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It is illegal to name software releases after pop-culture things? An example: version 2.0 of a software is named "Thresh", version 2.1 is named "Cassiopeia", and so on? (taking names from a single source) | This is permitted so long as it doesn't violate a valid trademark or service mark (or a few equivalent rights in names that are comparable such as collective rights to market beef under the name "Waygu" only if it is produced in a certain area of Japan under Japanese law) that covers goods or services of the same type in the same economic market. A trademark arises either when a term acquires a "secondary meaning" associating its use in connection with a particular kind of good or services in a particular market with a particular provider of that good or that service, or by registration of the trademark or service mark. "Tresh" and "Cassiopeia" are not terms that inherently are related to software, so they are permissible to use as trademarks for software unless someone else already has established trademark protection for them. | This is known as nominative fair use. The leading case in the US is New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). The International Trademark Association (ITA) summarizes: Nominative fair use generally is permissible as long as (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so much of the mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service and (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. The ITA uses iPhone cases as an example of allowable nominative use: Use of “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6. Here is an example of that by J.Crew. | Yes it's illegal. Just like singing/whistling happy birthday in public (used to be) illegal. You could be sued for untold amount of damages that could ruin your life forever (in theory). If you whistle a mashup remix then it's legal as long as it's different enough from the original that you can't tell that they are the same song anymore. Yes anyone can sue you if you piss them off. Disney doesn't sue all the people who sing covers of their songs because it's bad for business to piss off your fans, but they can sue if they feel like it. This is more common sense than anything else but I suggest you look into fair use copyright law since there is a lot of misconception about it. https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-is-fair-use/ | Disclaimer: I'm from the US and don't claim to know German or Turkish law. So let me discuss some general principles here, but details may well be different in Germany and Turkey. You're mixing together three very different things: trademark, copyright, and patent. Copyright protects the expression of an idea, in this case, the exact computer code, images, etc. If you didn't copy his code, the chance that you would coincidentally write identical code is remote. The fact that you both have a line of code that says x=x+1 wouldn't give him any grounds for a lawsuit. He'd have to show substantial portions of the code were identical. If you didn't deliberately copy his code, this isn't going to happen. Barring some extraordinary and unbelievable coincidence, you can't violate copyright accidentally. Trademark protects names and symbols used to identify a company or a product. If you decided to call your software company "Microsoft", then that other Microsoft could sue you for trademark infringement. Likewise if you copied somebody else's logo or other distinctive graphics. This is very different from copyright. It is quite possible to violate someone's trademark accidentally. Especially if he gave his company or product a rather generic name. Like if someone called his product, say, "Password Manager", someone else might make a product with the same name without ever having heard of the original. Ditto if he has some simple logo or other graphics. If you did accidentally duplicate a name or graphic elements, well, in the US a court would likely order you to change your name or graphics and that would be the end of it, unless you refused, in which case you'd end up in court. US Courts have ruled that very generic names have limited trademark protection. An example I saw recently was "Main Street Auto Repair". A court said that the owner of that name could prevent someone else from opening a shop in the same town with the same name, but he couldn't sue someone in another town who happened to use the same name. This is why, by the way, companies often use made-up words for their product names. In your case, this should be a trivial issue. If he is claiming trademark to the look of the main menu screen, just change the colors or move some buttons around. If it actually went to court, you should be able to argue that the similarity was accidental and when you were informed you promptly changed it, and that should be the end of it. Depending, I guess, on how hard-nosed the judge is, etc. Patents are different still. A patent gives the owner the exclusive right to use an invention or process for a specified period of time. It doesn't matter if you invented the same thing entirely independently. Whoever filed the patent first has exclusive rights. There have been cases where an inventor lost out to someone with a similar invention because he submitted his patent application one day later. If this other person has patents that you are infringing, you are pretty much out of luck. | They certainly can make that a license term and revoke the license if you do not comply. However, revoking the license is all they can do to "forbid". Or they could sue you for damages without revoking the license. That said, you are free to consult how to use their software so long as you do not hold a license so that you are not bound by the terms AND you do not break the law e.g. copyright. How to do it is up to you to figure. Maybe you could simply consult users that do have a license — on their premises and devices. | Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems. | The software being free and open source has no impact on whether it infringes any patents or violates any copyrights. Copyrights attach to fixed representations of creative work in a tangible medium (e.g., the actual code and graphical elements of the software in question). As long as you aren't copying the copyrighted work of someone else, you should be in the clear. So, if you write your own code from scratch, or rely on code that you're allowed to use (e.g., "free" software with a permissive license that allows it to be used freely), you should be fine. On the other hand, if you copy a chunk of code that you aren't allowed to use, and then change the variable names so that it's superficially different, you're likely violating someone's copyright. Patents are a much more difficult question. To determine whether you would infringe any patents, you would have to read the independent claims of every patent that might be related. If you perform all the steps of any one of those claims, then you are infringing that claim (and therefore, the patent in which it is found). Unfortunately, this is much easier said than done. First, it may be difficult to search for all the potentially relevant patents, and once you've found them, there may be far too many to read. Second, claims are written in a type of language that is specific to patents, and someone without experience in patent law may not understand them correctly. Finally, the terms in the claims may not take on their plain English meaning, but rather may have been defined by the language in the rest of that patent, so it's possible that you might incorrectly think you were in the clear based on a misunderstanding arising from that. All that said, it may be best to go ahead with implementing an idea and then waiting to see what happens. Chances are that the implementation will arguably infringe some patent in some way, no matter what's done. But chances are also high that there will never be any worrisome enforcement action taken against it by a patent owner, simply due to the difficulty and expense associated with enforcing patent rights. | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) |
Did any ancient legal systems require covenants/oaths/contracts to be made in the morning? “Then Abimelech went to him from Gerar, and Ahuzzath one of his friends, and Phichol the chief captain of his army. And Isaac said unto them, Wherefore come ye to me, seeing ye hate me, and have sent me away from you? And they said, We saw certainly that the Lord was with thee: and we said, Let there be now an oath betwixt us, even betwixt us and thee, and let us make a covenant with thee; That thou wilt do us no hurt, as we have not touched thee, and as we have done unto thee nothing but good, and have sent thee away in peace: thou art now the blessed of the Lord. And he made them a feast, and they did eat and drink. And they rose up betimes in the morning, and sware one to another: and Isaac sent them away, and they departed from him in peace.” (Genesis 26:26-31, KJV) Did any ancient legal system place any significance on oaths or agreements being made in the morning? It appears that Isaac and Abimelech and his companions discussed the agreement in the evening but did not formalize it until the morning. Was this actually required for legal purposes in any ancient jurisdictions? (In this case, it was an agreement between a king and another person, so "laws" aren't really relevant, but I'm curious if this was standard practice.) I don't want to debate the historicity of the Bible. I believe that this interaction truly did occur, but the question itself (did agreements have to be made in the morning?) is valid regardless of one's opinion on whether or not this really happened. I tagged this as contract-law because a contract seems to be the closest modern concept to the oath here. | If it means anything, it's probably about being sober rather than because of the time of day. To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing in the Bible or halakha that says oaths must be made in a specific part of the day. What we do find, in common with other ancient cultures, is an expectation that oath-making involves an invocation of divine authority, as the deity is being asked to punish someone if they break their agreement. Consequently, oath-making is often accompanied by a sacrifice (c.f. 2 Chronicles 15, or the Iliad book 3 for a non-Hebrew example), which needs a certain amount of preparation - not only finding the animal, but also being in a state of ritual purity. The precise wording and intent of the oath are also important, since one does not want to be bound to the wrong thing. All of this adds up to not doing the ceremony after a big party with lots of drinking. In this passage, they wait until morning, not because the morning is special in itself, but because it's undesirable to undertake a solemn religious commitment while inebriated or just tired. It may be that the morning is a "good" time because it's convenient to carry out morning prayers and ablutions and then immediately go on to the oath-making, but that does not mean that ancient Hebrew religious practice required promises to be made in the morning. In law, we also have the idea of being potentially held to an undesired agreement, if it was concluded while drunk or otherwise impaired. Legal systems differ in how they resolve it. The Talmud includes, for example: With regard to one who is intoxicated, his acquisition is a binding acquisition; that is, he cannot retract the transaction when he is sober, and similarly, his sale is a binding sale. Moreover, if he committed a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, he is executed; and if the offense is punishable by lashes, he is flogged. The principle is that he is like a sober person in all matters, except that he is exempt from prayer. (Eruvin 65a, trans. William Davidson) The covenant here is not a commercial contract, but would probably have included an element of prayer and sacrifice (even if not mentioned explicitly in the passage), and that is the part which demands sobriety. Roman law also had rules about impairment by reason of insanity, which is a similar idea; a permanently insane person cannot make contracts (Ulpian in Digest 3.5.3) but in other circumstances a drunk person might be held to their agreement. Somewhat to the contrary, drinking some amount of wine might be part of the formal oath ceremony in some cultures. In ancient Greece, as in the Iliad example, libations were made to the gods (especially Zeus Horkios, "oath-keeper") and the wine would have been formally consumed. Herodotus also records (Histories 4.70) that the Scythian oath ceremony involved drinking a mixture of wine and blood. This does not mean that the participants were intoxicated - there was probably not much wine and it was probably not that strong - but I mention it for completeness. By the way, the part of the Talmud cited above also includes the statement from Rav Nachman that "As long as I have not drunk a quarter-log of wine, my mind is not clear. It is only after drinking wine that I can issue appropriate rulings." Contemporary judges might or might not agree, but they'd be more circumspect in saying it. | It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst. | The entire purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to say that this contract is the agreement, and anything previously negotiated is not part of the agreement. I don't know why they would fail to include that in the contract. | would it be interpreted in favor of the person who did not draft the terms? Yes, provided that the interpretation is reasonable. That is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here, the term "deliverables and associated documents" might entail a contradiction if that term [allegedly or literally] encompasses "source code or content". That depends on what definition(s) of "deliverables and associated documents" can be adduced from the contract. The term could refer to items that are not "source code or content", such as the binary files (i.e., executables and DLLs), instructions & documentation on how to operate and troubleshoot the application, and so forth. In that case, there would be no contradiction because there is no overlap between these items and the source code. if term A) is written on line 10 and term B) is written on line 11, is it resonable to assume term B) takes precedence or modifies term A? No. The sequence of clauses/terms itself does not determine which one outweighs or qualifies the other. Instead, the language used in the contract is indicative of the parties' intent and therefore how the terms of that contract relate to each other. | Other than the oath (see the Coronation Oath Act), nothing at the ceremony has any legal significance. The coronation is a "symbolic formality." The reign begins at the moment of the preceding monarch's death. The Coronation Oath, in which the monarch swears to govern the peoples of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Realms “according to their respective laws and customs” is the only aspect of the ceremony which is required by law. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9412/ | What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings. | The main relevant bit of constitutional law is Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, where it was held that a general law against use of peyote does not violate the Free Exercise clause, though in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 a law specifically designed to restrict Santeria animal sacrifices is an undue burden on religion. The Employment Division court cites Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 as the only cases where the First Amendment prevents a generally applicable law from applying in a religious context, which the court notes "are distinguished on the ground that they involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections". The TRO doesn't go into detail about the reasoning: Based on the materials presented and the arguments of counsel, the court finds: (1) Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim alleging a violation of their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion So it is hard to say on what grounds the plaintiffs are likely to succeed. The governor's order is a bit peculiar, because it initially looks like a neutral 10-person limit on gatherings, but on the one hand makes an exception for religious events by allowing any number of people "officiating" so sets the limit on participants (advantage to religion, not constitutional), but then also includes numerous exceptions to the order, including schools, day-care, food pantries, detox centers, shopping malls, restaurants and so on. The set of exceptions is large enough that one might conclude that this is an undue burden on the exercise of religion. The breadth of the number of exceptions undermines claims of "necessity" which are crucial to any order that closes churches. | The parties can be required under oath to explain what they understand the plain meaning of the words to be. Where they disagree about the plain meaning of the words, they can use expert witnesses to give weight to their interpretation. Once the judge determines the plain meaning of the words (either by agreement between the parties or by reference to expert witnesses or other evidence), it is a matter of standard contract interpretation. Even in the case of an idioticon, where no expert witnesses are available, if the disagreement between the parties surrounds only a few words, the judge could find that there is no actual ambiguity because the context. Also, the judge could refer to parole evidence if needed. The purpose of the written contract is to provide evidence of your agreement. It is a bad idea to create evidence that you both may want to rely upon at some point if nobody else can understand it. |
A store security guard prevented me from entering a shop 30 min before the close, does he have the right to? I tried to enter a shop that closes at 11 p.m. in France, at 10:30 p.m., and the store security guard prevented me from entering. Does he have the right to? If not, what could I do to go in? What do I risk if I force the passage? | I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise. | I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state. | The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience. | I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you. | I doubt that you will find an official answer to that question. No law allows you to block passing (even if passing is illegal). Therefore, you must allow passing. There are laws against obstructing traffic. Japanese law addresses this, defining obstructing progress as starting to move or continuing to move in circumstances that would likely cause another vehicle or streetcar to have to suddenly change speed or direction in order to avoid danger You'd have to specify how you intend to "not let" a person pass you, but I can't imagine what you could do that would not be "obstructing progress". A recent anti-road rage law allows license revocation for violation. | Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. | Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law. | This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best. |
Is it correct to ban me from a concert without providing necessary proof that I was engaged in harmful or threatening behaviour? I received following email by a venue in London: "Hi there We are getting in touch as we are afraid we have had to refund your ticket for the event tonight. One of the artists performing has brought to our attention behaviour online that has made them feel very uncomfortable, and for their wellbeing and safety we have agreed it is best for you to not attend. Regards ..." I responded with the request to provide necessary evidence to make such a serious allegation. If they don’t provide any evidence, is there something I can do legally? What time frame should I allow them to provide me with the evidence? Calling someone a threat for someone else’s well-being and safety without proof and singling me out of attending a concert is falsity, no? T&C and the fact they refunded me would not apply here in the first place, correct? | A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest. | The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering. | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. | I live in MD near DC, and have been ticketed by the cameras in both DC and MD. At least for speeding and red-light violations (and I think for all camera detected violations) these are just fines, not true moving violations in that no license points are assessed, and there is no impact on insurance, provided the ticket is paid, unlike what would have happened had an officer written the ticket in person. One can contest the ticket, but it is not likely to be worth the time and trouble. This policy of not assessing points is precisely because there is no assured way of determining who the driver is with current technology, although cameras that can see the driver through the windshield and match him or her against a database by facial recognition may be coming. Currently a human reviews the images in an effort to rule out false positives and certify that an actual violation is shown. The name and title of this person is shown on the notice I get, at least from MD. What one can do "proactively": do not speed or go through red lights pay all camera tickets promptly (or file the paperwork to contest them). If unpaid beyond the deadline they turn into more serious violations that do carry points, just like failing to attend a court date. | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire! |
Can I provide plans for a patented product This question is about a physical product, where a part of the functionality is patented. I would like to recreate that product for educational purposes. I won't sell it. I guess I'm fine with "just recreating it for personal use". If I take this one step further and create plans or some tutorial material to recreate the patented functionality, can I get into trouble? I have read this question, which is about recreating and doing tutorial videos about something that is copyrighted and/or trademarked: Leagalities of recreating a website design but not using publically Specific case: Found a furniture design with a elaborate folding mechanism. This mechanism is patented. I would like to build my own furniture with that mechanism. It looks baffling at first, but I'm sure that everyone with a little technical background can figure out the function of the mechanism just by looking at photos and videos on the designers homepage. | A patent grants the holder exclusive rights to make, use and sell the patented item. As such, you can look at the patented object, you can document it, you can study it, you can draw up plans for it. A patent cannot be granted unless the applicant discloses what exactly is being patented. So you can get all the details of a patent from the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office). You cannot, however, make one without infringement unless you have permission, usually a license, from the patent holder. Now I am not in any way recommending this but as a practical matter, if you, as an individual, were to make such a piece of furniture incorporating a patented feature for your use, how would they know? There are no "patent police" going from door-to-door looking for infringers. On the other hand if you were to begin selling copies of this piece at your small shop, that might come to the patent holder's attention and they might take action against you. | Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms. | The question that you need to answer is whether, when you embed, you "copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content". It seems that you have done that, i.e. you didn't just "watch". The next question is whether you have "prior written consent of YouTube". Youtube requires a license from contributors granting users the right to "access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service". To fill the gap, you have to determine whether your act of embedding is permitted by the Youtube TOS. Their TOS states §2A that "The Service" includes the YouTube "Embeddable Player". It also says §4 YouTube hereby grants you permission to access and use the Service as set forth in these Terms of Service, provided that: (A) You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player). On the face of it and as long as you do the stuff that follows in B-I, you have complied with that requirement and therefore you have written permission from Youtube. | You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be. | THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not. | Under U.S. copyright law, the First Sale Doctrine protects such conduct. As the U.S. Justice Department explains: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). U.S. law with respect to the First Sale Doctrine is typical, and copyright law is fairly uniform internationally due to some relevant intellectual property treaties. But there are hundreds of countries in the world, and some of them might not include the First Sale Doctrine in their jurisprudence. For example, I do not know how this would be handled under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or under Islamic law. | Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation. | There are limits to what you are allowed to modify on your car. Federal safety regulations require certain features to be installed by the manufacturer, and to be maintained by the owner in a state that they remain functional. Besides obvious things like brakes, you need working headlights, turn signals, bumpers, wipers, etc. Heated seats is an option. A luxury convenience feature. Most cars don't have heated seats. If you had heated seats, but left them off or the switch broke and they weren't working, there would be no reason for the State Patrol to care one bit that your rump was a bit chilly. So, the state doesn't care enough make it illegal to have heated seats or not. It is entirely your choice. The question then becomes, does the state have any reason to care whether you have a manual switch to turn them on or off, or use a special software code to enable the feature? Logic dictates that if they don't care whether or not you have the feature, and don't care if you are using it or not, they would have not reason to care about the particular method you use to turn it on or off... Therefore the only real question is does BMW care? They might, if you came up with a method of enabling heat without a subscription and it became known to them. Especially if you made money publishing a how-to guide that cost them potential revenue. But that would be a civil, rather than a criminal matter. To me this action would be equivalent to buying a burger at a place that charges $.25 for a packet of ketchup, and instead using your own ketchup. It's your burger, and your ketchup, do what you want! ADDENDUM: Based on discussion on the other answer, as well as a suggestion in comments, I would like to briefly address (my opinion) on the applicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DCMA) of 1998. I actually just looked up this act, and have only a layman's understanding of copyright law, but there is a basic element that needs to be met for a violation to occur: The copyrighted material must be reproduced, altered, repurposed, and distributed in some manner. Private avoidance or selective non-use of a digital feature would not seem to rise to that level. I touched on this above when I alluded to publishing a written hack. It would probably also apply if you offered code that would bypass a feature, or to a car tuner offering to enable the feature for a fee. If there is a commercial benefit, there is a potential "victim", and a copyright issue. However, even code is questionable... There are many examples of companies offering aftermarket Engine Control Module code to enhance performance or improve gas mileage. Of course a manufacturer could always challenge a commercial competitor, but lawsuits cause money and create publicity - positive and negative. About the only "free" enforcement tool a manufacturer has is to not honor the warranty on any owner altered parts. Of note is the fact that seat heating elements are not digital, copyrighted, or otherwise protected work. The digital intellectual property that MIGHT potentially be at the center of a copyright controversy is the function of the pay system and the processing of an access code that unlocks a relay. What that relay sends electrical current to is really immaterial. It could be your stereo, it could be the airbag... One person snipping and splicing wire to avoid the IP "brain" and install a simple on/off switch or rheostat for personal use of seat heat should not be violation of any digital copyright law. |
What was the legal basis for farmer Eckardt Heukamp to be forced to sell his farm to RWE? In Germany there are currently between 200 and 2000 climate activists in the Lützerath hamlet fighting the forced sale of the hamlet to a mining company. They are primarily on/around the property of farmer Eckardt Heukamp who objected to selling his farm. Here is the wikipedia article and here is a BBC article. In general the forced sale of land is driven by the ideas of Eminent Domain, which is the forced sale of property to the government for public use. The justification for the existence of Eminent Domain laws always heavily relies on the use of the land to be for the public. This case however implies that a company (the farmer) is forced to sell its land to another private company (RWE), so that the latter company can profit off of the resources in the land owned by the farmer against the wishes of the farmer. The only case I can think of where Eminent Domain is used somewhat commonly for sales to a private company is for the purchase of land for railways, but this is - as far as I am aware - justified by the positive externalities of train networks, so it's basically a form of 'subsidy'. Such a reasoning does not seem to apply to a mining company. So my question is basically: What is the reasoning behind laws allowing entire villages to be sold to private mining companies? Does the state get some 'maximum energy prices' or something similar in return to justify this as a 'public use', or is there a completely different justification? (Btw, I am not particularly interested in the specifics of German law, and more so in the general justifications for 'laws like this', so answers for different jurisdictions are welcome as well) | Art 14 GG provides a right to personal property, but not without limitations. In particular, expropriation is allowed on the basis of a concrete law with fair compensation, when necessary for a public interest. In 2013, these disputes relating to the Garzweiler mine were decided by the German constitutional court. In decision 1 BvR 3139/08, one such expropriation law was found constitutional. It gave public interests such as: supplying the economy with raw materials maintaining jobs in the mining industry maintaining and growing the economy More recently, the goal of fulfilling political energy strategies (e.g. energy independence) has become more prominent as well. Such public interests don't automatically override the right to property – all relevant rights and interests must be balanced. But in practice, the economic interests of a large corporation do seem to override individuals' right to their property, especially since they must be given fair compensation. Opposing public interests might weigh more strongly. It will be interesting to see how recent expropriation for the purpose of lignite mining will be viewed in retrospect, given that climate protection has also been found to be a constitutionally protected interest. | california The relevant parties may go to court for an equitable solution. See the 2010 California Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 3.6. Cullen Earthquake Act: 751.50. If the boundaries of land owned either by public or by private entities have been disturbed by earth movements such as, but not limited to, slides, subsidence, lateral or vertical displacements or similar disasters caused by man, or by earthquake or other acts of God, so that such lands are in a location different from that at which they were located prior to the disaster, an action in rem may be brought to equitably reestablish boundaries and to quiet title to land within the boundaries so reestablished.** (my emboldenment and embedded link) | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | It isn't precisely clear which jurisdiction you are located in (recall that this website handles matters from everywhere in the world). But, generally speaking, in the United States, you have no right to limit someone's existing tree on their property merely because it casts a shadow on your solar panels. The installer should have known better. A minority of U.S. states, including California, consider new construction that blocks the view of existing structures a form of "nuisance" that can be abated if it unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the existing property. But, that protects existing structures, rather than new ones. In Japan, there are building code requirements designed to insure that key portions of every home get natural sunlight daily. Again, this only applies to the construction of new buildings. I know of no law that gives someone who newly installs a solar panel a right to remove or trim a neighbor's tree simply by virtue of doing so. And, without knowing whose law is involved it would be impossible to determine with any reliability. The property with the solar panel could seek to buy the right to an unobstructed view from the property with the tree, in what would probably be called a "view easement", but that would only happen if the terms were such that both consented and it was written up in a legal document to that effect. | It's important to be absolutely clear on what is being sold. Using English translations may affect the outcome. Assuming "SoleTraderCompA" is an Einzelunternehmen, the sale would be an asset sale. The company isn't sold, because the company is legally identical to person A! Instead, person A makes an extensive list of all assets he's selling (goods, real estate, intellectual property, etcetera). "SoleTraderCompA" might be a trade mark, in which case the trade mark can be sold. Person B can also be an Einzelunternehmen, and as part of its business operations buys aforementioned assets from person A. But in general, any legal entity can buy the assets of person A, including a GmbH or AG. | You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form. | No, it is not illegal under 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G) to use a pesticide labeled for use against one pest against another pest... at least not anymore. It turns out that there apparently were cases of the EPA interpreting the language of that portion of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in an overly broad manner. This included the interpretation in question here, as well as even interpreting it to ban using doses or concentrations less than those specified by the label. In response, Congress amended FIFRA in 1978 to add a definition of the term "To use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling" as 7 USC 136 (ee): The term “to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling” means to use any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by the labeling, except that the term shall not include (1) applying a pesticide at any dosage, concentration, or frequency less than that specified on the labeling unless the labeling specifically prohibits deviation from the specified dosage, concentration, or frequency, (2) applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling if the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling, unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifically state that the pesticide may be used only for the pests specified on the labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesticide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment... [other exceptions not relevant to this question] The act that included the amendment became Public Law 95-396 (PDF), also known as the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, upon being signed into law by President Carter on Sept 30, 1978. A question was raised on the linked question that this exception might have been referring to accidental use against one pest when another was being targeted, however, the following description of the meaning was given in a summary of the bill on the Senate floor when the final version of the bill was being considered for passage: Third, the new definition will permit farmers to use pesticides that are already registered for a crop or site for pests not listed on the labeling. It is rather foolish to tell farmers that they can put a pesticide on a crop for one bug, but that they cannot apply it to the same crop for another bug. Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA), Senate Floor, Sept 18, 1978 (Source: Congressional Record vol. 124 (1978), part 22, page 29760 (Warning: 584 MB PDF)) Senator Talmadge was Chair of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry at the time and so had been heavily involved in crafting the bill. So, allowing the use of a registered pesticide against a pest not mentioned on its label was indeed the expressed intent of Congress in adding this exception to the definition of using a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. As long as the pesticide in question is being applied to a plant, animal, or site specified on the label and the Administrator of the EPA hasn't required the specific pesticide in question to expressly prohibit use against other pests on its label, then intentionally using it against a pest not specified on its label is not a violation of 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G). | I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty. |
In the U.S., what happens to intellectual property that has escheated to a state government? A recent answer to a question here about the legality of publishing a work for which the copyright owner cannot be found mentions If the owner has no legal heirs, in most jurisdictions the property escheats to the government (in the US to the state government). How do U.S. state governments normally deal with such intellectual property whose copyright has escheated to the state? Do they auction it off? Release it as public domain? Something else? I know that U.S. federal government publications are normally released into the public domain, but I'm not sure if that applies to the state governments at all or if it would apply in the case of orphaned works that have escheated to the state. | If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected. | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing. | If the author died in 1946 then copyright in his works expired at the end of 2016. The work is in the public domain. The relevant section of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988 extends to the whole of the United Kingdom, but not Crown Dependencies or colonies. You need to be sure that the work is the author's own work. If someone else has contributed then the copyright endures until it expires 70 years after the death of the last of the authors. The same applies to art. If you want to reproduce artwork, say for a cover/sleeve design, that would also have the artist's copyright, which lasts for 70 years after that person's death. The typography of a book has copyright which lasts for 25 years from publication. | Under Copyright? The first question is: Is this novel still under copyright. This depends on the place and date of publication. In many countries copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author. Some countries use different rules. In the US, a work published before 1978 is in most cases copyrighted for 95 years. Works published after that are protected for 70 years after the death of the author. More complex cases are detailed in this well-known chart. Who holds the Copyright? For most novels, copyright is initially held by the author(s). The author may sell or give away the copyright at any time. If the author does not transfer the copyright during life, it will pass with other property st the author's death. It may pass by will or by default (intestate) inheritance in the absence of a will. The author's surviving spouse children, if any, are often the heirs to any copyrights, but not always. Authors with many works still in print may have s "literary estate" set up to handle their copyrights. Works with multiple co-authors usually have the copyright shared between all authors; in equal shares unless they agree otherwise. Any one copyright holder may license a derivative work such as a translation. A would-be translator of a work still under copyright must find the copyright holder(s) and obtain permission. If the holders cannot be found, no permission can be obtained, and any translation would be an infringement of copyright. The copyright holder could sue for damages after publication. Damages may be quite substantial in some cases. This varies by country and by the facts of the case. In the US The Federal Copyright Office will search its records to try to determine who holds a copyright. They charge a fee for doing so, and success is not guaranteed. Other countries may have similar services. Addition: There is no automatic or guaranteed way to find who now owns a copyright. In some cases the owner does not even know that s/he owns the copyright. If the holder died without heirs the copyright may belong to the government (state government in the US). Research into the author's life may reveal probable heirs. An obituary may list the author's children, if any. Finding them and asking is a reasonable place to start. | You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | Works enter the public domain after ... years from publication. In the United States, this is incorrect for some works and incomplete for the rest. Currently, most works are copyrighted for the life of the author plus 70 years; publication date doesn't affect the copyright term. Works made for hire (such as code written for Google by an employee), anonymous works, and pseudonymous works are copyrighted for 95 years after publication or 120 years after creation, whichever is shorter. |
What gives rise to binding obligations at international law? There are many international agreements, declarations, and norms. Which of these give rise to obligations that are binding on nation states at international law? | Generally: treaties, customary international law, and unilateral declarations can give rise to binding obligations The most well-accepted sources of international law are summarized in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. Sources of obligations are treaties (also called conventions or agreements) and customary international law (see generally, John H. Currie, Public International Law, p. 99-100). A third—unilateral declarations—has also been recognized, but it is less well developed as a source (see Currie at p. 111-117; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 253, p. 266): It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made. Treaties Treaties (also sometimes called "conventions", "charters", "covenants", "protocols", "pacts", "acts", "statutes", or "agreements" (Currie, p. 125)) express the will of the parties to be bound by their terms. The law of treaties is itself largely governed by a treaty: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention describes the ratification process and how treaties come into force. It specifies that treaties are binding upon the parties and that treaties must be performed in good faith. Customary International Law It is also widely recognized that there exists customary international law that creates or reflects binding obligations on states. For something to be customary international law, a rule must satisfy two elements (see Currie, p. 188): general and uniform state practice; and opinio juris (the requirement that states believe that the rule is legally obligatory). See also Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5: [77] There are two requirements for a norm of customary international law to be recognized as such: general but not necessarily universal practice, and opinio juris, namely the belief that such practice amounts to a legal obligation. [citations omitted] [78] To meet the first requirement, the practice must be sufficiently general, widespread, representative and consistent. To meet the second requirement, opinio juris, the practice “must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation”, as “distinguished from mere usage or habit.” [citations omitted] [80] When an international practice develops from being intermittent and voluntary into being widely accepted and believed to be obligatory, it becomes a norm of customary international law. [82] Once a practice becomes a norm of customary international law, by its very nature it “must have equal force for all members of the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favour.” [citations omitted] Jus cogens There are some elements of customary international law that are "non-derogable" (Currie, p. 206; Vienna Convention, art. 53). These are called jus cogens or peremptory norms. These cannot be derogated from even by treaty. See Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5: [83] Within customary international law, there is a subset of norms known as jus cogens, or peremptory norms, which have been “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole . . . from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” This Court acknowledged that “a peremptory norm, or jus cogens norm is a fundamental tenet of international law that is non-derogable.” [citations omitted] Relationship to domestic law Treaties do not change domestic law. States must take actions in good faith towards implementing treaties in their domestic law. This is known as the dualist approach. However, even in countries that take a dualist approach to treaty implementation, the dominant approach to customary international law is that it is directly and automatically incorporated into domestic law (see Nevsun, paras. 86-89, in particular the empirical study of Professors Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg cited at para. 88): [P]erhaps the most striking pattern that emerges from our data is that in virtually all states, CIL [Customary International Law] rules are in principle directly applicable without legislative implementation. . . . [M]ost countries that require treaty implementation do not apply the same rule to international custom, but rather apply it directly. | The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights agrees in Art. 8 that The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure...(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. "Exercised in conformity with the law" does allow some restrictions on striking. In the US, the NLRB sets rules governing legal vs. illegal strikes, for example a strike in the face of a no-strike contract provision, or a strike to compel an employer to fire an employee who doesn't pay union dues when no union-security agreement is in effect. So you would have to look at the labor law of Israel to see what strikes are legal vs. illegal, and that also requires looking at individual union contracts. Theoretically, a nation could enact a law authorizing any one-day strike as a form of political protest, but there is no such law in Israel as far as I can tell (this article introduces the various relevant laws of Israel). The point is that international law on this point requires corresponding national law, as state above. ICCPR does not create a special right to conduct political strikes against a third party. | Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually. | Documents from countries which did not sign (or to be received by non-signatory countries) must be certified by the foreign ministry of the source country (or its equivalent) and then further certified by the foreign ministry of the receiving country, before such documents can be used in legal proceedings. The Wikipedia article says: A state that has not signed the Convention must specify how foreign legal documents can be certified for its use. Two countries may have a special convention on the recognition of each other's public documents, but in practice this is infrequent. Otherwise, the document must be certified by the foreign ministry of the country in which the document originated, and then by the foreign ministry of the government of the state in which the document will be used; one of the certifications will often be performed at an embassy or consulate. In practice this means the document must be certified twice before it can have legal effect in the receiving country. For example, as Canada is not a signatory, Canadian documents for use abroad must be certified by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa or by a Canadian consular official abroad, and subsequently by the relevant government office or consulate of the receiving state. This seems to answer the question rather completely. | should you tell the third party to sign it using the standards of the U.S.? In most cases signing a contract is not subject to country-specific standards. All that matters is that it can be ascertained from the contract who the parties are as well as and their willful, informed formation of that contract. It is more typical for a contract to specify that it is governed by the laws of country X and/or jurisdiction Y. That places on the counterparty(-ies) the burden of ensuring that they know the legal framework that underlies the contract at issue. Lastly, note that a party entering a contract is "by definition" not a third party. At most, a third party might sign a contract in a witness capacity, not than in the capacity that implicates rights and duties pursuant to that contract. | The source of the power of the United States government to do the things that it does are the people themselves. (United States Constitution) The people have decided on three branches of government (judicial, executive, and legislative). The expression of the will of the people through these three branches of government results in the government having authority to enforce laws within the borders of the United States. It is not through any contract, agreement, certificate, registration, or other that you come under the jurisdiction of the United States, but simply by your presence. (There are some limited exceptions for foreign diplomats and tribal sovereignty.) | Under Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution, The Congress shall have power... To declare war but does not say what follows from "declaring war", nor does it say what form such a declaration shall take. This rather long document analyzes the notion of "declaration of war". The primary significance of a "declaration of war" lies in international law, see the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Articles 1 and 2 say: The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war and The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war So if the US were to declare war on Canada, we would need to officially notify the government of Canada of this fact, which we could do because there is a country Canada whose government we can inform. This is not possible with "terrorism", which is not a nation. There were official declarations for the War of 1812, against Mexico, Spain, and WW I, WW II (11 declarations). Since "the South" was not (from the perspective of "the North") a separate country, the United States did not declare war on itself to conduct the Civil War. In fact, since the congressional action authorizing military action against the Algerine Cruisers (the 2nd Barbary War) in 1815, the actions authorized by Congress have not used the word "war" (except in mentioning a specific law, the War Powers Act), except in the aforementioned declared wars. Instead, the resolution described what could be done: it shall be lawful fully to equip, officer, man and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas "Declared war" is a fairly limited genre of use of force, but "being at war" in the broadest sense, is common and can involve concepts and things (terrorism, poverty, drugs). | Here is a substantial collection of interpretive canons; this article discusses rules vs. canons. This article discusses contract interpretation from both the perspectives of drafting and litigating. These are all from the perspective of common law systems. This article (in English) and this chapter (English, paywall) reminds us that French contract law is different, to which I would add this which focuses on the French subjective theory of contracts – starkly distinct from the common law theory. This page (en français) will probably be of most interest to you. The 2016 modification to the civil code added art. 1190 (and other articles) which says Dans le doute, le contrat de gré à gré s'interprète contre le créancier et en faveur du débiteur, et le contrat d'adhésion contre celui qui l'a proposé which is contra proferentem. The Latin name is not officially assigned to this law, and being a new addition to French law, it's too early to tell if it will be so named in French legal practice. |
Evil mother filed missing person report after kicking out adult daughter. Any way to dismiss it? Alright, so my girlfriend and I were planning to move in together sometime next month. We've been in a long distance relationship for over 2 years and have never met in person until now. She was in Oregon and me in California. To make this easier for everyone, I kept advising her to tell her parents in advance so I can meet them beforehand. Unfortunately, they suddenly went berserk and decided to kick her out one random day at 3am after her mother failed to catfish me the night before. She was able to beg for extra time so they let her stay until evening that day. That day, her mother kept yelling and breaking her things (shattered phone as evidence) as well as spilling water on her boxes she had prepared to move out. When she told me about this that morning, I immediately skipped work and went on a 17-ish hour long non-stop road trip to pick her up. She has just turned 18 last month and did not have a job so she would've probably ended up on the streets. She still had her laptop to talk to me so I was able to call her a taxi for a nearby Motel. With the money she had, she was only able to afford up to 2 nights there. Anyway, I got there at 2am and we left to California the next morning. Now we're finding out that her mother tried messaging the phone she broke and accusing me of kidnapping her daughter. We know she's crazy so, for our safety, we refuse to disclose our location but she did take selfies, videos, and even called her over the phone to prove that she's fine. Even then, she filed a missing person report and we're being tracked down. They already found records of places we stayed and visited. What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Can we file chargers to her mother for being so abusive? Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. She's short which makes her look a lot younger than she is. She did bring her Oregon driving permit and birth certificate as proof of her age. Furthermore, I'm part of the DACA program so I fear this may put my work authorization at risk. I really love my fiancee and do not want to be separated from her... | What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her. | Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions. | In California, all parties to a conversation (people being recorded) have to agree to a recording. There are no special rules pertaining to husbands and wives. It is sufficient that the parties are aware that the recording is being made and they continue to talk, knowing that fact. There are exceptions, under Cal. Penal 633.5, in that surreptitious recordings are allowed in order to gather evidence of "extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a violation of Section 653m". To be used as evidence, there are also "predicate rules" to the effect that you have to prove who the voices are from, that the recording hasn't been altered, and that the recording is reliable (e.g., there isn't a mysterious 18 minute gap). | There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office. | She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that. | Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement. | You can't give your landlord a "notice to quit" A "notice to quit" is something a landlord gives to the tenant under s8 or s21. Assuming you want to end the tenancy, you would give them whatever notice is required in accordance with the lease. Why the paranoia? Ending a residential tenancy is routine and would not normally land you anywhere near a court. You give your notice, pay your rent, move out and get your deposit back. Is there something going on that you're not telling us? If so, ask about that thing in a different question. The video would be fine as evidence However, it would only be used if there was a dispute over the service of the notice. While this can happen, its pretty rare and your precautions seem ... elaborate. Your landlord's name and address (and yours) will be a public record forever Courts are public, the names and addresses of the parties are a matter of public record (unless you are children, or sex offenders, or have some other reason the court accepts as to why this shouldn't happen). These records are kept indefinitely. | Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend. |
When does a "range extender" become a "hybrid"? Some companies sell their vehicles as "hybrid" vehicles, in that they take both an electric plug and fossil fuels to make them go. Some are referred to as "Self Charging Hybrids", as they do not have an external electrical connection to charge the battery. Other companies sell their vehicles as "Electric Vehicles" with a "Diesel Range Extender". These take an external electrical connection to charge the battery, as well as diesel to fuel the range extender. For example, when I was looking to purchase a fully electric vehicle recently, the salesperson for one manufacturer literally said to me, verbatim, that their vehicle "is not a hybrid, it's an EV with a range extender." To the layperson, these could arguably seem like the same thing, as ultimately the "Diesel Range Extender" is, in reality, an Internal Combustion Engine. Does the law constrain the way that auto manufacturers can characterize their vehicles and, if so, how? Specific company names excluded to mitigate the risk of slander. | California (technically states that follow California emissions) "Range Extended Battery Electric Vehicle" or "BEVx" means a vehicle powered predominantly by a zero emission energy storage device, able to drive the vehicle for more than 75 all-electric miles, and also equipped with a backup APU, which does not operate until the energy storage device is fully depleted, and meeting requirements in subdivision 1962.2(d)(5)(G). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13 § 1962.2 1962.2(d)(5)(G) requires the vehicle meet TZEV smog-forming emissions standards, including a 15 year/150,000 mile emissions warranty, 10 year battery warranty, and strict evaporative emissions standards. | There is currently no direct limit. First, under the Space Liability Convention, a nation bears responsibility for an object launched from its territory. Accordingly, the Soviet Union was billed for $3M because of the crash of Kosmos 954 in Canada. A thing is not "space junk" initially, so "space junk" is not a thing that is produced in the normal sense (cars and computers are produced). Any restrictions on space debris would therefore have to be either in terms of the number of items a country could launch (there is no provision for such a limit), or requirements regarding what must be done when something becomes "space junk". The existing liability law is a country-to-country liability law, and if a Virgin Moon ship lands on your house or on Russia, neither you nor Russia can sue Virgin Moon. Russia might sue the US, if it was launched from the US. In the case of such a suit, the respondent nation has to have been negligent, and there are no standards for determining negligence. Also, actually proving the origin of a bolt is not trivial, plus, the recourse is via damage caused by the bolt, not the simple fact of there being a bolt. There is some law in the US (SPACE Act of 2015) which addresses private launches (the bill is here). | The US Department of Transportation does not "recognize" fast lanes, or have any limits on highway speed, which are determined by the states. Here is a resource on the various keep-right laws of the states. No state has a "fast lane" that allows speeds greater that the legal limit, nor does any state have a law requiring drivers to drive exactly the posted limit. Every state has some provision regarding slow-moving vehicles, and none frame the matter in terms of fast-moving vehicles. The legal convention is that slow-moving vehicles must be on the right, not the left. Some states have the restriction that you may not drive in the left lane except to pass, for example 625 ILCS 5/11-701(b), (d). You may drive in the left lane in Utah, but you must not impede traffic (which means you must move to the right). The signage depends on the laws of that state, and in all cases reflects laws against too-slow driving, and never approval of too-fast driving. | Yes, in Orange County, CA, in a residential zone or on residentially-developed property, this is a code violation. Specifically you are looking at Title 3, Division 13, Article 1, Sec 3-13-4(11): Sec. 3-13-4. - Prohibited Conduct. Except as provided in section 3-13-6, exemptions, it shall be unlawful for any responsible party having charge or possession of any real property in county territory to:... (11) Keep, store, or maintain upon any premises under his/her control any abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle, or part thereof, except as permitted by Table 3-13-6(c). You may store/work on this vehicle from a building or location that is not visible from the street, but you cannot work on or store the vehicle on the street or driveway. You might also be able to erect a 6' tall opaque fence around the car, provided the fence meets standards. The code making this illegal is a county ordinance for Orange County, CA, which is not applicable to other counties in California (other counties/cities may have their own ordinances). Codes which cover this sort of activity are generally made at the county or city level. They vary dramatically from location to location, and are often different based on the zoning of the property within the county or city. | The law is known to everyone in theory. But as various people are said to have said, In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not. Starting from zero and actually finding out what law is applicable to your circumstances is not a trivial matter. To have an answer you can rely on you need to do the following: Find out what law calls it. Sometimes this is obvious, but not always. Go and find the law in question. Over the last 10 years this has got much easier. It used to mean going to your city library and looking up the relevant law. These days we have Google (other search engines are available). Find any other laws which might have bearing on the matter. This can be a long way from obvious (see below). Find any relevant appeal court cases in which something like your circumstances have arisen, and figure out how they relate to your actual situation. You may find that some of the laws which you read in Stage 3 have been ruled unconstitutional, or that the standard of evidence required to prove or disprove something about it has been set impossibly high, or that the penalties or damages have been set absurdly high or absurdly low. If you are in the US then maybe some of those precedents were set in other circuits, in which case you need to figure out what your local circuit is likely to do about it should the occasion arise. Make a calm, dispassionate decision about what to do about your situation. Many people find this extremely difficult. The answer might be life-changing. Under these circumstances making a good decision is very hard. Just to give you an idea about (3), suppose you are planning on importing something for your business. Here is a list of areas of the law you might fall foul of, off the top of my head and I've probably missed some: Tax. Trade in endangered species. Drug prohibition. Environmental protection. Biosecurity. Health and safety. Consumer protection. And that is just the criminal laws. Theories of civil liability can get really complicated. But OK, lets suppose you figure out the law, but despite your best efforts you find yourself in court (criminal or civil). Now in addition to all the law you find yourself enmeshed in a complicated bureaucratic set of rules, depending on the type of court and where you are (e.g. US rules of civil procedure). At this point you need to learn not just the rules but how to play the game they describe. Think of it like playing chess; learning how the pieces move is only the first step on the long road to becoming a competent chess player. And the legal system is like chess in another way; there are no do-overs if you make the wrong move. (Incidentally, anyone who says "Well lets just get rid of all the complicated rules and laws" is committing the fallacy of Chesterton's Fence. Just because you can't see why the rules are there doesn't mean there isn't a good reason). Or you could just hire a lawyer. | It's important to be absolutely clear on what is being sold. Using English translations may affect the outcome. Assuming "SoleTraderCompA" is an Einzelunternehmen, the sale would be an asset sale. The company isn't sold, because the company is legally identical to person A! Instead, person A makes an extensive list of all assets he's selling (goods, real estate, intellectual property, etcetera). "SoleTraderCompA" might be a trade mark, in which case the trade mark can be sold. Person B can also be an Einzelunternehmen, and as part of its business operations buys aforementioned assets from person A. But in general, any legal entity can buy the assets of person A, including a GmbH or AG. | Maybe You linked to the publication of a patent application, not to a patent. Based solely on looking at the format of the number the answer would be, Yes, unless it eventually became an issued patent. As it happens, it did become issued patent US9066511B2. That would make the answer no. Since the application was filed before you started selling them, the fact that you were selling them in 2017 could not be used to challenge the patent. I say the answer is maybe because the patent has been disputed in court and I do not know if the outcome has left the patent valid. You can look this up at the USPTO Public PAIR. Then you need to search with either the patent number or the publication number. When you get to the record of the history of that application look at the Image File Wrapper tab. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer In France, the Code de la Route (Article R413-15) outlaws the possession of devices that detect or disturb, or are intended to detect or disturb, the operation of devices or systems that record or regulate road traffic, or allow evasion of road traffic offenses. This Article was last amended on 3 January 2012, and it is punishable by a fine of up to €1,500, confiscation of the device, and confiscation of the vehicle. The law is not prescriptive about such devices, and this is likely intentionally so. This Article is technology-agnostic, and would apply to any device with such a purpose. You can therefore assume that all speed radar detectors are illegal. |
Must one give anything but name and DOB to police if they have been witnessed committing an offence by the cop? My understanding is that if there is cause to believe you have committed an offence, however minor, you must provide your name and date of birth to police who require it. They often then ask your place of birth which will have been recorded if you’ve ever previously been arrested, or if indeed you have ever been arrested, to practically aid them in identifying your correct record on their database. My understanding is that one would be within one’s rights to reply no comment to either or both of these two questions, but it may raise the suspicion or annoyance of the cop, creating difficulty for him or her to accurately identify you, in which case they may be slightly more likely to feel it necessary to take you in so as to accurately ascertain your identity as a practical matter. Is this correct? | You don’t have to give your name or DOB unless and until the officer has described the offence they suspect you may have committed However, once this has been done, you must provide your name, your DOB, your address, and what you are up to if asked. See this handy summary from the Mayor of London. If you are arrested, you will be advised that you do not have to talk to the police but that failure to do so will count against you in court. | There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around. | Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant. | Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death. | No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal. | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. | In Massachusetts law it says the following: The term ''police officer'' as used in this section shall mean a police officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself by exhibiting his credentials as such police officer while attempting such arrest. So, showing a badge or ID card or possibly even an official business card would be sufficient under the law. | There are certain situations where the law may require you to provide some information -- particularly when you've been pulled over for a traffic violation -- but it is typically limited to basic identifying information. Beyond that, it is legally advantageous to refuse to answer questions. If you are doing so, though, you should explicitly invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and your Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Invoking the Fifth prevents the police from using your refusal to answer as evidence, and invoking the Sixth requires the police to stop asking you questions. It may, however, be practically disadvantageous to refuse to answer questions, as there are cops who are just looking for a reason to act like a psychopath. |
International standards on prisoners' right to vote Are there any international standards or declarations/conventions on prisoners' right to vote? | The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),1 Article 25, says: Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. The United Nations Human Rights Committee (the monitoring body for the ICCPR) has said: The right to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections must be established by law and may be subject only to reasonable restrictions, such as setting a minimum age limit for the right to vote. States parties must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right, including measures to overcome specific difficulties, such as illiteracy, disability, language barriers, poverty and impediments to freedom of movement. The Committee has taken the position that a blanket ban on prisoner voting is incompatible with article 25. The Supreme Court of Canada has summarized (in a dissent in Sauvé v. Canada, 2002 SCC 68, but the summary is accurate): Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) states that every citizen shall have the “right and the opportunity” to vote “without unreasonable restrictions”: ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in a comment on Art. 25 of the ICCPR, stated that restrictions on the right to vote should be “objective and reasonable” and that “[i]f conviction for an offence is a basis for suspending the right to vote, the period of such suspension should be proportionate to the offence and the sentence”: “General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, General Comment No. 25 (57), Annex V, CCPR/C/21, Rev. 1, Add. 7, August 27, 1996. The UN Human Rights Committee, in its Observation Report on the United States in 2014, reported that the United States was not meeting its obligations under this Article: ...the Committee reiterates its concern about the persistence of state-level felon disenfranchisement laws... The State party should ensure that all states reinstate voting rights to felons who have fully served their sentences ; provide inmates with information about their voting restoration options ; remove or streamline lengthy and cumbersome voting restoration procedures ; as well as review automatic denial of the vote to any imprisoned felon, regardless of the nature of the offence. 1. 173 nations are parties to the ICCPR. It is a treaty and as such is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. | Not legally. Private prisons are operated under a government mandate (typically via a contract with the government). That said, depending on jurisdiction, there are plenty of scenarios where a prisoner is legally permitted to leave a prison. This can include work release programs, work details controlled by the prison, to visit sick or ill relatives, as part of a rehabilitation program (e.g., to attend an education program), etc. How much of these forms of release can be manipulated by a private prison likely varies by jurisdiction. Of course, some of the relevant decision makers may have a preference for keeping the prison owner happy, even if the owner has no direct influence. Mind you, it is probably difficult to get into such a position. I suspect a prison operator would not be sent to their own prison (and would not want to be; prisoners might attack them). Similarly, the government would probably block a jailed felon from taking ownership of their own prison. | International law is always subordinate to domestic law. In the Westphalian world we live in, all power rests with each and every Sovereign nation. International law is a creation of those nations and only has force where the affected nation acquiesces to it. For example, the US and Russia have refused to sign up to the International Criminal Court so that court has no jurisdiction in their territory or over their citizens. North Korea has refused to sign the Berne convention so there is no protection of foreign copyright there. Similarly, a nation, having entered a treaty, can revoke that treaty. There would be consequences but these would be geo-political, not legal. Of course nations can and do behave hypocritically - insisting that others follow the law they ignore. | Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure. | When traveling abroad, how does a nation state know that a couple is married? Usually by accepting the couple's verbal statement. Some countries include a remark in a married person's passport with the name of the person's spouse, which is obviously more likely to be accepted in case of doubt, but not all countries do this. The usual formal proof of a foreign marriage is a certified copy of the foreign marriage certificate with an apostille or similar legalization whereby the foreign ministry of the country where the document was issued (or, in some federal contexts, of a constituent entity) attests to the legitimacy of the official who certified the copy and to the authenticity of the certification. This is a fairly burdensome process that is normally associated with proving family relationships in connection with establishing residence in a foreign country. Nobody is going to expect visitors to have such documents. For a casual or temporary purpose such as hospital visitation rights, the certified copy might be helpful even if it is not legalized. On the other hand, in a country where homosexuality is criminalized, the certificate could be used as evidence against the couple. What laws are in place regarding hospitalization and next of kin? This will be governed by national law. Human rights treaties probably have something to say about it, at least indirectly, but if your spouse is in the hospital that's not going to be of much use. Local law and the hospital's policy will control. What happens to a same-sex couple traveling to a nation that is not amicable to same-sex unions, say India? This is rather too broad, especially as it will depend on the sympathy of the people involved as well as on local law. The outcome could be anywhere from according full spousal visitation rights to the arrest of both spouses followed by conviction, imprisonment or possibly worse, deportation, and a ban on reentering the country. | So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds. | There are circumstances in which countries that are generally recognized to follow the rule of law will extradite in the absence of a treaty. For example, the U.S. generally will not extradite absent a treaty, and there are many countries with which the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty. Regardless, 18 U.S. Code §§ 3181 and 3184 leave the executive with the authority to extradite without regard to the existence of a treaty, persons (other than citizens, nationals or permanent residents of the United States), who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries. U.S. Department of Justice Manual, 9-15.100 - General Principles Related to Obtaining Fugitives from Abroad | 18 U.S. Code § 611 is the relevant law. (a) It shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing a candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, unless— (1) the election is held partly for some other purpose; (2) aliens are authorized to vote for such other purpose under a State constitution or statute or a local ordinance; and (3) voting for such other purpose is conducted independently of voting for a candidate for such Federal offices, in such a manner that an alien has the opportunity to vote for such other purpose, but not an opportunity to vote for a candidate for any one or more of such Federal offices. This is not the most straightforward of law on the books. It says "you can't vote unless..." three things. It has to be locally legal to vote for something other than a federal office, the election has to include something other than voting for federal office, and it cannot be possible to vote for a federal office at the same time. Given that, it is impossible for any alien (even documented) to vote for president. Extant alien-voting laws are no higher than municipality, most being in Maryland. Violation of the law is a crime. Because non-citizens are not allowed to vote in state-wide elections, the theory is that they literally cannot vote, so they will not receive a ballot, which comes from the state. Here are the election laws for Maryland. There isn't a provision for "disqualifying" a vote, instead a person is prevented from voting in the first place if they are successfully challenged, because they can't prove who they are or the person they claim to be is not registered to vote (a non-citizen will never be registered with the state to vote, assuming no fraudulent documentation). Takoma Park non-citizen residents can vote in city elections and they register with the local gov't, not the state. |
Are there any limits on being "overly selective" during Jury Selection? Say Andy the attorney is trying to defend Nathan the Nazi in a criminal court case. During Jury Selection, where potential jurors are vetted, what is stopping Andy from saying that every Nazi-hater is not suitable to be part of the jury? And what is stopping the prosection from saying that anyone who's a Nazi sympathizer is inadmissable? In general terms, are there any limits on an attorney's power to disqualify potential jurors until they find just the right one who is pre-disposed to side with their client? | One limit is that potential jurors cannot be excluded solely on the basis of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019). As summarized in Flowers: Equal justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. Enforcing that constitutional principle, Batson ended the widespread practice in which prosecutors could (and often would) routinely strike all black prospective jurors in cases involving black defendants. By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Batson immediately revolutionized the jury selection process that takes place every day in federal and state criminal courtrooms throughout the United States. The Batson restriction is not merely that one cannot explicitly announce race as the factor by which one is excluding a juror. This will most often not be the kind of evidence available and if that were the rule, the purpose of the rule would easily be defeated. What Batson prohibits is exclusion of a juror "on the basis of race" (whether or not a proxy was the proximate or purported means by which the prosecutor made the decision). See Flowers at p. 18 of the slip opinion: The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons are the actual reasons, or whether the proffered reasons are pretextual and the prosecutor instead exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” | While the right to a jury trial is waiveable, in order to have a bench trial in a federal district court, the court and prosecutor generally must agree. before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had (Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930)) This is codified in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, just because the waiver can be (and generally is) conditioned on governmental consent, some courts have nonetheless allowed the defendant's request for a bench trial despite the lack of consent from the government. See e.g. United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1976) (a trial against multiple defendants that would require considering "approximately 1,000 exhibits," "over a three month period," with some evidence admissible against some defendants while inadmissible against others; and the government did not try to "rebut the inference that substantial prejudice [in a trial by jury] is practically impossible to avoid under these circumstances"). This possibility appears to have been left open by the Supreme Court in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1964): We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. | As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them. | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | When the required number of jurors vote "yes" (or "no", or whatever the question is), then the jury has reached a verdict. There is no provision whereby the presiding juror can re-interpret "yes" as "no". In the case you describe, if a unanimous verdict is required that despite a reasonable inference that the last juror believes the defendant to be guilty, he has voted not guilty so the jury has not reached a verdict. In case the guy in charge decides "In this case no means yes", thus falsely presents a supposed unanimous verdict, there is still an option for juror polling, in which case the not-guilty juror gets a chance to affirm his not guilty vote; though one of the parties has to request jury polling. If during polling the juror's response is not a clear "yes", then it could be more complicated. | The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact. | can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. |
Does copyright no longer apply if one cannot find the owner? Suppose a work was originally published in France (and in French) , in 1940. Suppose the author (Georges Macron) died in 1980. Suppose it was translated into English, and published in English in 1955. and the translator (Francis Farmer) died in 1995. Suppose the original French publisher went out of business in 1963, and there was no single successor company. Suppose the English-language publisher went out of business in 1975, and again there is no single successor company. Suppose that John Reaper has written a new book in English. This new book reproduces many whole pages (say 70) of the 1955 translation, plus 15 full,-page illustration from that edition. John Reaper has approached the publishers of more recent editions of the translation (all of them from before 1990). John has approached the grand children of macron, and the heirs of Farmer (who had no children). He has looked through the records of the copyright offices in France, the UK, and the US, and has written to everyone named in those records as holding copyright in the book or its translation, or as being an agent of any such owner. No one has admitted to holding the rights to the 1955 translation, or to knowing who does hold those rights. Assume that the new book is an expansion and revision of the original book, not a commentary on or analysis of the original, and is not likely to qualify as a fair use of the original. [Note that these details of publication dates and death dates are given to make it clear that the book is still under copyright in various countries, and to make it clear what sort of efforts John has gone to while trying tro secure permission.] Can John Reaper lawfully publish his new book with a note: Pages {numbers} are taken from the 1955 edition of {title} a translation of {french title} by Georges Macron. The holder of copyright in that work could not be found after diligent search. If anyone holds those rights or knows who does, please contact me at {address} and proper arrangements will be made. If John does this, can he be successfully sued for copyright infringement of the 1955 translation or of the 1940 original? John wants to publish in the US, the UK, and France and other EU countries. This is based on comments to Can I print scans of a book's pages in my book? in this stack. | No, John may not lawfully publish such a book in such a way What John wants to do is not lawful. It would infringe on the copyright on both the 1940 original, and on the 1955 translation. Both of those are still in copyright under the laws of France, the UK, and the US. Someone owns those copyrights: some person or business or other entity. If the owner has no legal heirs, in most jurisdictions the property escheats to the government (in the US to the state government). In the case of a company, its assets will be sold or handed over to some entity. But they will not become ownerless, any more than real estate will become ownerless when the owner dies or the owning company is dissolved. It is possible that the owner does not realize that s/he owns these rights. But if John publishes his book, then owner might then realize the rights that s/he holds. The owner could demand payment, or sue for damages. Under US law the damages could include any economic loss that the owner has incurred plus any profits that John or his publisher have made. John and his publisher would both be liable for these damages. As a result, no publisher is likely to be willing to publish John's book. If John self-publishers, he incurs the risk of such demands and suit. In some countries (such as the UK) there are legal procedures fore dealing with such "orphan works". In those countries one can register with a government agency, and obtain permission to use the work after a search has revealed no owner, paying a rate set by law. But there is no such provision in the US. There, John must either not publish, or gamble that no owner will appear and make demands he cannot afford to meet. | According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case). | I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations. | The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work. | This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable. | The exact timing of this story makes a bit of a difference, as you're placing the story right around the time of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which changed the rules for works first published after March 1, 1989. Before then, most copyrightable works were only treated as protected if they included a proper copyright notice, which required the copyright symbol (or "copyright" or "copr."), the year of first publication, and the original copyright owner. So if this happened in February 1989, the lawyer was correct that you needed to include "a proper copyright notice." But he was probably mistaken to think that your rendering was problematic. The copyright symbol required was the same circled C that you mentioned, but the Copyright Office will also recognize a variant on the symbol if it "resembles the © closely enough to indicate clearly that the variant is intended to be the copyright symbol." The office's current guidance makes clear that your variant would be sufficient: Acceptable variants include: The letter c with a parenthesis over the top. The letter c with a parenthesis under the bottom. (c c) (c) The letter c with an unenclosed circle around it. Examples of unacceptable variants on the © symbol include the following: CO C C/O @ (i.e., the letter a in a circle). The letter c with a circle attached to the bottom of the letter. The letter c in a square. [c] The same was true under the guidance that would have been in effect at the time. See section 1005.01(c)(6). If the advice came after March 1, 1989, the notice would not have been strictly necessary, regardless of how you rendered it. | The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation. | The Organization Does Not Own the Copyright As you were clearly not an employee of the organization, and did not have a specific contract with them, this was not a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH). Therefore, the copyright initially belonged to the author, in this case the programmer, that is you. That being so, it would require a written document to transfer the copyright to another during your lifetime. In future there should be a written agreement in such a case, spelling out just what rights are to be retained by whom. It can save lots of trouble. The organization would have an implied license to use the software. The terms of this would be defined by the conduct of the parties, and might be a matter of dispute. Probably there would be a non-exclusive license without any fee or ending date. Probably there would be no license to distribute to others unless you explicitly grant one. Specific US Laws 17 USC 101 defines a WFH: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. (emphasis added) 17 USC 201 provides that: (a) Initial Ownership. — Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire. — In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. ... (d) Transfer of Ownership.— (d) (1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. (d) (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 17 USC 204 provides that: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent. |
How to confirm if I can legally use a pedagogical mnemonic? The field of education uses many mnemonics, such as CUPS, RACE, KWL, the CRAAP test, SQRRR, etc. Most of these were originally created by academics, and introduced in academic journals. Many years ago I attended a college and my professor invented her own mnemonic, similar to those above, outlining the steps to teach a particular type of information. She never published this publicly and instead made this only available in a packet distributed to her students. Though I can't find my copy of this packet anymore, I don't recall any TM or Copyright, but instead a printed warning not to share the information. Unlike the ubiquitous mnemonics which I mentioned above, her mnemonic appears in zero publications, and after 2010 or so, stopped even returning search results; only alumni of her classes heard of this term. I also can no longer find contact information for the professor (in her 80's by now). Addition, she invented many of the words falling within the mnemonics, so not only is the mnemonic very special, the words within are her own invention. Her words don't appear in a dictionary, and there are no synonyms for them in English. I'd like to use her exact terminology in a textbook. How can I confirm that I can legally use this terminology? Do I need to search state databases for copyright? Trademark databases? | A mnemonic like CRAAP is not protected by copyright. The Copyright office says "Copyright does not protect names, titles, slogans, or short phrases", so you do not run afoul of copyright law using that or any other abbreviation. There is a registry of copyright-registered works, maintained by the copyright office, where authors may register their works, but legal protection exists regardless of registering. Some abbreviations are protected under trademark law, which you can search here. There are 50 registrations that include "AAA" and three that are just "AAA", also you'll find WTF and LOL. Trademark protection doesn't forbid all uses of an registered abbreviation. It turns out that "CRAAP" is not a registered trademark, but it could be the registered trademark of a manufacturer of crab traps, so you would not likewise call your crab trap company CRAAP, but it would be okay for plumbing supplies (trademark is relative to business uses, which are described in the registration). The only other imaginable scenario that would impede your plan is a non-disclosure agreement. For that to be relevant, there would have to be a valid contract between you and the teacher which specifically prohibits disclosure of the acronyms. The chances that there is a contract between you and the teacher is so low that it is hardly worth considering, but let's explore that for a moment. A contract is an agreement between parties where each party promises to do something that they are not already obligated to do, in exchange for getting something that they do not already have a right to. You had a contract with the college, not with the teacher. The college clearly would not prohibit "using any information gained in the course of study here", and the courts would not enforce any such "don't use" wording in a contract as unconscionable (why else do you go to college?). Your contract with the college allows you to take classes and use the knowledge that you gain. The teacher's contract with the college requires her to teach some content, and probably allows her to set certain rules of class conduct. She might have been able to toss you out of class for disseminating her methods, but at this point she has no legal recourse. NDA enforcement is generally limited to protecting "trade secrets", which are defined in terms of information with independent economic value deriving from the fact that the information is non-obvious". Also, an NDA will have a time limit associated with it except in the case of highly-sensitive personal information (social security numbers), so the courts will not enforce language saying "you can never make use of this information, or these names". | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | This is very common in all sorts of legal documents, not just the United States Code. Another familiar example where this is seen is on checks. It serves as a sort of "redundancy check", to help catch errors where either the words or the numerals could have been incorrectly transcribed. Of course, one could ask why similar redundancy isn't used to avoid errors in other contexts; there doesn't seem to be a good answer for this besides "tradition". Some people feel the practice is obsolete and should be abandoned, e.g. https://www.butlersnow.com/2020/04/five-5-reasons-to-stop-writing-numbers-like-this/. | Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect. | Why do attorneys have these? Originally to use as references, although some kinds of books (e.g. case law reporters, Shepard's citations, Martindale Hubble directories, and serial analysis of case law like Am. Jur.) are rarely used that way any more. When I started practice in the mid-1990s, it cost several hundred dollars an hour to access online legal sources (that were less comprehensive and had lower quality search functions than the service that comes free with my bar membership today), so the vast majority of legal research was done with hard copy case reporters, digests and annotated statute books. A complete set of case reporters for a single state would typically run to hundreds of volumes with new ones arriving monthly. A full set of Shepard's Citations (which told you if a case have been overturned or questioned in later cases or just where it was cited with approval) took roughly a full shelf of a full sized book case when limited to a single state. Any law firm that is at least fifteen or twenty years old needed them when they bought them and lawyers hate to throw anything away. Case law research is now predominantly online. The last time I used Shepard's citations and hard copy case reporters on a regular basis was a decade ago. Law journal research is also predominantly online now. I sent most of my uglier and numerous law books (including several dozen volumes of an outdated legal encyclopedia summarizing case law) to the recycling bin about six or seven years ago. Do they actually reference them, especially when so much information is searchable and indexed online? Lawyers still routinely use statute books in states where they practice, court rules, standard jury instructions, and to a somewhat lesser extent treatises on different areas of the law (including the Restatements of Law). Now and then, lawyers will still use a hard copy of a West Digest. And, I have yet to encounter a lawyer who doesn't have at least one or two decent sized book cases full of law books. In statutes and court rules (and regulations), typesetting details that can get mangled online are important and browsing a structured text can be easier to do on paper than online. There are some regulations available only in online versions that I print for ease of use (e.g. Colorado's marijuana regulations and its Medicaid regulations). I also print for ease of use my state's title standards (for use in determining if someone has marketable title to real estate), even though they don't have the force of law. I also keep a few hard copy model statutes with the official commentary. It can also be hard on the eyes to look at a computer screen non-stop all day, so looking at something you use regularly on paper can be a relief. Are the books updated regularly? or are these the books they graduated with, and are rarely changed out? Statutes and court rules and jury instructions are typically updated annually, following each year's legislative session. Treatises are updated with "pocket parts" every year, that are added to a hardbound edition that is updated at most, every several years. A pocket part is a softbound update with the same section organization as the underlying treatise that has a flap the fits into a pocket in the back flap of a hard cover treatise. Bigger "pocket parts" are printed as thin softcover bonus volumes to the original treatises. I also keep a current softbound "Bluebook" (the reference regarding how legal materials should be cited to in legal documents and legal scholarship) and several high end dictionaries including Black's Law Dictionary, the OED and a few others in hard copy (because browsing is easier when you don't know exactly how a word is spelled). I keep many of my law school textbooks, which some people do, and other people don't, and I buy new treatises especially when I move into a new area of law practice where background guidance is useful. Do the books exist purely for psychological impressions, or is there a utilitarian purpose? Both. Sometimes old books that don't have much ongoing practical use are kept on the shelves because they are pretty. For example, I don't really need a hard copy of my outdated New York State Statutes, but they look good (even though I practice mostly in Colorado and look up New York State statutes online when I need to actually use them). But, I use hard copy statutes and court rule books for the state where I practice on pretty much a daily basis and use hard copy treatises at least several times a week in my law practice. In that respect, I am not atypical, although I probably use hard copy books more than younger lawyers do. Of course, even among these books, some volumes are used much more often than others. I look at a volume of insurance industry regulation statutes at most, once a year, while I read the volume related to divorce and probate at least once or twice a week, for example. Hard copy books are also useful for pinning down the corners of blueprints and surveys when you are in litigation where those kinds of oversized paper documents are at issue. ;) | Derivative work The Kenku first appeared in Dungeon Magazine 27 in 1991 and appears to be an original work as far as I can tell. It, therefore, enjoys copyright protection until 70 years after the author dies - it seems unlikely that the author died before 1950 so the copyright has probably not expired, AFAIK, the author is, in fact, still alive. Your usage is what is known as a derivative work and making derivative works is one of the rights that copyright grants to the copyright holder. You can't do it without permission unless you have a fair use defence: you don't. If you call your Kenku a duck; it's still a Kenku This is the inverse of the well-known duck test much beloved of philosophers and employment-law judges but equally relevant to copyright-law judges. Changing one (or several or even many) aspects of a copyrighted work is still copyright infringement. You are free to write something inspired by the Kenku but once "it looks like a Kenku, swims like a Kenku, and quacks like a Kenku, then it probably is a Kenku". | Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..." | If you use the reviewer's code, or code derived from it (e.g. if you just changed a variable name) then they own the copyright on that part of the software. If the reviewer describes a solution which you implement, or if you re-implement the code from scratch while taking ideas and methods from the reviewer's code, then you own the copyright on that code. However if there are only a few ways to implement something in code then the code is not creative and hence cannot be copyrighted. For example the regular expression in the question you link to is (as far as I can tell) the only correct solution to the problem: any programmer addressing the problem will have come up with that RE. In this the position is akin to a database of phone numbers: while the collection may be copyright (depending on whether selection or arrangement required creativity), the fact that Alice Jones has the number 012345 is not copyrightable, and neither is the alphabetical arrangement of names. Where it gets messy is the boundary between the two. The requirement to detect 4 or more repeated digits in a credit card number could be implemented in a number of ways, but whether there are enough of these to qualify any particular solution as "creative" would be a matter of fact for a court to decide. |
