another payment at a rate close to my yearly salary divided by 260 days (52 weeks and 5 days a week). I would like to request one of the two daily rates below and find the legal basis for it: salary divided by 230, to account 30 days of annual leave entitlement into account salary divided by 222, as above, and also bank holidays (8 per year in the UK). No details in employment particulars I checked the Employment Rights Act of 1996 and it requires details on the rate for payment in lieu of leave: 1 Statement of initial employment particulars. ... (4) The statement shall also contain particulars, as at a specified date not more than seven days before the statement (or the instalment containing them) is given, of— ... (d) any terms and conditions relating to any of the following— (i) entitlement to holidays, including public holidays, and holiday pay (the particulars given being sufficient to enable the employee’s entitlement, including any entitlement to accrued holiday pay on the termination of employment, to be precisely calculated), My offer letter does not include these details and I have no other legal documents. Scenario for "payment in lieu" Consider the following scenario. For simplicity, let's assume: my contract had 24 days of annual leave (2 per month) a month has 20 working days I left my employer on the last day of September I had 18 days left of annual leave to take I could either (i) have requested a payment in lieu for the annual leave; or (ii) let the contract extend to cover the 18 days of leave. I think that "payment in lieu" means that my gross payment should be the same in both cases (net payment differs depending on the monthly tax-free allowance in the UK, but that's between me and the taxperson). In case (ii) I could have extended the contract by 20 days to cover the full month of October: for 18 of those days, I would have taken leave from my stock at the end of the contract; for the other 2 days, I would have taken leave accrued by being on payroll during the month of October. If October had a bank holiday, then I would still have had one day of annual leave at the end of October. Questions am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? is there a legal basis for such a request? | am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No. | The German law mandates minimum notice periods for work contracts. But there is no restriction on maximum notice periods, as long as the employee does not have a longer notice period than the employer (§622 BGB de|en). So yes, in theory you could negotiate that the company is not allowed to fire you in the first 4 years. But I would find it unlikely that they would agree to that. When the stock options are really your only reason why you want to avoid getting terminated in the first 4 years, then they are more likely to be open to negotiations about the stock option clause than about the termination clause. | are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability. | The answer to your question is that your manager cannot ask you to undertake training without payment. All employees are entitled to be paid for the work they have done. They are also entitled to be paid if they are ready and willing to work but their employer has not provided them with any work to do, unless your employment contract says otherwise. https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/rights-to-pay/ Zero hours contracts can be very complicated legal issues, but you are entitled to be paid for the time you spend there doing what your employer has asked you to do. However, if your employment were to be terminated due to a disagreement then you may not be able to make any claim before an Employment Tribunal as you do not yet have a sufficient length of employment. There are many legal complications, and each case is different and individual. Giving general legal advice is beset with all kinds of problems. You may wish to direct your employer to the Citizens' Advice page. If they do not agree to either pay you for your time there or allow you to leave when they do not wish to pay you then your best option might be to seek employment elsewhere. | I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no "40 hours minimum required", the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the "allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws. | No employer has ever the right to withhold your pay check for work you have done. It is strictly illegal. Even if they had 100% evidence that you caused damage and were responsible for that damage, they still can't withhold your pay. They have to pay you, and then they can try to take you to court. The reason for this law is exactly cases like yours, where people try to avoid payment. If the "powerful attorney" tells you that you are not getting paid, then that "powerful attorney" is making a big mistake, because any lawyer would love to take your case to court and see the judge cutting the "powerful attorney" down to size. If you don't want a lawyer now, then you can write a letter by registered mail telling them that you worked for them, how much the payment due is, that they are legally required to make that payment, and that you will take them to court if they are not paying. If there is a conflict between law and a "powerful attorney", the law wins, and the law is on your side. | Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion! | There are circumstances in Australia where it is legal to work unpaid. Unpaid Trials A work trial is okay when: it involves no more than a demonstration of the person’s skills, where they are directly relevant to a vacant position it's only for as long as needed to demonstrate the skills required for the job. This will be dependent on the nature and complexity of the work, but could range from an hour to one shift the person is under direct supervision for the entire trial. Any period beyond what is reasonably required to demonstrate the skills required for the job must be paid at the appropriate minimum rate of pay. If an employer wants to further assess a candidate's suitability, they could employ the person as a casual employee and/or for a probationary period and pay them accordingly for all hours worked. Student Placements Under the FW Act, a vocational placement is lawfully unpaid if it meets all the following criteria: There must be a placement There must be no entitlement to pay for the work the student undertakes The placement must be done as a requirement of an education or training course The placement must be one that is approved by the training institution When all of the above criteria are satisfied, hosts are not required to pay students entitlements under the FW Act. However, a host can choose to pay the student at their own discretion if they wish. If the placement doesn't meet all of the above criteria, it won’t be a vocational placement under the FW Act. However, this doesn't automatically mean that the person is an employee and entitled to payment. The relationship may be a ... Work Experience & Internships A work experience placement is an unpaid internship only if it meets a number of criteria; if it doesn't it is an employment relationship and the worker is required to be paid. The criteria are: the person must not be doing “productive” work the main benefit of the arrangement should be to the person doing the placement, and it must be clear that the person is receiving a meaningful learning experience, training or skill development. Volunteering Key characteristics of a genuine volunteering arrangement include: the parties did not intend to create a legally binding employment relationship the volunteer is under no obligation to attend the workplace or perform work the volunteer doesn't expect to be paid for their work. The more formalised that volunteer work arrangements become (for instance if the volunteer is expected to work according to a regular roster) the greater the possibility that an employment relationship will be found. It is less likely that an employment relationship will be found to exist where the volunteer work is undertaken for selfless purposes or for furthering a particular belief in the not-for-profit sector. Large not-for-profits (e.g. Red Cross) consist of a mix of paid employees and volunteers; smaller not-for-profits (e.g. a local rugby league club) may consist entirely of volunteers. In this context it is important to note that if there is an expectation of payment (other then reimbursement of expenses) like a stipend for officials then the arrangement is an employment arrangement and all relevant employment law (e.g. minimum wage, workers compensation etc.) kicks in. As an aside a not-for-profit that has even a single employee loses its exemption under Work Health and Safety laws for all their workers; both employees and volunteers. |
Would a patent on the Win32 API make Linux Wine illegal? There is the Win32 API which provides access to systems functions on Windows. For example there is the CreateFile API call to create a file. And then there is Linux Wine which implements this API to run Windows programs on Linux. Let's say Microsoft writes a specification for the Win32 API (which in fact already exists in Form of HTML help pages) and registers a patent on it. Would this make Linux Wine illegal? Would this force the Linux community to remove Wine (which implements the Win32 API) from all distributions and code repositories? I was told in this question that permission to implement a specification can be restricted by patents: Can the permission to implement a specification be restricted? | Too late. It is public knowledge and has been for many years. You can't patent something that isn't new. | First, just to be clear, this is an old story from 2014. Second, Microsoft wasn't seeking payments for patents on the OS per se, but on the drivers for the chips that connect the cell phone to the cellular networks. In 2014 Microsoft bought Nokia. Part of Nokia's value was that it held a whole bunch of fundamental patents for cellular communications. Microsoft was suing Samsung on the basis of those patents. Samsung in turn claimed that Microsoft's acquisition of Nokia, and their attempt to charge for the Nokia patents violated the terms of a 2011 agreement between Samsung and Microsoft. Samsung and Microsoft settled the dispute in 2015. The terms of the settlement were confidential. Microsoft and Google did wage a separate patent battle in the courts of the US and Germany. This was also settled in 2015. This is all water under the bridge now. In 2018 Microsoft joined the Open Invention Network (OIN), a consortium of companies that agreed to license their patent portfolios to Linux royalty-free, and agree not to assert their patents against Linux systems. | Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation. | You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users. | As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold. | All Licenses are granted in the shape of contracts. Contracts contain clauses that allow or disallow their transferability. The typical way a License for a software is obtained is to buy a key that acts as proof of purchase, and then agreeing to an EULA. For example the Win10 one. very typical clauses from the Win10 EULA explicitly forbid to transfer of the license without the device it was installed on: Installation and Use Rights. a. License. The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one instance of the software on your device (the licensed device), for use by one person at a time, so long as you comply with all the terms of this agreement. Updating or upgrading from non-genuine software with software from Microsoft or authorized sources does not make your original version or the updated/upgraded version genuine, and in that situation, you do not have a license to use the software. c. Restrictions. The device manufacturer or installer and Microsoft reserve all rights (such as rights under intellectual property laws) not expressly granted in this agreement. For example, this license does not give you any right to, and you may not: (iii) transfer the software (except as permitted by this agreement); Transfer. The provisions of this section do not apply if you acquired the software in Germany or in any of the countries listed on this site (aka.ms/transfer), in which case any transfer of the software to a third party, and the right to use it, must comply with applicable law. a. Software preinstalled on device. If you acquired the software preinstalled on a device (and also if you upgraded from software preinstalled on a device), you may transfer the license to use the software directly to another user, only with the licensed device. The transfer must include the software and, if provided with the device, an authentic Windows label including the product key. Before any permitted transfer, the other party must agree that this agreement applies to the transfer and use of the software. b. Stand-alone software. If you acquired the software as stand-alone software (and also if you upgraded from software you acquired as stand-alone software), you may transfer the software to another device that belongs to you. You may also transfer the software to a device owned by someone else if (i) you are the first licensed user of the software and (ii) the new user agrees to the terms of this agreement. You may use the backup copy we allow you to make or the media that the software came on to transfer the software. Every time you transfer the software to a new device, you must remove the software from the prior device. You may not transfer the software to share licenses between devices Cincom Systems, Inc v Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. Sept 2009) held that you can not transfer software that was merely licensed, even as the part of your company that uses the software becomes part of another company through a merger. The licensor had put express language that forbids the transfer of the license by licensee into the contract: When Alcan Ohio merged with Alcan Texas, the license granted by Cincom solely to Alcan Ohio transferred to the surviving corporation, now known as Novelis. Because Novelis did not abide by the express terms of Cincom's license and gain Cincom's prior written approval, Novelis infringed Cincom's copyright. Likewise, the court in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) held that you can not re-sell an (installed) digital item as you create a new copy without the license for this. In a similar fashion, Disney recently changed the Terms of Service and contract on the digital codes that come with DVDs. The new terms explicitly forbid unbundling the code from the disk and forbid transferring the disk after using the code. This was what allowed Disney to gain an injunction in the case of Disney v RedBox. The end result is not out yet. In the EU, the ruling in one case fell different: UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. held in 2012 that there is possibly a right to resell your used license... as long as it is a license forever (emphasis mine): in the event of the resale of a user licence entailing the resale of a copy of a computer program downloaded from the copyright holder’s website, that licence having originally been granted by that rightholder to the first acquirer for an unlimited period in return for payment of a fee intended to enable the rightholder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of that copy of his work, the second acquirer of the licence, as well as any subsequent acquirer of it, will be able to rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right under Article 4(2) of that directive As a result software licenses adapted and started to expressly sell the license as a license to obtain the service of a maintained software. To software as a service - which Windows and the Office suite are - this ruling does expressly not apply and you can not re-sell such a software license after it has been used. Signed License v. License Key That does not apply to the key, the representation of the payment. You can buy them in a store. They are a pretty tangible good. The principle is - in general - that you validate the license you sign by handing over the key to the supplier of the software. This usually voids the key. But... all those sites claim you can transfer?! not.... quite: once you agreed to the EULA and obtained the software service it can no longer be resold. Also, you just agreed you may not do that with transferable software. However, as long as you have the key unused the unused key for a license can be resold. That is a physical good that the first sale doctrine applies to. However, you may not retain a copy of the key to sell it, again and again, you would interfere with your customer's ability to contract as a used key often is rejected - you'd have defrauded the customer. Even in the EU, if you bought a perpetual license, you need to render your copy unusable under the ruling above: The CJEU held that the first purchaser needs to "make his own copy unusable at the time of its resale…in order to avoid infringing the exclusive right of reproduction of a computer program which belongs to its author“ The CJEU therefore briefly commented “to solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor – whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ – to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys“. The key is a means to show you are entitled to a contract. It is the consideration Microsoft gets for signing the other side of the contract. Most software resellers deal with keys, the resale of keys is expressly possible. Some software companies mark a used-and re-sold key and require to contact the company to make sure that the software has been disabled on the other end. Since many companies can't render the software disabled on the seller's end, they refuse to acknowledge the sale on the same basis: the software was not disabled or rendered useless, and as a result, the sale did not happen in accordance with the judgment. | According to the website, the VirtualBox base package is licensed under the GPL. That means you're free to use it for any purpose. The VirtualBox Extension Pack has a more restrictive license, which is only free for personal, educational, or evaluation use. | This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement. |
Would it be legal for an American to hack Russian military infrastructure to aid Ukraine? I am an American citizen located in the US. Suppose I wanted to hack Russian military infrastructure and disable it in order to aid Ukraine. Would this be legal? | It's illegal. 18 USC 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, makes it illegal to, for instance, "intentionally access a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, cause damage and loss." A "protected computer" is defined to include any computer "which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". This effectively includes every computer in the world that's connected to the Internet (see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007). To the best of my knowledge, Congress has not added any exceptions for Russia or any other specific country. It's also likely to be forbidden by the laws of your state. You did not specify a state, but taking Colorado as an example, the following are crimes under C.R.S. 18-5.5-102: (a) Accesses a computer, computer network, or computer system or any part thereof without authorization; exceeds authorized access to a computer, computer network, or computer system or any part thereof; or uses a computer, computer network, or computer system or any part thereof without authorization or in excess of authorized access; or [...] (e) Without authorization or in excess of authorized access alters, damages, interrupts, or causes the interruption or impairment of the proper functioning of, or causes any damage to, any computer, computer network, computer system, computer software, program, application, documentation, or data contained in such computer, computer network, or computer system or any part thereof; or (f) Causes the transmission of a computer program, software, information, code, data, or command by means of a computer, computer network, or computer system or any part thereof with the intent to cause damage to or to cause the interruption or impairment of the proper functioning of or that actually causes damage to or the interruption or impairment of the proper functioning of any computer, computer network, computer system, or part thereof [...] Note that this applies to any target computer, and the prosecution would not have to prove that the computer was used in, or affected, interstate or foreign commerce or communication. Other states most likely have similar laws. | Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not. | Following the links in the article you quoted, you find that it is indeed illegal in Germany to insult a foreign head of state. For a prosecution to happen, the foreign government has to ask for prosecution, and it would be a criminal case. It's not clear to me whether a TV station could be sued as well. Where Mr. Böhmermann lives would be irrelevant, what would be relevant is whether the insult happened in Germany. | The "letter" you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a "country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions", which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of "embargo restrictions"). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians. | They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore. | No, it is not. Just as it is illegal to steal from a thief, it is illegal to hack a hacker. Criminals are often considered a good target for crimes from a practical standpoint, but crimes against criminals are still prosecuted. As criminals are unlikely to report crimes against them to the authorities (particularly when doing so runs the risk of them being arrested for their crimes), targeting them does tend to result in a lower risk of being caught by the authorities, but if the crime is discovered, it will generally be prosecuted all the same. To that point, two Florida men have recently been arrested and are being prosecuted for stealing millions of dollars in Bitcoins from an illegal, darkweb drug marketplace in 2013, and there is always the more famous case of the two government agents who are in jail for stealing from the Silk Road. In your specific example, if all you did was hand over the information to the FBI, it's less likely that you'd be prosecuted than if you did so for personal gain, but you would be at risk of prosecution for engaging in vigilante computer hacking, yes. Also consider that if your actions happened to interfere with an ongoing investigation or result in the inability to prosecute (say, for the evidence you gathered being tainted and inadmissible by your involvement), you could be charged with crimes such as obstruction of justice or interfering with a police investigation as well. | I said this in a comment, but I'll put it in an answer. When France forcibly confines an American, the United States is entitled to ask France, "what the hell do you think you're doing, trying to confine our citizen in your country?" There are really just six basic answers that the United States will accept, and nothing in this scenario is specific to France or the US (it applies any time a foreign national is arrested by any country), and the six responses are the six basic principles of jurisdiction: Active nationality: "He's our citizen too! What the hell do you think you're doing, questioning how we treat our own citizens?" The US doesn't generally get to question how France treats French citizens, even if they're also American citizens. And France gets to require its citizens to obey French law anywhere in the world. Subjective territoriality: "He broke our laws on our soil. We don't care that he's your citizen, he has to obey our laws while he's here." This and nationality are by far the most well-accepted answers. Protective: "He threatened our state. We have the right to protect ourselves." This applies to things like attacking French government personnel or forging a French passport or similar: France isn't protecting its citizens, it's protecting France itself. Objective territoriality: "He may have committed this crime outside France, but its effects happened inside France. We can punish him for causing those effects." For instance, if you're in the US but hack a computer in France, France has an argument that they get to punish you for that. Passive nationality: "He may be American and have done this outside France, but he hurt our citizens. We have the right to protect our citizens." Again, a plausible argument. This is not necessarily a strong argument, but it can be made. Universality: "This thing is a crime against all of humanity. It's something that needs to be stamped out by all countries working together, without worrying too much about whether or not the defendant actually affected the country prosecuting him in any way." This is very rare. Murder is not a crime of universal jurisdiction. It's limited to more severe crimes, as well as crimes of a fundamentally international nature. So piracy is on the list, as is plane hijacking, as is genocide. Killing an ambassador is on the list: you're a threat to international order. But normal murder? Not even close. It's not a crime with international implications, and it's not a crime which is so fundamentally horrific that it needs to be ended by any means necessary. The death penalty has never been considered to be that fundamentally horrific, and likely never will be, particularly when (as in the US) it is limited to people who have committed something that is an extremely serious crime in any country (i.e. murder). The only way France could make a remotely plausible argument that it gets to punish American executioners is if they're dual citizens or if they executed a French citizen. Then France can't arrest the executioner because US is a sovereign state and gets to impose its own penal laws. But normally? France couldn't arrest them even if it wasn't for the fact that they're executing US government policy, because Americans in America don't generally have to obey French laws. | There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account". |