Does how a court interpret a contract depend on whether it's a layman or expert who wrote the contract? The title sort of says it all, I'm wondering if a contract would be read differently or more literally if written, or signed, by a trained lawyer then if it was done by layman. So let's say that I sign a contract with someone that has an ambiguous statement in it, one where strict reading of the words as written would imply X, but from context, it seems likely that the statement was actually meant to imply Y instead. For now, let's say I am arguing I read the contract as meaning X when I signed it, and the writer of the contract is trying to argue they meant Y. As I understand it whether the contract is read as meaning X or Y is enforceable is dependent on what is the most reasonable reading. If it takes an excessively literal reading to get X, and any sane person would infer Y then Y is what is enforceable. If a sane person would instead likely view X as being the intent, then X is what is enforceable even if Y was what the writer had intended. But what if it's ambiguous which reading is most reasonable, would it matter rather the writer of the contract was a trained lawyer, or a layman like me? Could I argue that a the writer was a lawyer and should know how to write a contract and so they should have understood the literal interpretation of the clause was X and thus has no legal grounds for claiming they meant Y? If instead the writer was another layman, would they be more likely to be able to argue they meant the obvious interpretation Y and that literal reading X was just bad writing of someone who didn't know what they were doing? The same argument could be made in reverse as well, if instead I wrote the contract and had meant literal interpretation X and the signer claims they thought the contract meant 'reasonable' interpretation Y, would the signer being or not being a lawyer affect rather I can claim they should reasonable have believed X was intended? | It doesn't matter. When a contract is left ambiguous the interpretation that is used is the one that is the most favorable to the party that did not draft the contract, under the logic that if the party that did draft the contract chose all the wording and thus, they could have stated their interpretation in the contract just avoided this whole mess in the first place. A similar rule exists in criminal law, where if the law is ambiguous, the interpretation used is the one most favorable to the defendant, since the state could have drafted it in a way that made their interpretation clear. | In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices | The language "I therefore place you on notice that" in your proposed missive is superfluous and adds nothing that is legally relevant. Flourishes like that are common among former paralegals, court clerks, common law country notaries, and other non-lawyers who want to sound legalistic but don't really have the relevant legal knowledge. It is common to say "I put so and so on notice that" in a legal opinion or a summary of a case, but mildly uncommon and not necessary to put those magic words in the notice itself in a situation like this where there is no prescribed statutory language that must be used on a specific legal form. In this situation the important thing is that the person is actually made aware of the situation, not that you conform to a statutory form. Also does it add anything to have stated the effect if they do not do so ("This may be detrimental..."), if the matter proceeds to a court case? If they complain of a lack of an opportunity to inspect in a later court case, it allows you to say, "I told you so and I gave you a chance to do something about it" which might be fairly convincing to a judge and would probably overcome any arguments that you engaged in spoliation of evidence. | This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code. | In practice, common law courts turn to academic writing, either law review articles or legal treatises or the "Restatements of Law", on a regular, but infrequent basis. These sources are not binding sources of legal authority but can shed persuasive light on the logic behind a legal rule or the course of action that has been taken in previous similar cases. In civil law countries (i.e. those not descended from the legal system of England), there are far fewer circumstances in which court precedents are sources of law. Much of the gap in credible sources for how ambiguities in the statutory law should be interpreted in these countries comes from academic writing. In a typical civil law country, a leading law professor has more impact on how the law is interpreted than senior appellate court judges. Again, academic writings are not binding legal authority, but in the absence of alternative sources for material interpreting statutes, they are very persuasive. | In any court, there will be situations where a judge has discretion to make some decision. The judge might have to decide "did X meet the burden of proof", and due to the situation two reasonable and competent judges could come to different conclusions. You couldn't blame either for the decision, even though they would make opposite decisions. On the other hand, a judge might make gross mistakes. The judge might decide "X met the burden of proof" when this is clearly a mistake. That's what the appellate court is interested in. An appellate court checks whether the judge made mistakes that a judge shouldn't make. So in this situation, the appellate court doesn't decide whether X met the burden of proof. The appellate judge decides "did the trial judge make a decision that a trial judge shouldn't have made". An appellate judge might think to himself or herself: "well, I would have decided differently, but this trial judge’s decision was one that a reasonable judge could have made", and if that is what he or she thinks, the original decision will stay intact. | If a contract sometimes uses the wrong name, is it still valid? Yes. It is valid as long as the contract as a whole permits identifying the parties (unequivocally) and ascertaining their role with respect to the contract. Using "Contractor" and "Consultant" interchangeably despite only the former being explicitly defined seems a bit sloppy, but it does not by itself alter or invalidate the meaning of the contract. The excerpt you reproduce is self-explanatory. Its first sentence identifies the parties, and there are only two. Thus, there is no reasonable way to dispute that the second sentence means "Contractor shall indemnify Company", since a clause of the sort "he will indemnify himself" makes no sense. Moreover, the legal definitions of Indemnitor and Indemnitee (Black's Law Dictionary) clearly make reference to "the person" (who protects or is protected, accordingly) and "the other" (that is, not to self). | The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin). |
What is the definition of "Race" used in ICERD? It seems like it's not defined in the convention (International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination). But does race only mean colour in the convention? | Article 1 of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) defines "racial discrimination" to mean "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life." The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination CERD is the observing body for the ICERD and has not seen it necessary to define "race" under this instrument. To the contrary, it has adopted General Recommendations that clarify that the protections apply to particular groups of people without stating which of the listed categories they are best captured by. See this Introductory Note: CERD has adopted General Recommendations to clarify that the ICERD protections in article 1 include groups not explicitly named but who fall within the Convention’s broad criteria, such as women (G.R. 25), indigenous persons (G.R. 23), the Roma (G.R. 27), Dalits (G.R. 29), non-citizens including refugees (G.R. 30), African descendants, particularly those in the diaspora (G.R. 34), Muslims subjected to Islamophobia, and more generally persons whose religious identity has been “racialized,” that is used as a basis for discrimination (G.R. 32). In fact, the use of the term "race" was and is a contested aspect of the convention, as revealed through the travaux préparatoires (Patrick Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2016). The UNESCO report, "The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry," was available to the drafters of the ICERD and it asserted that "[t]here is no evidence for the existence of so-called 'pure' races." Some (e.g. Vieno Voitto Saario) were of the view that "race," "colour," and "ethnic origin" "all meant much the same thing." It continues to be argued that CERD should "repudiate the notion of race." | In the US, it seems not It appears that left-handedness is not considered a disability under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). The "ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual" reads in relevant part: Simple physical characteristics such as the color of one's eyes, hair, or skin; baldness; left-handedness; or age do not constitute physical impairments. Similarly, disadvantages attributable to environmental, cultural, or economic factors are not the type of impairments covered by title III. Moreover, the definition does not include common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper, where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder. This is the most direct statement on the ADA and left-handedness I have been able to find. The actual implementing regulations and the statutory language are not so clear. I have not found any case in which a claim was made under the ADA which cited left-handedness as a disability udner the ADA, either the original act or as amended. Section § 36.105 of the ADA regulations defines disability. It reads, in relevant part: (a) (a) (1) Disability means, with respect to an individual: (a) (1) (i) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (a) (1) (ii) A record of such an impairment; or (a) (1) (iii) Being regarded as having such an impairment as described in paragraph (f) of this section. (a)(2) Rules of construction. (a)(2) (i) The definition of “disability” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ... (b) (b)(1) Physical or mental impairment means: (b)(1)(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (b)(1)(ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability. (b)(2) Physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions such as the following: orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, intellectual disability, emotional illness, dyslexia and other specific learning disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism. (b)(3) Physical or mental impairment does not include homosexuality or bisexuality. (c) (c)(1) Major life activities include, but are not limited to: (c)(1)(i) Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, writing, communicating, interacting with others, and working; and (c)(1)(ii) The operation of a major bodily function, such as the functions of the immune system, special sense organs and skin, normal cell growth, and digestive, genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal, and reproductive systems. The operation of a major bodily function includes the operation of an individual organ within a body system. (c)(2) Rules of construction. (c)(2)(i) In determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the term major shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard. (c)(2)(ii) Whether an activity is a major life activity is not determined by reference to whether it is of central importance to daily life. (d) Substantially limits. (d)(1) Rules of construction. The following rules of construction apply when determining whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a major life activity. (d)(1)(i) The term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. “Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard. (d)(1)(ii) The primary object of attention in cases brought under title III of the ADA should be whether public accommodations have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not the extent to which an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis. (d)(1)(iii) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity does not need to limit other major life activities in order to be considered a substantially limiting impairment. (d)(1)(iv) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. (d)(1)(v) An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this part if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment does not need to prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section. (d)(1)(vi) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment. However, in making this assessment, the term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for substantially limits applied prior to the ADA Amendments Act. (d)(1)(vii) The comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical evidence. Nothing in this paragraph (d)(1) is intended, however, to prohibit or limit the presentation of scientific, medical, or statistical evidence in making such a comparison where appropriate. ... (d)(3) Condition, manner, or duration. (d)(3)(i) At all times taking into account the principles set forth in the rules of construction, in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, it may be useful in appropriate cases to consider, as compared to most people in the general population, the conditions under which the individual performs the major life activity; the manner in which the individual performs the major life activity; or the duration of time it takes the individual to perform the major life activity, or for which the individual can perform the major life activity. (d)(3)(ii) Consideration of facts such as condition, manner, or duration may include, among other things, consideration of the difficulty, effort or time required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; or the way an impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function. In addition, the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, such as negative side effects of medication or burdens associated with following a particular treatment regimen, may be considered when determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. (d)(3)(iii) In determining whether an individual has a disability under the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs of the definition of “disability,” the focus is on how a major life activity is substantially limited, and not on what outcomes an individual can achieve. Also relevant is "Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended" which describes in detail the rule-making process leading to the amended regulations. In "Case of the Big Bus Driver" an article on an ADA employment case, it is said that: It is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural, and economic characteristics that are not impairments. The definition of the term “impairment” does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle tone that are within “normal” range and are not the result of a physiological disorder. | I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; "indemnity" is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage. | Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts. | That’s legal The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, marital status or disability”. Federal law prevents employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national origin, age (40 or older), disability and genetic information (including family medical history). What law school you went to is on neither list. If Harvard’s policies break the rules, that’s not the firm’s issue. However, AFAIK, Harvard is scrupulously fair in their admissions program - so long as you have the grades and the money, they’ll let you in. It’s not Harvard’s fault that most of the people who get the best secondary education and have the most money are predominantly white, Christian, and US born - that’s do to politico-social-historical-economic factors beyond Harvard’s control. | Adding m/w/d in a job posting is not explicitly required by any German law. It is however the established way to implement the requirements of the AGG (~ general equal treatment act) which in turn implements various EU directives. Protected classes under the AGG are race, ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief system, disability, age, and sexual identity. Of these, only gender manifests itself in the German language, making workarounds necessary that indicate that no gender is preferred. Within certain bounds, the German language can use gender-neutral terms, for example a job called “Lehrer/-in” or “Lehrer*in” could also be called “Lehrkraft”. If you are able to use gender-neutral language in English but are still subject to German law, adding “m/f/d” is probably not necessary but still a very sensible idea as it corresponds to German best practices. If you fail to add some explicit note that applicants of all genders are welcome, nothing bad will happen automatically. However, a person with a not-explicitly listed gender may apply for the job, get denied, and then sue with the argument that they were denied because of their gender. The employer would have the obligation to prove that their job postings are non-discriminatory. | Very briefly, holding political views or having political party affiliations simply do not give a person inclusion in a protected group (Wikipedia) when it comes to federal law. Protected classes do include • Race – Civil Rights Act of 1964 • Religion – Civil Rights Act of 1964 • National origin – Civil Rights Act of 1964 • Age (40 and over) – Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 • Sex – Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Civil Rights Act of 1964 • The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interprets 'sex' to include discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity • Pregnancy – Pregnancy Discrimination Act • Citizenship – Immigration Reform and Control Act • Familial status – Civil Rights Act of 1968 Title VIII: Housing cannot discriminate for having children, with an exception for senior housing • Disability status – Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 • Veteran status – Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 and Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act • Genetic information – Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (Many state laws also give certain protected groups special protection against harassment and discrimination.) In the US, political beliefs are one's own to choose and participate in, mostly due to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (Wikipedia): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble... | Businesses can discriminate against their customers on any basis they like provided that such discrimination is not on an illegal basis like race, sex or age. They do not have to serve you if they don't want to. |
What options do I have for recovering unpaid utility bills from a roommate? I rented out a room in my apartment to a roommate for four months. While rent was paid in full (as it was due at the beginning of the month) my former roommate owes their share of one month worth of bills and will likely end up owing two as it doesn't look like they intend to pay. I have not received the bills for July yet as there's a delay of a few weeks for one and a bit less than a month for the other. I have a signed contract in which they agreed to pay, though it was not professionally drafted. I have received payments for two months of utilities in the past, one of which I have an electronic record of (though it was combined with their rent). The problem (though it is strange to classify it as such) is that the debt owed is fairly small - a bit less than $100 currently. It will likely end up being a bit less than $200 if, as seems likely, both sets of bills are left unpaid. While not inconsequential, it's too small a sum to justify the expense and effort of hiring a lawyer and potentially even going to court. What should I do in this situation? I am prepared to accept a well reasoned answer for "nothing". It is still a relatively small loss to me in comparison to the gain of splitting the rent and a couple of the utility bills for those months. Is it pragmatic for me to seek legal advice from a professional, despite the small debt? I don't want to waste anyone's time with a free consulation if I know that there's no realistic chance I will hire them and I don't want to hire someone for $100+ over such a small sum. Is there some other way I can encourage my former roommate to pay without suing or harassing them? | Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed. | The difference is that the person was originally invited to live there, so they do have a claim of residency. A tenant recently allowed someone to move into his apartment as his caregiver. This is the problem here, the person was invited to live in there in exchange for a service. This person now has a legal right to occupy the property and the eviction process must be followed. If the person broke into the house and occupied a room, that is trespassing since there was no original legal right to occupy the property. The trespasser cannot claim any legal right to the property and therefore is trespassing. Can it really be so that he is legally bound to allow these strangers to share his apartment with him because of a technicality that classifies them as "squatters"? Unfortunately yes. This should be a lesson to the tenant that they need to properly run background checks and have solid contracts with live-in caregivers/roommates. Unfortunately this is not only inconvenient, but will probably be an expensive lesson as well. | Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario. | It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service"). | If you have an actual lease under which you reside at your parents' place, they must abide by the terms of that lease – presumably that sets the rent that you pay and states how long the lease is good for, Otherwise, if you're just living there, and have been living there for some time, then the courts may treat you as a month-to-month tenant. That means that they can end the tenancy with 30 days notice. Or, they can initiate an eviction proceeding. The less optimal outcome is that the court may treat you as a house guest, in which case no formal eviction proceeding is necessary. One way or the other, it is illegal to physically give a person the heave-ho from their residence, even if it is a family member. One recourse then is to hire an attorney to persuade your parents of at least that aspect of the law, if it is really in doubt. This gent addresses the matter for parents whose children have moved back home. He also mentions hiring a mediator, which could put the situation on a clearer legal ground. As for psychiatrists, anybody can see a psychiatrist; and anybody is free to hire a lawyer to try to force another person to see a psychiatrist. The prospects of getting a court order to force a child or a parent to see a psychiatrist because they are at loggerheads over some matter is extremely remote. The courts only force psychiatric treatment in extreme cases (e.g. threats of violence, actual delusions). | I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney. | Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause. | Can a landlord legally charge for pet rent even when no pets are present in the apartment? Yes. Absent any indication in the lease that your cats would not move in immediately, the landlord is right. I assume that your lease reflects mutual knowledge of your intent to bring your cats over (via a marked checkbox or in "d) Pet1 Details: ... Pet 2 Details ..."). If so, according to the lease, you officially have pets in the apartment. To avoid being charged unnecessarily, you should have (1) ensured that the contract reflects the intended delay regarding your cats, or (2) asked the landlord to amend the lease once it is imminent that you will bring your pets over. One or multiple administrative reasons justify a landlord to charge pet fees even if there are no pets in the apartment. For instance, the landlord might need to notify his insurer whenever an additional rental unit will host pets, thereby resulting in adjustments to a premium. Likewise, the number of pets might be a factor when a cleaning company bills the landlord. The lease was signed with the impression that the $40 would only be necessary if we brought pets. Hence the relevance of determining whether or not the lease objectively reflects that you notified the landlord of your intention to bring pets and, if so, when it would become effective. If the latter is not specified, it defaults to the start date of the lease. It also sounds like if we never mentioned pets until, say, 6 months in, they would charge us pet rent for the previous 6 months even though the pets were not present. It depends. If the landlord "busted" you, then he could sanction you in accordance with the terms of the lease. Instead, if you subsequently requested an amendment to the lease, then the landlord would only charge you from the date you officially bring the pets. But the effective date needs to be reflected in the lease/amendment. Should I take this to court and get a lawyer? No. First, for the reasons I mentioned above. Second, because lawyers want money, and they will detect right away that there is really not much to recover in a controversy like this one. Third, because complaining about a relatively small amount ($40/month) tells the lawyer that he or she won't get much money from you either (and lawyers want your money). And fourth, because the yearly total of pet fees indicates that the matter would have to be filed in Small Claims Court, where --if I am not wrong-- parties are not allowed to be represented by counsel. Going to court is not "peanuts". Even if your were allowed --and you managed-- to retain a lawyer, you would end up paying so much in attorney fees to someone who might not be forthcoming, let alone diligent. If you no longer plan on bringing pets, just ask the landlord to amend the lease accordingly. |
Suppose I pay by money order, not debit card. If the mechant scams me, will the Post Office refund me? I've had some trouble with merchants sending wrong parts or even ignoring orders in the past. Obviously banks won't fight them tooth and nail for a refund. But if I pay a little more for a money order, maybe the Post Office will take it more seriously. | No, the only purpose of a money order is that it's effectively a form of guaranteed cash that only one person can access. There are no additional protections offered by it. However, given that you are amenable to paying a little extra to facilitate your payments, you may want to consider using a credit card in the future. Provided it's not an all the time thing, credit cards will withhold payments on your behalf if a vendor fails to fulfill their obligations. This means that you're not liable for the cost of the merchant sending you the wrong thing or ignoring your order requests. I've personally done this for several things: Hotel reservation that was borderline unsuitable for human habitation. When a vendor failed to send something I'd purchased. When proceeding with this, bear in mind that the credit card company will want you to make such a claim as soon as possible and to provide as much information as possible to support your claim. If you've e-mail chains, save them. If you've been communicating by phone, write down and provide a summary of your communications. If you have an issue, don't wait a month to raise the concern, do it within a week. Probably about once a year I need to do something like this. Generally what this does is it starts a dispute process whereby the credit company will contact the vendor to get their side of the story (usually they don't respond to them either). After 60 days, the charge is dropped from your bill and presumably the credit card company refuses to pay for the disputed item. Ultimately, this gets you the best possible result. You get your money back and you didn't have to go to court to do it. | With the additional information in the comment, the approach most likely to give you a good outcome would be to present this as a dispute between the retailler and the manufacturer. Make a note of who said what and when, and try to obtain written confirmation from the retailler. It sounds like the retailler is currently on your side, which makes your position stronger as your legal contract is with them and they will have obligations under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (I'm assuming you bought the item as a private individual and not as a business). Note that you may not have a right to replacement. Consumer protection legislation and warranty terms include several ways the supplier can provide redress (usually repair / refund / replace). Since the preference is replacement, you will not be able to argue an inherent design fault with the product. This may give the manufacturer the opportunity to assert that the retailler, or you, specified an incorrect fitting kit - or that it was incorrectly installed. If the fittings were supplied with the foil, you could argue that it was an issue with these that led to total loss of the rest of the foil. It looks like you currently have grounds to claim this against the retailler. If there's no satisfactory resolution, consulting the Citizens Advice bureau would be a good place to start. | Yes, its legal Economically, there is no difference between a cash discount and a card surcharge; legally, there is. That’s because the law prohibits charging more than the advertised price for a given payment method but doesn’t prohibit charging less. Of course, it’s likely there is some illegality here but it’s not against the customer. A business doesn't give a 10% discount to avoid paying a 1-2% fee. They do it because they are not reporting (some of) their cash sales to the tax authorities and are therefore saving the 25% VAT and 18% company tax. | There are vendors providing software to facilitate this sort of task. Avalara is perhaps the best known, but I don't have any experience with it and couldn't say whether it's actually any good or not. But the bottom line is that in a destination-based sourcing regime, sales taxes must be computed based on the address of the destination, not city or ZIP code associated with that address. As Avalara has noted, this is a giant hassle, but it's nonetheless the current state of the law. Of course, this assumes the seller has sufficient nexus with Louisiana to trigger a duty to collect sales taxes in the first place. From the question, it is not clear whether this is true. | Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this. | No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions. | Yes The document is called an invoice and the customer has taken the clothing “on account”. Most businesses of any size outside the retail sector operate this way. Remember that you are effectively lending your customer money. What are the terms of this loan? What are you going to do when/if they don’t pay? You need to deal with this either in your sale contract or a separate credit contract. | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. |
Would it be legal for a business to provide only unisex multi person restrooms for use? Let's say for some reason a business owner decided to make all their restrooms unisex. These are not single-person rooms, but larger restrooms with numerous toilets (and possible urinals). Is there any reason this would not be allowed legally? I know there are requirements for restrooms, but I'm not aware of any requirement that explicitly states there must be separate accommodations for separate sexes. Can an owner provide only unisex multi-person restroom if they so chose? Let's use my home state of Maryland where state law is relevant. | usa No. U.S. Federal Regulations An employer having only unisex, multi-person restrooms is a violation of OSHA regulations. Sex-specific restrooms are required, at least for the employees, unless the restrooms are only single-occupancy. While, as another answer mentions, California has a law authorizing cities in California to require restrooms to be gender-neutral, such laws would be unenforceable as preempted by federal law unless/until the OSHA regulation is changed. (For those not familiar with U.S. regulations, OSHA is the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which regulates workplace safety. Its regulations apply to the entire United States.) 29 CFR 1910.141(c)(1)(i) is the relevant regulation here (emphasis mine): Except as otherwise indicated in this paragraph (c)(1)(i), toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex, shall be provided in all places of employment in accordance with table J-1 of this section. The number of facilities to be provided for each sex shall be based on the number of employees of that sex for whom the facilities are furnished. Where toilet rooms will be occupied by no more than one person at a time, can be locked from the inside, and contain at least one water closet, separate toilet rooms for each sex need not be provided. Where such single-occupancy rooms have more than one toilet facility, only one such facility in each toilet room shall be counted for the purpose of table J-1. There is an explicit exception to the requirement for the restrooms to be sex-specific for single-occupancy restrooms, but there is no exception for restrooms designed to be occupied by multiple people as you've described. This particular regulation applies only to restrooms that are available to employees (as opposed to those exclusively for use of patrons.) Requirements for those exclusively for use of patrons are set by state-level plumbing codes. maryland Maryland Plumbing Codes While the OSHA regulation above does not apply to restrooms for use only by patrons, Maryland's plumbing codes require separate facilities for each sex for those, too, with a few exceptions. Section 403.2 of Maryland's plumbing code (emphasis mine): 403.2 Separate Facilities Where plumbing fixtures are required, separate facilities shall be provided for each sex. Exceptions: Separate facilities shall not be required for dwelling units and sleeping units. Separate facilities shall not be required in structures or tenant spaces with a total occupant load, including both employees and customers, of 15 or fewer. Separate facilities shall not be required in mercantile occupancies in which the maximum occupant load is 100 or fewer. Separate facilities shall not be required in business occupancies in which the maximum occupant load is 25 or fewer. 403.2.1 Family or Assisted-Use Toilet Facilities Serving as Separate Facilities Where a building or tenant space requires a separate toilet facility for each sex and each toilet facility is required to have only one water closet, two family or assisted-use toilet facilities shall be permitted to serve as the required separate facilities. Family or assisted-use toilet facilities shall not be required to be identified for exclusive use by either sex as required by Section 403.4. | Farmer's Market is private property, which means that the owner gets to set the rule according to which you are allowed to enter and remain on their property. There is no fundamental right to be in a business, either under the US Constitution or California's. While you have a constitutional right to put a soapbox on the public sidewalk and denounce or extol whatever you like, there is no such right on another person's property. You also have a right to express racially and sexually abhorrent content on the street. Your right to express your viewpoint ends at the store's doors. The manager has a property right to withdraw the implicit permission to enter and remain that is implicit in running a publicly accessible store. Your constitutional right to say whatever you want has to do with government action,not private action. You have no right to compel individuals to listen to your viewpoint on private property. It is a business decision, well within the rights of the property owner, for him to find your conduct unacceptable and grounds for expulsion. You do have a recourse: shop somewhere that doesn't care what you say to their customers. | With respect to disciplining its students and employees, a private school can basically do whatever it wants. There's more freedom to do so with respect to students than with employees, who have greater protections derived from anti-discrimination laws, collective-bargaining agreements, and the like. If a private school wants to impose a No Burger Tuesdays and a complete ban on political activity, that's probably going to be permissible. The First Amendment will protect the school's right to associate with only those who meet its standards, as absurd as those standards may be. Again, there are exceptions to this rule, like Title IX, which requires equal educational opportunities regardless of sex, but they don't have much bearing on your question. Even for a public school, there will be quite a bit of latitude here, because these rules don't actually regulate off-campus conduct. If a student wants to attend an off-campus public gathering, the campus police aren't going to lock him in his room or arrest him for leaving campus. The rule is simply that if you attend a public gathering off campus, you may not come back on campus afterward to threaten the lives of your classmates. | Section 381.00316 is unconstitutional because it is an unjustifiable content-based restriction on speech, in violation of the First Amendment. The law is unconstitutional because private businesses and their owners have a First Amendment right to demand that their customers engage in speech as a condition of doing business. If you've watched Showtime at the Apollo or America's Got Talent, you understand the concept that a business owner can make decisions -- objectively or subjectively -- about what kinds of speech they want to host. If you want to make it through your performance, it's incumbent on you to satisfy the predilections of the business owner. And this doesn't just apply to TV. If you went to a poetry slam at your local coffee shop, the owners could boot you if talked through the performances, making it difficult for other customers to enjoy the show. Likewise, they could boot you if you went to the mic and started spouting racist nonsense, or if you just stood at the mic and said nothing at all. In the Florida case, Norwegian is doing the same thing -- just not for artistic reasons. Beyond requiring customers to pay for a ticket, it is requiring its customers to communicate the message that they are vaccinated, and they are requiring them to communicate using written documentation. In other words, Norwegian is demanding that customers engage in speech ("I am vaccinated") in a certain way (written proof of vaccination), and that kind of exchange falls within the protections of the First Amendment. That speech is subject to regulation because of its vaccination-related content of that speech, making Section 381.00316 a content-based restriction on speech, which subjects it to strict scrutiny, meaning that the state cannot enforce the law unless it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The state argued that the law furthered compelling governmental interests in protecting medical privacy and preventing discrimination, but the court wasn't buying it: Here, Defendant has presented no evidence to demonstrate that his asserted interests are in response to real problems that Florida residents are actually facing. There is no evidentiary support to show that residents have experienced intrusions on their medical privacy or discrimination because some businesses, including cruise lines, have required COVID-19 vaccination documentation. The legislative record cited by Defendant is bereft of any facts or data underpinning the Statute’s purported purpose. In light of the absence of any appropriate data, reports, or even anecdotal evidence on this issue, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant’s articulated interests are based on a problem that exists in fact. And even if these were compelling interests, the state failed to prove that the law was actually advancing them. Because the law outlawed the exchange of written communication rather than outlawing the vaccination requirements themselves, businesses remained free to demand information about vaccination status (through oral statements, for instance), and to discriminate against who they knew or believed to be unvaccinated. (N.B.: For procedural reasons, they court actually applied intermediate scrutiny, but the law ends up invalid for basically the same reasons.) Section 381.00316 is unconstitutional because it substantially burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The law was also struck down because it intrudes on the federal government's authority to regulate interstate (and international) commerce. When a law is challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, courts ask two questions: (1) Does the state law favor in-state economic interests; and (2) Does the state law's burden on interstate commerce outweigh the legitimate local benefits to the state? A "yes" answer to either will invalidate the law. Here, the court held that the law did not directly favor in-state economic interests, but that the burdens on commerce outweighed the local benefits. Because the law did not meaningfully advance any of the local interests it had invoked (as discussed above), but it did impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce because Norwegian's ships travel to additional ports where proof of vaccination is required: Section 381.00316 will prevent NCLH and other cruise lines from possessing verified information necessary to effectively and efficiently process landing and disembarking at various, preferred domestic and international ports where documentary proof of vaccination is required. This affects not only opportunities for vacation activities like sightseeing, but also responses to mechanical and medical emergencies, or even geopolitical crises. Depriving cruise lines of corroboration of passengers’ vaccination status impedes their ability to prepare and address these eventualities. Either the First Amendment violation or the Commerce Clause violation would have been independently enough to invalidate the statute. Norwegian also argued that the statute was preempted by the CDC's Conditional Sailing Order and related orders, but the court declined to address that argument. | I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply. | It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions. | The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins. | It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law. |
Can someone sign a legally binding contract without giving away their identity? I'm a known sperm donor, donating to women via Artificial insemination who want to have a child but want to know something about the donor or avoid the cost; I also advise many women I'm not donating for. Most women want to get a contract signed saying the donor will have no legal rights after birth. In the USA there is one state that respects these contracts a very small number that don't, and the vast majority have no clear precedence either way. I tell women they are generally better off having a contract just in case it may be respected and so they should probably get one even if it's actual enforceability is unknown; plus there are some indirect benefits of the contract even if it never is used in court. Many potential donors won't sign such contracts, and for good reason. Given the contracts may not work the donors prefer to protect themselves from potential child support by hiding their identity behind untraceable contact information and making it so the recipient, or the government, can't find them to force child support. Thus they really don't want to sign their full legal name on any contract. I don't really like women using those sorts of donors because of risks that are associated with using a donor you can't properly screen, but plenty still do. So the question is rather one can have their cake and eat it to. What's the best way to both ensure that a donor's full identity is not revealed and yet make as clear and explicit as possible that the donor agrees to the full contents of such a contract and want it enforced if someone ever comes hunting them down for paternity and manages to find them? I know in theory just having an e-mail saying "I don't want parental rights" is effectively a contract, but something like that is even less likely to be enforced then a full contract in a state without existing precedent, and it's unlikely to ease the concerns of a recipient. What's the cleanest option to give as much confidence to both sides the contract is agreed to and enforceable even if a donor refuses to give away their full legal name? For instance could the donor sign a contract using his 'donor name', whatever name he uses when advertising themselves as a potential known donor? with the idea being if you have already associated that name to him to show up for child support then you have proven that name is his and thus the signature is binding? I'm not including a specific state since I advise women in states all over the USA. | There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one. | Pursuant to well-established law in the US, the person carrying the fetus (conventionally, the mother) has the right to an abortion. Doing so might be a breach of contract. Some jurisdictions flat out ban surrogacy contracts (Arizona, D.C), perhaps even penalizes (Michigan, NY), or declares void (Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska). In California, surrogacy contracts are legal and enforceable. One possible challenging scenario is that the mother refuses a requested abortion, the other is that one or both of the intended parents seek to block the mother from getting an abortion. The former case in the case of Melissa Cook, where there was an attempt made to reduce the number of pregnancies from three – Cook carried the fetuses to term despite a contrary request from the intended parents (no action was filed to attempt to force an abortion). There has apparently been no attempted case to force a mother to carry a fetus to terms because of a contract (i.e. order for specific enforcement). Under present US law, the woman carrying the fetus has the exclusive right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. No statutes or case law suggest that a surrogacy contract will override that right, and some laws explicitly deny the ability to force a mother to have an abortion (Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-808(2) & (3), Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §160.754(g), Fla. Stat. Ann. §63-213(3)(b)). A mother could be sued for breach of contract if she terminates a pregnancy – the intended parents may have suffered a financial loss from that decision, but that depends on the state. | should you tell the third party to sign it using the standards of the U.S.? In most cases signing a contract is not subject to country-specific standards. All that matters is that it can be ascertained from the contract who the parties are as well as and their willful, informed formation of that contract. It is more typical for a contract to specify that it is governed by the laws of country X and/or jurisdiction Y. That places on the counterparty(-ies) the burden of ensuring that they know the legal framework that underlies the contract at issue. Lastly, note that a party entering a contract is "by definition" not a third party. At most, a third party might sign a contract in a witness capacity, not than in the capacity that implicates rights and duties pursuant to that contract. | Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws. | In the UK, the law applicable to liability for child maintenance does not restrict it to children conceived in 'normal', conventional, or ongoing relationships. A biological parent has specific legal rights, AND a duty of ‘parental responsibility’ to look after the child. Mothers automatically have parental responsibility. A father has parental responsibility if he is married to the child’s mother, or is named on the birth certificate. Unmarried fathers do not have automatic parental responsibility, and neither do step-parents or grandparents. A proven biological father may not have parental responsibility, but will certainly have financial responsibility. In most cases fathers will have parental responsibility or can easily acquire it by way of an agreement or a court order. Unless there are compelling reasons, the courts are unlikely to refuse it. If a DNA test shows that the child is yours, then you are liable for the usual contribution to care at CSA rate of 15% of take home pay. When the baby is born the mother can apply to the CSA for maintenance naming you as the father. You will have a limited time within which to ask for (and pay for) a DNA test if you wish to challenge the issue. The cost is repaid if the child is not yours. Financial liability applies whether or not money has changed hands in return for the sex that led to the child's conception. The issue of casual sex leading to parenthood is a perennial one, and this page is as good as any: Dating site babies (Leiper Gupta Family Lawyers) Also in the UK, if you donate sperm through a Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) licensed clinic, you will not: be the legal parent of any child born have any legal obligation to any child born have any rights over how the child will be brought up be asked to support the child financially be named on the birth certificate If you use an unlicensed clinic to donate sperm, or an informal method, you will be the legal father of any child born from your donation under UK law. Legal rights for egg and sperm donors (UK Government) | The primary question is whether remaining silent would constitute a breech of medical ethics. The pertinent ethical principle is AMA Opinion 2.15 One of the requirements is that the donor be assigned an advocate team whose interest is the donor, not the patient, and these should generally be distinct individuals in order to avoid conflict of interest. Assuming that the donor's team is aware of this fact, they have a duty to disclose it, since it materially affects the donor's willingness to donate the organ. The ethical opinion does not specifically address "patient breaking up with a directed donor", but there is a general obligation to share information, and it would probably be found to be a breach of medical ethics to suppress relevant non-medical information. The ethics of directed donation from live donors is not well-developed. I will mention that Potential donors must be informed that they may withdraw from donation at any time before undergoing the operation and that, should this occur, the health care team is committed to protect the potential donor from pressures to reveal the reasons for withdrawal. If the potential donor withdraws, the health care team should report simply that the individual was unsuitable for donation. From the outset, all involved parties must agree that the reasons why any potential donor does not donate will remain confidential for the potential donor’s protection. In situations of paired, domino, or chain donation withdrawal must still be permitted. Physicians should make special efforts to present a clear and comprehensive description of the commitment being made by the donor and the implications for other parties to the paired donation during the informed consent process. Neither team can tell the patient that the reason the girlfriend withdrew was because they ratted him out (anyhow, we can suppose she said something to him on her own). The hospital knows this fact, and has both a duty to the patient to solve a medical problem but also to the donor to be sure that the consent is informed. The hospital would be suppressing a fact relevant to the donor's willingness to undergo the operation, which is a breach of duty. This fact is not protected by HIPAA, or any other California statute, so does not supersede the obligation to reveal relevant facts. | Signing as a witness binds you to nothing. Do not sign if you do not qualify as a witness (e.g. Time known, occupation) but otherwise go for it. It is unlikely that anyone would check your bona-fifes but if they did a statutory declaration would probably be satisfactory. Remember, the point of witnessing is to show the form was actually signed by the person. | I am a notary public in Vermont and have had to deal with people who had name variations. Readers of Law StackExchange like to citations to reliable sources; I'm not going to do that, just describe my experience. Many states do indeed allow a person to adopt a new name through usage. Government agencies and large commercial agencies don't like that, and they can and do thwart the law by imposing their own administrative procedures. If you don't like their procedures, fine, give a lawyer a $20,000 retainer, have the lawyer sue, and wait three years. And after spending all that money, the court might find that although it isn't a crime for a person to change their name by usage, there is no law requiring the administrative agency to accept it. If you don't have tens of thousands of dollars to waste or years to wait, you have two choices. Get married, and use the marriage license as evidence of your name change. The format of marriage licenses is different in every state, so how well this works depends on the state. The other option is to get a court-ordered name change. |
voiding contract for research paper publishing in a journal Hypothetical scenario: a person Adam wrote a research paper in chemistry. He submitted his paper to a less prestigous online journal that publishes articles and research papers on an online website, but does not print them on a piece of paper. A part of the submission process is a contract in which author of an article gives certain rights to the journal. Say four years after the mentioned journal published Adam's research paper on the journal's website, Adam submited his research paper to a more prestigious journal. question: Can Adam void the contract with the less prestigious journal and submit his research paper to the more prestigious journal for publishing there? | Adam cannot simply void the contract because he has a chance to publish in a more prestigious journal. What he can do depends on the provisions of he contract to which Adam agreed. It is likely, but far from certain, that the agreement permits Adam to cancel it under specified circumstances. If it does, and if those circumstances now apply, Adam can cancel and then submit the paper to the other journal. It is possible that the contract gives he first journal (J1)_ exclusive rights only for a limited period of time. If this is so, and if that time has passed, then Adam may submit the paper to the other journal (J2) without violating the agreement. It is likely, but not certain, that the agreement has provisions permitting the paper to be republished in another journal. If it does, than Adam may republish by complying with those provisions. They will probably include a requirement that the J@ publication include a notice similar to this: This paper was originally published in J1 in the {date} issue. J2 would have to be willing to include such a notice. The agreement between Adam and J1 will specify some things that J1 must do, as well as things that Adam must do. If J1 has failed to carry out a significant part of its obligations, for example if it never published Adam's paper, Adam may be able to rescind the agreement for materiel breach. Exactly what failures on J1's part allow this varies by jurisdiction. Adam would be wise to consult a lawyer before taking this step. Adam may request permission from J1 if none of these situations applies, and J1 may give permission. It would probably insist on a notice like the one mentioned above. But J1 does not have to grant such permission. If none of the situations above apply, and Adam cannot get (or does not ask for) permission from J1, then submitting the paper to J2 would probably violate Adam's agreement with J1. J1 could sue Adam, and perhaps J2 also. If the people running J2 know of this situation, they may well refuse Adam's paper. Adam may be able to write a new paper, based on the same research as his original paper, perhaps with more recent research added. That would not be covered by Adam's agreement with J1, and he could submit that to J2. | It is legal to rewrite a book that is out of copyright, although ethical considerations demand that the original author and source be credited. You need to derive your rewrite from a version that is out of copyright, however, rather than a translation whose incremental innovations due to the transformation arising from the translation is still under copyright. Certainly, the 16th century original would be out of copyright, and in all likelihood, so would many of the later editions, but probably not the one from 1971. | A contract is terminated by performance when all parties have completed their obligations. So, when you have delivered and they have paid and any other obligations incidental to that have been completed (such as the expiry of any warranty or guarantee) then the contract has ended. There are other ways of terminating a contract but they are (hopefully) not relevant here. What you have in your contract is not an end date but a date by which you were obliged to complete one of your obligations. Not delivering by that date is technically a breach of the contract which would entitle the other party to sue. However, there is a mechanism in the contract for varying the date for delivery which you have done and the client has agreed to. Note that there is an implicit term that you will exercise any powers you have under the contract (such as extending the delivery time at your "sole discretion") in good faith - if your client rejected your proposed revision and sued, you would have to demonstrate that the revised date was reasonable in the circumstances. You should not unilaterally materially amend a written document that records a contract - doing so entitles the other party to terminate the contract. | Issues considered Based on the papers you cite, it seems like its not even straightforward in U.S. law. They discuss three main legal questions that are obstacles to implementing an open-access policy: Is there a "teacher exception" to work for hire, giving researchers initial copyright over their papers? Does a non-exclusive partial rights transfer survive a subsequent exclusive copyright transfer? Is a university policy a sufficient legal instrument to achieve the non-exclusive rights transfer in question (2)? Turns out, this scenario is specific enough that it really matters which jurisdiction is being considered. I took this question as an opportunity to research the copyright regimes of France, Germany and Japan (translations of their respective copyright acts linked). Japanese copyright law is fairly similar to U.S. copyright law in terms of rights transfer, so I will mainly be analyzing the first two (that and I have no competence in Japanese). I am not in any position to be writing papers over this subject, but in considering questions (2) and (3) with a civil law context, I'll cover some laws on governing rights transfers. I'm not considering question (1) because if the university holds original copyright, then it is trivial for them to implement an open-access policy. I thus assume the faculty members hold original copyright for this answer (which is generally the case in France and Germany anyways). Author's rights basics Author's rights are separated into two branches: moral rights and economic rights. Moral rights are generally non-transferable. Often they cannot be waived and last for eternity. Economic rights are those which can be transferred and exploited, but as you note these may also be subject to restrictions. For the rest of this answer, I will be avoiding the term "copyright" as it is ambiguous: It can mean just the economic rights (like in the translated Japanese), or author's right as a whole (like in the translated German and French). Note: Links from this point on are in French (English resources weren't sufficient). Survival of non-exclusive rights transfers In Germany, this is a straightforward affirmative: Section 33 states: Exclusive and non-exclusive rights of use shall remain effective with respect to rights of use granted later. [...] In France, an answer to this question is elusive. This isn't too surprising as French statute hardly references non-exclusive licences. As an example, it took until 2007 for the GPL to be recognized in court. Given that the courts have been leaning towards giving weight to open licenses, my assumption is that they would follow the common-sense approach taken by German law though I've not found any direct statement to that effect. Implementing an open-access university policy From an author's right perspective, the biggest issue I see in drafting such a policy is that by default the authors give the university a non-exclusive right of distribution for future articles. France has particularly strong protections for future works. L131-1 states: Total transfer of future works shall be null and void. Though it may look as if this can be easily avoided by adding a few simple small clauses, jurisprudence has been to interpret this in favour of the author when possible. For further information, see here. While I'm of the opinion the scope of the policy would be narrow enough to avoid the reach of L131-1, there are additional restrictions on publication contracts. Noting that giving the university non-exclusive distribution rights will likely make the university a "publisher" in the eyes of the law, L132-4 states that: A clause by which the author undertakes to afford a right of preference to a publisher for the publication of his future works of clearly specified kinds shall be lawful. Such right shall be limited, for each kind of work, to five new works as from the day of signature of the publishing contract concluded for the first work or to works produced by the author within a period of five years from that same date. This makes it difficult to have a blanket open-access policy. I'm not certain whether an opt-out clause would be enough to avoid the above restriction. Additionally, France has the moral right of retraction allowing the author to withdraw granted rights of use under strict conditions (L121-4). French moral rights can't be waived so it's futile to account for it in a policy, but it's something to be aware of when implementing an open-access system. In Germany, while there are some protections for future unknown types of use, the scope is fairly well defined here. This puts the situation squarely under Section 40: (1) A contract in which the author undertakes to grant rights of use in future works which are not specified in any way or are only referred to by type shall be made in writing. The contract may be terminated by either party after a period of five years following its conclusion. The term of notice shall be six months, unless a shorter term is agreed. I therefore don't see an issue with this in Germany provided that the policy is specifically agreed to and is renewed with faculty at least every 5 years. Legislated open-access Whether or not the university implements a lawful open-access policy (which is challenging in France...), the author has another available option. Both Germany (Section 38(4)) and France (L533-4 I. of the Research Code) have legislated a limited form of open-access that the author has a right to. While the laws are slightly different, they boil down to the following: After publication in a journal, the author may publish the article in an open-access manner after an embargo period of at most 12 months notwithstanding any exclusive rights transfer to a publisher, provided that the research was at least half funded by public funds. | The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal). | I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. |
Is there any recourse if a defendant was found guilty due to an unknowingly false claim made by a juror during deliberations swaying jurors? I know that often a potential juror who is a lawyer, or anyone with direct expertise relevant to a case, will be removed by one side or the other. However, this doesn't always happen, if for example all the peremptory challenges were used up on other more worrying individuals. So let's say juror Bob is someone whose profession is directly related to a major topic in a trial. Both the defendant and the prosecutor had expert witnesses making opposite claims about the evidence, and both claims were complicated enough that the average juror is going to have difficulty judging which one is correct. Still, all the other evidence would seem to suggest the defendant was innocent and the jury seems ready to say that when in steps Bob. Bob declares the expert witness for the defendant was clearly wrong because of some reason X, and given that fact they should trust he prosecution's witness that the evidence was damning. The jury figures Bob should qualify as an expert witness, one that's theoretically unbiased and safe to use as a tie breaker. Thus given Bob's insistence that the defendants argument was fallacious the others are convinced to find him guilty. Only once Bob heads home he does some quick research and realizes he had misremembered subject X and his argument was therefor wrong. The defendant's expert witness's argument was sound and Bob now believes not only was he wrong but that the defendant was innocent; yet largely due to Bob the man was found guilty. Bob wants to make amends and contacts the lawyer for the defendant to explain what happened. Does the defendant have any recourse in this case? Or did one person's bad memory doom an innocent man? | canada What should have happened Jurors will be instructed along the following lines (Model Jury Instructions, 8.4 - Outside Information): The only information that you may consider is the evidence that has been put before you in the courtroom. You must disregard completely any information from radio, television, or newspaper accounts, Internet sources, Twitter, Facebook, or any other social media, that you have heard, seen or read about in respect of this case, or about any of the persons or places involved or mentioned in it. Any other information about the case from outside the courtroom, is not evidence. They will also be instructed about reasonable doubt in relation to expert evidence: The issue on which these experts... differ is an essential element that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Before you accept the opinion of the Crown’s expert on this issue you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that s/he is correct. If you are not sure that s/he is correct, then the Crown has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that essential element of the offence charged. Given that the jurors were waffling, they would have had reasonable doubt and should have acquitted. Regardless, once a jury verdict is rendered, it is not possible for the trial judge to alter the verdict except where the judge learns that the jury did not render the verdict it intended (R. v. Burke, 2002 SCC 55). Even a judge learning of potential juror bias does not have the power to declare a mistrial after the verdict is rendered: R. v. Halcrow, 2008 ABCA 319. There are very narrow grounds to appeal a verdict based on a problem with what the jury did There may be very limited opportunities on appeal: if one can show a reasonable apprehension of bias based on evidence that does not include matters intrinsic to the jury room (e.g. R. v. Mehl, 2021 BCCA 264) if the verdict was unreasonable in the sense that it was a verdict that no jury, properly instructed and acting judicially, could reasonably return—this is the standard referred to in ohwilleke's answer (in the circumstances you've described, it seemed that there was evidence in the record that the jury could have been convinced by, so your scenario does not seem to meet this high standard for an unreasonable verdict) Jury-secrecy rules prohibit matters internal to the jury from ever being introduced as evidence Above all of this are the statutory and common-law jury secrecy rules. The rule in Canada is this (from R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer, 2001 SCC 42): statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced and votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations are inadmissible in any legal proceedings. In particular, jurors may not testify about the effect of anything on their or other jurors’ minds, emotions or ultimate decision. On the other hand, the common law rule does not render inadmissible evidence of facts, statements or events extrinsic to the deliberation process, whether originating from a juror or from a third party, that may have tainted the verdict. The dividing line between intrinsic matters protected by the jury secrecy rules and extrinsic matters that might be able to be revealed is not always clear, but the evidence you've described seems to be an intrinsic matter: [61] Jurors are expected to bring to their task their entire life’s experiences. It is on the basis of what they know about human behaviour, knowledge that they have obviously acquired outside the courtroom, that they are requested to assess credibility and to draw inferences from proven facts. Even though not the object of evidence tendered in the trial, an opinion, a piece of general information, or even some specialized knowledge that a juror may reveal in the course of the deliberations, is not an extrinsic matter. Typically, such information would not be the object of evidence tendered at trial. It would be viewed as either irrelevant, too remote, or as attempting to usurp the functions of the jury. On the other hand, if a juror, or a third party, conveys to the jury information that bears directly on the case at hand that was not admitted at trial, by reason of an oversight or a strategic decision by counsel or, worse yet, by operation of an exclusionary rule of admissibility, then it is truly a matter “extrinsic” to the deliberation process and the fact that it was introduced into that process may be revealed. [62] The line between matters of general knowledge and information that bears directly on the case may not always be evident. For example, if a juror shares with his fellow jurors his detailed familiarity with the location where the crime was alleged to have been committed, this may be viewed as an intrinsic matter protected by the secrecy rule. If the same juror, however, went on a visit to the site, took photographs and brought them back to the jury room to support his interpretation of the facts at issue, this may be extrinsic, outside information that falls outside the secrecy rule. | To what standard does the evidence need to be convincing so that the judge is satisfied that a jury could “reasonably convict” the defendant? The High Court expanded on the answer to this question in Mitchell, the decision you cited, at [32]: [In R v Kim [2010] NZCA 106] the Court of Appeal discussed the meaning of “insufficient to justify a trial” in the context of sufficiency of evidence: It is for the jury to determine whether the evidence is, or is not, sufficient to establish guilt. It is not for the Judge to predict what the jury will find. The test is whether the evidence, if accepted by the jury, is sufficient in law to prove the essential elements of the charge to the required standard. If so, the Judge should leave the case to the jury and not withdraw it on evidentiary grounds. Can circumstantial/cumulative evidence be sufficient? In 2015, Dr Chris Gallavin, Dean of Law at Canterbury University, wrote: Circumstantial evidence is the bedrock of inferential reasoning. As advocates, we are well aware that a case is not “weak” by virtue of it being based upon circumstantial evidence alone (a common misconception). Circumstantial evidence will often form the base of a strong case, again, in both the criminal and civil jurisdiction alike. Does this evidence meet the standard asked about above? Unfortunately this question is not allowed, because the rules state: Please don't ask questions seeking legal advice on a specific matter. These are off-topic for Law Stack Exchange. While users generally contribute answers in good faith, the answers are not legal advice, and contributors here are not your lawyer. The test of “insufficient to justify a trial” is somewhat Delphic because it calls for an evaluative judgment. That judgment can only be formed by a court with relevant jurisdiction. | How would jury selection work for a trial of Donald Trump? Just like it does for everybody else - using the rules for criminal procedure in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, in New York, each juror must be fair and unbiased: A juror who cannot provide unequivocal assurance or whose credibility about the assurance is in doubt would properly be excused for cause. Jurors (like judges) are not blank slates; they have opinions about all sorts of things. That doesn't matter. What matters is if they can set those opinions aside and make a decision based only on the evidence. It is not necessary for juror's minds to be empty, just that they be open. | The title question is overly-ambitious: it is not guaranteed, and nobody thinks that it is. The law does what is practical to achieve the desired result. Actual failure one way or the other is mostly irrelevant until a clear pattern to the failure is found, then there might be a legal resolution, but it might also require a political resolution. One consideration is whether it is possible for a defendant to receive a fair trial in a certain jurisdiction. Generally, you are tried in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred, sometimes (rarely) the venue can be changed to a more neutral location. This consideration is significant in high-profile cases. For example, the trials of Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad took place relatively far away from the scene of the crime. The trial judge must weigh the arguments for an inconvenient trial location, and in this trial the judge refused a petition for a change of venue. The judge stated that "As far as change of venue, I do not think that that would give the defendant any kind of a fair trial beyond what we are doing here today. I don’t think there’s any place in the state of Minnesota that has not been subjected to extreme amounts of publicity on this case" A second layer of protection is that prospective jurors may be excused. If a juror declares in advance (during voir dire or elsewhere) that the defendant is guilty, they will be excused for cause. The defense (or prosecution) also has some number of peremptory challenges – in this case, the defense has 5 and the prosecution has 3. In this category, a seated juror can be excused for cause (this happened), when a juror admits that some news e.g. about the city's settlement had prejudiced the juror. Also related to juror selection is that juror must swear to follow the law in reaching a decision. The third layer of protection is limiting testimony, for instance if the prosecution were to ask a witness something like "Won't there be major riots if Chauvin isn't convicted?", the defense would presumably object and prevent such testimony from getting uttered in the first place, or getting officially stricken if it somehow gets out. The fourth layer of protection is that jurors are meticulously instructed as to the logic of decision-making. If you can find a copy, there are here (MN does not make the instructions freely publicly available). Here are the California instructions. Additionally, a judge might attempt to limit what can be said by the media, or might sequester the jury so that they cannot hear any such publicity during the trial (but that's impossible for pre-trial publicity). Another layer is that a mistrial can be declared. However, what goes on in the jury room is in a black box that the legal system cannot generally touch. If a juror was paid off, that could be touched by the legal system, but there is nothing that can be done if it turns out that a juror has a bias in favor of the prosecution, despite the premise of neutrality. Finally, if the facts are so clear, a judge might overturn a conviction on the grounds that a reasonable jury could not reach that conclusion, based on the facts and the law. By "final" I ignore the possibility of an appeal. | Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints. | This is a great question because it's a useful vehicle for understanding a cross-cutting principle of law: baselines and exceptions. I find that thinking of law as a system of baseline rules and exceptions to these rules is a great way to organize and make sense of the mess that is 'the law.' A police officer testifying about what you told them, whether it helps you or hurts you, is hearsay. So, as you correctly pointed out, the baseline assumption is that that testimony can't come in. But, the hearsay rule is famous for having a ton of exceptions to it. Two relevant exceptions here are: (1) statements against interest, and (2) prior inconsistent statements. If what you told the police officer was a direct admission of liability, or a statement that contradicts the theory of the case that you're presenting to the jury, either or both of these exceptions are going to kick in and make that hearsay admissible. These exceptions are not going to kick in, however, for hearsay statements that help you. A humorous, but related, aside, is that there's some jurisdictional differences in how far the 'statements against interest' exception goes. In some jurisdictions it only applies to admissions of liability, but in other jurisdictions it also applies to simply embarrassing statements. My evidence professor illustrated this by, out of the blue, mind you, saying, in class, "I stopped wetting the bed when I got to college," and then explaining that in the latter type of jurisdiction, that statement would be admissible. He then paused after the class had finally stopped laughing and said "that's not true, by the way...I stopped in high school." | The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. |
What is the origin of trials by jury? What is the origin of trials by jury? Were juries used in Old Testament, Greek, Roman, or Inquisition trials? | The modern jury trial in common law countries (i.e. those with legal systems based upon those of English law) derives from 12th century English practice as it evolved over time in England, and is frozen in time to some extent in U.S. practice, by the nature of the jury trial as an institution at the time that it became a constitutional right in the United States in 1789. The English jury system emerged in the 12th century in the wake of the Norman conquest of 1066 CE, and codified Norman customary law, particularly among its soldiers in courts-martial and had some resemblance to modern courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the United States military such as the notion that you could be judge's only by your peers in rank or your superiors, although it subsequently evolved in English civil practice. (England also developed in parallel non-jury courts of equity as a division of the tax collection department in England, a set of courts that were merged with courts of law in most places in the U.S. in the 19th century, the remains a distinctive source of U.S. jurisprudence in matters which are decided solely by judges. This short summary also ignores features like the coroners' juries and grand juries of English derived practice.) The civil jury is now almost extinct in England itself, and in most common law countries other than the U.S., except for a handful of kinds of cases (e.g. defamation, civil fraud, false imprisonment, and eminent domain cases), and in serious criminal cases. Other cases in England are now handled in the first instance by a single judge at the trial court level in most cases. Outside the common law countries, first instance trials in serious cases are usually conducted by a panel of three or five judges, with a lead judge presiding over the conduct of the matter. Most jury-like systems outside of common law countries are limited to serious criminal matters, and often involve a hybrid of judges and specially selected citizens with exceptional ("blue ribbon") qualifications who deliberate together with the judges. These systems were mostly adopted after World War II in imitation of U.S. and English practice, but some as early as the 15th century in Europe. The Continental European practices described in an answer by @Geremia, and likewise Greek direct democracy based trial and Sumerian trials come from a tradition that was abandoned no later than the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe as civil codes on the model of the French and German civil codes were adopted, and often much earlier. These practices are not ancestral to the current practice of jury trials in modern legal systems. Juries were not described as a means of adjudication in the Bible. In the ancient democratic Greek city-states, some city-states had direct democracy of landed males citizens and those citizens met collectively in town meeting style to address both legislative and judicial matters. The governance practice of Caribbean pirates, or some isolated bands and tribes, of small early New England Puritan communities, and of small revolutionary military units, have some similarities to this kind of practice, all of which were small communities organized on a principle of direct democracy and which arose more or less independently of each other. Mostly, in the Roman Empire, judges or regulated private arbitrators resolved the matters that were vested in civil and criminal juries today in places that still have them. Some serious matters at times in Rome were decided by quasi-juries in a Greek town meeting like format with hundreds of jurors in a stadium or amphitheater. But this was never a routine means by which justice was metted out. Inquisitorial trials were a subset of canon law, and canon law is generally carried out by deputized clergy, in a process that was more written than oral, and in that involved active investigation by the judges rather than passive consideration of adversary presented evidence (giving rise to the modern inquisitorial judicial systems common in Continental Europe, Latin America, and much of Asia (where Maoist or Islamic legal systems are not primarily influences). In Medieval Times, the predominant practice was for decisions to be made by the ranking local feudal lord, or his delegate, and the role of the delegate of a feudal lord is directly ancestral to that of the common law legal system's judges, which is one of the reasons that common law judges have powers such as contempt of court, and immunities from liability not available to judges elsewhere. Select institutions in the Holy Roman Empire and what is now Germany in the 15th to 19th centuries appear to have been devised in imitation of the English jury system. | Carl may not do this, as he would be prohibited from making this argument at trial. At trial, evidence must be relevant, meaning that it makes a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Because the trial is meant to determine whether Carl is or is not guilty, his promises of future philanthropy have no bearing on the matter. And even if they somehow did, Carl still would not be able to tell the jury about them because they would be blocked under Rule 403, which excludes evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by its risk of biasing or confusing the jury. If Carl attempts to make these statements anyway, he risks a mistrial, which means he has to start over with with a new jury. In some jurisdictions, Carl may, however, be permitted to make this argument during the sentencing phase, where the court can properly consider the societal effects of whatever punishment it imposes. At this point, though, it's obviously a little late for Carl, as it presumes he has been convicted. | Why should they? If a person is accused of a crime, say murder, why should more evidence be needed to convict them if they are a high ranking government official than if they are just an ordinary person? Why should their trial be conducted differently? If convicted, why should their punishment be different? Yes, you can run societies that way and people have and do but it isn’t very fair is it? Equality before the law does not imply any other sort of equality People high up in the government have more power and authority than others but if they are alleged to have broken the law they are treated the same as anybody else. | Short answer, yes, jurors will typically render a decision of guilt vs. innocence. This is pretty common in nations where the legal system is derived from British Common Law (about 2 billion people world wide live in a Common Law nation). The U.S. is unique in that it uses juries for Civil Trials as well as Criminal Trials. The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution in which the 6th amendment guarantees the right to trial by impartial jury (contrary to popular opinion, it is not a jury of peers, as this alludes to the Peerage systems, which the U.S. never adopted). That line is from the Magna Carta which was influential in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. A jury usually consists of a panel of 12 people pulled from the locality of the crime, unless a change of venue has been granted because the alleged crime is so well known an impartial jury cannot be seated from the population. The jury will hear all the evidence from both sides, as well as opening and closing arguments. They will be provided "jury instructions" by the judge and must find if the evidence presented (The Facts) meet the criteria for a conviction of a charged crime (The Law). In all Jury Trials, a Jury fills the role of "Trier of Fact" while the Judge fills the role of "Trier of Law." While the judge has the education background to understand what the law says constitutes a crime and how to find that law as well as how to make sure the defense and plaintiff/prosecution make fair arguments, any random group of 12 people can understand facts and put together whose story they believe, the defense's or the prosecution's. In the case of an innocent person being convicted due to inept defense, this does happen and is horrible, but there are recourses in the form of appeals courts, which can overturn a trial and order that a new one be held (a mistrial, essentially, the original trial never happened and the person is legally innocent. Try again and do it proper this time.) Ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid grounds for appeal of a conviction and does happen. In the other scenario, an inept prosecution, this does happen as well and it's not the fault of the jury that the guilty person went free, but for the prosecution. The prosecutor is at a disadvantage in every criminal case to balance out the fact that their office has more resources to bring to bear then most defendants. Among these handicaps is that their "story" about what happened must not have any "plot holes" in it (beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard of proof) and that the prosecution has to convince 12 people that their story is the only way this could happen (try convincing 12 random people to agree to anything more complicated than "the sky is blue and grass is green") and they only have one shot to do it (Double Jeopardy essentially bars the prosecutor's office from initiating the appeals process... and blocks someone who is declared innocent from doing it because why the hell would you want to?!). Here, the problem is that the Prosecutor doesn't have to charge the accused right away and has a bit of generous time to investigate (depends on statute of limitations on particular crimes) ... but the right to a speedy trial means that once charges are filed, the clock starts on how long the prosecution has to bring the case. Delay to long and the judge will give a directed verdict that the person is innocent because the prosecution wasn't ready. The importance of this fact that is a staple belief of Common Law is in the "Blackstone Ratio" which states: Better that 10 guilty people go free than a single innocent person suffers So the jury finding the prosecution inept is certainly the prosecutor's problem, not the jury's problem. It's a feature not a bug. If an innocent person does suffer, then we have a bug and we must see that it is corrected. As a final note, the jury also has the power of Jury Nullification of the Law. In the U.S. it's not really certain if Jury Nullification invalidates the law completely but in effect, it allows the Jury to declare a person innocent because, while they believe the prosecution's story that the defendant did what they were accused of, they don't believe this person should be convicted because they believe the crime they're accused of should have never been a crime in the first place. | Jurors don't have a "right" to jury nullification per-se. The "right" of jury nullification is really just a logical consequence of other rights that the jury and the defendant have The American jury draws its power of nullification from its right to render a general verdict in criminal trials, the inability of criminal courts to direct a verdict no matter how strong the evidence, the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits the appeal of an acquittal,[2] and the fact that jurors can never be punished for the verdict they return. In fact, the court doesn't want juries to nullify, because that undermines the rule of law, and they might penalize lawyers tho try to argue for nullification The 1895 decision in Sparf v. U.S.,[24] written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5-4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.[25] Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jury_nullification_in_the_United_States As far as how would juror's know about jury nullification, they could have read about the process before being selected for jury duty. Some Juries might also rule contrary to their instructions without actually having heard about jury nullification because they have some sort of sympathy with the defendant. | The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error. | You will most likely be instructed to not share or even use your own translation of the testimony. In California, the instruction on translations is: Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff). In People v. Cabrera 230 Cal.App.3d 300, it was ruled that supplying a competing translation is juror misconduct, see also People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907 (it is misconduct for a juror to inject expertise into the deliberations, referring to the fact that a juror "informed the jury ... [that he had a] background in law enforcement, and that the lack of evidence did not mean the defendant has no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age." Florida has a similar instruction: The evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although some of you may know (language used), it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the English [interpretation] [translation]. You must disregard any different meaning. If, however, during the testimony there is a question as to the accuracy of the English interpretation, you should bring this matter to my attention immediately by raising your hand. You should not ask your question or make any comment about the interpretation in the presence of the other jurors, or otherwise share your question or concern with any of them. I will take steps to see if your question can be answered and any discrepancy resolved. If, however, after such efforts a discrepancy remains, I emphasize that you must rely only upon the official English interpretation as provided by the court interpreter and disregard any other contrary interpretation. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare |
How do you get legal advice on a question from a lawyer? It's common to respond to requests for specific legal advice on this site with something along the lines of "you need to hire a lawyer." I've said it myself. However, I'm not exactly sure what it involves. If I just want to know whether or not something is legal, or have some other question to ask a lawyer (not a case that will require continuing work; just a question), how exactly do I hire a lawyer? Do I do it in person at the lawyer's office? Do I call? Do I do something online? How much should I expect to pay? | Normally, you call, briefly discuss what you want, and schedule a meeting for paid consultation. The charge for a one hour consultation would vary greatly but would typically be $100-$500. You may need to sign a fee agreement and provide a retainer for the fees to be paid in advance, but different lawyers have different policies. | Barristers are advocates, and their other roles fall out of that core role. I think of it this way: your solicitor takes care of your legal risk; your barrister is the 'big gun' you bring in for specific important legal advice and to represent you in person. I'll give you my experience from the perspective of working in a large government agency. For us, 'barrister' often equates to 'Queen's Counsel' (now called 'Senior Counsel'), which is a particularly senior barrister. I am also speaking from Australia. We have the same split profession as the UK, but there are probably differences. You generally don't stop using a solicitor and start using a barrister. Rather, you have a solicitor the whole way through and then you engage a barrister through your solicitor. You can engage a barrister directly, e.g. if you have in-house counsel, but it is not common to do so. Even if you have in-house counsel, you will usually engage more specialised external solicitors to handle litigation. The barrister's role is generally to (1) provide advice on specific issues (after the solicitors have sifted the evidence and provided a brief to the barrister) including advising on your prospects in particular litigation and (2) represent you in court i.e. write submissions and speak to the court. It is not uncommon to have a barristers represent you in proceedings other than a trial (if you have the financial resources to afford a barrister). For example, a barrister may represent you in mediation or may accompany you to an examination by some regulatory authority. (Furthermore, a regulatory authority may even hire a barrister to question you, since barristers are often good at that based on their in-court role; or you and the party you are having a dispute with might appoint a barrister as the arbitrator or mediator.) You may have a barrister you prefer to use; more likely, however, your solicitor would know barristers and would recommend an appropriate one. Barristers are specialised so you would use a different barrister for a tax dispute, contractual dispute, employee dispute, etc. An organisation large enough to sustain constant legal disputes would have a number of barristers that it would go to as and when they were needed, on the basis of their particular skills and availability. There is no such thing as a firm of barristers. Each barrister is independent. A barrister's office will be in 'chambers', which is an organisation that leases office space and hires clerks to manage member barristers' business. But the barristers in a chambers are not in business together as members of a firm of solicitors are. Barristers are proud of their independence, and they all want to be appointed as judges so they have to appear impartial. To further illustrate how you might use a barrister: sometimes you get legal advice from a barrister and you cannot read the advice. You can see the words but it's gibberish. Your solicitor will interpret it for you. | Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word. | Disclaimer: I am not familiar with US law, so this answer is from a general perspective. It should apply in most jurisdictions, though. Are there any laws or regulations which I can use to convince a hospital's billing department to talk to me, despite the fact that they have a clear policy otherwise? No, I don't think so. A company or organization is generally free to decide for themselves who will or will not communicate with you - I don't think there is any law giving you a right to choose. How would this even work? What if the people you ask to talk to are overworked, on vacation or just not qualified? However - you do have another, more important right: To be considered valid, a bill must provide credible evidence that the charges are justified. You cannot just ask someone to give you money, you must actually provide a reason why you are owed money. In this case, this means the hospital must send you a bill that you can understand and verify. To get this: First, stop bugging them over the phone. Once a point is reached where legal action seems likely (like in your case), any information you get is only really useful to you when in writing. So do everything in writing. It's fine to talk to them if it helps solve the problem - but insist on getting things in writing afterwards. The first thing you need to write is a formal letter that you refuse to accept the bill, because you cannot verify it. Outline in details what parts you cannot understand/verify, and ask for the information you need (such as what the codes mean). Once you have received a satisfatory explanation of the bill (which may take multiple letters), you go through it with a fine comb, and dispute any items that you think are unjustified. You may need the help of a lawyer to exercise these steps, but in principle you can probably do it on your own, too. Whether you get a lawyer is ultimately a trade-off (making a mistake may cost you money, but hiring a lawyer costs money, too). A first consultation with a lawyer is probably not too costly (ask first!), and may help you to decide whether you need more assistance. | Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.) | Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed. | The old saying: Being your own lawyer means you have a fool as the lawyer and a fool as the client. If one fool calls the other fool as a witness, that's even more foolish. And the worst crime is annoying the judge with your antics. Opposing council will just take note of every question you ask and your replies, and then call you as witness themself. And assuming they are a proper lawyer, everything they ask will be hurting you. No need to accuse you as "leading" or "badgering" the witness. | You will almost certainly be sued For a small amount like this they would use junior lawyers and while the suit may take a while I’d be surprised if a lawyer spent a week all up on such a simple case. Say 40h at $200 = $8,000 which, when they win, you have to pay. Bargain. |