Seller unilaterally triples the shipping cost Bob (in New Zealand) is on the hunt for a specific, a bit bulky and heavy device all over the world. He finds it at a web store in Spain for a good price. They ship internationally: shipping cost is automatically calculated upon providing an address. Bob, happy with all the costs, places an order and pays by credit card. The card gets actually charged. A few days later, when the purchase already appears finished on the card's online statement, the store emails Bob: shipping cost to NZ is triple the one you've paid. Do you wanna pay the difference or cancel the order and get the refund? What does the Spanish law say about situations like this? Is the store obliged to honour the contract and ship at the original cost, or is there no contract (only invitation to treat)? Even assuming that there is a contract (money was actually taken, not just authorized), is the store allowed to say "sorry we made a mistake as to the shipping costs" and just pull out? Note that the store effectively has no specific terms and conditions (the relevant page on their site is filled with "Lorem ipsum..."), so the default law, whatever it is, apparently applies. If the store is obliged to honour the original deal, are there any regulatory authorities lodging a complaint to which would teach the store some good manners? Would this matter, if pursued by Bob, be a small claims matter in Spain given that the total bill is about €2,000? | france France is not Spain, but both are civil-law jurisdictions, so I expect this answer to be marginally more applicable to the original question than answers based on common-law countries. Listed prices are binding on the seller, even if mistaken Price tag errors (whether physical or electronic) usually involve low amounts of money, so there is not much jurisprudence on that point. Let us start by discussing Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 04 juillet 1995, 93-16198, where the highest French court endorsed a 1993 court of appeal ruling, because it illustrates some relevant principles. A jewelry store put up a ring for sale for 100 000 francs (equivalent to roughly €20 000 in 2021), which someone bought. The store later realized that there was a mistake in the price tag (the intended listing price was more than four times higher) and sued to revert the sale. The court of appeals judged that as a general rule, mistakes in price tags are a risk the seller takes; the buyer could reasonably think the asked price matched the true value of the ring, and therefore it was not "unrealistically low" The latter point refers to a statute (Code Civil 1169) that says a contract of something-for-money is void if the price is "unrealistically low". The ruling essentially says that the test for "unrealistically low" is whether the buyer should reasonably be aware that the price is due to a mistake from the seller. I doubt a store can rely on the "unrealistically low" provision in the case of shipping fees. A random consumer has no way to accurately know the price of overseas shipping. Even if they did think the shipping fees were much lower than expected, it might be because the store chooses to charge something else that their exact costs, for whatever reason (e.g. uniform shipping fees is easier to maintain on their website that one cost for each country; some stores are "free shipping" meaning they recoup their shipping costs with higher item prices). No surprise fees The seller might argue that their shipping costs were unknown, and that the shipping fee they charged was a provisional estimate, or conditional on a later determination of the true cost. Code de la consommation, L112-3 says that when the total price of the item or service sold "cannot be reasonably known in advance [of the sale]", the seller must provide advance notice to the buyer, as well as the method by which the unknown components of the price will be later determined. No such notice appears to have been made. Online sale: when is the contract formed? The seller might argue that clicking "buy" on an online shopping cart does not form a contract, but that they reserve acceptance at a later date. The other answers seem to indicate that is a valid practice in some common-law countries, but I believe that is not the case in France. I could not find court cases on exactly that point, and therefore cannot be sure that the rest of my answer is correct. I believe the seller is bound by the terms offered on the website, based on Code Civil, 1127-1 and 1127-2. Quiconque propose à titre professionnel, par voie électronique, la fourniture de biens ou la prestation de services, met à disposition les stipulations contractuelles applicables d'une manière qui permette leur conservation et leur reproduction. L'auteur d'une offre reste engagé par elle tant qu'elle est accessible par voie électronique de son fait. (...) Le contrat n'est valablement conclu que si le destinataire de l'offre a eu la possibilité de vérifier le détail de sa commande et son prix total et de corriger d'éventuelles erreurs avant de confirmer celle-ci pour exprimer son acceptation définitive. Whichever business proposes by electronic means the sale of goods or services must allow the contractual conditions be be recorded and reproduced. The author of an offer is bound by it as long as it is accessible due to his or her actions. (...) The contract is formed only if the recipient of the offer could check the details of his or her order, its total price, and could correct possible mistakes, before confirming the order to formulate his or her definite acceptance. "Due to his or her actions" means I cannot screenshot an Amazon page (or duplicate it on my web server) and request the conditions of that screenshot two years later. However, it does not include provisions for mistakes in the listed price or sales conditions, and I would expect the general rule (price tag mistakes are on the seller) to apply on the internet. The last paragraph cited is a consumer rights provision - essentially, "no contract is formed unless the consumer did X". However, it implies that once the consumer did X, the contract is formed. Contract enforcement For the above reasons, I believe clauses that allow an online store to unilaterally cancel an order once placed are unenforceable (unless force majeure or other narrow exceptions apply). That being said, the incentive to sue in such cases is low (and I could find no jurisprudence). In France (and I believe in all civil-law systems), civil liability is established by three factors: a damage, a wrongful action, and a causation link between the two. In the jewelry case, the store could easily prove the damage (difference between the price at which the sale was made and the price at which the item was estimated), and the causation link between the consumer’s action and the damage; however, there was no wrongful action. In the case where the exchange of goods against money has been blocked by the store, the consumer’s problem is to prove damage. If they have not been charged, or if they have been charged but refunded, the direct monetary impact is zero. The consumer would have to prove other theories of damage: for instance, that they relied on the ordered item to do something, and could not find a replacement in time. However, in all such scenarios, the causation link will be hard to prove. | It's the seller's responsibility. Note that in the UK you actually get much more than 2 years. The 2 year rule is the minimum required by the EU, but each country is free to implement that as they choose and the UK has much more. In the UK you are protected by the Consumer Rights Act. It states that products must last a "reasonable length of time". What counts as reasonable depends on the goods. For electronics 2 years is usually the absolute minimum, but for things like televisions the courts generally consider it to be 5 years even for cheap models. Under the Act the retailer is responsible. They can either replace the device or refund you, with the refund amount accounting for the 1.5 years use you had from it. As it was part of a phone contract it could be difficult to agree on a value for the speaker, but looking up the replacement cost for the same or a similar device is a good place to start. Which? has a lot more information and advice. | A lawsuit is designed to put you in the position you were in before the sale happened. Since the company has already offered you a full refund, suing would achieve nothing except cost you fees; your time and frustration are not legally recompensable. It may be that some consumer-protection office can fine this company for misleading advertising; the case would turn on whether the mistake should have been noticed before customer support sent a false confirmation. If you want to start the process, you should make a formal complaint to your local trading standards/customer service office. You will get no reward except relief to your feelings. | The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory. | You are correct in that the GST is 10%. It never has been (and likely never will be!) 2.5%. You're also correct that some items (generally considered as 'essentials') are GST free. For example, the ATO includes 'most basic food' on its list of GST-free items. However, these GST-free items are completely GST free, and restaurant meals certainly don't class as basic food. Perhaps interestingly, the wholesale sales tax when it was first introduced in 1930 was set at 2.5%, but it wasn't at that rate for long (see A brief history of Australia's tax system). If I had to guess, I'd say this is probably a dodgy set up in this restaurant's point-of-sale system (there's also no such thing as 'GST2'). Hopefully their returns to the tax office are not as dodgy! | Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you. | Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? No, but he must pay for the goods if the supplier asks. Does this fall under unjust enrichment? No. This is simply a contract law issue. The person is contractually obliged to pay for the goods and, in the present circumstances, they haven’t done so. If so, to what extent must he try? He doesn’t have to make an active effort to pay but he can if he likes. However, if and when the vendor realises their mistake and asks for payment, it must be made in a reasonable time. | The statement ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. could certainly be considered as defamatory. However, in the US and many other countries, truth would be a valid defense, if the person making the statement could prove that the statement is true. I don't see how it could be construed as solicitation. If worn on a shirt into ABC, the management could surely ask the wearer to remove it. If that request is refused, they could ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer has a valid membership, then it would depend on the exact terms of the membership contract, and provisions of local law, whether ABC could insist that the wearer leave, or have the wearer arrested for trespass should the wearer refuse. Any regulations incorporated by reference into the contract would also matter. At least in the US. walking back and forth on a public sidewalk just outside ABC's door, wearing such a shirt or carrying a classic picket sign with such a message would be pretty clearly legal, provided that others are not unduly obstructed, and no valid local ordinance is violated. In the wear-the-shirt-inside case, if the wearer refuses to remove the shirt or leave, the management would probably call law enforcement. LE will not want to decide whether wearer has the legal right to remain in the club wearing the shirt. They will probably ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer protests that s/he has a valid membership and thus a contractual right to stay, who knows what they would do. If they still ask the wearer to leave, the wearer would be wise to comply and perhaps take legal action to enforce his or her membership rights, which will depend on the contract details as mentioned above. A lawyer would probably be very helpful if the wearer wants to take that route. The wearer would be wise to remain polite and appear calm, not yelling or using epithets. |
Can a person be fired, banned and evicted (etc.) without a court order? It seems like a lot of "punishments" can be applied to a person without having to go to court. For example a person can be banned from private or public property for any or no reason. I've seen residential leases that state a lease can be immediately terminated if a tenant commits a crime, though a courts decision is not necessary to find them guilty (clause 7, here). An employee can be terminated with cause if an internal investigation finds them guilty of misconduct (even if the process was total bogus, for example not giving them a chance to defend themselves). Do I understand things correctly? Is the idea that these things probably won't happen to an "innocent" person? Also this does not preclude counter lawsuits, for example I've heard of a case where an employee was fired for sexual harassment but he he maintains he didn't do it and is suing his coworkers and former employer for defamation of character. Does Habeas corpus come into play in any of these situations, or is it only applicable when physically being detained or jailed? | It seems like a lot of "punishments" can be applied to a person without having to go to court. Yes, because everyone has the right and freedom to associate, or dissociate, with other people, and the freedom of contract, at least when the state does not decide to interfere. The state, owing to its monopoly of legitimate violence, has a duty towards everyone under its rule and the people in many countries decided that the state's power should be significantly limited with judicial supervision where individual rights and freedoms are implicated. Other individuals or legal persons do not in general owe a duty to be friend with you or to sign or continue a labour or rental contract with you. At the same time, the people and their government have also decided in certain situations there exists a power imbalance (e.g. between the landlord and the tenant, the employer and the employee, groups suffering from discrimination and stereotypes) where unlimited freedom of association and contract not only harms the individual's human dignity but also harms the society as a whole (e.g. homeless and unemployment, which may lead to increased crimes etc.). Thus, in some situations, the law prohibits discrimination and provides for legal rights generally for the more vulnerable. However, this is a decision that is undertaken by each jurisdiction. A court order is only required if the law says that you normally have a legal entitlement but the state or someone else wants to take it away or limit it, or if the law explicitly requires a procedure before the court. Since you tagged the question with canada... Can a person be fired ... without a court order? Yes. However, in Canada, all jurisdictions have labour laws that regulate dismissal of an employee. Dismissal without cause usually requires notice period and/or severances, depending on the length of employment. Dismissal for cause can be challenged in court and the employer has the burden of proof to justify the cause on a balance of probabilities (more probably than not) and the terminated employee will have the right to have them heard before the court and present their evidences. If the person occupied a unionized position, they may also be able to file grievances with the union before an arbitrator, depending on the text of the collective agreement. The collective agreements also often provide for procedural requirements before the dismissal of an employee in a unionized position. Violation of these procedural requirements may lead to the annul of dismissal or awards of damages. Can a person be banned ... without a court order? Yes. You have no general right to be on another person's property in Canada. Your rights end where others' property (or other) rights begin. Like said in the beginning, this is a societal decision and an act of balancing particular to each jurisdiction, for example, in some places, there exists a right to roam over certain publicly accessible lands. The property owner or another person otherwise legally authorized has the authority to decide who they want on their property (which means what is one's own), subject to certain narrow exceptions, under common law and provincial trespassing acts. Your neighbour cannot prevent you from crossing on their land if you have a valid easement and are not abusing it. But if you are abusing your easement, your neighbour may take you to court for an order. Here the property owner includes the state. However, like almost all decisions made by the state, in Canada and many other countries with the rule of law, can be judicially reviewed for their reasonableness, and sometimes correctness. Like all decisions made by the state, trespassing notices may be challenged if the decision is arbitrary or without legal basis. Can a person be evicted ... without a court order? No. In all jurisdictions in Canada, eviction, that is, the forced removal of tenant from a premise, can only be carried out by sheriffs or other legally authorized officers upon an order from a court or tribunal (often called Landlord and Tenant Board or similar), with exceptions for certain tenancies (e.g. where the landlord and the tenant share living area). Court order is not required for the termination of a tenancy; but the termination of tenancy can only be achieved if the tenant agrees or a tribunal or court orders so. Does Habeas corpus come into play in any of these situations No. Habeas corpus means "that you have the body", which is an order from a judicial official to command the state to bring someone in its custody before the court, so that the legality of their detention by the state may be determined. In Canada, habeas corpus only protects liberty interests of an individual. | In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store. | It is a felony to escape from a jail; see California Penal Code section 4532. (Escapes from a prison are covered in section 4530). However, California law recognizes a necessity defense when a crime is committed in order to avoid "significant bodily harm". (See the link for other important elements of the defense.) This defense would probably only be viable if after escaping, the inmate turned himself in as promptly as he reasonably could, once clear of the immediate danger of harm. He could go to any police station or law enforcement office; or he could call any police agency, explain the situation, and wait for them to come and arrest him. He would then presumably be taken to a different jail. If the inmate thinks the jail is unsafe, he can sue the state in either state or federal court (the latter as a civil rights case). It's unlikely that a court would order his release on this basis; more likely, they would order the state to improve conditions in some specific way, and they might award monetary damages to the inmate if he is injured. He also would probably not be able to stay out of jail during the suit. If the state arrests him, they'll put him in jail unless a court orders his release (or he's granted bail, or his case is otherwise resolved). If he hides to avoid arrest, then he's a fugitive. I seem to recall there's a general principle that fugitives don't have access to the courts. | A store owner may ban any person from that store that s/he chooses, provided that the ban is not for a reason forbidden by applicable anti-discrimination law, such as banning all people of a particular race or religion. That does not appear to be the case in this situation, from the description. Since this is a franchise, the store has a local owner who is not the chain company. The company will have a franchise contract with the local owner, which will specify in what ways the company can and cannot control the store. They might or might not have the power to require the store owner not to ban you, or not to engage in verbally abusive behavior in the store. In any case, you, or any third party, cannot force them to exercise such power, even if they have it under such a contract. It is very unlikely that law enforcement the authorities will treat the verbal harassment as a crime based on a customer report. You could publicize the situation, as by an online review, which might cause the chain company to take some action, for fear of bad publicity. But be careful. You have already learned that your initial understanding of the situation was significantly incomplete. If any public statements you make are untrue, and harmful to reputation, you could be accused of defamation and sued, perhaps successfully. | They come to her house excessively and have even told her if she has house guests they will arrest her. Can they really do that? Absent special circumstances such as those discussed below, however, having house guests is not a crime, and some laws that purport to prohibit this are unconstitutional. But, there are a variety of proper and improper reasons that this could be happening, as well as some that are in a legal gray area. Clearly, the police are doing this for some reason, proper or improper, because it is a sustained pattern of conduct that seems to be singling out one person. But, without more of a factual context it is hard to tell what that reason is so that it is possible to determine whether or not their threat has a legal basis. Like most legal questions, the answer cannot be provided in a vacuum and a full factual context is necessary to know if the police conduct is illegal or not. Valid Reasons Part of A Pattern Of Evidence Showing A Suspected Vice Offense One possible subtext is that the police believe that the premises is a de facto house of prostitution, or that she is dealing drugs out of the house, even though they don't yet have the evidence to arrest her on those suspicions. The police could be implying in their threat to arrest her that the presence of "house guests" would give them probable cause to arrest her on suspicion of a vice offense such as prostitution or drug dealing. Municipal Ordinance Violations Many valid reasons involve municipal ordinances, almost all of which can be punished by arrest and incarceration just like a misdemeanor criminal offense, even when the ordinance does not describe conduct that would usually be considered to be criminal in nature. For example, municipal codes usually authorize law enforcement to arrest someone for a zoning violation, even though it would be very unusual to arrest someone for violating a zoning law. There are often municipal ordinances which limit how many house guests you can have at any one time in a single family house or apartment, such as fire codes and laws designed to prevent loitering and gang activity, and there are often rules that prohibit certain kinds of activities like loud and disorderly parties (especially where