Does gdpr.eu violate GDPR compliancy? As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. If that's true, it's basically impossible to fetch any external resources on a website without asking for consent first, so not even style sheets or JavaScript libraries from CDNs. Recently, a German court even fined a website owner for using Google webfonts (German source: golem.de). People at my workplace where advised to host Google fonts locally because of that decision. That being said, while I was reading about this regulation on https://gdpr.eu/, I noticed that the site itself uses Google webfonts without asking for user consent (see screenshot). What I would like to know is basically: could gdpr.eu be in violation of the GDPR? Or am I misunderstanding the regulation? I am honestly confused. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. I've read some questions about the GDPR on here and information from gdpr.eu and other websites, but it's still very unclear to me what is legal and what is not. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. | As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. That's not exactly true, consent is merely one of six possible legal basis for processing (article 6). For example, processing of personal data can also be lawful if it necessary to perform a contract, legally mandatory, or in the public interest. The court decision acknowledges that but rules out another basis in this case because it considers that it is possible to serve fonts without relying on a third-party ([…] der Einsatz der Schriftarten auch möglich ist, ohne dass eine Verbindung von Besuchern zu externen Servern hergestellt werden muss). Confusingly, it only refers to article 6(1)(f) when it seems to me that (b) would also be plausible but maybe this wasn't raised during the proceedings? If the data controller cannot invoke any other basis for the lawfulness of the processing then yes, the only thing left is asking for consent, i.e. invoking article 6(1)(a). But that doesn't mean that you should expect to be asked for consent each and every time your personal information is being used. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. Yes, implying consent doesn't really make sense under the GDPR definition (article 4, see also article 7): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action European data protection authorities have issued guidelines that detail what that means and clearly reject “bundling” different data processing. The regulation also makes it clear that data subjects should be able to withdraw consent at any time, which does not seem possible with the fonts on golem.de My reading of all this is that assuming consent because you are using a service (or even created an account or checked a box at some point) simply isn't valid consent. Either you don't need consent at all in the first place or what you need is freely given, specific consent and “implying” consent or bundling it with a registration process achieves exactly nothing. But this is still extremely common and it might take some time before enforcement and case law definitively settle this question. Smart data controllers trying to avoid collecting consent (like Meta) have abandoned any claim that signing up to the their services would constitute consent (because that's transparently not the case) and try to bypass the issue entirely using another basis like contractual necessity. This is also being litigated. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. That sounds more like the way EU directives work. Regulations are supposed to be immediately applicable (no implementation in national law necessary) with minimal differences between countries (except when they explicitely provide for that). Of course, enforcement would still mostly be in the hands of national court systems and (in Germany) provincial data protection authorities but there are mechanisms to ensure consistency (the European Data Protection Board, prejudicial questions to the CJEU, infringement proceedings from the European Commission…). | There is a lot going on in this question, so I'll pick out some individual aspects. Last but not least, I'll discuss if GDPR even applies. Does the GDPR require consent for X? Almost always, no. Consent is only one of many legal bases of processing. A common alternative to consent is a “legitimate interest” where a balancing test is performed between this legitimate interest and your interests, rights, and freedoms. Consent is typically only appropriate if this balancing test fails, for example if you would not reasonably expect this processing activity to occur. It's worth noting that it's a reasonably common occurrence that businesses are sold or merged. This is not unexpected. In general, you would not be required to consent to such a transfer. What can a company do with personal data acquired through a merger/acquisition? The GDPR does not provide explicit provisions for this case. But it might be useful to think about the two cases where (a) the new company is a continuation or successor of the original one, and (b) where the data is transferred (“sold”) to an otherwise unrelated company. In case (a) where the business is continued as normal, there is no change. In case (b) where data is transferred to a separate company, things are more complicated. The original company would need a legal basis for transferring the data. But as mentioned above, there might be a legitimate interest. Arguably, such a transfer could also be based on Art 6(1)(b) if the transfer is necessary to continue to provide the service, for example if the original company would otherwise have to terminate service. Of course, activities like data brokering where access to data is granted to unrelated third parties would generally fail to be covered by contractual necessity or a legitimate interest, and would probably need consent – but that doesn't seem to be the case here. When a data controller (such as the new company) acquires your personal data from sources other than directly from you, then they are subject to the notice requirements in Art 14. They have to actively notify you about their processing activities. But because you received emails that mentioned the transfer, this condition might have been met. Of course the new company continues to be bound by the purpose limitation principle as detailed in Art 6(4) – they can only use the data for purposes that are compatible with the purposes for which the data was initially collected. Thus, the new company cannot arbitrarily widen processing purposes, though some change in scope is certainly permissible. How does the GDPR right to object and to restrict processing apply here? The Art 21 GDPR right to object means that if the legal basis for a processing activity is a “legitimate interest”, then you can ask for an opt-out. But in some cases, this objection does not have to be granted. An objection essentially requires the controller to repeat the legitimate interest balancing test, taking into account the “grounds relating to [your] particular situation” that you provided in the objection. The Art 18 GDPR right to restrict processing is an alternative to the right to erasure. It applies only in narrow circumstances, for example while an objection is being checked. It is likely that you were informed about the transfer to a new company about 1 month in advance, so that you would have been able to prevent this transfer by closing your account prior to the deadline. If the new company conducts processing activities based on a legitimate interest, then their presumably GDPR-compliant privacy notice about which you were notified will certainly explain that you have a right to object. Is the new company GDPR-compliant? That is impossible to tell, but nothing you've shown so far indicates that they're non-compliant. My largest issue with this story is that the new company is from Australia, a country with extraordinarily bad privacy protections (as of 2022). However, due to the way how the GDPR treats international transfers of data, this doesn't prevent Australian data controllers from being GDPR-compliant, although it does make it difficult for other companies to use services based in Australia. Does GDPR even apply? Whether GDPR applies to a non-European company depends only on whether they either offer goods or services to people who are in Europe (“targeting criterion”), and whether the monitor people's behavior that takes place in Europe. Factors such as your citizenship would be irrelevant. I'll ignore the monitoring criterion, and focus on the targeting criterion. I'll assume that you are in Europe (EU/EEA or UK). Whether a company is targeting people in Europe depends primarily on the company's intentions. It does not matter whether the service is accessible from Europe. Thus, it is quite possible that the original company was not subject to the GDPR. Then, any questions about GDPR, consent, and data transfers are moot. In contrast, the new company clearly mentions GDPR-compliance, which would only matter if they intend for people in Europe to use their services. So GDPR probably applies to them, giving you the full suite of GDPR data subject rights as (hopefully) outlined in their privacy notice. And as long as they notified you that they acquired your personal data in accordance of Art 14, I don't seen anything that they might have done wrong in respect to this acquisition/merger. | The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer. | If you are not processing the personal information of EU citizens yourselves then you are unlikely to be classed as data processors under GDPR (check Article 3: Territorial Scope, p.32-33). If you were to operate a Software-as-a-Sevice (SaaS) solution then you would be a data controller/processor (or both) and GDPR would certainly apply if you have EU citizens as customers/users. While I can't see any reference to software vendors in the GDPR text, as a software vendor it would be in your interest to ensure your products meet the criteria set out in Article 25 (Data Protection by design and by default, p.48) in order to help your customers to comply, such as: Implement appropriate technical measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. Implement appropriate technical measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons. These along with similar organisational measures are the responsibility of the data controller, but unless your software helps them to comply they may be forced to consider alternative solutions which reduce their overall risk. If your software already has a number of such controls in place it may be worth putting a white-paper or similar communication together which can inform your customers of how your software helps them to comply. There does not appear to be any direct liability to the software vendor through GDPR. If a data breach is the result of a design flaw or implementation bug in the software and your customer gets fined as a result, they may be likely to pursue you on grounds of the software not being fit-for-purpose and lacking the appropriate technical controls required to ensure data privacy. In this event, your defence will rely upon records of designing and implementing controls, records of software testing and remediation, and having in place suitable procedures to ensure security patches can be quickly deployed to your customers when required. Further clarification as requested: If your organisation doesn't process the personal data, doesn't have any third parties process it on your behalf (includes hosting companies) or have any access to it ever, then you're neither a controller or processor. However, if your customers ever send you personal data or grant you temporary access to personal data as part of troubleshooting issues with your software, then you would be a processor in this context and would need an appropriate contract in place and would need to ensure the appropriate technical and organisational controls are implemented to comply with GDPR and reduce risk of a personal data breach. Additionally, if international data transfers take place as part of this (e.g. sending/accessing files over the Internet) you would need to ensure your organisation is able to provide an equivalent level of protection for the rights of the data subjects - for example if you are in the U.S. you would likely need to voluntarily join up to the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield or use the EU's Model Contract Clauses within your contracts in order for it to be legal for EU-based businesses to use you as a data processor. For more information about international transfers read the EU's Data Transfers outside the EU page. Ref: GDPR | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | "1) Can I use an pre checked tick box under GDPR?" Nope. "Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent." (Recital 32) "2) Since GDPR also requires the data collector to ensure that the user is not under the age of 13 so I am planning to ask the users age only for that region i.e. EU Region. Now will simply mentioning that "By continuing you acknowledge that you are above 13 years" will work or will I have to ask the users age?" You have to require some affirmative action. Implicit consent (just continuing) is not acceptable (ibid.) "3) The GDPR requires the data collector to have a proof of the users consent. Now what kind of proof will be required for my App? I am ensuring that the user cannot move forward without providing the consent (only once) is that sufficient as a proof or is any other proof required?" If you are collecting data about the user, you should record the time and date consent was given as part of the user profile. If you are not collecting data about the user (this is only done by third party services such as Google analytics etc.) and there are no user profile, then preventing the user from using the app will have to do. The GDPR also requires data-minimization, and creating a user profile to record consent when no user profile is otherwise required will violate data-minimization-principles. | I'd say it's definitely illegal. Here's what the cookie notice says on Facebook at the time of writing this answer: By clicking on or navigating the site, you agree to allow us to collect information on and off Facebook through cookies. And here's what the GDPR define consent: ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Also consider this, by the way: When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. Facebook's notice is a small blue bar at the top of its blue header, and you might not even notice it (at least on a desktop computer where I'm seeing it). I see no way to easily deny consent, for example there is no button saying "I don't accept". All you can do is click on the link to their cookie policy, and still that policy does not present a clear and easy way to deny consent in all different cases, it looks pretty complicated (among other things, it depends on whether you have a Facebook account or not). So denying consent looks pretty difficult, if at all possible. On the other hand, to give consent, you'd only have to click on any link. I tried this. I opened my browser in private/incognito mode, so it should not use any previous cookies. On Google, I searched for "facebook John Doe". Clicked on a result bringing me to a Facebook page with a list of profiles of people named John Doe. The cookie bar appears at the top, but let's pretend I did not notice it. Then I click on a profile, supposing I'm interested in a certain John Doe, and... I land on John Doe's profile on Facebook, now without the cookie notice! What happened is I gave consent by clicking on any link, that is, clicking on John Doe. I can't see any way this "consent" could ever be considered "freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes". Why is Facebook not compliant? Well, they probably couldn't be compliant even if they wanted to, unless they wanted to go out of business. Lately I've been wondering what the purpose of Google Analytics would be if users were always given the option to freely refuse consent. Virtually every user would always be clicking on "I don't accept", every time everywhere, so lots of business models would be totally disrupted. By the way, as of now, the cookie bar of this community (stackexchange) does not comply with GDPR either. To tell you the truth, I'm afraid very few websites have a GDPR compliant cookie notice. | It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32). |
What triggers the need for a DBA exactly? Lets say an LLC is named something generic like: "Iron Chimpanzee Company" and then the members decide to create three websites specifically for the sale of boats, steaks, and blind dates. Can the company name the sites "Iron Chimpanzee Boats", "Iron Chimpanzee Steaks", and "Iron Chimpanzee Dates" without any DBAs? How is this type of thing determined? | The basic requirement is that any communication using the trade name be possible to trace back to the LLC using the trade name, either with a disclosure in the communication itself, or with a trade name (a.k.a. doing business as a.k.a. dba) registration that links the trade name to the entity in the public record. If this is not done, business conducted in the trade name may be treated as a sole proprietorship or general partnership of the people actually conducting the activity, rather than an activity of the limited liability company behind it, thus depriving those people of limited liability protection. | This follows from a term in your agreement: in opening the account, you agreed to a binding arbitration clause. The general reason why they can do this is because it is not prohibited by law to have such clauses in agreements (in fact, the Federal Arbitration Act protects such clauses from legal challenge). For the same reasons, the clauses can impose deadlines on opt-out or require opt-out by mail as opposed to email or phone call. The premise is that if you find such terms unacceptably onerous or unacceptable, you will not patronize that business. That assumes that the customer read and understood the agreement that they signed, which I grant is often untrue. | Is there any significance to "Inc." vs "Corp."? does it matter if Bob's construction business is Bob's Construction Inc. or Bob's Construction Corp.? No. "Inc." is an abbreviation for "incorporated" and "corp." is an abbreviation for "corporation" which are really just different grammatical variations of the same word. Limited is a term that can include both limited liability companies and corporations in some contexts, so this is less desirable if you want to make clear that you are a corporation rather than a limited liability company. Making the distinction between a limited liability company and a corporation is desirable because a 1099 has to be issued for payments to an LLC but not for payments to a corporation. The word "company" is even broader and can be used to refer to any business firm regardless of its form of organization. | Most limited liability companies (LLCs) are small, closely held firms that are owned entirely or in substantial part by active employee-manager-owners with modest capital contributions. LLCs with large numbers of owners typically have a large share of non-employee investor ownership and are most common in oil and gas firms and in real estate firms that either develop, or buy and hold, real estate. Most large accounting and law firms and many other professional service firms are organized as LLCs or LLP (limited liability partnerships), which are owned by the senior employees whose contributions as employees dwarfs their contributions as investors. (Non-lawyers and non-physicians aren't allowed to have ownership interests in law firms and medical practices, respectively). These are the largest firms in the world with significant employee ownership. Start up tech firms organized as LLCs also often give equity stakes to employees even below the senior-managerial employee level. Rank and file employees are sometimes given an ownership interests in firms, but this is more commonly done through an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) or certain other tax encouraged mechanisms for employee ownership in corporations (e.g., incentive stock options), or in the context of a firm organized as a cooperative (which is taxed essentially like a C-corporation but with an entity level deduction for cooperative dividends paid to members), than it is as an LLCs. One important reason for this is that pass-through taxation (which applies to LLCs not electing to be taxed as corporations) is not workable as a means of imparting ownership to large numbers of rank and file workers, because the compliance paperwork of sending out dozens or hundreds of K-1s to these workers is daunting, and because the prospect of a disconnect between allocated income and loss, and actual distributions (e.g. taxation on "phantom income" of the entity that is not distributed) is problematic. | Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...". | If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer. | I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software. | If you are the CEO of a public company, this might be a problem if it causes less profits for the shareholders. They could fire you if your actions cost them money. If you are the owner of a business, then the CEO of your company (you) can do anything legal that all your shareholders (you) agree with. Nobody can force your company to deal with anyone, especially with no business, except for existing contracts or if there is illegal discrimination. Now all this is not “your personal opinion” but “the ceo running the company according to the wishes of the shareholders”. You are allowed legally to discriminate against a company whose business practices you don’t like. You have to do nothing, just don’t deal with them. If Facebook sends you a million dollar order, just don’t accept it. Make sure that no sales contract is created. It is remotely possible that you have problems if such a decision causes you to go bankrupt and you can’t pay your taxes or debt, like a debtor could claim you could have paid your debt and want your personal money instead of your broke company’s money. |
Do US gag orders block seeking of legal counsel? Do gag orders issued in the United States of America prevent you from seeking legal counsel and discussing the case? I expect that anyone who has received a gag order may not understand the legalize of the order and what they can and cannot do. Naturally, I'd expect them to email some lawyers to ask for advice. By definition, a gag order prevents you from speaking about it. But does that also apply to seeking legal counsel? I'm sure there have been countless cases of gag orders in the U.S., but I also expect that we don't know about most instances due to, well, the gag order. Two exceptions come to mind: Calyx Internet Access, 2004 Lavabit, 2013 In the first case, Nicholas Merrill was represented by the ACLU. Was it a violation of the gag order for Merill to contact the ACLU? In the US, does a gag order prevent you from emailing organizations with lawyers for the purpose of seeking legal advice? | The issue raised by the post primarily comes up in the context of a "National Security Letter" which is a form of administrative subpoena which a recipient is not allowed to disclose having received in many cases. For example, the case of ACLU v. Ashcroft, linked in the question, and pertaining to Calyx Internet Access (2004), involved a National Security Letter. There was also a National Security Letter component to the Lavabit (2013) case cited in the question. But the National Security Letter statute itself (at least as presently amended) expressly allows conferral with counsel about it. The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(2) which provides: (A) In general. — A wire or electronic communication service provider that receives a request under subsection (b), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to — (i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in order to comply with the request; (ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or (iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the Director. Even if this exception were not in the law, however, this exception would probably be implied in law, because the courts have held that National Security Letters and similar non-disclosure agreements must provide a timely opportunity for judicial review, which implicitly includes a right to counsel in the proceeding. See Under Seal v. Sessions, Slip Op. at 34-40 (9th Cir. 2017). Similarly, a Medicaid gag rule, that prohibited people from conferring with lawyers regarding legal options for circumventing means tests for the Medicare nursing home program, were held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Zahner v. MacKereth, Civil No. 11-306 Erie (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014, not overruled or negatively treated on appeal). There are a few tribunals, primarily the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court (that provides probable cause and legality review for national security inquires) and the military commissions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in which a lawyer representing a party in those tribunals must have a security clearance. But, the requirement of a security clearance to represent someone in the tribunal would not apply to pre-litigation legal counsel to review and response to the National Security Letter. | Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS. | Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness. | National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-"content") user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges. | Unless you received an order from the court prohibiting contact, it might be legal; but it's probably not the best idea. Let the lawyers handle it Attorneys have far better, more effective means of dealing with this situation than the course of action you describe. Lawyers have productive tools to accomplish the job and they know how to use them. For example, assume the best-case-scenario results from your idea and you get the other side to admit their affidavit is fallacious in some way. "Aha!" you shout. "Success! Daylight!" But then what? It's not on record. You can't testify to the admission because that's hearsay. Now imagine they next share this information about your little conversation with the counterparty that had them sign the affidavit in the first place. After first being alerted of your concerns, they both now act in concert to shore up their stories and you never see that "daylight" again. Contrast that outcome with one where your guy or gal's attorney deposes the witness under oath, gets them to concede to your version of the facts then introduces the deposition as favorable evidence at trial. That's a much better outcome for "your side." Wouldn't you agree? Be wary of unintended consequences Generally speaking, such direct contact between the parties is often problematic and rarely helpful. (Except, in some cases, when direct contact between the parties leads to a negotiated settlement. Which happens far less often than the direct contact going sideways making the situation even more intractable.) Before you launch off on your own and do something that might be counterproductive. First, identify the areas of the affidavit that you think are inaccurate. Give that information to the party you support, then have them run it by their attorney to figure out the best way to handle the situation. | The wording is a little confusing, but I interpret it as saying the following: Normally, discovery in a court case allows either party to demand documents from the other, to be used as evidence. However, our courts have exceptions; certain documents might be 'privileged against discovery', meaning they couldn't be demanded in that way. If one of those exceptions would apply to a document under court rules, then you can't request it under Freedom of Access either. To know what those privileges are, and how broadly they apply, you'll have to consult the rules of court procedure for your state. | Defamation laws do not distinguish between charitable organizations and others: however, in the US there are special considerations for "public figures" (they are not afforded as much protection). The medium does not matter -- texting, blogging, letter-writing, whatever. The defamatory statement need not have been received by a wide audience – it suffices that the message was received by one person other than the person being defamed. A single defamatory act is all it takes: there is no requirement of there being an established and repeated practice of defaming. One way to defend against a charge of defamation is to show that the statement is true. An alternative is to show that the statement is incapable of being proven true or false (e.g. calling someone a "jerk" doesn't assert a factual proposition). A careful scrutiny of the actual statement, performed by an attorney specializing in such matters, is really the only way to know whether words like "may", "possibly" would make a statement an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. A person suing for defamation would have to have suffered a loss, but there is a category of false statements, per se defamation, considered to be so injurious that damage need not be proven. That included allegations of criminal activity and allegations of professional incompetence, either of which could be applicable in the context you are describing. The First Amendment provides much protection against such suits, which may not exist in other countries. Because of this, a law was recently passed in the US, 28 USC 111, which says that domestic courts will not enforce a foreign defamation judgment that is inconsistent with the First Amendment. [Addendum] This part is crucial: "The only people I've expressed my concerns to, aside from the organization itself, is my parents and my wife's parents. However, they have shared with a few friends...". If you alleged illegal behavior to your parents, that's a problem. If you only said e.g. "I have concerns", that's not a problem. It would also matter in what way you tried "to disclose to a U.S. based organization details of the foreign organization they are supporting that indicate it might not be on the up and up". | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. |
Why is a cover song not fair use? (But parody songs are?) Considering fair use law, parody, transformative works: Weird Al always asks for permission for his parodies but many law professionals have stated he would not have to. Considering all this, why does a musician need to license the original piece of music when doing a cover, especially when the cover is really different and transformative? How is it not fair use? It feels like an RIAA lobbying loophole to circumvent fair use. Some cover songs are radically different from the original. Weird Als song are quote similar in tone and melody compared to some non parody cover songs out there. Legally, where does a a song inspired be another song start and end and a cover song start and end? Where is the line? And what legal quality differentiates a parody song from a cover? Exhibit as an example, where the cover is so different, you wouldn't even know it's a cover: Some Velvet Morning - Nancy Sinatra, Lee Hazlewood (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ws_h7et5KbQ) vs Some Velvet Morning - Primal Scream, Kate Moss (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iR7l__Florc) | A "cover" does require a license, but it a special license – a compulsory license, sometimes called a "mechanical license". Under 17 USC 115, upon payment of a fixed license fee, you can obtain a compulsory license (meaning that the author cannot withhold permission) as long as you don't create what would be a derivative work for music, that is you adhere to this restriction: A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under this title, except with the express consent of the copyright owner. This essentially defines the limit that you seek. Wierd Al compositions are so-o-o over the limits set for a compulsory license, but arguably (according to some), he might be able to avail himself of a fair use defense, because parody and commentary are the primary reasons for the fair use exception in the US. A "cover" is typically not fair use, in that it has a palpable effect on market and it is not "transformative. | Copyright infringement requires that you actually copy elements from an earlier work produced by a different author. If you created a similar, or even identical, work independently, it is not copyright infringement. When considering whether or not infringement has occurred, the court is likely to consider whether the defendant could reasonably have had access to the plaintiff's work. If the court finds that they could have, then the defendant would be required to produce evidence of original authorship. Consider the My Sweet Lord/He So Fine case, where the court found the defendant had subconsciously copied the plaintiff's song. Had Harrison been able to produce evidence of original authorship, the judgment could have been different. In your example, it is unlikely that an suit in copyright infringement could be decided against you, as you've stated the text is generated randomly. However, more evidence of this randomness might be required to support your case. Of course, whether a computer or automated process can produce works independently is still questionable; I'm not aware of cases that have tried this. The US Copyright Office has said that Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable. Of course, whether this has a bearing on your particular scenario is undecided, and I'm not sure how it would be decided. It is almost certain that the worst case outcome would be an injunction requiring you to cease publicising the product, or perform reasonable checks prior to publication to ensure that the product of your program infringes on works; it would be unlikely that you would have costs ordered against you, especially if the program is truly random, and the random text was given as much, or more, publicity than the coherent text. | The quote in the question and the question text both imply that what is protected by copyright is "creative effort" or "creative value". In united-states law at least, the test is "originality". In many, probably most, cases these will be the same. But there can be things with "creative value" that are not considered original enough for copyright protection, or in some other way are not subject to copyright protection. Individual words or short phrases such as the titles of works are not protected by copyright, even if they have creative value, for example. An improvised song or dance that is not recorded is not protected, however creative it may have been, because it was not "fixed in a tangible form". However, a hash computed from a text is indeed a fact, just as a statement of the number of characters the text contains, and it would not be protected by copyright. The hash algorithm might or might not be protected by patent, and the code to a hash program might be protected by copyright. But the resulting hash value will not be protected by either. | Maybe. It might fall under "fair use", which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four "factors" that have to be "balanced", plus a fifth. The factors are "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes", "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole", "the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work". The fifth consideration is "transformativeness". W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be "fair", except for the Youtube monetization problem. The "nature of the copyright work" question is primarily about "artistic works" versus "factual works", so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are. | It is illegal to make copies of copyrighted materials without license. In the case of software, obviously it will be illegal to make copies by copying and installing the software without a license, but we are not talking about that. If I have a legitimate license of say Photoshop, and I start the application, parts or all of the code will be loaded into the RAM of my computer, which is a copy. According to copyright law, it is legal for me to make that copy. You are allowed to copy legitimately owned software into RAM to execute it. If your copy of Photoshop is illegal, and you start the application, the copy that is made into RAM is again copyright infringement. Having read the software license for the software that you get when you buy a Mac, it seems that if you steal my computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement, and it seems that if you buy such a stolen computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement as well, because the license that I received when I purchased the computer covers anyone using it with my permission, and covers anyone who legally buys the computer from me, but doesn't cover a thief. Now does this affect the work that you did? No, you have the full copyright on your work. Copyright law doesn't require that your tools are all used legitimately. | The basic principle is that copyright never protects an idea, it only protects the expression of an idea. In the US, that rule is embodied in 17 USC 102(b) which provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. When significant, detailed, and specific plot elements are copied from a prior work, then that may make the new work a derivative work. Creation or distribution of a derivative work requires permission from the owner of the copyright (if any) on the prior work (source work). But the elements used must be significant and must be detailed. If all that is taken could be expressed in a summery contained in a single sentence or paragraph, this will not make the new work derivative. For example, such ideas as: Napoleon meets the Emperor of China and they form an alliance. [My idea] Sherlock Holmes helps to repel the Martian invasion described in The War of the Worlds. Conan Doyle's Professor Challenger is also involved. [Wellman's Sherlock Holmes's War of the Worlds] Aliens crash land on Earth in 1905, creating an alternate timeline. They seek to start WWI early, to stimulate technical development. [Benson's ...And Having Writ] would on their own not be enough to constitute a derivative work and thus infringement. But the more specific detail from the source work is used, the more likely it is that an infringement suit would win. By the way, the rule is the same whether the source work is a book, or a TV show, or an opera, or any other work subject to copyright protection. If the work is old enough, any copyright will have expired, but the format of the original does not matter, as long as it is "fixed in a tangible form" which includes video tape, DVD, computer file, or a script written on paper. About the only things that do not count as fixed would be an impromptu dance, song, speech, or story whch the creator performed or spoke without its ever having been written down or recorded in any way. | Unfortunately, the "but everyone does that" (BEDT) argument doesn't hold water as evidenced by prosecutions of looters. Would uploading this video be a copyright infringement? It would be hard to answer this part of the question without knowing where and from whom the clips had come from. If the clips came from a company like ESPN or a YouTuber that doesn't give you permission to be able to use their clips then yes this might be a copyright infringement. If you use video/clips that are labeled as creative commons then nt it wouldn't be an infringement. YouTube has a feature for this. Would my actions be fair use? First, we'll need to understand what fair-use is. Fair use is the ability to use copyright material under certain circumstances without permission. To best determine if using copyright-protected material in your work you should weigh it against the four factors of fair use. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; The nature of the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. More information about fair-use here Youtube outlines their fair use guidelines here | A few years ago, there was a trial in the USA about some short sound on some music CD: One party claimed that one piece of music on the CD contained a sound of less than one second length which is copied from another CD without the permission of the copyright owner of the other CD. It could never be found out if this claim was really true. The court's decision was: If it is not possible to distinguish between a copy and a work that does not depend on the other work at all, it is not a copyright infringement - even if the sound has been copied from the other CD. For this reason, I'd guess that a 4x3 image would not be a copyright infringement, yet, while 60x45 would definitely be one. Just for reference: The same image as 3x4 and as 45x60: |
Are customers who withdraw their profits and lending earnings from FTX during its last days before its bankruptcy liable to clawback from creditors? It seems that some companies and investors, such as Binance, are liable to pay creditors through clawback for FTX collapse as a result of fraud. https://cointelegraph.com/news/companies-and-investors-may-need-to-return-billions-in-funds-paid-by-ftx What about profitable customers? Suppose a customer made trading profits and earned interest from lending his cryptocurrencies on FTX. He managed to withdraw his funds just hours before FTX's collapse. Is he liable to for the clawback? | united-states Are customers who withdraw their profits and lending earnings from FTX during its last days before its bankruptcy liable to clawback from creditors? It seems that some companies and investors, such as Binance, are liable to pay creditors through clawback for FTX collapse as a result of fraud. If the right conditions are met the amounts paid can be clawed back. There are a lot of special rules that apply but the most general is that if you receive money or property to pay an amount owed on a debt within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition being filed without providing substantially contemporaneous and equivalent value at the time that you receive the money, and the amount received is more than you would have received in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, then the amount received may be clawed back into the bankruptcy estate. Usually, in financial transactions, the dollar values in an account in your name are considered to be contractual debts owed by the financial institution to you, rather than "your property". So paying amount the balance of an account (to the extent it has been at that level for at least 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition) will usually be a preference and give rise to a clawback obligation if the bankruptcy estate choses to enforce that right (in a Chapter 7 that call is made by the bankruptcy trustee, in a Chapter 11 that call is made by the "debtor-in-possession"). If a clawback amount is not returned voluntarily, court action can be taken to recover it. This is what a court has ruled, for example, in one recent crypto bankruptcy case. The lookback period is 1 year rather than 90 days for "insiders". If the debt is backed by new collateral in this time period, even if not paid, the agreement to provide new collateral can be invalidated (certain additional technical rules apply to this provision). Small amounts (up to $600 for consumer debtors and $5,000 for non-consumer debtors) are disregarded even if the payment would otherwise be a preference subject to being clawed back. To make sure I have fully answered the question: What about profitable customers? Suppose a customer made trading profits and earned interest from lending his cryptocurrencies on FTX. He managed to withdraw his funds just hours before FTX's collapse. Is he liable to for the clawback? Yes. If the conditions described above are met. The logic is that people who pull out money at the last minute due to luck or insider information should not be treated differently than those who do not do so. The relevant section of the bankruptcy code is 11 U.S. Code § 547 (Preferences). It states: (a)In this section— (1)“inventory” means personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease; (2)“new value” means money or money’s worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation; (3)“receivable” means right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned by performance; and (4)a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last payable without penalty, including any extension. (b)Except as provided in subsections (c), (i), and (j) of this section, the trustee may, based on reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case and taking into account a party’s known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses under subsection (c), avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— (1)to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2)for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3)made while the debtor was insolvent; (4)made— (A)on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5)that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if— (A)the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B)the transfer had not been made; and (C)such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title. (c)The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer— (1)to the extent that such transfer was— (A)intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and (B)in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; (2)to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was— (A)made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B)made according to ordinary business terms; (3)that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor— (A)to the extent such security interest secures new value that was— (i)given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral; (ii)given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement; (iii)given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and (iv)in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and (B)that is perfected on or before 30 days after the debtor receives possession of such property; (4)to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor— (A)not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and (B)on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor; (5)that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of— (A) (i)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (ii)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creating such security interest; (6)that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title; (7)to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt for a domestic support obligation; (8)if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600; or (9)if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $5,000.2 (d)The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the trustee. (e)(1)For the purposes of this section— (A)a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and (B)a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee. (2)For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made— (A)at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 30 days after, such time, except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B); (B)at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 30 days; or (C)immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at the later of— (i)the commencement of the case; or (ii)30 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee. (3)For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. (f)For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. (g)For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section. (h)The trustee may not avoid a transfer if such transfer was made as a part of an alternative repayment schedule between the debtor and any creditor of the debtor created by an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency. (i)If the trustee avoids under subsection (b) a transfer made between 90 days and 1 year before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor to an entity that is not an insider for the benefit of a creditor that is an insider, such transfer shall be considered to be avoided under this section only with respect to the creditor that is an insider. (j) (1)In this subsection: (A)The term “covered payment of rental arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a lessor to defer or postpone the payment of rent and other periodic charges under a lease of nonresidential real property; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount of rental and other periodic charges agreed to under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (B)The term “covered payment of supplier arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a supplier of goods or services to defer or postpone the payment of amounts due under an executory contract for goods or services; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (2)The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section for— (A)a covered payment of rental arrearages; or (B)a covered payment of supplier arrearages. | Although crypto space may be little regulated, insurance is in most jurisdictions highly regulated. Any such arrangement would need to comply with current laws on insurance, until and unless modified laws to cover this sort of thing are passed, and then it would need to comply with those. Tax authorities generally allow one to declare "other business income" or "other investment income" without forming a legal entity. I cannot say how such income would be classified in any given jurisdiction. Whether the platform, or some legal entity associated with the platform, would need to be registered will depend on the current laws and regulations governing insurance, and on the way in which teh contracts are structured. A disclaimer cannot prevent one from being sued. The contracts would need to carefully and explicitly state who is liable for what. Programs cannot be held accountable for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. If negligence in the creation or operation of a program causes a loss, the operator may well be liable. Programs cannot be sued for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. It may well be essential to constitute the "platform" as a legal entity of some sort. Otherwise its operator will be liable for its actions. I cannot be sure. I once encountered a somewhat similar system in which insurance was provided by individuals exchanging contracts, so that in a sense each member insured all the others. There was a company that supervised and provided legal and administrative services to the group of individuals, and collected fees for this. That sounds a bit similar to the suggested platform, but I don't know exactly how that company was organized. The system was called "NJ CURE". I don't know if it is still in operation. | I'm assuming you're talking about U.S. federal bankruptcy law (Title 11). Once bankruptcy is declared, any claims against the debtor are subject to the bankruptcy laws, and any claims against the debtor in any other court are automatically stayed under 11 USC 362. That means if you bring an action against the debtor for conversion, a court will not hear it, because the debtor's bankruptcy stays any such action. It gets more complicated if you want to sue the brother. In general, except in limited circumstances, the brother is not protected by the bankruptcy stay. [source]. So you can likely sue the brother. Your question about "priority," however, may be based on a misunderstanding of how the law works. If you sue the brother and win, you will get a judgment against the brother, which you can then attempt to collect from the brother's assets. If the trustee convinces a court that the property in question is, in fact, the property of the estate, the trustee can recover it from the brother, or from anyone the brother subsequently gave it to, until it is transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value--who must be unaware of the fraudulent nature of the conveyance. See 11 USC 550. Because you were aware of the fraud, you are not a bona fide purchaser for value, and the statute seems to give the trustee the ability to recover the money from you, just as it would from the brother. In practical terms, this will rarely happen--but if it did, the bankruptcy estate would win, because the avoidance of a transfer means the property was never the brother's in the first place. | If you were to seek legal recourse for breach of contract (their Terms and Conditions), the best outcome you could hope for would be "making whole", and since they have already offered this a court could award you what the retailer already offered, but make legal costs on both sides the plaintiff's liability (ie. you), since you could have taken the offer and avoided court. The Terms and Conditions associated with the discount code mean that you won't be able to return the gift cards for cash. It will be argued that by using the code, you agreed to those terms and conditions. The second paragraph of their reply looks like an attempt to scare you, but it has legal merit. By using the unauthorised code you could be considered to have made false representation when you entered into the contract. This could render the contract void, and if they could demonstrate it had been done deliberately to gain money it could meet the threshold for fraud (which is what the police would possibly investigate : if it can be shown that you were aware the discount code didn't apply to you it would constitute making "a false representation ... to make a gain for himself" [sub-paragraphs 1-5, paragraph 2 of the Fraud Act 2006]). You may be able to argue that the voucher websites misled you (though it sounds like you, I and the retailer already know that's not true), but since the retailer has offered to repay what you paid there are unlikely to be any damages - and, unless the voucher site took commission from your transaction, a contract between you and the voucher sites would be difficult (possibly impossible) to establish. In the circumstances, returning what you originally paid is a good offer. | None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim. | "Fraud" requires an intent to deceive. In cases like this I would fall back on the saying, "Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence." Practically speaking: the email you received from them is an amendment to their Terms of Service. I.e., your contract with the company starts with their standard Terms of Service, and is modified by any agreement you reach that explicitly supersedes the ToS. Based on your description it is your credit card company that is in violation of its duty to adjudicate chargebacks. If you refuse the charge, and present the email agreement and evidence of A's "failure," then the card company has no grounds to impose the charge on you (unless the merchant in its response to the chargeback can convincingly argue that the email agreement is invalid). | The European laws have specific sections regarding digital goods. The following two passages are relevant to you: From Returning unwanted goods: Warning! Please note that you may not use goods that you have received before deciding to withdraw from the purchase. The right to withdraw exists to allow you to examine the product in the same way as you would in a shop, not to give you 14 days free use. Be aware also that more specific rules apply to digital content (e.g. downloading or streaming music or video). From Shopping online: Digital content Specific information requirements apply when you buy digital content online, e.g. when downloading or streaming music or video. Before you make the purchase, you must also be informed how the content operates with relevant hardware/software (interoperability) and about its functionality, including whether any geographical restrictions apply to the use of the content and if private copies are allowed. You also enjoy the right of withdrawal within 14 days from concluding the contract for online digital content. However, once you start downloading or streaming the content you may no longer withdraw from the purchase, provided that the trader has complied with his obligations. Specifically, the trader must first obtain your explicit agreement to the immediate download or streaming, and you must explicitly acknowledge that you lose your right to withdraw once the performance has started. So yes, the law specifically allows you to waive that right when purchasing digital goods. So long as Steam has correctly advertised the product's system requirements and other key details, you lose your right to withdraw from the purchase the moment you start downloading it to your system. | Yes. Money damages can be awarded in this circumstance and would likely be awarded if the infringement was found to have occurred and not to have been fair use. Even in the absence of proof that any profits are made, there are statutory damages that can be awarded on a per offense basis for copyright violations, and trademark cases in addition to having statutory violations can measure damages by harm to the trademark owner and not just unjust enrichment to the infringer. |
Can the police arrest and detain a person (specifically a minor) without telling them the charge? I am in a class in which I was assigned a "Case" to study. These were fake, and I was asked to point out who was guilty or at fault and for which charge. I asked the teacher: Is it legal to detain a minor, or anyone, without telling them the charge? (He told me "Ask three before me" so I did, then I asked again and he told me to keep asking. So here I am asking some other people. This is based in the United States of America btw.) For clarification, this hypothetical case stated that after the preliminary hearing, they cut the story off and we had to make a decision, even then no charge was exposed. | Arrests For Crimes A charge must be identified very early in the criminal justice process, typically upon booking an arrested person at a police station or jail, which will usually take place minutes to hours after an arrest is made. At the latest, a provisional charge will be revealed at a first appearance before a judge (which will usually take place within a day, or sometimes a bit longer on a weekend or holiday in rural areas whether it should or not), although the charges identified at that time can be amended later in the process. A plea of guilty or not guilty is entered at an arraignment, which sometimes is combined with a first court appearance and sometimes is conducted separately. A preliminary hearing happens much later in the criminal justice process, after an arraignment (which is sometimes combined with a first court appearance), and after counsel is assigned to represent the person who is charged. A preliminary hearing is an adversarial mini-trial before a judge at which the prosecution presents evidence sufficient to establish probable cause on previously disclosed charged in a somewhat summary fashion (not necessarily everything to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), and the attorney for the defendant can cross-examine witnesses, object to questions improper under the rules of evidence, and introduce exonerating evidence (although this last option is only rarely utilized). A preliminary hearing is a substitute for a grand jury indictment as a means to screen whether charges are supported by probable cause. Usually, but not in absolutely all cases, if the arrest is pursuant to an arrest warrant, the arrest warrant will be presented to the person being arrested immediately prior to, at the time of the arrest, or immediately after the arrest is made, and the arrest warrant will provide some insight into the charge. But, unless a state statute or court rule provides otherwise, a charge does not usually need to be disclosed during the actual process of making an arrest, or while the person arrested is being transported to a police station or jail for booking, although the charge often is disclosed at that time or even before the arrest is made. Frequently, someone is read their Miranda rights before the charge is identified. Some of the fine details are a matter of state specific court rules and statutes, but the general outline of the process described above is the U.S. constitutional requirement. The process for arresting a minor is not very different from the process for arresting an adult, but usually, when a minor is arrested, a parent or guardian must be promptly notified of the arrest and the charge, if possible. Many states have a minimum age for arresting a minor for committing a crime or juvenile delinquency offense, which is typically somewhere in the range from age seven to age twelve, although there is considerable variation on this point. This is an area of the law where active efforts to pass reform legislation to take a less punitive approach with younger minors are underway. Minors Taken Into Custody For Other Reasons Also, while adults are overwhelmingly arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, a minor is sometime placed under law enforcement or social services custody in a manner that looks like an arrest, but isn't, for a reason other than a charge that the minor is actually believed to have committed a crime. For example, suppose that a five year old child is found in an apartment at which two adults presumed to be the child's mother and father, are found dead (the reason for their deaths doesn't really matter). In that situation, the law enforcement officer at the scene would generally take physical custody of the child pending the arrival of a social services officer at the scene who would then take physical custody of the child from the law enforcement officer until another suitable guardian could be located, even though there is no suspicion that the child committed a crime. The name for this process varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In New York State, for example, this is called "person in need of supervision" case (PINS for short), which is sometimes thought of as a civil custody matter and is sometimes classified as what is called a "status offense" that justifies the government taking custody of a minor even though the minor has not committed a crime. | Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | In general, you do not have civil recourse against the government for (lawful) legal process that you are the victim of. "Counterclaim" would only be applicable when A sues B, and B makes a counterclaim against A – the police don't sue you, they arrest you, and the prosecutor prosecutes you (or decides not to). If the police beat you up, you could sue them for violating your rights, under what is known as Section 1983. Given the scenario you describe, this comes closest to involving false arrest, meaning that there was no probable cause for arrest. Otherwise, the police have immunity for their actions. But if there is a legal arrest warrant, there is probable cause (existence of probable cause is the standard for issuing an arrest warrant), so no claim against the police will succeed. I am leaving out the anomalous concept of an unlawful arrest warrant, where a judge issued an arrest warrant but there is in fact no probable cause. Such a case would be covered by Section 1983, where either the judge or the swearing officer (or both) violated your rights. | If A reasonably suspects that B committed a felony, A may arrest B, which means that A may also use reasonable force to detain B. They can also arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their presence, if it constituted a breach of peace. It is, of course, up to A to be correct that the act is a felony or a breach of peace, and to know what is reasonable force. If your arrest is in fact not lawful, you may be sued (battery or false imprisonment) or prosecuted (battery or unlawful imprisonment). Punching a person in the shoulder is the felony of battery, and direct observation creates highly reasonable suspicion. In such circumstances, anyone could have arrested the child. Unlike a police arrest, a citizen is not required to Mirandize an arrested suspect. This memo summarizes citizens arrest law including case law for Washington state. The right to perform citizen's arrest is statutorily recognized as a defense under RCW 9A.16.020 The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: ...(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody | Yes. Although there are numerous child-protection laws, there is nothing specific for (beggar) children in this scenario so it would fall within Criminal Force, an offence contrary to section 350 Indian Penal Code: Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent ... or intending ... or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other. The punishment for which may be found at section 352 Whoever ... uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment ... for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. For completeness "Force" is described by section 349 as: A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling... [A substance could be, for example, a broom handle or a pan of water] Also, for completeness there's the alternative of Assault under section 351 if no force is used. | In Massachusetts where I live, here are the general guidelines: In re G.L. c. 268, § 32B(b). A person can be charged with resisting arrest only when the officer is acting under the color of his official position (meaning he is on duty and acting according to those duties). The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew that the person seeking to make the arrest was a “police officer.” The Commonwealth may do so by proving that the officer was in uniform or, if not in uniform, identified himself (herself) by exhibiting his (her) credentials as a police officer while attempting to make the arrest. Such credentials would include such things as a badge, insignia, identification card, police radio, or other police equipment such as a clearly identified police vehicle. Thus, in Massachusetts according to usual legal interpretation: (1) The officer must be on duty and acting in an official capacity. (2) The officer must be provably known to be a police officer by some means to the person charged. Resisting arrest must be ancillary to some other charge. You cannot just be charged with "resisting arrest" unless you are actually being arrested on some other charge (or interfering with someone else being arrested). So, as far as a search is concerned, even if the resisting arrest charge were thrown out, the real question would be why was the person being arrested in the first place? That would determine the admitability of the evidence. | You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal. |
A had sexual intercourse with B because A misidentified B as her boyfriend. Did B committed sexual assault? B has similar facial characteristics with A's boyfriend, C. A had sex with B with both sides' consent. B did not lie about his identity. Later A find out that B is actually not her boyfriend. Does A has reasonable ground to claim it a sexual assault (or rape, or other similar offense)? Answer from US, Canada, Europe, or any other countries is welcome. | canada Avoiding an overly literal reading of your assertion that "both sides consent" The actus reus of sexual assault is sexual touching without the consent of the complainant. In your scenario, you say that "both sides" consented. If this is truly the case, then there is no sexual assault. But I don't think you meant to say this. As I explain below, in order to consent, A must not have been mistaken about the identity of B: A could not have thought that B was C. If she was mistaken, as you assert in the title and in the second paragraph, then she was not consenting at law in Canada. Thus, I will assume you have used "consent" more colloquially, and move on to assess the scenario in which A merely "consented" in the sense that she was not physically or otherwise coerced into the physical acts. Can mistaken identity result in sexual assault? Yes In your scenario, where A thought B was C, the actus reus of sexual assault has occured: sexual touching without A's subjective consent. This is because consent is linked to the identity of the partner (see R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para. 88). See also R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 at para. 57-58, 63: a complainant’s mistaken belief about the identity of the partner or the sexual nature of the act — whether or not that mistake is the result of a deception — will result in no consent under s. 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code." ... if a complainant agrees to sexual activity with A, who is a specific individual known personally to her, she is not agreeing to sexual activity with B ... the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. G.C., 2010 ONCA 451, 266 O.A.C. 299, leave to appeal refused, [2010] 3 S.C.R. v, adopted this approach and held that the complainant’s belief that the partner was her boyfriend when it was in fact his identical twin resulted in no consent to the “sexual activity in question” under s. 273.1 of the Criminal Code. (See also R. v. O.A., 2013 ONCA 581, 310 O.A.C. 305.) Since A was mistaken about the identity of the partner, there was no consent. B may very well have a defence available: mistaken belief in communicated consent (R. v. Barton). This defence asserts that the accused did not possess the mens rea of sexual assault (which is knowing of the lack of consent, or being reckless as to the lack of consent). This defence asserts that, despite A not consenting, B believed that A did consent. This was the attempted defence in G.C. and O.A., cited above. For this defence to be successful, B's belief in A's communicated consent must be based on reasonable steps taken by B to ascertain consent. Whether the steps taken by B were reasonable depends on what was known to B at the time. the accused must take steps that are objectively reasonable, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time In your scenario, you have not asserted that there is anything known to B about "similar facial characteristics [he shares] with A's boyfriend." However if it is well-known to B that he looks like C, and depending on how similar the features are, and depending on what B knew about A's ability to discern the difference between B and C this might put an obligation on B to affirmatively confirm with crystal clear language that A knows that B is not C, failing which, he would not have the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent. For example, in G.C. (the identical-twin case), "[t]he trial judge recited the relevant facts of that night known to the appellant and concluded that without doing more than he did to make his identity perfectly clear to the complainant, the appellant could not be said to have taken reasonable steps necessary to ascertain that the complainant was consenting." Anticipating comments that will always come up about evidence: this answer intentionally skips over questions like "how would you prove X in court." This answer only says what the law is and what would have to be proven. If you would like to read about evidence and how to prove facts in court, please see this answer to the question How do you prove a fact at issue in litigation? | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | england-and-wales Yes As well as the general offence of comtempt of court by publishing facts in breach of a court order, there are also two statutory provisions making it an offence if those facts reveal a person's identity (maliciously or not): section 1, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: (1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where a person is accused of an offence to which this Act applies, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed (“the complainant”) shall during the complainant’s lifetime be included in any publication. [...] The relevant offences are listed in section 2 (being rape and a number of other serious sexual offences). section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933: (1) No matter relating to any child or young person concerned in proceedings to which this section applies shall while he is under the age of 18 be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as someone concerned in the proceedings. (2) The proceedings to which this section applies are— (a) proceedings in a youth court; (b) proceedings on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated); (c) proceedings in a magistrates' court under Schedule 7 to the Sentencing Code (proceedings for breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation orders); (d) proceedings on appeal from a magistrates' court arising out of any proceedings mentioned in paragraph (c) (including proceedings by way of case stated). [...] | Your question is essentially this: consider a defamation lawsuit in which A alleges that B falsely stated that A did X (and it is not contested that B made the statement) also consider that B has done X in the past is it of any relevance to A's defamation suit that B has done X in the past canada Evidence must be relevant to a live, material issue In order for evidence to be admissible it must be "relevant to a live, material issue in the case" (this is from a dissent, but there is no disagreement about this point). Stage 1: Did B make a defamatory statement about A that was published - no relevance to this issue Defamation is prima facie proven if B's statement was published and if it tended to lower the reputation of A. The fact that B has done X in the past is irrelevant to this aspect of the analysis, especially when the defendant is not alleging that they did not say "A did X." Stage 2: Defences - there is a very narrow path for relevance on this issue Once defamation is prima facie proven, the burden flips to the defendant to establish a defence. Of all the possible defences, the only one in which I could see B having done X in the past being relevant is the defence of fair comment: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. The fact the B has done X in the past could be relevant to this defence if B were to use that familiarity with the activity X as part of the commentary on why they believe that A has done X. It could also be relevant (not on its own, but along with much more context) for an allegation of malice on B's part. Conclusion: Evidence that B did X in the past would likely not be relevant I see it very unlikely that B having done X in the past would be relevant. It would likely be treated as a collateral issue, unless B's credibility somehow became absolutely central to the litigation and if the judge was convinced that such acts relate to credibility. On the facts as described, and even for a fair comment defence, I don't see that being the case. | Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her. | Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | england-and-wales Is this illegal? YES, NO, MAYBE Context is everything, and it depends on whether this was just playful (for want of a much better word) or sexual touching. Assuming that the "grandma" is actually her grandmother, the likely offence - if there is one at all - would be sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s.25 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: A person (A) [i.e. grandma] commits an offence if — (a) [s]he intentionally touches another person (B) [i.e. the child], (b) the touching is sexual, (c) the relation of A to B is within section 27 [which includes grandparents], ... (e) — ... (ii) B is under 13. Touching is defined at s.79(8): (8) Touching includes touching — (a) with any part of the body, ... (c) through anything [e.g. panties] ... Sexual is defined at s.78 as: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that — (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. A key point to prove is whether s.25(1)(b) is met or not, so again: context is everything. Is it legal only for women to do? NO - Both males and females (over the age of criminal responsibility of 10) can commit any sexual offence apart from rape which is purely male-specific for anatomical reasons. |
Does any legal reason prevent customer service departments from addressing situations which have given rise to police involvement? In my experience when attempting to address unsatisfactory treatment from companies and organisations I have often been told that they cannot say anything about the issue due to police having been called about the incident. Is there anything legal behind this, or is it just a cheap cargo culting type of cop out (no pun intended) because of the uncomfortable fact that their organisation had screwed up? | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | The misunderstanding The only person who can chose to prosecute or not to prosecute a criminal case is the state: in the US this is through the office of the relevant District Attorney advised by the police. When a person makes a complaint to police (or other authorities), the police/DA commence an investigation. In an ideal world all complaints would be investigated rigorously and thoroughly, however, we live in this world. The police/DA will assess the complaint and decide if it warrants the dedication of scarce resources to investigate. One of the factors they will consider is how vigorously the complainant prods them in the ass. Ultimately, the police/DA will decide if there is enough evidence to place the matter before the courts. The complainant has no say in when or if this will happen. A complainant cannot "drop the charges"! The misconduct For a police officer to disclose to another police officer that they were the subject of a felony (or any) complaint is gross misconduct and a huge betrayal of trust. At best it shows poor judgement, at worst it is corrupt. Your friend needs professional legal advice right now! | Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority. | This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate." | I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply. | Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing". |
How restrictive is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe? Lets say that I want to take a picture or record a video of a city I am visiting in Europe and like its inevitable people will appear in the picture or video. I cannot do this before asking permission to everyone that appears on the picture? If I witnessed or I am the victim of any type of agression or abuse on the street or at work, I cannot record it because I will face legal consecuences? | Technically, yes, GDPR might apply. Filming other people does involve the processing of personal data, and GDPR will apply unless this is for “purely personal or household purposes”. But exactly that will be the case for most holiday snapshots or short clips for your personal social media. As far as I understand, you do not have to worry about purely personal activities. Even if GDPR would apply, this doesn't mean it would be illegal. It means you'd need a “legal basis”, such as a “legitimate interest”. If there are just a couple of people in the background of a video, it's possible that their rights might weigh less important than your interest in shooting the video – but that would need a case by case analysis. Your legitimate interest would almost certainly prevail if you need to record a crime to which you are victim. Regardless of GDPR concerns, note that this is just a small aspect of legal concerns. Instead, also consider personality rights copyright (if art or architectural works are visible) / freedom of panorama customs and reasonable expectations of other people These issues will depend largely on the specific country or area you are travelling to. Europe is not homogenous in its perception of privacy issues. For example, consider the issue of dashcams in a car. These are considered to be quite normal in some European countries, but effectively illegal in others. | If you can’t stand the heat, get out of the kitchen The thrust of this question, as well as many others you have posted, seems to be looking for a way of avoiding your obligations under the GDPR because they are difficult, onerous and/or expensive. Too bad! You don’t have the option of which laws you comply with and which ones you don’t. If I had my choice, I’d comply with the GDPR and not with tax law, but I don’t so I can’t. You have 3 simple choices: Do your best and insure the rest. This means learning what’s required and implementing it to the best of your ability and taking out appropriate insurance cover to deal with any mistakes you make. Ignore the law and hope you don’t get caught. Don’t release apps. | As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia). | I live in the EU and Facebook has blocked access to my account unless I accept their privacy rules, which means giving up GDPR protections. Facebook operates in the EU and has EU data subjects, therefore Facebook is subject to GDPR. You should be able to withdraw your consent. Article 7(3) says: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. | You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy. | The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case. | It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that. | This issue touches upon two distinct GDPR rights: Art 15 right to access: you have a right to receive a copy of all personal data concerning you that are undergoing processing (including storage). Access may only be denied where this would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” Art 20 right to data portability: if processing is being carried out by automated means, and processing is based on certain legal bases (consent or contract, but not legitimate interest), then you have a right to receive a copy of your personal data in a machine-readable format, for personal data that you have provided to the data controller. Whereas the right to access is fairly straightforward, the right to data portability applies under much more narrow conditions. Basically, it's a right that you can download any data that you've uploaded so that you can move to a different service. Google Takeout is primarily concerned with your right to data portability, and provides your data in a machine-readable format. Any photos that you've uploaded to Google Photos, you'll be able to download. Thus, it could be technically compliant to exclude information that they've inferred about your personal data, such as image-recognition results. Such results would still be personal data under the GDPR definition of the consent, and would be covered by your right to access. Google might argue that you already have access to this data through the web interface. In my opinion the GDPR clearly requires the data controller to provide a “copy”, i.e. the data in some durable form – not merely access through a web interface. Whereas your question is specifically about Google, the same issue applies to other services as well. E.g. Ruben Verborgh has an interesting blog series on trying to get access to all their data from Facebook, though unsuccessful so far. Similar to your scenario, Facebook offers a download for personal data but does not include all personal data in this download. In one of the documents provided by Facebook in the course of the exchange, they note that they allow access to photo tags through the web interface, but do not include this in downloaded data – without providing further justification. |
Can a company in Germany hire a remote worker from Iran? Can a company registered in Germany hire a remote worker based in Iran? What regulation act is applied in this case? | If by "hire a worker" you mean hire you as their employee, then no. And that has nothing to do with Iran or sanctions. See https://expatriates.stackexchange.com/questions/23844/can-i-work-remotely-for-a-german-company-from-india-being-an-indian-citizen and just replace "India" with "Iran", or really "any non-EU country". The only way you can legally sell your work and get money from a German company in Germany when you don't reside in Germany with a German work permit is being an independent contractor or company and invoicing the German company for services provided. Whether this contract would be targetted by sanctions is a matter of that specific contract. It might depend on what work you do, and what you need to be given access to, while you work. That said, what a company legally "can do" might still not be what they do. Hiring a lawyer to navigate this (because people on the internet are not the best source of legal advice) might well exceed any benefits they have from hiring you. Even if it is legal in the end, it might still be too costly. Your best bet here is a company that already has dealing with contractors from Iran, already has lawyers for this on payroll and knows how to navigate this legally, not only in theory, but with their specific business dealings and services. In case you are actually asking on behalf of the Germany company, you should already know all this. You should also know that the real answer is "get a lawyer". But just in case you are just curious and want a sneak peek, you can go to the website of the "Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle" and see what they say and how your specific company and the specific contract you have in mind plays with the regulations. Warning: there is no easy answer I could summarize here, it is multiple pages of references to applicable laws and regulations. https://www.bafa.de/DE/Aussenwirtschaft/Ausfuhrkontrolle/Embargos/Iran/iran_node.html If your company has dealing with other nations, especially the US, you may want to check their conditions as well. Even though it might be legal in Germany, that does not really give you any protection from other countries sanctioning you in their juristiction or simply not giving you any further contracts because you don't play by their rules. | Under German law, yes sure. As long as you keep to all regulations. You have to declare your taxes. This is income, whether it comes from inside Germany or not and whether it is paid into a German bank account or foreign. You have to have a health insurance and likely need to pay into the social security and pension funds. As your employer most likely does not do this for you as a German employer would be required to, you will need to pay both the employee and the employer's part yourself. So yes, if you pay your taxes on it and have health and social security insurance, Germany does not care where the money comes from. Now whether the company in Mauritius is legally allowed to hire and pay you under their law? I have no idea. Please note that filling out all the right forms correctly is not for the faint of heart. And finding out that you did it wrong only years later is painful and costly. Also calculate your costs before you do anything. Paying both parts for your health insurance for example can easily be up to 400€ a month more then a German employee at a German company, so run your numbers. You may be better off being officially self-employed or even incorporated. Just because it's legal, does not mean it's a good idea. Hire a professional to advise you on the economic and bureaucratic side of this. | In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment. | I can't answer this for all of Europe, but in the UK you can pick your company name as long as it cannot be confused with the name of another UK company (and some other rules, like you cannot name it Her Royal Majesty's Game Studio). Both companies may want to register trademarks, and if they register a trademark in the USA that you registered in the EU, then they cannot use their trademark in the EU, and you can't use yours in the USA. You can register your trademark in the USA if you're quicker. When you try to register a trademark in the USA, anyone with a valid interest can protest against it. If they notice the registration, they will most likely succeed if they object. If they don't notice – well, that's tough for them. I wouldn't say it's impossible to overcome your trademark, but it would be hard. | I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope). | The specific case depends on whether the foreign brand has protected their name in your country (you have very little chance), or whether the foreign brand is already well-known in your country (you might be up for a major fight and lose). There is the possibility that the foreign brand might grow and wants to expand into your country, in which case you might get involved in a fight with them, no matter who is legally right. For an example how that can end, visit www.nissan.com . It may not be a risk you want to take. | Is this actually true? Not really although there may be figments of truth woven in. First, the GDPR does not prevent tax authorities from determining layers of corporate ownership or investigating tax fraud. Second, your substantive tax liability depends upon the tax laws of the countries in question. If you owe taxes under a country's tax laws but the country can't find it, that makes you a tax criminal, and doesn't mean you don't owe the tax. Third, the exact rules on what triggers tax liability in mixed country fact patterns are highly technical and not fully uniform. If you actually do business abroad within the meaning of a country's tax laws in a way that is not subject to its taxes, then it is legal. But this scheme probably doesn't meet that standard under most country's tax laws. So you hire two local directors, as contractors, from country B. On the contract signed, they oversee the day to day operations and work for you as advisor since you're the only shareholder. So their existence, the contract and the structure show that the company is managed in country B, run in country B and has economic substance in country B. This way the offshore company isn't taxed in country A. This allows you to get dividends from the company tax free (after paying corporate taxes in country B) to your account in country A. A few thoughts on this specific example. If you truly are nothing but a passive source of funding for a company, then owning shares in this company is no different from owning shares in a public held company (e.g. BMW). The notion that dividends from the company are tax free in county A in that situation is very likely incorrect. Usually, dividends and other intangible income is taxable income in the country where they are received. Most likely, the dividends are income subject to taxation in country A. There is a concept in tax law which U.S. tax lawyers call the "Economic Substance Rule" which is also true, but with different names (most of these countries don't have English language tax terminology anyway) which means that when someone is going through the motions of conducting a transaction in a tax favored form when in substance, something different is really going on, the tax authorities can choose to tax the substance rather than the form of the transaction. So, if the really valuable work is being done by the shareholder without visible compensation, rather than by the local directors and managers, you the shareholder might be taxed on "imputed income" representing the fair market value of the services rendered, or treated as the true manager of the company in country B. Similar issues can arise when valuable intellectual property is transferred to the company without being duly reflected in a fair market value purchase of equity interests, a sale at fair market value, or a licensing agreement for royalty payments. Tax officials aren't limited to looking at paperwork. They can and do interview the human beings involved in interviews that those human beings are legally obligated to attend and cooperate with and to provide truthful information in with legal consequences for lying in those interviews. Even if no official documentation or public statements would tip off tax officials, a significant share of tax evasion cases are driven by whistleblowing by disgruntled former employees, ex-spouses, jilted significant others, mistreated business partners, and revengeful angry children who feel that they have been mistreated by their parents. Nothing in the GDPR prevents whistleblowing to tax authorities. Background In E.U. countries, closely held company ownership must be declared and recorded in a notary public's "public records" or a corporate register (unlike, for example, the United States, where, this information was only contained in the internal records of the company in most cases, although a new law called the Corporate Transparency Act effective January 1, 2022, or later if initial regulations aren't adopted, changes this status quo). E.U. directives expressly requires much more public disclosure by private companies than the U.S. more generally. For example, a recent Dutch overhaul of its rules for disclosing beneficial ownership of companies is a model of contemporary modern European legislation on the subject. This affords access to this information as follows (UBO is the Universal Beneficial Ownership registry and FIO is the Fiscal Intelligence Agency, an anti-money laundering agency): The public can only access the publicly accessible UBO-information with a valid registration and in exchange for a fixed fee. The identity of those persons that access the UBO-register will be registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and UBOs may inquire as to how often their information has been consulted. The Chamber of Commerce may register the Citizen Service Number (Burgerservicenummer) of persons who access the register. The FIU and other competent authorities will, upon request, have access to that information. The FIU and other competent authorities may perform a search in the UBO-register based on the name of an individual, thus listing all connections of that individual, while the public will only be able to search the UBO-register for the UBO(s) of a specific entity (and not for the name of an individual). Even though this limitation to search options was presented as a measure to protect the privacy of UBOs, it is generally expected that commercial platforms that register company information will enable searches based on the name of individuals. The FIU and competent authorities have access to both the publicly and not publicly accessible UBO-information. In the Netherlands, the following institutions are, amongst others, qualified as competent authorities with unlimited access to the UBO-information: the Dutch Central Bank; the Authority for the Financial Markets; the Financial Supervision Office; the Dutch Gaming Authority; the Tax & Customs Authorities; the National Police; the Public Prosecutor’s Office; the Dutch intelligence agencies; and the Tax Intelligence Agency. As this example illustrates, taxing authorities are given express statutory authority to gather information pertinent to tax collection. The Dutch situation, prior to the recent reform, collected essentially similar information, but at a decentralized basis in the offices of the notary handling the incorporation of the entity in question, with similar parties having access to the information. The E.U.'s General Data Protection Regulation generally, affirmatively extends to the provision of a good or service to an E.U. person subject to the regulation, something that would not include tax collection. See Article 3(2). Also, mutual assistance treaty obligations between E.U. countries to share information, which would include many tax treaties between E.U. countries, and criminal investigations (which would include criminal tax fraud cases) are expressly exempted from its scope. | German law applies As your mother was a German national, German law applies to all her property worldwide. US state law applies As your mother was a permanent resident of a US state, its law applies. Conflict of Laws It is unlikely (read impossible) that you will be able to comply with both laws simultaneously. You, therefore, have a conflict of laws problem that can only be resolved by the courts. In most cases where this particular conflict occurs, the local courts will accept that they have jurisdiction, and will also accept the court of nationality's determination that the applicable law is that where the property is - i.e., they will ‘accept the renvoi', and apply their own law to the inheritance of the property. You will need to apply to the German court who will probably decide that the US portion be dealt with using US state law and the German portion be dealt with using German law. You then need to take that decision to your state court who will probably acquiesce. Probably. Fortunately, as the US and Germany have a tax treaty, you will only need to pay inheritance tax once. |
How do you pay for LLC startup costs before it is formed without co-mingling funds? If I need to pay for LLC startup costs (like a virtual address, email, and state fees) before I can create my LLC (or business bank account), what account should I use? I'm concerned that using a personal account for these business expenses will lose me my limited liability protection. | Normally, a payment of LLC startup costs is booked in the accounting records of the LLC as an in-kind contribution to the capital of the LLC at its actual cost. This is not likely to be considered co-mingling if done to the minimum extent necessary. Co-mingling sufficient to impair limited liability protection usually involves using LLC property for personal expenses, rather than using personal money for LLC expenses. Reporting the expenditures as capital expenditures on an LLC tax form (typically IRS Form 1065) and amortizing it to take some of the expense in the current year will also provide a third-party confirmation subject to auditing of your internal accounting for the expenses. If you were really worried, you could, after the LLC has been formed, make a contribution to capital to the LLC bank account once you have one, and then cut yourself a reimbursement check for the amounts actually incurred out of the funds made available by the capital contribution against an itemized invoice with supporting information. The LLC would then amortize the expense of your reimbursement check as allowed under the relevant tax code provisions (historically, these expenses were amortized over fifteen years, but there have been some recent tweaks to that provision allowing shorter term expensing in certain circumstances, so check with your accountant). According to IRS Tax Tip 2021-166: For costs paid or incurred after September 8, 2008, the business can deduct a limited amount of start-up and organizational costs. They can recover the costs they cannot deduct currently over a 180-month period. This recovery period starts with the month the business begins to operate active trade or as a business. A good rule of thumb with respect to co-mingling and related issues is that all transactions of any kind between the LLC and its members should be reflected in clear, contemporaneous, written documentation. | Typically it works like this: Sales Tax: Owed in the state that the sale is made (in your case, New York). This is difficult in the internet age with businesses operated with no physical presence in a state. Technically sales (and local taxes) are due depending on where the item that was sold is delivered, so if you shipped an item made in Texas to New York, New York sales taxes would be due on that item. These taxes would be paid to the state of New York. Same for all 50 states. This is a huge burden on small businesses and is not usually enforced. Most small businesses only collect sales tax on items sold to the state that the business is operating from (in your example, you would only collect Texas state sales tax). Income Tax: This is the corporate tax levied by the state that the business is operating in, in this case it would be Texas. Since Texas does not have a state income tax, there would be no income tax. However Texas does have a Franchise Tax that would be due (this is due from all business organized or operating in Texas) The state that the business is registered in may have its own taxes which would be on the income of the business and would be specific to the state that the business is registered in. These can also be in the form of registration fees, annual fees, franchise fees, etc. | My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm. | This would not be "legal jeopardy" per-se, really the only remedy that Stack Exchange would have in a case like this would be to ban both accounts. It would be different if you caused SE some kind of monetary/reputation damages to the site itself. From SE's Acceptable Use Policy: Identity Theft and Privacy. Users that misleadingly appropriate the identity of another person are not permitted. It seems your described scheme would violate that term. But this isn't a legal problem, just an operational one. You aren't violating any law (unless there are local laws against this) by paying somebody to "be you" on SE. The most that this would earn you and your cohort would be a ban and probably removal of the contributions. | It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also. | What happens to a corporation, or any of its executives, when that corporation is dissolving but has unpaid state franchise tax fees that it does not have the assets to pay? You can't get blood out of a turnip, even if you are the tax collector. This said, if assets were transferred without consideration to someone, the tax due could be recovered from the recipient of the assets in a fraudulent transfer action against that recipient. Can these corporation liabilities transfer to their executives? Depends upon what the applicable state statute says. More than one state has franchise taxes and the consequences for violating them are not the same. The magnitude of the taxes are also not the same. In some states it is basically an annually filing fee of a couple of hundred dollars or less, and simply forcing the corporation to dissolve for nonpayment would be considered punishment enough. In California, franchise taxes amount to a full fledged and significant state level corporate income tax. Many states impose personal liability as a matter of law on directors of corporations that pay dividends or make liquidating distributions to owners of a corporation when it is insolvent. | The parties don't need to explicitly agree on the price beforehand, unless a law explicitly requires it for a specific kind of transaction. Contracts do not need to have all terms explicitly spelled out for those terms to be binding; it is expected that dental care has a cost, and if you don't explicitly specify the cost then it's assumed you're willing to pay a reasonable fee. They can't charge you six million dollars for a bandage, but there's a very wide range of fees considered "reasonable" for a doctor to charge. If you care more about the price, it's your responsibility to work these things out yourself before saying "yes." The dentist does not need to make you sign a written contract saying it's your job to check, because when you agreed to the care without asking about the price you already agreed to pay whatever would be charged (subject to the fact that courts will not enforce an unconscionable contract). California law requires hospitals to provide someone without insurance a written estimate of healthcare costs upon request, as well as requiring any hospital with a master list of charges for services to make it available to the public and to give anyone (on request) a list of average charges for 25 common outpatient services. It does not require medical charges to be set out in advance without a request, just like other fields of commerce aren't generally required to do that. | Defining the value of a privately held company is hard (tax returns don't provide a very informative basis because accountants will tend to under-value things like "goodwill" in order to avoid paying tax). However that doesn't matter for this stack, because the only legal question is: If I had some means of coming up with a number and presenting it, would it be legally acceptable to define that as their company value in a license? And the answer is: absolutely yes! You are pretty much entirely free to define terms in your license as you see fit. If you want to define "company value" as meaning "the annual gross salary paid to receptionists", go for it. (You would probably need to define what a "receptionist" is in this case). |
Is it illegal to download passwords in bulk from the dark web to make a password checking tool to help people? I remember some password managers like Google's would give me a warning about passwords that have been compromised. My question is this. How is Google or any company able to see that the password I have chosen matches one that has been compromised? My first thought on this is that they must have gotten it from 1 of 2 places. Either they themselves would do what a hacker would do and download a bunch of files with bulk information they could try for like 10 million account combinations. They could get this from where it would be seen first aka the dark web, or they get the bulk passwords from the company that says its been hacked and releases whose information was compromised. I am not sure though and would like to invite other opinions on how they are able to legally obtain the hacked data. Assuming they have some sort of contract with the government that says I promise not to do anything bad with this information. In general there must be some way to get like a permit to explore on the dark web in order to get information on the latest hacks. Seems like the quickest way to counteract hacks. | Most of the question has nothing to do with the law, it's about technical how-to or how-does, which should be asked in Information Security SE. There are two possible legal questions: is it legal to break into a computer system and take a database of passwords, and it is legal to acquire such a database obtained by someone else. As should be known in the US, per 18 USC 1030, breaking into a computer is illegal in the US. Given that, it is extremely unlikely that Google illegally breaks into other computer systems to obtain passwords. The aforementioned law criminalizes accessing computers without authorization, not (just) "taking" stuff from computers without authorization. The law does not criminalize receipt of illegally obtained material. Passwords are not protected by copyright. If Google were to induce someone to break into a computer system to get passwords, that would be legally actionable, however there is no law penalizing innocent receipt of illegally-obtained passwords (insofar as they are not protected by copyright). It is not illegal to access the dark web, at least in the US (probably it is illegal in Saudi Arabia). Using stuff gotten from the dark web can easily be illegal (e.g. logging in to someone's bank account, or forging a passport). There are many services which monitor the dark web and report breaches, which is totally legal. | First of all, Google's TOS says we reasonably believe that your conduct causes harm or liability to a user, third party, or Google — for example, by hacking, phishing, harassing, spamming, misleading others, or scraping content that doesn’t belong to you And you ask: But suppose a researcher, say based in UK, managed to work around them, get a big amount of data from Google searches and use it to publish some research. You're confusing methods with results. Someone uses methods to get a result, but if the results are not legal, the methods are usually illegal, too. Would the above depend on how they circumvented Google's checks (i.e., by using lots of proxies)? The words "or scraping content that doesn’t belong to you" means just that; it does not give any wiggle room for the actual method used to scrape. Could they get, theoretically, into trouble? Very much so. The researcher would have at least civil liability, and possibly criminal exposure. Would they, practically? Google can be very not kind to people who break their TOS. And Google has lots of money to spend on lawyers and court fees to enforce their TOS. Google would probably be able to easily prove the data came from their servers, and would probably have server logs to help prove it. And see user6726's answer for specific legal citations in the US and UK. | That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | Disclaimer: Not a lawyer or even living in US. I try to write the answer under US law. Other countries law may differ. Make sure you consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction. Here is my understanding of the individual examples: You don't need permission legally, because you are only accessing your own account and your own information. You are the only one damaged by the intrusion and therefore, nobody can really file a lawsuit against you. This is often used by security researchers when the subjects are uncooperative. That being said, if it is an actual pentesting client, you may want to refrain from it regardless. You don't need a permission to modify hardware you own. This is completely legal and not considered an attack. It would qualify as an upgrade, such as replacing a component in your laptop. You are allowed to do that. You should have a permission here. This is an intentional penetration test and you should have permission to do this. The same as 3. This is an intentional penetration test and you should get a permission. Though if you logout immediately and don't mess with the interface, it may not be illegal on the basis that you did not cause any damage or steal any information, or it may be illegal under some circumstances. It may also be impossible to prove that you did not do anything while there. | It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question. |
App that contains a feature that allows users to deposit money that they may use to purchase later or get refunded In my app / website, there is a feature for the user to deposit money that they could then use to purchase later or get refunded 3 months later. What is the legal implication of this feature? | An incomplete list: Getting the money. How did you plan to get paid? Credit card? Paypal? Integrating those into a website in compliance with their terms of service is not easy. (I wouldn't touch credit card numbers, in particular, even with a ten-foot pole. Too much liability risk for weak implementations. Too many highly skilled attackers to pounce on any mistake.) Distributing the App. Places like the Apple App Store have their own terms of service, especially regarding payment and in-app purchases. At a guess, Apple would reject your app, but if they allowed it, how does your withdrawal policy fit with the 30% cut they want from the initial transaction? Holding the money. So there are user accounts with a credit balance that can be withdrawn again. Would you be able to repay them if all users withdraw at the same time? Where do you keep the money? Currency risks. Say international customers pay in currency A, which the payment provider transforms into currency B. Then they want their money back, but exchange rates have changed. What do they get? Knowing your customer. There would be money laundering concerns. Do you have the infrastructure to identify your customers? Can customers change the (re)payment method from one account to another? Can you handle withdrawals if a user no longer has the same credit card, for instance? Scammers leaving you to hold the bag. Say a scammer tricks a victim into making a deposit, and then finds a way to redirect the withdrawal (see above). Would you be able to deal with the legal and administrative fallout? | It is unlikely that you could successfully sue the bank for breach of contract, but of course the first thing you should do is carefully read the agreement and see exactly what they promised. It is understandable that you would like to get your money right now, but that isn't necessarily guaranteed under the agreement. Assuming there is no statement in the agreement as to how long it will take them to deposit the reward once requested, they would have "a reasonable time period". I located on of those agreements, which says that it will be deposited 90 days after completing the requirements. If that is what your agreement says and after 90 days still no money, then you should speak to the branch manager and request timely compliance with the agreement. It would cost more than $600 to sue them, and the court won't punish them extra for missing a deadline (assuming this was not a deliberate and willful refusal on their part). | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. | There is a legal dictum, de minimis non curat lex, which might lead to an exasperated court official refusing to issue your lawsuit (with or without providing the $1 out of his own pocket to save everybody's time); I recommend you look it up. But there is no official term for what you suggest, although many lawyers might off the record provide colourful descriptions. If you wish to waste your money on such a claim, then obviously in your view it is worth pursuing. Clients often say "the principle is more important than the money", though they say so more often before they receive the bills than after. | Dale has the right answer, but I'd like to elaborate on why it isn't lawful (as compared to why it would be unlawful). I know it doesn't work that way on line, but it's simpler to think of a credit card as a physical piece of plastic. The bank will have issued this to their customer. It will have a number and an expiry date. You have no way of knowing whether a replacement card has been issued. Even if one has, the customer has authorised you to charge a specific card - you do not have the customer's authorisation to charge a different card with a different expiry date. By guessing the expiry date, you would be making a representation to the bank that the customer has authorised you to charge that card (if it exists), when they have not. | I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B). | england-and-wales The government grants limited rights of return (thanks Jen), for which you are entitled to a cash or cash-like refund (e.g. reversal of a credit card charge as described below). The vendor has the option to go above and beyond that statutory minimum as a courtesy to the customer. In that non-compulsory zone, they have the liberty to offer store scrip rather than a cash refund. Of course, any business can try to cheat you, and then you have to stick up for your rights by insisting or reporting to relevant authorities. united-states If you buy with a credit card, the rules and contractual obligations of the credit card companies oblige the merchant to accept returns by doing a refund to the card. It's important to understand how this happens: the merchant isn't just picking an arbitrary amount of money and doing a new "sale in reverse"... they are identifying a specific past transaction that already happened, and modifying or reversing it. That is a system safeguard so they don't credit the wrong person or be tricked into a reversal on a transaction that never happened. That's why they want your receipt. On a cash transaction, it is sellers prerogative whether to issue cash or store credit. Issuing store scrip is a reasonable option to deter theft and fraud. For instance someone who wanted an item could get it for free, by buying the item, taking it home, returning the next day without the item, grab another identical item off the shelf and sneak over to the CS line and "return" it with yesterday's receipt. With cash sales, that would be completely untrackable, and the thief is gone. With credit card, they have your identity; with scrip they can "flag" the scrip in their system to either prevent its use and/or have a security officer detain you if you try to use it. For instance American home stores will cheerfully take re-saleable condition items back even without a receipt, but will issue a store voucher for the value rather than cash. That policy would be a disaster if they refunded cash. As it is, I find it rather convenient! So if you want the convenience of cash refunds, you can just use credit cards - gaining the feature at the expense of anonymity. | People talk about "depositing money", "having money in the bank", and "withdrawing money" but these everyday expressions (used by banks as well as customers) do not accurately represent the legal reality. In the Middle Ages there was controversy about the legal nature of banking but in modern times it has been considered to simply be a debtor-creditor relationship. This legal position was confirmed by the House of Lords in the 1848 case of Foley v Hill. The relation between a Banker and Customer, who pays money into the Bank, is the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor, with a superadded obligation arising out of the custom of bankers to honour the customer's drafts; and that relation is not altered by an agreement by the banker to allow the interest on the balances in the Bank. The relation of Banker and Customer does not partake of a fiduciary character, nor bear analogy to the relation between Principal and Factor or Agent, who is quasi trustee for the principal in respect of the particular matter for which he is appointed factor or agent. This means that if you "deposit" money in a bank account you are actually loaning money to the bank. The money "deposited" is no longer your money - it is the bank's money (which is why they can use it to lend to borrowers). You no longer have the money but, instead, you are a creditor of the bank - you have a personal right to repayment by the bank of its debt to you. When you "withdraw" money from the bank you are simply requiring the bank to repay to you part of the debt the bank owes you. In most jurisdictions there is regulation of banking services which is designed to ensure that banks do not become insolvent. It addition there may be depositor protection schemes which ensure that if the bank does become insolvent depositors are protected to some extent (e.g. perhaps personal, as distinct from corporate, depositors might be protected to the extent of 80% up to a certain limit). But these schemes do not change the basic legal position that a "depositor" is simply an unsecured creditor of the bank with no proprietary rights. I think the point being made here by Virgo is that when someone deposits money in a bank the bank does not hold the money on trust for the person depositing the money. The depositor simply has a personal right to be paid the money by the bank - i.e. it is a simple debt. If the depositor is a trustee then the beneficiary has a proprietary interest in the depositor's personal right against the bank. Virgo is attempting to explain (by means of some theory contained in the part you have not quoted) how the beneficiary's proprietary interest in the trustee's personal right against the bank can get transformed into a proprietary right in the money itself so that the beneficiary is still entitled to it even if the trustee (or bank) becomes insolvent (or, depending on the circumstances, "trace" it in an equitable claim against a third party). |
Can lawyers ask judges questions? I came across a courtroom exchange on twitter Adv: I ask this question. J. CT Ravikumar: Who are you asking the question to? Adv: To the #SupremeCourt J. Shah: You cannot ask us questions. You can say 'I ask myself'. That's okay. Only we have that prerogative - to put questions to you. As seen in the responses below, to the general public, this comes across as highhandedness. Let's assume the lawyer is a newcomer still getting used to the system. What I'd like to know: Would judges in the courts of developed countries like USA, UK, France, Germany, etc. give similar instructions in their own courts? Or is this phenomenon, let's say, "uniquely Indian"? If so, what would be the reason a lawyer can't ask a judge questions? | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | The question seems to somewhat misunderstand the role of courts in the united-states The United States uses a common-law system, ultimately derived from the law of Great Britain as it was at the time of the US Revolution, and thus incorporating its history largely derived from the practices of English Courts. There was a period in this history where much new law was made by judges, although a great deal of it was also made by statutes, that is by Parliament. In theory such judge-made laws merely "discovered" what the law "had always been" but in practice judges made much new law. Since then the incidence of judge made law has greatly declined in the UK, and has declined even more in the US. I think that it is fair to say that Judges in the US do not now make new law with any frequency. There is, however, a major exception to this. In the US, the Federal Constitution is the "supreme law of the land", and no federal or state statute, regulation or practice may stand if it does not conform to relevant requirements of the federal Constitution. (Nor may any local ordinance, regulation or practice.) But the federal constitution is written mostly in rather broad and general terms, requiring for example that "due process of law" be provided, but but not spelling out in detail what that means. It is therefore up to judges, and particularly to the judges of Federal appellate courts, and most particularly the US Supreme Court, to say when a law, regulation, or practice is in violation of some constitutional requirement, and what must be done to avoid such conflict. One example is the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holding that when admissions or confessions by criminal suspects questioned while under arrest were admitted into criminal trials, this violated the defendants' rights against compelled self-incrimination unless they had been advised of their rights under the law, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel. This introduced a new substantive rule of law as a way to enforce a long-existing constitutional provision. The Wikipedia article says: Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. But the concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing". A more recent example is the case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) in which the US Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment together guaranteed a right to same-sex couples to marry. This again was a new substantive rule, significantly different from the previous practice for most of US history, as a way of defining and enforcing long-existing constitutional provisions. Related to these are cases where a law, or a provision of a law, is held to be unconstitutional, and thus not a valid law at all. An unconstitutional law may not validly be enforced. Such a case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) which held that laws requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance (flag salute) in schools were unconstitutional. These sorts of actions do not occur in those common-law countries which do not have a formal written constitution that is superior to laws passed by the legislature. That is the case in the UK, for example. Aside from that sort of case, where constitutional rights are being asserted or constitutional requirements are being enforced, the main power of US judges over the law is to interpret the law (both statute and regulation) when it is unclear or ambiguous, and to decide exactly what it will mean and how it will be applied. These interpretations can be changed or completely reversed by later legislative action, that is by new laws passed by Congress or by a State legislature. This sort of interpretation occurs in all common-law countries, and also in civil-law countries, although to a somewhat lesser degree in civil-law countries. In general, civil-law countries tend to spell out their law in more specific detail in laws passed by the legislature, leaving somewhat less room for interpretation by courts and judges. By the way, my understanding is that Indonesia is not strictly a civil-law country, but uses a mixture of systems. The Wikipedia article "Law of Indonesia " says: Law of Indonesia is based on a civil law system, intermixed with customary law and the Roman Dutch law. Before the Dutch colonisation in the sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms ruled the archipelago independently with their own custom laws, known as adat. Foreign influences from India, China and Arabia have not only affected the culture, but also weighed in the customary adat laws. I cannot speak to the specifics of how the courts of Indonesia have interpreted the law on drugs in that country. | Yes, you can be compelled by the government to reveal information: All it takes is a judge agreeing with a plaintiff or prosecutor that it has some relevance to a complaint over which the court has jurisdiction. If that point arrives and you want to protect that information you only have three choices: Get a legal team good enough to convince the court otherwise. Face the consequences of contempt of court for failing to supply the information requested. Flee to another jurisdiction before #2 happens. | In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so. | Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that. | Almost none of this is written down anywhere in official court rules but there are some widely adopted standards for this practice. Most courts require that only one lawyer be in charge of speaking at any given stage of the trial. But, it wouldn't be unusual, for example, for one lawyer to question most of the witnesses and for a different lawyer who is more familiar with the specialized subject matter in question (e.g. electrical specifications), usually a junior lawyer, to question the expert witnesses in a case. Also, if the usually designated lawyer is absent for some reason (stuck in traffic, sick, etc.), the "second chair" lawyer can (and is often required to) take over the case for the client until the "first chair" lawyer is available again. Mostly, second chair lawyers (I've spent plenty of time over the years in this role) do the following (a non-exclusive list): take notes, pay attention to how the judge and jury are reacting to testimony, provide input into jury selection decisions, reminds the primary lawyer of points that still need to be covered in the examination of a witness, reminds the primary lawyer of exhibits that still need to be formally offered into evidence, scrambles to find rebuttal or impeachment evidence for unanticipated testimony, prompts the primary lawyer to make objections if the primary lawyer was paying attention to something else, identifies and has at the ready exhibits needs to present (or to follow the other side's examination), looks up points of law that are relevant or will need to be referenced that come up during trial, handles logistics for witnesses who are not on the stand (keeping them in the hallway if the witness is sequestered, trying to obtain the appearance of no show witnesses or reshuffling their order, saying thank you to witnesses who are no longer on the stand, etc.), carries some of the litigation team's stuff into and out of the court room, provides informed commentary and suggestions during breaks and working lunches, etc. Also, in addition to the usual "first chair" and "second chair" roles, often supplemented by a paralegal or legal assistant, there is a different kind of arrangement in which different lawyers for the same person can fully participate. This far less common arrangement happens when the person showing up in court is wearing "more than one hat" and has a different lawyer in different capacities. For example, suppose that someone is the President of a corporation and both the corporation and the President individually are both sued. There might be one primary lawyer for the corporation and one for the President personally, and both lawyers might participate fully. | An interrogation isn't necessarily a sit-down-in-a-room thing. Miranda v. Arizona clarifies what they mean by "interrogation" for the purposes of that opinion: By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. If any post-arrest questioning might happen, it is prudent to inform the defendant of their rights. Miranda also reminds us that: Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. [...] Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment, and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. The police are not required to give a Miranda warning in order to make use of statements that the defendant volunteers while in custody. But, police generally can't predict when they might ask the defendant a question (or otherwise make the defendant feel compelled to answer). | I am guessing that the question is about the United States, since the "objection!" procedure is not the same in other places. The Supreme Court has held that even though you have the right to represent yourself, this is conditional on your maintenance of proper conduct. If you disrupt proceedings and disregard judicial directions, then the judge can find you in contempt of court, just as with anybody else who was doing that. In Illinois v Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), a self-represented litigant "started to argue with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful manner", threatened the judge's life, and made clear that he intended to filibuster the process, saying "There is going to be no proceeding. I'm going to start talking and I'm going to keep on talking all through the trial. There's not going to be no trial like this." The judge ordered him removed from the courtroom on several instances of this behavior, and also appointed professional counsel. Following a series of appeals against all this, the Supreme Court ultimately said: Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464 (1938), we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course. be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. |
Is Apple violating any specific rights of mine by preventing me from taking a fair use screenshot? Apple's Safari web browser prevents you from taking a screenshot of DRM (Digital Rights Management) content, such as Netflix movies, by blacking out that part of screen (when taking screenshot) which has the movie (as seen the the screenshot). This is done in order to prevent piracy, and I get it. However, my question is if Apple doesn't actually infringe any rights here? Because, for example, can't I opt to take a screenshot of a movie, to use it in a blog post? I believe Apple is infringing some right of the user here. | Apple has no obligation to allow you to make fair-use copies or extracts. You have no affirmative right to make them, even if it is not against the law to do so. | It's Problematic The castle is both copyright and trade mark of Disney. As a trade mark, you are not permitted to use it in a way that indicates that yours is a Disney product or affiliated with Disney - you are probably OK here. As a copyright, Disney has the exclusive right to make derivative works which is what your mosaic is. So, you either need Disney's permission or the work needs to fall under the fair use exemption. As a single domestic work which substantially changes the original it probably does but the only way to know for sure is get sued and win. If you go ahead I would ask your client to indemnify you, however, this is only effective to the extent that your client has the financial resources to defend the lawsuit or pay the damages. However, there is an alternative. The Cinderella Castle was inspired by real architecture, all of which is public domain. If you copy one of these castles (e.g. Neuschwanstein Castle) you have no issues with Disney and only a true fanatic would notice the difference. | There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question. | No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though. | You can take pictures of public buildings and use them in your game, if you want. You cannot copy pictures (of anything) taken by someone else without the copyright owner's permission, so you need Google's permission to copy their photographs. The public building exception is specifically about architectural works and does not include e.g. murals drawn on buildings, or billboards. In such a case, you would need permission from the copyright holder (the artist, or employer). You might hope for a fair use exception (again, assuming you took the pictures yourself), which has a better chance of succeeding if this is a free game. | may require that you obtain license rights from third-party owners or licensors of content that you include in your text inputs (Emphasis mine). Based solely on the excerpt above, yes, you have the copyright on the audio files if you created the source material, as you are the creator, using Amazon Polly as/to generate a "tangible medium". One of the central rights granted by copyright is to control translation into a different medium (in this case, from text into audio), as is the right to control distribution, which is what this excerpt is talking about. "Third party" in this case means neither you nor Amazon. Basically, Amazon is informing you that using their software on someone else's copyrighted material does not grant you copyright on the audio recording. | Although you aren't interested in the TOS, you should be. You are not allowed to make any copy of other people's stuff without permission. The TOS is how you get permission. First, the author uploads his material to You Tube, because he has an account and the TOS associated with the account specifies the license that he grants to You Tube and the world – same thing with Stack Exchange. The TOS says (roughly) "when you upload stuff, you give permission for others to access your stuff using the You Tube interface". Content-consumers likewise are allowed to stream content using their interface, but not generally download. (The license terms changes over time – previously there were more license types). Specifically, You are not allowed to: access, reproduce, download, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, alter, modify or otherwise use any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as expressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if applicable, the respective rights holders; and they don't expressly authorize ordinary download, you have to use their interface. You might also directly contact the author of the work in question and negotiate a deal where you can directly acquire a license from the rights-owner. But if you want to access the material via You Tube, you have to do it in a way that is permitted, and You Tube says that you're not permitted to download. Any "copying without permission" is infringement. | "Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video. |
How can you sue someone if all you have is a name and email? If a contract is breached, the victim should be able to sue the party/person who breached it. But what if all they know about the other person is his/her name (potentially fake even) and maybe an email? If the victim doesn't sue the other party, then is there any point in the contract? | You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so. | a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself. | Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear. | No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated. | Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line). | If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | Technically speaking, such emails are copyrighted by the sender. However, showing such an email to a third party, or posting it publicly in order to comment on it would almost surely be a fair use in the US. In any case, such an email would have no commercial value, and so there would be no financial damages possible. A lawsuit over such a technical copyright infringement would, in my view, be quite unlikely, and even less likely to be successful. Indeed, filing such a suit would be one of the best ways for the business to draw attention to the issue, in an example of the Streisand Effect. |
Can prosecutors and/or judges be sued for dereliction of duty when they change charges to avoid a jury trial? Scenario (Utah, USA): A defendant is arraigned at a pre-trial hearing. Charges include driving without insurance and driving with an expired license. State law declares that those who do these things are guilty of misdemeanors in each case, and prescribes a minimum penalty for each if found guilty. The defendant expresses a desire for a trial, and seeing that these are criminal charges, he exercises his State and Federal Constitutional right to a jury trial to respond to those charges. The judge immediately prevaricates and solicits input from the prosecutor, who promptly adjusts the charges to "infractions". The judge then repeatedly affirms that a jury trial is not an option because no criminal charges are being made, despite criminal charges having been the cause of the arraignment. The judge attempts to coerce either a bench trial or a plea deal, repeatedly saying that since no criminal charges are being made, no jury trial can be arranged. The State Constitution also says that "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation". In the same jurisdiction, people arraigned with identical initial charges and with comparable evidences against them have been charged as misdemeanors, pled guilty or issued a plea in abeyance, and were convicted by a bench trial with no further findings beyond police reports or pulling their traffic records, and were left with a criminal record on account of the conviction, and required to pay a commensurate fine and being required to conform to additional sentencing. Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? | Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record. | The judge would reject the defendant's guilty plea and proceed to trial. This is a common part of a plea colloquy, which is a standard (often scripted) conversation that occurs between the judge and a defendant who is pleading guilty to ensure that the plea is voluntary and made with knowledge of its possible consequences. It seeks to ensure that the defendant is aware of what they're charged with and the consequences of their plea, and that they were not improperly pressured into pleading guilty—for example, because they felt that their lawyer wasn't doing a good enough job. This is required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11, which requires that: Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement) Many (possibly most/all) US states have similar rules. For example, Pennsylvania law states that "The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and shall not accept it unless the judge determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered." Examples of scripted questions to establish this include: Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this case by your attorney, Mr./Ms. __________? Are you satisfied with the services of your lawyer? [ Mr./Ms. defendant ], are you satisfied with the representation you have received from [ Mr./Ms. defense counsel]? If the defendant answered that they were not satisfied (and continued to give that answer when informed of the consequences of doing so, as occurred in the below example), the judge would reject the guilty plea and proceed to trial. It's remarkably difficult to find a case in which anyone has actually done this. The only one I could find was this New Jersey case in which the "defendant would not agree on the form that he was satisfied with defense counsel's work." The judge informed the defendant in various ways that this would lead to the plea being rejected and proceeding to trial: Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. ... The only other thing I can do is schedule you for trial, Mr. Cuevas, which you are entitled to. Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. I can't take your plea after you're telling me that you're dissatisfied with your lawyer. If I can't take your plea because it's not appropriate and it's not legal, the only other thing I can do is schedule the case for trial. | Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called "jury nullification." And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you "roll the dice" there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move. | When the jury is sworn in united-states Jeopardy is said to "attach" when the jury has been sworn in, or if it is a non-jury trial, when the judge first starts to hear evidence after a witness has been sworn. At that point the trial has begun, and a new trial would normally constitute double jeopardy, which is not allowed under the Fifth Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. Jeopardy also attaches when when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea unconditionally, and thereby ends the case (on acceptance of a plea, see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975)). Exceptions There are several exceptions to the double jeopardy rule. If the defendant requests or agrees to a dismissal, and agrees that it will be "without prejudice". This is unusual, as a defendant will not usually agree to a dismissal without prejudice, which specifically means that the case may be brought again if the state chooses to do so. If the first trial and the second are under different sovereignties. For instance, if one trial is by a state and the other is by the Federal Government. Or if one trial is by state A, and the other by a different state B. Or if one trial was in a court of some nation other than the US. The Double Jeopardy rule only applies if both trials are under the same government. A mistrial due to a hung jury (see United States v. Josef Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824)) or due to procedural error, misconduct (by a person other than the posecutor or judge), or a situation beyond the control of the court, such as: civil disorder; the illness or death of an attorney or a juror; Disqualification of a juror. If the two trials are for legally different offenses, even thoguh both are based on the same underlying facts. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), where the US Supreme Court held that: a[n]…offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. If a conviction was overturned on appeal and remanded for a new trial If the defendant was never truly in jeopardy at the first trial. The classic case is that of Harry Aleman in which the judge in the fist trial was bribed to manipulate the proceedings so that Aleman would be acquitted. See Could double jeopardy protect a murderer who bribed the judge and jury to be declared not guilty? and this Wikipedia article as well as this other article. The case was Aleman v. Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998). The Aleman case may be the only instance in which this rule has been applied. See also When is a trial considered to have happened vis-a-vis double jeopardy? Sources Online Articles Findlaw's page: "When Does Double Jeopardy Attach?" states: Double jeopardy protections in the U.S. Constitution keep criminal defendants from being prosecuted twice for the same offense. But the protection does not “attach” itself to a case immediately when a defendant is charged, nor does it necessarily end upon conviction. Once someone is charged with a crime, jeopardy attaches at the following stages: When the jury is sworn; When the first witness is sworn (for cases tried by a judge without a jury); When the court first hears evidence in a juvenile proceeding; or When the court accepts a plea agreement between a defendant and a prosecutor. The Justia article "Protections Against Double Jeopardy for Criminal Defendants" states: One of the core protections for criminal defendants is the double jeopardy rule provided by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The short version of the rule is that you cannot be prosecuted more than once for the same crime. It prevents prosecution for the same crime after an acquittal or a conviction, and it also prevents imposing multiple punishments for the same crime. However, double jeopardy becomes much more complex in some circumstances. The obvious application of double jeopardy is when law enforcement finds new evidence of the defendant’s guilt after the jury has already acquitted them. The prosecution cannot charge them again, even if the evidence shows that they probably are guilty. Another situation in which double jeopardy is clear is when a judge tries to sentence a defendant for a crime for which they have already served their sentence. ... Double jeopardy does not attach until the court swears in the jury, or until the first witness starts to testify in a trial before a judge. Filing charges thus does not trigger the rule. Double jeopardy attaches in a bench trial as soon as the first trial witness is sworn in. ... The federal and state governments can prosecute a defendant separately for the same conduct without violating the double jeopardy rule. Multiple states also can pursue separate prosecutions. Protection attaches only for prosecutions by the same sovereign. The dual sovereignty rule means that a defendant can face prosecution by both the state and the federal government, although often one will defer to the other. The federal government may have a right to prosecute a crime that did not cross state boundaries, occur on federal property, or violate a specific federal law, as long as it had some connection to interstate commerce or another area controlled by the federal government. The Nolo article "The Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy" states: The government must place a defendant "in jeopardy" for the Fifth Amendment clause to apply. The simple filing of criminal charges doesn't cause jeopardy to "attach"—the proceedings must get to a further stage. Indeed, in many cases, the prosecution can drop charges through dismissal or nolle prosequi, then later refile them. Generally, jeopardy attaches when the court swears in the jury. In a trial before a judge, jeopardy normally attaches after the first witness takes the oath and begins to testify. Case Law [Footnotes generally omitted] Serfass (1975) in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) the US Supreme Court wrote [Page 420 U. S. 388] As an aid to the decision of cases in which the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause has been invoked, the courts have found it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies are implicated by resort to the concept of "attachment of jeopardy." See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 480. In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn. Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973). In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (CA10 1936). See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 336 U. S. 688 (1949). The Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is "put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge." United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 195 U. S. 128, 130-131 (1904); United States v. Macdonald, 207 U. S. 120, 207 U. S. 127 (1907); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 208 U. S. 391-392 (1908); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426, 262 U. S. 429 (1923). ... Petitioner's defense was raised before trial precisely because "trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining" its validity. United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 395 U. S. 60 (1969). See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1). [Footnote 13] His motion to postpone the trial was premised on the belief that "the expeditious administration of justice will be served best by considering the Motion [to dismiss the indictment] prior to trial." At no time during or following the hearing on petitioner's motion to dismiss the indictment did the District Court have jurisdiction to do more than grant or deny that motion, and neither before nor after the ruling did jeopardy attach. ... [Pages 420 U. S. 390-392] It is true that we have disparaged "rigid, mechanical" rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458, 410 U. S. 467 (1973). However, we also observed in that case that "the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial." Ibid. Cf. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 303. Implicit in the latter statement is the premise that the "constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's guarantee" are not implicated before that point in the proceedings at which "jeopardy attaches." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 400 U. S. 480. As we have noted above, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach until a defendant is "put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge." Id. at 400 U. S. 479. This is by no means a mere technicality, nor is it a "rigid, mechanical" rule. It is, of course, like most legal rules, an attempt to impart content to an abstraction. When a criminal prosecution is terminated prior to trial, an accused is often spared much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment which attend a trial. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 355 U. S. 187-188; United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. Although an accused may raise defenses or objections before trial which are "capable of determination without the trial of the general issue," Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1), and although he must raise certain other defenses or objections before trial, Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(2), in neither case is he "subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction." Green v. United States, supra, at 355 U. S. 187. Moreover, in neither case would an appeal by the United States "allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first." United States v. Wilson, ante, at 420 U. S. 352. See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 484. Both the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its terms demonstrate that it does not come into play until a proceeding begins before a trier "having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. at 195 U. S. 133. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 329. Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy. [Emphasis added] Jorn (1971) In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) the judge found that several prosecution witnesses had not been (or might not have been) sufficiently informed of their rights against self-incrimination nor warned of the dangers they might incur by testifying. [Page 400 U. S. 473] The [trial] judge, expressing the view that any warnings that might have been given were probably inadequate, proceeded to discharge the jury; he then called all the taxpayers [potential witnesses] into court, and informed them of their constitutional rights and of the considerable dangers of unwittingly making damaging admissions in these factual circumstances. Finally, he aborted the trial so the witnesses could consult with attorneys. When the case was brought up for retrial, the defendant argued that such a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy clause. the US Supreme Court wrote: [Page 400 U. S. 474-5] The issue is whether appellee had been "put in jeopardy" by virtue of the impaneling of the jury in the first proceeding before the declaration of mistrial. In Sisson, supra, the opinion of the Court ... concluded, inter alia, that the "put in jeopardy" language applied whenever the jury had been impaneled, even if the defendant might constitutionally have been retried under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment. 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 302-307. [Emphasis added] ... [Page 400 U. S. 476-7] But it does not follow from the nonappealability of rulings which are essentially interlocutory insofar as they expressly contemplate resumption of the prosecution that Congress intended to foreclose governmental appeal from the sustaining of a later motion in bar on the trial judge's conclusion that constitutional double jeopardy policies require that the earlier mistrial ruling now be accorded the effect of barring reprosecution. ... [Page 400 U. S. 479-481] The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing a defendant "twice in jeopardy" represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in federal criminal proceedings. [Footnote 8] A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial. And society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. Both of these considerations are expressed in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 355 U. S. 187-188 (1957), where the Court noted that the policy underlying this provision is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty. These considerations have led this Court to conclude that a defendant is placed in jeopardy in a criminal proceeding once the defendant is put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge. See Green v. United States, supra, at 355 U. S. 188; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 336 U. S. 688 (1949). [Emphasis added] But it is also true that a criminal trial is, even in the best of circumstances, a complicated affair to manage. The proceedings are dependent in the first instance on the most elementary sort of considerations, e.g., the health of the various witnesses, parties, attorneys, jurors, etc., all of whom must be prepared to arrive at the courthouse at set times. And when one adds the scheduling problems arising from case overloads, and the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the single trial to which the double jeopardy provision restricts the Government be conducted speedily, it becomes readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide. [Emphasis added] As the Court noted in Wade v. Hunter, supra, at 336 U. S. 689, a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Thus, the conclusion that "jeopardy attaches" when the trial commences expresses a judgment that the constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's guarantee are implicated at that point in the proceedings. The question remains, however, in what circumstances retrial is to be precluded when the initial proceedings are aborted prior to verdict without the defendant's consent. [*Emphasis added] In dealing with that question, this Court has, for the most part, explicitly declined the invitation of litigants to formulate rules based on categories of circumstances which will permit or preclude retrial. Thus, in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824), this Court held that a defendant in a capital case might be retried after the trial judge had, without the defendant's consent, discharged a jury that reported itself unable to agree. | If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error." | united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more "special verdict" questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called "courts not of record", a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record. | Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here). | I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers. |
When aquitted in a "The People vs XYZ" trial, is XYZ entitled to any compensation for all they went through as an innocent party? Say that Bob is put on trial for murder in some County. So the trial will be "The People vs Bob", and headed by the local government*. Bob spends weeks held in jail and spends tens of thousands on attorneys. Ultimately, Bob is found unanimously not guilty (e.g. due to some very strong evidence that obviously shows he's innocent). Is Bob entitled to any compensation from the government or anyone? A completely innocent man spent weeks in jail and had to spend thousands. Not to mention probably completely trashing his reputation. Can the government just do that to citizens and the citizens just have to live with it? I'm mainly interested about the answer for the USA, and perhaps California in particular. *I don't know how law works, so sorry if I'm not exactly write about the naming/jurisdiction conventions. The point is that it's the public government vs Bob. | Short Answer Is Bob entitled to any compensation from the government or anyone? Generally not, although there are some states where this is possible on a limited basis or in isolated circumstances. Sometimes Bob can get his non-attorney fee court costs reimbursed or can have his government employer indemnify him for his attorney fee expenses in work related criminal prosecutions resulting in an acquittal. California is among the states that reimburse people acquitted of misdemeanor or infraction cases for court costs incurred (but not attorney fees), but this doesn't extend to felony criminal case acquittals. A minority of states (including California and federal criminal prosecutions) have exceptions for malicious prosecutions that are groundless and/or frivolous where reimbursement can be sought in a parallel case. Washington State allows an award of defense attorney fees if there is a self-defense based acquittal. Most states don't require reimbursement of the attorney fees incurred for a state provided public defender whether or not one is acquitted, but some do, at least in cases of conviction. Six states require a defendant who is acquitted but found to have had some ability to pay the legal fee of the defense to that extent. Those states are Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire and North Dakota. In addition, Michigan, does not allow for recoupment of appointed counsel defense costs after the fact, but it does require all able defendants to contribute to the costs of their assigned defense. A completely innocent man spent weeks in jail and had to spend thousands. Not to mention probably completely trashing his reputation. Can the government just do that to citizens and the citizens just have to live with it? Yes. State law is the main protection and varies widely. The majority rule is to provide no compensation. Federal Civil Rights Action Remedies There can also be an award as part of the remedy in a separate parallel lawsuit for an intentional violation of a person's federal constitutional rights by a state or local official acting under color of state or local law, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the qualified immunity defense is overcome. Even then, there is almost never liability against a judge or prosecutor who intentionally violated the well established constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their court related conduct. But liability can be imposed if a judge's actions are complete ultra vires (i.e. outside the scope of his or her authority), or if a prosecutor participates in the investigative phase of a criminal case in a manner indistinguishable from other law enforcement officers. The only case I can recall where civil liability was imposed on a judge was a case where he threw a child who was not a party to a custody case (a sibling of a child whose case was before the judge) in jail without any legal proceedings for a few days on grounds that did not constitute contempt of court. Judges and prosecutors are not immune to criminal charges related to their misconduct or to removal from office or disbarment for their misconduct, however. Long Answer There are some U.S. states where almost all acquitted defendant are entitled to some compensation (at least for "court costs"): Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, and North Carolina without limiting reimbursement by type of case or type of defendant. Thus, all defendants acquitted of criminal charges in these four states are potentially eligible to receive compensation for certain defense expenses. But these usually don't include attorney fees, just out of pocket court process related costs other than attorney fees. Washington State which reimburses attorney fees incurred defendant a self-defense case has arguably the broadest provision of for awarding attorney fees to acquitted defendants who hire their own counsel. Louisiana allows discretionary awards of attorney fees as a general matter, but in practice, it is closer to the states and the federal rule that allows for malicious prosecution actions in exceptional cases. In the vast majority of U.S. states, an acquitted defendant is not entitled to any compensation. In some U.S. states, such as North Carolina and Texas, a convicted defendant must often pay the cost of their public defendant as part of their court costs, a debt which is owed to the state which pays for public defenders. In theory, at least, this reflects the fact that an acquittal is not a finding that the defendant is innocent, only a finding that guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Some states allow compensation for a "malicious prosecution" in a collateral lawsuit. For example, in federal criminal cases, the Hyde Amendment to the Equal Access to Justice Act, permits a criminal defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees if (1) the defendant are acquitted, and (2) “if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note. This is parallel to the standard for sanctions for a lawsuit lacking substantial justification in a civil case. A law review article from 2001 reviews how that provision has been applied. (Spoiler: acquitted defendants who are themselves particularly rare in the federal system with only nine successful cases from 1997 to 2001, rarely win Hyde Amendment claims in the entire United States. But it does happen now and then.) As survey of U.S. practice in these situations is found in a 2015 law review article (with relevant footnotes included below): This controversy is a national issue, affecting defendants prosecuted at both the federal and state levels.6 While the federal government has adopted a single, limited approach by which acquitted defendants may seek reimbursement,7 state approaches vary widely8 -from providing no reimbursement whatsoever9 to providing full reimbursement for legal expenses and attorney's fees in certain situations.10 For example, some states limit reimbursement to defendants acquitted of certain offenses,11 while other states limit reimbursement to public employees12 or to those who have been prosecuted in bad faith.13 Although there have been occasional scholarly efforts advocating compensation for acquitted criminal defendants,14 none reviews the existing state laws on reimbursement or how these laws are applied. At least twenty states provide some form of reimbursement to certain defendants.15 Civil-suit reimbursement is a separate but related issue. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-37-10 (2013) (providing that the attorney of a prevailing party in a civil suit may recover attorney's fees and disbursements from the adverse party); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 15-17-37 (2013) ("The prevailing party in a civil action or special proceeding may recover expenditures necessarily incurred in gathering and procuring evidence or bringing the matter to trial."). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651 (discussing several rationales for attorney fee shifting in civil litigation but refraining from expressing a preference for or against fee shifting). This Article focuses only on reimbursement for acquitted criminal defendants. The Hyde Amendment allows a prevailing party in a criminal case to recover attorney's fees and other expenses when the position of the United States was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012)). While states have taken various approaches to reimbursement, they have almost uniformly addressed the issue through legislation. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Sawyer, 620 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1993) ("Cost provisions are a creature of statute and must be carefully construed. This Court has held for over a century that cost provisions against the State must be expressly authorized .... ); People v. Lavan, 218 N.W.2d 797, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that the trial court's award to acquitted defendant of his costs and attorney's fees violated the sovereign immunity doctrine because there was no statutory authorization for the award). But see Latimore v. Commonwealth, 633 N.E.2d 396, 398 (Mass. 1994) ("As a general rule, absent a statute or court rule authorizing the award of attorney's fees and costs, parties are responsible for their own costs of litigation." (emphasis added) (citing cases)), superseded by amended rule, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15, as recognized in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 739 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 n.4 (Mass. 2000) (noting that Rule 15 was amended following Latimore in order to provide additional reimbursement). There are a few exceptions, however. For example, North Carolina provides for reimbursement through a constitutional provision, see N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23, and Massachusetts provides for reimbursement through court-made procedural rules, see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15(d), 25(c)(2), 30(c). See, e.g., James J. Belanger, Frederick R. Petti & James Berchtold, Seeking Attorney's Fees in Criminal Cases, NEV. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 6, 32 ("Nevada currently has no mechanism for compensating a criminal defendant who has been forced to defend him or herself in a groundless action."). Not only do the remaining states provide no reimbursement to acquitted defendants, but a few of them partially charge acquitted indigent defendants for their legal representation. Six states currently have "recoupment" statutes that require acquitted indigent defendants to reimburse the state for a portion of their appointed defense counsel's fees if they are able. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.1(a)-(b) (West 2014); IOWA CODE § 815.9 (2013); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.120(1)(b) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.3975(1)-(2) (2001); Id. § 178.398 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9(J) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1(2) (2013). A seventh state, Michigan, does not allow for recoupment after the fact, but it does require all able defendants to contribute to the costs of their assigned defense. See MICH. CT. R. 6.005(C). The United States Supreme Court, in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), upheld the constitutionality of recoupment statutes, finding that requiring repayment does not interfere with, or have a chilling effect on, the constitutional right to counsel. See id. at 51-53. The Court found significant, however, that the statute at issue in Fuller imposed reimbursement obligations only upon defendants who were actually able to pay. Id. Other states also have recoupment statutes, but those states recoup only from convicted defendants. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 161.665 (2011). The American Bar Association recommends that states go even further by recouping from defendants "only in instances where they have made fraudulent representations for purposes of being found eligible for counsel." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-7.2 cmt, at 92-93 (3d ed. 1992). See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) ("If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal."); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.110(2) (2014) (reimbursing defendants acquitted by reason of self-defense for "all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in[the] defense"). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1447 (West 2011) (misdemeanors or infractions); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.070 (West 2006) (impeachment proceedings); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-103 (2013) (misdemeanors). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 16-6.1 (West 2014) (acts or omissions arising out of one's performance of official duties); N.Y. Pur. OFF. LAW § 19(2)(a) (McKinney 2008) (actions within the scope of one's public employment or duties). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-327(B) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1447 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3923 (2004); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § ld (2014). See, e.g., Fotios (Fred) M. Burtzos, Should I Lose Just Because You Accuse?, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 101, 102, 104 ("A defendant who prevails, regardless of how that takes place, should not be mined or left significantly worse off for winning .... If the district attorney chooses to pursue someone in court and fails in that pursuit, the office of the district attorney should be required to try to return that person to the same financial position he or she was in before the prosecution began."); Omer Dekel, Should the Acquitted Recover Damages? The Right of an Acquitted Defendant to Receive Compensation for the Injury He Has Suffered, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 474, 474 (2011) (contending that the "prosecution should bear the various costs of an acquitted defendant's trial process"); Luciana Echazu & Nuno Garoupa, Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation?, 32 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 233, 234 (2012) (considering an economic model for implementing "a loser-pays-all rule" in criminal cases, with a focus on the rule's effects on deterrence and legal error); Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 584, 600 (1995) (suggesting that fee shifting should be applied to certain classes of criminal cases, including cases in which defendants retained private counsel and were acquitted, but only if such defendants can "prove their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence"); Russell E. Lovell II, The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs and a Reasonable Attorney Fee to the Non-Indigent Defendant upon Acquittal, 49 NEB. L. REV. 515, 516-18 (1970) (advocating for reimbursement for non-indigent acquitted defendants using a tort-like remedy to make them whole again); Keith S. Rosenn, Compensating the Innocent Accused, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 705, 706 (1976) (noting the devastatingly high costs of criminal defense work and arguing for the creation of a "a right to compensation for damages resulting from erroneous criminal charges"); cf Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants for Detention Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 407, 408 (2010) (arguing that acquitted defendants "should have a right to compensation for the period spent indetention before an international criminal court"). But see David S. Jones, How Many Shields Are Enough?, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 101, 103 (responding to Burtzos' article, supra, and stating that "[tlo say we need new legislation allowing [acquitted defendants] recovery of attorney fees, costs, or other damages from the government ignores not only the current safeguards for the accused, but also their existing remedies"). The article continues noting that: Ten states reimburse at least some acquitted defendants for their attorney's fees. l00 While no state provides attorney's fees reimbursement to all acquitted defendants, every state allowing for reimbursement of public employees includes such fees in their reimbursement laws. The ten states are: Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.3(B)(1) (2014) (permitting "payment of legal fees and expenses for defense"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) (stating that for certain unsuccessful appeals by the State, "the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-1-47(1) (2010) (authorizing municipalities "to investigate and provide legal counsel" to public employee defendants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 12-20 (West 2014) (stating that, for boards of education members, "the board of education shall defray all costs of defending such action, including reasonable counsel fees and expenses"); id. § 18A:16-6.1 (stating that, for officers and employees of boards of education, "the board of education shall reimburse [them] for the cost of defending such proceeding, including reasonable counsel fees"); id. § 40A: 14-155 (West 2014) (providing that, for members of municipal police departments, "the municipality shall provide said member or officer with necessary means for the defense"); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 19(2)(a) (McKinney 2008) (I]t shall be the duty of the state to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred by or on behalf of an employee in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding .... ); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-6-201(1) (LexisNexis 2013) ("[Public] employee[s] shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense .... "); id. § 53A-6-503(2) ("[A]n educator is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the educator's defense .... "); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.28 (2013) (stating that, for acquitted members of the Virginia Retirement System, "the Board may reimburse all or part of the cost of employing legal counsel"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.110(2) (West 2014) (providing that, for a defendant acquitted by reason of self-defense, "the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including ... legal fees incurred ... in his or her defense"); PA. R.J.A. No. 1922(A) (A judge may be reimbursed for legal fees paid in the defense of a criminal action .... "); supra notes 84, 88-90 (quoting Massachusetts' four relevant court rules permitting reimbursement of a defendant's "reasonable attorney's fees" for certain unsuccessful appeals by the Commonwealth). Footnote On Compensation For Wrongful Convictions There is also no general right to reimbursement or compensation after a wrongful conviction which is set aside, apart from a § 1983 lawsuit against a law enforcement official who intentionally violated the well established constitutional rights of the wrongfully convicted person. Some states provide by statute or court rule for compensation of wrongfully convicted defendants whose convictions are set aside, but state law varies greatly on the standard for determining a right to compensation and on the amount of compensation that must be awarded. Often there is no right to compensation absent proof of actual factual innocence rather than a merely vacated conviction, and/or wrongdoing by a state actor. Many states provide no relief or compensation to a wrongfully convicted defendant who is later released other than the federal § 1983 action if it is available. | Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages "not less" than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to "allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total".) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a "friendly" organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the "friendly" organization members, so that only the "friendlies" get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with. | was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity & import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly "Carol's sake" entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's "good legal reason" does not necessarily have to protect or advance "Carol's sake". | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. | This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter. | You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm. | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). | It seems like callous behavior which leads to a foreseeable death deserves a bigger punishment than just firing of the administrator. The starting point of the analysis is that no one is legally responsible, civilly or criminally, for a suicide unless that person intended that the person who committed suicide do so, which is almost certainly not true in this case. As a matter of law, a suicide caused by merely callous behavior not intended to cause someone to commit suicide is not foreseeable. And if the only actions brought are civil, then the University would be the defendant and the actual individuals who were involved would not themselves even face any trial. This is not accurate. It would be routine to bring suit against anyone personal involved (probably both the administrator and the gay student who allegedly colluded), as well as the University, and indeed, the likelihood of a recovery against one or both of the individuals would be greater than the chance of recovery against the University. To recover against the University it would be necessary to show that the Title IX violation occurred pursuant to an officially approved policy or practice of the University, but this case seems to have at its heart, a failure to an administrator to follow a policy of the University. It might be possible to sue the University or someone involved in the process for a violation of his civil rights, but generally speaking, his death would not constitute recoverable damages in a such a suit. Also, generally speaking, a Title IX claim requires that any party held liable to have had an intent to violate someone's civil rights, rather than that the person was merely mere inept or negligent in implementation or non-implementation of a bureaucratic policy or dispute resolution procedure. This is alleged by the Plaintiff, probably in part because it has to be to prevent the case from being dismissed on the pleadings, but is quite implausible that this really happened that way, and this is difficult to prove unless there is some really hard evidence backing up the alleged collusion. Generally speaking, the fact that a hearing board comes up with a wrong conclusion after allegedly not following proper procedure, is not actionable for damages and certainly wouldn't constitute fraud. UPDATED RESPONSE TO EDIT 2: there maybe other victims, in similar situations, who are not protected by the criminal justice system if nothing of what is alleged to have transpired is deemed illegal It is a common fallacy that if something is not a crime, that it is not illegal or that there are no remedies. A civil lawsuit is a common and often appropriate remedy for all manner of wrongs, and the compensatory and injunctive remedies for civil wrongs such as a breach of contract and torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress are often significant. This said, as a government entity, the University of Texas and its employees are probably immune to many tort causes of action that would be available against a private party engaged in the same conduct. In this case, probably the only viable causes of action against the University of Texas itself, as opposed to the responsible individuals in a particular case, would be for breach of contract for not actually carrying out its policies as impliedly promised, and for injunctive relief under Title IX insisting on new policies that would prevent misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. Generally speaking, a criminal law remedy is less victim oriented than a civil remedy and is outside the control of the victim, which can be traumatic for a victim who would prefer not to be involuntarily dragged into the criminal justice process. The notion that settlement is not possible in the criminal justice system is likewise mostly incorrect. There is a reason why we don't handle rapes (for example) in civil courts. Criminal justice system exists to make sure that, at least in theory, those who commit heinous acts cannot buy their way out of consequences of those actions. In fact, one can bring a cause of action for a rape in a civil court. I've done it. And, the lower threshold of proof, the lack of a right to remain silent without legal consequences under the 5th Amendment, the greater focus on compensation for the victim, and the greater level of control of the victim are all good reasons to pursue this route. Many cases of rape by people able to afford to pay compensation are also cases of actionable sexual harassment. In general, criminal law is the solution that is usually resorted to not so much because the acts committed are heinous, but because the typical person who violates a law that is criminally prosecuted is judgment proof and unable to pay compensation that is even remotely proportionate to the harm done, so a civil remedy does not discourage that behavior. Your typical rapist who is prosecuted in the criminal justice system isn't capable of paying meaningful compensation to a victim, although there are always exceptions. Preventing people from buying their way out of their wrongdoing is almost never advanced by criminal justice scholars as a reason for a criminal justice remedy. And, when I have clients who have been harmed, for example, by fraud, most would far prefer to receive compensation from the wrongdoer, than to see the perpetrator punished without receiving any meaningful compensation for their own injuries, which is the usual result in the criminal justice process. Most people think of the criminal justice system as more of a last resort when all other options fail than as a good first choice which it rarely is even when it is the least bad option. So back to the main question, what, if any, criminal charges can be leveled against the administrator and the false accuser if the alleged facts of the case can be confirmed to be true? In the fact pattern presented, where a public official at the University of Texas conspires with a student with whom the official has a pre-existing personal relationship to produce an intentionally inaccurate result in a University disciplinary hearing harming a defendant in that process, there are several university statutes that might form a basis for criminal action against either the public administrator or the conspiring student on the offense identified or conspiracy to commit the offense identified. In no case are any criminal charges against the University of Texas a plausible option in this fact pattern. Each of the offenses is a misdemeanor under Texas law. The best fit is "improper influence". Texas Penal Code § 36.04. This involves reaching an outcome in an adjudication for a reason other than one legally allowed due to someone's application of influence other than a bribe or kickback. The section states: (a) A person commits an offense if he privately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law. (b) For purposes of this section, “adjudicatory proceeding” means any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Two other possibilities are "abuse of official capacity", Texas Penal Code §39.02, or "official oppression" Texas Penal Code § 39.03. These sections and a related one, read as follows in the pertinent or potentially pertinent parts: Sec. 39.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly: (A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or (B) governs the conduct of the public servant. . . . Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY. (a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly: (1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment . . . (b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. . . . 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: . . . (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. (b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity. (c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor . . . Also, in all three of these cases, the fact that someone committed suicide afterwards is basically irrelevant legally. |
When do new members get sworn in as congress people? I have seen two sources (one was LA Times) state that new members are not sworn in until after a speaker is elected. If that is correct, how do the results of an election get reflected in that key election? | Ch. 34 of House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House explains that "The general practice for election of Speaker begins with nominations from each party caucus followed by a viva voce vote of the Members-elect". We know who those people are; one of these days, they may make the transition to being "Members", after the Speaker is chosen and sworn in. 2 USC 25 says that after elections, the oath of office shall be administered by any Member of the House of Representatives to the Speaker; and by the Speaker to all the Members and Delegates present, and to the Clerk, previous to entering on any other business; and to the Members and Delegates who afterward appear, previous to their taking their seats. It is up to the House to decide if "and" means "and after that". | The FCC Commissioner is appointed, per 47 USC 154, by POTUS, subject to approval by the US Senate (as a member of the Commission). Thereafter he serves for 5 years. However Article 2 of the Constitution allows removal from office: The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors. But only the House of Representatives can impeach and only the Senate can remove (of the President declines to do so). There is no provision for a citizen to sue to remove a civil officer. It is, of course, legal for citizens and others to lobby politically for whatever action that want Congress to take. "Net Neutrality" rules can be more permanently fixed by act of Congress. By act of Congress, the FCC may be required to, allowed to, or prohibited from setting some set of rules. Such laws are typically broad and leave a lot of discretion to the executive branch. Congress has not passed a law mandating "net neutrality", and as ruled in Comcast v. FCC the FCC lacks "ancillary jurisdiction" over internet services of at least Comcast. There have been previous attempts to legislate "net neutrality", such as the Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006 which died on the floor of the House, which purported to guarantee "net neutrality" via an extension of antitrust law. However, the only way to make such a provision permanent is to make it be a Constitutional Amendment, since an act of Congress can be repealed or amended in such a way that it effectively doesn't exist. | Speech of foreign nationals is not treated the same as that of citizens. In the case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of various statutory limits on campaign spending. Some parts of the law were upheld, others were overturned in 1st Amendment grounds. They upheld limits on contributions to candidates and volunteers' incidental expenses, and overturned limits on expenditures. In the decision, the court observed that [n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and "governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny'" The court stated that Even a 'significant interference with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. This is reasonably-standard strict scrutiny boilerplate language: what it remind you is that no Constitutionally-protected right is absolute, and all rights are subject to limitation, when that right conflicts with a compelling government interest. In the case of the federal contribution laws, that interest is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. The court then found that under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. 52 USC 30121 imposes a prohibition which, if placed on US persons, would be held to violate the 1st Amendment. That law prohibits, among others, a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election by "a foreign national", defined to not include lawful permanent residents but otherwise includes all foreign citizens and entities. The constitutionality of this law was challenged on First Amendment grounds but affirmed in Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (written by Kavanaugh in his previous job), and upheld in a one-sentence affirmation by SCOTUS. So, 1st Amendment rights of foreign nationals are not protected to the same extent as those of US citizens. It should be noted that the court also (expressly) did not decide if Congress could also constitutionally ban contributions by LPRs, or could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in other forms of speech (issue advocacy and speaking on issues of public policy) – that matter was left undecided. | He's not a judge in a courtroom with all the power of a federal judge. He's temporary presiding officer of the Senate, in charge of enforcing Senate rules. The Senate calendar is under control of the majority leader who passed the rules of how the trial would be run. If the rules don't say "must adjourn for the day by X o'clock" then Roberts would not be allowed to do so on his own, he needs a Senator to ask for adjournment and then get consent from the rest of the Senate. | If no President or Vice-President is picked by Inauguration Day, January 20th, then the Presidential Succession Act kicks in. The Act lists the line of succession Acting President. It starts with the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore and then goes through the cabinet officers. (You can see the full order of succession here.) You can read more here here and here. | The 12th Amendment specifies a process in case of failure. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President which means that there shall be a president until the House can reach an agreement. It is therefore possible that the acting president will be president for 4 years if no resolution is possible. If there is no vice-presidential choice either, the Presidential Succession act provides that the Speaker of the House becomes president until the situation is straightened out, which again could be 4 years in the future. | Not less than a full house of Congress, and perhaps Congress as a whole, might have standing. It is hard to see anyone else who would. The law of Congressional standing (the link is to a report of the Congressional Research Service, a policy research arm of the Library of Congress that does research for Congress) is quite involved and is not perfectly consistent and clear. Congress would argue that it has suffered an institutional injury as an institution and perhaps authorize someone to bring suit on its behalf via a joint resolution. As the Court explained in Arizona State Legislature, an “institutional injury” is an injury that “scarcely zeroe[s] in on any individual member,” but rather “impact[s] all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally.” There is considerable uncertainty regarding how this would be applied which is not really at issue in this case at the present time since Democrats control both houses of Congress and support the President in this policy. Individuals legislators lack standing to sue in a case like this one. See also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, "Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court", 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014); Matthew L. Hall, "Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation", 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539 (2012). A blog entry from a law professor considers the question and comes up with the Congressional standing analysis above, the notion that a loan serving company paid on the dollar value of the loans serviced might have standing (which isn't inconceivable but is a stretch), and finally considers "competitor standing", a minority view that I do not think is sound in these circumstances (because the forgiveness is retroactive only and does not change competitive positions going forward). | This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts. |
Could an international organisation be sued in New York, if they have a presence there but the crime happened overseas? Using sexual assault legislation as an example. New York State Senate passed the Adult Survivors Act in June 2021. This act created a one-year look back window for survivors of sex crimes who were 18 years of age or older at the time these crimes were committed. The bill behind this law has a long statement that includes the following section (formatting added) ...EVERY CIVIL CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST ANY PARTY ALLEGING INTENTIONAL OR NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSIONS BY A PERSON... This then could imply that an organisation that is accused of negligence in connection with a sexual assault case could be sued under this act. My question is somewhat more general however: Could an international organisation be sued for a crime like this, if the crime happened outside of U.S. jurisdiction but the organisation has a presence in New York State? ("Presence" here means a permanent presence such as that the organisation has been running some operation in the state.) | The law that New York passed does not create any cause of action, it overrides existing rules regarding time-barring of civil claims, so the quick answer to the question "does this law apply in that kind of case" is "that law is irrelevant". There is a general legal question about the jurisdictional limits of a court. For example, a foreign insurance company will be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a US federal court over a claim under a cargo insurance policy for a shipment to the US. The case Daimler AG v. Bauman seems to be similar to the type of case you are asking about. This case involves the Dirty War of Argentina, and the question of whether Daimler's business connection to Mercedes-Benz Argentina gives plaintiffs standing to sue in US courts over actions in Argentina. SCOTUS held in that case that Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by conduct of MB Argentina that took place entirely outside the United States The court first notes that For a time, this Court held that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons was necessarily limited by the geographic bounds of the forum but this has been modified to recognition of two personal jurisdiction categories: One category, today called “specific jurisdiction”...[which] encompasses cases in which the suit 'arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum' [and] distinguished exercises of specific, case-based jurisdiction from a category today known as 'general jurisdiction,' exercisable when a foreign corporation’s 'continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.' The court observes that "general jurisdiction has not been stretched beyond limits traditionally recognized". As I understand the hypothetical, the proposed wrong does not derive because of the defendant's connection with the jurisdiction, and the connection to New York (or any other state) would be that it might be forum convenient for the plaintiff to litigate in. This would fall under the category of "general jurisdiction" (assuming that New York is not the company's corporate home nor is it their primary place of business), and the state's courts would not normally have jurisdiction in that case (lacking any specific statute creating a cause of action and explicitly declaring extraterritorial jurisdiction). The underlying constitutional rationale is the Due Process consideration that a person (including a corporation) should not be be forced to defend themselves in courts in states where they have no real connection. The question that would be asked is whether the corporation had sufficient connection to the state that the state courts would have jurisdiction. We should also turn to three SCOTUS cases, Nestle v. Doe et al, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are considered. The Nestle court's analysis of the underlying principle starts by observing and citing from RJR Nabisco that First, we presume that a statute applies only domestically, and we ask "whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication" that rebuts this presumption. In Kiobel, the court states – reaching further back to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that [w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none, a principle which "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord) (EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co). The relevant statute under which these suits were initiated is the Alien Tort Stature, 28 USC 1350, which allows an alien to sue in US courts under certain circumstances, and states only that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States". ATS would clearly not be applicable to the case of a US person suing a foreign corporation, but the other cases have articulated a principle that transcends the specifics of the ATS – there would have to be a statute giving a state extraterritorial jurisdiction over the matter. | The ultimate answer as to why any given law is the way it is, as opposed to some other way that it might be, is because the legislature, or the courts if it is part of the court-made common law, chose to make it that way. Law is a human institution, and is not always logical or consistent. However, in this particular case, prohibitions on sex with a person under a given age (not always the age of majority, often known as the "age of consent") have a long history as a part of the law, which can be discussed here. The question seems to be missing a key detail. Where marriage is legal below the age of consent, sex within a legal marriage is normally an exception to statutory rape laws, that is laws against sex with a person under the age of consent. For example, the Arizona Criminal Code § 13-1405 provides in pertinent part that: A. A person commits sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person who is under eighteen years of age. But AZ Code § 13-1407 provides in pertinent part that: D. It is a defense to a prosecution pursuant to section 13-1404 or 13-1405 that the person was the spouse of the other person at the time of commission of the act. It is not a defense to a prosecution pursuant to section 13-1406 that the defendant was the spouse of the victim at the time of commission of the act. [§ 13-1406 prohibits sexual assault, defined as sex without the other party's consent. It includes classic forcible rape] ... F. It is a defense to a prosecution pursuant to sections 13-1405 and 13-3560 if the victim is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age, the defendant is under nineteen years of age or attending high school and is no more than twenty-four months older than the victim and the conduct is consensual. California Penal Code Section 261.5 provides in pertinent part that: 261.5. (a) Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor. For the purposes of this section, a minor is a person under the age of 18 years and an adult is a person who is at least 18 years of age. [emphasis added] Colorado Code [§ 18-3-402] provides in pertinent part that: (1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: ... (d) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; or [emphasis added] (e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of age and the actor is at least ten years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; [emphasis added] The Wikipedia article "Statutory rape" lists several reasons that have been given for such laws. It states: The original purpose of statutory rape laws was to protect young, unwed females from males who might impregnate them and not take responsibility by providing support for the child. In the past, the solution to such problems was often a shotgun wedding, a forced marriage called for by the parents of the girl in question. This rationale aims to preserve the marriageability of the girl and to prevent unwanted teenage pregnancy. [citations omitted] Obviously, this rationale does not apply if the parties are married, and the man is legally obliged to support his wife and child, as was the usual practice before modern times. The Wikipedia article also states: Statutory rape laws are based on the premise that an individual is legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse until that person reaches a certain age. The law mandates that even if he or she willingly engages in sexual intercourse, the sex is not consensual. When an underage marriage requires parental consent, as it does in some US states, this rationale is less applicable. Another rationale comes from the fact that minors are generally economically, socially, and legally unequal to adults. By making it illegal for an adult to have sex with a minor, statutory rape laws aim to give the minor some protection against adults in a position of power over the youth. Again parental consent provides some protection against this concern, and as the classic adult predator would not be willing to marry the victim, an exception for marriage does not enable such predators a free pass. In general social policy and public opinion have treated sex within marriage differently, and more favorably, than sex outside of marriage. Rules in the common-law system reflect this. The legal requirements of a marriage have been thought to offer protection (both for the underage person and for society) against the problems that underage sex would otherwise cause, and so consensual sex with a person under the age of consent within a lawful marriage is generally legal. It might be debated whether this is good reasoning, and one might argue that laws on this point should be changed. There have been changes, piecemeal, state by state, not all in the same direction. One common, although not invariable, change is so-called "Romeo and Juliet" laws, which remove or reduce criminal penalties when the "adult" is not that much older than the "child" (often within 3 years of age, although laws vary by state within the US) and the sex was consensual. These are described at greater length in the Wikipedia article. Note that the AZ and CO laws quoted above have such provisions, and that CA reduces penalties in such cases in a section not quoted. Details of the various statutory rape laws within the US as of 2003 can be found at "Statutory Rape Laws By State". This gives specific legal citations to the laws involved. These are often still valid even if the details of the law have changed. | However, if a website is based in the US and the terms of service say that the law governing the terms is US law, how can GDPR have any affect? It is unlikely that the EU will be able to enforce financial penalties against a company with no presence in the EU. But they could for example block your website in the EU, depriving you of your EU user base. The actual measures that they could or would take against such a company are still unclear, since the GDPR is quite new, and there has been no action under the GDPR against foreign companies. I'm not a lawyer, but I've signed many contracts in my life and nearly all of them have some form of "governing law" clause. The governing law clause in a contract identifies the law that will be used to interpret the contract and to resolve any disputes arising from the contract. The law identified in the clause does not become the sole law governing every aspect of the relationship between the parties, however. For example, a business in New Jersey could have a contract with a client in New York with a clause specifying New Jersey law as the governing law of the contract. But that does not mean that New York's consumer protection law doesn't apply to the transaction. | Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it. | Crimes are prosecuted either where they were committed, or where the harm was intentionally caused, or both.[1] The statute of limitations that applies is the statute of limitations in the country where the crime is prosecuted. Other statutes of limitations for crimes are irrelevant. Generally speaking, if a crime is still prosecutable in the place where it is committed and is a serious felony, an extradition treaty will require the country where the suspect is located to be extradited to the country where the crime was committed and the country where the crime was committed (in this case Norway), goes through the proper channels under the extradition treaty. (There are exceptions in death penalty cases, but neither of these countries have the death penalty.) The statute of limitations for murder in Portugal would not protect someone who committed a murder in Norway. Also, even if there was a statute of limitations in Norway (say it was an armed robbery not resulting in serious bodily injury instead), most countries don't count time that a suspect spends outside the country fleeing law enforcement against the statute of limitations. [1] There is an obscure exception to this for what amount to crimes against humanity that is not applicable in the case presented by the question. | If a libelous statement is posted online, and the victim and offender are from different states, which state would be more pertinent to the defamation case? I.e. which state's defamation laws, statue of limitations, etc. are relevant? First of all, a basic point. Defamation claims arise under state law, even though state law is required to conform to the limits imposed by the U.S. Constitution. Also, there are two distinct issue to consider. One is which state's courts have jurisdiction to hear such a case, and the other is which state's law should be applied to each particular issue in the case which is called "choice of law". In practice, the two issues often overlap. But this isn't always true. For example, you can always sue a defendant where they reside (or in the case of a business entity, where its headquarters are located) on a claim arising anywhere in the world. The courts of this state have "general jurisdiction" over this defendant. But, suppose for example, that the defendant resides in Maine, but the defamatory statement was made in New York State by the defendant when the defendant was located there to people who were predominantly in New York State, and the statement was about someone who lived in New York State and things that that person supposedly did in New York State. In that case, if a lawsuit were filed in Maine against the defendant (since Maine would have "general jurisdiction" over the defendant), the courts of Maine might very well apply the law of New York State to most or all of the non-court procedure related legal issues in the case. The law of the place where the statement is made can apply, and the law of a place where the statement was intended to be directed (e.g. a state where a known subject to defamation resides) can be applied to a defamation case. But, the law of a place were people merely incidentally receives knowledge of a defamatory statement is not a proper law to chose or forum in which a lawsuit can be brought, if (1) the person making the statement was not directing the statement at someone in that state and (2) the person making the statement did not intend that the person to whom the statement is directed suffer reputational harm in that state. The default choice of law rules (in the absence of a contrary statute) apply the law of the place with the "most significant connection" to the legal issue being applied and the same state's law is not necessarily applied to all issues in the case. In the absence of a showing that another state's law differs from that of the state where the lawsuit is filed and that it has a more significant connection to the relevant legal issue in the case, the law of the state where the case is being tried will be applied. Many states have specific statutes regarding the application of a statute of limitations from another state than the one where the lawsuit is filed in order to discourage efforts to apply the law of whichever state has the longest statute of limitations, and to discourage filing case in a state just because it has a long statute of limitations. In practice, a lot of the substantive law of defamation is limited by federal constitutional First Amendment limitations and by a common English common law source for defamation law. So, the substantive law of defamation other than the statute of limitations isn't that different from state to state. But, in recent years, the biggest difference has been that some states have enacted Anti-SLAPP statutes (SLAPP is an acronym for "strategic lawsuits against public participation") that disfavor many kinds of defamation actions procedurally. The existence or lack of an anti-SLAPP statute in a state may make choice of law important in a defamation case. A recent case illustrates that it is hard to decide which states's law applies (via this blog around April of 2022). Former California Congressman Devin Nunes sues Georgia-headquartered, Delaware-incorporated CNN in Virginia for allegedly defamatory claims made in New York about Nunes' conduct in Austria. The case is transferred to New York, but still governed by Virginia choice of law, and the New York court determines that, under Virginia law, California law governs the claims. The California Congressman objects that Virginia law would have applied New York law. Second Circuit: Virginia law would have applied California law. Dissent: Virginia law would have applied New York law. Or maybe D.C. law. A comparative international analysis of the choice of law rules that would apply in the same fact pattern can be found here. See also a Florida federal court case applying these tests in 2019. Can a lawyer licensed from any state handle such cases? Usually a lawyer must be licensed to practice law in the state where a lawsuit is filed (but not in a state whose law is applied by an out of state court). A lawyer from outside a state where a lawsuit is commenced can seek admission to the bar of the state where the lawsuit is pending pro hac vice which is an admission for a single lawsuit. But, usually a lawyer admitted pro hac vice in a state court must be affiliated with a lawyer admitted to practice in the state where the case is filed as co-counsel for that case in order to do so. | where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida. | The basic legal principles are as follows. First, a government may pass a law criminalizing an act, for example this Ugandan law which penalizes homosexual acts, their attempt, and aiding and abetting same. Second, a government has the subpoena power to compel a party to provide evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, unless there is some specific restriction enacted in the country – I find no applicable restrictions in Uganda. In principle, the government could subpoena records of an internet service, in order to find violations of the law. Enforcement of the subpoena is relatively simple within the country, but enforcement against a website in Norway, for example, would be virtually impossible, in that Ugandan courts do not have authority in Norway and Norwegian courts will not recognize such an order. Uganda is not a party to the Hague Service Convention, so the Norwegian courts will simply not consider the subpoena. |
Are towns and city names trademarked? So for instance, could I develop an energy bar and market it as the “Houston Bar”? Or even just have a bar with “Houston” on the packaging that was self evidently a bar. | No However, there are laws against misrepresentation. If you use the expression ‘Houston Bar’ for something not made or associated with Houston you may be violating these. In addition, the World International Property Organisation recognises geographic identifications which have the effect of law in many jurisdictions. These are a subset of US trademark law. | This is likely not fair use. At first blush it appeared similar to things one might see in The Onion (parody print and online newspaper) or other parody publications or shows (SNL, Key and Peele, etc.). In this case, the context would have likely been deemed transformative. However, since they are selling coffee called "Dumb Starbucks" while using their trademark, they would be be found liable if sued. You can parody a trademark brand, so long as the work is transformative such that the use of the brand goes from selling coffee to making a commentary in which the brand itself is relevant. Amendment I don't think this would pass the test as a parody/commentary. Originally, I failed to notice that they are actually selling coffee. This takes it out of fair use and they would almost certainly lose if sued. If they never sold the coffee, but just had it open as a performance art (like I had originally read this) giving the coffee away to complete the parody, I think they'd be fine. However, they are literally using the Starbucks logo, and selling the same product. This is clearly an infringement of their copyright and not fair use. Sorry for the confusion. | I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead. | From the patent angle, you will need to make sure that you are not infringing on a patented swing. That should be pretty easy at present because golfers are not patenting their swings. What Mowzer says about public disclosure probably has something to do with this. However, at least one golfer patented a swing: I would be more concerned with the right of publicity of the golfers whose swings you are selling. You can't use someone's name for commercial advantage without their permission. (I will leave this thought for another day: Can analysis of a golfer's swing, without reference to their name, be appropriation of their identity if the swing is so unique?) I am just going to rip this straight out of C.B.C. Distribution v. Major League Baseball, 443 F.Supp.2d 1077 (E.D. Mo., 2006), cleaning up some formatting and removing some citations. This is a good cite because it discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence and the New York origins of the right of publicity doctrine. The right of publicity is recognized by statute and/or common law in many states. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Right of Publicity and Privacy § 63 (2d ed.2005). A fairly recent concept, according to the Sixth Circuit in ETW Corporation v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 929 (6th Cir.2003), this right "was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum. Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir.1953), where the Second Circuit held that New York's common law protected a baseball player's right in the publicity value of his photograph, and, in the process, coined the phrase `right of publicity' as the name of this right." Subsequently, in Zacchini v. Broadcasting Company, 433 U.S. 562 (1977), 433 U.S. at 573, where a performer in a "human cannonball" act sought to recover damages from a television broadcast of his entire performance, the Supreme Court recognized that the right of publicity protects the proprietary interest of an individual to "reap the reward of his endeavors." The right of publicity is described in Section 46 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (2005), Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The Right of Publicity. This Restatement provision states that "[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability...." Relying on the Restatement, the Missouri Supreme Court held in TCI, 110 S.W.3d at 369, that "the elements of a right of publicity action include: (1) That defendant used plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage." See also Gionfriddo, 94 Cal.App.4th at 409, 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 307 ("The elements of the [tort of the right of publicity], at common law, are: '(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.'") To prove a violation of one's right of publicity a plaintiff must establish that the defendant commercially exploited the plaintiff's identity without the plaintiff's consent to obtain a commercial advantage. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.1983). | No An actual price is merely descriptive, amd cannot be a trademark, any more that "computer" can be for a PC. A phrase including a price could be a trademark. Once upon a time, Pepsi used the slogan "Twice as much for a nickel too" which ws, or may have been, a trademark. They hypothetical Christopher Columbus Pizza could use a phrase such as 'A new world of flavor for only $14.92", but not, I think, the price alone. | How come this is viable? Because it’s legal. What if people use their service to commit crimes? What if people use a Ford in a bank holdup? Or a Glock in a murder? Or the US Postal Service in a Nigerian letter scam? If the goods or services are legal and not provided for an obviously illegal purpose, nothing happens. | What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes | Just Do It. The preceding sentence is one example of a trademark that consists of common words demonstrating that it can be done. As to the podcast if you were duplicating the name of their podcast it would depend on a number of things including if they had trademarked that name, and how Apple's terms of service are for the iTunes podcasts. |