alcohol is served or available). But, these ordinances almost never prohibit all house guests. The police could think that she is operating a short term leasing operation (i.e. Air B-n-B) or hotel, in a place where this use of the property is banned by municipal ordinance, and it appears that her "house guests" fit this description. Many municipal ordinances impose curfews on minors, and someone could be arrested for having a party at which minor house guests are present after curfew under some of those municipal ordinances. Some municipal ordinances (or even sometimes state laws), which are not always constitutional or valid under federal housing laws, prohibit unrelated people from cohabiting, either because the cohabitation amounts to de facto polygamy, or because zoning laws prohibit more than a certain number of unrelated people from living at a residence. Valid Reasons Particular To Certain Individuals If someone is on probation or parole or house arrest or out on bail pending criminal charges, the conditions of that criminal sentence or bail condition could also limit the ability of someone to have house guests. For example, if someone had previously been convicted of disorderly conduct and noise violations and contributing to the delinquency of minors, with a wild party, a probation condition for that person might prohibit them from having house guests during the duration of the probation sentence. Similarly, many probation, parole and bail conditions, prohibit the person released in the community from associating with known felons or gang members. Civil or criminal protection orders can also prohibit particular people (e.g. ex-spouses) from being at a particular location. Many states impose restrictions on where sex offenders can reside that could be implicated in this case. A few states also have a criminal sanction of "exile" on the books that prohibits certain people from being in certain jurisdictions following their conviction. Gray Area Reasons It is also entirely possible that the police are asserting rights to do things that they don't actually have the right to do. And, in most jurisdictions in the U.S., it is not categorically unconstitutional for law enforcement officers to lie to members of the public about their authority or other matters, in order to achieve a law enforcement purpose, even if they would be violating the law if they followed through on their lies about what they are permitted to do. Improper Reasons There could also be clearly improper reasons for this conduct. For example: perhaps a police officer wants men to say away from his ex-spouse or daughter, even though he has no right to do so and his colleagues are backing him up, or perhaps the police think that her house guests are disreputable and are taking matters into their own hands without legal authority to keep "bad people" out of territory in their "beat", or perhaps they suspect but can't prove that she deals drugs or conducts some other sort of illegal activity at her residence, or perhaps she is one of the few black residents of the neighborhood (or her house guests are black) and the police want to harass her to cause her to leave the neighborhood, and they don't think that she will be able to punish them for their misconduct effectively though legal channels before getting fed up and moving away. For example, if they make an arrest and can articulate some kind of alleged probable cause even if it doesn't hold up in court, they may be able to dramatically inconvenience this women with impunity, particularly if the local trial court judges that would consider the arrest decide to side with the police even when misconduct would be clear to a neutral observer. | While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court. | This law sounds likely to be unconstitutional and/or invalid because it is pre-empted by state or federal laws. Among other things it probably violates the First Amendment right to petition the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws (by depriving people who have had previous police calls of the right to call the police without penalty) and due process (by imposing a penalty based upon a call, without a presumption of innocence, rather than a finding of wrongdoing that overcomes a presumption of innocence). It could also implicate a tenant's right as a Fourth Amendment seizure without probable cause, or a Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation. It is probably also pre-empted by state law which establishes the grounds for which someone may be lawfully evicted, which almost certainly do not include this condition. Likewise, the conditions under which liability for police injuries is imposed are also probably pre-empted by state law. California has an express statutory prohibition on this kind of rule at Cal.Civ.Code § 1946.8(c) which provides that: A landlord cannot punish, or threaten to punish, you or another resident for exercising your right to request law enforcement or emergency assistance on behalf of a: victim of abuse; victim of crime; or person in an emergency. Your landlord also cannot put any penalties in place if a person who is not a resident or tenant calls law enforcement or emergency assistance to your residence. To be protected under this law, the person who calls the police must believe that law enforcement or emergency assistance is needed to prevent or deal with an act of abuse, or the heightening or worsening of an act of abuse, a crime, or an emergency. The American Civil Liberties Union is currently actively attempting to identify cases where these laws (often called nuisance laws) are being used in this manner for the purposes of bringing litigation to invalidate the laws or restrain their use. Litigation is in process in Seattle, Washington and East Rochester, New York. The ACLU also notes that: In situations where an alleged "nuisance" offense is related to an incident of domestic violence, landlords may choose to evict all the residents to avoid future incidents or police calls that could result in a fine. Yet, these evictions violate federal law. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has made it clear that tenants who are denied or evicted from housing because they have suffered domestic violence can file sex discrimination complaints with HUD under the federal Fair Housing Act. Thus, there would often be pre-emption of the local law by federal law as well. An op-ed piece in the New York Times reviews similar issues in Lakewood, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pointing out that the U.S. Constitution and federal housing laws are likely to be violated by these statutes. In at least two instances, one included in an edited question in Norristown, Pennsylvania, and one mentioned in another answer, the case of Somai v. City of Bedford in Bedford, Ohio, the ACLU has concluded favorable settlements after litigation to have these ordinances repealed and to win compensation for aggrieved parties, although, because they are settlements, neither case establishes a binding appellate precedent. We don't intend to challenge the laws at this time - they make it easier for us to evict problem tenants whose visitors damage our property - but were wondering if there are examples of similar laws that have either gone unchallenged for a long period of time or that have been challenged and judged to be legal. As landlords, you are in a difficult position. These laws have not gone unchallenged for a long period of time nor have they been challenged and judged to be legal. Instead, in all likelihood, a legal challenge to these newly enacted laws is likely to be imminent. And, while you face violations of local laws in these cases by not taking action, you may face federal housing law liability if you do utilize these laws and these laws are found to be invalid. | I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith. |
Is nickname on an android app consider as personal Information for GDPR policy I am currently developing a puzzle game where the player initially has the option to enter a "NIckname" of his choice ( might also be his name - its up to him what to enter) so that his time score ( app is based on the best win times) can appear on a World Leaderboard of the top 10 times performed of the users played the game. My question: is the nickname held on my database considered as personal Data since it can be anything and also a user might enter a name that might point to other people (since anyone can choose anything)? If nickname is not consider by itself something that direct or indirect points to a specific person then i will go for it otherwise i may choose for each player a random ID. My database data will be permanent ( not ephemeral) because i need to track down the best achieved times and display only the top 10. Also the player will have the option to skip this step ( so no nickname for him ) and also if a nickname has been chosen the player will the option to delete his profile. thank you | Yes such a username would be personal data. It is information that relates to an identifiable person. In this context,a person isn't identifiable only if you can infer their real-world identity, but already if you can single out one person's records. Thus, your random IDs and any linked information would be personal data as well. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean that processing it is illegal. It just means you need a legal basis. That could be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject (like saving game progress), a legitimate interest, or consent. Taking into account GDPR principles like "data protection by design and by default", it could be sensible to hide a players stats from the leaderboard until they give consent. On the other hand, you may have a legitimate interest to provide leaderboard data for ranking/comparison, especially if the leaderboard entries are pseudonymized. In any case, it should be clear to the users which information is visible to others. | When you make a request based on the GDPR, Art. 12(6) GDPR applies. Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. As you can see, this only applies when the data controller (Blizzard) has reasonable doubts about your identity. If I understand it correctly, Blizzard provides services (games) which requires you to login with a username and password. So they have no doubts about your identity when you use their (paid) services with just a username and password. So there should also be no reasonable doubts when you make other requests when you are able to login to their website. A copy of your government ID seems unnecessary. Recital 57 also confirms that identification does not require a government ID: Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. A copy of your id, includes a photograph. The photograph could show health, religious, racial or ethnic information. That kind of personal data has much stricter rules defined in Art.9 . Most governmental IDs contain a national identification number. EU Member States can limit processing of those identification numbers even further. For example in the Netherlands processing of the identification number is only allowed when a specific law exists. So Blizzard is not allowed to process a Dutch national identification number. There are also ID convers] which hide sensitive information like document numbers and photographs in case you do need a copy of an ID. Also note that identification is only possible by comparing existing personal data with the provided personal data. I assume you did not provide a copy of your ID when registering. So many things which are shown on the ID do not make sense to sent to Blizzard. It does not know your place of birth, so it cannot verify it. Art. 5 requires 'data minimisation' for personal data. So they are not allowed to process more data than required. So you also do not need to send you more data than required. You should get an answer on your request within 30 days. However, since you ask to delete your account, the answer also might be that they will deny your request. They have to explain why they will not delete your account. | The university has a legal obligation to collect certain data from attendees, including employees an visitors. It has decided to keep these records in digital form, and offers a smartphone app as a convenience. The university has outsourced the data processing activity to a third party. This is perfectly legal under the GDPR, if that third party is contractually bound to only process the data as instructed, and not for their own purposes. Whereas the university acts as a data controller (Verantwortlicher), the third party would be a data processor (Auftragsverarbeiter). I have some doubts though whether an app or a website is indeed the solution that offers the best data protection, especially taking into account the GDPR's data minimization principle. Requiring updates when entering or leaving any room is potentially excessive. Given the sensitivity of the data, the university should have performed a data protection impact assessment to weigh the consequences of this measure. At least for employees, the measure would likely have to be approved by the union (Personalrat) as well. | GDPR recital 64 says: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. The GDPR does not specify exactly what methods of verification are "reasonable". GDPR Article 11 paragraph 2 provides: Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. This is amplified by Recital 57 which says: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. GDPR Article 12 paragraph 6 provides: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. All of the above seems to indicate that the Data Controller must follow reasonable practices, but is not required to guarantee a positive response to a Data Subject who cannot supply reasonable evidence of identity. Moreover the Controller is required to reliably ascertain the identity of the Subject before providing information or acting on a request. Incidentally, good security practice is that the site does not retain the actual password. instead it hashes the password with a good cryptographically secure hash function, and stores the hash. This means that the site cannot reliably determine if a password is unique among all passwords saved by the site, and searches among passwords are not normally done, and would not be reasonable. A site using an email address as the User Identifier would normally enforce at the time an account is created that the email is unique among all emails registered on the site. A user who cannot provide the email would typically be rejected as not able to be identified, unless the site retains additional ID info not listed in the question. I think such a practice would be considered to be reasonable in the current state of technology. | There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front. | Privacy against publication of criminal convictions has been considered in the High Court in NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), if I may run the risk of posting a legal citation myself. But note that the claimaints there are anonymized, as often happens in criminal trials as well. In some cases, the court may give an injunction against disclosing names or details, and can hand down both a public and a private judgement, with the latter being a restricted document that does have the identifying details. So this question could only apply to mentions of criminal process where the accused is actually identified. (And I think just saying "R v Smith" is not enough - the posted or linked text would have to give some identifying detail about which Smith it is, the nature of the crime, etc.) I have no qualms at all about talking about NT1 and NT2. The claimants brought a case against Google for making available information about their long-spent convictions, including on GDPR grounds although it took place just before the implementation of GDPR in UK law. Dealing with that argument under the prior legislation, the judge found that of the various exemptions claimed by Google, the condition The information contained in the personal data has been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject. (found in the Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 3, paragraph 5, implementing the Data Protection Directive that preceded GDPR) applied, because of a longstanding principle for criminal conduct. The idea is that (paragraph 111): A person who deliberately conducts himself in a criminal fashion runs the risk of apprehension, prosecution, trial, conviction, and sentence. Publicity for what happens at a trial is the ordinary consequence of the open justice principle [...] The same must be true of the details of the offending, and other information disclosed in open court, including information about himself which a criminal reveals at a trial or in the course of an application. The core principles are the same as the carve-out from defamation law for the fair and accurate reporting of criminal proceedings (paras 44-49). That "made public" condition can now be found in a slightly different context in the Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 1, Part 3, paragraph 32, which mirrors Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR for the purpose of Article 10: This condition is met if the processing relates to personal data which is manifestly made public by the data subject. Since this is virtually the same condition of European provenance, in the same context of surrounding rules, I think the precedent is a good guide. For courts themselves, law reports, and journalism or scholarship, there are other specific grounds to rely on. Individual Stack Exchange posters are surely covered under the general exemption for posting on social media in a private capacity, GDPR 2(2)(c) as interpreted through its Recital 18. For the site itself, as in the case of NT1 and NT2, there could well be a legal claim made about the inclusion of criminal conviction information in a posted answer. (In general, such a post, being free text, could contain all sorts of defamatory statements or other objectionable content.) The court would have to look at the competing interests and the level of harm. NT1 was not successful but NT2 was. The example scenario, where we are talking about a very brief mention of a criminal case, cited because it illustrates a legal point rather than because there's anything relevant about the person mentioned, is quite far from the grounds complained of by NT2. For NT2, there was a newspaper article in which he was "quite inappropriately, portrayed as one of a rogues' gallery of serious criminals" (para 188), eight years after the end of his sentence, and it was this that he wanted removed from search results. In particular, the academic exemption (para 13) seems strong, in the same way that it would be for a publisher of legal academic content. The test of "substantial public interest" does not apply, because this exemption comes through paragraph 36 in the case of criminal convictions; it's enough to show a reasonable belief that publication would be in the public interest. Google was not able to rely on the "journalism" version of this exemption (again, under the prior law) because they are a totally generic search engine for all kinds of data and purposes (para 100 of the 2018 judgement). The public interest test, and the accompanying "legitimate interest" for the data controller, do not seem too difficult in this example. | Making the game free makes very little if any difference to the position here. There are two kinds of IP issues that could possibly be involved: copyright and trademark. Note: both copyright and trademark are civil, not criminal issues (except in very limited circumstances which do not apply to the situation described in the question). You will not "face charges" but might possibly be sued. If you are asked to take down such a game and comply, this might end the matter, but if an IP holder claimed that damages had occurred before the game was taken down a suite might possibly still be brought against the developer. Copyright Names, like titles and other short phrases, cannot be protected by copyright. As long as no other text from anyone else, and no images are copied or imitated, copyright is not infringed. This means that there are no copyright issues. Game mechanics and rules cannot be copyrighted, although the words of game rules can be. Therefore, fair use which is a strictly US copyright legal concept, is not involved here. Neither is fair dealing, a somewhat similar legal concept from the UK and some commonwealth and European countries. Trademark Here is the main issue for this situation. The names of individual Pokémon characters are probably (almost surely) protected as trademarks. That means you cannot use them to identify your game, or any other product or service, and you cannot use them to advertise or market your game. This is true even if the "selling price" is $0. The use here does not seem to be nominative use, as you are not intending to refer to Pokémon or any of its variants. You are just reusing the names. As long as you make it very clear that your game is not made by, nor in any way authorized or endorsed by the makers of Pokémon, this is probably not trademark infringement. But if the makers of Pokémon become aware of your game, they might well send you a cease and desist letter, and they might file a trademark infringement suit. Even if you were to win such a suit, as I think you might well do, it might be costly to defend. Could you alter the names to ones you invent form yourself? That might save a lot of trouble and hassle. What is the value to you in reusing the well-known Pokémon names? | I know that I have to provide detailed information which data I save and how I use it. Yes, you should, if you are getting access to users' Dropbox accounts, which will contain all sorts of private data, copyrighted (and illegally copied copyrighted files), etc. You provide the detailed information to your users through a click-through Privacy Policy - TOS (Terms of Service) in your App, like any other App out there. Click wrap (Wikipedia) user agreements are legally binding in many jurisdictions. Even if you don't access files and information - such as personal information or files - you still need a clear TOS for your App, for both your users' and your own legal protection. But I am a poor student who don't want invest money into a lawyer to write me a privacy policy ... I do not plan to get paid for (this app)... Being a free or paid App doesn't make a difference when it comes to the TOS, if you need one, and if you need to pay for one to be drafted. But not investing money in a lawyer can be a critical mistake if your App will be distributed on the popular App directories like Google Play and iTunes and your TOS does not clearly and legally outline all possible usage and data polices. Lawyers have experience in covering all the bases. Is there any way I can do this privacy policy on my own? Sure, you can: https://www.google.com/search?q=privacy+policy+generator But you run considerable legal liability not having a TOS that correctly and legally addresses all users' privacy concerns and clearly outlines what you do to insure security. That's what lawyers are for. Is it possible to just create some “I save all your data“ policy which would of course be to much but it would include all data I save and so I would not miss anything in my policy? Sure, you can simply say I save all your data. But how can you be sure that you've haven't missed important policy details and scenarios that could result in legal action against you? Like how long do you save data? When will you delete it? How secure is it? Can the user ask for deletion? What happens if you get hacked? What about users in countries other than the US? Users under 18 years old? You must use arbitration for any disputes? And on and on. The considerable legal liability of using a non-professionally drafted TOS means you run the risk of getting sued. You have to decide if it is worth the risk. |