Date on Legal letter Very often, the letters will state to respond within x days from the date of letter. Are there any regulations for law firms, banks or credit companies to provide a reasonable window of time for recipients to take action? For instance, if the letter dated 28 Feb(Fri) and requires the recipient to respond within 3 days from the date of letter, is this considered valid? And also, if a legal letter has a typo on the contact number for recipient to reach out, is the letter still considered valid? Examples on the types of letters: a. demand letter. b. writ of summon. c. Letters of objection / challenging or contesting a determination d. settlement offers e. Cease and desist letters p/s: I don't know what is the appropriate tag for the question, please edit as needed. | Depends on the context Statutory timeframes Certain documents, like a Statement of Claim or an Adjudication Application, set very strict timeframes in motion by their receipt and there are real legal consequences if they are not responded to within a statutorily mandated period. For the former, failure to respond may result in a default judgement and, for the latter, it prohibits the adjudicator from considering a response. In such circumstances, the statute will set out the notice period. Contractural timeframes The document may be initiating an action where there are timeframes spelled out in a pre-existing contract. For example, what’s commonly called a “show cause notice” is a notice from one party to the other that they are invoking a contractural term that requires them to give the other party the opportunity to respond, that is, to “show cause”, why they should’t do something the contract then allows - like terminating it. In such circumstances, the contract will set out the notice period or, if the contract is silent, then a reasonable notice period is required - see below. Reasonable notice It is inherent in contracts, but also a feature of the law more generally, that when a specific notice period is not given, reasonable notice is required. What is reasonable depends on all the circumstances including the ability of the recipient to respond, the severity of the consequence of not responding, and the urgency of the issue. For example, a reasonable time to respond to an eviction notice will be longer than that required to respond to remove your vehicle that is blocking a fire escape - particularly if the building is presently on fire. Date of the notice or date of receipt? When measuring all these times, the question might arise as to whether they are from the date printed on the notice, the date the notice is delivered (or, in legal speak, served), or the date that it comes to the attention of the recipient. Again, that will depend on the circumstances and a statute or contract may measure time from any of those things. They may also have deemed receipt, that is, receipt has legally occurred even if it hasn’t factually occurred. For example, receipt may be in the ordinary course of mail for a posted letter - so for a letter posted by Express Mail, the next business day after postage even if the Post Office loses it. Any or all of these may be subject to their own measures of reasonableness. For example, even if the time is measured from the date on the notice, this would not be reasonable if the sending party waited 2 weeks before sending it. Similarly, if the recipient can demonstrate that they spent the last 6 months in a coma, it might not be reasonable to sanction them for failing to respond. The legal art of service, deemed or otherwise, is a whole subsection of law in itself. | What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law. | A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end. | No, in germany there is no universal requirement as to form (Formfreiheit). This includes associating a signature with a name in block letters. In principle you can enforce a contract in court even if the written contract does not identify the contracting parties by spelled out name, but by signature only. It stands to reason there is no benefit in omitting the full names. The legislature implemented elevated form requirements for certain legal transactions by mandating the use of a notary. Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature. The link between signature and person is established via the notary’s documentation. You could put an alias “Donald Duck” next to your signature, the notarial deed will indicate that in fact Kalle Richter signed the document. As far as I am aware all european-union legal transactions will need to go through their official channels. It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper. Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation. One thing is for sure, the european-union does not impose a “minimum framework” on its member states. I recollect there are some directives regarding electronic signatures, but that is a different story now. | While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws. | Supreme Court Rule 37 places the deadline to file an amicus brief in support of certiorari at "30 days after the case is placed on the docket or a response is called for by the Court, whichever is later." The Court doesn't generate briefing schedules for each case, so you have to calculate those dates yourself. A case is "placed on the docket" upon filing of the petition for certiorari. Respondents are not required to file any response to the petition, but in some cases, the Court will ask them to do so. Both events will appear on the Court's online docket, so you can find those dates and add 30 days. For instance, in Kowall v. Benson, the Petitioner filed for certiorari on April 15, 2022, so the deadline for an amicus brief would have been May 15. But on May 31, the Court asked the Respondent to file a response brief, so that kicked the deadline out another 30 days, to June 30. | It's based on the date the letter was received, not the date it was mailed. Since it's certified, it's not received until somebody signs for it, which starts the clock. The actual date isn't possible to calculate from the information on hand. The delivery receipt would have the date it was signed for, it would be prior to the end of the 30th calendar date from that date. Edit... Your new "twist" results in void service and doesn’t require action by the HOA. Certified mail is a service of the USPS, hand delivering or email does not legally count as "certified mail". If a contract requires service by a specific method (e.g. certified mail), then delivery by any other means is invalid and of no effect. | An oral contract is (usually) entirely legally binding (exceptions include things like land sales). Written notes do not change that. The important thing about nearly contemporaneous notes is that if the contract runs into difficulty and you need to litigate, they are likely to be accepted by a court as good evidence of what was agreed. They will be much more difficult for the other party to challenge later (they can be challenged now of course - which is part of why they are considered good evidence of what was agreed). |
Can I sue my neighbor if he fired a gun and a bullet goes through my wall and almost kills me? A neighbor two units down from me discharged a firearm inside the unit and the bullet went through both of our units and ended up in mine. If either of us had been using the bathroom we may have been killed. Is there any legal action that we can take or anything that we can pursue? | Yes. You can file a police report. You can also sue for cost of repairing any damaged property. | "Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well). | Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-). | You can sue anyone for anything. I will answer these on the assumption that the real question is whether there is a legal basis for such a suit. 1) Could someone open a civil action against the city of Las Vegas for failure to provide security? Or are city/county municipalities immune? And is the state of Nevada immune? This would not prevail. There is governmental immunity and there is no duty of care. And there is also no plausible argument, factually, that somebody in the government did something wrong. Note also that a comment accurately notes that the incident took place in the City of Paradise rather than the City of Las Vegas, and the question has been revised accordingly. Some states have a general victim's compensation fund that helps partially cover losses of crime victims, but I am not aware that Nevada has one. 2) Could someone sue the concert promoters for failures to provide safety? And/or was that safety limited to the actual physical area of the concert? No. The risks were unprecedented, unforeseeable, and there would have been no cost effective way to prevent them. 3) Could someone sue the hotel/casino for failure to provide general safety? What about failure to prevent the gunman from bringing weapons into the hotel/casino? The hotel/casino is not a guarantor of general safety. The trouble with "failure to prevent" is that the weapons were legally obtained and owned. While it could have raised suspicions, there was no crime or illegal activity to report due to the lax guns laws of the U.S. and Nevada. Notably, in a similar suit arising out of the Aurora, Colorado theater mass shooting at a showing of The Dark Knight Returns, a court dismissed claims of those injured against the theater because the crime was not foreseeable at the time and because the crime was an intervening and superseding cause of the harm. The precedent is not directly applicable, since Nevada is in the 9th Circuit and is a different state, while Colorado is in the 10th Circuit. But, the principles of law that apply would be very similar and persuasive to a court in Nevada. 4) What about the store that sold the firearms to the shooter? Even though those sales appear to have been legal in Nevada? No. As you note, the sales appear to have been legal. If someone could show that the sales were made illegally, or worse, were made illegally with knowledge that this was intended, that would be a different story. 5) Or one or more of the firearm companies themselves? No. The guns were not defective and were in compliance with federal regulations. Specifically, this is governed by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act which would also apply to the conversion kits that he purchased to make some of the firearms more like automatic weapons. 6) What about the shooter, his estate, and/or his family? I assume it can be alleged that they might have known of the shooter's plans and/or failed to intercede. Claims Against The Shooter The shooter is dead, so he would be hard to serve with process (i.e. you can't sue dead people, you can only sue their estates). Another way that crime victims often receive compensation is from restitution awards in a criminal case. But, in U.S. jurisprudence, criminal charges cannot be brought against dead people and are automatically dismissed if a defendant dies before he is convicted or after he is convicted but before the conviction is final. Claims Against The Family Family is not legally responsible for other family member's torts and crimes simply by virtue of being family members (although claims against a decedent's estate may impact them by reducing the inheritance that they might otherwise have received) and there is no plausible reason to believe that anyone, other than possibly his girlfriend, would have had any knowledge of his plans. He appears to have had a distant relationship with his brother who knew nothing, his parents are dead, he was not currently married, he divorced each of his two successive wives long ago, and he has no descendants. Claims Against The Girlfriend His girlfriend might have knowledge and involvement (her ID was used, but apparently without her consent while she was out of the country, and the $100,000 sent to the Philippines, probably for her, could be construed as a unilateral dying gift) and the FBI is investigating that, but there is no terribly good reason to think that she could foresee what was going to happen or acted negligently in some respect. She has denied having any knowledge in public statements made by her lawyer - she says she thought he was just breaking up with her when he asked her to take a trip to see family in the Philippines and there is no immediate reason to doubt her statement. There is also not a general duty to report crimes which one suspects that someone you know will commit in the future. One could argue that the shooter had an arsenal of guns that could have clued in the girlfriend, but so does about 3% of the total population, and a much larger proportion of the population that is wealthy and has a hunting hobby. So even if she'd told authorities about the arsenal, this concern probably would have been dismissed, and without causation there is no cause of action. The $100,000 sent to the girlfriend could probably be recovered for the creditors of his estate as a fraudulent transfer action against the recipient. This has nothing to do with the fault of the girlfriend. But, any gift made while someone has liabilities or anticipated liabilities in excess of his assets are voidable, and the tort liability anticipated in this case would have been far in excess of the shooter's assets. Claims Against His Estate Claims for wrongful death absolutely can and should be filed in his estate. He was a wealthy man and there should be enough to at least make some payment to every victim. It may be necessary for a public administrator or a creditor to step forward to open the estate as it is unlikely that the shooter's family wants that job. They would not want the job because the heirs will almost surely get nothing from his probate estate because his tort liabilities almost certainly exceed his net worth. But, it is important that someone step up to serve as the executor of his estate, because otherwise his assets could be depleted by failures to pay debts resulting in penalties and seizures of collateral, and by failure to collect property to which his estate is entitled such as rent and mortgage payments owed to him or to companies he owns. There is a strict time limit for asserting claims against an estate that can often be a short as three months after the date of death. The relevant statute is as follows: 147.040. Claims: Limit on time for filing A person having a claim, due or to become due, against the decedent must file the claim with the clerk within 90 days after the mailing for those required to be mailed, or 90 days after the first publication of the notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020. A creditor who receives a notice to creditors by mail pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 155.020 must file a claim with the clerk within 30 days after the mailing or 90 days after the first publication of notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020, whichever is later. If a claim is not filed with the clerk within the time allowed by subsection 1 or 2, the claim is forever barred, but if it is made to appear, by the affidavit of the claimant or by other proof to the satisfaction of the court, that the claimant did not have notice as provided in NRS 155.020 or actual notice of the administration of the estate, the claim may be filed at any time before the filing of the final account. The period of 90 days prescribed by this section is reduced to 60 days if summary administration is granted under chapter 145 of NRS. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.040. It is possible, and even likely, that filing new lawsuits against the shooter or his estate after his death, other than by filing a claim against his estate in a Nevada state probate case, would be barred by Nevada probate law, so that claims are concentrated in the claims process. Also, while federal courts would usually have jurisdiction over a diversity lawsuit brought by an out of state plaintiff against an in state defendant, there is a probate exclusion from diversity jurisdiction that requires claims to be filed in the probate estate rather than in federal court. The hardest question for the estate once it is liquidated will be how to allocate the estate's limited assets among unrelated debts of the decedent, claims of the deceased victims and claims of those victims who were injured or suffered property damage only. There are, of course, rules to govern that in the Nevada probate code and in case law. The primary rule that applies is as follows: The debts and charges of the estate must be paid in the following order: Expenses of administration. Funeral expenses. The expenses of the last illness. Family allowance. Debts having preference by laws of the United States. Money owed to the Department of Health and Human Services as a result of the payment of benefits for Medicaid. Wages to the extent of $600, of each employee of the decedent, for work done or personal services rendered within 3 months before the death of the employer. If there is not sufficient money with which to pay all such labor claims in full, the money available must be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the amounts of their respective claims. Judgments rendered against the decedent in his or her lifetime, and mortgages in order of their date. The preference given to a mortgage extends only to the proceeds of the property mortgaged. If the proceeds of that property are insufficient to pay the mortgage, the part remaining unsatisfied must be classed with other demands against the estate. All other demands against the estate. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.195. Of course, often people end their lives and go on killing sprees when their situation is much worse than it appears and it could be that he has debts that left him on the verge of bankruptcy with nothing left for others to recover out of his estate. Claims Against The Shooter's Liability Policies The shooter almost certainly had comprehensive general liability insurance policies in his businesses and homeowner's insurance that cover him for liability for negligence. But, these policies are required as a matter of public policy, and do as a matter of commercial practice, have an intentional acts exclusion. So, there is no reasonable argument that he or his estate were covered by insurance for his acts. Claims Against The Shooter's Life Insurance Policies and Retirement Plans As a wealthy accountant, the shooter probably have life insurance and probably had retirement plans. If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was his estate, the analysis is unchanged (but the IRS has a priority claim for taxes due upon the distribution of the retirement plan assets). Also, the fact that he killed himself does not invalidate his life insurance policy if it is incontestable (which is usually defined in the policy to mean at least two years old). If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was someone other than his estate (particularly if the beneficiary designation is more than four years old, removing the fraudulent transfer act as a challenge to the designation), the default rule is that these assets are not available to his creditors including the shooting victims. Some states allow an insolvent estate to invade certain non-probate transfers. I would need to do further research to determine how this applies in Nevada, but his probate estate might have a basis to recover some of the life insurance and retirement asset proceeds with third-party beneficiaries for the benefit of the insolvent estate. (There is also a choice of law issue presented. Many life insurance policies and retirement plans state that they are governed by the law of a particular state. It isn't always clear if that choice of law provision, or Nevada law, would control the question of whether an insolvent probate estate may access funds otherwise payable in a non-probate transfer to another beneficiary.) The main statute in Nevada governing invalid non-probate transfers is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 155.093, et seq., and it does not allow an insolvent estate to secure those funds, but I am not an expert on Nevada probate law and there may be another exception that allows an insolvent estate to reach these amounts. A Nevada statute which could be applicable to override these beneficiary designations says: SB 454, § 51. Creditor claim: General power created by powerholder Appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or of the powerholder's estate to the extent provided in chapter 112 of NRS. Subject to subsection 1, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is not subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or the powerholder's estate to the extent the powerholder irrevocably appointed the property in favor of a person other than the powerholder or the powerholder's estate. Subject to subsections 1 and 2, and notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision or whether the claim arose before or after the creation of the power of appointment, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of: (a) The powerholder, to the same extent as if the powerholder owned the appointive property, if the power is presently exercisable; and (b) The powerholder's estate, to the extent the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claim and subject to the right of a decedent to direct the source from which liabilities are paid, if the power is exercisable at the powerholder's death. As used in this section, “power of appointment created by the powerholder” includes a power of appointment created in a transfer by another person to the extent the powerholder contributed value to the transfer. Nev. Rev. Stat. § SB 454, § 51. The beneficiary designation could be reviewed as a power of appointment. Chapter 112 of the Nevada Revised Statutes is Nevada's Fraudulent Transfer Act. 7) And more of an opinion: could a group of victims attain class action status against any of those entities? Against the shooter's estate, yes. Against anyone else, there is not a valid cause of action unless new facts are revealed. On the other hand, since the probate claims process consolidates claims into a single case at a single forum before a single judge, it would usually be unnecessary to file a class action in this situation. Other Possible Plaintiffs and Defendants The Hotel The shooter damages the hotel's windows and his room, and he may not have paid his bill. These would be claims of the hotel in his estate. Criminal Enterprise Victims Josh Marshall at the Talking Points Memo is among those who have suggested that his spending was far in excess of his apparent source of income, and that he may have been engaged in some form of illegal activity which could conceivably even have caused him to decide to end his life. The shooter reported his source of income in real estate transactions as $1,000,000 per year from "gambling", which as Josh Marshall accurately points out, is pretty much impossible given the type of gambling that he engaged in which is overwhelmingly biased in favor of the House in the long run. Professional gamblers play games like poker where it is possible, at least in principle, to win in the long run without cheating. But, he didn't play those kinds of games with any frequency. One of the more plausible explanations for why he would gamble so much is that it is a form of money laundering that allows him to turn ill gotten gains that he would use to purchase chips at casinos into gambling winnings, in exchange for the house's inevitable net gains from his bets in the long run (which can be a pretty small percentage transaction cost, on average, compared to other forms of money laundering). If so, others may have claims against his estate, that compete with the claims of the shooting victims, under statutes such as RICO, based upon this conduct if there was any. Criminal Conspiracies Of course, if evidence came out that this was actually done at the direction of some criminal syndicate (perhaps to raise the price of gun company stocks?), that would be another thing entirely and one could sue the other conspirators (as well as prosecuting them criminally), but there is nothing strong enough to file a case in court that would survive an attorneys' Rule 11 obligations to file claims with a genuine factual basis at this point. It would be an avenue to investigate on the long shot possibility that this conspiracy theory was true. Such conspiracies are not entirely unprecedented. One mass shooting incident in Germany recently that was originally believed to be a terrorist attack turned out to have been motivated by a desire to influence the financial markets. Life Insurance Policies Everyone who has a life insurance policy that was killed could make a claim against that policy. The harder legal question is whether people who had only "accidental death" life insurance policies could make claims in this case. Worker's Compensation Claims Everyone who was killed or injured while on the job at the scene (e.g. roadies for the concert, security guards, police, photographers working the show) could make a worker's compensation claim against their employer's worker's compensation policy. This would include medical costs, lost wages and funeral expenses. Health Insurance Everyone with health insurance who was injured who was not on the job could make a health insurance claim for their medical costs. CGL, Auto and Homeowner's Insurance Claims Most comprehensive general liability insurance (CGL) policies of businesses would cover property damage in this incident. Most automobile insurance policies (but certainly not all) would cover damage to a car in this incident. Most homeowner's and renters insurance policies would cover property damage to property other than a vehicle in this incident. It wouldn't be unusual for a CGL policy for the concert organizers or the venue would have a provision that covers medical expenses up to a small dollar limit for injuries sustained by invitees (i.e. concert goers) at the concert or venue as the case might be. But, it wouldn't be unusual for there to be no such coverage. Travel Insurance Claims From the comments: Many tourists from the UK would have travel insurance. Other European countries probably as well. I checked the online terms of a random UK company, they would pay for the cost of hospital treatment or funeral in case of "unexpected injury", and I seriously hope they wouldn't claim that if someone fires a gun at you, an injury would be "expected". Plus travel related expenses, like transport home, just losing your flight etc. The one I checked wouldn't pay for disability except for "personal injury", that is something you caused yourself. And no compensation, just the actual financial loss. Tort Claims Of People Not Personally Injured The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress tort, which is recognized by Nevada, while by its terms applicable only to "negligence" cases not at issue here, allows recovery by someone who had a near miss with physical harm and suffers emotional distress as a result. There is a reasonable chance that Nevada courts would allow this tort to be applied to "near miss" cases of intentional physical injury. Pretty much anyone on the scene (roughly 22,000 people) could arguably make such a claim against the shooter's estate. Spouses of people who are injured can often make a claim for "loss of consortium" in Nevada for physical harm to their spouse, even if they are nowhere near the scene of the incident. These claims could be made against the shooter's estate. This would allow claims by several hundred people in this situation. Many of the wrongful death claims would be statutory claims of next of kin, rather than claims brought by their estates. these would be brought against the shooter's estate. Trivia Point If this had happened on certain Indian Reservations, there probably would have been federal liability to all Indians harmed in the attack, as the federal government has liability for all criminal harm caused by "bad men" on the Indian Reservations in question to Indians under the treaties creating those reservations. But, obviously, the Las Vegas strip is not in Indian Country, even though many casinos in the U.S. are in Indian Country. | I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith. | I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge. | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). | If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase. |
Can Amazon ask for my credit card statement? I have problems with Amazon, I was trying to buy a 30 eur gift card for a birthday but they put the order on hold and blocked my account. Then I got a mail stating that I should fax Amazon my latest credit card statement with my name and address. At first I disregarded it as phishing but then months later I tried to login and found out my account is just blocked. So I sent them an email and they sent the fax request again (see below). It seems very fishy to me, no shop ever asked me to do this and I do a lot of online shopping. I cannot even do it, I don't have a card statement like that, it's a debit card actually and who uses fax in 2016? I asked my bank if they had any experience with this but they haven't replied yet. Is it even legal for Amazon to ask for this? Thank you for any thoughts on this. Greetings from Amazon.de. Please note that your order is currently on hold pending the verification of your billing information. We will be happy to proceed with your order as soon as we receive a recent credit card statement for the credit card you referenced for this order. At your earliest convenience, please fax us a statement which displays the billing name and address for the card. You can find our fax number on the Amazon.de Help page: www.amazon.de/fax Alternatively, you can ask the issuing bank of your credit card to contact us with verification of these details. You will not be able to access your account online until this verification procedure has been completed. However, it is not necessary to open a new account or place a new order; we will complete the processing of outstanding orders once your billing information has been verified. Thank you for your patience with our security measures. Please don't hesitate to contact us by email at [email protected] should you have any questions. Sincerely, Amazon.de http://www.amazon.de There's no way to send them an email but their fax number is on their actual website. Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently: [email protected] Technical details of permanent failure: Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain amazon.de by amazon-smtp.amazon.com. [207.171.188.180]. The error that the other server returned was: 550 #5.1.0 Address rejected. | It is legal for a company to ask for any information they want as a condition of doing business with you, so long as their request isn't proscribed by law. I don't know of any jurisdiction where a request for banking or credit information is illegal. (In this case, however, it does seem like you are being phished. You could report the matter to your country's consumer protection agency.) | Disclaimer: Links are in German. My German is quite rough. Quoted translations provided by Google Translate. Turns out the question "Do I need an Impressum?" is complicated. I'll start with examining the case for companies, then work down to the average private citizen. Impressum requirement The requirement for an online Impressum comes from the Telemediengesetz (TMG) § 5: 1) Service providers are obliged to keep the following information readily available, readily accessible and constantly available for commercial, usually paid telemedia: the name and address under which they are established [...] Applicability based on country of origin The applicability of the TMG is described in §§ 2a, 3. Thankfully, there is a 2013 court case focused on these sections, involving an Egyptian company marketing cruises and not having a proper Impressum on their website. Also thankful is that law firm mth Tieben & Partner summarized this decision, because as it turns out, I cannot read judicial German. Summarizing their summary, §§ 2a, 3 sets the standard that the required information is based on a country of origin principle (Herkunftslandprinzip), where if that country of origin is Germany, § 5 applies. However, this principle is rooted in EU directives, and as such is not applicable to non-EU countries. For these, the law falls back on the older principle of market location (Marktortprinzip). If the non-EU company advertises in Germany and thus participates in the German market, then it must have a valid Impressum. I'll note that, the TMG considers Germany to be the "country of origin" if the company is either registered in or has significant operations in Germany (see the given sections for specifics). This is not the same "country of origin" as is found in copyright law. Applicability to private website hosts As it turns out, an Impressum is not required for private non-commercial websites. However, as pointed out by this Anwalt article, the wording of the TMG makes it such that omitting an Impressum may often be illegal. In particular, the definitions section of the TMG provides very broad definitions of "Service provider" (Diensteanbieter): Service provider shall mean any natural or legal person who provides his own or third-party telemedia for use or provides access to use; in the case of audiovisual media services on demand, service providers shall mean any natural or legal person who effectively controls the selection and design of the content offered, and "commercial communication" (kommerzielle Kommunikation): Commercial communication means any form of communication which serves the direct or indirect promotion of the sale of goods, services or the appearance of an undertaking, other organization or a natural person engaged in trade, trades or crafts or a liberal professions; [...] Conclusion In terms of variables like the one you suggest, the proper "variable" for companies is the country of origin. For private web hosts, I would argue that residency is the closest analogue to country of origin as defined in TMG §§ 2a, 3. Location of server doesn't matter, and I don't think citizenship does either. With that in mind, the values would be: Germany: Required EU: Not required Rest of world: Required if advertised/directed in/towards Germany. with the caveat that truly private non-commercial websites never require an Impressum. | Yes, your transaction history is your personal data. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. Your transaction history relates to you, and you're definitely identifiable for the bank. You have access to the transaction history to the app, which would probably satisfy Art 15 GDPR. You do also have a right to data portability under Art 20 GDPR which allows you to get your data in a machine-readable format – but strictly speaking this right only applies to data you provided yourself. You could try to explicitly invoke this right. Your GDPR rights must be satisfied without cost. Your bank almost certainly does provide machine-readable API access, in conformance with the open banking mandate from the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2, Directive (EU) 2015/2366). The Directive requires your EU member state to have passed a law that gives you “the right to make use of services enabling access to account information”, if you're already using online banking. However, the exact details of that right will depend on the laws in your EU member state. You might already be able to connect to your transaction history via Open Banking software such as GNU Cash. | It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money. | For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue). | The fact that the terms and conditions do not mention the word "disable" is significant, but not in the way you seem to think. You state: "...the merchant's T&C which does not explicitly allow the merchant to charge a fee for a disabled account". However, this doesn't mean that the merchant needs to explicitly state that they may. What it actually means is that the merchant does not recognize the term "disable" in the context of terminating the service contract. (Did they use stop, terminate, delete, eliminate, fall into disuse, log off, etc. or any other similar expressions?) You haven't defined what "disable" means, but perhaps it is more like a "pause" in service for which payment is still required? (Like having the post office hold your mail vs terminating all deliveries.) What you need to do is to read the section of the T&Cs that deals with terminating service and payment, understand what is required, and execute the procedures they describe. Whatever words they use, do that. If you have done all the steps and can prove it then you have a case against them, otherwise you are arguing semantics and interpretation... As to the title question, it does not appear that any "law" has been broken, this is just a contractual misunderstanding. P.S. This is the reason why I always set up payments through my bank to "push" money to vendors rather than authorizing them to "pull" money from me. When I am done I notify them and stop paying. I don't need to ask them to please stop taking it from me. | Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive. | What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law. |
Parliament's internal rules applying to non-members Rules established by parliaments to govern their internal discipline usually imply reductions of financial allowances on members, banning them from the parliament's grounds for a set period of time, or even expelling them in some countries and/or parliaments. These sanctions may usually be decided by a presiding officer, a special commitee/commission, or even the whole house. They are rarely appealable, and never (that I know of) before a normal trial jurisdiction (the EU's Court of Human Rights notwithstanding). Can non-members of these assemblies be subject to application of these rules ? There are things I don't include in my question, such as offences made under normal law on parliament grounds or against members of congress/parliament, or even enforced by parliament police. In particular, contempt of Congress (refusing to answer as a witness in a committee) is outside the purview of this question, since it's an offence established by law and adjudicated by a judge. Capitol Police ousting someone from the building at times when the internal rules say the building is closed also wouldn't count, if the person can walk away freely and no prosecution, sentence or fine is engaged. I'm mainly asking about whether a parliament's internal rules can be applied like a law on a non-member, and whether internal organs such as the president of an assembly can apply that rule the same way a judge would apply a law. | Yes The Browne-Fitzpatrick Privilege Case in 1955 resulted in the two being gaoled for 90 days for breaching the privilege of the Australian Parliament. They were, respectively, the owner and editor of the Bankstown Observer and the breach was an article in that paper that alleged that a then sitting MP, Charles Morgan, had been involved in immigration malfeasance as a lawyer prior to being elected. The men were grilled by the Privileges Committee of Parliament during which they were denied legal representation. The Committee determined that they had infringed privilege and the House, on the motion of the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, voted to gaol them. The High Court of Australia refused to hear an appeal as did the UK Privy Council (which was the highest court with Australian jurisdiction at the time). So, for things printed 300km from Parliament, Parliament decided that these men had broken Parliamentary rules and should be imprisoned. There is doubt, both then and now, that this was a political hatchet job. There is also no doubt that what was done was legal then, however, given that the High Court has since discovered an implied right to political communication in the Constitution, it may not be possible today. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | The Rules of Professional Conduct apply only to lawyers and are the foundation for a lawyer to be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred or receive other license related professional discipline. They are neither criminal offenses, nor on their own, a grounds for a civil lawsuit (although they may be relevant to an element of a civil cause of action giving rise to a lawsuit). The Rules of Professional Conduct also prohibit using a non-lawyer as a sock puppet to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. But, the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves are not applicable to pro se parties or even to non-lawyer parties who are acting fully independently of the lawyers they have retained. In some circumstances, a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(g) could also constitute the crime of extortion, or could constitute duress such that an action taken in the course of litigation or a business deal is not actually legally considered to be voluntary and making it potentially voidable. But this would not always, or necessarily even usually, be the case. Incidentally, Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 is one of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the most state to state substantive variations and it also has multiple differing interpretations even in cases where the language is verbatim identical between states. The appropriate scope of this rule as a matter of policy is one of considerable controversy. And, it isn't unusual for the converse to happen (i.e. for a criminal prosecutor or an attorney regulation system official to force the hand of a civil litigant in the course of negotiations about those charges). | The list is enormous. For example, if subpoenaed to appear in a legal case, you must appear pursuant to the order. If ordered to pay child support, you must pay child support. If you are an executive in a company, you may not act on the basis of non-private information regarding the company. Your comment that "If it's not detailed on this list, you'll probably never be concerned with it, eg, gun registration laws and other situations that don't apply to most residents" applies to a number of things on the list, for example most people are not called for jury duty, probably the majority of people are not subject to property tax requirements. most people do not have to register for the draft. By adding "If X...", you can make these into universal rules – everybody that meets the filing requirements must file federal income taxes. Non-citizens have a few additional requirements, but they are a drop in the bucket compared to the general case, obey the law which applies to everyone. | Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself. | There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process. | This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling. | No, abuse of power is not necessarily criminal Imagine a judge that is “heightist” - they always rule in favor of defendants who are taller than 175cm and always rule against those who are shorter irrespective of the merits of the case. This is clearly an abuse of power. It’s not illegal because “height” is not a category protected from discrimination (AFAIK). However, it is a failure to correctly discharge their legal obligations. |
Accident involving left turn into private drive and a passing vehicle Where does fault lie in the following situation; and what tickets if any should be issued according to Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and why? Please cite IL MVC code that applies. A 3 lane (unmarked) road exists that traverses north/south. Side street parking is allowed on the north bound lane. Side street parking is not allowed on the south bound lane and is marked as such. A vehicle traveling south is hugging their right curb as parked cars exist on the north bound lane. Traffic is moving in both directions with the center lane being used by north bound vehicles. A vehicle traveling south signals to turn left while in the right portion of their lane and comes to a stop to allow a oncoming traffic to clear and allow a truck to exit the private drive that they wish to turn in. (There is insufficient space for the South bound vehicle and the truck to use the private drive at the same time.) The south bound vehicle waits for the truck to finish its left turn and then proceed in front of the south bound vehicle. The south bound vehicle waits to ensure no additional north bound vehicles are coming (the truck obscures some of the road until it is further south) and then proceeds to make a left turn. At this time a 2nd vehicle traveling south comes up behind the waiting vehicle and proceeds to pass the vehicle assuming it's a parked car. The 1st vehicle proceeds to make a left turn and collides with the 2nd vehicle. The 2nd vehicle swerves more to the left in an attempt to avoid the accident; but the accident occurs anyway. The 2nd vehicle states the 1st vehicles hazard lights were on and that they thought they were parked being that far to the right. They indicate as a stationary vehicle they have an obligation to ensure it is safe to proceed before pulling out into traffic. The 1st vehicle states their turn signal was on; and had simply been waiting for a free and clear moment to turn left. They indicate they were not parked; and therefore had no obligation to check if it was clear behind them. Again who is at fault or what %'s of fault should be applied and why? For purposes of explanation's the 1st south bound vehicle can be called vehicle #1(red). The 2nd south bound vehicle can be called vehicle #2 (black). The truck can be called Vehicle #3 (blue). Example of Road: At this time these are the two IL-MVC codes which seem to apply; but there very well may be others; and I'm not sure 801 applies at it seems to be for intersections which I'm unsure this is. http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?DocName=062500050K11-701 http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?DocName=062500050K11-801 | The question asks for analysis of a specific accident, and I'll leave that to other answers. This answer is focused on conceptual misunderstandings in the question itself. Where does fault lie in the following situation; and what tickets if any should be issued according to Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and why? Again who is at fault or what %'s of fault should be applied and why? Lawsuits v. Traffic Citations It is important to understand that whether tickets could be issued according to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, and legal fault in a lawsuit arising from an accident involving a motor vehicle are two very different legal concepts. Also, there isn't necessarily only one person at fault or only one person who has violated the Motor Vehicle Code. Motor Vehicle Code Violations Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are analyzed one by one in a criminal or quasi-criminal traffic court proceeding where the issue is whether a fine or other punishment should be imposed for violating it. One person being cited does not mean that another person can't be cited as well. These proceedings would be brought by the "People of the State of Illinois" against each defendant by a government official at government expense. The government also has no legal obligation to bring charges for every violation that could in theory be legally supported by the facts. The outcome of the traffic court proceedings would be inadmissible evidence in a lawsuit arising out of the accident. Usually the police report will also be inadmissible evidence unless the police officer who wrote it is brought into court to testify in support of it, or the parties stipulate otherwise. Civil Liability In A Lawsuit In a lawsuit, brought by the private lawyer for a person who has suffered damages from the accident (called a "plaintiff") must show that someone else was negligent, which means that they failed to act with reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent harm to others, that this caused their damages, and must prove their damages. Private lawyers for the defendants whom the Plaintiff seeks to assign fault to are usually paid for by the defendants' insurance companies and argue against their clients having liability. A jury hears all of the evidence and assigns a percentage of fault to each party including the plaintiff. If the person injured is found by a jury to be at least 50% at fault, then there is no recovery. If the person injured is found to be less than 50% at fault, then the other parties at fault have legal liability to the plaintiff based upon their percentage of fault. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1116. Negligence in a lawsuit doesn't necessarily have to involve a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. A jury can find, for example, that someone was driving too fast for the conditions despite not violating the speed limit, or stopped too abruptly, even if those aren't Motor Vehicle Code violations and can find a percentage of fault based upon that conduct. A violation of the Motor Vehicle Code does not automatically translate to fault either. Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are a basis for a finding of fault, in what is called negligence per se, if the code section violated was intended to prevent the kind of accident that actually happened. Failure to use a turn signal, for example, will rarely constitute negligence per se in an accident where one car rear ends another car. There are very simple cases where one can truly state with absolutely certainty that only one party is at fault for purposes of a negligence lawsuit. For example, comparative fault is hard to argue in a case where a garbage truck hits and damages a building while the driver isn't paying attention and the building owner sues the garbage truck driver and his employer, although even then the issue of what damages should be awarded can be litigated. (Full disclosure: I litigated this case for a building owner until it had to be transferred to new counsel due to a merger of my law firm with another law firm that represented the other side in the case.) But usually (at least in cases that go to trial) there is at least some colorable argument that more than one person involved failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and if so, the jury must allocate fault percentages on a basis that it feels best allocates responsibility for the harm caused to a particular plaintiff by the accident as it sees fit in their good judgment using common sense. And, this allocation of percentage fault is almost impossible to overturn on appeal if there is any argument based upon any evidence introduced at trial that the people to whom fault were allocated indeed not totally without fault. It is impossible to say, as a matter of law, what percentage of fault should be assigned to each at fault party when more than one party is potentially at fault. This is question purely for the finder of fact (usually a jury, but the judge in a bench trial). | There are only two rules I am aware of that apply to rear-end collisions on a roadway (in which all vehicles are properly headed in the same direction): The first vehicle that hits another in the rear is at fault for the collision, and any collateral collisions. The preceding rule is always true unless there is evidence that the vehicle that was struck did something reckless or intentional to cause the collision. For example, "cutting" in front of a truck and decelerating unnecessarily and faster than the truck can brake. (Before dashcams became widespread this was a common tactic of fraudsters, who would subsequently sue the "rear-ender's" insurance company for "whiplash" injuries.) You seem to be asking whether there is a law or rule against coming to a stop too close to a vehicle in front. Tailgating is generally illegal, but I have never heard of the concept being applied to vehicles that are not moving. (Clarification on your question: "Stop far enough behind the car in front of you so that you can see the bottom of their back tires" is a safety heuristic that allows you to pull around the vehicle in an emergency without shifting into reverse. It's a "rule" of defensive driving, but I have never heard it written into law.) | This simply indicates that the lane the arrow is pointing to is reserved for the use of bicycles. Typically such a sign would be mounted on a pole near the curb, so that the arrow would point to the rightmost lane of the road. Another version of the sign exists with an arrow pointing straight down. This one is designed to be mounted on a cantilevered pole, so that it is directly above the bike lane in question. Where the bicycle lane is immediately adjacent to the curb, the ground-mounted version of the Reserved Bicycle Lane sign (Rb-84A OTM) should be installed. In cases where the bicycle lane is not adjacent to the curb, such as when a parking lane is present, the overhead mounted version of the Reserved Bicycle Lane sign (Rb-84 OTM) may be considered. If used, the overhead sign should be installed on a cantilever and centred above the designated lane, every 200 m or where visibility obstructions warrant. The cantilevered signs are not required after every intersection. (All images and quotes taken from the Ontario Traffic Manual.) | Pull over to the right edge, stop, and wait until the emergency vehicle has passed. Do it safely. California Code Section 21806: [...] the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection, and thereupon shall stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed. 21807: The provisions of Section 21806 shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property. | This would probably not be a drunk driving offense. Under the UK "drunk in charge of a motor vehicle" law: How is “in charge” defined? There is no definition of “in charge” and the courts have been keen to avoid an all-embracing test. In determining if a person is in charge the court will consider: Whether he was in the vehicle, if so where, or how far he was from it; What he was doing at the time; Whether he was in possession of the key for the ignition; Whether there was any evidence of an intention to take some form of control of the vehicle; Whether any person was in or near the vehicle and if so the particulars of that person. You could also be prosecuted if you are found in the passenger seat or the back seats. You do not have to be sitting in the driver’s seat to be considered “in charge”. However those that own or lawfully are in possession of the vehicle or have recently driven it are deemed to remain in charge unless it can be shown: that they had put the vehicle into someone else’s charge or can establish that they had ceased to be in control AND there was no realistic prospect of resuming control whilst unfit. Are there defences available? The law states that someone cannot be convicted of an “in charge” offence if they can prove there was no intention and / or likelihood of the vehicle being driven whilst the driver was over the prescribed limit. Unlike many other offences, with the offence of being drunk in charge, the accused must prove that they did not have any intention to drive the vehicle. The prosecution is not required to prove that the accused was likely to drive whilst unfit or over the limit. A defence is available if it can be shown that there was no likelihood of driving whilst over the prescribed limit and doing this should be established by expert scientific evidence or compelling circumstantial evidence. These defences are known as “statutory defences”. Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 states: “The defendant must prove that it was more likely than not that he had no intention of driving whilst the level of alcohol in his breath, blood or urine remained above the prescribed limit in which case, he is not considered to be in charge”. Our question is, if you "leave the keys on the front seat, the engine off and get in the back to sleep it off, would they have comitted an offense?" Since the person in the question had an intent to "sleep it off" rather than to operate the car while under the influence, he (or she) has not committed an offense. The burden of proof would be on him (or her) to establish that intent, but sleeping in the backseat with the engine off and the keys out of the ignition in the front seat, would be pretty compelling circumstantial evidence of a lack of an intent to operate the car while under the influence. There might also very well be a local ordinance prohibiting sleeping in a car in a particular place, but it wouldn't be a traffic violation. | When a pedestrian is in a clearly marked crosswalk, and didn't suddenly leap out in front of an oncoming car, the vehicle operator is legally obligated to stop. Stop, not merely slow down, see for example RCW 46.61.235 The operator of an approaching vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian or bicycle to cross the roadway within an unmarked or marked crosswalk when the pedestrian or bicycle is upon or within one lane of the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For purposes of this section "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway It is legal to stop and ask "Excuse me, can I pass?", or words to that effect, in case a pedestrian gets stalled. There is no defense whereby you don't have to stop if it is dark, or you are free to ignore pedestrians in the crosswalk if there is a bright light. The burden is on the driver to see the pedestrian that he is about to hit. It is also not a defense that the guy in the right lane did not previously cream the pedestrian. The pedestrian is not invisible, although perhaps because of the light it was not possible to see the pedestrian until the car is maybe 20 feet away. If the driver had slowed down in a manner appropriate to the circumstances (as is required by law), he could have easily stopped before the crosswalk. It is not a defense that "this street is posted for 30, I was doing 30", because you are never allowed to drive faster than is safe for existing conditions. | You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment. | The reason an at fault driver is liable for damage in a collision is due to the tort of negligence. To be liable under negligence one of the many factors that the plaintiff (that's you in this case) must prove is that the damage you suffered was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's (that's the U-turner) acts or omissions. This is where your case would fall down: a collision is a reasonably foreseeable outcome, damage to your braking system in normal operation is not reasonably foreseeable given that an emergency stop is something a breaking system should be able to do. This is simply a maintenance issue. |
In-court identification of defendants (Inspired by Can a lawyer subject the court to a (temporary) ruse for a legitimate purpose?) Under which circumstances are witnesses asked to identify people present (in particular defendants) in the courtroom? In which jurisdictions is this a thing? (I know it happens in the US; what about the UK, etc?) Are there rules mandating it (either local court rules, statutes, or jurisprudence), or is it something the parties may choose to do or not? If the parties choose, why would they do or not do it? | canadacriminal-law In Canada, this is called "in-dock" identification and, while not prohibited, it is recognized to have very little probative value. It has "particular frailties over and above the normal frailties attaching to identification evidence" and "adds little" (R. v. Izzard (1990), 54 CCC (3d) 252, pp. 255-56 (Ont C.A.); R. v. F.A. (2004), 183 CCC (3d) 518, para. 47 (Ont. C.A.)). | I've never heard of a rule specifically addressing this in the united-states, but I expect most courts would disallow it. I suspect a court would believe that the note-taking would be a distraction to the witness, whose focus should be on listening to the questions and providing truthful answers. The note-taking may be perceived as a distraction from the testimony for others in the courtroom, as well. If I were examining the witness, I would probably be entitled to see what the notes say, dragging out the witness's examination. Then the witness would want to take notes about my questions about her notes, and I'd want to see those notes, and you can see how it can get out of control. | How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases. | You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer | NY Est Pow & Trusts L § 3-2.1(a)(1)(C)(4) requires that There shall be at least two attesting witnesses, who shall, within one thirty day period, both attest the testator's signature, as affixed or acknowledged in their presence, and at the request of the testator, sign their names and affix their residence addresses at the end of the will. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the thirty day requirement of the preceding sentence has been fulfilled. The failure of a witness to affix his address shall not affect the validity of the will. That means that the witnesses attest to having seen you sign the will, and you must know that it is a will being signed. There is no requirement that they see the will itself, and they do not "attest" anything regarding sound mind, memory or testamentary capacity. It is not required that witnesses receive a copy of the will (for any reason), and it is probably extremely rare for them to do so. However, a witness could be called, during a subsequent court procedure, to testify as to relevant facts such as that a beneficiary held a gun to the testator's head. | What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. | united-states But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court"? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? Legal Ethics Considerations There are circumstances when commenting publicly on litigation violates the ethical rules for lawyers related to trial publicity See Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (the numbering system for professional conduct rules for lawyers is uniform nationally in the U.S. although the substance of the rules can differ in detail from state to state - Colorado's rule is fairly typical). Mostly this rule calls for avoiding statements that could prejudice a jury unless the other side has already done so and those statements need to be rebutted. This rule states (in its Colorado version): (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation. (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a). Statements such as "We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court" are allowed and are not terribly uncommon. But, making a comment about something that can be easily inferred from the publicly available documents filed in court provides little or no positive advantage for a litigant. Also, one doesn't have to say much to create at least a colorable Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 issue that a mediator can raise in settlement talks, or that a judge can be forced to analyze. Even if the claim of unethical trial publicity ultimately doesn't hold water, it still muddies the waters and distracts lawyers and litigants from dealing with the substance of the dispute. The Risk That A Statement Will Be Used Against You Usually, the main concern is similar to the concern about talking to police: Anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. For example, this week former President Trump's public statement about his knowledge of classified documents, which are the subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation of him, seriously harmed his position legally. (His statement was made quite a while ago in a semi-private forum, but at a time when the possibility of a criminal investigation still should have been on his radar screen.) In the civil rape-defamation case against him (as noted, for example, in this Law.SE answer), Trump's decision to continue to speak publicly about matters that were the subject of active litigation against him in an earlier case resulted in an extended statute of limitations and an opportunity to refile the case without having to worry about Presidential immunity from liability for statements he made while in office. It isn't just former President Trump that does things like this, but his conduct provides good textbook examples of what lawyers worry about when their clients talk about cases that are being litigated. Social media statements about pending cases by litigants routinely provide powerful evidence against them in trials. Some clients (particularly politicians and many senior executives of big and medium sized businesses, but also more ordinary people with big egos) are "forces of nature" who can't resist running their mouths, usually to their detriment, when given the least leave to do so. It is easier to teach them to say "no comment" across the board about pending litigation, than to transmit the depth of understanding necessary to comment without saying something potentially harmful. Lawyers spend many hours and sometimes days preparing their clients for depositions for a reason. Avoiding Annoyance To Opposing Counsel, Parties, And Judges Making a comment about pending litigation has the potential to aggravate opposing counsel and can emotionally influence non-lawyer opposing parties with whom a negotiated settlement will be reached 90%+ of the time (only about 1-2% of civil cases go to trial, but some are resolved by default judgments or on motion practice as opposed to by settlement). It can also irritate a judge who frequently prefers to be out of the public spotlight when necessary, even when the statements made aren't prohibited, and judges in the U.S. have lots of discretionary authority. |
Defendant not present for sentencing If the defendant does not turn up to court for sentencing, can the defence still put forward mitigations and character references? One would assume that the defence would be prevented from bringing certain positive elements up in retaliation for the defendant fleeing. Jurisdiction: England & Wales. Edit - I am talking about the defendant fleeing the country. | The defense isn’t prevented from presenting any arguments, but some arguments might be less convincing. “My client is really sorry and will do everything he can to fix the damage and he has learnt his lesson”. “Your client just skipped bail, didn’t he?” “My client is so sorry for this drunken attack and has since given up drinking alcohol”. “Why is Your client not here?” “He has a hangover”. | Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction. | Does failure to present a charge to a grand jury leave that charge open for future indictment? Yes. Indeed, even if the charge is presented to a grand jury and it declines to indict, exactly the same charge that one grand jury declined to indict upon can be presented to a future grand jury and produce a valid indictment. I understand that normally when a Grand Jury declines to indict for an alleged crime, prosecutors may not present it again to a future Grand Jury. (I believe this rule is statutory, not constitutional.) While I won't rule out the possibility that such a statute exists, I am aware of no state where that is the case. A charge upon which is grand jury declines to indict is often not presented to a future grand jury as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or prosecutor's office policy, but generally this is not a mandatory rule. One reason that it is not a mandatory rule is that there is no practical way that a defendant could enforce the rule if it was a mandatory rule. Grand jury proceedings are secret (at least until an indictment is produced and then only as pertinent to the defendant indicted on the charges producing an indictment). Generally, even the judges in the court calling a grand jury have no access to its proceedings until it issues an indictment, and then has only slightly more latitude to review its proceedings than a defendant in the case. | Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense. | Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record. | How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases. | canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin"). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, "If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism..."), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. "Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence..." This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. "Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence..." Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional. | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. |
On the (Equi)Potency of Each Organic Law of the United States According to the United States Code, there are four organic laws of the United States: The United States Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of November 15, 1777, The Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, and The Constitution of the United States of America of September 17, 1787. QUESTION: Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? If not, on what basis are they ranked? I ask this question because in Supreme Court decisions, it seems to me that it is only the U. S. Constitution that is, in practice, considered. | Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America, beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White, the reference made to the concept of "perpetual union" found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham. | You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach. | TL;DNR: Madison, Hamilton, Justice Harlan & Justice Scalia agree with you. Justice Black does not. You raise an interesting question. As you point out, the Qualifications Clause, Art I, § 2.1, (those who vote for the House of Representatives “in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”) gives states the power to establish voter qualifications. Yet 18 U.S.C. § 611, passed as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, (the IIRIRA) makes it illegal for most aliens to vote in federal elections. What gives? First, the IIRIRA is purely symbolic. It literally has no effect on who can vote in the US. For almost a century, every state has prohibited aliens from voting in state elections. Under the Qualifications Clause, this means no aliens can vote in federal elections. (Before WWI, many states allowed aliens to vote.) Second, some people argue Congress has control over voter qualifications under the "Elections Clause," Art. I, § 4.1, which gives Congress the power to regulate the "Times Places and Manners of holding elections." Like Dale M, these people read, "Manners of holding elections” to include the qualifications for voting. This reading of the Elections Clause is inconsistent with several of the sources of constitutional authority Americans typically consult, including the text, the intent of the Founder and precedent. All of these support the “Qualifications Clause” reading of the Constitution. 1) Constitutional Text: Reading the Elections Clause as giving Congress control over voter qualifications, renders the Qualifications Clause almost completely meaningless. Yet everyone agrees the Constitution should be read so that all its parts mean something – no part should be rendered superfluous. 2) Intent of the Founders: When the Founders debated voting qualifications, they were clearly worried that politicians would manipulate the electoral rules to favor them. The Founders believed the Qualifications Clause kept both national and state politicians from stacking the electoral deck. First, by giving the power of deciding who could vote to the states, the Clause prevented national politicians from choosing their own electorate. Secondly, by requiring the states to use the same qualifications for voters in state and national elections, the Clause prevented state politicians from manipulating the rules in national elections. As for the Electoral Clause, in Federalist 60, Hamilton was clear who controlled voter qualifications: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen…are unalterable by the [federal] legislature…” 3) Precedent and practice: For most of our history, people acted consistently with Hamilton’s statement. They tolerated a wide variation in who was allowed to vote across states. As noted above, many of those states specifically allowed aliens to vote. (And, starting in 1787 with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, Congress passed a series of laws allowing aliens to vote in territories.) When Americans did make nationwide changes to voting qualifications, they did so by amending the Constitution. There are only a handful of Supreme Court decisions involving federal control over voting qualifications. In 1970 the Supreme Court upheld a federal law changing the voting age to 18. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, relied on the Elections Clause to say that Congress had the power to change voting requirements. None of the other Justices shared Black's views on the Elections Clause. Instead, they agreed with Justice Harlan, who said, “nothing” in the Constitution, “lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.” (These Justices used the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for federal control over voter qualifications.) Since then, no Justice has followed Justice Black. Instead, they have followed Justice Harlan. For example, in 2013, Justice Scalia, (in an opinion joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor) said, “the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them.” From this evidence, I’d say you were right to be puzzled about the constitutional authority for the IIRIRA. A federal law preventing aliens from voting in federal elections undermines the text of the constitution by rendering the Qualifications Clause superfluous, goes against the clear intent of the Founders, and is inconsistent with 200+ years of history and precedent. It only survives because it has no practical effect on voting in the US. | Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take. | From what I read, it appears that the final quoted statement is not saying another authority does this so much as the Archivist does not do it. Which would mean that the when the state notifies the Archivist and says "We ratified the amendment" the Archivist accepts that the state did all required steps to ratify the amendment and doesn't need to tick a check box list of steps. Or to put anotherway, the lawful Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment in a State is determined by the state's own institutions and not the Federal Government's. Once the state says it's ratified, the Feds assume it was done so following the states own processes and was not done in an underhanded fashion. | No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1). | How can incitement of imminent lawless action not be constitutionally protected? The short answer to your question is "because the Supreme Court of the United States said so." In Brandenburg v. Ohio SCOTUS found that the Constitution protects speech that calls for lawless action in the abstract but does not protect speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". The court's per curiam opinion seems to treat the decision as self-evident - it's quite short after discussing the facts of the case. However, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion (his "caveat") that discussed and was critical of previous decisions in such cases, including the use of the 'clear and present danger test', so his opinion is useful for a brief history of First Amendment judgments to that point (Brandenburg). The Declaration of Independence is not law. Following "a history of repeated injuries and usurpations" and failures to reach political settlements it asserts a moral right to overthrow the tyranny of the British crown. It alludes to rights, it does not "enshrine" or create a legal right that the judiciary can interpret. Judges might refer to the Declaration in their judgments, not using it as legal authority but an articulation of fundamental values. | So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other. |
Warranty repair and collector's items I recently watched a YouTube video about a brand new Corvette Z06 engine blowing up after 52 miles. There are many articles about this incident, as well. Barring anything being the owner's fault, the lawyer in the video said that the dealer would put in a new engine and that would be that. He did mention about collectabity of the car could be damaged. However, he said he would not get into that. However, I am curious. People buy new cars as investments and not for driving. Having matching VINs on the car and engine demands higher prices upon resale. While no one can see into the furure and no what something will actually be worth, there is no lack of evidence that certain cars will increase in value. Some cars go up in value by orders of magnitude. Take the Lamborghini Miura, which was $20,000 new. Now some are worth over $2,000,000. Of course, all this can apply to more than cars as there are other things that follow suit. I definitely feel that Chevrolet has no obligation to do anything other than replace the engine. However, this does theoretically hurt the long term value of the car. Is there any legal recovery for this loss? Irrelavent, to the question, this guy said he is done with Chevy and will sell the car when its repaired. He will likely make more than he paid for it as well, as these vehicles are heavily in demand. So that is a positive for him. | Barring manufacturer negligence (and even this is a dubious theory, given that recovery would be for pure economic loss), there is probably no legal theory that would allow recovery of any loss of resale value. I am assuming that the promise to replace/repair the engine if it fails is part of the contract of sale. This is typical for a warranty that the manufacturer will repair certain failures. Assuming the manufacturer fulfils what it agreed to in the warranty, then the buyer is getting exactly what they contracted for and there is no contractual theory that would support any further recovery: there is no breach. The buyer bought a car that included a warranty to repair. I cannot imagine that they bought a car that included a promise that it would not fail. | Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | The damages should be granted. The “dirty hands” doctrine is only applicable when seeking equitable relief - motor vehicle damages fall under the tort of negligence. | Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined. | I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time. | You are describing a liability suit. My sense is that based on the facts you describe you will face two serious challenges to making a successful case. Damages and liability. In order to win a liability case, you must first establish that you have been damaged in some way. According to your facts, your damages are at best, the replacement value of a used controller. I'm guessing that's what, $20 or so? That doesn't cover the cost of an attorney's time to even begin to hear your version of the facts, much less give you advice or pursue a case for you. After you establish damages, you must prove the company is responsible or has some share of liability for causing your damages. Again, I think this is going to be an obstacle for you. Not placing a warning that the game will affect you by causing you to throw your controller and be mean to your mom would be unprecedented if you were to prevail. AFAIK. | Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car. |
Can a lawyer subject the court to a (temporary) ruse for a legitimate purpose? This question is about the legality of a possible defence tactic that might be used in a criminal trial. It is a variation on things you see in lawyer movies fairly commonly. Suppose that a criminal trial occurs, and the defendant is not already in custody when the matter is heard (e.g., it proceeds by summons, or else he was out on bail). There is a witness to the crime and it is expected that she will identify the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crime. Now, suppose that the defence lawyer has reason to believe that this witness is actually not able to genuinely identify the defendant (as distinct from someone who looks a bit like him), but expects that the witness wants to assist the prosecution, and so she will nevertheless confidently point to whoever is in the defendant's chair and say that she is certain he is the perpetrator. So the defence lawyer attends court with a person who looks like the defendant, but is not the defendant. The lawyer can prove that this pretend-defendant was nowhere near the crime (e.g., he was overseas at the time). He sits this pretend-defendant in the defendant's chair and proceeds with the matter roughly as normal (while taking any necessary instructions from the actual defendant remotely by some surreptitious means). He is careful not to explicitly say that this is the defendant, but he acts in a manner that ensures that the judge and prosecutor will assume that this is the defendant. Suppose now that the prosecution witness testifies, and as expected, she identifies this pretend-defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, and says that she saw him clearly, and she is absolutely certain it is him. The defence lawyer keeps questioning this, but she is resolute. At this point the lawyer reveals the charade, thus destroying the testimony of the witness and exposing her as either dishonest, or at least unreliable. He brings in the real defendant for the remainder of the proceedings. Now, obviously this is a matter where the defence lawyer has perpetrated a ruse on the court, and has thereby misled the court, albeit temporarily. However, this is done in the pursuit of a legitimate purpose --- namely, to test the evidence of a prosecution witness and expose the unreliability of that witness. Also, to be clear, the defence lawyer will reveal the true defendant at this point in the trial regardless of the witness's testimony. If challenged on this, the lawyer could potentially argue that this kind of temporary ruse does not really constitute "misleading the court", since he will ultimately reveal the true defendant, though that might be a weak argument, since there is certainly a temporary misleading occurring in the ruse. My questions: Firstly, is there any practical impediment that would make it impossible to implement this tactic? Assuming it is possible, what (if any) legal impediments would there be to using this tactic in a criminal matter? In particular, would the defence lawyer (and possibly also the defendant) be exposed to legal danger for misleading the court? Is there any case law where something like this has occurred (i.e., lawyer misleading court temporarily in order to test evidence of opponent)? Note: I have not specified a jurisdiction for this question, but I am interested in the answer in any Western jurisdiction. If the answers depends on jurisdiction, then it would be interesting to know whether this is something that would generally be prohibited. I am aware that there is a large body of case law on the legality of ruses by police against suspects, but I am not aware of any case law on ruses against the court by a lawyer. Update: For what it's worth, this exact tactic was just used by Saul Goodman in an episode of Better Call Saul. In that show, the actual defendent is seated in the gallery of the courtroom with the other spectators, and a similar-looking person is sat at the defendent's table. The result in the episode was a mistrial, and a dressing down to the lawyer from the judge, but no other sanction. | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | The evidence will almost certainly be inadmissible And, of course, you will be disbarred and never work as a lawyer again, you might also go to jail for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Whether the person is convicted or not will depend on the strength of the other evidence the state has. In the notorious case of Lawyer X, Nicola Gobbo was acting as a barrister for a number of Melbourne underworld figures while simultaneously acting as a police informer. A number of those convicted have successfully appealed their convictions on the basis that they didn’t get a fair trial. In their judgement on AB (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym); EF (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 58 the High Court said: But where, as here, the agency of police informer has been so abused as to corrupt the criminal justice system, there arises a greater public interest in disclosure to which the public interest in informer anonymity must yield. EF's actions in purporting to act as counsel for the Convicted Persons while covertly informing against them were fundamental and appalling breaches of EF's obligations as counsel to her clients and of EF's duties to the court. Likewise, Victoria Police were guilty of reprehensible conduct in knowingly encouraging EF to do as she did and were involved in sanctioning atrocious breaches of the sworn duty of every police officer to discharge all duties imposed on them faithfully and according to law without favour or affection, malice or ill-will. As a result, the prosecution of each Convicted Person was corrupted in a manner which debased fundamental premises of the criminal justice system. | The prosecution chooses the order of its witnesses and must present all of its witnesses before the defense presents its witnesses, and the defense chooses the order of its witnesses. The parties can agree, with the judge's permission, to take a witness out of order (usually for the convenience of a witness who has limited availability on a relatively minor issue). But this is done far more often in civil cases than in criminal cases, because the defense wants to preserve its ability to argue that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in its own case, which can be important in an appeal. If a defense witness is taken out of order, something that a defense witness says could inadvertently tip the balance by establishing some minor but mandatory element of some offense that the prosecution failed to include it its "case in chief". For example, maybe the relevant statute requires that the defendant be over the age of eighteen to be guilty of a crime (e.g. statutory rape), and the prosecution forgets to ask a question about the defendant's age in their case in chief, so the prosecution fails to prove that element of the crime. If a defense witness taken out of order says that "I've known the defendant since I went to his fifth birthday party in 1980.", that could be the difference between having the case reversed on appeal and affirming a conviction on that count. So the defense is reluctant to allow its witnesses to be taken out of order. After the prosecution has presented its "case in chief", and the defense has presented its "case in chief", the prosecution may then present rebuttal witnesses to the testimony of the defense witnesses, and often, the defense may then present rebuttal witnesses to the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses. After the prosecution completes its case in chief, the defense has the right, if it wishes to do so, to present no additional evidence whatsoever. In a criminal trial, the prosecution often presents many witnesses and the defense often presents far fewer witnesses, but that is not a hard and fast rule. Often the defense presents very little evidence for reasons similar to its reasons for not wanting to take a defense witness out of order. For example, suppose a prosecution witness on a key point is not very credible. Offering a defense witness on that point who is also not very credible could bolster the jury's opinion of the prosecution witness's credibility, or could simply help to corroborate that "something" definitely happened that was memorable when the crime was allegedly committed, even if their accounts are not identical. | In an adversarial legal system, the parties are responsible for framing the issues in dispute and adducing relevant evidence. The parties, and perhaps more importantly their lawyers, also have an obligation of candour to the court. Courts routinely accept unchallenged assertions because there are serious consequences for misleading the court, and the opponent (rather than the court which should remain neutral) is in the best position to investigate and prove any suspected dishonesty. It is a matter for the party commencing proceedings (plaintiff or prosecutor) to decide how the parties will be named. People often change their names, and may use multiple spellings. It is not uncommon for typographical or other errors to appear. Generally, it is in the interest of at least one party to name the parties "correctly," ie. consistently with other government records that will be used to enforce any judgment, but a person's name is ultimately a formal matter that can be corrected if necessary. In cases of uncertainty, aliases can be specified, as occurred in Microsoft v McDonald (aka Gary Webb) [2006] EWHC 3410 (Ch). A person who is genuinely known by an alias (ie. the use of the alias is not part of an attempt to mislead the court) should use their "real" name in court, but could potentially conduct litigation using the alias without anybody noticing. However, court proceedings are public and this would not necessarily protect the person's identity. To achieve this, an anonymity order under CPR 39.2 is required, as explained in XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 [13]–[22]. | It depends on the jurisdiction, but generally speaking, this will not permit you to evade criminal responsibility. In Ohio, for instance, the complicity statute treats the conduct you're describing as equivalent to soliciting another to commit an offense or to aiding and abetting another in committing an offense: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. The penalty for complicity is the same as for the underlying offense, so you don't really get any kind of break for running your offense through an innocent party; you just get a pissed off witness who can testify against you. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | If a person is wrongfully deprived of money (or something else of value) for a period, that is damage, even if the money is later repaid. The victim might have used the money in some profitable or advantageous way during the period when it was taken. But the victim need not prove exactly how s/he might have profited, it is enough to show that the victim was wrongfully deprived of something of value. Of course, there are other elements to fraud. There must have been a lie or deception, on which the victim reasonably relied. There must have been intent that the victim so relay. The deception must have been material and must have directly caused or led to the damage. (Or have gotten the Fraudster a benefit that would not have been provided had the victim known the truth.) But assuming that all the elements of fraud are proved, restitution, even full restitution with interest, does not excuse the fraud. However, as a practical matter, if offered full restitution on condition of a release or an agreement not to prosecute, many victims will choose to take it, preferring their money back, perhaps with interest, to a legal case, even a winning one. | Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics |
How will the "stop and identify" statute work in New Hampshire in this particular hypothetical? I asked this question before but it was closed. So I will try to be here more specific. I have read the stop and identify statutes wikipedia page. In this page there is written that: In 12 states (Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin), police "may demand" identifying information. Of note, though, in New Hampshire for example (RSA 594:2), statutory language authorizing a 'demand' for identity does not establish a legal requirement to provide documentation of identity (ID), or even a requirement to respond in the first place. So in New Hampshire a police officer may DEMAND my identification from me, and I may simply ignore him/her without committing a crime, right? If my understanding is correct, suppose I am a gentlemen in my home in New Hampshire, and I am being harrassed by Mr. X (although I don't know his name): Mr. X is outside my door, he is calling my phone number repeatedly, he is repeatedly knocking on my door, he is repeatedly shouting my name out, he is repeatedly calling me a child molester, etc. I call the police. The police shows up. I tell the police I want to file charges for harrassment against the guy in front of me (Mr. X, but I don't yet know his name). The police asks Mr. X (still, nobody knows his name at this time) for his identification. Mr. X will repond that "statutory language [...] does not establish a legal requirement to provide documentation of identity (ID)". End of it. End of my charges. Is that correct? Note this question is not a duplicate of this one, because the latter question occurred in Texas, and the answer provided there ("Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute") does not apply here, because here we are in New Hampshire, which has such a statute. | First of all, Mr X's refusal is in no way the end of the interaction, nor of your charges. If your report of Mr X's actions gives the police probable cause, they can arrest Mr X, even if he refuses to identify, and even if they do not know his name. The only difference is that if they do not know his name, they cannot use his record, if any, in deciding whether to arrest him. If they do arrest him, they can and usually will search him. If he carries ID, they will then know his name. Even if he doesn't, he can be lawfully required to provide his legal name once he has been arrested. So End of it. End of my charges. is not at all correct. Now let us look at the actual NH laws involved. Wikipedia links to two provisions: Section 644:6 and Section 594:2. What do they actually say? Section 644:6 provides that: 644:6 Loitering or Prowling. – I. A person commits a violation if he knowingly appears at a place, or at a time, under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted include, but are not limited to, when the actor: (a) Takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement official or upon questioning by such an official. (b) Manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. (c) Has in his possession tools or other property which would lead a reasonable person to believe a crime was about to be perpetrated. (d) Examines entrances to a structure which the actor has no authority or legitimate purpose to enter. II. Prior to any arrest under this section, unless flight or other circumstances make it impossible, a law enforcement official shall afford the actor the opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and give an account for his presence and conduct. Failure to identify or account for oneself, absent other circumstances, however, shall not be grounds for arrest. III. No person shall be convicted under this section if the law enforcement official did not comply with paragraph II or if it appears at trial that the explanation he gave of his conduct and purposes was true and, if believed by the law enforcement official at the time, would have dispelled the alarm. In such cases, any record of the arrest made under authority of paragraph I shall be expunged. IV. In this section, "entrances" means any part of a structure through which entry or egress could be made. Note first of all that Section 644:6 only applies when the person accused has appeared "under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property" more or less when the person has given a reasonable impression that s/he might be going to break in or commit some similar crime. "Loitering with intent" it is called in some jurisdictions. In those circumstances, a LEO must offer the accused a chance to explain his or her purpose to help dispel suspicion. That would include giving his or her name. The accused is under no obligation to give a name, or show ID. The only penalty for not doing so is that suspicion will not be dispelled, and if the officer thinks fit, the accused may be arrested. This section might well apply to the scenario in the question. Section 594:2 provides that: 594:2 Questioning and Detaining Suspects. – A peace officer may stop any person whom the officer has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. An officer may request the person's name and address, but the officer shall not arrest the person based solely on the person's refusal to provide such information. This also applies only when an officer has "reason to suspect" the accused. The section permits the officer tho "request" (which the officer could probably do even if this section had not been passed). But it does not impose any duty on the accused to respond, nor impose any penalty for not responding. Again the only penalty is the failure to dispel any suspicion in the officer's mind. The officer may in any case act on any reasonable suspicion or probable cause that may appear. This section might also apply to the situation in the question. Neither section really gives an officer any power or authority the officer would not otherwise have. Both authorize the officer to request name and other identifying information. Neither makes it an offense to refuse to provide such information. Neither section describes what the officer may do as a "DEMAND". Whether either actually constitutes a "stop and identify" statue might be debated, but the statute itself is what matters, not the label attached to it. In the situation described inn the question, an officer might well request Mr X to identify himself, and explain what he is doing and why. The officer can take Mr X's response, if any, into account in deciding whether to detain Mr X for investigation, arrest him, warn him, or take other action, or take none. That is true whatever response Mr X may make, or if he ignores any request. So these sections will not greatly change what might happen, one way or another, in such a situation. | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf | The victim of domestic violence is referred to as the complaining witness. Domestic violence arrests will result in a criminal investigation. It is not up to the complaining witness to determine if charges are brought against the one who was arrested - this is up to the prosecutor. Here is a good article at Findlaw that discusses the process. If the complaining witness recants, the prosecutor may decide to drop the charges. The prosecutor may, though, decide to continue the charges and prosecute the case. The complaining witness in recanting may face charges as well - for example, for making a false police report. If the prosecutor presses the case and your husband is convicted then, yes, it will be on his record. Seeking the advice of a New York attorney who specializes in these matters is the best course of action. EDIT: Here is additional information regarding New York Criminal History Records: New York State law does specify that, unless the court orders otherwise, arrest records are sealed when criminal actions are terminated in favor of the accused - dismissed, found not guilty, etc. This is spelled out in Criminal Procedure Law 160.50. Arrest records are part of the public record until disposition of the case is completed. At New York State's Court web site, you can read about how to get criminal records of anyone - they are public record so anyone can make a request about anyone. There is a fee of $65. Records can be ordered online and the results can be emailed to you. Searches are processed by an exact match of name and date of birth. From their web site you will see that criminal cases transferred or removed to Family Court are not reported. Neither are records for people who had a single misdemeanor conviction over ten years ago or pending criminal cases categorized as Youthful Offender Eligible. Generally speaking, New York criminal cases are part of the public record and are available to anyone unless they meet certain criteria or have been sealed under New York State law. Note that sealing records doesn't mean the record goes away. It just means that the record is not available to the general public without a court order unsealing the record. Here is the link to on-line direct access to records requests: http://www.nycourts.gov/APPS/chrs/onlinedirectaccess.shtml | If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed. | I'll use California penal code 837 as an example, though most other states have similar statutes: A private person may arrest another: For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence... 839 says: Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him therein. Generally, someone making an arrest is allowed to use "reasonable force" to effect the arrest. The question then becomes, is the act of interrupting a football game a public offense? Once a fan at a football game enters the field, assuming it is a violation of the license granted to the fan, they are trespassing. These fans are often drunk when performing their midfield dance so that is another public offense for which they could be arrested. Once arrested, the interloper must be turned over as soon as possible to a magistrate or peace officer. The person making the arrest is always subject to being sued. It is a question for a trier of fact to determine if unreasonable force was used in effecting the arrest. My guess is that in most of these cases security simply ejects the exuberant fan from the premises and the fan never looks back. If a lawsuit were to be filed it would be based on unreasonable force being applied during the arrest. California penal code 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Certainly, one could be charged with assault in effecting a citizen's or private arrest but it would go back to the definition of reasonable force and what force was necessary to effect the arrest. If someone resisted arrest I think it more likely that that person could face an assault charge. | There isn't a general answer to this question. It needs to be evaluated incident and sub-incident act by sub-incident act. The use of force is legally permitted to prevent harm to others and to the property of others under some circumstances. Citizens arrests are permitted under some circumstances, but generally, the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the crime while it is in the process of being committed. Some laws prohibit wearing masks under some circumstances, but usually not in all circumstances. Your client's "business model" is not consistent with being able to testify in court, so the criminal justice system will only be able to convict someone whom your client delivers to police if they can do so without your testimony. As a general rule, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence collected by private parties or to statements obtained by private parties that are not made under duress that are not Mirandized. But, if your client is effectively "deputized" or becomes a "de facto" agent of the state who is called up to be a member of a posse for the police, for example, by using an agreed symbol such as shining a light with a symbol on it on some clouds, at that point, with respect to that matter, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda probably do apply to evidence that your client obtains, and exclusion of that kind of evidence could make prosecution much more difficult, unless the prosecution can successfully make an argument that the other evidence that the illegally obtained evidence leads them to is not "fruit of the poisonous tree" because it would have inevitably been discovered in due course using only the legally obtained evidence. Even if your client does violate the law, law enforcement is not obligated to investigate his alleged crimes even if the victims complain, and prosecutors are not obligated to prosecute those crimes, even if they have overwhelming evidence of guilt which they could use to secure a conviction. Prosecutorial discretion is basically absolute. Your client might be sued civilly for operating a corrupt enterprise under RICO, for various intentional torts, and for negligence, by people who think that they have been harmed by his conduct, but someone can only sue your client if they can figure out who he is and serve him with civil process. If you are helping your client conduct on ongoing criminal enterprise, whether or not the crimes are prosecuted by the criminal justice system, the attorney-client privilege you have with your client is probably forfeit should you be placed under a subpoena and your may be violating other ethical rules. But, of course, somebody has to figure out that you are part of this criminal enterprise before you suffer any consequences for being involved. | 1: What's the correct process to get a restraining order? The police aren't involved in the formal process, although sometimes people go to the police and are told that they have to go to a judge instead. The aggrieved plaintiff presents an ex parte affidavit or makes statement in person under oath to a duty judge (who often asks clarifying questions). If this statements states a basis for a protection order one issues with a prompt return date (a week or two). At the return date the order either becomes final if the defendant doesn't show up, is vacated if the plaintiff doesn't show up, or is tried in an evidentiary hearing if both show up. Of course, a court order is ultimately just a piece of paper and there is no legal recourse against the government if they don't successfully stop the person restrained from doing something. Also enforcement of restraining orders was a lot more lax in 1987 than it is today, and men asking for restraining orders were taken less seriously then, than they are now, by most judges. 2: Can Dan keep his adultery secret during that process? Not really. In the initial ex parte hearing, Dan can probably tell the story artfully in a way that hides the adultery, but in the adversarial hearing, if there is one, the other side (or their lawyer) can ask him under oath about the affair and he has to answer truthfully in a public court hearing setting. 3: Is it plausible that Dan's family and friends don't learn about that process? Yes. Unless he's famous enough to make the newspapers (which in a decent sized city is pretty famous), and if he initiates the process, the only person who gets formal notice before the order issues is the court, and if the court issues the initial order, the only person who gets notice is the defendant. If Dan doesn't call family or friends as witnesses and don't tell his workplace why he's at court, nobody is told. It isn't a secret. It's a matter of public record that could be subsequently discovered at any time. But there is no active means of notification of friends and family in the short term. Realistically, Dan might ask a cop or a lawyer what to do, get accurate or inaccurate information, and decide not to pursue it for fear of creating sworn proof of his affair at a hearing. Cops love to provide legal advice that they aren't qualified to dispense. Dan's concern is particularly relevant because this happened in New York State in 1987 when New York State didn't have no fault divorce at the time, and the outcome of divorce proceedings on the merits for property division and alimony and custody would have been heavily influenced by marital fault in the divorce case. Revealing an affair under oath as he might have been required to do at a hearing would have crushed him in a subsequent divorce outcome if his wife found out and decided to divorce him. |
Supreme Court Cases That Have Been Decided on Statistical Evidence---Are There Any? Have there been any Supreme Court cases that have been decided based on statistical evidence? If so, which ones; and what was the evidence presented? In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes (before he became a Supreme Court judge) had said in a speech at Boston University: ``For the rational study of the law---the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.'' However, in the 120+ years which followed Holmes' speech, it has been observed (see, for example, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-is-allergic-to-math/) that the Supreme Court has not been very receptive to statistical/quantitative evidence. I would like to know of any counterexamples to that observation. Thank you. | It is far from obvious what would qualify as a “Supreme Court cases decided based on statistical evidence”, actually, it is far from obvious what constitutes “statistical evidence”. At the minimum, I expect that it is evidence which at least counts numbers of examples of something, and uses that number to reach a legal conclusion. For example “Of the two candidates, Smith received 10,000 votes and Jones received 10,001 votes. The wording of the statute declares to be the winner that candidate who receives ‘more than any other candidate’, therefore we hold that Jones won”. People often supplement raw counts with some measure of ‘significance’, which can be a significant (sorry about that) factor in discrimination cases, based on disparate impact theories; and also in evaluating forensic evidence (thus DNA evidence was poorly treated until the lawyers figured how to sell it). Any appeal to statistical hypothesis testing is highly unlikely to ever arise at the level of SCOTUS. That is because (generally-speaking, perhaps there are obscure uses baked into law) the law and the legislature do not mandate particular alphas for acceptance of a statistical hypothesis. Instead, admissibility of testimony is (federally, and for half of the states) determined by the Daubert standard, encoded as FRE 702 which requires that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case”, implicitly subsuming some domain-specific standards of hypothesis testing. To the extent that DNA evidence is admissible in court and the expert can make a compelling, unrebutted argument for identity (“1 chance in 70 billion” as opposed to “49 chances in 100), statistical evidence is routinely accepted (or excluded as inconclusive). SCOTUS does not commonly have original jurisdiction so it is very unlikely that they would have ever been presented with trial-court level disputes involving words like “Bonferroni” or “Pearson's chi-squared test”. This article looks at the role of statistics in disparate impact cases in the US. The ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power does not directly appeal to any statistical reasoning, it indicates simply that an pair of intelligence tests were used as a substitute for a requirement of a high school education, but the tests were not intended “to measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs”. A claim rejected by the lower court was that “these two requirements operated to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of Negroes, they were unlawful under Title VII unless shown to be job-related”. The dicta of Griggs provides numerous numeric statements such as “while 34% of white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro males had done so”, “use of a battery of tests… resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests, as compared with only 6% of the blacks”, “the percentage of white employees who were promoted but who were not high school graduates was nearly identical to the percentage of nongraduates in the entire white workforce”. A striking mention of statistical concepts cited in Griggs is found in CFR § 1607, 35 Fed.Reg. 12333 (Aug. 1, 1970) which is a requirement that employers using tests have available “data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated”. SCOTUS is absolutely silent on the question of actual numbers in this case, that is taken to be a matter of fact determined by the lower court, and SCOTUS’s only job is to decide if employers can be required to show that a particular test is job-related. There is no discussion of what level of asymmetry in numbers is proof of discrimination. Another relevant SCOTUS case is Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio which might be seen as a case of SCOTUS being “unfriendly” to statistics, but the ruling simply holds that proving statistical significant between variables is insufficient. In fact in the holding SCOTUS identifies the Court of Appeals error as being a comparison of the percentage of cannery workers who are nonwhite and the percentage of noncannery workers who are nonwhite makes out a prima facie disparate-impact case. Rather, the proper comparison is generally between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market In the above statistical article, other cases are cited where the courts engaged in magnitude inquiries of practical significance. 29 CFR 1607.4 states a “rule” known as the ‘four-fifths” rule that A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact however the Supreme Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977 finds that this is no more that “a rule of thumb”. Ricci v. Destefano finds that “[A] prima facie case of disparate-impact liability [is] essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . and nothing more . . . .”, and a prima facie demonstration does not require a disparity of any particular magnitude. In short, SCOTUS cases frequently have a “statistical” underpinning, any time a scientific question arises. By the nature of expert testimony and the Daubert standard, the court does not rule on what constitutes a technically-correct statistical test, that is a matter for the trier of fact to decide. Disparate impact cases provide the best opportunity for higher courts to be confronted with statistical arguments. If some law were passed that specifically requires a particular p-value on some body of numbers and demographics, the court would have to discern the legislative intent of such a law, and not the majority opinion of some body of scientists as to what is “statistically correct”. | When judges are finder of fact, the standard is one of deference to the trial court, but may be overcome if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous finding". See Concrete v. Const. Laborers, 508 U.S. 602 (1993). | Yes, there is a good chance. Ordinarily, the law as written is what is enforced. On occasion, the wording of the law is actually ambiguous, or vague, which means that the jury will need an instruction as to how to interpret the law. In fact, juries are not literally read the statute, they are given a set of decision-making instructions so that they can decide "If we find X, we must acquit; if we find Y we may convict". Your attorney will, if he is diligent, note the problem and strive for an instruction that favors the client. (The prosecution will of course object). Eventually, on appeal, a court will decide what the law "really means", and that decision might be strictly based on the letter of the law, or it might be based on a supposed spirit of the law, i.e. what the legislature "originally intended". That outcome is determined in part by the jurisprudential ideology of the prevailing justices of the appeals court. Usually, letter of the law prevails until a higher court rules that a particular "spirit" is what was originally intended. | There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney. | You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court. | I don't think there would be such a case. The Supreme Court itself does not allow cameras in its courtroom. Also, when Florida wanted to bring cameras into Florida courtrooms, the Supreme Court said in the 1981 case Chandler v. Florida: Absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions to these defendants, there is no reason for this Court either to endorse or to invalidate Florida's experiment. It's also worth noting that "the jury may not be filmed" and "The Florida Supreme Court has the right to revise these rules as experience dictates, or indeed to bar all broadcast coverage or photography in courtrooms" were two of the specific rules that the Supreme Court noted Florida had implemented. Although those particular rules were not at issue in this case, the Court made no further mention of them, and thus perhaps tacitly approved of their constitutionality. Given that there does not seem to be a general right to film in a courtroom, it seems unlikely that there would be a right to film jurors in particular. Furthermore, this page lists the courtroom camera rules for several states. In many of them, filming jurors is prohibited. Presumably, if there was a ruling that this was unconstitutional, they wouldn't have those rules. | Basically, the idea of incontrovertable evidence is that the evidence points to one and only one truth, and the fact-finder need not doubt it (metaphysical doubt) unless opposition provides material fact that refutes the claim. That is, the defendant may be innocent until proven guilty, but evidence that shows guilt exists on the defendant's part is not false just because it demonstrates this. Thus, if the person making the claim meets the burden of proof, the person in the defense must refute with new evidence that raises doubt about the new fact. One should not assume it is not factual just because it aids in the claim against a defendant. You cannot doubt the evidence just because you doubt it; there must be a reason. | These questions are typically left to the discretion of the judge in whose courtroom the presentation is happening. It is very common to see these types of devices in trial courts, but they are much less common in appellate courts, and I doubt you'd ever see one in the United States Supreme Court, where the arguments are essentially limited to oral presentations. |
Can Disney+ require me to disclose my age and gender in order to continue streaming? I just received this email a few moments ago: Disney+ Provide your birthdate and gender to keep streaming Disney+ now requires additional information from the primary account holder, including your birthdate and what best describes your gender. To avoid any interruption to your streaming, please update your account with this information before December 8, 2022. Screenshot: And they say: Disney+ is also requiring what best describes your gender. This information will be used to personalize your experience, which may include ads, and in other ways consistent with our Privacy Policy As per my understanding of the CRPA, the section on Data Minimization (as reported by this website) says: Businesses must only collect and retain what’s “reasonably necessary” and “proportionate” to the intended purpose. I already have an account in good-standing with Disney+ for about a year now - I'm sure they already know I'm a legal adult for the reasonable purpose of controlling age-restricted content within their streaming service - and to require a statement of gender disclosure is just odd - so I cannot fathom how they can hold my access to their service for ransom at the price of my personal information. | Disney's help page on this says I don’t want to provide my birthdate or gender. What can I do? Providing a birthdate is required for all Disney+ accounts/profiles while a gender is required for all accounts/profiles over the age of 13. Note that for gender submission, you may elect “Prefer not to say.” If you do not wish to provide your birthdate or gender, you may cancel your account by visiting your Account page or by contacting Disney+ Support. It's reasonable to provide proof of age: COPPA in the US requires it to protect those under 13. And you don't have to give them your gender. | It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest. | I’ve managed to answer my own question. Age discrimination legislation only applies to over 18s: It’s only discrimination if a trader or service provider treats you unfairly because of: age - if you’re 18 or over disability gender reassignment pregnancy and maternity race religion or belief sex sexual orientation Source | Whether consent is necessary depends on the specific processing purposes. For example, general usage statistics about search terms or about the usage of the site likely fall under a legitimate interest. Outside of the GDPR, there can be consent requirements for the use of specific technologies. Per the ePrivacy directive, consent is required for accessing or setting cookies on a user device, unless the cookie is strictly necessary for the service requested by the user (“functional cookie”). This consent requirement also extends to other storage and fingerprinting technologies. A functional cookie could e.g. be used to store a history of search terms on the user device itself. However, ad personalization is not strictly necessary for the search functionality, so setting cookies (or using similar technologies) for ad personalization requires consent, regardless of whether ad personalization itself would require consent. To determine whether a processing purpose falls under a legitimate interest, the data controller must weight the interest against the data subject's rights and freedoms. There are no objective guidelines on this, and ultimately a court would have to decide. However, I would assume that the tracking necessary for ad personalization is an inappropriate infringement on the data subject's rights and freedoms, so that ad personalization cannot fall under a legitimate interest. The data controller would have to choose a different legal basis, which effectively only leaves consent. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area. | A web site that is serious on protecting some content behind a paywall will put the protected content, or a version of the page with both protected and unprotected content, on separate page or pages, so arranged that a user will not be able to follow the link until that user has signed in and been accepted as an authorized user. A site that merely uses CSS to hide "protected" content is not really protecting it. CSS is designed to be modified by the ultimate user -- that is part of its function. If the site chooses to send you content, you are entitled to read it. Even if some of the content has a CSS tag attached which suppresses or obscures the display of that content, they know perfectly well that any user can supersede this with local CSS, and so I don't see how they have any legal claim, nor any way of knowing if you have accessed the "hidden" content or not. If you attempt to bypass or hack a login screen, that might be circumvention under the US DMCA, or "Unauthorized computer access" under any of several laws. | The other answers don't quite spell it out, so I will. There is no law in the UK requiring landlords or their agents to show a property to all parties interested - refusal to show a property may however in some cases fall under discrimination laws, so that might be something you can pursue if you feel the refusal is due to your gender, race or sexual orientation. While they may have to justify their data collection under the GDPR, that is entirely separate to their refusal to show the property to you. |
What kind of compensatory damages are available in a class action lawsuit (landlord/tenant) The scenario: A landlord holding multiple rental properties/apartments has been found in a class action lawsuit to have been illegally overcharging renters for X amount of money per month each over a period of Y months time (Y differing based on how long a tenant was there, obviously). What kind of monetary compensations are the range of possible awards? Possibilities I can think of: A: XY for each tenant, just returning the overcharged money. B: XY+interest set at some rate by the court, returning overcharged money and compensating for the time plaintiffs did not have the money C: Some multiple of XY based on some form of punitive/encouragement for companies to not engage in that behavior in the future. (Other than the cost of both sets of legal fees, obviously) | Usually, the compensation would be B (economic damages plus prejudgment interest at the appropriate rate), together with court costs other than attorney fees. But the lease, or depending on the exact nature of the violation, a state law, might provide for a prevailing party's attorney fees. Intentional fraud rather than just a negligent mistake or breach of contract of widespread effect, might justify some punitive damages. Breach of contract itself does not justify punitive damages. | Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position. | This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution. | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit. | If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate. | No, such clauses are precise and common. The landlord wants to say: “we're not liable for anything”. Unfortunately for them, they can't say that because the law might still recognize some liability. So this construction achieves the next best thing: to the maximum extent possible, they will not be liable. What does this mean for you? If you want to sue them because you think they were liable for something, you won't be able to do that successfully – unless you can point to a liability they cannot disclaim. Yes, this might not always be entirely clear but that's why there are courts. On to your concrete objections: Firstly, it wrongly assumes that the "law" on exclusion clauses is settled and certain. Perhaps the case law is uncertain. Or there may not even be law. Which is why this construction says: we don't know where precisely the maximum is, but whatever the maximum is: we want it. Secondly, it wrongly assumes that "the maximum extent" can be handily identified. Perhaps Landlord and I disagree on what "the maximum extent" is. Either you can convince the landlord that they are liable and can settle this out of court. Or you go to court. Then, your opinion doesn't matter, only the court's judgement. Thirdly, the "law" can change. Then what's "the maximum extent" or "law"? This construction avoids this problem because it does not fix a certain list of liabilities that are included or excluded. Instead, it will disclaim maximum liability at any relevant point in time, which will likely be the time of the event giving rise to liability. If new laws are passed, they won't generally apply retroactively. However, new case law could update the interpretation of existing laws. What can you do? This is a business negotiation. You want that the landlord fulfils their duties, and they don't want to be on the hook if something bad happens. In particular, they don't want to be forced to pay for any missed profits or such. Maybe the clauses could be modified to ask for reasonable effort on the part of the landlord to mitigate certain events, in particular with regards to security. But in reality: you will have to get insurance to cover the cases you are concerned about. And some risks are just business risks. | Does (Customer) have any claim or recourse against (Store)? No. The store's conduct altogether preempts a finding of unconscionable tactics. The store's conduct would not be found in violation of Oregon's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). See ORS 646.605(9) et seq. (I am not verifying the multitude of cross-references in the UTPA, but the language of explicit items gives a general idea of what types of conduct the statute sanctions) The store's decision to decline orders, preorders or money for the product impliedly alerts customers not to grow premature expectations on acquiring the product. Also the store's disclaimer of out of stock weakens a customer's possible allegation that customer relied on a promise of availability of the product. Accordingly, the store prevents a customer from credibly arguing that he incurred losses as a result of the store's conduct. Does it matter if (Product) was available in other stores or just never produced at all? Does it matter if other stores have (Product) but charge more than $N? No. The fact that the store [unsuccessfully] attempted to get stock indicates that the shortage --and hence the failure to supply the product-- is not willful. This implies that the matter is not actionable even if the customer "suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property". See ORS 646.605(10) and .638. That being said, it is noteworthy 646.683(8)(a) lowers the requirement of willfulness [of violation] to one of recklessness in the context of class actions. |
Which country has jurisdiction over copyright violations? If an individual registers an LLC or S Corp in a country with lenient copyright laws and lives in a country that takes copyright more seriously, which country has jurisdiction over that individual - the country where the LLC is registered or the country where the person lives? Or both? | To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice. | Does the statute of limitations apply if the company to be sued wasn't operating in the U.S.? If the company is not operating in the USA then, of course, US law does not apply to it. There may be statutes of limitations where it is operating but the US ones are irrelevant. However, the company you describe which is entering into a contract with a California resident to provide goods or services in California is most definitely operating in California. The fact that it doesn't have a physical presence in California doesn't mean it's not operating there. If you wish to bring an action in California, the Californian statute of limitations will most definitely apply and time will run from when the breach of contract occurred. You are suffering under the misapprehension that you can't sue a foreign company in a US court You can. It's technically more complicated and there can be disputes over jurisdiction, the appropriate venue and which law applies but assuming all of that can be managed and a Californian court has jurisdiction and considers itself the most appropriate venue (it may be that a Chinese court is more appropriate) then there's no reason why you can't sue a foreign company with no physical presence in California. | The main legal question is, whose law applies? According to Krauss v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 787, where Krauss (in all-party PA) was recorded by Globe (in one-party NY). Krauss sued Globe in NY under PA law. The court found that the "law of the place of injury" determines which laws hold. Since the recording took place in NY and not in PA, NY law applies, case dismissed. A similar setup (and different outcome) arose in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, 137 P.3d 914 where SSB (in one-party GA) recorded Kearney (in all-party CA). The CA Supreme Court reached the opposite decision, finding that "the failure to apply California law in this context would impair California's interest in protecting the degree of privacy afforded to California residents by California law more severely than the application of California law would impair any interests of the State of Georgia". It is unlikely that functioning in the capacity of an officer of a NJ company at work would be found legally relevant. The main questions would be, where was the recording made, and which court system is deciding the matter? Assuming that the suit is filed in PA and given that Pennsylvania no longer follows the lex loci delicti rule (Griffith v. United Air Lines,416 Pa. 1), the prospects are greater, following the persuasive precedent of the California ruling would tip the sales in favor of a finding against the NJ person making the recording of a party who is in PA (and who files the suit). In a somewhat related PA Supreme Court case Pennsylvania v. Britton, 229 A.3d 590 there arose a "two jurisdictions" problem of recording – involving California and Pennsylvania – the court observes that when an issue implicates substantive laws, such as the privacy rights asserted by Appellant, a conflict-of-law analysis requires the forum court to apply the law of the state with the most interest in the outcome of the controversy which is to say, the PA Supreme Court agreed (indirectly) with the reasoning in Kearney v. SSB. | Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution. | Is a country an institution or an entity? Neither. It's a sovereign state (a "political entity", not an entity in the sense of a legal persona). | However, if a website is based in the US and the terms of service say that the law governing the terms is US law, how can GDPR have any affect? It is unlikely that the EU will be able to enforce financial penalties against a company with no presence in the EU. But they could for example block your website in the EU, depriving you of your EU user base. The actual measures that they could or would take against such a company are still unclear, since the GDPR is quite new, and there has been no action under the GDPR against foreign companies. I'm not a lawyer, but I've signed many contracts in my life and nearly all of them have some form of "governing law" clause. The governing law clause in a contract identifies the law that will be used to interpret the contract and to resolve any disputes arising from the contract. The law identified in the clause does not become the sole law governing every aspect of the relationship between the parties, however. For example, a business in New Jersey could have a contract with a client in New York with a clause specifying New Jersey law as the governing law of the contract. But that does not mean that New York's consumer protection law doesn't apply to the transaction. | Mongolia apparently has a list of banned words (list is NSFW) that websites can't use. And according to this State Department report: Additionally, the regulation requires Web sites with heavy traffic to use filtering software that makes the user Internet Protocol addresses of those commenting or sharing content publicly visible. The report also says: The law places the burden of proof on the defendant in libel and slander cases, and both defamation and insult are criminal charges. NGOs reported that these laws were used more frequently than in previous years to control the press. Canada is probably a better choice, even if it isn't perfect. | A website itself cannot be copyrighted, but the content on it is. Copyright protection is automatic: when you write something, it is protected by copyright law, and that protection persists when you put it on a website. If you intend to sue someone for infringement of copyright, you may have to register the copyright (details depend on national law). Creative Commons is not a way of protecting your intellectual property, it is a way of selectively removing copyright protection (by granting permission to copy, under certain circumstances). In some countries, such as Cyprus, registration is not required; also, infringement is a criminal offense subject to a prison term up to 2 years and a fine up to 1500 pounds for a first offense. There are various differences between Cypriot and US law in terms of the registration, but basically the protection in the US is more limited for unregistered works. Under Article 4, as long as you are a citizen or resident of Cyprus, you are entitled to protection in Cypriot court. |
How to determine which national copyright legislation applies if I put someone else's work online? Suppose there is a work by author A, whose copyright expires tomorrow (i.e. it goes into public domain) in their country of birth C1. I upload it (tomorrow) online on a blogging site by a company E based in country C2 with servers physically in country C3 (where it is possible that C2=C3, or even C1=C2=C3 but not necessarily). I live in country C4. In countries C2, C3, C4 the work's copyright has not necessarily expired. Can I get in trouble? I am particularly interested on whether I can get away with it if I make C1=C2 or C1=C2=C3. Thanks. | You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective). | Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use". | are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright. | No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though. | How do you know if the copyright claimant or owner of them material you are using is allowing their content on Youtube? You don't. ... does fair use automatically cover you for anything related to this? No Is it illegal to share the music experience of a legally purchased MP3 ... or to provide services that play songs ... but are not hosted by your website (in which case you just act as a pointer to other sites which are participating in illegal activities)? Yes What rights/privileges can cover you if you wish to participate in this? None I've heard (rumours probably with no legal standing), that as long as you are not monetizing their material, you will not have any legal action taken against you. You probably won't have action taken against you. That said, you probably won't get busted for smoking weed in your basement. Lack of enforcement makes it no less illegal. What copyright means Copyright is a legal right created by the law of a country that grants the creator of an original work exclusive rights to its use and distribution, usually for a limited time. The exclusive rights are not absolute; they are limited by limitations and exceptions to copyright law, including fair use. The copyright holder decides how, when and by whom their work can be used and copied. At some point this right expires and the work passes into the public domain. It is not trivial to determine what works are public domain and what are not as it depends on the copyright law in the country they were created in at the time of creation and how that law has changed subsequently. In most of the world, the default length of copyright is currently the life of the author plus either 50 or 70 years. Many jurisdictions also grant workers for hire moral copyright in their creative work even when the proprietorial copyright vests with their employer. Copyright comes into existence automatically; it doesn't need to be registered or denoted in any way. For example, I have copyright in this answer and you have copyright in your question. A few countries (the USA among them) have a copyright register but that only limits the remedies an unregistered copyright holder has; failing to register does not negate copyright. Further, a single work can have multiple copyright holders: a music video for example has (barring contractual arrangements): the composer(s) holds copyright in the music the lyricist(s) holds copyright in the lyrics the performer(s) hold copyright in the music performance the actor(s) (if any) holds copyright in the acting the producer(s)/director(s) holds copyright in the finished product. In practice, most of these people have contracts which give their copyright to someone else. Almost certainly, every MP3 of every song is covered by copyright; that is, someone, somewhere owns the copyright; that is at least one someone. How can you tell who that is? Often, in the absence of a claim of copyright, you can't. Obviously, if it is a song published by a record label than its pretty obvious that they hold copyright on it and you don't need to worry about the deals they have with the artist/composer etc. Remember, copyright violations are a civil matter; the state does not get involved. It is up to each individual copyright holder to take whatever action they wish under the law to protect their rights. | A simple EULA does not absolve you from legal responsibility. The law that you need to be acquainted with, if you are dealing with the US (i.e. might be sued in the US), is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in particular Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act which states the "safe harbor" provisions. Aspects of DMCA safe harbor are covered in many Law SE questions. In essence, you have to provide a way for rights holders to complain that someone has infringed their copyright on there site, and you have to take down allegedly infringing material: and there are a number of legal formalities to attend to in doing this. The main point is that you can't just ignore the problem and hope it goes away, and you can't just say it is not your responsibility, which is what a simple EULA does. To be protected, you need a "designated agent" where complainers can contact you. You provide the information online (as well as stating the DMCA policy, which can be in the EULA), and also register that information with the Copyright office (online). The complaint has to be in writing, and most of the burden is on the author of the complaint, but you still have to be sure that the complaint is legally conforming. The complaint has to say what was infringed (e.g. the URL), the identity of the protected content (title of the book, for instance), and provide the complainer's signature and contact information. It also requires the complainer to say that they have a good faith belief that the material is illegally copied (no permission, and not otherwise allowed by law), and a perjury statement that the foregoing is accurate and authorized by the copyright holder. When you have a conforming notice, you must "expeditiously" remove / disable the infringing material (there is no definition of "expeditious"), notify the user, then wait for a proper counter-claim (same general form as the take-down claim but where the user denies the posting the material was illegal. If you get a counter-claim, you notify the alleged copyright owner and wait for them to file suit in 10 days. If they don't do that, you restore the material. Here is a sample complaint, and a sample counter notice. Also, this document (look for the download tab) reorganizes the legal language so that requirements are put in logical order and not randomly scattered throughout the US Code. | Copyright expires 70 years after the original writer breaths his/her last breath, after that it becomes public domain. And all works published before 1923 are in the public domain in the US. This means that the inheritors of the rights cannot sue you for infringement because there is nothing to infringe. If the music is not in public domain you will need to contact the rights holders and negotiate the rights to use the music. This can also be a company that has the right to sublicense the content to others. This is often the way radios and DJs get the right for the music they play. | The copyright on the book of quotations protects the collection. That is, it protects the author's choice of which quotations to include, and of what order to list them in. It also covers any division of them into groups or categories, and any added text (intros, comments, and so on) written by the author. It does not protect the quotations themselves. As those are not the original work of the author, s/he can have no copyright in them. Any quotes that are in the public domain (through expiration of copyright, or otherwise) may be used freely. Any others are protected by copyright. However the use of a short quotation is often fair use under US law, or is subject to another exception to copyright elsewhere. But that depends very much on the details of the factual situation. So quotes with expired copyrights are safe to use. Others may well be safe if they are relatively short, and proper attribution is given. |
What is considered a derivative work? US Copyright law defines "derivative work": A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. I'm not sure if the examples below can be considered derivative works as well: an academic paper that cites or refers to other papers a discussion thread on Internet (or each comment or reply on it) about a work a fanart or a fanfiction metadata a review or a criticism a work inspired by other works They don't quite 'represent' the original work, but still they are based on the original work. Would it be copyright infringement (regardless of being fair use) to create and distribute such work without explicit permission of original works' copyright holders? (edit) I've found an example: original work : poem "Eloisa to Abelard" by Alexander Pope(1688-1744) (potential) derivative work : film "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" directed by Michel Gondry The film's title is a quotation from the poem, and the quoted part is cited within the film. Does it make the film a "derivative work" of the poem? Should the creation and distribution of the film have gotten permission from Alexander Pope (if he was still alive) or appropriate copyright holder of the poem? (edit 2) I looked for the word 'derivative' from dictionary: (typically of an artist or work of art) imitative of the work of another person, and usually disapproved of for that reason. – from Oxford Language (through Google search) Now I see why the examples on the law were limited to 'representation' of the original work. I'm not a native English speaker, and thought 'derivative' means 'inspired or motivated by something'... | Derivative Works under US law and the Berne Convention US Copyright law defines "derivative work" in 17 USC 101 as: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. Article 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention reads, in relevant part: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. Under 17 USC 106 one of the things that a copyright owner has the exclusive right to do or authorize is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that under the US definition, a derivative work is one based on an earlier work, not one that merely refers to a derivative work. Merely mentioning or citing a previous work is not enough to make the later work derivative. It must, in some substantial way, use and be developed out of the previous work. The classic examples of a derivative work are: a translation into another language; an adaptation into another medium or form (such as making a novel into a play or film); and making a sequel. But derivative works can be derivative in various other ways. Examples from the Question Let us look at the examples mentioned in the question: an academic paper that cites or refers to other papers This is a mere reference and is not at all derivative. However a paper that contained little or no original content, but consisted almost entirely of such citations might be considered derivative. a discussion thread on Internet (or each comment or reply on it) about a work Discussion or criticism of a work, or a reply to it, is not normally considered derivative. Such comments are not derivative of the work under discussion, nor of the previous comments. Quotations of either are likely to be permitted fair use, and so not infringing, although that will depend on the exact details of each case. a fanart or a fanfiction This is likely to be a derivative work, depending on how much of the source work is used, and whether distinctive details are reproduced. Note that ideas cannot be protected by copyright. (See 17 USC 102(b) for this.) So the idea of a person who turns into an animal of a particular type, or has some special power or ability or characteristic is not protected by copyright. But the details expressed in the source work, such as the mannerisms or appearance of a character, or the specific nature of a setting, can be protected, and to draw on them may be infringement, unless fair use applies. metadata "Metadata" is a very general idea. Typically the kind of information included in metadata is not protected by copyright, but in some cases it may be. a review or a criticism A review, criticism of, or comment on an existing work is not normally considered a derivative work. Quotes used in a review or criticism are often protected by fair use under US law, but if the quotation is excessive, and particularly if it allows the review to serve as a replacement for the original and to harm the market for the original, it may be infringement. a work inspired by other works Again, this depends. If only the general idea is imitated, then the later work is not derivative If detailed, distinctive, and specific characters, settings or plot lines are imitated, then the later work may be considered derivative, and infringing if permission is not obtained. The Nichols Case In the case Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F. 2d 119 - Circuit Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit (1930) Judge Learned Hand, a famous judge, wrote a very influential and often cited opinion describing when two similar plays are, and when they are not, infringements of one another. It is worth reading to better understand this issue, even though it is over 90 years old. What makes a Work Derivative So in general a work is derivative when it uses significant, distinctive, and detailed elements of a previous work, or is a revised or altered version of the previous work. Copyright in a Derivative Work If a derivative work is made with proper permission, or the source work is out of copyright, the author of the derivative work has copyright in all the original parts of the derivative work. However if the derivative work is infringing, and was created without permission, the author has no valid copyright in it at all. Fair Use and True Parody If a work is held to be a fair use of the original, it is not infringing even if it is a derivative work, this is an exception to copyright in US law. It may still be important to note that the work is derivative, because the author has copyright only in the original aspects. If a work is a parody, it is likely to be held to be a fair use. Note that in copyright law a true parody is a work that comments on the source work by imitating or mocking it. A work that imitates a source work merely to be funny, or to comment on general social conditions, or to make some other point, but not to comment on the original, is not a parody in US copyright law. Courts often refer to such a work as a "satire", even though this is not the standard literary definition of "satire". A Satire will usually not be a fair use of the source, or if it is, it will be for other reasons. Addition (in response to an addition to the question) original work : poem "Eloisa to Abelard" by Alexander Pope(1688-1744) (potential) derivative work : film "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" directed by Michel Gondry The film's title is a quotation from the poem, and the quoted part is cited within the film. Does it make the film a "derivative work" of the poem? No. First of all, any copyright on the poem has long expired, it is in the public domain. Secondly, merely referring to a previous work in the title and citing it in the body does not make the later work derivative, it is merely a literary reference. A significant part of the earlier work would need to be used to make the film derivative. Unless much more was used than is mentioned above, this would not qualify even if the poem were still in copyright. Meaning of "Derivative" Like many other words of the English language, the word "derivative" has several different senses. The sense leading to the definitions: imitative of the work of another person inspired or motivated by something is mostly used in the context of criticism and review of works of art or literature. In copyright law, "derivative" is a technical term, defined by the definition section of the law, and by previous court cases. It is not unrelated to the meaning from literary or art criticism, but it is specific and by no means the same. The word "derivative" also has other specialized meanings, for example in chemistry, and in mathematics. | It would be copyright infringement. The script that you are planning to copy from is protected by law, so requires the copyright-owner's permission to create a derivative version (your own interpretation). If instead you write a completely different story inspired by the original book, you might not get sued. The problem is that there is a reasonable chance that you would accidentally duplicate part of one of the myriad adaptations, then the jury would have to decide whether it was just a coincidence, or copying. | Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered. In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say. While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed, albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for "artist reference" in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing1. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives2, rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for "artist reference." This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure. | Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*] | Copyright reserves to the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce the work (Copyright Act, s. 3; 17 U.S. Code § 106). Downloading a copyrighted work is a reproduction of that work and would be an infringement unless excepted (e.g. you have been given a licence, your download is fair dealing or fair use, etc.). Canada lists downloading as an example of infringment. And the United States says: Uploading or downloading works protected by copyright without the authority of the copyright owner is an infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive rights of reproduction and/or distribution You say: "uploading to Z library is considered illegal." This implies the content on Z library is generally protected by copyright and not licenced for distribution via Z library, but that is a factual question. | It is probably a word that can be used, but not definitively. Many words of general applicability coined by authors enter into the general lexicon. The process is similar, but not precisely identical, to the dilution of a trademarked term to become a generic descriptive term for anything in the category of items so trademarked. Early examples of originally trademarked words that entered the general lexicon are "elevator" and "escalator". For example, the word "grok" coined by Robert Heinlein, is now part of the general lexicon, as is the word "quark" coined by James Joyce (although its current meaning has shifted). The word "robot" from K. Čapek's play R.U.R. ‘Rossum's Universal Robots’ (1920), would be another example of a word coined in fiction that has entered general use. The scene a faire doctrine also authorized public domain use of tropes and terms that have achieved wide use in a genre. As a rule of thumb, if three different authors have used a term to mean the same thing, or an author who is no longer in copyright has done so, it can be used freely. For example, regardless of who originally used it, the term "mecha" would not be protected by the doctrine due to its used by multiple authors and commentators in a particular science fiction sub-genre. "Mentat" is a close case, because it is overwhelmingly used in a specific series of books written by Frank Herbert and his son with licensing from his estate, and because the series has produced so many published properties, not only in books, but in TV and movies, it has been close to maximally protected from an IP perspective by the Herbert Estate, his publishers, and his audio-visual licensees. There is at least a colorable argument that use of the term in a fictional setting would be a derivative work, intended to evoke and be derived from the extended series of creative properties. The best counterargument that the term has entered the general lexicon, or in any case is not a protected derivative work, would comes from use of the term in a non-fiction sense which is not negligible, even though it isn't terribly common. Wikipedia notes two (probably unlicensed) commercial uses, one as a trademark and the other as an IT company name, in addition to two minor fictional uses, one with a similar meaning and one with a somewhat shifted meaning. Further, to the extent that the non-fiction use was great enough to show that it entered the general lexicon, at that point, fictional use would no longer be a derivative work because the work could be derived from many sources in which the Herbert estate does not have copyrights. A Google N-gram search could be used to evaluate that argument empirically. The use of the word in the early 19th century (before Herbert was born) is particularly promising, although the senses in which it was used pre-Herbert would have to be evaluated, and the context in which it was used post-Dune would also have to be evaluated (if all the uses are in his licensed books, it hurts the cause). A quick scan suggests that in the early 19th century that it was often used as a Latin or French word used untranslated for foreign flavor in English language works, so there is an argument that it is really a loan word not specific to Herbert. Much of the modern use is in fair use commentary expressly referencing Herbert's works and in obvious misspellings of the word "mental". Particularly encouraging in the N-gram search are the uses of the word in independent science fiction novels including "The Search for Snout" (2014) by Bruce Coville, "Dorsai!" (2013) by Gordon R. Dickson, "Eye of the Storm" (2009) by John Ringo, and "The Ghost Brigades" (2007) by John Scalzi. Also, particularly notable is the use of the word in an independent non-Dune novel in "Clockwork Lives" (2015) by Kevin J. Anderson and Neil Peart, since Kevin J. Anderson was a co-author of some of the Dune novels and would have contractual obligations to the Herbert Estate as well as copyright obligations; signifying a concession of non-ownership of the term by the estate. This use in five independent fictional cases in the same genre in works published long enough ago for the statute of limitations for infringement to have lapsed (with late filed suits used to muddy the waters). This strongly advances the scene a faire doctrine validation of the word. The term is also used in a scientific journal article in 2008 in the Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, but in a related but not identical sense of the word. Another litmus test regarding whether a word is part of the general lexicon is whether it appears in more complete dictionaries, such as the OED, or Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, or in a notable published thesaurus, None of the dictionaries and no thesaurus that I have in hard copy have that word, but this could be because mine are dated. An updated dictionary and thesaurus search would be probative evidence of this question. A thesaurus search for "genius" or "prodigy" that came up with "mentat" listed would be a good thing to look for. A third issue for general lexicon v. derivative work analysis would be whether the word can be derived by obvious use of affixes and suffixes and retroflex letters from words that are in dictionaries. For example, a word plus -ology (for the study of), or -itis (for medical conditions) would not generally be beyond the scope of legally permissible public domain use. This again is a close call in the case of "mentat". Single words are also harder (but not impossible) to protect as derivative works, if not trademarked as well, than extended passages either verbatim or paraphrased or translated, which would weaken the derivative work claim, although it wouldn't be entirely without merit just because it was a single word. | Copyright is automatic: when you write something original, it is thereby copyrighted. Thus there is no act of "copyrighting". The only important act is registering. All versions of a work are covered by copyright protection. When you revise a work, the existing copyright still exists, and you have created a derivative work. If copyright is held by a known person, the expiration date is author's death + 70 years. In a work made for hire (the company owns the copyright), it is the earlier of is 95 years from first publication or the shorter of 120 years from creation. A revision does not generally affect the duration of copyright: however, if a joint work is created, the copyright on the underlying work expires relative to the death of the original author and the copyright on later parts created by a second (added) author is relative to the second author's death. So if A writes ch. 1-4 of a book, then adds ch. 5-8 subsequently with a new co-author B, duration of copyright for ch. 5-8 is determined relative to the death of B. None of that matters for a company web page. | Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video. |
May a tenant install their own smoke detector? I live in a studio apartment that has an ionization-based smoke detector right next to the kitchen. Unfortunately, almost anything I cook triggers a false alarm.(Even turning on the oven with nothing inside will set it off.) I think it may be possible to solve this problem responsibly by replacing the smoke detector with a photoelectric detector, but if I do so, am I legally "tampering" with the detector? I've technically removed their smoke detector, but I've preserved (perhaps even improved) the general fire safety of the apartment. What are the legal consequences for doing this in the state of Georgia? | Here's a bit of Georgia law that is relevant. By law, your apartment shall have installed an approved battery operated smoke detector which shall be maintained in good working order unless any such building is otherwise required to have a smoke detector system pursuant to Code Section 25-2-13. Also, "Detectors shall be listed and meet the installation requirements of NFPA 72". Furthermore, Any occupant who fails to maintain a smoke detector in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility, other than a nursing home, listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in good working order as required in this Code section shall be subject to a maximum fine of $25.00, provided that a warning shall be issued for a first violation. (note that there is a burden on the occupant, not just the landlord). However, Failure to maintain a smoke detector in good working order in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in violation of this Code section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be considered by the court on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or occupancy of such dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section. Whether or not a photoelectric smoke detector is NFPA-compliant is not a legal question, but you could read NFPA's comparison of ionizing and photoelectric detectors here. If we assume (as is reasonable to do) that you install an approved device, then there is no code violation by picking your own device, does not change liability, and can have no effect on insurance rate / cancellation. OTOH, it is conceivable that the lease is written to prohibit any monkeying around with the smoke detector. | This law sounds likely to be unconstitutional and/or invalid because it is pre-empted by state or federal laws. Among other things it probably violates the First Amendment right to petition the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws (by depriving people who have had previous police calls of the right to call the police without penalty) and due process (by imposing a penalty based upon a call, without a presumption of innocence, rather than a finding of wrongdoing that overcomes a presumption of innocence). It could also implicate a tenant's right as a Fourth Amendment seizure without probable cause, or a Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation. It is probably also pre-empted by state law which establishes the grounds for which someone may be lawfully evicted, which almost certainly do not include this condition. Likewise, the conditions under which liability for police injuries is imposed are also probably pre-empted by state law. California has an express statutory prohibition on this kind of rule at Cal.Civ.Code § 1946.8(c) which provides that: A landlord cannot punish, or threaten to punish, you or another resident for exercising your right to request law enforcement or emergency assistance on behalf of a: victim of abuse; victim of crime; or person in an emergency. Your landlord also cannot put any penalties in place if a person who is not a resident or tenant calls law enforcement or emergency assistance to your residence. To be protected under this law, the person who calls the police must believe that law enforcement or emergency assistance is needed to prevent or deal with an act of abuse, or the heightening or worsening of an act of abuse, a crime, or an emergency. The American Civil Liberties Union is currently actively attempting to identify cases where these laws (often called nuisance laws) are being used in this manner for the purposes of bringing litigation to invalidate the laws or restrain their use. Litigation is in process in Seattle, Washington and East Rochester, New York. The ACLU also notes that: In situations where an alleged "nuisance" offense is related to an incident of domestic violence, landlords may choose to evict all the residents to avoid future incidents or police calls that could result in a fine. Yet, these evictions violate federal law. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has made it clear that tenants who are denied or evicted from housing because they have suffered domestic violence can file sex discrimination complaints with HUD under the federal Fair Housing Act. Thus, there would often be pre-emption of the local law by federal law as well. An op-ed piece in the New York Times reviews similar issues in Lakewood, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pointing out that the U.S. Constitution and federal housing laws are likely to be violated by these statutes. In at least two instances, one included in an edited question in Norristown, Pennsylvania, and one mentioned in another answer, the case of Somai v. City of Bedford in Bedford, Ohio, the ACLU has concluded favorable settlements after litigation to have these ordinances repealed and to win compensation for aggrieved parties, although, because they are settlements, neither case establishes a binding appellate precedent. We don't intend to challenge the laws at this time - they make it easier for us to evict problem tenants whose visitors damage our property - but were wondering if there are examples of similar laws that have either gone unchallenged for a long period of time or that have been challenged and judged to be legal. As landlords, you are in a difficult position. These laws have not gone unchallenged for a long period of time nor have they been challenged and judged to be legal. Instead, in all likelihood, a legal challenge to these newly enacted laws is likely to be imminent. And, while you face violations of local laws in these cases by not taking action, you may face federal housing law liability if you do utilize these laws and these laws are found to be invalid. | Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-). | You're forgetting city and county health codes, business permits, zoning regulations, fire and occupation regulations, business and property insurance, labor laws, etc. These can differ between the city and the county, and depending on if you own or lease the building. Best thing to do is start with your city/county business permit office; they can provide information. Call the fire department and ask. Ask the county health department. Find out if a business incubator exists in your city/county and ask them: https://esd.ny.gov/certified-business-incubator | let's look at the referenced Section 28085 ARTICLE 13. Theft Alarm System [28085- 28085.] ( Article 13 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 993. ) 28085. Any motor vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm system which flashes the lights of the vehicle, or sounds an audible signal, or both, and which operates as follows: (a) The system may flash any of the lights required or permitted on the vehicle. (b) The system may sound an audible signal. (c) No vehicle shall be equipped with a theft alarm system which emits the sound of a siren. (Amended by Stats. 1994, Ch. 516, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 1995.) This tells us what is allowable as a theft alert system. It may use sound(b) and turn the car into a goddamned Christmas tree(a), provided it is not: a siren sound(c) not audible(b) or a non-permitted light like Emergency Vehicle Lights(a). It does not regulate when it may fire, only that the sound alert has to be audible (preventing infrasonic make-your-ears-bleed or dog whistle sounds) and that the lights have to be an allowable part of the vehicle. So you could set the alert to honk or play imperial march or berate the wannabe thief or use painful loud music, all provided that it is audible and does not violate other laws. So, what is the correct operation of a car theft alert? Nothing in the article says, that you may just use the signals and honking for alerting in the case of theft, but that the system may use all the things in A and B under condition C to operate. Operation is "effect brought about in accordance with a definite plan". The definite plan for the alarm system is as follows: initialize alert the owner that it has correctly initialized wait for theft attempt or shutdown in case of theft: alarm everybody in case of shutdown: shutdown How the alertion and alarm are set up is up to the manufacturer's discretion, as long as the Article 13 is not breached. Example: My Ford Fiesta does a double-flash of the turn lights and a low key beep overpowered by the lock operation on locking and a single flash on unlocking. That is the factory setup (for my area) afaik. The manufacturer (or if I wanted to go to a car shop) could under Article 13 set the activation to trigger a short honk or any other audible to signal proper initialization as part of the normal operation. The failure of the sound coming after locking the car would alert me that something is amiss and it is not operating. The top 3 causes are most likely that the car key battery might be dead, a malfunction of the car alert or someone jamming the frequency of the key. As it is clearly part of the operation of the alert system, which is marked as a legal use of the horn of a car in Article 12 under Section 27001 b, yes, the alert may honk. INAL, so only my layman reading. | It may depend on the jurisdiction (although I can't readily think of one where this is not the case) but deliberately, recklessly or negligently putting a burning object next to someone else's property knowing that there is a real risk of it catching fire (and going ahead with it anyway) will almost definitely make one liable: especially if there is an ulterior motive. In england-and-wales This would be called arson - causing criminal damage by fire - an offence contrary to section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 Cross posted with the jurisdiction defining comment | Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny". | As you note, it does appear that this tenant has committed one or more crimes. In Pennsylvania crimes are prosecuted by the state, and you can begin the process by filing a private criminal complaint with your local Magisterial District Court, which will forward it to your county's District Attorney for review and prosecution. You've essentially written the complaint here; now you just have to file it. The criminal process would proceed independently of whatever civil processes you might be pursuing. |
Can I scan in pre-1923 photographs from books and upload them to wikipedia without violating copyright? Arcadia Publishing has the Images of America book series, many of which have pre-1923 photographs. Same thing for Eyewitness Books. For example they have a book on money which has images of coins and currency going back hundreds of years. My question is... could I scan in some of these images from these books and upload them to, say, Wikipedia? In the United States anything published before 1923 is public domain but what exactly does that mean? Like if I want to upload a pre-1923 image from one of these books to Wikipedia do I have to track down the original and upload scan it in myself or can I rely on the scans that other people did? | Date and Place of Publication Matter If the photographs were published in the US prior to 1923 (or indeed now prior to 1927) by a US resident, they are now in the public domain (PD) in the US under US law. Wikipedia will generally accept such photos, and the persons who would otherwise be the copyright holders will not be able to bring an infringement suit in a US court. If the pictures were taken before 1923, but not published until after 1980, they will be under copyright until 70 years after the death of the photographer, or until 2047, whichever is later. If they were taken before 1923, but published after 1927 with a proper copyright notice, and if published in 1963 or before, and their copyright was properly renewed 28 years after publication, the copyright lasts for 95 years after publication. There are various other sets of circumstance that may apply. The famous Cornell chart "Copyright Term and the Public Domain" covers all the relevant cases and spells out in which cases works are in the public domain, or if not, how long the copyright lasts for. If the photograph(s) were first published outside the US, or the photographer was neither a US citizen nor a US resident, then a suit could be filed in the country of origin of the photographs, under the laws of that country. Copyright term varies in different countries, but in most it is calculated from the death of the author (the photographer) varying from 50 years to 100 years after the author's death. 70 years is perhaps the most common term, including most countries in Europe. The Wikimedia Foundation (publisher of Wikipedia) takes the legal position that it is governed only by US law. To the best of my knowledge there has never yet been a successful copyright suit over an image (or text) published on Wikipedia that is PD under US law, but not by the law of its country of origin. So you will see that the date of publication is a key fact, and the place of publication may also be relevant. The copyright page of the book which you are scanning will give the date that book was published, and may well give the dates of publication of images included inn the book, if those are earlier. Under US law, scanning a previously published image will not generally give a new copyright on the image, nor will re-publishing a previously published image. Creating a modified (derivative) version of an image may well give a new copyright on the modified elements, but will not extend the copyright on the original image. (All this is also true for texts.) The age of the subject of a photo (or other image) is not relevant to the duration of the copyright of a new, original image of that subject. The date that the image was created (as opposed to being published) will only rarely be relevant. Money Images of US coins and currency (bills) are a special case. They are considered to be "works of the US Federal Government" and so are not protected by copyright within the US at any time. A new US coin or bill first put out in 1922 would still not be protected within the US. Money of other countries may be protected, or not, depending on the laws of its country of origin. But money issued before 1927 would be PD under US law. | "Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI. | http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf is the Copyright Law in English for Denmark. You should probably try to find a Danish version to ensure the translation is accurate. Chapter 2 lists the exemptions from the general rule that you need the copyright owner's permission to use their IP. Unfortunately, the usage you have made does not meet the requirements for private use (s12): digital copies may only be shared among the members of one household, placing them on the web extends beyond your household. It may meet the requirements of educational use (s13) providing that your school has met the requirements for Extended Collective Use (s50). For photographs, this seems unlikely, such arrangements are usually limited to songs and television works. Under Chapter 6b, you are permitted to use "orphaned works", however, this requires that you have made a diligent search for the owners and have been unable to either identify or locate them. Copyright violation is subject to both penal sanctions (fines and in egregious violations imprisonment) (s76) and damages (s83). TL;DR Yes, you could be sued. Yes, the copyright holder would probably be successful. No, it is extremely unlikely they would bother. | The Mugshot was most likely made by a state employee in the course of their work. Employees don't get a copyright for works from their work but their employers do so generally, as that is work for hire. However, the government is different: The US government specifically can't have any copyright from works of its employees. They are public domain. 17 USC 101 & 105 State governments are a little different. Technically they could be copyrighted unless they are laws and edicts, but states might disclaim such: Arizona employees make Arizona copyrighted works. California works require public access and are public domain unless the state specifically authorizes a work to be copyrighted. Florida and its employees can't have copyright in government works unless they specifically make a law that carves a work out from this beforehand. Indiana employees make technically copyrighted works, but they can't restrict use by obtaining a license or fee in any way under IC 5-14-3, making them quasi-public domain. A public domain image can be done with whatever you want. No strings attached, no rights of rightsholders violated. However, not everything made on behalf of the government is made by the government: Contractors do have the copyright in the first place, and then can assign it to a government, which does not make a work public domain. | Under United States copyright law, according to the Copyright Office, 206.01 Edicts of government. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. Referencing laws is even clearer: copyright doesn't protect referring to something like "Section 830 of the Penal Code of the State of California." Note that this is assuming that they remain within the US, where copyright law is a federal issue. Other countries don't all have the edict of government rule. If a place were to legally secede and become their own country, they would cease to be bound by US copyright law. They would get to decide if it was legal for them to do it or not; this is just like how it works between the UK and US (the UK claims copyright on its laws, but US courts will not enforce that copyright because it's incompatible with US law). Treaties complicate things, but the Berne Convention allows the edict of government exception. That said, seceding from the US unilaterally is both legally and practically impossible; seceding from a state is likewise generally going to be legally and practically impossible without permission from the state. So, it all depends on the agreements made. EDIT: To specifically address the model codes issue, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) was a case specifically about what happens when model codes are adopted wholesale into law. The Fifth Circuit (after initially finding that the model codes were protected) reversed en banc, finding that a model code produced for the purpose of being incorporated into law, and which has been incorporated into law, and which is then reproduced as the law of the place that incorporated it into law, is not subject to copyright. Veeck may not apply to cases where the law merely references the model code, or where the thing in question was not made to be incorporated into law (e.g. state laws referencing the Red Book valuation of a car didn't make the Red Book public domain). If both of those are true, it probably doesn't apply; if one holds but not the other, it's unclear. However, if the actual municipal code directly contains the text of the model code, and you reprint it as the law of that municipality (rather than as the model code), there is no copyright in the law. | OSM does use aerial/satellite images. But as the OSM FAQ explains, Google Maps and similar sources have unsuitable terms of service. These would prevent use even if no copyright was involved. The location of a street is factual and cannot be copyrighted. However, a photo of a street (whether at eye level or from a satellite/plane) can be protected by copyright, as can the presentation of this fact as part of a map. Maps are not necessarily just databases of facts1 but involve decisions in how to best present and arrange this information. Similarly, projecting aerial photography onto a map is not merely a gallery of images – it requires warping, stitching, retouching, and color-adjusting images e.g. in to remove cloud cover. Creating the raw images also requires decisions about flight patterns, altitude, camera perspectives, lenses, and exposure times. Compare the guidance in Circular 42 of the US Copyright Office: The copyright in a photograph protects the photographer’s artistic choices, such as the selection of the subject matter, any positioning of subject(s), the selection of camera lens, the placement of the camera, the angle of the image, the lighting, and the timing of the picture. The result: Whether I make a panorama snapshot with my smartphone camera, or a billion-dollar company flies a plane to create an array of aerial photographs – the result is likely to be a copyrightable image, regardless of the substantial involvement of automated means. Even if the subject of the photo is very boring and seems uncreative.2 Of course, there is some public domain imagery that can be used. In particular, works created by US government agencies is public domain within the US. However, the materials produced by the likes of NASA and the NOAA/NWS are not necessarily useful for mapping purposes. And public domain status within the US is of no use to people outside of the US, which many OSM contributors are. 1. Databases are subject to copyright in some jurisdictions, notably the EU. 2. Technical photography without artistic merit is still covered by copyright. Other countries might apply a different threshold of originality, but this aspect is somewhat universal. | The USPS and other postal services have created a service called Digital Postmarks or EPCM (Electronic Postal Certification Mark) to address exactly this problem. Basically you can upload any document that you want to be "unalterable and time stamped". The service computes a hash (a number that will change if the contents change), and store the time stamp and the hash on a secure server. If, at some time in the future, you want to confirm the authenticity of the document, you can upload another copy - the fact that it produces the same hash proves it's not been tampered with. | united-states The composition of a photograph, a painting, or an image of any sort is one of the elements that can be protected by copyright, and indeed one of those aspects that make an image original and thus a proper subject of a copyright under US law. A new image that imitates the original and distinctive composition of another might be held to be a derivative work, and thus an infringement of copyright if done without permission. Note that the composition must be original. A photo of, say, two people standing side-by-side has been done many times, and would probably not have any distinctive element of composition. The images shown as part of the question look rather distinctive to me, but for all I know this is a cliche that has been done over and over. If this came to an actual lawsuit a defendant could present evidence showing the composition to have been previously used by others, and thus common coin, free for anyone to adopt. This would be similar to the Scènes à faire concept. Things that have been done over and over are not original and are thus not protectable by copyright. That would ultimately be a judgement for the court to make, dependent on the facts of a specific case. I suspect this answer is correct for the laws of many countries, but I can only confirm it for US copyright law. |
Are Donations Enough to Validate Trademark? Suppose a business does the following: claims one of their brands is an unregistered trademark gives away 100,000 free T-Shirts to random entities using the brand mentioned in Step1 above accepts a $1 donation from a random entity to thank the business for free T-Shirts that were received Does the business now have a legal basis to enforce its unregistered trademark claim? | There must be a use in commerce Assuming there are no other barriers to trademark protection, you are asking what amounts to a "use in commerce" that is sufficient to warrant trademark protection (I'm assuming in United States law). In the United States, the protection comes from the Lanham Act, and protection requires "use in commerce". See e.g. International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003). This requires "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark" (15 U.S.C. § 1127). This does not require a sale and token sales are not determinative However, "the existence of sale or lack thereof does not by itself determine whether a user of a mark has established owenrship rights therein" (Planetary Motion v. Techplosion, 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2001)): announcement of a title ("Plasmer") to 13 million comic book readers and promotion at a trade conference was sufficient to establish trademark rights, even without sales but a toy manufacturer's promotional efforts were not sufficient—they only made a few presentations and even made one sale to a toy retailer The talismanic test is whether or not the mark was used "in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark" (Windows User, Inc. v. Reed Business Publishing Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), citing New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 417 (1st Cir. 1951)) The Court in Planetary Motion says "Courts applying the 'totality of circumstances' approach routinely have found evidence of a few sales of goods to which the mark had been affixed insufficient to establish trademark ownership." In the particular case in Planetary Motion, the Court found that free distribution of software using the "Coolmail" mark constituted a "use in commerce." The factors they noted were: the distribution was widespread there was evidence that the public actually associated the mark with the software distribution was not limited to a trade show or a group of friends or small circle the software was posted and accessible on the internet using the filename bearing "Coolmail" users were communicating about the software using the word "Coolmail" the software was incorporated into other software that was sold the software was distributed under a GNU General Public License—"the sufficiency of use should be determined according to the customary practices of a particular industry" Application is fact-based, looking at the totality of the circumstances Applying the principles from above to your hypothetical, the fact that there are not widespread sales would raise an immediate issue that could be argued in litigation. The question would come up as to whether this was a "bona fide use" and not use "made merely to reserve a right in a mark." In my view, the single donation of one dollar would not change anything; nor would even a literal sale of a single shirt. The question would turn on whether the distribution of 100,000 shirts, even without sale, created a connection in the minds of users between the mark and a product (presumably clothing?), and put others on sufficient notice that this mark was to be used in commerce. This is a heavily fact-based inquiry, and on the facts of the hypothetical, we just don't have the information to answer this. | The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other. | I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must. | OK, the prohibition on commercial use stems from either: The tort of passing off; this is a private civil matter between the model and the publisher, or Breach of s18 of the Australian Consumer Law which involve misleading or deceptive conduct; this is a public civil matter with strict liability (i.e. intention or negligence is irrelevant) between the ACCC and the publisher with fines of up to $1,100,000 for a body corporate and $220,000 for an individual. In both cases the cause of action arises from the possible presumption by a person who views the photograph that the model in it is endorsing the goods or services that you are selling. The standard is: Would a reasonable person, viewing the photograph in context, come to the conclusion that the model is endorsing the goods or services (either because they really like it or they were paid to show they really liked it). Context is everything here. Some examples: If you a photo studio selling the actual photograph then there is no endorsement. If you are using the photograph to promote the studio there is. If you are showing a crowd scene (e.g. at a football match) there is no endorsement. If you are showing a building and the people are incidental there is no endorsement. If you are showing individuals or small groups in a way that promotes your goods or services there is endorsement. So, look at the photograph and the purpose you are using it for: could a reasonable person draw the conclusion that the people in it are endorsing your application? | No This summarizes the situation with Disney specifically. The Disney trademarks are so ubiquitous and recognizable as being Disney's and not, for example, yours that your use is bound to create confusion in the minds of the public that your business is in some way associated with Disney. That is the essence of trademark infringement. In particular, where your business has nothing to do with the characters it is clear that you are only using them for the cachet of the Disney reputation. Disney will defend their trademarks - this is not at all unlikely. | united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details. | The relevant law is trademark law. The basic question is whether the mark is identical or creates an unreasonable risk of confusion with the protected mark. There is no per se 30%-40% rule. I can imagine cases where changing a single letter in a long phrase turns a trademark violation into a parody or clearly different mark (see the Electric Company TV show). I can also imagine cases where changing a large part of the mark could still be infringing and confusingly similar. A parody is protected on fair use grounds in copyright law (which could conceivably come into play since this is a derivative work but would be protected since it is a parody), but in trademark law the issue is that a parody is unlikely to be confused for the original. Of course, at a fine grained level when one is looking at particular cases rather than general ideas, you would have to know which country's laws were involved, for example, where the goods would be sold. | Ideally, you would say something like "Compatible with WhatsApp. Not endorsed or affiliated with WhatsApp." If you do that, it would be a valid nominative use of the other company's trademark and would face a very low risk of an infringement action. |
Am I allowed to use the word "meta" in the name of my product or startup? I am programming an app and want to call it "metaApp". Am I getting sued soon by Meta a.k.a. Facebook? Or is the word "meta" a commonly used word and ok? (In the case of Apple, it is also not allowed...) So can I use the word "meta" for my branding? MetaSoft, MetaHuman, MetaBeta? | If you do, you will probably be faced with a lawsuit. If the program did something that they don't do, it might be okay (but hire a lawyer to be sure). Perhaps a plumbing app would be safe. They (Meta) do state that Meta is one of their trademarks, and you can verify that here. That means that they have the exclusive right to use the mark "Meta" in the particular spheres where they operate, namely G & S: Identification verification services; Online social networking services; Personal concierge services for others comprising making requested personal arrangements and reservations and providing customer-specific information to meet individual needs; Providing access to computer databases and online searchable databases in the fields of social networking; Social introduction and networking services; Social networking services related to sports, fitness, and coaching activities provided through a community website online and other computer and electronic communication networks; User verification services; Social introduction, networking and dating services as well as Computer hardware; Application programming interface (API) for software which facilitates online services for data retrieval, upload, download, access and management; Computer peripheral devices; Virtual, augmented, and mixed reality software for use in enabling computers, mobile devices, to provide virtual reality experiences; Software for integrating electronic data with real world environments for the purposes of entertainment, education, communicating; Virtual reality computer hardware; Virtual reality software for use in enabling computers, mobile devices, to provide virtual reality experiences; Motion tracking sensors for virtual reality technology; Motion tracking sensors for augmented reality technology; Digital media streaming devices; Wearable computing devices comprised primarily of software and display screens for connection to computers, mobile devices, and in order to enable virtual reality and augmented reality world experiences; Software for tracking motion in, visualizing, manipulating, viewing, and displaying augmented and virtual reality experiences; Software, firmware and hardware for use in visual, voice, audio, motion, eye and gesture tracking and recognition; Hardware and software for operating sensor devices; Electronic sensor devices, cameras, projectors, and microphones for gesture, facial, and voice detection, capture and recognition; Hardware and software for detecting objects, user gestures and commands; Wireless computer peripherals; Computer software for modifying photographs, images and audio, video, and audio-visual content with photographic filters and augmented reality (AR) effects, namely, graphics, animations, text, drawings, geotags, metadata tags, hyperlinks; Computer software, downloadable computer software and mobile application software for facilitating interaction and communication between humans and AI (artificial intelligence) platforms, namely, bots, virtual agents and virtual assistants; Application programming interface (API) software for allowing data retrieval, upload, access and management; Software for organizing images, video, and audio-visual content using metadata tags; Application programming interface (API) for use in developing AI (artificial intelligence) platforms, namely, bots, virtual agents and virtual assistants; Computer software for sending and receiving electronic messages, graphics, images, audio and audio visual content via the internet and communication networks; Downloadable software, namely, instant messaging software, file sharing software, communications software for electronically exchanging data, audio, video images and graphics via computer, mobile, wireless, and communication networks; Computer software for personal information management, and data synchronization software; Computer software for use in facilitating voice over internet protocol (VOIP) calls, phone calls, video calls, text messages, instant message; Communication software and communication computer hardware for providing access to the Internet; Electronic display screens; Computer peripherals for remotely accessing and transmitting data; Computer hardware for displaying data and video; Computer peripherals for displaying data and video; Software to view virtual images in creating augmented reality; Computer software for setting up, configuring, operating and controlling wearable devices, computers, and computer peripherals; Computer software for accessing, monitoring, searching, displaying, reading, recommending, sharing, organizing, and annotating news, sports, weather, commentary, and other information, content from periodicals, blogs, and websites, and other text, data, graphics, images, audio, video, and multimedia content; Computer software for accessing, browsing and searching online databases; Computer software for accessing, monitoring, searching, displaying, reading, recommending, sharing, organizing, and annotating news, sports, weather, commentary, and other information, content from periodicals, blogs, and websites, and other text, data, graphics, images, audio, video, and multimedia content; Computer software for controlling the operation of audio and video devices; Computer software for creating, editing, uploading, downloading, accessing, viewing, posting, displaying, tagging, blogging, streaming, linking, annotating, indicating sentiment about, commenting on, embedding, transmitting, and sharing or otherwise providing electronic media or information via computer the internet and communication networks; Computer software for integrating electronic data with real world environments for the purposes of entertainment, communicating, and social networking; Computer software for modifying and enabling transmission of images, audio, audio visual and video content and data; Computer software for modifying photographs, images and audio, video, and audio-visual content with photographic filters and virtual reality, mixed reality and augmented reality effects, namely, graphics, animations, text, drawings, geotags, metadata tags, hyperlinks; Computer software for processing images, graphics, audio, video, and text; Computer software for sending and receiving electronic messages, graphics, images, audio and audio visual content via computer the internet and communication networks; Computer software for sending and receiving electronic messages, alerts, notifications and reminders; Computer software for social networking and interacting with online communities; Computer software for the collection, managing, editing, organizing, modifying, transmission, sharing, and storage of data and information; Computer software for the redirection of messages, Internet e-mail, and/or other data to one or more electronic wearable wireless communication devices from a data store on or associated with a personal computer or a server; Computer software for wireless content, data and information delivery; Computer software to enable accessing, displaying, editing, linking, sharing and otherwise providing electronic media and information via the internet and communications networks; Computer software to enable development, assessment, testing, and maintenance of mobile software applications for portable electronic communication devices, namely, mobile phones, smartphones, handheld computers and computer tablets; Computer software to enhance the audio-visual capabilities of multimedia applications, namely, for the three-dimensional rendering of graphics, still images and moving pictures provided as updates for or in combination with head-mounted display screen devices; Computer software, downloadable computer software and mobile application software for creating, managing and accessing groups within virtual communities; Computer software, namely, an application providing social networking functionalities; Computer software, namely, an interpretive interface for facilitating interaction between humans and machines; Downloadable computer software for finding content and content publishers, and for subscribing to content; Downloadable computer software for viewing and interacting with a feed of images, audio, audio-visual and video content and associated text and data; Gesture recognition software; Software for detecting objects, user gestures and commands; Software for operating sensor devices; Software to view virtual images in creating virtual, augmented and mixed reality; Interactive entertainment software; Location-aware computer software, downloadable computer software and mobile application software for searching, determining and sharing locations; Messaging software; Mixed reality software; Mixed reality software for interactive entertainment; Mixed reality software for navigating a mixed reality environment; Mixed reality software for object tracking, motion control and content visualization; Social assistant software; Software and firmware for enabling electronic devices to share data and communicate with each other; Software development tools; Software driver programs for electronic devices for enabling computer hardware and electronic devices to communicate with each other; Software for advertisers to communicate and interact with online communities; Software for alerts, messages, emails, and reminders, and for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating, reviewing, and receiving text, data, audio, image and digital files and display screens; Software for creating and managing social media profiles and user accounts; Software for creating, editing, uploading, downloading, accessing, viewing, posting, displaying, tagging, blogging, streaming, linking, annotating, indicating sentiment about, commenting on, embedding, transmitting, and sharing or otherwise providing electronic media or information via computer and communication networks; Software for creating, managing and accessing groups within virtual communities; Software for creating, managing, and interacting with an online community; Software for integrating electronic data with real world environments for the purposes of entertainment, education, communicating, and social networking; Software for modifying and enabling transmission of images, audio, audio visual and video content and data; Software for processing images, graphics, audio, video, and text; Software for social networking; Software for streaming multimedia entertainment content; Software and firmware for use in visual, voice, audio, motion, eye and gesture tracking and recognition; Software, namely, an interpretive interface for facilitating interaction between humans and machines; Video display software; Computer software, firmware and hardware for use in visual, voice, audio, motion, eye and gesture tracking and recognition; Computer hardware and software for operating sensor devices; Computer hardware and software for detecting objects, user gestures and commands; Computer software driver programs for electronic devices for enabling computer hardware and electronic devices to communicate with each other; Cameras; Wireless computer peripherals; Video receivers; Sensors for monitoring physical movements and dozens of other also-registered areas. | It is not clear to me how you "use" a mythological entity, and I take no position as to the divine consequences of any unauthorized uses, but you are entitled to incorporate then in your own intellectual creations for two reasons. First, any imaginable copyright on original texts (e.g. the Bhagavad Gita) has long since expired. Not all texts are of such certifiably ancient provenance, so there may be contemporary texts created by a practitioner of Ásatrúarfélagið which is protected. Second, names (Amitāyus, Zaraθuštra, Ngai) are not protected by copyright, so you can use names. | If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post. | I take it that you intend using the logos of the various companies to show that you do business with them? That would be "nominative use" and would be legal even without permission, but it would be better practice to ask for permission. You would need to make it clear that these companies do not endorse or recommend you (unless they do and say so in writing). If you get permission, ask about any color variations they are OK with. Would it be possible to put a black or dark color undercard below any logos that are white on transparent? this would make them visible and be a minimal change to the standard form of the logo. Again, the key thing is to make it clear that you are not claiming to be any of those companies, nor to be endorsed by them. And yes, a short consultation with a lawyer knowledgeable in trademark law would be a very good idea, and might not be very expensive. | You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry. | If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here. | This is not "unfair competition". You are allowed to ask people for their views and take them into account in designing software, even with the specific intent that it compete successfully with existing software. In the US you have a protected right to do that under the First Amendment. If the chat site where you asked is run by the developer or owners of the app, they can ask you to avoid such question there, and even ban you from the site if they choose, because it is their site. But if you went onto a public site (like Stack Exchange, say, or Quora) the app owners would have no right to insist that you not ask for such opinions. The degree to which the design or interface of an app or other software may be protected against imitation is a complex one, and depends on the country involved. But widely known and used features such as a 'like' button, message threading, or a comment section are almost surely not protectable. Listening to users of existing simile products and getting their ideas on what works well and what is lacking is generally a good idea, and is in no way "unfair". | TOS are a contract. If you have a contract through the App, you have incorporated the TOS as a term of your contract. Contracts mean what they say they do, what you are thinking of as "basic contract law" is actual just an ordinary and customary term that people in your industry usually make a part of the contract, not contract law itself. |