Trespassing on public property for filming a public area in California I was filming at a County Social Service office. The Social Service Administrator told me to leave because I was filming and called the Sheriff. The Sheriff arrested me for trespassing. | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | There is no mailbox-specific law. You can take pictures in public, and you can put a camera to take pictures on your property. Whether you can install a camera in a particular place depends on who owns that place. Of course, you also can't aim it to peer into a nearby residence; and it has to be a video-only camera (unattended recording of audio is illegal without the consent of the thief). In some cases, mega-boxes are owned by the USPS so you would need USPS permission. There is a widespread false narrative that the USPS owns all mailboxes, but the USPS does not say that nor does the US Code. USPS describes two kinds of cluster-boxes, private and USPS-owned. The USPS offers no statements on permission or its denial to install a cameras inside a USPS-owned box, so you would have to ask the local post office in case your box is USPS-owned. | united-states In the US, the default rule is that your home is your castle. In general, nobody, not even the police, can enter your home without your permission. The main exception to this rule is that police do not need your permission if they have a search warrant to search your home. To get a warrant, the police must convince a magistrate that they have good reason (ie, "probable cause"), such as a gps track, to believe they will find evidence of a crime if they search the house. The police in your hypothetical are in a similar situation to police who are tracking the gps signal from a "bait car/bike/phone/tablet/package." (A bait car is a car/etc that has been fitted with a camera and gps tracker, and left out as bait for thieves.) As long as the car is in public view, the police do not need a warrant to search it and arrest the person driving it. However, once the bait car is out of public view, where the police can no longer see it, they need a warrant to go in and recover it, even if they can see it on the tracker. (See, for example, the instructions for bait car programs from the Eugene and Reno Police Departments.) (For phones, which may not be in "plain view" even if the thief is, the police use ring programs to make the phone ring. Hearing a phone respond to a ring program gives them probable cause under the "hearing" version of the "plain view" doctrine.) Bottom line: In the US, the police need a search warrant. Since search warrants take time and effort, police may be unwilling to get a warrant for something as low valued as a phone. If the police can't or won't help, there are various options for privately enforcing one's rights. These range from the legal -- knocking on the door and confronting the thief -- to the illegal -- left to your imagination. | The question for trespassing is whether the trespasser has been adequately notified of the possession interest that another person has in the property. Although it is legal to evangelize door-to-door without a permit, most jurisdictions will require you to leave promptly if the owner asks you to leave. In the absence of such verbal requests, you have a legally protected interest in engaging in conversation with your neighbors. Based on the law as I understand it, it is likely that your jurisdiction will recognize a right to proselytize to your neighbors door-to-door regardless of a no trespassing or private property sign. However, for the sake of certainty, here’s a little bit about trespass law. Typically, states have statutes that define what it takes to make a sign “conspicuous” enough to create grounds for prosecution. Such laws include specifications for the thickness of markings and the sign’s distance from the ground. Arkansas statutes have established that a person who enters or remains unlawfully on property has committed trespass, which means that the person must enter or remain in or upon the premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon the premises. Communication is key. Arkansas law provides that if the property is unimproved and apparently unused, and is not fenced or otherwise “enclosed in a manner designed to exclude an intruder,” the person entering the property does so with license and privilege. Generally, however, if a person unlawfully enters property that has been improved, he has trespassed regardless of a sign on the premises devoid of some religious purpose for his visit. Thus, there really is not a significant difference between the “No Trespassing” sign and the “Private Property” sign. Both would communicate to any potential intruder that the property he is about to enter is presently being possessed by another person and thus would likely be sufficient to provide grounds for claiming notice in court if a property owner should choose to bring a suit. | A related post is here. Are police required to record in car dashcam video for traffic tickets in NJ, USA? Probably not. Is there any way to find out if they aren’t telling the truth? Ask and hope you are not lied to. Can I contact the police chief, mayor, or municipal judge? You can contact the police chief or mayor if you can get through to them. They are not required to answer you unless you make a formal discovery request or public records request. You cannot make ex parte contact with a judge when the other side's lawyer (in this case, the city's lawyer) is not present. How can I defend myself in court trial if the judge always believes highly credible police officers over defendants if I don’t have video? You can tell your side of the story under oath with any details that makes your story believable. You are correct that the judge will usually believe the police officer and not you. So, usually you will lose. This is one reason that most people try to plea bargain their traffic tickets, rather than going to trial. Due process rights give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story when contesting a ticket, but it doesn't give you a right to win (even if you are actually in the right) if the judge or other trier of fact doesn't believe what you have to say. It does not appear that you have a right to a jury trial in a traffic case in New Jersey, although this depends to some extent on the kind of violation being charged, so you are probably stuck with the beliefs of the municipal court judge about who is the more credible witness. | Jurisdiction? washington. RCW 9A.16.020 says when force is lawful. (1) Whenever necessarily used by ...a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction Not apparently applicable in this case. (2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody Looks promising, except RCW 9A.52.070 says "(2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor". For the record, (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary but you didn't describe malicious trespass (which incidentally is not statutorily defined in Washington). Our last hope is: (4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public For example, you can detain a person for a few seconds to ask what he's doing there and to get whatever answer you are going to get. It does not extend to "detain the trespasser until you are satisfied that he has truthfully identified himself", or "until the police show up". | In CA, with no papers given to you, there is no ticket. You are required to sign the ticket, which you obviously did not do. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". |
I'm creating an app, which country's law will be applied to it? So, I'm creating an international app; all my team is from Mexico (including me, of course). Which country's law will be applied to it? The app is physically hosted in the United States, but our "main market" will be of course Mexico. I'm not a US resident and have no economic activity inside the US; in fact, I don't even have economic activity in Mexico since I'm 14 years old. | The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of. | When a country makes criminal laws, these laws usually apply to anyone present in the country, and acting in the country. But the country is free to declare that some law might apply to its own citizens in a foreign country, or even foreign citizens in a foreign country. Assuming the laws about using marijuana say nothing about the country, that most likely means it only applies to using marjuana in the country itself. But if the US government decided that taking marijuana in Canada is illegal for US citizens, then nobody can stop them. In this case, Canada would not extradite you (unless Canadian law says that it is criminal for Canadians to use marijuana in another country), and Canadian police would likely not collect evidence. So even if illegal, it would be hard to convict you. PS. The "polygamy" case would be interesting, I think you would have to read the exact wording of the laws in every country. Some countries will say that you can't get married twice, and the attempt to get married a second time while already married is bigamy. In that kind of country you wouldn't have committed a crime within that country. Also, you would only be married to the first wife. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it. | However, if a website is based in the US and the terms of service say that the law governing the terms is US law, how can GDPR have any affect? It is unlikely that the EU will be able to enforce financial penalties against a company with no presence in the EU. But they could for example block your website in the EU, depriving you of your EU user base. The actual measures that they could or would take against such a company are still unclear, since the GDPR is quite new, and there has been no action under the GDPR against foreign companies. I'm not a lawyer, but I've signed many contracts in my life and nearly all of them have some form of "governing law" clause. The governing law clause in a contract identifies the law that will be used to interpret the contract and to resolve any disputes arising from the contract. The law identified in the clause does not become the sole law governing every aspect of the relationship between the parties, however. For example, a business in New Jersey could have a contract with a client in New York with a clause specifying New Jersey law as the governing law of the contract. But that does not mean that New York's consumer protection law doesn't apply to the transaction. | Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation. | Obviously, it's not simply illegal to have a business that exchanges currency - legal currency exchanges do exist, after all. But you'd have to be careful if you wanted to open a business that does this. According to 31 CFR 1010.100, you are considered a "dealer in foreign exchange", and thus a "money services business", and thus a "financial institution", if you are: A person that accepts the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments denominated in the currency, of one or more countries in exchange for the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments denominated in the currency, of one or more other countries in an amount greater than $1,000 for any other person on any day in one or more transactions, whether or not for same-day delivery. You are not considered a "money services business" if you do this "on an infrequent basis and not for gain or profit", but you say you want to "open a business" that does this, so this exemption wouldn't apply to you. If you are considered a financial institution, then you must comply with all sorts of anti-money-laundering regulations, including, for example, verifying the identity of your customers, and filing reports with the US Treasury. You would definitely want to hire a lawyer to guide you through the requirements. | Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)! |
Is displaying the user first name and last name a breach of GDPR? We have a registration form where we create an account for a user where they need to fill their first name and last name. When creating the account we also create a public profile behind the scene by reusing their last name and first name which they previously gave to create their account. My question is: Is this legal in regards to privacy ? I noticed a few apps ask for a first name and last name, then have another form for the public stuff. And more generally is it legal to show some of the user personal data as long as it is in the terms and service and the privacy document ? | Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it. | When you make a request based on the GDPR, Art. 12(6) GDPR applies. Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. As you can see, this only applies when the data controller (Blizzard) has reasonable doubts about your identity. If I understand it correctly, Blizzard provides services (games) which requires you to login with a username and password. So they have no doubts about your identity when you use their (paid) services with just a username and password. So there should also be no reasonable doubts when you make other requests when you are able to login to their website. A copy of your government ID seems unnecessary. Recital 57 also confirms that identification does not require a government ID: Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. A copy of your id, includes a photograph. The photograph could show health, religious, racial or ethnic information. That kind of personal data has much stricter rules defined in Art.9 . Most governmental IDs contain a national identification number. EU Member States can limit processing of those identification numbers even further. For example in the Netherlands processing of the identification number is only allowed when a specific law exists. So Blizzard is not allowed to process a Dutch national identification number. There are also ID convers] which hide sensitive information like document numbers and photographs in case you do need a copy of an ID. Also note that identification is only possible by comparing existing personal data with the provided personal data. I assume you did not provide a copy of your ID when registering. So many things which are shown on the ID do not make sense to sent to Blizzard. It does not know your place of birth, so it cannot verify it. Art. 5 requires 'data minimisation' for personal data. So they are not allowed to process more data than required. So you also do not need to send you more data than required. You should get an answer on your request within 30 days. However, since you ask to delete your account, the answer also might be that they will deny your request. They have to explain why they will not delete your account. | The scope of the GDPR is entered when personal data is being processed in a structured manner. Personal data is any information relating to identifiable data subjects (definition in Art 4(1)). "Peter attended the meeting on the 14th" is personal data. "That woman with the blue handbag said she wanted to return on the 25th" is personal data. However, aggregate statistics do not relate to individuals, and are typically not personal data. "On the 14th, we had 25 attendees" is not personal data. Not all use of personal data is within the scope of the GDPR. For example, the GDPR would not apply if two organizers talk about who attended the meeting. However, Art 2(1) says the GDPR applies when personal data is processed wholly or partially with automated means (e.g. computers, smartphones), or forms a filing system or is intended for a filing system (e.g. keeping notes on attendees, keeping attendance lists) If GDPR applies, the organization would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules and principles, summarized in Art 5. Primarily, this means: having a clear purpose for processing selecting a suitable Art 6 legal basis for that purpose (e.g. consent or a legitimate interest) only processing the minimum data necessary for achieving that purpose determining and implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of the processing activities preparing for data subject rights, in particular by providing an Art 13 privacy notice when collecting data from the data subjects There are of course some complexities in the details. When the legal basis is "consent" (opt-in), the organization would have to ensure that this consent was freely given and sufficiently informed. Per Art 7(4), consent would not be freely given if that consent was a condition for access to the meeting. Using "legitimate interest" (opt-out) can be more flexible, but it requires performing a balancing test to show that the legitimate interest isn't outweighed by the data subjects' interests, rights, and freedoms. Roughly, relying on a legitimate interest is appropriate when the data subjects can reasonably expect the processing activity to occur. Regarding point 1, keeping general counts and aggregate statistics about attendees is probably OK since it wouldn't be personal data. If you are very conscientious about this, you could round all counts and use categories like "0-4 attendees, 5-9 attendees" for each facet, which makes it more difficult to make inferences about individuals. But the fundamental point is that all your data should relate to attendees as a whole, never to individuals. Regarding point 2 and 3, this is a question of legal basis. Since you gather names through informal conversations, I think that attendees would be weirded out if they learned that you kept detailed records on their attendance. So I think that you probably wouldn't have a legitimate interest here. However, being upfront with this and offering an opt-out could change this. On the aspect of keeping detailed notes on data from informal conversations, I'd like to point out H&M's EUR 35 million fine back in 2020 (summary on GDPRHub.eu). In a callcenter, managers used to have conversations with employees. These conversations touched on anything from vacation experiences to health problems, marriage problems, and religious beliefs. All of that is fine. What was not fine is that the managers went full Stasi and kept detailed notes about all of this on a shared drive and used that information for management decisions. This went on until a configuration error made those files accessible to all employees. This violated all the points in the basic compliance process outlined above: the records had no clear purpose, no suitable legal basis, contained way more data than necessary (and even Art 9 special categories of data like information on health or religious beliefs which have extra protection), did not have appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access, and did not fulfill data subject rights like the Art 13 right to be informed. In case this non-profit is a church or religious organization that had its own comprehensive data protection rules before the GDPR came into force in 2018, those can continue to apply per Art 91. This could probably address some issues of legal basis, but cannot circumvent the GDPR's general principles. | In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now). | Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc. | Earlier this year, the Internet lawyer Arnoud Engelfriet wrote a blog post about exactly this topic. As it is written in Dutch, I will summarize it here: As you also said, deleting posts breaks the flow of the archived conversation and it makes your archive incomplete. This is a problem for the freedom of expression and information. But Art. 17(3) GDPR includes an exception to the right of erasure for this situation. So posts do not need to be deleted. However, profiles are not included in this exception. So they must be removed, but they can be pseudonymized. For example replace the username with user89432, and remove all details from the profile. If other posts contain the nick of the author of an anonymized post, that is considered an journalistic, academic artistic or literary expression, so Art. 85 GDPR would apply, so the right of erasure does not apply to that. Bottom line: you only have to pseudonymize the account, if that person wants to be removed from the forum. | I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data". | If the website's processing of your personal data is within the scope of the GDPR, then you have a qualified right to request the erasure of your personal data. It is relevant whether: the website operates within the EU; the website is operated by a company established in an EU country; the website aims to sell goods or services to people in the EU; or the website is routinely processing the personal data of people in the EU (including non-citizens). Furthermore, it is relevant whether your posts: contain one or more identifiers from which you could be personally identified, directly or indirectly, including by only the administrators or owners of the website; and by their content, directly reveal information relating to you. For example, let's say you posted on a forum saying that "I am a keen supporter of socialism", and your personal email address was used to sign up to the website, then you would have revealed information about your political beliefs, which by reference to a username, the website owners could use to uniquely identify you by your email address. You would not necessarily have to have used your name. If, for example, you posted something factual, like, "The Porsche 911 GT2 RS MR recorded the fastest lap time for a road-legal sports car on the Nürburgring," then it is only personal as long as it is associated with an identifier through which you could be identified. As such, the removal of the relationship could easily anonymise the post. A data controller has an obligation to provide means by which the data subject can exercise the rights guaranteed under Chapter 3 of the GDPR. Article 17 grants the right to "erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay" where the grounds under Art. 17 lit. 1 (a) to (f) are met. It may be relevant what the lawful basis of processing personal data was in the first place, such as in determining whether you can withdraw consent (i.e. you cannot withdraw consent if consent was not given), or in determining whether there is a right to object under Article 21 lit. 1. Derogations permissible under local implementing laws may provide for other exemptions or requirements to the right to erasure, so it is also important to determine the country of jurisdiction. |
What amount of force, if any, can be used to prevent animal abuse? What amount of physical force, if any, can be used to prevent animal abuse (a dog's owner hitting the dog, with a minor present) in Oregon? Is it legal to restrain the owner? Take the dog to a safe area? | If someone attacks your dog, or the dog of a third person, you may use force to defend property rights, see ORS 161.205 and ORS 161.229. This does not apply to a person attacking their own animal. Force may also be used to effect an arrest by a private person (ORS 133.225) – you "may arrest another person for any crime committed in the presence of the private person if the private person has probable cause to believe the arrested person committed the crime". You would need to study up on ORS 167.320. Assuming that the abuse is less than causing death, for first degree animal abuse, it is when one "causes serious physical injury to an animal". The child actually becomes relevant because the misdemeanor becomes a felony when The person knowingly commits the animal abuse in the immediate presence of a minor child. For purposes of this paragraph, a minor child is in the immediate presence of animal abuse if the abuse is seen or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor child. So in fact, no amount of force can legally be used to prevent a person from hitting their dog. Force can be used to arrest a person (which prevents any further beating), if the person causes serious physical injury to the dog. | I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level. | (Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account) | massachusetts This is a matter of state law, so let's look at a particular state: Massachusetts. My answer below is largely based on the Massachusetts model jury instructions for self-defense cases. Short answer: the most problematic part of using force in the situation you describe is that you have a "duty to retreat" in the state of Massachusetts. In other words, you would not be justified in using force in your own defense or your wife's defense unless there was no reasonable way to get away from the assailant. (The opposite of a "duty to retreat" state is a "stand your ground" state; the Wikipedia article on the subject lists which US states are which.) Long answer: You would be acting in defense of another (p. 17 of the instructions): [A] person may use reasonable force when that is necessary to help another person, if it reasonably appears that the person being aided is in a situation where the law would allow him to act in self-defense himself. In other words, your use of force to defend your wife is acceptable if it reasonably appears to you that your wife is in a situation where she would be justified in using self-defense. So would she be justified in using non-deadly force in self-defence? To prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the Commonwealth must prove one of the following things beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant did not reasonably believe he (she) was being attacked or immediately about to be attacked, and that his (her) safety was in immediate danger; or Second, that the defendant did not do everything reasonable in the circumstances to avoid physical combat before resorting to force; or Third, that the defendant used more force to defend himself (herself) than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances. The second point would be the tricky one for your hypothetical case. In a public space, you have the "duty to retreat"; this duty does not apply in your home (the "castle doctrine"), but it does apply everywhere else. Here are the model jury instructions for this point of law: A person cannot lawfully act in self-defense unless he or she has exhausted all other reasonable alternatives before resorting to force. A person may use physical force in self-defense only if he (she) could not get out of the situation in some other way that was available and reasonable at the time. The Commonwealth may prove the defendant did not act in self-defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resorted to force without using avenues of escape that were reasonably available and which would not have exposed the defendant to further danger. You may consider any evidence about where the incident took place, whether or not the defendant might have been able to escape by walking away or otherwise getting to safety or by summoning help if that could be done in time, or by holding the attacker at bay if the means were available, or by some other method. You may consider whether the use of force reasonably seemed to be the only means of protection in the circumstances. You may take into account that a person who is attacked may have to decide what to do quickly and while under emotional strain. | The fire department is entirely within its rights, which are the same as any other property owner. The fact that property is owned by a governmental body does not mean that members of the public can't be excluded that property. Some governmental property is public, but lots of it is private, and this would usually include most parts of fire department property. As long as you have not been denied any access to a public road by this fence, there is nothing improper about it. Anyone can walk through their parking lot, park their car there, meet friends, whatever, This is almost surely inaccurate. The fire department does not have to allow members of the public to have any access to their property and probably would demand that most of the uses you describe stop if they interfered in any way with the performance of its duties. | An individual does not have authority to "issue" a restraining order. In the U.S. only judges can issue such orders. The guidelines and policies for obtaining a restraining order vary by jurisdiction, although in the end a judge can issue any order he wants. So in theory you might be able to find a judge who will issue an order for any or no reason. In practice I'd be surprised if many judges would abuse their office to gratuitously harass people in this fashion, though there are probably a few amusing/disturbing examples out there to the contrary. | Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon. | In California (as in all states) there is a justifiable homicide defense which might be used in such a situation. For the force to be justified, you have to reasonably believe you are in danger of being harmed, that you need to use force to avoid the harm, and you may only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat. It then is a matter for the jury to decide whether those principles were followed in your particular instance. The reason why it's hard to predict the outcome is that it depends on a subjective evaluation by the jury, as to whether the shooter had a reasonable fear and whether lesser force was a viable option. The jury's decision is guided by instructions to the jury (#506, #506) which focus on relevant distinctions. The jury will be told that "Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be", and that you have to reasonably believe there is "imminent danger of great bodily injury". My evaluation is that that does not describe the scenario in the question. There is some possibility of future harm... but not imminent harm. People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470" states that "the rule developed at common law that killing or use of deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense was a forcible and atrocious crime" and "Examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem, rape and robbery", and that could support application of a justifiable homicide defense in a bank robbery. But in the present instance, the bank is being robbed and the shooter is a by-stander. Despite all of the bank robberies in California, there is no relevant case from which one could draw an analogy. |
Is it possible to have copyright on a TV show format? There was the TV show "TV total Deutscher Eisfußball-Pokal" (TV total German ice soccer cup) by Stefan Raab and the last episode is from 2015. See wikipedia Now someone wanted to make a similar show "Kick auf Eis" (kick on ice) in 2022. But now they got a warning from the lawyer of Raab and so they won't make the show. He claims it's a copy of his show. See this news I am less interested in if this is justified (the warning by the lawyer). I am more interested in what the basis for such a warning is. Is it copyright? Does Stefan Raab have a copyright on the show format? When you paint a picture you automatically obtain copyright on it. This might be the same for the video material of a single show. But did Stefan Raab automatically obtain copyright on the whole TV show format? If not what is the legal basis for the warning? | The argument would have to be either a derivative work under copyright, or a trade dress/trademark claim. Neither sounds very solid at all. Neither copyright nor trade dress/trademark protect ideas like a TV format. They can only protect very similar expressions of an idea that necessarily flow one from the other and, for example, the game mechanics can't be protected by copyright. | In ABC v Aereo 573 U. S. ____ (2014), the US Supreme Court held that activity almost identical to what you describe is copyright infringement. Respondent Aereo, Inc., sells a service that allows its subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. When a subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently airing, he selects the show from a menu on Aereo’s website. Aereo’s system, which consists of thousands of small antennas and other equipment housed in a centralized warehouse, responds roughly as follows: A server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber alone, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by the antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive and begins streaming the show to the subscriber’s screen once several seconds of programming have been saved. The streaming continues, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has received the entire show. We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes [copyright] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. We conclude that it does. A nicer summary, oral argument transcript and audio are available from the Oyez Project. In my opinion, your example is more clearly an infringement of copyright than Aereo's. Aereo dedicated separate antennae to receive a signals for each subscriber at the subscriber's direction, and rebroadcast the signal over the internet in near real-time. This let them argue two things: 1) that they were not performing the work, only letting other people perform it, and 2) that the performance was not "to the public". In your example, the server is receiving and saving the broadcast, and then later, that single copy is being reproduced and transmitted to whomever requests it. That would certainly be considered both reproduction and performance to the public. | Video would not be transformed in any way, and discussion would take place on reddit or other discussion platforms. So you are copying someone else's video and reposting it verbatim and in full in vimeo, without adding any additional content of your own? What is even the need for it? If you want to discuss the video in Reddit or similar, you can link to the original video instead of your copy. The usual way that fair use is used is when you include the relevants parts of the work being criticized as part of your video. There are other points to take into consideration; IP lawsuits are very specific of the details of the works involved (for examples it could be easier to consider fair use the inclusion of the full original work if it were a short one that if it were a long one) so it is difficult to give an absolute "yes" or "no" answer. But what you attempt to do seems highly problematic. If your argument were valid, what would prevent me from setting an URL to download the latest Hollywood blockbuster because I am commenting about it on Reddit? Imagine that I start selling copies of "The Avengers XXII: A day at the Park"1 adding just a note at the end saying "I like this movie, but they played frisbee a lot too much" as opinion/commentary/criticism... do you think that it would qualify as "fair use"?2 Coupled with the fact that it seems that copying the video seems not necessary for commenting on it (again, just link to the source) I would consider more prudent3 not copying it. 1Well, technically I would say that I were selling my opinion (which is perfectly legal), with the film included only as "fair use" to provide context to my opinion. 2Answer: No, it would not. 3I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, and this site does not provide legal advice. | Short Answer Based on the facts you supplied, it seems the author's request for removal might be unenforceable. Explanation Section 2.a.1. of the license declares the license is irrevocable. [Emphasis added]: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. Irrevocable means: "Unable to cancel or recall; that which is unalterable or irreversible." Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. So don't rely on my answer for anything. Hire a real attorney if you need help with a legal matter. Never take legal advice from strangers on the internet. Treat all answers on this site the same way you would as if they came from a bunch of strangers at a party who got all their legal information by watching episodes of Boston Legal, The Practice and Ally McBeal. But have lots of opinions they are willing to share on legal questions nevertheless. | In principle, every single copyright license allows someone to do something that plain copyright law wouldn't allow them to do. Very often there are conditions: They are allowed to do X, which plain copyright law wouldn't allow them to do, but only if they fulfil some condition Y. The consequence is that if they do X without fulfilling the condition Y, then they are committing copyright infringement. Details are different from country to country. In the USA, you cannot force someone to do what the license asks the, to do, but if they don't, it's copyright infringement, and you can sue them and ask for damages. Other countries see it as a contract, where by doing X they agree to do Y as well, and not doing it would be breach of contract. Often with the interesting effect that you as the copyright holder cannot prove that they accepted the license, so in court they can tell the judge whether they were committing copyright infringement or whether they are in breach of contract. You can of course use your own license - however, one of the standard licenses mean the license was likely checked by a better lawyer than you would want to pay, and is much more likely to achieve what you want to achieve. If there were any problems say with the Creative Commons license, people would have found those problems and fixed them a long time ago. | The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected. | If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court. | Following the links in the article you quoted, you find that it is indeed illegal in Germany to insult a foreign head of state. For a prosecution to happen, the foreign government has to ask for prosecution, and it would be a criminal case. It's not clear to me whether a TV station could be sued as well. Where Mr. Böhmermann lives would be irrelevant, what would be relevant is whether the insult happened in Germany. |
Pregnant spouse slipped abortion pills unknowingly. What would the legal ramifications be? Suppose a partner to a pregnant woman gave her an abortion pill which successfully aborted the pregnancy. Suppose that this was done in a non-violent way, unbeknownst to the woman. One could argue this is murder, however, if the woman took the abortion pill herself, in most parts of the USA and Europe, it would be perfectly legal and not considered murder. I'm broadly interested to know what charges could be brought against the partner? In particular, I'm interested in why, in a locality where abortion is legal and not legally considered murder, could be compelled or forced abortion by a third party be considered murder? I'm interested in the context of the USA and Europe in particular. This stems from this article, whereby a man held his partner at gunpoint and forced her to ingest an abortion pill. He was charged with murder, despite abortion being legal at the time. | Although abortion is legal in the US, not everyone is allowed to perform an abortion. In Washington, the law allows a physician to terminate a pregnancy, and recognizes a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. An abortion performed by anyone else is not legal, and performing an illegal abortion is a class C felony. There are "plan B" pills which are legal in the US and levonorgestrel is available without a prescription, but the mifepristone and misoprostol regime is not available without a doctor's orders. In this scenario, the partner will have performed an illegal abortion, and is guilty of a controlled substances crime. In some states, there is a separate crime of fetal homicide. In Washington, this is covered under 1st degree manslaughter, a class A felony, if one "intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child". "Any injury" does not require "great violence" or "striking". It is also the class B felony of poisoning which includes slipping in a harmful substance with intent to harm another person, as well as assault. | In the US, only a few states allow conjugal visits by prisoners: California, Connecticut, New York and Washington. Details of implementation for Washington are here (it is called "Extended Family Visiting"). There are various limitations, for example you can't have committed homocide within the last 5 years, you can't be on death row, and so on. Although they don't explicitly say you can have sex, you can, and they have (a small sample of) contraceptive and STD-preventing technology for prisoners to avail themselves of. If you fail to take advantage of contraceptives, then yes it is possible. There is no provision pertaining specifically to mass murder. | Generally, in non-emergency situations, the state with jurisdiction over parenting issues related to children including relinquishment and adoption is vested in the courts of the "home state" of the child. A child's "home state" is defined by statute by a coordinated definitions set forth in parallel laws at the state (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act in 49 states) and federal (the Parental Kidnapping Prevent Act) level. This definition of "home state" provides a fairly precise definition of something that approximately matches your intuition regarding the state where the child resides in most cases. There is also an international treaty with a similar home state definition. The state where the child was born ceases to be relevant at the point at which that state ceases to be the child's "home state". But, once a state's courts take jurisdiction over parenting issues for a child, the barrier to divest that state of jurisdiction is higher than it would be if there was no prior litigation. So, the state establishing the child support decree would often be the "home state" in the fact pattern set forth in this question. I will refrain from discussing the substantive law of voluntary relinquishment following an acknowledgment of paternity and payment of child support at length in this post as it is beyond the scope of what was asked. Suffice it to say that this is generally disfavored and is sometimes impossible. Also, the actions that could lead to involuntary termination of parental rights (even for mere non-support) also often have parallel felony criminal sanctions associated with them. | Murder is definined in Utah as: Murder is causing the death of another person under any of the following circumstances: ... Knowingly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and under circumstances which evidence a depraved indifference to human life. It's not unreasonable to consider dropping 3,000,000 bouncy balls over a populated area as "depraved indifference", particularly if someone had asked/read the question and would therefore know the potential consequences. Whether the killer would be charged with murder or manslaughter depends on the exact circumstances. | Short Answer I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally. Agreements of this type are not valid in Switzerland, the U.S., Australia, or any other jurisdiction of which I am aware. There are some fine nuances to this general rule, however, that are explored below. Obviously, of course, there are many countries in the world, and there could be an outlier out there somewhere. Exceptions For Choice of Family Religion Agreements In particular, in some countries, such as Israel and India, the substantive family law rules that apply to a married couple and their children are governed by the religion of that family as determined by law. Thus, Muslims families and Hindu families in India, for example, are governed by different laws related to child custody. In these countries, there is a legislatively approved set of family laws for each faith, but the laws for members of one religion are not the same as the laws for members of another religion, and there are typically rules to determine which sets of family law to apply in cases where the parents of a child belong to different religions. Pre-nuptial agreements in these countries may govern, to some extent, how a married couple's religion is determined for intra-national choice of law purposes, although they cannot specifically resolve custody issues on a pre-dispute basis. U.S. Law In General This would not be enforceable in most U.S. states. Agreements between parents in matters involving children (even post-dispute) are generally not legally binding, because the court has an independent duty to evaluate the best interests of the child under the circumstances as they actually present themselves. Courts can and do appoint third-party guardians ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the children when they have any reason to doubt the judgment of the parents. Put another way, pre-nuptial agreements and post-nuptial agreements, may govern property division and maintenance and restoration of name and inheritance rights and enforcement of economic provision rules, in the event of death or divorce, but may not govern parental responsibilities or child support or the circumstances under which the marriage may be terminated. Post-Dispute Agreements In practice, if parents come to a post-dispute agreement that happens to track the outlines of a non-binding pre-dispute agreement regarding parenting time and parental responsibilities, and the agreed resolution seems reasonable after perfunctory due diligence, a Court would usually ratify that agreement without much second guessing. But, the pre-dispute agreement would be only marginally relevant in the event of a dispute and would not have legal validity. It might be considered by a court as one factor among many in addressing the parenting dispute, as a source of ideas for a resolution and to ascertain the expectations and perspectives of the parents, but would not be given much weight in most cases. Exceptions For Dispute Resolution Method Agreements The exception would be that in some jurisdictions, a mediation or arbitration clause for parenting disputes in a material agreement would be honored, although the same substantive law would apply, in theory. Exceptions For Assisted Contraception And Surrogacy Agreements Note, however, that most jurisdictions in the U.S., do honor and give legal effect to a contract regarding the intended parent in a medically assisted conception or surrogacy contract, in which a pregnancy arises through some means other than intercourse between a man and a woman which of the source of the sperm and egg from that man and that woman that gives rise to a fertilized egg (e.g. cases of sperm donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In those cases, the default rule is generally that the legal parents of the resulting child are the intended parents under the contract. But, this is purely an agreement governing paternity, and not parenting once a child is born. Swiss Law While I do not have first hand knowledge of Swiss law, a digest of Swiss law prepared by Westlaw (a major law book publisher and online legal research provider) does state the rule of Swiss law clearly, however: The areas a pre-nuptial agreement can cover are fairly limited. The following cannot be determined in advance: The preconditions for a divorce, nullification or separation of a marriage are ultimately governed by law. Any agreements that are not compliant with the law are invalid. Agreements on arrangements for children, in particular about parental responsibility, visiting rights or maintenance, made in advance, are not binding. Any amounts saved in pension funds during a marriage are divided in the event of a divorce. Waiving such a division is only possible under very restrictive conditions. Agreements in a marital contract that are not compliant with the law are invalid. This source also identifies the precise statutes and treaties that apply to resolve these questions of Swiss law. Choice of Law and Forum Related Issues There is also an implicit choice of law issue presented. Choice Of Law and Forum Agreements Are Usually Void Generally speaking, under U.S. law, these issues are governed in domestic cases by the state that is the "home state" of a particular child under a statutory test and the parents may not contractually agree to a choice of venue. In international cases by the state and country that are the home state and country of the child under a test established by treaty which may not be contractually agreed to in advance. Since the applicable statutory tests in the U.S. usually direct a court to apply the laws of the state with which the child has the strongest residential connection (except for Native American children whose family law disputes are subject to tribal law), and since laws relating to divorce and parenting are matters of state and not federal law for the most part (except as to choice of law and choice of forum issues, and certain federal welfare program guidelines for child support that states have economic incentives to comply with and all do), the law governing parental rights and responsibilities (and over the circumstances when a couple may get divorced) may change over time as the family (and each particular child) moves over the course of their lives. In international cases where there is not treaty in place between the potentially relevant countries (and in which diplomatic personnel or members of foreign royal families or families of heads of state are not involved), a U.S. court will generally apply the law of its own state in all cases where it has jurisdiction over the child, or of both parents. Jurisdictional disputes and inconsistent decrees are resolved in part through diplomatic channels at the national level in these cases. There Is Little Variation In U.S. Substantive Custody Law In practice, this isn't a very important observation in domestic cases, however, because almost every U.S. state gives judges extremely broad discretion to handle custody disputes on a case by case basis under a "best interests of the child" standard during the last several decades (even though this isn't constitutionally required), subject only to the barest U.S. constitutional limitations prohibiting decisions that amount to a termination of a legal parental relationship without certain forms of due process, and there aren't huge differences in the case law applying that standard in practice between states. The differences between particular judges in a particular county would typically be as great or greater than the difference between different states, when it comes to final outcomes in disputed and litigated cases. Before the best interests of the child standard was adopted more or less universally, many states had a sex specific "tender years doctrine" that presumptively gave custody of younger children to mothers and older children to fathers. But that standard was held to be unconstitutional because it discriminated based upon sex. In each state where the tender years doctrine or similar sex specific custody doctrines were held to be unconstitutional, the "best interests of the child" standard was adopted rather than a gender neutral standard that provided more guidance to judges such as a dictate to maintain the status quo as much as possible such as a "primary caretaker presumption" (which many judges applying the "best interests of the child" standard actually apply in practice). Most European countries also follow the "best interests of the child" rule for child custody. One of the big differences between jurisdictions in their laws typically involve issues like the standing of people other than parents to intervene in parenting litigation, such as grandparents, stepparents and social workers, and the rights of these third-parties vis-a-vis the legally recognized fathers and mothers of a child, and the circumstances under which an adoption and related relinquishment of parental rights is valid. The procedures that apply in family law cases also often differ significantly between jurisdictions. Exception For Post-Dispute Choice of Law and Forum Agreements However, once there has been a litigated dispute in the first instance, that jurisdiction will generally retain authority over the parenting of the child set forth in a decree. But if there is an agreement of the parents which has been ratified by a court regarding choice of law and venue that will be honored in a post-dispute settlement agreement. Also, there are typically statutory circumstances that cause the original jurisdiction to address a parenting dispute to lose authority over the child. For example, suppose that a couple divorces in England with a separation agreement approved by a court that states that the divorce court in London shall have continuing jurisdiction over future custody and child support disputes and the London divorce court approves that agreement. A U.S. or Swiss court would usually defer to the London divorce court for these matters at that point, unless some emergency or change of circumstances undermined the relevance of London to future disputes involving the child. | This is indeed an area of law where the answer does depend on the jurisdiction. As a 2015 article on the subject noted (and I am loathe to refer to less current sources as this is a rapidly changing area): The United States has no national laws or regulations governing assisted reproduction. However, many states have piecemeal legislation. Some aspects are regulated, while others are not; some states have strict laws or regulations whereas others are looser. As a 2017 American Bar Association article with citations notes, this isn't entirely true. There are some national laws that apply, but they aren't comprehensive and probably don't control the situation described in the OP. It also notes that: Certain states, like California, have created a legislative environment supportive of surrogacy by providing for the validity and enforcement of commercial surrogacy agreements and enacting legislation to define the resulting nontraditional parental relationships.10 Others, like New York, explicitly prohibit commercial surrogate parenting contracts,11 requiring most residents and potential surrogates in the state to seek desirable surrogacy arrangements in other states. However, so many aspects of ART are simply not addressed by the states:12 there is no state regulation of the number of children that may be conceived by an individual donor, no rules regarding the types of medical information and updates that must be supplied by young donors as they age, no standards regarding genetic testing on embryos, no limits on the age of donors, and virtually no regulation of the gametic13 material market. (Gametic material means sperm and eggs.) The American Bar Association has more resources on related issues here. A 2014 article surveyed the issue broadly. Colorado has a law that permits arrangements like these and makes them enforceable if the formalities of the statute are followed. It is not easy to figure out exactly which states do and do not allow this because: (1) there is a model act to authorize this but many states that allow it crafted their own legislation rather than following the model act (Article 6 of the Model Act is the part relevant to the OP), and (2) some states have allowed this kind of arrangement via case law rather than statutory law. There are also states with no statutes on the subject and no clear case law one way or the other. As of 2010 all but a handful of states had some kind of legislation, but as noted above, some of that legislation disallowed rather than authorized certain practices or only address some issues and not others. This article reviews in detail the facts and rulings in several cases that are on point to this issue, for example, from California, Minnesota and Montana. | Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough. | Through the legal doctrine of "transferred intent", wherein if one intends to murder A, and undertake actions to kill A, but one's actions kill B, one has murdered B. Whatever crimes one would have committed, had one performed them on one's intended target, are considered committed against the individual one actually performed them on. Many crimes require one to have mens rea to be guilty; they do not require one to have mens rea towards a given individual. So, so long as one had the proper intent to murder someone, the actual victim of their actions is irrelevant. |
Kidnapping if two children run away, and one turns 18? So let us say that if there were two minors that ran away together. If one of them turns 18 after they have run away, could the 18 year old be arrested for kidnapping? | "Kidnapping is the unlawful taking away or transportation of a person against that person's will" The crime would occur if the second person was taken by the first, the age of the perpetrator is immaterial to the commission of the crime but it will affect where and how it is prosecuted. The age of the victim will matter as the victim must be old enough to competently grant consent - if they are too young to do so then it will be a kidnapping. On the face of it "running away together" does not imply an unwillingness. Note also that kidnapping is the crime of "taking away"; holding a person against their will is the different crime of false imprisonment. | You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice. | In the US, police do not put a person under house arrest, instead, the courts do, as an alternative to standard imprisonment (either awaiting trial, or serving their sentence). The police are not involved at all; the courts cannot be sued for lenient sentencing. If a person leaves their house (even to buy a bottle of milk), they will have violated the terms of their more lenient sentence, and will be arrested and sent to regular jail. Generally, police are not liable for damages, especially when they fail to be omnipotent in their efforts to prevent others from doing wrong. | It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder. |
Is a firm required to arbitrate disputes arising after the expiration of employment contract? Suppose an employee is hired by a firm for a period of one year. After the first year the employee may continue working for the company, until terminated, as an at will employee (For simplicity, let’s assume the contract explicitly contains a starting and ending date so there is no ambiguity as to the expiration of the contract). The contract also specifies under what circumstances the employee maybe terminated and a specific protocol the company must follow to terminate the employee (for example, giving a certain number of days advance notice). Contract also contains a binding arbitration provision. Suppose the employee continues working for the firm for another 3 years after the initial one year term ends. After four years, the firm fires the employee. The employee argues that the company did not follow the termination protocol outlined in the contract and wishes to compel arbitration whereas the firm wishes to litigate the case in court. The firm argues that it is no longer bound to arbitration since the contract (which contains the arbitration clause) was only binding during the first year and has thus expired. Although the employee agrees that the contract expired in a general sense he argues that the part of the contract that governs how the employee must be terminated is still governed by the contract. Although the employee acknowledges that the general agreement to arbitrate no longer exists (for example, if the employee sustains an injury on the job after the first year the employee would agree that the firm is not bound to arbitration) since the termination protocol clearly arise from the contract, the employee argues, the firm is still bound to arbitrate this specific dispute. What case precedent can be applied to this case (especially in NJ)? Is a firm required to arbitrate disputes arising after a contract expires if the contract specifically contains provisions that govern the phase of the employment after it expires? Note: The above scenario hypothetical. It is only intended to help illustrate the essence of the question. | Is a firm required to arbitrate disputes arising after the expiration of employment contract? The wording of this question is problematic. From your description it is doubtful that the contract truly expired at the end of the first year. It is valid for a contract to encompass multiple phases with different provisions specific to each phase. Providing that "[a]fter the first year the employee may continue working for the company, until terminated, as an at will employee" is different from expiration of the contract at the end of the first year. The contract simply outlined what happens before and after that point in time. The employer's allegation that the contract expired at the end of the first year is inconsistent with outlining in that same contract the nature of the parties' continued relation after the first year. Said nature of the employment relation should have been outlined in a separate contract in order to preempt an interpretation of there being one same/ongoing contract. The employer's allegation is vague and untenable also in a scenario where the employer terminates the employee within the first year. The employer's allegation seemingly implies that the employee's deadline for arbitration proceedings expires at the end of the first year. That would give the employer the opportunity to evade the arbitration clause by choosing a timing that de facto prevents its employee from enforcing the clause. Questions regarding arbitration are unanswerable without knowing the exact terms of the relevant clause(s). Just like the contract provides a transition from fixed term employment to at will employment, it is possible --but not necessarily the case-- that the arbitration provision is applicable only to some of the phases that the contract encompasses. | A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire. | I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract. | Usually web site owners will prefer arbitration and people who would potentially sue web site owners will prefer a court forum, but this is only a typical situation and not a die hard rule for all circumstances. Features of arbitration: Binding arbitration is not subject to appeal so it tends to favor repeat, low stakes litigators over one-time high stakes litigators. Binding arbitration precludes class action lawsuits and punitive damages in most cases. Binding arbitration creates an institutional bias in favor of the contract drafter because the arbitrator needs to rule in their favor to get future business from the party selecting arbitration v. non-arbitration. Binding arbitration has much higher filing fees than ordinary court and is usually faster than ordinary court, but litigation costs for the parties tend to be similar to ordinary court. Binding arbitration has a reputation for "baby-splitting results" rather than all-or-nothing decisions in favor of one side or another. Binding arbitration can escape biases (e.g. anti-gay, anti-religious minority, anti-marijuana, pro-local citizen) that might exist in a local court system. Binding arbitration generally allows for much more irrelevant evidence to be admitted, and binding arbitration decisions cannot generally be overruled on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to follow the law or completely screwed up in understanding the facts. There is a much weaker likelihood of getting a fair result. Binding arbitration is generally not public, so the proceedings are generally secret, avoiding publicity and disclosure of secrets discussed in the proceedings. Arbitration often considers written documents like letters and witness statements in circumstances where courts in the U.S. would require in-person testimony (this is less of a consideration outside the U.S. where the hearsay rule is much less strict or is non-existent). Arbitrators are more often subject area specialists in the matter that is disputed. Arbitrators are less likely to reinterpret language in a TOS in terms of policy considerations or judicial precedent glosses (i.e., they are more likely to read contracts literally). Arbitration awards are not immediately enforceable and must be filed with a court in a summary proceeding to be enforced which makes them inconvenient for cases that are mostly uncontested. Arbitration awards don't create precedents that can be used in future cases. Arbitration can more often be decided without an in person hearing than court cases, even in situations where there are factual disputed between the parties. Features of court: Filing fees in court cases are cheap. Judges in courts tend to be far more impartial than arbitrators. Court decisions are immediately enforceable without a collateral enforcement action. This is particularly important when preliminary relief like a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is desired. Court decisions that are incorrect under the law or not supported by the facts can be appealed. They are much more likely to follow the law. Less irrelevant information is considered in a court decision. Court decisions can serve as precedents in future cases. Jury trials and class actions are often available in court cases. Court decisions are more likely to clearly rule in favor of the party in the right and against the party in the wrong without "baby splitting." Judges and juries in courts are "generalists" who are less subject to institutional capture than arbitrators (especially specialist arbitrators). Court is a more favorable forum for one-time, high-stakes litigation. Courts can have jurisdiction over people who aren't parties to an arbitration agreement but who may be necessary to grant full relief or who have a stake in the outcome. Punitive damages are often available in court cases when they wouldn't be available in arbitration forums. | I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney. | In germany, this is called Friedenspflicht. Both employers and employees (and their unions) are required to refrain from strikes and lockouts in disputes on issues which are covered by a currently valid collective bargaining agreement. The agreement may also stipulate that there will be no labor actions on issues which are not covered, as long as the agreement is in force, but that is not necessary. Example: There is a collective bargaining agreement on wages, which is still running. Strikes for higher wages are prohibited. Strikes to get better staffing for the night shift would be allowed, if the agreement doesn't say how many employees should be on duty even during slack hours. | Assumed: United States jurisdiction, no discrimination component to your experiences. There is not a legal limit on how much time an employer requires you to be in another city so long as the employer is complying with wage and hour laws, family leave laws, and the like. They may be in violation of their employment contract with you if the contract specified that you were being hired for a position in one city. A four-week trip does not sound like "time travelling" to me, it sounds like a temporary posting in another city. Similarly, depending on how well the contract is drafted, the state whose law governs the employment, and the company's other behavior you may be able to sue them using material misrepresentation or fraudulent statements about the position you would be taking. If you want more insight into whether you might have a case, take your contract to an attorney. In practice, however, the solution is almost certainly not a lawsuit. The solution may be to start looking for a new job, to communicate better with your boss, or to figure out how much money it would take to keep you working doing the job you are actually doing rather than the one you were hired to do, and to negotiate a salary increase. Try posting your question with a few more facts over at workplace.stackexchange.com for more insight into how to deal with the problem professionally. | It seems like a lot of "punishments" can be applied to a person without having to go to court. Yes, because everyone has the right and freedom to associate, or dissociate, with other people, and the freedom of contract, at least when the state does not decide to interfere. The state, owing to its monopoly of legitimate violence, has a duty towards everyone under its rule and the people in many countries decided that the state's power should be significantly limited with judicial supervision where individual rights and freedoms are implicated. Other individuals or legal persons do not in general owe a duty to be friend with you or to sign or continue a labour or rental contract with you. At the same time, the people and their government have also decided in certain situations there exists a power imbalance (e.g. between the landlord and the tenant, the employer and the employee, groups suffering from discrimination and stereotypes) where unlimited freedom of association and contract not only harms the individual's human dignity but also harms the society as a whole (e.g. homeless and unemployment, which may lead to increased crimes etc.). Thus, in some situations, the law prohibits discrimination and provides for legal rights generally for the more vulnerable. However, this is a decision that is undertaken by each jurisdiction. A court order is only required if the law says that you normally have a legal entitlement but the state or someone else wants to take it away or limit it, or if the law explicitly requires a procedure before the court. Since you tagged the question with canada... Can a person be fired ... without a court order? Yes. However, in Canada, all jurisdictions have labour laws that regulate dismissal of an employee. Dismissal without cause usually requires notice period and/or severances, depending on the length of employment. Dismissal for cause can be challenged in court and the employer has the burden of proof to justify the cause on a balance of probabilities (more probably than not) and the terminated employee will have the right to have them heard before the court and present their evidences. If the person occupied a unionized position, they may also be able to file grievances with the union before an arbitrator, depending on the text of the collective agreement. The collective agreements also often provide for procedural requirements before the dismissal of an employee in a unionized position. Violation of these procedural requirements may lead to the annul of dismissal or awards of damages. Can a person be banned ... without a court order? Yes. You have no general right to be on another person's property in Canada. Your rights end where others' property (or other) rights begin. Like said in the beginning, this is a societal decision and an act of balancing particular to each jurisdiction, for example, in some places, there exists a right to roam over certain publicly accessible lands. The property owner or another person otherwise legally authorized has the authority to decide who they want on their property (which means what is one's own), subject to certain narrow exceptions, under common law and provincial trespassing acts. Your neighbour cannot prevent you from crossing on their land if you have a valid easement and are not abusing it. But if you are abusing your easement, your neighbour may take you to court for an order. Here the property owner includes the state. However, like almost all decisions made by the state, in Canada and many other countries with the rule of law, can be judicially reviewed for their reasonableness, and sometimes correctness. Like all decisions made by the state, trespassing notices may be challenged if the decision is arbitrary or without legal basis. Can a person be evicted ... without a court order? No. In all jurisdictions in Canada, eviction, that is, the forced removal of tenant from a premise, can only be carried out by sheriffs or other legally authorized officers upon an order from a court or tribunal (often called Landlord and Tenant Board or similar), with exceptions for certain tenancies (e.g. where the landlord and the tenant share living area). Court order is not required for the termination of a tenancy; but the termination of tenancy can only be achieved if the tenant agrees or a tribunal or court orders so. Does Habeas corpus come into play in any of these situations No. Habeas corpus means "that you have the body", which is an order from a judicial official to command the state to bring someone in its custody before the court, so that the legality of their detention by the state may be determined. In Canada, habeas corpus only protects liberty interests of an individual. |