On the Term "Commercial Use" and the Usage of an Apparently Free Font I am in the process of finishing up a book which I anticipate will be published in the United States. For the book's cover, I would like to make use of a font that is freely downloadable; and, as far as I can tell, does not forbid commercial use. In this case, I would like to make use of a font available from https://www.schäffel.ch/de_gruppe1.html. Now, I say, "as far as I can tell", for German is not my native language, and although I did not determine that "commercial use" is forbidden, I also did not detect anything along the lines of "free for commercial use." QUESTION: Would using a freely downloadable font for a book to be published be considered as "commercial use"; and if so, may I legally use a font in that book (without reprisal) from a foreign site, which again, "as far as I can tell", does not seem to forbid it? | https://www.schäffel.ch/allgemein_de.html: "Die Fonts dürfen für private und professionelle Zwecke unbeschränkt verwendet werden. Sie kommen vollständig und mit allen Einbettungsrechten. Es wird gebeten, jegliche Modifikation der Datensätze, den Vertrieb unter anderen Namen, die Verteilung auf anderen Websites als dieser oder die Eingliederung in Font-Pakete zu unterlassen." That is, The fonts may be used without restriction for private and professional purposes. They come complete and with all embed rights. Please refrain from any modification of the data sets, distribution under other names, distribution on websites other than this one or incorporation into font packages. | "Educational use" does not get a free pass on the law against circumventing copy-protection. First, "educational use" is extremely broad and could include "to post on Stackexchange", or "so that I can learn something". The cited clause specifically limits this exception to "A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution" – the library must be nonprofit, and the archive or educational institution may also need to be nonprofit (until the courts fix the ambiguity in the scope of "nonprofit"). Second, the circumvention has to be very limited: the purpose must be only to evaluate the work, to see if you want to legally acquire it. So a nonprofit library can peek into a work to see if they want to buy a copy, but you may not. The only thing the library can do is evaluate the work for legal acquisition, and they have to get rid of the pirated copy once they've made the decision. Additionally (other parts of the subsection say), they can't do this is there is an equivalent legal copy available (e.g. if there's a print book available, they can't hack into the e-book to "determine" whether they want the book), and w.r.t. libraries and archives they must be open to the public. | If the blog author holds the copyright on the ebook, they can distribute the ebook anyway they choose, either via download from Github or elsewhere, or sell it in an online store. They hold the copyright, they alone can decide how to distribute it. If they also sell the ebook in the Microsoft press Store, they may have an agreement with the store to also allow their own free downloads; it's hard to say without knowing the agreement. If there are ebooks on Githb available for viewing or download, the owner of the Github page should hold copyright of the ebook, both 1) for their own protection against copyright infringement, and 2) to not break GitHub's TOS against copright infringement: https://help.github.com/articles/github-terms-of-service/#f-copyright-infringement-and-dmca-policy | It depends. Symbols which are not entitled to trademark protection in a market, usually because they are merely descriptive or generic or functional, are in the public domain and may be used by anyone, but a person using a descriptive or generic symbol can't prevent someone else from using the same symbol to promote their own business. For example, I can use the scales of justice symbol to promote my law practice on my law firm website. But, since that symbol is a generic one in the law firm market, I can't sue a competing law firm from using the same symbol on their website. The essence of a protectable trademark that an owner of can legally exclude competing firms in the same market from using, is that your firm manages to infuse into the distinctive affectation for which trademark protection is claimed with what is called "secondary meaning" to the words or image or other manifestation of the trademark when it is used in the market where the owner of the mark wants to obtain trademark protection. For example, descriptive trademarks are not eligible for trademark protection and are instead in the public domain and can be used by anyone in a market where the mark is descriptive. You can't gain a legally protected right to use the word "liquor" to describe a business that is engaged in selling liquor, and you can't gain a legally protected right to use the words "doughnut shop" for a business that sells doughnuts. But, if you use the words "doughnut shop" to describe a business that sells liquor or bras, rather than doughnuts, and those words come to be associated in the mind of the public with your particular chain of liquor stores or lingerie stores, then the words "doughnut shop" have acquired a "secondary meaning" which can be legally protected by trademark law allowing you to deny other businesses the right to use that trademark in the economic market where it has acquired a secondary meaning. (The scope of an economic market can be both geographic and conceptual related to the nature of the products sold. The manner in which an economic market is determined for a mark is beyond the scope of this answer or the original question.) The analysis with respect to symbols is analogous. You can't gain legal protections for using a common symbol in a manner that merely conveys its pre-existing common meaning. For example, if you use the hashtag sign # to mean "number" or "pound", that probably cannot be legally protected by trademark law. But, suppose that one particular firm (e.g. Twitter) uses the hashtag sign in a novel sense associated exclusively with a service that this particular firm provides, in a manner that is not semantically derived from its pre-existing meanings. In that situation, the firm might very well be permitted to claim trademark protection for the use of that common symbol in this new sense that has a "secondary meaning", which associates that symbol in a certain context exclusively with that firm, in the market where that firm does business. Similarly, you could probably not gain trademark protection for the common highway "yield sign" design to mean "yield" or be careful or some other similar semantic meaning. But, if you used the common highway yield sign to sell spaceships, and people came to associate that symbol with the spaceships sold by your particular firm, rather than with spaceships in general, you might be able to secure trademark protection for the yield sign symbol in that marketplace. It is easier to develop a "secondary meaning" for a distinctive and particular stylized presentation of either words in a particular script, or a variation on what would otherwise be a common symbol, than it is to develop a "secondary meaning" for generic words or a generic symbol that is has an existing meaning in other contexts. For example, while Apple could probably not have claimed trademark protection for an image of a clock spinning clockwise while the user has to wait while the computer is thinking about something, Apple's distinctive variant of this image (which some people call the "pinwheel of death") might very well be eligible for trademark protection.' The AppleOS pinwheel of death | Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this. | The difference between commercial and non-commercial software use is about as clear as it gets, outlined by the definitions in the license above. One makes money, the other doesn't. There is no gray area. Your intent or expectations for a project may seem to alter the difference between the two and add a gray area in your mind, but they don't. Once you are a commercial user, buy a commercial license and/or upgrade the non-commercial license to commercial. That's the legal angle; and what is illegal and what is unethical are not always the same. If you still feel like your intent does make a difference and you feel unethical about using a non-commercial license - because you are building a community and hoping/planning on making money - buy the commercial license to begin with. | The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work. | You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law "rights" refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the "right" i.e. "freedom" for someone to do something). |
Decency Laws vs. Discrimination Laws Apropos of this. Brief background: Teacher in Canada transitions from male to female. Teacher purchases extremely oversized prosthetic breasts which they use as part of their gender reassignment, and wear a top over their breastplate which wears tightly around the breastplate and shows the nipples. Parents and (some) news media are outraged. School board claims they can't discipline or reprimand, the teacher in any way, or ask the teacher to change their behaviour, or even institute a general dress code for staff that would cover this situation, due to anti-discrimination statutes. Question: Where is the legal line between what is considered a "decency law" (public indecency, pornography, nudity) and a "discrimination law" (not accepting someone on the basis of discrimination)? Legally speaking, how does it affect the situation if the person in question was primarily associating with minors, in a role of authority? I would assume it is not irrelevant given legal underpinnings of laws such as child pornography and statutory rape. | I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. | It is. Part 2 Chapter 1 Section 8 specifically says "People who are not married or civil partners do not have this characteristic." In practical terms, a claim for unlawful dismissal would not have to rely on this Act or this Characteristic. Many company handbooks refer to avoiding discrimination on "marital status", so the claim could be made that the company had acted against policy. Not as strong as national law, but likely to succeed in absence of other factors. Single people who were expected to cover shifts that people with a family consistently avoided could argue constructive dismissal on "making unreasonable changes to working patterns or place of work without agreement" grounds. And cases of sexual harassment are as likely to refer to Sections 11 or 12 of the Act as to Section 8. There appears to be some interest in this - north of the border if not in England and Wales - and perhaps less jurisdictionally in Bella De Paulo's article for Psychology Today, which concludes "All serious forms of prejudice and discrimination go through a similar process of going unrecognized, then getting dismissed and belittled once people start pointing them out, and in the best cases, eventually getting taken seriously. Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that when she was first appointed to the Supreme Court, the other judges did not think gender discrimination existed. ..." | You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know. | There is nothing illegal about the child asking for nude images, but, depending on jurisdiction and circumstances, there is quite likely to be a serious legal problem with the adult providing such nudes. The exact laws that might be violated would depend a lot on the jurisdiction. The detailed facts would also be significant. But such a situation is fraught with danger, for the adult. Even if there is no ill-intent, such actions could easily be misinterpreted, and might be technically unlawful regardless of intent. Of course, not all nudes are obscene, or even "inappropriate for children". Which are so classified depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction. | "The EU" is a lot of different jurisdictions, and laws vary between them. The following answer applies to the UK. A: Alice is guilty of making and possessing indecent images of a child. The fact that the child was herself is irrelevant, as are her current feelings on the subject. The "making" offence was committed when she was under 18, so for that she would be treated as a child, but the possession offence would be be charged at her current age. If Alice has made recent copies of the pictures, for instance by moving her files to another computer, then she is guilty of "making" as an adult. B: As with "A", but with increased penalties for publishing it. C: As with "B", except that the offence was committed when she was under 18. | Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one). | Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional. | There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced. |
Can Canadian trial judges set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal? Not long ago I learned that the Crown can appeal from verdicts of acquittal in Canada, unlike prosecutors in the U.S. I once thought that the reason why U.S. judges cannot set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal is that it would violate a right to trial by jury, but law.stackexchange.com told me that that is not the reason; rather the reason was that double jeopardy is not allowed. If the U.S. sees an impermissible double jeopardy in the prosecution's appeal from a verdict of acquittal or in a judge's setting aside such a verdict, and Canada sees no impermissble double jeopardy in an appeal by the Crown, might Canada also see nothing impermissible in a judge's setting aside the acquittal verdict? | Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be "plain error" (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say "I object" that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was "harmless", which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings. | The double jeopardy clause would prevent you from being retried by the government that tried you for murder (probably a U.S. state). But, you could be tried for fraud and obstruction of justice at the state level, and you could be tried for murder if an appropriate federal offense were located, at the federal level. Often conspiracy to deprive someone of their civil rights is used as a federal offense when there is a state level acquittal, and it isn't impossible to imagine that happening in this case as the victim had a right to the protection of the laws, and the state had a right to enforce the criminal laws, which was deprived in a manner that could be called "under color of state law.' | The jury ultimately decides if a person is guilty or not. Jury nullification is when the person is clearly guilty or innocent, but for some odd reason the jury (who knows the person is guilty/innocent) gives the "wrong verdict" An example of this in the UK was when a guy was being charged with a spy crime years after his crime happened (I cant remember the case), the jury essentially thought that so much time has passed that it was silly to convict him, so gave a non guilty verdict. There are cases for and against jury nullification. In my personal belief I think in certain cases, such as if edward snowden would be charged, I would find him non guilty as a matter of what is right to ky conscience, regardless of the fact that he clearly did something illegal | Yes. This is legal. See, e.g. SPARF v.U.S. 156 U.S. 51 (1895); U.S. vs Moylan, 417 F 2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969); U.S. v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1988) ("the jury asked the judge about jury nullification. The judge responded, "There is no such thing as valid jury nullification." The jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the majority and the dissent agreed that the trial judge's instruction was untrue, but the majority held that this false representation was not a reversible error."). Indeed, procedurally, the system is specifically designed to prevent courts from even considering such a question. See also, e.g. People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80, § 2 (Colo. 2019) (holding no crime was committed) ("Defendants Mark Iannicelli and Eric Brandt stood in the plaza square adjacent to the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse in Denver and asked people entering the courthouse whether they were reporting for jury duty. If any of these people answered affirmatively, then Iannicelli and Brandt would hand them one or more brochures discussing the concept of jury nullification, which the brochures defined as the process by which a jury in a criminal case acquits the defendant regardless of whether he or she has broken the law in question. As a result of this conduct, the People charged Iannicelli and Brandt with multiple counts of jury tampering") This is deeply entwined with the U.S. law interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause's protections, which prohibit a retrial or appeal following a judgment of acquittal, which have been incorporated by the U.S. Supreme Court as applicable in state courts as well. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. |
Is the weight of the container included in the weight of drugs? In this video a suspect has a can of soda with a bag of cocaine inside. While trying to get the guy to admit to possession, a police officer tells the suspect that the weight of the entire package would be what he's charged with possession, saying it weighs about a pound (implying that the soda can's weight is included). I know that police officers in the United States are allowed to lie. Is this an example of the officer lying to the suspect to get him to admit to a smaller amount of cocaine, or is it true that for some reason the weight of the container is included when charging people for possession? | There is a slim chance that it is truish, depending on whose law you are asking about, and also depending on the facts (if the drug was in a baggie, it's unclear; it is was mixed with the soda, it's clear and it's true). As far as I know, the "baggie in can" theory has not been put to the appellate test (perhaps that is evidence that the can does not count). However, in the case Chapman v. US, 500 U.S. 453, defendant was convicted of the sale of LSD-laced blotter paper, and was sentenced accosting to the 5.7 gram weight of the blotter paper, not the 50 milligram weight of the LSD that it contained. SCOTUS upheld the sentencing based on the higher weight, holding that "The statute requires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when determining the appropriate sentencing for trafficking in LSD", because the statute is stated in terms of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" (here, 21 USC 841, are some of the current laws, which repeated use the formula "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of"). The question that would arise is whether a can containing a bag of something is a "substance" or "mixture". The ordinary meaning of "mixture" precludes that interpretation, but of course you also have to look at the legislative history to determine what Congress's intent was in writing these laws. Saying that a can with a bag is a "substance" is also counter-intuitive, but not as plainly unreasonable as calling a can and a bag a "mixture". In Chapman, the court observed that "Congress clearly intended the dilutant, cutting agent, or carrier medium to be included in the weight of those drugs for sentencing purposes", but again you might interpret "carrier medium" as referring to something other than "the means of carrying the drug" – "carrier medium" is not statutorily defined, and its "plain meaning" is broad (but also note that the statute doesn't mention "carrier medium"). In its ruling, the court appeals to "the history of Congress's attempts to control illegal drug distribution", and a careful study of all of the pertinent documents for this case might definitively rule in vs. out an interpretation that the weight of the container is to be included. An obvious ludicrous consequence of including container weight is that if you are arrested for possession of a trace amount of a drug, found in your car, the weight of the car is to be considered and you get life in prison. It is plausible that the officer has a vague acquaintance with the Chapman-type ruling, and has misapplied the law, thus he has a good-faith belief that his claim is legally correct (thus he did not lie, he was simply wrong). Perhaps some DA has pursued the "drug plus can-weight" theory, but I doubt that has happened. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | First, if the police officer had reasonable cause to believe that a crime was in progress then the search would not be illegal in the first place. However, let's assume the search was illegal. Normally the evidence would be excluded under the exclusionary rule. However, there are two exceptions known as the independent source and attenuation doctrines. The evidence of the police officer as to the imprisonment would be excluded. However, the evidence of the victims is independent of that illegal search and their testimony would be admissible. Further, that testimony would allow independent discovery and admissibility of any physical evidence in the property. However, if the victims were dead, then there would be no independent discovery and none of the evidence would be admissible. | I can at least look at the federal sentencing guidelines. From the description of the offense I'm guessing he's charged under 18 USC §922(g)(3). In the guidelines, this offense would appear to fall under "§2K2.1. Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition". The notes here say: For purposes of subsections (a)(4)(B) and (a)(6), "prohibited person" means any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n). I therefore believe he meets the criteria of §2K2.1(a)(6) ("if the defendant was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense"), which would mean the base offense level was 14. Then the big question is whether he falls under §2K2.1(b)(2): If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6. I doubt the handgun was for sporting purposes or for collection; it was likely for self-defense. But I also don't think he is accused of unlawfully discharging or using it. I'm not sure exactly how this would be interpreted. If the offense level is 6, a sentence of probation would normally fall within the guidelines. If it was 14 (or even 12 after a possible 2-level decrease for taking responsibility), a sentence of probation would not be within the guidelines. This is, however, a pretrial diversion, not a conviction. I'm not sure how much the ordinary guidelines apply to that, or whether that's normally done for this sort of thing. It's also possible that I'm missing some factor which would change the offense level more. | Arizona does not license chemists, though they do license pharmacists. There is a law against possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of which is a felony. The law also says In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following: Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any drug. The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter. The proximity of the object to drugs. The existence of any residue of drugs on the object. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this chapter. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use. Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use. National and local advertising concerning its use. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the business enterprise. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community. Expert testimony concerning its use. The size of your equipment would be relevant in defending against such a charge; your publications in the field of chemistry would be relevant. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that you were using the glassware to make drugs. Paraphernalia is defined as all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a drug in violation of this chapter. so a garden shovel can be used to grow marijuana, but that is not enough. The prosecution has to prove that the items "are used, intended for use or designed for use" in drug making – not just that they could be so used. | Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule. | The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. |
Can illegal immigrants sue the U.S. government if they got injured while being detained? Can illegal immigrants sue the U.S. government if they got injured while being detained? In my knowledge, legal immigrants can sue the U.S. government if they got injured while being detained, but I am not sure if illegal immigrants can sue the U.S. government for doing the same. I am asking, because I don't ever think I've heard of a case where illegal immigrants sued the government. | Can illegal immigrants sue the U.S. government if they got injured while being detained? Yes, if they are in the USA at the time. See the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001): It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders. [citations omitted] But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. (My emboldenment) In my research for this answer I came across a 2017 FactCheck.org article that disproved a fake news story that was doing the rounds. I have not repoduced it here to prevent its wider circulation by being found by internet search engines. Instead, this is what FactCheck has to say: Q: Did the Supreme Court rule that immigrants living in the U.S. illegally can’t sue anyone if they feel they’ve been mistreated? A: No. That claim was made in a bogus story published on satirical and fake news websites. The fake news story appears to have come from the case of Hernandez v Mesa that... ...centered on the 2010 shooting of a Mexican teenager [Hernandez] on the Mexican side of the Mexico–United States border by a U.S. Border Patrol agent [Mesa] who was standing on the U.S. side of the border at the time he fired his weapon. ... and whether the Constitution extends protection to an individual who is killed on foreign soil, even though that person is standing just a few yards outside the United States. Apparently it doesn't as, after much toing and froing, on 25 February 2020 the SCOTUS... ruled against Hernandez and held that the Court's precedent under Bivens did not extend to cross-border shootings. | Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability. | No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid. | It is illegal to discriminate on the basis of "national or ethnic origin" This is spelled out in the Canadian Human Rights Act s3(1). However, a person's citizenship is something that can (must) be discriminated on. Unless it is being used as a proxy for "national or ethnic origin". Right to work in Canada To be allowed to work in Canada, person must be a: Canadian citizen (including dual-nationals), non-Canadian citizen and hold a work-permit, non-Canadian citizen and be doing exempt work. So, an employer asking about citizenship to determine eligibility is fine. An employer asking to discriminate in favour of group 1 over group 2 or 3 is not. | You don't explicitly say (this being an internationally visited and populated site), but based on your question, I will assume that you are in the US. For the question you asked: Is the company the government? If not, then NO, you cannot successfully sue a company (or person for that matter) for violating the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment to the US Constitution in any circumstances whatsoever. (Sorry, this is a pet peeve of mine). The US Constitution does not bind or restrict any private* individual or company, in any way. (Here "private" means "non-governmental; a "public(ly traded) company" is still considered a "private" entity in this context). The US Constitution exclusively deals with four things: How the US Federal Government operates, powers of the government, and restrictions of the government, and the definition of treason (which arguably is itself a restriction on the power of the government, by denying them the ability to define treason themselves). The First Amendment itself is explicit about this restriction: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech (emphasis mine). Note that, while the First Amendment does not mention acts of the President, this is because the President's Constitutional powers are quite weak and limited; What powers the President does have and usually uses are granted to the office by laws passed by Congress, and so the restriction comes with them, as Congress cannot delegate to the President powers that Congress themselves do not possess). As such, no company can be sued for violating the First Amendment (or any portion of the Constitution, really) because it does not apply to them. Now, there may be laws passed by relevant legislatures, but these are dependent on your jurisdiction (e.g. state). However, as a general rule of thumb this would be legal. Turning down a candidate based on what they say in an interview is the point of having an interview; Turning down an candidate for saying something in an interview that could potentially leave the company liable for a lawsuit under the theory of vicarious liability is only good common sense. | This is called a qui tam action. It's a concept that's been around a long time in the English legal system (predating the US), to encourage people to help the government enforce its laws. The more contemporary system is to give private parties the right to sue on their own behalf for some wrong (known as a "private attorney general" system), which is how things like civil rights claims tend to work; the difference with qui tam is that the government is the plaintiff (source) It's possible when the law says that a claim under some section may be filed by a private person on behalf of the government; at the time the article was written, the false marking statute (35 USC 292) stated that "Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States." In a qui tam action, the government is the plaintiff; it's just that instead of a public attorney handling the case, it's handled by a private party. There were three active qui tam statutes in US federal law as of 2009 (source: CRS): the False Claims Act (31 USC 3730), the patent marking claim, and an Indian protection statute (25 USC 201). The patent marking qui tam provision has been repealed, leaving just the two. For the Indian protection statute, I can't find any reference to any special procedure; for the False Claims Act, there is a special procedure included in the law. In the False Claims Act, when an action is submitted, the government is notified and the complaint kept sealed for 60 days while the US government decides what to do. If the government wants to take over the case itself, it can do that; if it wants the private party to run the case, it can do that too; if it wants to dismiss or settle the case it can do that as well. It can also ask for the time to be extended, or for discovery to be delayed to gather evidence or prosecute a separate criminal or civil case. If the government lets the private party run the case, they can still intervene later if they have a good reason. After the case finishes, the private party gets 15-25% of the judgment or settlement (if the government took over the case) or 25-30% (if the private party ran the case), plus attorney fees. If the facts the case was brought under were publicly known when it was filed, the amount shrinks to 0-10% if the person supplied information to the government that wasn't publicly known when it was supplied, and the case is dismissed if the person just learned about it from public sources. For the false marking statute, a district court actually found it unconstitutional in part because of the lack of the extensive procedure found in the False Claims Act. There, the procedure was just to file the case like normal; the clerk had to tell the Patent Office that a claim had been filed within a month, but one issue was that a settlement could have happened in that time and bound the government. It's possible higher courts would have ruled had that section not been repealed later that year. As for other countries, the idea came to the US from England, but the Common Informers Act 1951 eliminated it there. However, private prosecutions (which do exist in England) are similar in that the case is on behalf of the Crown, but handled by a private party; they're different in that the private party doesn't get any part of the judgment. While it's hard to prove a negative, I can't find any evidence of qui tam provisions outside the US. | When you breach a contract, you can get sued in local court, and if you don't show up to defend yourself, default judgment will be entered against you. Then the aggrieved party will have to collect, but the court in Washington (to invent a jurisdiction) can't enforce an order against a person in Norway (to invent another jurisdiction). So the aggrieved party would need to take enforcement of the judgment to the Norwegian courts. In the actual case of Norway, this is fairly simple, you just call an attorney in Norway to do the paperwork. It might be harder if the other jurisdiction is Belarus. If you return to the US, even if there is a money judgment against you for the rent owed, you will not be arrested for that debt. Depending on the state (about half of the states), you might be arrested for failing to comply with a court order to pay the debt. The difference lies in refusing to comply with a court order, versus simply having a debt. The State Department conveniently lists the reasons for denying a visa. Owing money or having an uncollected judgment against you is not one of the possible reasons, in fact even having been ordered by a court to pay, ignoring the order, and the court issuing an arrest warrant does not make you inadmissible. | A government can pass laws which cannot be fully enforced, or even widely enforced. Such laws are nonetheless legally valid, unless repealed by the legislature, or struck down by the courts in accord with the procedures in the particular country's laws. In common law countries, it is often a defense to a criminal charge that a law is impossible to comply with, but this only arises when there is an attempt to enforce the law, and it is in fact impossible for that defendant to comply with that law. If the defendant can comply, it is not relevant that other defendants might not be able to. If taxes were assessed that totaled more than all the legal money in circulation, the government might increase the money supply. Or it might not try to collect in all cases, or not collect the full amount. Otherwise many taxpayers might enter bankruptcy. In other cases of impossible laws, the results would depend on just how enforcement was attempted. The government cannot magically give people the ability to do things they cannot. A law requiring everyone to fly by flapping his or her arms would not secure compliance. It might put a lot of people in jail if people were arrested for not flying by hand. A law requiring everyone to register with a government agency before stepping outside would be foolish, and perhaps unenforceable under current conditions (but perhaps would be sensible in a Moon colony). Such a law would be legal (although it might fail a "rational basis test in the US) but an attempt to enforce it widely would lead to confusion or perhaps resistance. Most governments are not so foolish as to pass laws that cannot be complied with by large numbers of people, even if they have the legal power to pass such laws. A government that passed such a law might become unpopular, or even be overthrown. In some cases in history, laws that could not be complied with by particular groups were used as ways to persecute those groups. |
Is attorney client privilege practice wide? Does the concept of attorney client privilege apply to workers within the same law practice that are not directly involved with your case as well? | Basically, the privilege does apply to other members of the firm including non-lawyer staff, although the analysis that gets you there can be a bit involved in some cases. The Duty of Confidentiality As @DavidSiegel notes, there is a distinction between the duty to not reveal client secrets subject to certain exceptions, that in all U.S. jurisdictions arises primarily under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, Rule 5.1 regarding partners and supervisory lawyers in law firms, Rule 5.2 regarding subordinate lawyers in law firms, and Rule 5.3 governing how the rules apply to non-lawyer assistants in a firm. The Attorney-Client Privilege There is a separate body of law that heavily overlaps that governs the attorney-client privilege which is the right to refuse to disclose confidential information of a client to third-parties even in the face of a court order of subpoena that would otherwise compel someone legally to disclose information. The attorney-client privilege has a couple of components. One is the privilege for confidential communications between a lawyer and a client (which extends to disclosures to other attorneys and staff in the firm with a need to know and people with whom there are joint defense agreements) and the other is the work product privilege which protects work done for a client by a lawyer or the lawyer's law firm in the course of a legal representation of the client (which is almost as strong but has some narrow exceptions that don't apply to the confidential communications privilege). The work product privilege, like the confidential communications privilege, is not waived or impaired because attorney work product (or attorney staff work product) is shared within lawyers and legal staff in a law firm as necessary to represent a client. An attorney-client relationship that gives rise to the privilege extends directly from the client to every lawyer in a law firm that works on their case in any way, or is made privy to the attorney-client privileged material regarding the client in any way. In Colorado, where I primarily practice (which is entirely typical in this regard), this is mostly codified by statute in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-90-107(1)(b) (at pdf page 544) which expressly extends its protections to legal staff by stating: An attorney shall not be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall an attorney's secretary, paralegal, legal assistant, stenographer, or clerk be examined without the consent of his employer concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in such capacity. There is also a great deal of case law interpreting this statute. The case law establishes, for example, that the privilege belongs to the client and not the attorney or the employees of the attorney. In federal courts when dealing with questions of federal law, the attorney-client privilege is governed not mostly by state statutes and case law but by the federal common law authorized and developed under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and Federal Rule of Evidence 502. FRE 501 states: Rule 501. Privilege in General The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision. FRE 502 states: Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. (a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope of a Waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together. (b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(5)(B). (c) Disclosure Made in a State Proceeding. When the disclosure is made in a state proceeding and is not the subject of a state-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if the disclosure: (1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in a federal proceeding; or (2) is not a waiver under the law of the state where the disclosure occurred. (d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court — in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding. (e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order. (f) Controlling Effect of this Rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101, this rule applies to state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if state law provides the rule of decision. (g) Definitions. In this rule: (1) “attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications; and (2) “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. | There are two basic problems with your theory: You say: can't one accept a case on contingency and "as time permits," so that in such an event one would simply drop the contingency case (or, if it looked promising, hand it off to some other lawyer in a slump)? No. you can't. If you take a case, then drop it because a more profitable case comes along, you might well be disbarred, not to mention sued by the client you just threw over. You might even spend a night in jail for contempt--in many cases, you are not allowed to simply drop a case without the court's permission. So if you accept a contingency case, you accept it until (1) the case is over, (2) the client fires you, (3) you, the client, and the judge all agree you can quit, or (4) you can convince the judge you should be allowed to quit regardless of the client's wishes. Until then, you are stuck with the time and expense involved with handling the case. "Expense" is the second problem. You seem to be under the impression that once you've paid for the office and the coffee maker, there's no downside in pursuing a contingency case. But filing and pursuing a lawsuit cost money, not just time. Copying and coding documents costs money. Stenographers for depositions cost money. Just filing a lawsuit often costs a few hundred dollars. Hell, in a major lawsuit, you will probably spend a few hundred dollars just on postage. And a lot of commercial litigation now involves expert witnesses, whose fees start at a few hundred dollars an hour. Normally that all gets billed back to the client, but on a contingency case the lawyer often absorbs most or all of it. So from a lawyer's perspective, even if he or she is not working right now, "any positive payout" isn't enough. It has to be enough of a payout, and enough of a chance of winning, that the expected reward is worth paying, potentially, the cost of a trial, and forgoing other work if things get busy again while you're trying to prep your contingency case for trial. The fact is, for a lot of this sort of case--even if it looks "potentially profitable" to a non-lawyer--is going to be less profitable, in the long run, than spending the same amount of time playing golf with people who might actually pay you by the hour to do something. Also, two quick notes: Your suggestion of raising the contingency up to 100%, or close to it, won't help--it's illegal in many jurisdictions, and unethical in all of them. As a side note, even if a lawyer did take one of these cases, it wouldn't do you any good, since lawyers are prohibited in most cases from splitting their fees with non-lawyers. | Chaudhry v Prabhakar is unlikely to be applicable Giving specific advice one-on-one in a field of known expertise when specifically asked creates a duty of care. Giving general advice on a mass-communication forum to general questions when all parties are aware that specific legal advice is specifically off-topic doesn’t. | Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction. | When they start giving legal advice ... unless your PA is a lawyer. In a nutshell, legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver Unlike legal information - such as information posted on a street sign - legal advice proposes a specific course of action a client should take. For instance, it's the difference between telling someone what to do (legal advice) as opposed to how to do it (legal information). For your specific questions Can they research the CC&Rs, Bylaws or other such states, federal statues to help me better understand the letter? Researching and even summarising is not legal advice. If they give opinions on what you should do as a result of that research it is legal advice. Can they write up a response letter that I would look at and approve ... Yes ... or if minor enough they could just respond? It depends on what's involved. If it is a purely factual response ("Is this your car?") then this is ok. If it is legal advocacy, it isn't. Putting aside the legalities; how does your PA feel about you suing them if they stuff any of this up? If I was your PA, I wouldn't be acting as your agent without an indemnity. | Yes Ideally a case will be conducted by the same judge throughout, however, there are a multitude of personal, professional and administrative reasons why this might not happen - litigation can take years and like every other workplace people come and go, have changing family circumstances, sickness, vacations etc. A litigant should not be alarmed and trust that the new judge has got themselves up to speed. For most people, litigation is a rare and confusing experience, for judges it’s just another day at the office. | The wording is a little confusing, but I interpret it as saying the following: Normally, discovery in a court case allows either party to demand documents from the other, to be used as evidence. However, our courts have exceptions; certain documents might be 'privileged against discovery', meaning they couldn't be demanded in that way. If one of those exceptions would apply to a document under court rules, then you can't request it under Freedom of Access either. To know what those privileges are, and how broadly they apply, you'll have to consult the rules of court procedure for your state. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. |
What incentive does an arbitrator in retail or labor cases have to rule for the plaintiff? When a customer or employee goes to mandated arbitration, the arbitrator is paid by the defendant; the arbitrator, or a body that picks the arbitrator, is also chosen by the defendant. I have seen it said that they more often rule in favor of the defendant, but apparently they also occasionally rule in favor of the plaintiff. I am interested in that small second category of cases. I am interested in retail and labor cases rather than cases between two corporations. What incentive does an arbitrator have to rule in favor of the plaintiff? Sheer decency is important. Is that it? But humans often act according to incentives, particularly when the framework in which they work, in this case the arbitration system, does not have (I think) a strong value system pushing against the incentives. In the legal system, it is bad for a judge's career to be overruled too often on appeal. An arbitrator can in some cases be overruled by a follow-up lawsuit. Is this their incentive? Or is there some other motivation? | They get paid either way I’m an arbitrator, adjudicator, and mediator and I’ll make this very clear: I don’t give a rat’s arse who wins. When I’m acting as a mediator I can go even further: I don’t give a rat’s arse if the dispute even gets resolved. My job is to do my job. To manage the process and, if making a decision is part of the process, make a decision. My paycheque is totally unaffected by who I decide for. Future employment prospects depend on you being good at the job. Bias is not being good at the job. Oh, yeah. Also, it’s the law that I’m impartial. In any event, most arbitration clauses give the parties no input in the selection of the arbitrator (e.g. by nominating the president of a professional association of arbitrators to appoint them) or require them to agree on the arbitrator. | Technically anyone can sit on a jury. Lawyers are not automatically excluded from juries anymore, as being called for jury duty is a right and a duty that the law abhors automatically excluding people from. That is the official line on this. However, in reality, lawyers will always be stricken from serving by one of the lawyers trying the case. Each lawyer has a certain number of preemptory strikes (the ability to get rid of a juror for any reason, aside from those protected by law, such as race, religion, etc). They also have unlimited "for cause strikes," which are when a juror is biased in some way. Lawyers trying the case almost always try to use a cause strike to get a lawyer off, saying that they are biased toward either Defense or Plaintiffs based on the type of law they practice. The judge will usually not let them use a cause strike, saying that an attorney is ethical enough to apply the facts to the law and not sway the jury based on their personal biases that everyone has; plus, we're officers of the court so we have a duty to be ethical. Hence, they are typically forced to use a preemptory strike to get a lawyer off, but they will, every time. (If the lawyer just tried a similar case, then they'd get to use for cause.) The real reason that the lawyer from one side or the other definitely wants a lawyer off is that the jury instructions presented by each side to the judge are crafted in a way that each word carries specific meaning and, with that, is designed to lead to a certain way of thinking. Once the lawyers have fought over the instructions and the judge decides what will be presented, the jury only gets them in writing...in some states not even in writing, they only get them read to them without a copy to take back to the room. If a lawyer is in the jury, that person will undoubtedly be able to explain exactly what the law requires for a finding, or exactly why a certain finding should be had. They will advocate one way or another; this is undeniable. The instructions are purposefully confusing. The reason is this: when we fight over jury instruction, inherently, one of us will want an instruction that is hard to understand, for a lay person. This is because we want them to apply the law as it is commonly (mis)understood, not as it truly is, because that's not good for our case. To have a lawyer on the jury would defeat the finely crafted instruction and its potential to confuse. They would undoubtedly explain the instruction to the jury. One may think this would be helpful, however, juries are told that any special knowledge they have about anything pertaining to the case shall not be shared as it could sway the jury. This is most true when it comes to a lawyer sitting. When a jury doesn't understand a jury instruction, their only recourse is to send a question to the judge. In states where they have the instruction in writing, all he can say is "read carefully;" he cannot give his interpretation of what the instruction means. If a judge did give his own interpretation that is grounds for a mistrial or an appeal at least. A lawyer on the jury would be able to explain, "Oh, what this really means is X," and this is bad from one side's perspective, almost always. We all have biases, and even finely determined rules of law can be subtly pushed toward one direction or another with the use of a certain word over another, or the placement of one element before another. Generally, unless the side who would most want the attorney off had exhausted their preemptory strikes, and lost the argument to remove for cause, there is very little chance a lawyer will serve. The fact of the matter is that both sides are very likely to want a lawyer stricken from the jury pool, (even from the side who may believe the lawyer to have leanings in their favor). It is essential to control as many factors as possible in a jury trial, and an attorney on the panel is just a wild card. The potential always exists that if a lawyer ends up on the jury, they could explain the elements of the case to their fellow jurors, who may then not rely as fully upon the carefully crafted language in the instruction(s). This could backfire on either side when certain portions of the language used may be intentionally vague or difficult to parse though for someone who doesn't practice law. Anyone interested in the process of choosing and striking jurors (in the U.S.), through the process of voir dire, this is a fairly comprehensive article on the topic. | Settlements are brought about by an analysis of the relevant litigation risks. To take a simple example, suppose both sets of lawyers agree that the plaintiff will likely collect about $2.6 million if s/he wins the lawsuit, and that the chances of prevailing are about 50-50. That would produce a settlement figure of $1.3 million (0.5 x $2.6 million). The main reason that settlements fail is because the two sides don't agree on the above parameters. For instance, if the defense felt that the plaintiff would be awarded no more than $1 million, it would not settle for $1.3 million. Or it may agree with $2.6 million as the potential liability figure, but feel that the plaintiff's chances of winning are only one in three. | No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations. | A plaintiff wins a civil claim by proving their case on the balance of probabilities - that is, is their case more likely than the defence case. The court will decide if it is more likely that the employee was terminated for attempting to make a workers compensation claim or if it is more likely they were fired for the reason the company gives. When I’m called upon to make such decisions I apply the duck test: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. ... even if someone is trying to tell me it’s a chicken. | Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process For grievances between private parties, they can agree to resolve them through arbitration. For breaches of public law (like GDPR) the state is the one against whom the offence is committed. Arbitration is not available to resolve these matters - resolution is through the courts or administrative tribunals. | Let's say that the mediation doesn't succeed to achieve voluntary compliance satisfactory to both sides. What happens next? Under Sec 706(e) it appears that the complainant has to litigate himself in a civil court, and potentially be exempt from any fees and have an appointed attorney. Not really. The EEOC at that point (within a certain time period) either decides to litigate the case itself, or if it chooses not to litigate itself, authorizes the employee to litigate the case at his or her own expense, and if the employee prevails, the remedy awarded by the Court includes what the court determines to be the employees reasonable attorneys' fees. The details of the process and the relevant deadlines are available at the EEOC's website. Basically, if the case isn't resolved in mediation, the employer makes a position statement, the employee responds, the EEOC investigates (using its subpoena power, if necessary) on average for ten months, and the EEOC either prosecutes the case itself, or it issues a "Notice-Of-Right-To-Sue" which allows the private employee to hire a lawyer and sue the employer. How often does it actually happen? The EEOC handles about 90,000 charges per year and wins about $525 million a year in judgments and settlement awards (parallel agencies at the state level handle additional cases in a similar manner). The vast majority of the cases are settled or result in a Notice of Right To Sue letter, with only 100 to 400 lawsuits per year actually filed by the agency resulting in $22 million to $168 million a year of awards in court cases. About 25% of these cases go to trial. The rest settle before trial or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once the EEOC brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. So, there are a lot of cases, although there is only about one EEOC claim per 1,000 employees in the workforce subject to EEOC jurisdiction per year. Whether this is a lot of complaints or not many, is really a matter of opinion. Only about one in twenty-five people will ever file an EEOC claim in his or her entire life, although this will vary considerably based upon a person's race, national origin, religion and sex. A non-Hispanic white Christian male of European descent is much less likely to file an EEOC claim during his lifetime than someone who does not fit that description. Realistically, a majority of cases that aren't abandoned by the employee in the administrative process (which is a significant share of the total) or found to have no factual basis (a small but significant percentage) are settled for fairly modest dollar amounts (an average of about $10,000 to $20,000 per claim). The bigger dollar cases for a single employee usually end up being brought in a private lawsuit rather than by the EEOC itself. About 14,000 of those charges each year result in a Notice of Right to Sue letter followed by a civil lawsuit filed by a lawyer for the employee. It isn't terribly easy to determine from official statistics what proportion of cases resulting in a Notice of Right to Sue letter rather than an EEOC lawsuit ultimately do not result in a lawsuit being filed by the employee. About 250 of these cases (not quite 2%) go to trial each year. The rest settled or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once an employee brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. Folk wisdom in the employment litigation field is that the average settlement of a case of ordinary strength on the merits that is settled fairly early on in the process is about six months of wages. An estimate that the employees in private lawsuits secured more than $200 million a year in settlements and money judgments is probably a gross underestimate. It could easily be $500 million to $1 billion per year. But, there are no good statistics available since settlement amounts are overwhelmingly confidential. The EEOC sues on behalf of the employee in cases it chooses to litigate itself on a weekly basis, and likewise declines to prosecute and certifies the case to allow the individual to prosecute the case with a private attorney all the time. Is there any relevant case law? Yes. Pretty much every relevant detail of the process has been litigated in case law that has produced reported decisions because there have been many thousands of employment discrimination cases litigated under the Act. There are probably at least two dozen to four dozen new published appellate decisions in the federal circuit courts each year on these kinds of cases, if not more, and those decisions have come at a pretty steady rate for the past half century. There are hundreds of published decisions interpreting these statutes in almost every one of the federal circuits. On quite a few issues, there are splits of authority between different circuits regarding how to interpret the law that will ultimately be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, or by Congress, or that may remain unresolved forever. How will the civil court try the case? Will the judge reference the Civil Rights Directly? It is a little unclear what you are asking here, but I will do my best. Regardless of whether the EEOC or the individual employee brings the case, it is filed as a Complaint in federal court like any other federal lawsuit, litigated according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and resolved in the vast majority of cases either by a judge in a pre-trial motion, by a settlement between the parties, or by a jury trial presided over by a judge. In a jury trial, the judge tells the jury what the applicable law says and the jury decides if the employee has proved a case against the employer when applying that law after hearing the evidence presented at trial and then decides what damages award to make, on a very short jury verdict form. In a bench trial (i.e before a judge without a jury), the judge makes those determinations in a lengthy written ruling setting forth the factual and legal basis for the judge's determination on the merits. Jury trials are much more common than bench trials in these kinds of cases, partially because plaintiffs want juries to make a damages determination, and partially out of a perception (not entirely inaccurate) that judges tend to be pro-employer on average. What is a likely punishment? Punishment is mostly the wrong term. It is a lawsuit for money damages to compensate the employee for harm actually suffered. The jury (or the judge if the case can be decided before trial in a motion for summary judgment or if a jury trial has been waived) determines the amount of compensation, if any, which should be awarded for lost wages, non-economic compensatory damages, etc. and the judge then awards attorneys' fees and court costs based upon the submissions of the parties after the trial is over based upon a determination of what is allowed by law and what is reasonable. To some extent, an employer's obligation to pay attorneys' fees and costs acts as a proportionate punishment for not immediately settling a case where the employer is found to be in the wrong. To some extent, non-economic damages can constitute a punishment. But, when an employer is found to have discriminated intentionally, which is most of the time, punitive damages can also be awarded, although they must be proportionate to the amount of actual compensatory damages awarded, typical one or two times the compensatory damage award unless that award is very small. Statutory liquidated damages are sometimes awarded in lieu of certain kinds of punitive and compensatory damages awards in age and sex discrimination cases under the Equal Pay Act. There are also dollar limits on awards based upon the size of the employer. Why is the process convoluted by adding an extra step in form of the commission? Mediation is allowed as a compromise to encourage negotiated resolutions that avoid litigation costs before everyone has spent a lot of money on lawyers. In practice, a surprisingly large number of cases result in pre-trial mediation resolutions, often in cases where an outcome if the case had gone forward to a trial would have been uncertain. The involvement of the Commission is a compromise between having a system where all cases are prosecuted at state expenses and one in which all cases are brought privately with an opportunity to win attorneys' fees if one prevails. The EEOC has usually used its authority to bring cases that are clearly cases of improper employer conduct where due to the small dollar amounts involved or the number of employees affected, an individual lawsuit would not provide an adequate remedy since private lawsuits would not be brought otherwise. It is very hard for a private attorney to justify bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit over a case where the damages are likely to be in the $5,000 to $25,000 range because the employee doesn't make much money unless liability is 100% clear (e.g. there is an admission on videotape from the employer), despite the fact that a prevailing party can get non-economic damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. So, it is particularly hard to bring employment discrimination cases on behalf of employees who don't earn much even when they aren't discriminated against. The availability of EEOC enforcement prevents employers of low wage workers and workers in temporary employment whose damages are small from ignoring the Civil Rights laws with impunity. A private lawyer does something on the order of $30,000 to $150,000 of billable work to bring an employment discrimination case involving a single employee-client to trial, and a lawyer defending such a case for an employer will typically incur more legal fees for their employer client than the employee's lawyers do, while the employer's lawyer defends the case all of the way through a trial, even before considering any amounts actually awarded to a prevailing employee in a case where the employee wins. Each side's legal fees, individually, will usually exceed the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded combined in a fairly small dollar case for an employee who wasn't paid very much, or at least didn't lose a huge amount of money economically due to illegal discrimination (for example, because the employee wasn't promoted while a less qualified candidate was promoted). This is an important reason why lots of cases settle and why the EEOC is necessary. The EEOC process also provides a means by which arbitration agreements with individual employees can be circumvented because the EEOC is not a party to those agreements and is not bound by them. Why isn't discrimination simply prosecuted by the state's attorney? After all racial discrimination very much fits the definition of a public wrong. Government agency resources aren't unlimited, so the government can't prosecute every credible complaint, so the EEOC has to pick and choose how to get the most bang for its available resources. In practice, the EEOC can only afford to pursue about one in ten of the employment discrimination cases subject to its jurisdiction that go to trial with its own lawyers. The cases it can't afford to bring, it delegates to the private sector rather than simply leaving those cases unprosecuted as would happen in the criminal justice system. This also provides a way for an employee who has a lazy or unenthusiastic government lawyer assigned to their case at the EEOC who doesn't take what the employee sees as a strong case seriously a way to get relief for employment discrimination despite the fact that the EEOC isn't willing to back them up. Private lawsuits are a check and balance against bad EEOC decisions about how strong cases are as well as a way for the EEOC to avoid financing the legal fees of people who can afford to sue on their own. Is the enforcement any good? Lots of employees over the years have gotten lots of money, although probably not 100% of the amount of the economic harm they suffered (and, of course, employee and employer attorneys have gotten paid a lot of money in the process as well, which is good if you are a lawyer, but is dead weight loss from an economist's point of view). But, more importantly, the behavior of employers has changed greatly as a result. In practice, most lawsuits, and almost all lawsuits not brought by the EEOC itself, involve either wrongful termination or failure to promote someone, rather than discriminatory hiring, since it is hard to show an individual right to be hired for which an individual is entitled to compensation. Even in EEOC cases, most are brought for discriminatory advertising or openly admitted discrimination in hiring, rather than covert discrimination by an employer in hiring on a non-permitted basis. The EEOC brings a handful of cases alleging covert discrimination in hiring against medium or large employers each year, in part, just to provide a credible threat to anyone considering doing so, often with a combination of tips from insiders (particularly those from hiring officials who are fired in retaliation for not following a discriminatory hiring policy) and with undercover "test applicants" who submit functionally identical resumes for the same job when many job openings are available. But, this is usually a tiny share of the total volume of employment litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts. There is a certain irony in this, because employers who are willing to hire someone who belongs to a "protected class" in the first place, who hence, are probably not the most discriminatory employers in the market, are more exposed to a realistic risk of a discrimination lawsuit, than employers who refuse to hire anyone in a "protected class" in the first place, so long as the employer keeps its mouth shut about this practice and is willing to lie and come up with false pretexts for its actions. Dishonest gross racists and clear misogynists are under punished, while less culpable employers who are more honest but still a little bit discriminatory in the cases of a few well paid employees are over punished relative to more culpable employers. Also, employment discrimination laws provide the most monetary compensation to the most competent and well paid employees who probably have the greatest capacity to mitigate their damages by seeking other employment from less discriminatory employers, while providing the least compensation to the marginal employees for whom discrimination in employment most impacts their quality of life. Indeed, often the most marginal employees aren't even willing to risk filing a complaint with the EEOC for fear of being blacklisted in the future in a manner that is impossible to prove. Still, at a minimum, by making it illegal to publicly state a discriminatory reason or to state a discriminatory reason to someone who could testify against you in court, the laws in question have changed the internal normative standards that managers of medium and large sized business apply on a day to day business such that at least lip service and public commitment is given to the requirements of the civil rights laws. This change in corporate culture has probably had more of a real world effect than actual suits for damages have in regard to discrimination in hiring. The benefits of the voluntarily discontinuation of discrimination in employment as employers internalized the norms established by the civil rights laws for the most part has provided far more benefit to employees who were previously discriminated against than litigation and settlements resulting from the EEOC process. For example, when Sandra Day O'Connor (future Supreme Court justice) was a young lawyer, fewer than 5% of attorneys were women and she was often mistaken for a secretary or receptionist by clients. Now, about half of all young associate lawyers (even at very large firms who graduated from very prestigious law schools) are women. Almost all of this change was due to a change in professional norms that were a direct result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (women had legally been allowed to be lawyers since the 1920s almost everywhere and earlier in some places), rather than through case by case litigation. The Civil Right Act opened up a huge new lucrative profession to women and minorities, and the experience of the legal profession was the norm and not the exception. Before the act, women were pretty much limited to school teaching, being librarians, nursing, secretary work, food service, day care, piece work sewing and laundry work. After the Civil Rights Act, their employment opportunities dramatically increased. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is likewise, more or less single handedly, responsible for today's black middle class which would have been an order of magnitude smaller otherwise. There are economic arguments that discrimination laws do or do not do much good, but those arguments rarely consider the fact that the law, when it was first enacted, dramatically changed corporate culture and the moral viewpoints and norms of the middle and upper middle class who act as employers making hiring decisions across the nation. Until the Civil Rights Act was enacted, tradition and prejudice kept a huge share of the population out of most of the marketplace in a manner completely contrary to what a naive Economics 101 analysis would predict. | Yes Ideally a case will be conducted by the same judge throughout, however, there are a multitude of personal, professional and administrative reasons why this might not happen - litigation can take years and like every other workplace people come and go, have changing family circumstances, sickness, vacations etc. A litigant should not be alarmed and trust that the new judge has got themselves up to speed. For most people, litigation is a rare and confusing experience, for judges it’s just another day at the office. |
"Most junior counsel present" In W.S. Gilbert's The Maiden Brief -- a work of fiction set in England in the mid-nineteenth century -- when prosecuting counsel does not attend due to another case, the judge calls for "the most junior counsel present" to represent the crown in a criminal case at the Old Bailey. Does this literally mean the most recently qualified barrister who happens to be in the court? Was this known or common practice (rather than in the story for comic effect)? Might it still happen? What was the justification? Was it anything more than the general tendency to place inconveniences on junior parties? A link to the short story: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Foggerty%27s_Fairy_and_Other_Tales/My_Maiden_Brief | The reference to "most junior counsel present" does literally mean the most recently qualified barrister who happens to be in the court. That is confirmed by Polter's response: "I was only called last term!" The story takes place in 1860. By this time, it was common for the court to assign a barrister who happened to be in court to conduct the defence of an accused person. According to Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the 19th Century (1998), p 110–111: Assignment was a practice developed by the judges as a means of ensuring that prisoners facing grave charges did not go undefended for want of means. The judge would ask one of the counsel present in court to undertake the prisoner's defence without fee, a request never in practice refused … During the debates on the Prisoners' Counsel Bill of 1834, one of the arguments used against the assignment of counsel clause which it contained was that the judges already had power to assign counsel, and that counsel never refused to act … So far as one can judge from trial reports, assignment of counsel to poor prisoners in felony cases was, and remained, a rare occurrence during the late 1820s and 1830s, but became increasingly common during the 1840s and 1850s. But I can't find any historical analogue to Polter's virtuosic success in prosecuting a "dock brief" on behalf of the Crown. As Bentley explains, the practice of assigning counsel evolved for the benefit of the accused, not the Crown. And the barrister assigned was not invariably the "most junior counsel present" (p 114): The selection was made from amongst those in court not already engaged in the case. Sometimes the judge would call on the most senior counsel in court. Sometimes one of the barristers present in court would volunteer his services. Occasionally the accused would be invited to choose from the barristers in court. Modern practice The scenario in the story, where the advocate briefed to appear is in another court, having assumed (or hoped) that the present matter would not be reached in the judge's list, remains common in busy criminal courts throughout the common law world. Judges have various ways of dealing with this situation, where a hearing cannot proceed efficiently because of a lack of legal representation. Some matters, such as hearings at which an accused person must decide whether to plead guilty or not guilty, or make scheduling arrangements for trial, or be sentenced for a minor offence, are still routinely handled by lawyers who receive instructions on the day of the hearing. This is usually formalised through systems like the duty solicitors scheme operated by the Legal Aid Agency. When duty lawyers are unavailable, it is not unheard of for judges and magistrates to ask counsel physically in the courtroom to provide limited pro bono assistance to an unrepresented party. Such requests are limited to the kind of representation ordinarily provided by duty lawyers, and would not extend to conduct of a jury trial with zero preparation. As well as being significantly more demanding due to the greater complexity of modern criminal law practice, this would today be considered a breach of the right to a fair hearing. I have personally seen lawyers present in the courtroom, in suburban magistrates' courts around Australia, appointed to represent defendants at procedural hearings when there is no duty lawyer available. Lawyers volunteer for this as part of their professional duty to the administration of justice, or even as a way to find new clients. However, this never applies to a prosecution brief. At worst, an irritated judge might force another prosecutor in court for unrelated cases to account for their colleague's absence, or dismiss the case for want of prosecution. | This is not a quote, per se, rather, it is a meme. It is attributed to Gilbert Gray, and according to The Independent Saturday 7 March 1998 was originally: "I take it, Mr Gray, that your client is familiar with the maxim: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" "Indeed my lord, responded the QC drily. "In Barnsley they speak of little else." However, according to the Fortune Newsletter two years later, it was attributed to a different barrister, Charles Gray, who is reported to have recounted a story about a barrister in Reading who was asked by the judge whether his client was aware of the principle of Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself), to which the barrister replied: "In the Irish village from which my client comes, M'Lud, they speak of little else". It is also attributed in 2005 to some unnamed judge referring to sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As Tim Lymington notes, the Irish res ipsa loquitur version is attributed to Marshal Hall apparently was on the air in the BBC production The Trials of Marshall Hall originally from 1996, and is cited in a recent book review. The book review and Wiki versions of that statement differ slightly in the wording of the text, to wit Wiki: "Is your client not familiar with the maxim res ipsa loquitur?” replied, "My lord, on the remote hillside in County Donegal where my client hails from they talk of little else." vs. book review Judge: “Mr Marshall Hall, is your client familiar with the doctrine res ipsa loquitur? Marshall: “My Lord, in the remote hills of County Donegal from where my client hails they speak of little else.” Without a copy of the book, I can't say whether the reviewer mis-copied the quote, but at least we can believe that the linked quote represents the review author's wording. There is a much earlier work on the life of Marshall Hall, Marjoribanks, Edward For the Defence. The Life of Sir Edward Marshall Hall K.C. (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1929), which might contain the quote in question. At this point, I am inclined to take the Hall res ipsa loquitur quote as being original and the others as being derivative works. | I've retracted and replaced my previous answer. It is a citation to legal authority. It is probably a reference to the book "Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown Hale PC" (originally published 1736 with later editions also printed) (see 4.2.3) with Hale abbreviated "Hal.", "pl." being an abbreviation for "plea" (see 4.2.2) and "cr." being an abbreviation for "crown". Standard citation form is to spell it out, but if it is cited repeatedly later instances might be abbreviated. The link is to a scanned version of the out of copyright historical legal treatise on criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Wikipedia also discusses it as does a law library Wiki. | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | Yes When you are called for jury duty, you are given a list of expectations and duties. For example, Queensland requires everyone to dress neatly and New South Wales similarly so. The wording from NSW is: What you should wear You do not have to wear a suit and tie, but you should dress in neat, comfortable clothes. Do not wear thongs or shorts. As you may be sitting for long periods of time it is important to be comfortable, whilst still showing respect for the court. Why? Because wearing clothes that can be seen as disrespect to the court - e.g. very flashy or goofy ones - can get you expelled from court, fined or even jailed for contempt of court [NSW]. Victoria has a specific Juries Act, which includes the following language to point to its own contempt of court section: 84 Contempt of court Nothing in this Part affects the power of a court to deal with a contempt of court summarily of its own motion. 85 Enforcement of fines If a court fines a person under Division 2 or for contempt of the court, the fine is enforceable under the Sentencing Act 1991 as if the person had been found guilty of an offence | It's quite straightforward. Section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act (1985) preserves the right for private persons to initiate criminal proceedings. You would have to find a solicitor, and instruct him that you would like to bring criminal proceedings against the defendant. He would essentially do what the CPS solicitors do, and find a suitable barrister to instruct on the matter. Unlike many other countries, regular barristers do prosecutions. In this case, the barrister wouldn't be instructed by the CPS, but by your solicitor. You do have to note that the Director of Public Prosecutions reserves the right to take over the case. | "The whole truth" is part of a formulaic phrase which has been operationalized to mean merely "don't commit perjury." A witness simply answers the questions asked and is not permitted to go further. The witness is at the mercy of the lawyer's whims. The witness does not have a right to testify beyond the scope of the question asked. It is improper for a lawyer to cut off a witness when in the middle of providing an answer to the question asked, but those points are for the other side's lawyer and the judge to raise, not the witness. If the answer of a witness to the question asked on cross-examination leaves a false impression, it is up to the other side's lawyer to correct that by asking additional redirect examination questions of the witness in our adversary system. Asking questions that when answered truthfully leave a false impression because the answer presents an incomplete version of the whole story is standard practice in lawyering. This tactic is less effective, however, in jurisdictions like Colorado where judges and juries can also ask their own questions of witnesses once the lawyers are finished asking their questions. | Does the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Queen's Bench Division) ever exercise original criminal jurisdiction in serious cases (eg, a terrorism trial) in modern times? Has it ever exercised such jurisdiction since its creation by the Judicature Acts? No, with the exception of criminal contempt of court proceedings (which arguably don't constitute "serious cases"). Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, the Lord Chief Justice of the High Court was "President of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal and Head of Criminal Justice, meaning its technical processes within the legal domain," but these duties were appellate and administrative in nature, rather than involving original jurisdiction, and under the 2005 Act the Lord Chief Justice can appoint another judge to these positions. England's criminal courts and civil courts were already almost completely separated before the modern "High Court of Justice was established in 1875 by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873." The High Court is a direct successor to courts dating all of the way back to the 1200s, some of which had original criminal jurisdiction, but those predate the Judicature Act cutoff of the question. Caveats This said, English legal history is not a model of strict consistency, and I wouldn't be stunned to discover some random one-off original jurisdiction criminal trials in the late 1800s or early 1900s under statutes that have now been long since repealed that attracted little notice and have little or no modern legal importance. But, I have no actual knowledge of any such exceptions. For example, while the Admiralty Division of the High Court is now exclusively civil, I wouldn't be stunned to discover that the Admiralty Division at some point long ago, but after 1875, might have had original criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas, like piracy and mutiny, even though it no longer has such jurisdiction. England's Admiralty Courts historically had this jurisdiction, and England's Admiralty Courts were consolidated into the High Court in 1875. But it isn't easy to discern from the resources available to me precisely when authority for crimes committed on the high seas was transferred from England's Admiralty Court to the Crown Courts (which have jurisdiction over these cases now). Similarly, while debtor's prison was abolished in England in 1869, a few years before the High Court was created, I wouldn't be shocked to find that the Queen's Bench division may have handled some residual original jurisdiction cases related to quasi-criminal body executions for non-payment of debts originally resulting in incarceration in debtor's prisons, in cases originally arising prior to 1869 that weren't fully wrapped up in 1875. Footnote Some countries with common law legal systems and a court system based upon the English model have courts called a "High Court" which consolidate the functions of the English "High Court" and the English "Crown Court" (which handles trials in serious criminal cases) in a single court. This is frequently motivated by a shortage of judges with the exceptional legal competence necessary to inspire confidence in the conduct of such proceedings. In U.S. practice, for example, it is the rule and not the exception, for felony criminal cases, civil cases arising in equity, serious civil cases arising at law, and both criminal and civil appeals from lower courts to all be handled by the same court of general jurisdiction (although the terminology, of course, is usually slightly different since the U.S. does not have, and has never had after 1776, a King, a Queen, or Lords, as a matter of constitutional law). |
How does copyright over content that is not behind paywalled content work? I’m sorry but I like international law and consortiums exclusion right to ownership generally, so I would like that sort of answer to: How does copyright over online content that is not behind paywalled content work? Do people get some ability to share paywalled content? | Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing. | (Since this is looking rather close to looking for legal advice: "I'm not a lawyer, this is not legal advice, don't sue my pants off".) The relevant section of the license is this (bolding mine): You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital file-sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of any monetary compensation in con-nection with the exchange of copyrighted works. Therefore, if you are using the content licensed under the BY-NC-SA primarily to make money, that is a breach of the license. Any more advice past that is wading seriously into legal advice. | The answer to this depends very much in which country you are in, and how you go about implementing it. First of all, this might seem obvious, but copyright only applies if you copy something that is covered under copyright. If you copy an idea - that having a library that solves problem X is useful - and that is the only aspect you copy, then under U.K. Copyright law, there is no copyright infringement, as ideas are not copyrighted. However, if you copy aspects of the library interface, or the object model of the original library, then it's a derived work, and the copyright of the new work is only partly yours. If you translate the source into a new language, then the copyright is largely still with the original author. Every country implements copyright law in their own way. One of the principle differences are in the available "fair use" clauses. You may find that you are entitled to a fair use clause for creating a "compatible" library, or you may be allowed to quote small aspects of the original in your new work. You need to check up on your countries laws. | You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine. | You can read it, you can examine it to the point where you understand it, and then you can get inspired by the code and write your own code, without copying the code on the website, which does the same thing. If there is no license, then you can do what copyright law allows you to do. You are not allowed to copy the code, or create derived works by taking the code and modifying it. | The author of that work owns its copyright. Barring a licence that gives you the right to use it, you are infringing copyright. (I'm assuming no fair use in this case; i.e. the YouTube clip isn't actually about the audio track.) If you pay for licences, make sure the licence allows for the purpose you intend to use it for. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be. |
Three-party trial in France, and the role of the Republic's prosecutor In France, there are some circumstances apparently called "partie civile" where there's three different parties represented in court : the republic's prosecutor (procureur de la république), the plaintiff, and the accused. Each can apparently get nearly as much air time, and each can ask a different verdict to the court (i.e 5 years prison, 2 years prison, and acquittal for example). It seems, based on the information I have, that the plaintiff acting at all is due to the specific procedure of "constitution de partie civile", and that it's a supplement over normal procedure. Does that mean that in the normal case, offences (délits) and crimes are prosecuted only by the republic's prosecutor, without the plaintiff being represented by an attorney at all ? Is that really the normal procedure ? Secondly, are there any circumstances where A sues B for an offense or crime (not a contract violation or anything related to civil suits), and no republic's prosecutor is attached to the case, i.e where the plaintiff and its attorney act alone facing the defendant ? If not, what's the rationale of always involving the state at the prosecution level ? | Obviously, most of what follows is specific to france. General considerations In common-law countries, civil liability follows from a specific legal theory. One has to state one’s legal theory (for instance: breach of contract), and then prove each of the various elements of that theory. In France, and I believe in other civil-law countries, civil liability follows a more general pattern. Civil liability is established by a three-prong test of (1) wrongful action, (2) damage, and (3) causation link between the wrongful action and the damage. Now, in most civil cases (>90%), proving prong (1) will rely on certain civil statutes, in which case the distinction is mostly theoretical, because those statutes more or less mirror common-law causes of action. However, a criminal act would satisfy prong (1). Civil law does not see much difference between damages resulting from a "civil" cause (e.g. I bought an item from BigCorp that turned out to be defective and I had to buy a new one) or from a "criminal" cause (e.g. BigCorp intentionally sold me an item that violates the electrical code and it set fire to my house). BigCorp’s CEO might go to jail in the latter scenario and not in the former, but the legal arguments I will make at court are relatively similar. The victim of a criminal wrong may choose to either pursue a civil action, or trigger or "jump in" (constitution de partie civile) a criminal trial. While civil and criminal trials are separate in the US, the concept of a third party joining ongoing litigation is not entirely unknown ("intervention"). Statutes The procedural questions can be mostly answered by citing articles 2 to 5 of the Code de Procédure Pénale. I grouped together paragraphs of each article for ease of reading. I also used the equivalent US procedure terms for translation when I knew them. L'action civile en réparation du dommage causé par un crime, un délit ou une contravention appartient à tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par l'infraction. (...) L'action civile peut être exercée en même temps que l'action publique et devant la même juridiction. Elle sera recevable pour tous chefs de dommages, aussi bien matériels que corporels ou moraux, qui découleront des faits objets de la poursuite. L'action civile en réparation du dommage causé par l'infraction prévue par l'article 2 peut être exercée devant une juridiction civile, séparément de l'action publique. Toutefois, il est sursis au jugement de cette action tant qu'il n'a pas été prononcé définitivement sur l'action publique lorsque celle-ci a été mise en mouvement. La mise en mouvement de l'action publique n'impose pas la suspension du jugement des autres actions exercées devant la juridiction civile, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, même si la décision à intervenir au pénal est susceptible d'exercer, directement ou indirectement, une influence sur la solution du procès civil. (...) La partie qui a exercé son action devant la juridiction civile compétente ne peut la porter devant la juridiction répressive. Il n'en est autrement que si celle-ci a été saisie par le ministère public avant qu'un jugement sur le fond ait été rendu par la juridiction civile. Anyone who personally suffered from the damage directly brought about by a felony, misdemeanor or petty offense, has standing for civil action. (...) One can move for a a civil action in front of the same court and at the same time as the public action [= state prosecution]. The movant has standing for all damages (...) that are the consequence of the prosecuted facts. Civil action as outlined in article 2 can be brought to a civil court separate from the public action. However, if public action has started, the civil action is postponed until there has been a final judgement on the public action. Public action does not mandate postponing other causes of action pending in front of the civil court, even if the criminal case decision might have a direct or indirect impact on the solution of the civil case. Whoever brought a case in the appropriate civil court cannot bring it to the criminal court, except if the state brought a criminal action before the civil court ruled on the merits. So, basically, a plaintiff has to choose between bringing the case to civil court or to criminal court. If the case is brought to civil court, there will be no public prosecutor. If the case is brought to criminal court, there will be one. How to choose? The choice of where to bring the action is mainly tactical. Some factors include: whether you have a choice at all. On one side, non-criminal facts cannot be pursued in criminal courts (breach of contract, divorce, etc.). On the other side, proving the "wrongful act" prong of certain cases all but requires a criminal verdict of guilty (defamation, medical malpractice, etc.) whether public prosecution is more likely to help or hinder. The prosecutor on an armed robbery case will generally be on the same side as the victims, but they might be neutral or outright hostile to the plaintiff in other cases. For instance, prosecutors often take the "not my problem" stance in defamation cases. statute of limitation: civil actions are (generally) time-barred sooner than public prosecution, and the clock on civil statutes is not reset by criminal prosecution. Some more "cultural" notes Each can apparently get nearly as much air time.. As hinted to in o.m.’s comment, that is much less important than it would be in the US. In the adversarial system of the US, the judge is an observer / arbiter in the trial: the parties run the show, pick "their" witnesses, ask all the questions, etc. In the inquisitorial system of France, each witness will first be questioned by the judge, not the parties, and the parties usually have very few additional questions if any (the cases that you read about in the press are high-stakes and abnormal in that regard). ...and each can ask a different verdict to the court (i.e 5 years prison, 2 years prison, and acquittal for example). The partie civile would usually not give any opinion on the criminal punishment. Their job is to get a monetary award for their client, as fast as possible. The criminal sentencing is irrelevant to that. There are some exceptions: if the prosecutor requests an illegal sentence (it happens - sentencing rules are complicated), you don’t want to risk the judge granting it, because then the probability of appeal goes up drastically (which delays the whole thing) spending time in jail is not a lucrative activity; asking for less jail time might help with the defendant’s ability to pay compensatory damages comments along the line of "it would be unjust that this heinous criminal gets away with less than X years in jail" are usually unwise (why waste the judge’s time / goodwill on that? let the prosecutor do it), but may be necessary for PR or client management reasons (typically if the case is making front page news). Note also that the judge is not held by any of the requests - they might go higher than the prosecution or lower than the defense. I know that in theory US judges might do that, but in practice it never happens. In France, it is rare but not exceptional (I would guesstimate maybe 5% of cases?). | Short answer, yes, jurors will typically render a decision of guilt vs. innocence. This is pretty common in nations where the legal system is derived from British Common Law (about 2 billion people world wide live in a Common Law nation). The U.S. is unique in that it uses juries for Civil Trials as well as Criminal Trials. The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution in which the 6th amendment guarantees the right to trial by impartial jury (contrary to popular opinion, it is not a jury of peers, as this alludes to the Peerage systems, which the U.S. never adopted). That line is from the Magna Carta which was influential in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. A jury usually consists of a panel of 12 people pulled from the locality of the crime, unless a change of venue has been granted because the alleged crime is so well known an impartial jury cannot be seated from the population. The jury will hear all the evidence from both sides, as well as opening and closing arguments. They will be provided "jury instructions" by the judge and must find if the evidence presented (The Facts) meet the criteria for a conviction of a charged crime (The Law). In all Jury Trials, a Jury fills the role of "Trier of Fact" while the Judge fills the role of "Trier of Law." While the judge has the education background to understand what the law says constitutes a crime and how to find that law as well as how to make sure the defense and plaintiff/prosecution make fair arguments, any random group of 12 people can understand facts and put together whose story they believe, the defense's or the prosecution's. In the case of an innocent person being convicted due to inept defense, this does happen and is horrible, but there are recourses in the form of appeals courts, which can overturn a trial and order that a new one be held (a mistrial, essentially, the original trial never happened and the person is legally innocent. Try again and do it proper this time.) Ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid grounds for appeal of a conviction and does happen. In the other scenario, an inept prosecution, this does happen as well and it's not the fault of the jury that the guilty person went free, but for the prosecution. The prosecutor is at a disadvantage in every criminal case to balance out the fact that their office has more resources to bring to bear then most defendants. Among these handicaps is that their "story" about what happened must not have any "plot holes" in it (beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard of proof) and that the prosecution has to convince 12 people that their story is the only way this could happen (try convincing 12 random people to agree to anything more complicated than "the sky is blue and grass is green") and they only have one shot to do it (Double Jeopardy essentially bars the prosecutor's office from initiating the appeals process... and blocks someone who is declared innocent from doing it because why the hell would you want to?!). Here, the problem is that the Prosecutor doesn't have to charge the accused right away and has a bit of generous time to investigate (depends on statute of limitations on particular crimes) ... but the right to a speedy trial means that once charges are filed, the clock starts on how long the prosecution has to bring the case. Delay to long and the judge will give a directed verdict that the person is innocent because the prosecution wasn't ready. The importance of this fact that is a staple belief of Common Law is in the "Blackstone Ratio" which states: Better that 10 guilty people go free than a single innocent person suffers So the jury finding the prosecution inept is certainly the prosecutor's problem, not the jury's problem. It's a feature not a bug. If an innocent person does suffer, then we have a bug and we must see that it is corrected. As a final note, the jury also has the power of Jury Nullification of the Law. In the U.S. it's not really certain if Jury Nullification invalidates the law completely but in effect, it allows the Jury to declare a person innocent because, while they believe the prosecution's story that the defendant did what they were accused of, they don't believe this person should be convicted because they believe the crime they're accused of should have never been a crime in the first place. | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. | In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge. | A prosecutor's discretion is almost unassailable. The main reason for this is to prevent prosecutors from having to defend in a legal forum every single decision made. In a civil matter, prosecutors have absolute immunity form being personally sued for their actions (again, to prevent a prosecutor from being sued from every single defendant). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_immunity Misconduct by prosecutors may be resolved by reversal or retrials of court proceedings. But this is not something that really has criminal penalties. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_misconduct#:~:text=In%20jurisprudence%2C%20prosecutorial%20misconduct%20is,is%20similar%20to%20selective%20prosecution. Occasionally, a prosecutor may be subject to discipline from the state's Bar. This is rare, and is not much of a deterrent. https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/harmful-error/misconduct-and-punishment/ Theoretically, a prosecutor who out and out breaks the law can be prosecuted. Examples seem to be rare, and are more about government malfeasance (expense reports, misuse of government equipment, etc.). Due to the above standards, proving criminal conduct around prosecutorial discretion will be extremely difficult, as will finding a fellow prosecutor willing to even go down that road. It is in no prosecutor's interest to set the precedent of prosecutors being jailed for their behavior. So, why has nothing happened? Because in general, prosecutors can get away with almost anything. And I will add, Because America seems to like it this way. | Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area. | No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]." | In a civil action: If you are serving written discovery on a party, under the federal rules of civil procedure, or in any state whose adopted the model rules, (rules 33-37 typically), you need only send your requests for interrogatories, the production of documents, or for admissions to the party (through their counsel unless they are pro se), accompanied by the discovery notice, detailing the time frame in which they are due. It is typical that this time frame will get extended, sometimes by double or triple the original 21 day period plus 3-5 days for mailing. When the party is represented (this is 99% of the time) the attorney will just call you or email you for an extension and it is pro forma to assent to this. The court will not be happy if they need to seek permission of the court for this because you refused, as it is that common, and you will just get a reputation as a non-cooperative pain (not to mention, the time will come when you need an extension, and what comes around goes around). If they seek an unreasonable amount of time (I'm talking so close to the discovery cut off that you'd not have time for depositions after receipt), then you can limit it, but a couple of months is common. This need not go through the court. If they are not represented, they may just be late rather than calling, in which case you have a duty to contact them before involving the court. This is just because they don't know it is the norm, and it is nearly impossible to pull together everything needed from a full set of discovery in 21 days. When there is a true discovery dispute, you must show the court that you made all due diligent efforts to resolve it on your own. I don't have my rules in front of me (I will edit and add this when I do) ... but this is in the rules, it is not just practically speaking. Also, many jurisdictions require that you contact the court's clerk and get permission before filing any discovery motions. Sending a subpoena is not ever how this is dealt with. If the opposing party fails to respond, or if they are continually late and despite numerous contacts they still do not produce, then you would schedule a discovery conference with the court at which time you will seek a motion to compel. The court will typically give them even more time at this point. You are correct in that when a third-party is served with discovery request, since they have no obligation to take part in the case but for the presence of a subpoena; hence, in this situation you would use a subpoena to request whatever it is you are requesting. They may get their own lawyer who will try to limit your right to get anything from them as a non-essential party, but if it is really relevant you can do it. You would also use the subpoena for depositions, to ensure that witnesses present themselves. Otherwise, subpoenas are reserved for acquiring witnesses to appear in court or for custodians of records to bring records to court for hearings or trial. |