Do cookie banners need to change for GDPR compliance? Many sites these days display a "cookie banner" which declares that cookies are being used on the site, generally with a link to a policy document, which state that continued use of the site amounts to implicit consent to the use of cookies. Some online resources suggest that since GDPR states that consent must be explicit and revocable, that this also applies to cookies, rendering the "cookie banner" insufficient. Many sites use 3rd party libraries which will store cookies for tracking, such as Google Analytics. Additionally, other 3rd party libraries, such as AddThis, store tracking cookies which cannot be disabled. To prevent the storage of these cookies, AddThis and some other functionality would need to not be included on the site at all if the user hadn't opted in, which could affect functionality. It may also require a fairly significant investment of time. However, I don't see anything in the actually GDPR that relates to cookies in this sense. The application of GDPR to cookies seems to be based on independent interpretation. Does GDPR actually require a change to cookie banner functionality, or are current implementations sufficient? | The GDPR only mentions cookies once (Recital 30). (It says that cookies are personal data if they are associated with natural persons.) As far as cookies go, nothing has really changed since 2002, and the exception granted in the EU cookie directive Article 5(3) is still valid: This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service. If your site complies with the 2002 directive today, it will be GDPR compliant. All the "EU Cookie Law Compliance" plugins I've checked out let the admin configure the site to comply with the 2002 directive, and most let you choose between implicit consent (which is, and still will be, OK if you or third party services do not use cookies for profiling or to collect personal data), soft consent, or hard consent. The latter is however mandatory if you or third party services use cookies to for profiling or to collect personal data. However, if at least one of your cookies are used for profiling (and if you use Google analytics, you are), or if they are used to collect personal data, the exception from explicit consent quoted above does not apply and implicit consent (i.e.: "continued use of the site amounts to implicit consent to the use of cookies") has never been legal for the site. So while nothing has changed since 2002, there is a lot of misinformation about cookies floating on the Internet, and a lot of sites have their cookie banners set up wrong. You may want to do a new cookie audit for your site to verify that you comply with existing legislation. | The basic requirements for the effectiveness of valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 of the GDPR and specified further in Recital 32. There is no form requirement for the consent, so using a button is not a problem. However, I do not think the MailChimp-button you reproduce as an example is good enough. It asks for a blanket consent to stuff that is buried in MailChimp's “Anti-spam Policy & Terms of Use”. But according to the GDPR, what the data subject consent to can’t be buried in the ToU – it must spelled out in clear, plain language. Requests must be granular, asking for separate consent for separate types of processing. “When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them” (Recital 32). Blanket consent, as used by MailChimp, is not allowed. The other clear requirement from the GDPR is that opt-in is mandatory. Pre-ticked and opt-out buttons are explicitly banned: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent” (Recital 32). ‘No’ must become your data default, but if the user chooses to opt-in by clicking a button, this is valid consent. The MailChimp-button complies witrh this. The GDPR also requires you to keep a records of the consents given (so make that part of the user profile), and to withdraw consent at any time – so you make make provisions for that as well in your implementation of consent. | Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive. | You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you. | Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it. | GDPR will continue to apply to UK customers directly until the end of the transition period (31 December 2020): So, while the UK will no longer have any voting rights, it will need to follow EU rules. The European Court of Justice will also continue to have the final say over any legal disputes. Thereafter, the Data Protection Act 2018 will continue to apply (which itself applies "GDPR standards"). Six of one, half a dozen of the other. | There is no clear answer to this question. The GDPR doesn't not apply, but it delegates rules for processing in the context of employment to member states. That means, the laws in your country might override the GDPR here. As the data controller in this situation, the company must protect the personal data it processes, including the personal data of employees. Protection doesn't have to be absolute, just proportional to the risks. It may be fine to treat data in one context more carefully than another. This is always a judgement call of the data controller. There is nothing about holiday rotas where the GDPR would require them to be kept under lock. The company could very well decide that this data isn't very sensitive and that everyone can look at it themselves. For example, the company might argue they have a legitimate interest for this so that employees can see whether their colleagues are unavailable. But until the controller makes such a decision, the rota contains other person's personal data and cannot be disclosed without a legal basis. Here, I see three reasons why the company might be acting that way: They are overly careful with GDPR compliance and are cargo-culting restrictions that are not actually necessary. They have made a conscious decision to restrict access to this data to protect the private life of employees. They want to make it more difficult for employees to take time off. | I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope). |
What should a website do if the end user refuses to accept the necessary cookies? Suppose that a data controller chooses the consent legal basis for GDPR article 6 purposes. Then, the data controller says something along these lines in a cookie consent banner on their website: We need to use cookies to provide you with our service. Accept/ Decline What if the user clicks "Decline"? Should the website session be terminated? Should the website developer prevent the user from further accessing any part of the website? That seems like the logical conclusion if the user denies the processing of necessary cookies. | These kinds of cookie banners are typically noncompliant and useless since they are not clear and provide too little information to users. Careful: blocking a user who declines consent is usually a GDPR violation! Instead, only those aspects of the site that rely on this consent should be disabled. When cookie consent is needed Per the EU ePrivacy directive (PECR in the UK), information society services (websites, apps, …) are only allowed to store or access information on the end user's device if one of the following holds: the access or storage is strictly necessary for performing a service that was explicitly requested by the user; or the user has given consent Note: there is no “legitimate interest” exception for cookies. When is access/storage strictly necessary? For example, it is strictly necessary for a photography app to store photos on a device. It is strictly necessary for a website to store session cookies so that you can log in to the site. It is strictly necessary for an ecommerce site to store the contents of your shopping cart. It is strictly necessary to remember cookie consent status. And so on. It is not strictly necessary from the perspective of the user to have analytics cookies, ad personalization cookies, or cookies for features that the user doesn't actually use. Many websites that just provide the service the user expects will therefore not have to ask for cookie consent, even if they use cookies. It is worth noting that the ePrivacy definition is entirely technology-neutral. It doesn't relate specifically to cookies, but to any kinds of storage, including LocalStorage. Regulatory guidance considers any access or storage of information on the device to be in scope, even JavaScript APIs in a browser (for example to read the screen dimensions), and considers techniques like fingerprinting to be functionally equivalent and therefore subject to the same rules. It is also worth noting that these rules apply regardless of whether the information being accessed/stored qualifies as “personal data”. What consent is Consent is defined in Art 4(11) and Art 7 GDPR, and further explained in EDPB guidelines 05/2020. A defining feature of consent is that it must be freely given. The user must not suffer “detriment” for revoking or declining consent. And per Art 7(4): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. This disallows making access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. For example, it would not be permissible for a website to exclude users who decline consent for advertising cookies. But: The EDPB guidelines discuss that there can be “permissible incentive” for consent. For example, courts and some DPAs seem to be of the opinion that a subscription website can offer free access to users that consented to personalized ads: consent-or-pay-walls can be compliant, whereas consent-walls alone would not. Sometimes consent is really needed for a processing activity, in which case it is OK to block that service until consent is given. For example, websites should not load third party content like YouTube videos or embedded maps until consent is given to share personal data with the third party. The rest of the website should still work, though. If consent was not freely given, if the user didn't have an actual choice, then the consent is invalid. What should the data controller in your scenario do? The data controller should reassess the role of the cookies for which they are trying to ask for consent. If these cookies are strictly necessary from the user's perspective, then it is proper to inform the user about them – but this should not be confused with consent. It is my personal opinion that purely informational cookie banners are confusing/misleading and should be avoided, but this could also be argued differently. If these cookies are not strictly necessary, then the phrasing “We need to use cookies to provide you with our service” is quite misleading. It should be made clearer to the user that they can opt-in to additional services/improvements if they want to. The user should be able to configure this on a per-purpose basis. Thus, more compliant cookie consent flows will typically give the user three options: continue with only strictly necessary cookies/purposes (must be default behaviour if none is selected) consent to all purposes configure purposes For example, I'm fairly happy with the current Reddit cookie notice: Why this is a good notice: it explains the data controllers (Reddit and partners) it summarizes the purposes for which consent is sought it links to more detailed information the presented options “accept all” an “reject non-essential” are less ambiguous that “accept/decline” Comparing this with the list of minimum required information for informed consent in section 3.3.1 of the EDPB guidelines linked above, the following information is missing though: the identity of the “partners” what (type of) data will be collected and used the existence of the right to withdraw consent | If the website containing the GDPR-wall processes any personal data of users who hit the GDPR-wall, the GDPR applies to that website. This can be as simple as writing a logfile of all visits to the website. In this case it will be illegal if the website owner does not comply with the GDPR. However a supervisory authority would probably not spent any time on such a minor violation. As long as the the website with the GDPR-wall does not process any personal data, the GDPR does not apply, so nothing in the GDPR can forbid the GDPR-wall. Some related remarks: The GDPR does not require a "privacy policy" on the website if the website does not process any personal data. If personal data is processed based on consent, that consent must be freely given. Also it may not be disruptive. So a cookie wall asking for consent would be illegal. But the GDPR does not care about any other disruptive popups, as long as they are not related to asking for consent. Using GeoIP is a perfect way to implement such a GDPR-Wall, because it would block everyone from within the EU, but nobody else. So it blocks exactly those for who the GDPR would apply. In such a case it would not be reasonable to expect anything more from a website owner. A user which uses a proxy, can not expect to be protected by the GDPR, because it bypasses a restriction set by the owner of the website. A webserver does use the IP-address of all incoming requests, to send the reply back. That could be considered a processing of personal data, but everybody seems to agree it is not. I am not sure why. But I do agree that it would be very impractical if that is considered processing of personal data. I added an example from the Washington Post So you have to pay $9/month for a GDPR compliant subscription. Because the price you have to pay is not unacceptable high, I think it would be valid to offer the premium version this way. This does not force you to choose one of the other subscriptions. In december 2018, the Austrian DPA (DSB) has confirmed that a similar offer is lawful. On derstandard.at you get a choice between free access with tracking and advertising, or pay 6 Euro/Month for tracking free access. Because 6 Euro/Month is cheaper than subscribing to the printed edition, the DSB accepted that as a valid choice. More information can be found on noyb.eu or, (with more details but in German), on wbs-law.de. | From the WP 29 Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption - 00879/12/EN WP 194: Persistent login cookies which store an authentication token across browser sessions are not exempted under CRITERION B. This is an important distinction because the user may not be immediately aware of the fact that closing the browser will not clear their authentication settings. They may return to the website under the assumption that they are anonymous whilst in fact they are still logged in to the service. The commonly seen method of using a checkbox and a simple information note such as “remember me (uses cookies)” next to the submit form would be an appropriate means of gaining consent therefore negating the need to apply an exemption in this case. So a cookie to keep a user logged in, requires consent. But the checkbox "Keep me logged in" is appropriate to gain consent. So in your case you do not need to display a cookie banner. | The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer. | This question shows a misconception of GDPR. GDPR creates an obligation not just towards the data subject but also towards the authorities of the relevant state(s). The data subject cannot waive your responsibility to safeguard data, document internal processes, etc. GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personally identifying information (PII). Informed consent is one of the ways to get permission to process and store this data. If your data subjects are prepared to give your sweeping permissions, ask for consent (informed, revocable, etc.), document the consent, and go from there. The data subject does not get to decide what classification data falls under. If you collect, say, medical data, then you are subject to increased restrictions and safeguards. | The ePrivacy directive (Article 5(3)) requires prior informed consent for storage (or access) of information stored on a user's terminal equipment. In other words - you must ask users if they agree to most cookies and similar technologies before the site starts to use them. That is not always technically possible or creates catastrophic UX, so take a close look at which cookies are exempt from consent according to the EU advisory body on data protection: Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption (original, dead link) (user‑input cookies (session-id), authentication cookies, user‑centric security cookies, multimedia content player cookies, user‑interface customisation cookies, third‑party social plug‑in content‑sharing cookies etc.). Update 2019: Europe’s top court says active consent is needed for tracking cookies. There are few exemptions of cookies that generally do NOT require consent: User input cookies, for the duration of a session Authentication cookies, for the duration of a session User centric security cookies, used to detect authentication abuses and linked to the functionality explicitly requested by the user, for a limited persistent duration Multimedia content player session cookies, such as flash player cookies, for the duration of a session Load balancing session cookies, for the duration of session. User interface customisation cookies, for a browser session or a few hours, unless additional information in a prominent location is provided (e.g. “uses cookies” written next to the customisation feature | If the GDPR applies, then the e-privacy directive (EPD) (formally Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002) almost surely also applies. However, this being a directive rather than a regulation, the implement6ing laws may vary in different countries. The relevant provision is Article 5 paragraph (3) which reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia [among others] about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. This governs cookies and any other local data, that is, data stored on or read from the user's equipment. What this means is: A site operator must disclose, in detail, what cookies or other local data the site stores on or reads from the user's device. Even strictly required data (cookies) must be disclosed. A site may not store or read any local data until after consent has been obtained. The user must have the option to consent to or refuse consent to individual data items separately. Giving consent may not be a condition of permission to use the site. Consent must be opt-in, not opt-out, that is the default must be "No consent". Local data (including cookies) that is "strictly necessary" for the operation of the site is exempt from the requirement of consent, but not from the requirement of disclosure, and that means specific disclosure. It must be at least as easy to cancel consent later as it was to give consent initially. Do my Stripe cookies count as essential cookies? If the Stripe cookies count as essential, is it legal to provide no option to turn them off? Have I met my legal requirements in terms of disclosure? The terms and conditions and privacy policy were generated by Termly. I don't know stripe well enough to be sure, but they might. What do they do that is essential for operating the site? Yes. No, not if the disclosures in the question are the only ones you make. As I understand it, you must provide at least a link to a page that shows each specific cookie that you read or set, and what data is stored in that cookie, even for strictly required cookies. Update: I should mention t6hat although the above describes my understanding of the current legal requirements, I have read that enforcement of those requirements does not seem to be a priority for the relevant authorities at this time. Other aspects of data protection, such as proper security to avoid data breaches, and having a proper legal basis for processing, and other GDPR requirements, as opposed to e-Privacy requirements, seem to get more attention and resources from the relevant authorities. Having read the comment by the OP, it does seem that at least some of the stripe cookies are strictly required and need not have consent. The stripe cookie policy linked to is better than many sites currently offer. It does not go into fully specific detail, but it may be that the dashboard does, and that together the two are fully compliant. Linking to this policy (and if possible directly to the stripe cookie dashboard) would seem to me to cover most of the issues here. | There are no direct penalties per GDPR. The data controller must make sure that the person making the request is the data subject, or at least authorized by the data subject. If the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity, they should request additional information for identification purposes. The controller must find a middle ground between violating the GDPR by rejecting a potentially valid request and violating the GDPR by disclosing data to potentially unauthorized recipients. Having reasonable technical and organization measures that prevent unauthorized disclosure is part of the controller's responsibilities per Art 24. What the data controller can do is to block future requests from the alleged stalker. When a request is “manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character”, then the controller can charge a reasonable fee or refuse to act on the request (Art 12(5) GDPR). But it's up to the controller to prove that the requests are unfounded or excessive, it is not possible to reject potentially valid requests on sight. Depending on what the alleged stalker does with the obtained data, they would fall within the scope of the GDPR themselves and would probably be violating it because there is no sufficient legal basis. Also, the alleged stalker, as a data controller, would be required to inform the data subject about subsequent processing of the data per Art 14 GDPR. Attempting to obtain another person's personal data through an access request would have to be punishable by other laws. For starters, such attempts would likely involve identity theft, and successfully obtaining the data would probably be a kind of fraud. |
Is it legal for google street view images to see in my house (EU)? My aunt lives somewhere on the territory of European Union and I navigated to her house in street view mode on Google Maps. I noticed that by navigating those images you can see into her house! You can clearly see that she has a flower pot in the ground floor window. I mean, this doesn't create any problem, but what if she had a bathroom on that window and you could see her bathing? | germany In Germany, taking pictures - and publishing them - is legal, if they're taken from public areas, from the general perspective of a passer-by, and if the picture doesn't make individual persons recognizable. (There are some restrictions about making persons recognizable; if you take a picture of a monument or other building that would typically be photographed by tourists, and if the topic of the picture is clearly the monument, not a random bystander, then it's OK to publish even if the bystander's face is visible. But that doesn't work for individual's houses). Still, Street View got into trouble because their cameras are mounted on roofs of a car, in a height of 2.5-3 meters, so they violated the "perspective of a passer-by" rule. To return to the example of "bathroom", the camera could well be able to see you nude when a passer-by would only be able to see a small portion of the ceiling next to the window. Because of this, and because many Germans were uneasy with seeing their houses on the internet, as a condition to permit Street View at all, the German government insisted on allowing people to request their house to be removed; in 2010, approximately 250000 people made use of that (source: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11595495). Because of the high resistance against Street View in Germany, Google published what they had in 2011, but stopped collecting more images. This is explained in https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/germany-street-view/, which also explains some of the reasons why Germans are so heavily biased for privacy. | The United States has a fairly strict definition of where you have an expectation of privacy, a public bus certainly isn't a private place. In public, anyone can take pictures and video of anyone or anything else. You may have some sort of case if the girl were to use those photos to knowingly help your father violate the restraining order, but it doesn't sound like you believe that was the case. | While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR. | I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images. | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! | In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible. |
What is the scope for third party subpoenas in civil litigation? Are third party subpoena's of large organizations allowed in civil litigation? For example, if there is a lawsuit over a business deal, can one or more of the parties subpoena phone records such as emails and text messages from a phone company or an email provider? Also, what about internet service providers such as Google and Facebook? For example, if there is say a defamation lawsuit about something posted to Facebook, can the plaintiff subpoena Facebook to get records concerning when and what things were posted there? | A party may subpoena materials from a nonparty using a subpoena under Rule 45. A party may generally subpoena anything that is within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, i.e., any material that is relevant, not privileged, and proportional to the needs of the case. Rule 45 also protects third parties from subpoenas that impose an "undue burden," but I would argue that this is essentially the same thing as Rule 26's proportionality requirement. Records of phone calls, e-mails, and text messages are routinely subject to subpoenas under Rule 45, but again, that assumes that the messages are relevant and not privileged. Records to Facebook and Google can be a bit more complicated. I don't know that the question has actually been definitively answered, but social-media companies seem to take the position that access to certain records created by their users is exempt from subpoena under the Stored Communications Act. | As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible. | Do these warnings have any legal force? In the United States, no. They do not have any legal force. Some have tried to argue that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) applies; however, this law only applies to intercepting e-mails—not accidentally sending to the wrong party. There is no legal protection for "reply all" or "accidental send" human errors. If so, what are their consequences? If you're asking why some people put them in there, even if it's not legally enforceable, one reason is lawyers trying to prevent an accidental waiver of attorney-client privilege. Generally, a waiver of the attorney-client privileged must be intentional and knowing. Therefore, some argue that a disclaimer could help one argue that privilege was not waived. Although, I could not find a published case where an e-mail disclaimer actually helped this argument. Additionally, placing the e-mail disclaimer on the bottom of an e-mail (which is customary) is less effective than placing one at the top. As a note, some legal commentators and ethics committee's suggest that lawyers should use encryption "to ensure the confidentiality of such communications remain so when the circumstance calls for it, particularly if the information at issue is highly sensitive and the use of encryption is not onerous." See Legal Productivity's Post that quotes a California Ethics Opinion For more info, read this article here from the American Bar Association's Litigation Section regarding the efficacy of E-mail disclaimers: Do Email Disclaimers Really Work? | A grand jury subpoena needs to not be oppressive or unreasonable: see US v. R Enterprises, 498 US 292. The purpose of a grand jury is to determine if there is probably cause: "the Government cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting evidence sufficient to establish probable cause, because the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists". The court held that The unique role of a grand jury makes its subpoenas much different from subpoenas issued in the context of a criminal trial. Thus, this Court has held that a grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and that its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials Also note that The grand jury's investigatory powers are nevertheless subject to the limit imposed by Rule 17(c), which provides that "the court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive" (emphasis added). Since a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable, the burden of showing unreasonableness, as the above language indicates, must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance So the bar is lower for a grand jury investigation, such as this one. | Yes. You go into the court of relevant jurisdiction, and file a lawsuit to "quiet the question". Usually there is a counterparty who has something to say on the subject; sometimes not. If there is an apparent counterparty, they must be served notice of all aspects of the case. Let's say I manage a pipeline property management company; we are wholly owned by a pipeline company and we buy the land and lease it to said pipeline company. I need a parcel of land to complete a pipeline connection, and as part of my offer I gently remind the landowner, Beth, that we do have the legal right to take the property by eminent domain, with the hopes this will inspire them to a sensible price. Beth says "Bunk! Your LLC doesn't run any pipelines! You don't have eminent domain rights! 500% market price, or go away." Well. So, for the sake of moving the negotiation along, I go to court and ask the judge to quiet the question of whether we have eminent domain rights. Mind you, I don't go any further than that; I don't want to actually take it by eminent domain if I can talk Beth out of a consensual sale. The judge will, of course, suspect this applies to an imminent case, and will ask... so I might as well disclose the Beth situation. As such, I will have to serve Beth and keep Beth fully in the loop, so that Beth has full right to make the other side of the argument. Since it could affect others as well, the judge will probably also require publication in whichever newspaper handles legal notices. (Many newspapers are propped up financially by being official legal-notice organs for their county. They have six pages of editorial content, and 18 pages of legal notices and other ads.) Most likely, the judge will cowardly refuse to rule on whether a pipeline's land holding company has eminent domain, and simply rule that the pipeline company itself does, and could simply buy the land itself then transfer it to my company as a trivial, taxless transaction. So the judge would grant eminent domain conditional on that transaction being done. Beth then offers 133% of market which we haggle to 120% of market + legal fees. Good enough! Or, Beth refuses, in which case we file an eminent domain action in the same court and before the same judge; being already aware of the facts of the situation, there is nothing left to litigate, and the gavel drops quickly and predictably. This is how "quieting a question" works. It is somewhat less confrontational with the counterparty, since you are going to court, sort-of together, to resolve a hypothetical question; once we know whether we are on solid legal footing, we then are able to continue negotiating. Courts love this, because they really want people to negotiate and make consensual settlements. And if a party insists on filing a suit to on the quieted matter, they can pay their filing fees and lawyer fees to get a lecture: "we already resolved this." (Or alternately, to present new facts which mean the past ruling is no longer on-point; e.g., Beth discovers we don't want the land for a pipeline at all, but for an access road.) You can also do this with the IRS. This is called a Private Letter Ruling, and it will set you back a $750 filing fee (and legal costs, of course). You'll still get audited, but then you wave the Ruling in front of them and done. Doing this preemptively in a criminal matter would be adventuresome. Your biggest problem would be the press: it would be impossible to do this discreetly, as the case would be fascinating; and it would put every cop and prosecutor on notice that you have a mind to do the potentially illegal thing. | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. | Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46". | If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers. |
Can I sell jewelry online that was inspired by an artist/song and reference the music on my product page? I am looking at selling jewelry that was inspired by specific songs and am wondering if I can cite or link to their work legally on my product page. | As is typical with legal matters, "it depends". It is not copyright infringement to mention the name of an artist or work of art. It may be infringement of trademark, or of the right of publicity. For example, Apple Computers has trademarked the name "Apple" in the domain of computers, so you cannot call your computer company "Apple Computers", without their permission. You also cannot advertise in a way that implies that Taylor Swift endorsed your product, without her permission – this is the "right of publicity" (the name may differ, e.g. "passing off" depending on jurisdiction). The situation in the US is highly variable, since it depends on state law. The legal inclinations of the particular artist may be irrelevant, since they often have legal arrangements with publishers, and if you are going to get sued, it might be the publisher that sues you. Hiring an attorney to evaluate the specifics of your idea is the only reasonable approach to the matter. | Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties. | Maybe You linked to the publication of a patent application, not to a patent. Based solely on looking at the format of the number the answer would be, Yes, unless it eventually became an issued patent. As it happens, it did become issued patent US9066511B2. That would make the answer no. Since the application was filed before you started selling them, the fact that you were selling them in 2017 could not be used to challenge the patent. I say the answer is maybe because the patent has been disputed in court and I do not know if the outcome has left the patent valid. You can look this up at the USPTO Public PAIR. Then you need to search with either the patent number or the publication number. When you get to the record of the history of that application look at the Image File Wrapper tab. | Under United States law, copyright is normally held by the creator of a work. There is one major exception to this rule: the "work for hire." If something is considered a "work for hire" under the copyright statutes, the copyright is held by the employer. Whether something qualifies as a work for hire is a complex analysis: here is a Copyright Office circular covering some of the basics. To be clear, I'm not giving an opinion (and I don't have enough information to give an opinion) on whether any specific works you or your fiance may create or commission qualify as "works for hire." It's a narrower test than you probably think it is. If the work is not a work for hire, the copyright holder owns the copyright, and anyone else can use it only with a license from the copyright holder. A license can be implied by the parties' behavior and communications--but it shouldn't be. If you're in a situation where you need to know, for example: That you are allowed to use the artwork forever, and the artist can't ask you to stop later; That you are allowed to change the artwork if you need to, even a simple change like cropping or adding a filter or text; or That, if your product is successful, the artist won't be able to sell another license to someone else to compete with you; then you need a written contract spelling out who owns the copyright and what the rights of the other party are. A lawyer can draw up a simple, re-usable form contract for you cheaply that will prevent the problems you're worried about. Remember: even if this is a work-for-hire situation, if you need to prove that down the road, it may require a trial, or at least preliminary motion practice, to do so. That's a lot more expensive than getting your ducks in a row now will be. tl;dr: Get a lawyer. If you're in a major city, there may be a local arts law organization that will provide you with free help for a simple job like this one. (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts operate in several East Coast cities, and I know many top commercial lawyers who do pro bono for them). | This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard. | Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful. | Generally not. There is a notion in copyright law called the first-sale doctrine in which after a particular copy of a copyrighted work is legitimately sold, the purchaser can sell, lend, lease, give away, or otherwise dispose of the copy as he sees fit. Copyright does not give the copyright holder exclusive rights to authorize resales. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 for the relevant US law; in other countries the same principle is sometimes called exhaustion of rights. There are limits to the doctrine. In the US, it does not allow for for-profit software rental (for most software) or musical record rentals. Moreover, software companies noticed the part where the doctrine applies to a transfer of title (i.e. an actual sale). If you read a typical software EULA, it is generally quite explicit that the software was licensed to you instead of sold; this is why. Courts in the US have often enforced these provisions (particularly if the license imposes limits like "you can't resell it"); European courts have, as far as I know, been far less willing to accept that argument. However, as a general rule resale is specifically not forbidden by copyright. | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. |
What does UK law say about "sexual suggestions" to a 14 year-old when I am 16? I, 16, have been accused by a 14 year-old of "sexual suggestions", such as: Touching her breasts Telling her I "want to go to bed with her". Telling her "I want to sleep with her". Telling her she has nice breasts. Threaten to post an instagram post of her "bending over". Just as clarification, this is simply the parents accusing me here, no court battle or stuff yet, but the parents have accused that the social workers may attempt to take me to court. There were eight sexual accusations in total (some of which I can't remember). All are either complete fabrications or non-sexual comments portrayed in a sexualized fashion (for example, if a depressed person said they were ugly, would you tell them they were pretty? Of course you would). Now of course there are some things to consider about her, such as: She is severely mentally ill, and has been in multiple psychiatric hospitals, and still is in one. These things that she has "supposedly said" are pretty much all what the social workers have interpreted us as saying, rather than what she actually said. She herself has said that things like putting my arm around her was perfectly fine, and only today after I have been banned from speaking to her have I learned that "She is in an unable condition and anything she says might not be true". So, as a forum for topic-based questions here, I guess I am asking the following: Let's take the theoretical situation that all of the sexual things listed happened, with consent. What is the law on a 16 year-old doing the things listed above with a 14 year-old? Same as the above, except what would happen if it was made out that there was not consent? With no call recordings, what would be the best way to go about disproving (in a court scenario) that I did all of these things? I have some text history with her which would prove that we are good friends. For clarification, the "most extreme" accusation here appears to be that I apparently touched her breasts. All of the other accusations are that I have verbally said things to her that are sexual. | I'm not sure a case of harassment could be made out (it would depend on the circumstances in which you purportedly did those things or threatened her, except for touching her. Sexual assault The Sexual Offences Act 2003 defines sexual assault as: (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) he intentionally touches another person (B), (b) the touching is sexual, (c) B does not consent to the touching, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents. To your questions: What is the law on a 16 year-old doing the things listed above with a 14 year-old? Same as the above, except what would happen if it was made out that there was not consent? For sexual assault, it is presumed that if the person is between the ages of 13 and 16, they do not have the capacity to consent. That is - if there is no proof of consent, you are guilty of the offence, if the requisite mens rea - intent - to touch them can be proved. For everything else - it might amount to harassment but that is probably a stretch, I don't see the elements being made out. However, there are certain limits to what people can consent to - you can't consent to someone murdering you in most jurisdictions, for example. ... what would be the best way to go about disproving (in a court scenario) that I did all of these things? You do not have to disprove that you did these acts - it is the job of the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond reasonable doubt that you have done so. You can present evidence that satisfies an evidentiary burden that you did not do these acts, such as not being able to do so (by being in another place), or not intending to do the act. However, you would need to prove that you had consent and believed she was 16 or over to stand a reasonable chance of escaping conviction for the above crime, if prosecuted. As Martin has said - you need to get a lawyer for the right answer here. | british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date. | If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue. | In NSW Australia this is covered by Division 15A of the Crimes Act 1900 which deals with Child Abuse Material. Under Section 91FA a "child" means a person who is under the age of 16 years - the situation you describe would be between consenting adults in NSW. “Child abuse material” can be text or images that are sexually explicit and would be “offensive” to a normal person (which means offensive to the particular jury) Assuming Jane is 15 or less, however, prima facie the image would be child abuse material and under Section 91H "A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence." The punishment is up to 10 years in jail. Section 91H provides a number of defences, the most relevant to the circumstances you describe being: that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material. that the material concerned came into the defendant’s possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it. (for possession only) If, considering all the circumstances of the relationship, Joe doesn't know and could not reasonably be expected to know Jane's age then he can use the defence under S91H(1). If he did not request the picture and as soon as he was aware of Jane's age, deleted it, then he can use the defence under S91H(2). The outcome is not so rosy for Jane: she is guilty of both production and dissemination of child abuse material and (assuming she knows how old she is) faces up to 10 years in jail (14 if she is under 14) and registration on the Sex Offenders List for life. It is admittedly unlikely in the circumstances that the state would prosecute her and, if they did, it is very likely that the judge would rule that no conviction be recorded. | In the US, the various "child pornography" laws apply only if there is an actual picture of an actual child. A computer-generated image does not count under those laws, unless it is recognizably of an actual identifiable person who is or was a minor at the time, nor does a description of sex with a child, no matter how graphic or realistic. However I need to point out that any accusation of child pornography is potentially very serious, and any person who has been or might plausibly have been accused of such would do well to consult a lawyer who can review the exact facts and has tools to check recent caselaw. This page from the US DOJ says: Images of child pornography are not protected under First Amendment rights, and are illegal contraband under federal law. Section 2256 of Title 18, United States Code, defines child pornography as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (someone under 18 years of age). Visual depictions include photographs, videos, digital or computer generated images indistinguishable from an actual minor, and images created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict an identifiable, actual minor. Undeveloped film, undeveloped videotape, and electronically stored data that can be converted into a visual image of child pornography are also deemed illegal visual depictions under federal law. That page cites: 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children (Production of child pornography) 18 U.S.C. § 2251A- Selling and Buying of Children 18 U.S.C. § 2252- Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors (Possession, distribution and receipt of child pornography) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A- certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2256- Definitions 18 U.S.C. § 2260- Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States The Wikipedia article mentions that: Simulated child pornography was made illegal with the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA). The CPPA was short-lived. In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition held that the relevant portions of the CPPA were unconstitutional because they prevented lawful speech. Referring to Ferber, the court stated that "the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse of children". The opinion in Ashcroft included the statement that: Whether or not the films we mention violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohibitions. If these films, or hundreds of others of lesser note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. See Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U. S. 413, 419 (1966) Under Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), it may be a crime for an adult to provide "inappropriate" sexual content to a child, even if the content is not legally obscene, but this does not apply when both parties to a communication are minors. Text, written words, may be unlawful to distribute if and only if it passes the Miller* test, making it legally obscene. The wording of the test is: The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at 354 U. S. 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary. Pp. 413 U. S. 24-25. This test applies whether the subjects are children or adults. I do not know\ what rules would be applied by the authorities in Sweden. They are likely to be quite different. | canada In Canada it all depends on whether it is Bob or Alice who is female. If it is the male who lies about the use of contraception it results in sexual assault (R. v. Hutchinson), and in the case of sexual assault it is possible to sue for damages in civil court. In contrast if it is the female who lies about the use of contraception it does not result in sexual assault (🤦), and thus suing for damages is not possible (PP v. DD, 2019 (this is literally the case you describe)). To understand this legal difference one has to go back to the 1998 case R v. Cuerrier, which was about which lies cause consent to sex be withdrawn. Does lying about your identity count (impersonating your twin)? Does lying about your wealth count? Does lying about your religious believes count? Specifically in that case someone had not disclosed that they had HIV. The court ruled in that case that sexual assault laws should only concern themselves with lies that create a risk of physical harm, and thus 'causing someone else to get you pregant' does not count, whilst 'causing someone else to become pregant' does count. Anyway, an amazing article about this can be found on thewalrus.ca, which discusses exactly these cases. It's definitely worth a read, but here is their description of PP v. DD: THE CONSEQUENCES OF Hutchinson played out earlier this year in PP v. DD, a decision released recently by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In PP, the plaintiff and the defendant were in a brief sexual relationship that resulted in a child. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had lied to him about being on birth control, and that this lie had both robbed him of the ability to choose the timing and circumstances of the birth of his first child, and exposed him to the significant expense of childcare. In PP, the plaintiff chose to seek a remedy in civil court—meaning, essentially, that he wanted damages, not the imposition of criminal liability—arguing that the defendant had defrauded him. The plaintiff’s case in PP failed, mostly for policy reasons. Canadian law, like many other jurisdictions, is extremely reluctant to recognize any cause of action that might allow people to circumvent child-support obligations. But the Court of Appeal also commented on whether the plaintiff could advance a claim for sexual battery—the non-criminal counterpart of sexual assault. Relying on Hutchinson, the Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff’s consent to the sex he had with the defendant had not been cancelled out by her alleged fraud, because a woman who lies about being on birth control does not expose her male partner to any risk of significant bodily harm. | Will you be in legal trouble for child pornography? No. The legal definition of child pornography generally requires things such as "sexually explicit conduct" or "lewd and lascivious display". Mere nudity does not rise to this standard; photographic documentation of suspected physical abuse comes nowhere near it. Will you get in trouble for not reporting the suspected abuse? Almost certainly not. People with certain jobs are "mandatory reporters" of suspected abuse, but it's very hard to become a mandatory reporter without being aware of it (and even mandatory reporters generally aren't required to report members of their immediate family). I'm not surprised that Walmart reported the photos to the police. For various reasons, commercial photo processors are utterly paranoid about child pornography, and will report anything that might even remotely indicate the potential for such. (Strongly related: Is it legal to take naked non-abusive pictures of my child?) | If she was underage at the time then the making, possession and distribution of the video is a crime irrespective of how old she is now. See https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography |
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