Is addiction a disability? Is addiction considered a disability for employment and beneftis rights? Does it matter if the addiction is legal: say gambling or alcohol; or illegal: drugs or theft (Kleptomania)? | You didn't specify the context so I am assuming you mean for the purpose of anti-discrimination laws. If so, the definition of disability is found in Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (P) has a disability if — (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. Elaboration is provided in Schedule 1: 2 (1) The effect of an impairment is long-term if — (a) it has lasted for at least 12 months, (b) it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or (c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected. (2) If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur. However, this is subject to regulations made under the Act. Regulation 3 of the Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010 provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) below, addiction to alcohol, nicotine or any other substance is to be treated as not amounting to an impairment for the purposes of the Act. (2) Paragraph (1) above does not apply to addiction which was originally the result of administration of medically prescribed drugs or other medical treatment. Regulation 4 provides: (1) For the purposes of the Act the following conditions are to be treated as not amounting to impairments: — (a) a tendency to set fires, (b) a tendency to steal, (c) a tendency to physical or sexual abuse of other persons, (d) exhibitionism, and (e) voyeurism. So, in conclusion, an addiction is a disability provided that the following conditions all apply: It is a mental impairment which has a substantial adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. It has lasted or is likely to last at least 12 months. The substantial adverse effect is either current or has ceased but is likely to recur. It is not an addiction to alcohol, nicotine, or other substance unless it is the result of medical treatment. It is not an addiction to setting fires, stealing, physical / sexual abuse, exhibitionism, or voyeurism. It doesn't matter whether the addiction results in illegal activity provided the other criteria are met. | But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies. You are mistaken. A contract settling a bona fide dispute regarding people's legal rights can mutually (or unilaterally for that matter) release or waive their legal rights. In fact, a waiver or release of rights is routinely a part of a settlement agreement. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of such agreements are entered into every year and they are almost always enforced. Sometimes, but not always, a settlement agreement will also call for a dismissal of a case with prejudice, which (roughly) means a dismissal that prohibits refiling a case involving the same subject matter. | In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business". | Probably not. Theft generally involves an intent to permanently deprive someone of property, or knowledge that one is taking actions that have the very likely probability of permanently depriving them of property. Here, there is an intent only to hold possession of the keys during the shift and to return them. Also, while the surrender of keys is contingent upon the incentive of further employment, it is still a voluntary surrender of the keys. The place where theft issues could arise is if the keys are not returned by the person holding them, either at the end of the shift as punishment, or in mid-shift, if someone insists upon their return, either in an emergency or because they are sick of this manager and want to quit. If keys were retained in those circumstances upon a demand for their return, there might be a problem. This is because continuing to refuse to surrender possession of property permissively given to someone when that permission is revoked, in the absence of a legal right to impose a possessory lien, would generally constitute theft. While the purpose for the manager holding keys in this particular situation don't seem very valid, I can imagine circumstances (e.g. MRI technicians, jail guards, underwater divers, the site only has tandem parking), where retaining keys during a shift might be reasonable and appropriate. | A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals. | I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds. | The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds. | It depends on the jurisdiction and particular facts. The long history of not counting marriage as prostitution under law because of its social and religious legitimacy makes the transaction-related aspects of marriage fall outside the definition of prostitution in most cases that are not the explicit sale of a person for consideration, which is obviously forbidden as slavery today and could probably also be charged as prostitution in most jurisdictions. In your particular example, the girl is also saying what things will influence how she feels, and no reasonable person would say that she gives up her ability to withhold consent after marriage based on any alleged contract. A contract to lose the ability to withhold consent would also be void as against public policy, regardless of whether prostitution is involved. Bitcoin is a form of virtual currency. It is regulated by money transmitter law and trading it to obtain goods or services that cannot legally be traded for is still illegal. It's not that there is a defined "limit." It's that some things will fit into the definition and others won't. It's about categories, not quantities. |
Can a professor be fired for lying about a student breaking the rules? So let's say a professor at a college knowingly lies and tells the administration that a student did something that got the student expelled. Say administration found out the professor lied. Would that professor normally be fired? Thanks. | There is no "normal" answer. Grounds for firing depends on numerous factors. Some universities have explicit rules and procedures regarding termination, and they depend on the "status" of the person (ask about "tenure" on Academia SE). In principle, a faculty person can be fired because be belched, or wore a business-inappropriate shirt. State-funded universities may have stronger job protections built in to their rule system. I think it is likely that the administration would strongly want to fire him, though first they would undo the expulsion (which they can do). | As Putvi says, you are being extorted and this is a criminal matter and thus a matter for the authorities in your jurisdiction. However, you have a second problem entirely apart from that - you almost certainly broke academic ethical rules by submitting a piece of work that you did not write as your own (these things are pretty cut and dried in academic circles). This will not go away. Regardless of whether your extortionists are brought to justice, they can still release your details at any point in time and ruin your career, or it can come out in other ways. Own up to this with your university as soon as possible, and see if you can make it right. This will be hanging over you for the rest of your life, and can drop at any moment - these sorts of things have ruined people before. | I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts. | More generally, the university gets to set whatever rules it wants, unless there is a law limiting what it can do. For example, in the US a government university (qua arm of government) cannot require you to have a particular religion or profess a particular creed, but a private one can. An employer could require you to be in your office from 9 to 5, even though it is legal to not be in an office from 9 to 5. The general principle is that the institution can set its own rules for operation, unless those rules violate the law. Generally, the owner of property has the right to say how it can be used. It is quite common for universities to have variable policies regarding access to their books (e.g. "anybody can walk in and do things with the volumes, which are out in the open, except they have to have borrower's permission to take it out of the building" to "you cannot enter at all, and must have special permission to inspect the book -- nobody can take the books out of the building"). My experience is that UK libraries have a tighter rein on their holdings than do US universities (the sampling problem here is non-trivial). In some cases, the absolute control of the property owner is somewhat overridden by law, especially if the institution is a state-run university (not in the UK). Another possibility is that access to books is a contractual right (some kind of "terms of service" that you and they are bound to). Even in the case of US state universities, I cannot imagine a government having a law declaring the right to copy books to be such a fundamental right that a university cannot deny you that right. The most likely scenario for enforcement is as a contractual matter. A complete analysis of the relationship between the individual and the institution would be way too broad for here, but here is a sample of the questions that could arise. What is the source of your right to access books? Perhaps you are employed as a faculty person: do you have a contract? Can you be fired for breaking rules: are there any limits on what acts can lead to firing? What procedures if any are specified for termination, and what avenue of internal appeal exist? The government would not overrule the institution's decision unless they didn't follow the contractually-governed procedures for termination. Apart from the legal question, a perfectly coherent reason to prohibit scanning books whose copyright has expired is that the act of scanning them may damage the book. | The underlying assumption in this question seems to be that because A received defective professional advice from V, F may be free of blame. I believe that assumption is wrong. The gist of the question is this: Suppose a fraudster's deception causes a person to take a course of action they wouldn't have otherwise taken. As part of that, they suffer losses due to a second person's tort. Is that loss recoverable from the fraudster as well? In the scenario given, there are clearly two parties that are to blame for the loss: The fraudster, who perpetrated the fraud. The professional attorney, who gave defective advice. The fact that there also exists a second party that may have contributed to the loss does not in any way absolve the first party from blame or from being liable for his actions. In a tort case, it is always the person that caused the loss in the first place (the tortfeasor) the victim (A) should seek relief from first. So F is in no way “safe from litigaton”. In the event that the tortfeasor is not being able make full restitution (e.g. he is already bankrupt), A may sue V for professional negligence to recover his loss. However, to prevail, A vould must be able to prove that V has made critical errors that no “reasonable attorney” would have made. That is sometimes pretty hard to prove (it obviously depends on how clever F's deception was, and whether the number of hours A allowed V to use for due diligence should have been sufficient to uncover the deception). As for legal precedent, I am not aware of a single case where a fraudster has not been held liable because the victim of the fraud has sought professional advice (but it is of course not easy to locate precedent for something has not occured). | Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect. | If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations. | Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Yes. Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See "How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?" |
Is a mandatory fee added to paying one's lease legal? Is it legal for a property management company to require a convenience fee for every type of payment they accept, or must they accept some form of payment that costs nothing extra? It seems to me that the lease stipulates a contracted total amount of monthly payments, and requiring an additional fee to pay it effectively increases the rent. | Until it was found to be unconstitutional, Florida had a law against surcharges for using a credit card (the statute is still on the books, however). That was the only law against "convenience fees" related to making payments. Whether or not a business will accept a particular form of payment (check, credit card, money order, traveler's check, cash) is up to business. Apart from credit cards, there has been no law against charging for accepting a particular form of payment, but that charge would have to be part of the contract – the lease would have to specify in advance what the processing fee is for money orders vs. cash vs. credit card. The residential tenancies law of Florida does not prohibit incorporating fees into the terms of a lease (as some states do), so the lease can specify "$1500 for rent plus $10 for payment-processing, every month". | It depends on whether the lease requires it. If the lease requires you to have renter's insurance, you have to have renter's insurance. If it requires you to have a specific company's renter's insurance, you have to have the specific company's renter's insurance. If you don't do that, you have violated the terms of the lease and can typically be evicted. If you comply with the terms of the lease by having some renter's insurance and they still want you to have a specific brand of insurance, you have not violated the terms of the lease, and you cannot be evicted for such. They cannot "bill you" just because they want to change the terms of the lease -- that requires your agreement, or they can unilaterally change the lease terms at the end of the current period. The same goes for package service (I don't even understand what a monthly package service charge would mean). | I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use. | Technically the signage implied an agreement, and allowed you to infer one. But yes, I think that management could not legally insist on more than the posted price, whether for a lost ticket, or for a particular duration. (Unless the sign included "prices subject to change without notice" or something of the sort.) As a practical matter, challenge this is going to be a pain. The employees on the spot probably have no authority to vary the price merely because the amount programmed into the register differs from the posted sign. At least they will claim not to have such authority. And they won't release the car without being paid the $80 that they will insist is the proper price. To challenge this, a person would probably have to pay under protest, and then sue for a refund, I would hope in a small claims court. Most people will not go to that trouble for $10, which perhaps the management counts on. Publicity might be more effective. | Unless there is a unilateral change clause in your CURRENTLY effective lease, then no they cannot change the terms until the NEW lease becomes effective. Your question, however, is not entirely clear. You seem to be asking: "My current least charges me $X/month for a pet and the new lease, starting on 1/1/2023, charges my $Y/month for a pet." In that case it's perfectly OK since it's a new lease that replaces the old one and it's entirely up to you to either agree to it or find another place to live. Ohio also has prohibited rent control and rent stabilization state-wide (Ohio Revised Code, sec. 5321.20). | You have a contract - if you break it, you can be sued. A contract is a legally binding promise that the state (through its courts) will enforce. You promised to pay the deposit - you must pay the deposit. You promised to pay rent on a regular basis for the period of the lease - you must pay that rent. You don't want to live there? Fine, the lease probably doesn't require you to. So long as you keep paying the rent, you don't have to. If you break the lease, then the landlord can sue you for the damage that they suffer - this is typically the value of the rent until they can find a new tenant and if that tenant is paying less than you, the difference between that amount and your rent for the balance of the lease. If you want to renegotiate the contract (for example, to end it early), you will need to ask your landlord but they are under no legal obligation to release you from it. They may be willing to do so out of the goodness of their heart and/or if you pay them. | Yes Verbal contracts are fine except when the law requires a written one - as it does here. Real estate contracts are also required to be in writing dating back to the Statute of Frauds in 1677. “Written contract” doesn’t mean written by a lawyer - just that the fact and essential terms of the contract are written down somewhere. An email or text will qualify. “Work for me -$20/h” “Ok” is a written contract. | I got and answer from lawyer in Netherlands. To rent out to the company is not without risks. You rent out to the company and the company rents out to the actual user of the apartment. That is subletting. The sub-lessee is protected by law. So when the company fails to pay, you can end the contract with the company (you have to go to court for this), but then you will become the lessor to the actual user (=sub-lessee) then. If you feel that that is against your interests, you have to start a court procedure within half a year to end the contract with the actual user. Also note: it is forbidden to rent out to people that don't have a legal status. So you make sure you trust the company very well if you are going to rent out to them. I recommend to seek help from a real estate agent that is well known and member of NVM or other trustworthy organisation. |
Account worth $1 shared with 11.7 million people If I found a bank that let me have 11.8 million other (non spouse) people on it and put $1 in that account would I be liable for paying gift tax? This is a "reductio ad absurdum" of the fact that joint accounts are considered "gifts" for the purposes of the gift tax. | Under U.S. law, each donor can give up to $15,000 per person, per year to as many people as desired gift tax free (this is called the "annual exclusion"). So, yes you could. The gift tax portion of the Internal Revenue Code is specifically designed so that de minimis gifts don't have to be accounted for. Also, the amount of the gift for gift tax purposes if you had 11.8 million co-owners of an account would be 1/11,800,000 dollars, not $1 dollar each. While co-ownership of a joint account is a gift, it is not a gift of 100% of the value of the co-owned account to each co-owner. The default rule in absence of evidence to the contrary, is that co-owners of property have equal ownership of it. Adding one joint owner to a solo account is a gift of half of the amount in the account. | Judy's onward gift is not optional. She must agree to donate it or no deal. This is where the problem lies - you are not giving her a gift because a gift carries no obligations, you are contracting with her to make a $10k donation for which you will pay her $10k. As such, this is assessable income to her. | No. You have to pay taxes no matter what currency you are paid in, or for that matter, in most barter transaction as well. You would have to pay taxes even if you were paid in goats. Also, the counter-parties in transactions in which you are paid in Bitcoin and earn money often have an obligation to file information tax returns to the IRS. If you don't report the income, both you and any counter-party subject to reporting requirements could be liable for the tax as well as for penalties and interest and possible criminal charges as well for intentionally evading taxation and filing false tax returns. | Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure. | At the federal level, gift cards seem to be treated as a special case of electronic fund transfer. 15 U.S. Code § 1693l–1 and the corresponding regulations presently regulate disclosure of fees and expiration, and do not directly say anything about sale of such a card. There might be relevant state laws, though Washington state laws mostly mirror the federal law (also allowing issuing a card with an expiration date if given for no value to a charitable organization). You can actually get your last $5 back in cash in Washington per RCW 19.240.020. A gift card / certificate isn't a "thing" in the way that an apple, hammer or table is, it's a contractual relationship. If you own a thing, you can freely re-sell it to whoever you want (assuming there isn't an express statutory prohibition against the sale of the thing). You cannot universally sell (assign) a contract right – there is a default preference that you should be able to, but Amazon has in this case said "No, you can't". | You are describing a charity. In the simplest case, a charitable foundation could be established to receive donations and dispense payments for medical services. There are various irrelevant non-legal reasons why it might not work (e.g. insufficient contributions relative to demand). The main legal concerns of such a foundation are its tax liability (do they have to pay income taxes on contributions?), and local regulations (how do you distinguish between a scam and a real charity?). The tax question is primarily about 501(c)(3) status, and for the most part there should be no problems with charitably dispensing contributions, though there is a requirement that no part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual – perhaps the CEO would be an exception to the universality of the program (but providing equivalent service could be a pre-tax employment benefit). A recipient does not have to pay tax on a gift, owing to the "medical exclusion" Registration is a state-level matter, here is the Washington law. Nothing in that law says "you can't provide coverage of medical expenses", and no maximum income level is imposed on the recipient of a charitable gift. The concern of these regulations is mainly record-keeping and access to records, not on specific ways of benefiting the community. Since unlike taxes contributions cannot be coerced, this means that some people might not pay what other people deem to be "their fair share", which is, again, a political issue. | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. | No, this is not an acknowledgement of guilt or liability. It offers a "discount" some sort of reduction in price. This could be an offer of settlement without admission of liability, or even just advertising for repeat business (unlikely as that may seem). Without the rest of the communication, there is no way to tell. Unless there are specific admissions, this statement alone is not likely to have much significance in such a case. Edit: There is still not enough context to tell exactly what the sender of this communication wanted to accomplish with the offer of the discount, but since the OP now says "the party does not take the responsibility" this is not an admission of guilt, whatever else it is. It sounds like some sort of backdoor form of settlement offer without admission, but that is far from clear to me. My original answer is not significantly hanged here. |
Were Nazi atrocities legal according the German law of the time? I have recently had a discussion with a German who claims that Nuremberg trials were entirely based on ex-post-facto laws, and all the atrocities Nazis did were legal according to the Germany's and international laws of the time. His arguments are quite erratic and self-contradictory. They are as follows: Only citizens are protected by criminal laws; killing non-citizens is permitted. From my point of view, this is not the case in the majority of jurisdictions, and there is no evidence Nazi Germany was an exception. Also, this does not explain legality of killing euthanasia program victims who were German citizens. German law declared Jews non-humans, look at Nuremberg laws. I found no evidence that these or any other German laws declared Jews non-humans. Also, this does not explain how killing non-Jews, such as hostages was legal. Killing by the order of state is not murder. Okay, but in majority of cases of Nazi atrocities, there were no written orders. Even if they were, how they could overrule the law? I think, an order only switches the responsibility from the perpetrator to those who gave the order, and even that only if the "following orders" defense is accepted. There was no international law before the establishment of the UN. Again, doubtful, because there were international conventions on treatment of POWs and rules of war. So, my question is, whether these or other arguments to the effect that Nazi atrocities were legal according to the German law, valid? I am not asking whether the laws were enforceable or whether the victims could charge the perpetrators under Nazi regime. | It can (and has) been argued that some of the post-bellum trials of Germans and Japanese (but no Italians because they were Allies now) proceeded on shaky legal grounds. However, the arguments of your friend are wrong. In addition, many of the cases proceeded on solid legal foundations based on war crimes (e.g. the Commando Order) and treatment of prisoners-of-war (e.g. the Stalag-Luft III murders). Citizens and non-citizens are protected by the law and were even in Nazi Germany, albeit not equally. The Nuremberg Laws did not classify Jews as non-humans, merely as non-citizens (which is not to trivialise their awfulness). Superior orders has never been a recognised defence for criminal acts under civil or common law. The first recorded rejection of this defence was in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. The roots of modern International Law can be traced to the 16th century and were definitely well advanced by the 19th, let alone the mid-20th. Nations accepted that international treaties and diplomacy were supported by international law and these included the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929, since updated in 1949 (of which Germany was a signatory) among many others. In addition, since the Enabling Act (which instituted Hitler's dictatorship) was quite probably illegal, it can be reasonably argued that all actions that flowed from it (i.e. basically everything that the Nazi's were tried for) was illegal under German law. | Has it ever been formally established that giving any group, X, a priority of credulity in court over any other group, Y, would amount to granting the group X a title of nobility? No. This has never been formally established. In the 100 years between the ratification of the US Constitution and "Coffins v US", were there any laws or court decisions which would give any groups de facto nobility over other groups by demanding that their accusations against some other groups must be assumed (if formally stated) true until proven false? Effectively so. For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor works that way and that have been classes of people who have been historically not eligible to serve as witnesses. There are also many procedural circumstances historically (e.g. confessions of judgment) that operate in this manner. Did the argument that this amounted to granting of titles of nobility (which was prohibited) ever come up in any court cases? No.* The core litmus test under the title of nobility prohibition has been that a privilege granted by the government is hereditary and is not simply ordinary property. Without a hereditary component, the title of nobility prohibition does not apply. A lengthy analysis of this jurisprudence can be found in the answer to the Law.SE question "What exactly is a title of nobility?" While this question isn't a true duplicate of that one, the pertinent legal authorities are all discussed in the answers to that question. Obviously, it isn't possible to know every legal argument that was made orally in a trial court or legal brief for all of the United States for all time by everyone and anyone, often leaving no historical record whatsoever. There are no recorded appellate court opinions of which I am aware, however, that engage with this legal argument and rule upon it (which is usually what someone really means when they say "did this argument ever come up in a court case"). Post-Script This post also confounds a "presumption of guilt" with a per se rule regarding credibility determinations, but while both go to the issue of how evidence is evaluated by a tribunal, the two concepts otherwise have nothing in common, and sometimes it isn't clear which is which. For example, in many U.S. jurisdictions, a marriage certificate in existence at the time someone is born, accompanied by the passage of time under a short (often five year) statute of limitations, conclusively prevails on issues of paternity, over a DNA test that is 99.999% certain to be correct as a matter of genetics. You could interpret that as meaning that marriage clerks are always more credible than genetic scientists. But, of course, that isn't really the intent. Instead, this is effectively a substantive rule of law couched as an evidence rule. Similarly, the requirement that real property can only be conveyed in writing could be interpreted as an evidence rule, but it is more realistically viewed as a rule concerning the definition of what a transfer of real property really is that is useful to make a bright line rule. Thus, an oral statement can be a promise to transfer real property, but it doesn't really happen until there is a signed deed or other conveyance. A traffic ticket basically has a presumption of guilt in some jurisdictions, because if you fail to appear you are found guilty in absentia even without evidence, something that is not permitted as a matter of criminal procedure in the U.S. for more serious offenses for which you can be incarcerated. But, on the other hand, if you do appear, the prosecution has the burden of proving that you committed the offense alleged in the ticket. Perhaps the closest example there is to a presumption of guilt (either rebuttable or conclusive, depending upon the statute and facts) is a statutory rape law, which in theory, presumes that someone under a certain age does not have the capacity to consent to intercourse, rendering the offense rape. But, a more straightforward way of understanding those laws is that sex with a minor in the circumstances described is itself illegal without regard to any conclusive presumption of lack of consent. There are also many laws prohibiting certain people from testifying about certain matters in certain circumstances. For example, spouses may not testify against each other in court over a spouse's objection in many kinds of cases. These rights are called "privileges" and are not considered to be titles of nobility. The U.S. Code of Military Justice, intentionally allocates legal rights in these quasi-criminal proceedings in a manner that treats people with different military ranks unequally. Officers have different legal rights than enlisted soldiers, for example. But, since military offices are not hereditary, these rights are not titles of nobility. | united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority. | No, if, as you say we put aside the human rights questions surrounding the death penalty itself and assuming that the prisoners had been legitimately charged, convicted and had exhausted their appeals process. Once a person has been convicted, sentenced to death and has exhausted their appeals then the timing of the execution passes from the judicial branch to the executive branch of government. This is why governments can implement and remove moratoriums on executions at their discretion. Doubtless there are administrative rules and logistical issues involved in the actual timing of the execution but if these have all been correctly dealt with then they are essentially held at the pleasure of the person in the government charged with the decision. Was it legal? Probably. Was it ethical? ... | Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: "hate speech" based on race, religion, disability and "homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation" was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime ("to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt" based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination. | Almost every European nation has a "hate speech" law that makes the use of offensive bigoted words of phrases illegal. The U.S. does not have any such laws, and the First Amendment makes such laws unconstitutional. The closest the U.S. can get are laws criminalizing "Hate Crimes" which are ordinary crimes which were motivated in part or in whole by the victim's actual or perceived protected class status. Other specific examples as mentioned in comments, are that Germany has strict laws about advocacy of Nazi ideology. This is completely legal in the United States. Nazi ideology is not popular in the U.S. by any means, but it's allowed to be advocated for because of the strong Freedom of Speech Laws in the United States. In other regards, while U.S. Law is fairly similar to U.K. Law (you have to get into weeds about the differences), it is way more difficult to sue for defamation in U.S. than in the U.K. For starters, the U.S. has the "Public Person" rule which requires that any defamation about a person who is largely known to the public (politicians and celebrities largely) must prove Actual Malice Or Reckless Disregard for the Truth (I.E. You didn't even do the basic research into the statement) in order to prove defamation. But there's also the matter of the burden of proof. In the U.K. the speaker of the alleged defamation must prove in court that the statement was not defamatory. In the U.S., all legal challenges to are "protected speech" until proven otherwise in a court of law. This means that even with the "Public Person" rule set aside, the statement's original speaker need not prove that their speech is truthful, and the burden's on the accuser of defamation to prove it. Edit: Additional Info based on comments, but "Protected Speech" is a legal term used in the U.S. that defines speech that is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as opposed to commercial speech, which is speech used to make advertise or to further commerce and is restricted, and unprotected speech, which is speech that can land one in trouble. While the list of types of speech is long, every form of speech restriction is very very narrowly tailored. "Hate Speech", which would be the utterance of words or phrases that can be offensive to people of a protected class (a characteristic that is beyond the individuals control). "Hate Crimes" are not necessarily spoken during the commission of the crime, but rather can be charged in addition to the crime. Suppose a serial killer was killing people of a certain race, this is not enough for police to go on because most serial killers target victims that meet a physical description (same skin color, same hair color, same gender). Once the killer is captured, police search his apartment and find a manifesto where the killer admits that he is selecting his target because he believes people of this protected class are subhuman and thus his superior nature gives him the right to kill them, this would show that the killings were motivated out of hatred, and thus qualify as a hate crime. The way he phrases this may be purely academic and use in offensive language OR it could be laden with all manner of crass slurs. It doesn't matter... what he said is protected speech but what he did is... well... to quote Guardians of the Galaxy... is "murder... on of the worst crimes of all. So also illegal." Hate crimes criminalize crimes that are motivated by hatred... they do not criminalize speech that is hateful. | The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose. | Westphalian Sovereignty Israel has decided that this is the law in Israel and they are the only one who gets a say in this. The concept of the modern nation-state can trace its origins to the Treaty of Westphalia (possibly - there is disagreement among historians and political scientists but for our purposes we'll just let them get on with it) which ended the 30-years war. This was a complex and dynamic conflict of which one of the contentious issues was who had the right to determine the laws in a particular territory, particularly religious laws - the local prince/king/duke etc. or the Emporer. Long story short - it wasn't the Emporer. This is embodied in Article 2(1) of the UN charter: The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. That is, Israel and only Israel gets to decide what the law is in Israel. Which is to say, that what the law is in Israel is down to internal Israeli politics. Israel is a democracy so this is down to democratic politics. International law only allows involvement when the actions of a sovereign state (UN member or otherwise) infringe on the peace and stability of other sovereign states. I realise that there is a whole area of discussion here but suffice it to say that the internal operations of the UN are political rather than legal. However, laws on marriage in Israel seem unlikely to have international peace and security implications. |
Will the YU-GI-OH! card copyright ever end? Day by day they bring out new cards, I wonder if someday the royalties will end and if so when approximately? | It will end Each card has its own copyright. Using the united-states as the basis, because most countries mimic them, the copyright for a published work with a known author ends approximately 70 years after the death of the author or 95 years from publication for company-owned copyrights. The Yu-Gi-Oh manga was first published in 1996 and its author died in 2022, so the underlying manga will enter the Public Domain in 2093. The card game consists of three elements: the cards themselves, the artwork on them and the rules. The rules aren't copyrighted. The artwork's copyright is tied to the artists making it, if it is licensed art, or the company, when it is work-for-hire, so might or might lapse at two points: 70 years after the artist's death or together with the card. The card's copyright in the compilation lapses 95 years after the publication. The first set of Yu-Gi-Oh cards was published in 1999, so the copyright will lapse at the earliest 2095 on the first card set. But only that first card set. Other card sets will enter Public Domain when their 95 years are up. | It's complicated You still own your own posts First off, you own everything that you originally created. Posting it on Stack Exchange doesn't affect your rights to your own content. Incorporating suggestions If you copy any of the text from posts that were created by others, you must comply with the CC BY-SA license. The exact version will depend on when the content was posted, and can be viewed by clicking the "Share" link or viewing the post's timeline via the clock icon on the left. Currently, new posts are licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, which requires you to (basically) provide attribution with the creator's name, a link back to the content, and an indication of whether changes were made. A more detailed description of the exact requirements is here. You would also be required to license the work that you incorporated it into under the same license. However, game mechanics aren't copyrightable. If you merely used mechanics suggested in the posts without actually using the actual creative expression (for instance, names or description text) from the posts, you would not be required to provide any attribution or use any particular license, because you didn't use any copyrightable material from the post. A thank-you would still be nice All that said, it's still a nice thing to do to provide some sort of informal thanks to those who provided valuable assistance, even when you're not legally required to do so. | Imagine if the answer was a simple yes: adding a disclaimer was enough to exempt you from any and all copyright and trademark law suits. If that was the case, there would be no point in copyright or trademark law at all, because everyone could just include this disclaimer and never be sued. That doesn't mean every disclaimer is useless, but it does mean that copying and pasting some vague wording without understanding what it means is very unlikely to help you very much. The example you give is a good example of doing just that; the terms it uses are real, but they've clearly been thrown together without real understanding: Copyright is the right to control and profit from a creative work. This is relevant because images of Pokemon characters created for games, manga, etc are copyrighted by their creator. Trademarks are words, symbols, images, etc exclusively associated with a particular company or product. Trademark law aims, among other things, to avoid customers thinking they are getting an official product when they are not. "Nintendo" and "Pokemon" are both themselves trademarks. They are also the names of different companies. My limited understanding is that "The Pokemon Company" will be the owner of all the copyrights and trademarks related to those games, manga, etc. Naming them is a way of showing that you have researched this and understood their rights. "This app is not affiliated , endorsed or supported by Nintendo in any way". This is a disclaimer on the trademarks. Whether this is sufficient to protect against claims of counterfeiting depends on how prominent it is compared to other branding - you need to make it obvious to users that the product is unofficial, not bury this in small-print for the lawyers to find. "also some images used in this app are ... supported under fair use" - fair use is a US legal concept which allows copyrighted works to be used in certain specifically limited ways. Saying your use is covered does not make it true, you need to actually understand what provisions of the law allow your specific use. "no copyright infringement intended" This is a fluffy apology that has no legal standing. A more useful statement might be "every care has been taken to adhere to copyright and trademark law, if you notice a violation please contact X"; but you're still relying on goodwill, and it won't stop someone sending the lawyers in if they decide to. Which brings us back to the real question: The apps mentioned before are in the store since 2015 and they haven't been removed yet. The real reason for this has nothing to do with the poorly-written disclaimers, it is that Nintendo / Pokemon co haven't bothered. If an app is directly competing with an official app, or receiving a lot of attention (even if no money), the lawyers will descend; if it's a buggy image gallery with a dozen downloads, they might decide they have better things to do. If they do notice, they might just get Apple and Google to de-list the app, but not spend the time and money pursuing a legal case. On the other hand, at any time they might decide they need to tighten up control of their intellectual property, and make an example of a few authors picked at random. The only way to avoid that is to actually avoid violating their rights, rather than just saying so in a disclaimer. | By "buying the song" on Gumroad you don't actually buy the song, you buy the right to do specific things with that song. I couldn't find the exact license terms, but for 800 Yen (about $6) for a whole album I highly doubt that this will include much more than the right to listen to the song on a private device. The rights to publicly perform, reproduce, redistribute, use commercially etc. usually cost a lot more. So if you want the rights to use the song in your own video, you will have to negotiate the purchase of a license which allows you to do that with the creator. Or if they reassigned their copyrights to a music label or copyright collective (which some music artists do), with that organization. There are some exceptions in the copyright laws of some countries where you can use parts of a song without a license. For example, the "fair use" exception in US copyright law if you review, discuss or analyze a song. But such exceptions usually don't apply if you use the song as background music, adapt the song into an own work or even just reupload the song on your own channel. | As usual with trademarks, the key question is "will reasonable people be confused about the source or affiliations of the product or service". Trademarks are, as you already know, limited to a particular industry or area of business, in general. Displaying user videos is not exactly the same thing as a particular popular song, but they just might be close enough for some consumer confusion tom occur. Whether reasonable people are in fact confused into thinking that the app is in some way sponsored by the makers of the song is a question of fact. A trademark suit would probably need to present some sort of evidence that confusion had occurred or was likely. It also may make a difference whether "Tik Tok" has been registered as a trademark. In the US, registration gets greater protection than mere use. (In some countries there is no protection without registration.) It is also possible that the app has already licensed the rights to the term from the trademark owner for the song. This would avoid a potential suit. It is also worth noting that the term "Tik Tok" is not original with the song. It dates back, in that spelling, to at least the "Oz" books by L. Frank Baum and others Tik-Tok of Oz dates from 1914, and the character of the Tik-Tok from the book Ozma of Oz (1907). Terms that are not original coinages are less strongly protected in trademark law, and the app could claim to be alluding to the Oz character, not the more recent song. A comment by ub3rst4r says that: the term "Tik Tok" is registered as a trademark in the USA by "Bytedance Ltd" (which is the company that operates the app). If that is correct, the US Patent and Trademark office (PTO) came to at least a preliminary conclusion that this trademark did not infringe anyone else's trademark. That doesn't meant that an infringement suit is doomed, but it would make any such suit harder and less likely. It seems that, as described in this news story a company selling watchs under the name "Tic Tok" was sent a cease and desist letter on behalf of the singer Kesha Sebert. The firm responded by filing a suit for a declaratory judgement. The case is Wimo Labs LLC v. Kesha Sebert, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:11-cv-02978. However, google does not show any resolution of this case, one way or the other. This was brought to my attention in a comment by StephanS. As this docket record shows, the case was dismissed by agreement without prejudice, apparently after a settlement (as stated in the comment by user muru). Thus there was no ruling on the merits of the case. | It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed. | If you use the reviewer's code, or code derived from it (e.g. if you just changed a variable name) then they own the copyright on that part of the software. If the reviewer describes a solution which you implement, or if you re-implement the code from scratch while taking ideas and methods from the reviewer's code, then you own the copyright on that code. However if there are only a few ways to implement something in code then the code is not creative and hence cannot be copyrighted. For example the regular expression in the question you link to is (as far as I can tell) the only correct solution to the problem: any programmer addressing the problem will have come up with that RE. In this the position is akin to a database of phone numbers: while the collection may be copyright (depending on whether selection or arrangement required creativity), the fact that Alice Jones has the number 012345 is not copyrightable, and neither is the alphabetical arrangement of names. Where it gets messy is the boundary between the two. The requirement to detect 4 or more repeated digits in a credit card number could be implemented in a number of ways, but whether there are enough of these to qualify any particular solution as "creative" would be a matter of fact for a court to decide. | Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book. |
US Government - enummerated powers - enforcement of the Bill of Rights So these are the enumerated powers of the US federal government: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enumerated_powers_(United_States) At the end of the list there's this part: "Additionally, a number of amendments include a Congressional power of enforcement in which the language "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation" is used with slight variations, granting to Congress the power to enforce the following amendments:" But those amendments don't include the first 10 amendments (bill of rights) Which part in the enumerated powers allows the federal government to take action against states violating the bill of rights? Or generally... any congressional law? Thanks. | Amendments to the US Constitution are part of the US Constitution, and this includes the so-called Bill of Rights. The doctrine of applying parts of the US Constitution to states, known as incorporation, comes from the 14th amendment: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The scope of the doctrine of incorporation is logically limited to amendments because the original articles of the constitution state how the federal government is run, and does not guarantee any rights or privileges to individuals. Amendments 1,2,4,8 are fully incorporated against states, 5 and 6 are partially incorporated, third and 7th are not incorporated, and for 9th and 10th there is no ruling. This arrangement derives from decisions by the Supreme Court, interpreting the 14th Amendment and the concept of "due process". If a state were to passe a law forbidding criticism of the governor (violating the First Amendment), an individual could sue to have the law found unconstitutional. Because, under the 14th Amendment, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article", Congress can and has passed a law prohibiting violation of civil rights: 42 USC 1983. Since the state in this hypothetical scenario has violated federal law, the federal government (Dept. of Justice) has standing to sue the state for violating federal law. | Analysis. This question has never been squarely resolved by case law. An analysis would look to the U.S. Constitution (the pertinent parts of which are restated below) and case law under it, to determine if Congress has the authority to enact such a law or not including whether laws currently on the books affect it. Caucuses and primaries are used by political parties as part of their process for determining their Presidential nominees, and the only constitutional acknowledgement that they exist, or are subject to federal regulation is in the 24th Amendment. Political parties also have a 1st Amendment freedom of association interest in choosing their nominees as they see fit, subject to reasonable regulation in an area of law that is not well spelled out in case law. On the the other hand, caucuses and primaries are government regulated, mostly at the state level, because their results have an officially recognized role in Presidential elections under state laws regulating elections for Presidential electors, and primaries are generally conducted at state expense by state and local government officials, rather than by political parties acting autonomously. And, states have wide expressly granted discretion regarding how they conduct Presidential elector elections subject to the authority of Congress to prohibit various kinds of discrimination in the conduct of elections and to set the date of Presidential elections (a right that Congress has chosen not to strictly enforce allowing early voting, for example). New Hampshire does have the authority to say what a political party must do to have its nominee recognized on its general election Presidential ballot, and when it will conduct its state primaries. But, it does not necessarily have the power to determine whether or to what extent a national political party will consider the results of that primary in the process of selecting its nominee for President. The Democratic party, for example, would probably be within its rights to award no delegates to its national convention based upon New Hampshire's primary election participants based upon the New Hampshire primary election, and to instead award New Hampshire delegates solely as "superdelegates" who serve ex-officio, or based solely upon an entirely privately funded and operated Presidential caucus it held in New Hampshire at a date of its choosing. The flip side is that New Hampshire might be within its rights, probably, to decline to put a Democratic party national convention chosen nominee on its Presidential elector ballots, a retaliation, although arguably that would deny the rights of its citizens to vote in the Presidential election over which the federal government has more regulatory authority. The exact details of any situation leading to litigation would matter a lot, and it isn't possible to predict with any great certainty how a challenge would come out, although it is possible to articulate what provisions of the U.S. Constitution (and with more research, what court cases (maybe a dozen or two are arguably pertinent), federal statutes and state statutes) would be pertinent to the decision. It is possible to advocate for an outcome within the range of legally relevant authority, but, in practice, a negotiated compromise that would not push up against the hard constitutional limits of the constitution, relevant statutes and cases would almost surely be reached before it came to that point. For example, while New Hampshire might arguably have the right to refuse to put the Democratic nominee on the ballot because it didn't consider the results of its first in the nation primary in choosing its nominee, I very much doubt that New Hampshire officials would actually go that far, if push came to shove. On the other hand, if Congress passed a law stating that the District of Columbia shall hold the first in the nation primary, as it is probably expressly authorized to do under the 23rd Amendment, that federal law would probably pre-empt New Hampshire's law on the point. Relevant Provisions Of The U.S. Constitution As Amended Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution might be relevant. It states: The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution might be pertinent, it states in the pertinent part that: The Congress shall have power . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Even more directly, Article II, Section 1 which states, in part, that: The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. . . The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States. Article VI states in the pertinent part that: This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. These sections state: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. . . . Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. The 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 23rd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is the only one expressly recognizing the existence of primary elections, might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Collectively, these sections of the U.S. Constitution give the federal government considerable legislative authority to regulate state elections for federal offices. | There is no constitutional requirement that Congress provide copyright protection in the US. Congress could, if it so chooses, repeal Title 17 of the US Code, and afford no copyright protection whatsoever. Given that the US has protected copyright from its earliest days, that copyright protection in English law dates to the 1600s, that almost every nation currently has a Law protecting copyright, and that such protection is a requirement of membership in the World Trade organization (WTO) I find it highly unlikely that such a change in the law will be made in the foreseeable future. But Congress does have the power to abolish copyright in the US. | Because an "Order, Resolution, or Vote" is not the same as a Bill, and does not become a law. Thus the procedure for presentation, leading to signing, pocket acceptance, veto, or pocket veto, does not apply to Orders, Resolutions, or Votes. Therefore it is repeated to indicate that it applies to those legislative acts also. A "Vote", in the sense used here is a legislative decision or action that is neither a Bill nor a resolution. For example, the decision on when to adjourn to, that is, when Congress will come back into session after an adornment, is a Vote. A "Bill" is a proposed law. If it is passed by Congress and not vetoed, or if any veto is overridden, it becomes a law. Other legislative actions do not become laws, but otherwise go through much the same procedure. Note that some legislative actions do notneed the "Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives". For example, when the House votes on a new Speaker, it is a vote of the House only, and neither the Senate nor the President has a say. | There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest. | "Seila Law" is a law firm, not a law. They were a party in a recent SCOTUS decision, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S ___, which involved the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by Congress, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The court held that the structure of that law (regarding appoinntment and firing of the director) is unconstitutional: The CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers. More specifically, Article II vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, but the Constitution presumes that lesser executive officers will assist the President in discharging his duties. The President’s executive power generally includes the power to supervise — and, if necessary, remove — those who exercise the President’s authority on his behalf. The President’s removal power has long been confirmed by history and precedent. The law in question addresses a single position, director of CFPB, not all government agencies. "Agency" is defined in 18 USC 6 as includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. "Department" is then defined as one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government. POTUS firing power is about the executive branch, not the judicial or legislative branches, so it depends on what you mean by "agency". You can infer possible outcomes based on this ruling, but what they literally said is that particular law is unconstitutional. | Article 10 of Part I of the Constitution of New Hampshire (Article 10, Part II relates to classification of town governments) is mentioned in five reported appellate cases in the history of New Hampshire since it was adopted in 1784 that I could locate. It has never successfully been effective to protect the rights of anyone invoking it. (It is possible that it has been argued in a trial court on a jury nullification theory, but such cases wouldn't produce reported cases as criminal acquittals cannot be appealed by the government.) The cases, and the pertinent part of each ruling, are as follows: Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590, 619 (1874), it was held to create a moral rather than a legal right: The legal idea of a bill of rights is a declaration of private rights, annexed to and made a part of a constitutional grant of governmental power. Reservation is, in general, the purpose and legal meaning of such declaration. For exceptional reasons, applicable to the construction of article 10, the right of insurrection there declared is evidently a moral right, not reserved as a legal one. But many of the most important constitutional rights are reserved in terms much less imperative than "shall" and "shall not." The right of petitioning for a redress of grievances (the plaintiff's sole remedy, if the plea is good) is reserved by a simple declaration of the right, without a word literally signifying a command or prohibition. It was also addressed in the case Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 374, 746 A.2d 981 (1999) where it was found to not invalidate a means of raising revenue for a municipal electrical utility: Question two inquires whether HB 536 "violate[s] the constitutional provision that government is instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men under part I, article 10 of the New Hampshire constitution?" We answer this question in the negative. Part I, Article 10 provides: Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly [746 A.2d 987] endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind. This provision of our constitution has commonly been regarded as enumerating a citizen's right to reform an ineffectual or manifestly corrupt form of government. See City of Claremont v. Craigue, 135 N.H. 528, 533-34, 608 A.2d 866, 869 (1992); Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 50, 105 A.2d 756, 770 (1954). We have recognized for over one hundred years, however, that this provision is imbued with "[t]he principle of equality [that] pervades the entire constitution," State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 114, 18 A. 878, 879 (1889), and as such, Article 10 provides support for the maxim that "[t]he law cannot discriminate in favor of one citizen to the detriment of another." Id. Thus, Part I, Article 10 has been recognized as providing for more than a "right of revolution"; rather, it is one of many provisions in our Bill of Rights that forms the basis for a citizen's right to equal protection. See, e.g., Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 67, 489 A.2d 600, 602 (1985) (zoning ordinance violated equal protection rights guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 2, 10, 12, and 14); Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980) (statute violated equal protection rights guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 10, 12, and 14). Pursuant to the principle of equality inherent in Article 10, this court found that the raising of tax revenue to aid an electric utility would violate Part I, Article 10's mandate that government is "instituted for the common benefit ... of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men." Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 489, 190 A. 425, 429 (1937). Aid to a utility is forbidden except in protection of the public welfare and interest. And the protection must be in a needed service furnished the public by the utility as a condition of the aid. Without the condition the protective principle is inapplicable. Unconditional aid is not a proper charge of government to be met by the taxpayers. 144 N.H. 382 Id. at 488-89, 190 A. at 428. The court noted that the existing public utilities already provided sufficient power to service State customers, and that any additional supply was sent out-of-state. Id. at 489, 190 A. at 429. The court reasoned that because the transmission of additional electric energy outside the State served no public purpose, and thus the need for public funds for additional development was a private, not public, purpose, the proposed aid was unconstitutional. Id. In this case, however, the legislature is proposing to create a tax exemption, rather than directly raising tax revenue to subsidize private purposes. Cf. Opinion of the Justices (Mun. Tax Exemptions for Indus. Constr.), 142 N.H. at 101, 697 A.2d at 124 (finding determinative under Part II, Article 5 that there was not direct expenditure, but rather a uniform exemption of state-wide application). Moreover, even if one views an exemption as simply a form of direct grant, see Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N.H. 1, 9, 146 A. 511, 515 (1929) (exemptions are "in effect, a compulsory payment of money, by those who bear their shares of the common burden, to the privileged person who does not bear his share"), the public benefit gained by this legislation is sufficient to render it constitutional. Our constitution does not require absolute equality of burden in the case of exemptions. "The resulting inequality or discrimination against unexempted property is not fatal to the constitutionality of the exemption," Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 490, 491, 178 A. 125, 126 (1935), provided "it advances a public purpose," Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. at 550, 65 A.2d at 701, and is "properly within the legislature's discretion in acting for the welfare of the state," Opinion of [746 A.2d 988] the Justices, 87 N.H. at 491, 178 A. at 126. As stated above, the benefit to be gained by HB 536 is increased competition and customer choice, and not necessarily the need for additional power. Further, deregulation of the electric utility industry is "properly within the legislature's discretion in acting for the welfare of the state," id., and it is proper for the legislature to enact exemptions that promote the economic well-being of the State, see Opinion of the Justices (Mun. Tax Exemptions for Indus. Constr.), 142 N.H. at 100, 697 A.2d at 123. Accordingly, the tax exemption is properly granted under the legislature's "constitutional power to provide for the common benefit, protection and security," Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. at 487, 190 A.2d at 428, and does not violate Part I, Article 10. To the extent that question two implicates additional equal protection guarantees under Part I, Article 10, cf. Gazzola, 120 N.H. at 29, 411 A.2d at 151, we conduct our analysis concurrently with the next question you posed; namely, whether HB 536 improperly classifies taxable property such that the burden of taxation is inequitably distributed, cf. Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 320-21, 197 A. 701, 706 (1938) (constitutional issue of classification decided under Part I, Article 10). For the reasons stated below, this part of question two is answered in the negative. In another case, City of Claremont v. Craigue, 135 N.H. 528, 608 A.2d 866 (1992), it was argued unsuccessfully, that voter approval cleansed an improperly adopted budget of the taint of improper steps taken prior to the vote: Finally, the respondents cite part I, article 10 of the New Hampshire Constitution, known as the right of revolution, as a general right to self-determination. Part I, article 10 provides in pertinent part that "whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, [135 N.H. 534] or establish a new government." Without in any way detracting from the continuing validity and truth of part I, article 10, we find that none of [608 A.2d 870] the conditions specified in that article have been met in this case. Prohibiting voter ratification of a city's budget hardly "perverts" the ends of government or manifestly endangers public liberty, so long as the city's voters retain the right to elect their local representatives. Moreover, the defendants have not exhausted all other legal means of redress, since, as we noted above, the legislature has set forth a statutory procedure for charter revision, and that option remains available to the voters of Claremont. Therefore, the respondents' proposed revisions to the Claremont city charter are invalid, and of no effect. It was brought up, without success, in In re Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 911 A.2d 1 (2006), but I don't have access to that particular opinion in which an environmental regulation was challenged. It was raised in Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954) where the court concluded that it did not invalidate a McCarthy era law: It is also strongly urged by the plaintiff that the Legislature of this state cannot proscribe activities looking to the overthrow of government by force or violence because of Article 10 of the Bill of Rights which provides, in part, that ‘whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind’. With this interpretation we cannot agree. The right reserved to the people by this Article is not such a broad and unlimited right of insurrection and rebellion as to permit any group which is dissatisfied with existing government to lawfully attempt at any time to overthrow the government by force or violence. It is not claimed by the plaintiff that ‘the ends of government’ are now ‘perverted’, ‘public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress * * * ineffectual’ but it is only when those conditions prevail that the right to resist and to ‘reform the old, or establish a new government’ exists. The right possessed by the people of this state as a protection against arbitrary power and oppression cannot be utilized to justify the violent overthrow of government when the adoption of peaceful and orderly changes, properly reflecting the will of the people, may be accomplished through the existing structure of government. 99 N.H. 51 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501, 549, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137. To require a government representative of the people, in the face of preparations for revolution by force, to refrain from acting to curb the [105 A.2d 771] outbreak of violence and to confine itself solely to holding answerable those persons who have committed crimes of violence and terrorized the community in the name of revolution must result in anarchy. Dennis v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. 501, 71 S.Ct. 857. Article 10 was not intended to accomplish this result. So far as the circumstances of this case have required an examination of the 1951 act, we conclude that it is constitutional upon its face, so as to furnish a basis for the resolution of 1953. | It's not clear what the big deal is. Congress has already passed vast numbers of laws for POTUS to enforce, and has left the details of implementation up to the executive branch. The main limitation is that you need a Congress to fund any new federal government projects. The Constitution anticipates this problem, and there are clauses regarding filling vacancies (clearly applicable to the dead). Assuming that zombies are rioting in the streets, POTUS can invoke the National Emergencies Act, issuing an executive order to call out the National Guard. |
Who own the copyright - the artist or the subject in the drawing? If an artist draws a picture of some famous political figure, who owns the copyright to that image/drawing - the artist or the political figure in the drawing? What if the artist drew a picture of the political figure in a famous setting (such as a president by his inaugural address) - does that effect anything? Similarly, what if the artist simply copies a famous scene that was taken with a digital camera and converts it to an almost identical drawing? | The artist is always the initial owner of the copyright unless, under US law, the artist was hired to do the drawing under circumstances which make it a "work made for hire". This requires a regular employment relationship, or an explicit written contract saying that it is for a work made for hire. In the US this makes the employer the original owner, and then legal author. That is not true in most other countries. In many countries the natural person who creates a work is the author, even if by contract the copyright is immediately transferred to the author's employer. This matters because the author's life is used to measure the copyright term. In the US a work-made-for-hire has a fixed term (of 95 years from publication, or 120 from creation, whichever ends sooner), not measured by anyone's life. However, once the work has been created, the artist may sell or give away the copyright, including to the subject, if s/he so chooses. However, although the subject does not normally own the copyright, the subject may have relevant "rights of publicity" which may limit what the artist can do with the drawing. In particular, using it to advertise anything may be unlawful unless the subject's permission is obtained. Whether such rights exist at all, and exactly whatn they cover, varies significantly by jurisdiction. Inn the US this varies by state. | The work and the copyright to the work are different property rights Buying one does not give you rights to the other. Copyright laws differ by country so its impossible to say which need transfers to be in writing and which don't. For example, the United States requires them (and also allows owners to rescind the transfer after a number of years) but in Australia, it isn't necessary and the Copyright Act makes a number of presumptions in civil actions (ss126-131) which favor the person claiming the copyright so that, in the absence of contrary evidence, their assertion will prevail. | In the US, the original author still owns the copyright, unless the original work was out of copyright (in which case no one owns the copyright): copyright is not granted for just pressing a "scan" button, and mechanical reproductions are not eligible for copyright (copyright protects creativity, and a scan involves zero creativity). To quote 313.4(A) ("Mere Copies") of the Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition: A work that is a mere copy of another work of authorship is not copyrightable. The Office cannot register a work that has been merely copied from another work of authorship without any additional authorship. [...] Examples: [...] Photocopying, scanning, or digitizing a literary work. That doesn't necessarily mean the repository can't put any restriction on your use of the copy; the repository may have a terms of service. Terms of service are rooted in contract law, not copyright; just because the work is in the public domain, doesn't force the repository to show it to anyone who asks, and they can force you to agree to a contract first. The enforceability of that contract is fact-dependent. | That post is probably illegal. Because she is making false assertions about you (that are presumably damaging your reputation), she is likely liable for defamation. Because she has copied a picture of you without authorization, she is likely liable for violating the copyright of whomever owns that picture. Commenters have suggested she might invoke a fair-use defense, but I would expect it to fail. The four fair-use factors are: The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes: Both Plaintiff and Defendant are using using the photograph to identify the holder of an account -- a Facebook account in P's case, a business account in D's. D is using the photograph in connection with a profit-making enterprise, not for educational purposes, and her use is not transformative. The nature of the copyrighted work: Photography is a creative art at the core of copyright's purposes, generally entitled to thick protection. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[P]hotography entails creative expression warranting copyright protection.") The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: There is no indication that D took anything less than the entire photograph. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: The question is not only whether the defendant's use affected the actual market for the protected work, but whether many people doing the same thing would depress the potential market for the work. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (Courts must consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market.") The potential market for the image is probably very small, but widespread unauthorized copies, publicly displayed, would undoubtedly depress whatever market exists. So all four factors cut against the defendant. Fair use is a loser defense here. | No you don't. There are two copyright holders regarding the derivative work: yourself, for creating the original. the other artist, for creating the modified version. The other artist has received the right to use your original through the CC-BY license, under the condition that they attribute you appropriately. However, you have not received any rights to the other artist's work. | It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works. | Per a decision of the US Copyright Office last month, AI generated images are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want1, but so can anyone else. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be. Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US. 1 Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See the other answer for more details. | It is true that any work of the US government is not subject to copyright in the United States; it may be subject to copyright abroad (the relevant law excludes US government works from US copyright protection; other countries have their own copyright laws that generally don't explicitly exclude US government works, and so the works may be copyrighted there). A government work is defined as something produced by a government employee in the course of his official duties. It doesn't include everything released by a government agency; for instance, if a contractor makes something and the contract specifies that the government gets the copyright, the work is copyrighted (since it wasn't made by a government employee). If a foreign cosmonaut or astronaut composes and sings an original song in a livestream, then NASA may not have copyright in the livestream but the foreign astronaut would have copyright in the song. That said, NASA has a page of guidelines for reuse of their media, where they say that their stuff normally isn't copyrighted unless otherwise noted. They don't make any sort of guarantee, but they suggest you'd probably be fine embedding it, at least as far as they're concerned. |
How will one be sentenced if she immediately shoots someone to death with just one shot out of fear after being "jump scared"? Late at night on a street, Alan, dressed up as a horrible ghost, "jump scared" Betty and her brain going blank, she pull out her gun to shoot Alan. After one shot, she realised the ghost was a human being, so she stopped and called an ambulance, but the rescue was not successful. How will Betty be sentenced? I am effectively (or also) asking whether, if convicted, the facts described can be taken into account as mitigating factors at sentencing? | Self defence new-south-wales Self defence was codified in the Crimes Act 1900 in 2001. Section 418(1) provides that a person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence. Section 418(2) sets out the circumstances where self-defence is available. The questions to be asked by the jury under s 418(2) are succinctly set out in R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613 at [22]–[23] which was approved in Abdallah v R [2016] NSWCCA 34 at [61]. Section 419 provides that the prosecution has the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the person did not carry out the conduct in self-defence. Self defence does not have to be raised by the defendant for the jury to consider it - it must be eliminated by the prosecution. Where self-defence is an issue in the case (i.e. there is evidence that could support a reasonable doubt that the accused acted in self defence) the judge must direct the jury on how to deal with it. For a murder case, the direction must include: An acknowledgement that the law allows self defense. That the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self defense The Crown may prove this by either: (a) the accused did not believe at the time that they were acting in self defence - if this is not proved, the appropriate verdict is “not guilty of murder”, or (b) that the accused’s acts were not a reasonable response to the circumstances as they perceived them - if this is not proved the appropriate verdict is “not guilty of manslaughter”. However, if 3(a) is not proved but 3(b) is the appropriate verdict is “not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter”. In determining the issue of whether the accused personally believed that his or her conduct was necessary for self-defence, the jury must consider the circumstances as the accused perceived them to be at the time. For example, if the accused had an irrational fear of and belief in ghosts, that is a factor that tends towards self defence for Alice. Penalties The maximum sentence for murder is life or 25 years imprisonment. The actual sentence depends on the severity of the crime and any mitigating circumstances in accordance with the sentencing guidelines. For the circumstances you describe Alice cold expect 6-10 years if convicted. There are different categories of manslaughter, this one falls neatly into the excessive self defence category. In sentencing, the judge must explicitly decide if the convicted person intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm by their act or not. Alice used a gun; she intended to kill or cause GBH, this will increase her sentence. Because this is a relatively rare outcome (there are lots of convicted murderers and lots of acquittals, but very few manslaughter due to excessive self defence) its difficult to estimate the sentence. Say 4-10 years. | If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34. | This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter. | In germany, you are likely charged if you actively interfere. Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, as long as you don't endanger yourself. The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged. However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. One of the most prominent cases was in 2017, where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury. Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern but the charge is based on the new law: § 323 c Abs. 2 StGB - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid. Also, creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims in itself can be a breach of § 201 a StGB - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is not covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties. Being in peril yourself... When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute. If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent. Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen. But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable. However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem (§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung). | It appears you want to go for a defense strategy based on a self-defense argument. This won't work in many jurisdictions, because self-defense usually doesn't apply when you intentionally caused a situation where you knew you would have to harm someone in self-defense. Similar case: Bob regularly mugs old women in the park by threatening them with a gun. Charlie finds out and wants to stop him. But instead of reporting it to the police, he wants to take care of this himself. Charlie get a gun, dresses up as an old woman and waits in the park. When Bob shows up and tries to mug Charlie, Charlie shoots first. Well, anyone else who would have found themselves in a park threatened by Bob with a deadly weapon might have had a self-defense argument. But Charlie knew that by dressing up as an old woman, he would provoke Bob to attempt to mug him. This of course doesn't exonerate Bob. But Charlie actively caused the situation which would give him the opportunity to kill Bob "in self defense". Charlie even made a complex plan to arrange this situation and put serious effort into setting it in motion. It's premeditated murder. Your situation is basically the same. You caused someone to make an attempt at your life, and then killed them to "defend yourself". And you had plenty of other options: There are lots of ways to end your life without requiring the help of a hitman. By getting them involved, you incited them to commit murder (killing someone who wants to die is still murder under most circumstances). By hiring the hitman, you created two possible options: Either you kill the hitman, or the hitman kills you and they would be guilty of murder. Both are the direct consequences of your actions. You could have tried to cancel the hit when you changed your mind (if you tried and failed, that might give you a slightly better legal argument) You could have called the police and ask them for protection. Further, when you hired the hitman you committed a crime: incitement to commit murder. The fact that you were also the victim of that crime doesn't really matter. It also doesn't matter that you wanted to die: Assisted suicide is only permitted in very few jurisdictions, and those only allow it if performed by medical professionals under very narrow circumstances. Those circumstances would certainly not have applied, so the hitman would have been guilty of murder if he had succeeded (he is at least guilty of attempted murder, but you can't put a dead person on trial), so you would too. When you commit a crime and cause someone to die in the process, then that falls under the felony murder rule in many jurisdictions. You will likely be convicted of manslaughter or murder of the hitman, depending on when you decided to kill the hitman before they kill you. When you can convince the court that you did not premeditate to kill the hitman but only panicked in the last minute, and no felony murder rule applies, then you might get away with manslaughter. You might also be found guilty of incitement of attempted murder (your own murder). | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 | Yes. The principle caselaw is R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox 692 A husband and wife had an argument that led to the husband chasing his wife out into the street. The wife collapsed during this altercation and died. Whist the husband did not physically touch her, he did shout threats at her. The wife was found to have been suffering from an abnormality of the thyroid gland that neither was aware of that meant that fright or shock could cause death if combined with physical exertion. The husband was charged with manslaughter. [...] The husband was found guilty of manslaughter. No actual proof of violence was necessary as long as the defendant’s unlawful act, which was the threat of violence, caused her fright leading to her death. The criminal law acknowledges that an assailant must take their victim as they find them... Source And... The defendant chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died. He did not physically touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death where physical exertion was accompanied by fright and panic. Both the defendant and his wife were unaware she had this condition. Held: The defendant was liable for constructive manslaughter as his unlawful act (assault) caused death. The egg shell (thin) skull rule applied. He was therefore fully liable despite the fact an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would not have died in such circumstances... Source |
Double Jeopardy? A woman is thought to have been murdered (corrected this first sentence from a previous comment). A man is arrested for it. He is offered a plea bargain deal that will get him 15 years or he can take his chances in court but would get life if found guilty. All they have is circumstantial evidence but the arrested man is convinced by his lawyer to plea bargain due to the overwhelming circumstantial evidence against him. (side-note: For this scenario, the man did NOT actually murder this woman as we find out later in this story but he just didn't want to take the chance of getting sentenced to life in prison). Man serves his 15 years and is released...no probation, he served his entire sentence. Knowing he did not murder this woman he looks for her after he is released and finds her. Ends up she wanted to disappear and start a new life and set this man up to be framed for her murder. He is obviously mad at this woman and after he finds her, he kills her for revenge of sending him to prison and losing 15 years of his life for something he didn't do. He is arrested again and admits to the police to killing her but does not worry about being charged for murder because he has already been convicted of her murder and served his sentence. Can he be charged, convicted and sent to prison again? | Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered). | The question of double jeopardy is not for a jury to consider. It is a question of law that is decided by the judge. In this case, Rittenhouse is charged, among other counts, with first-degree reckless homicide. If he is found guilty on a lesser charge, he will have been acquitted of first-degree reckless homicide, and he will not be able to be retried on that charge by the state of Wisconsin. (If the trial is invalidated to the extent that jeopardy never "attached," for example if it is found that the judge had been bribed to prevent conviction, then a new trial could be brought.) Once jeopardy attaches, there can be no additional trials for the same crime, and any subsequent attempts at prosecution should be dismissed by the court long before a jury is selected. By contrast, if a court determines that a trial does not constitute double jeopardy and a jury is seated, the jury will not consider the possible existence of double jeopardy; the only way to challenge a trial judge's decision on that question would be through the appeals process. If the trial jury in the original trial cannot decide unanimously to acquit on a particular charge then it is a hung jury,and indeed that may result in a mistrial on only those counts on which the jury has deadlocked. From Wikipedia, quoting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: If the jury cannot agree on a verdict on one or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on those counts. A hung jury does not imply either the defendant's guilt or innocence. The government may retry any defendant on any count on which the jury could not agree. States, however, may approach this slightly differently. | The pardon does what it says it does Typically, the pardon is given for which the accused has already been convicted. Therefore, the principle of double jeopardy applies: the person has already been tried on the facts and all the charges that were or should have been brought have been determined. This, of course, doesn't prevent charges from being laid for other crimes allegedly committed at other times over different events. In the case where a person is pardoned more broadly, as in the Michael Flynn example, in addition to the double jeopardy limitation, a prosecutor is prevented from charging anything that falls within the scope of the pardon. Pardons do not constrain civil suits If you are pardoned of say, murder, that does not prevent the victim's dependants from bringing a wrongful death suit, just as being found not guilty wouldn't. These are different cases with different parties and the pardon has no effect. Similarly, a Federal pardon does not prevent a State (or another country) from laying charges over the same matter and vice-versa. | No, if, as you say we put aside the human rights questions surrounding the death penalty itself and assuming that the prisoners had been legitimately charged, convicted and had exhausted their appeals process. Once a person has been convicted, sentenced to death and has exhausted their appeals then the timing of the execution passes from the judicial branch to the executive branch of government. This is why governments can implement and remove moratoriums on executions at their discretion. Doubtless there are administrative rules and logistical issues involved in the actual timing of the execution but if these have all been correctly dealt with then they are essentially held at the pleasure of the person in the government charged with the decision. Was it legal? Probably. Was it ethical? ... | When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case. | The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful. | It is my understanding that he was charged under 18 USC § 1001 which gives a maximum sentence of 5 years under most circumstances. This is the absolute maximum; the judge is not allowed to give more than the law allows. Here are the federal sentencing guidelines. If you look in the guidelines, you'll see that the base offense level for this crime is 14. If there was a "substantial" interference with justice, the offense is increased by 3 levels. My guess is that they won't find this to be the case. There are several other adjustments that likely don't apply. Under the "Adjustments" section of the guidelines, it says: (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. It seems that the first one applies. The second one cannot apply in this particular case since the offense level was not 16 or greater. So the offense level would be reduced from 14 to 12. If you look at the Sentencing Table, you can see that an offense level of 12 has a recommended sentence of 10-16 months for someone with no prior criminal history. Also, this is in Zone C, meaning: the minimum term may be satisfied by... a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment. so it seems he would go to prison for at least half of that. But if the offense level was dropped just one more level, he would be in zone B, where probation with home confinement would be an acceptable sentence. But there's one more thing to consider: He's cooperating with investigations into other people. This allows a departure from the ordinary guidelines. Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: (1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. I have no idea where the Guardian got 6 months from. It's certainly possible that's part of the plea deal (although nothing says the judge has to impose the sentence that the prosecutor recommends as part of the deal), and maybe there are adjustments I'm not taking into account that would reduce the offense level further. I just now found a copy of the plea agreement. It specifies that the parties agree he will be sentenced under guideline §2B1.1(a)(2). This ordinarily is for offenses such as theft, property damage, forgery, or fraud. As far as I can tell, the government is just using this to get the sentence down, because there's no real relation to the crime he's accused of. Under that guideline, the base offense level is 6. The two level decrease for accepting responsibility puts it at an offense level of 4, with a possibility of a downward departure for cooperation. Regardless of whether or not there's a downward departure, this would have a 0-6 month sentence recommendation, which is the lowest available in the guidelines. This is also in Zone A of the sentencing table, meaning a sentence of just probation with no imprisonment or home confinement is possible. | Yes the woman is guilty of murder (under the law OP described) The issue of common law mens rea (the guilty conscience) is moot as it is no longer a component of the crime, see here. Almost all jurisdictions today have codified crimes so the common law mens rea is not relevant, for example, in Texas a person commits murder if they "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual"; feeling guilty about it or knowing it was wrong is not an issue. In the facts you describe the person "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual"; the fact that she did not consider the victim to be a person is immaterial. As described, she would have a hard time with an insanity plea in the same way that a white supremacist murderer would for classifying members of other races as "non-persons". You can see why the common law usage would no longer work. |
What happens to a bill vetoed by the president after the end of the Congress? The President of the United States may veto, i.e. return a bill passed by the Congress within 10 days (excluding Sundays) after it was presented to him. The term of the Congress begins and ends on January 3rd and lasts 2 years. For example, the term of the current 117th Congress began on January 3, 2021 and will end on January 3, 2023. If the Congress passed a bill (e.g. on December 30, 2022) and the President vetoed the bill after the end of the Congress' term (e.g. on January 4, 2023), would that effectively kill the bill, making the veto absolute and impossible to override (like the pocket veto)? Or could the new Congress still attempt to override the veto, even if the bill was passed by the previous Congress? Would there be any difference if the President vetoed the bill before the end of the Congress' term, but the Congress did not manage to meet and vote on veto override before the end of its term? | The veto aspect of the scenario is a red herring. All bills not passed into law by the end of a Congress die (subject to a small 10-day window for approval by a President). This is a frequently asked question at the Library of Congress: If a bill from any Congress does not become law during the Congress in which it is introduced, it is considered “dead.” For a “dead” bill to be enacted in a new Congress, it would have to be reintroduced with a new number and begin anew its journey through the legislative process. This is because when Americans elect a Congress, "[t]hey are electing a particular Congress, which lasts two years. So through 2013 and 2014, the 113th U.S. Congress has been making laws. For 2015 and 2016, the 114th U.S. Congress will be in office. ... When one Congress expires, all the pending legislation goes with it" (The Congressional Institute). "The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect before the adjournment of Congress" (H. R. Report No. 108, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1864, as quoted in Edwards, below). There is only one exception, discussed in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). It was held that even if a Congress has adjourned at the end of that Congress's term, the President still has the full ten days to approve a bill presented from that former Congress. | There's no settled legal answer to this, but there seems to be a general consensus that this would not be legal under the Impeachment Clause, which says: The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. There would be two main issues here: 1. Can a president pardon himself? It's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. The main argument in favor of self-pardons is that the constitution grants broad pardon authority for any offense against the United States, making an exception for impeachment, but not for self-pardons. The response to that is that the constitution uses all kinds of broad language that everyone agrees is not as broad as it sounds; Congress is not allowed to abridge the freedom of speech, but perjury laws are nonetheless constitutional. There are several theories as to why the self-pardon would be illegal, but they mostly come down to two main ideas -- that our legal system does not permit anyone to be the arbiter of their own case, and that a person subject to impeachment may not be pardoned. 2. Can a president issue secret pardons? Again, it's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. And again, the primary argument in favor of secret pardons is that the Pardon Clause grants broad pardon authority without requiring that pardons be publicized. The main arguments against are (1) that presidential pardons are inherently public acts, as they have no effect if the justice system doesn't know about them, and (2) that the Presidential Records Act requires official White House records to be transferred to the National Archives. | Not directly However, a President who is unable to discharge their duties (by being on vacation or otherwise) can be dealt with by either: the vice-President and Cabinet invoking the 25th amendment and declaring the President unable to perform their duties, by the House impeaching the President for the “high crime and misdemeanour” of not doing her job. If convicted by the Senate, the person is no longer President. | Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court. | The Supremacy Clause makes Federal laws superior to state laws and even state constitutions, but that is only true for Constitutional federal laws. If Congress passed a law seeking to restore the effect of the now overruled Roe decision, there would be a question as to what provisions of the constitution empowered Congress to do so. Such a law might be challenged, and if no convincing source of congressional authority to pass such a law was cited, it could plausibly be overturned. One supposes that the members of the majority in Dobbs would be reluctant to see that decision superseded by a new Federal law. One hopes that they would take a principled stance, and only overturn such a law if there was good legal reason to do so. Without seeing the text of such a law, and the constitutional arguments for and against it, there is no legitimate way to judge if it would be within the power of Congress. As a political matter, I doubt that the current Congress will pass such a law. | The FCC Commissioner is appointed, per 47 USC 154, by POTUS, subject to approval by the US Senate (as a member of the Commission). Thereafter he serves for 5 years. However Article 2 of the Constitution allows removal from office: The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors. But only the House of Representatives can impeach and only the Senate can remove (of the President declines to do so). There is no provision for a citizen to sue to remove a civil officer. It is, of course, legal for citizens and others to lobby politically for whatever action that want Congress to take. "Net Neutrality" rules can be more permanently fixed by act of Congress. By act of Congress, the FCC may be required to, allowed to, or prohibited from setting some set of rules. Such laws are typically broad and leave a lot of discretion to the executive branch. Congress has not passed a law mandating "net neutrality", and as ruled in Comcast v. FCC the FCC lacks "ancillary jurisdiction" over internet services of at least Comcast. There have been previous attempts to legislate "net neutrality", such as the Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006 which died on the floor of the House, which purported to guarantee "net neutrality" via an extension of antitrust law. However, the only way to make such a provision permanent is to make it be a Constitutional Amendment, since an act of Congress can be repealed or amended in such a way that it effectively doesn't exist. | No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates. | The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes). |
Is it possible to try Colin Powell for the Iraq debacle? Is it possible to try Colin Powell for the Iraq debacle because he lied about WMD and that helped the Bush admin to invade Iraq based on false premises of WMD, and millions of people died as a result? Please tell me about US federal law and the practical barriers to trying them. | After the edit of the question: Deceased defendants are not normally put on trial. Before the edit of the question: The ability of the US President to start military operations is a somewhat murky issue. Congress has the power to declare wars, the President is the commander in chief, and the War Powers Resolution complicates things. But this is not really an issue because Congress approved the operation. As far as domestic US law, the war was legal. I'm not aware of any competent legal authority deciding on the invasion being a crime of aggression under international law. The practical problem here is that such trials mostly happen under UN auspices at the end of a world war, putting the defeated side on trial. The UNSC would probably be involved, and the US is a veto power. Note also that Iraq had probably violated the ceasefire agreement from 1991 ... Which leaves the domestic issue of lying to the American public and especially to Congress. While perjury in a congressional hearing may be a crime, proving it would require a legal judgement of the state of knowledge at the time the supposed perjury happened. To a large degree, the US government deceived itself before it gave testimony, and being factually wrong is not perjury if the witness believed what he or she said. | There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal. | Any google review would be hearsay. That means, it would be proof that someone posted a review, and what was written in the review, but it wouldn't be proof that any facts claimed in the review were true. As it is proof of posting, anyone who feels slandered could sue for slander and be successful (depending on circumstances). But trying to claim that the contents of a review is a true fact will fail. You can of course try to contact the person writing a review, and they might be willing to appear in court as a witness. That would make it a statement by a witness which would be taken seriously, and not just hearsay. Since lying in a court as a witness is a serious matter, someone posting a false review will very likely not be willing to appear in court for you. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | Yes to attempted murder and conspiracy to murder. No to murder Although the particular example you raise looks like entrapment and law enforcement can’t do that in the United States. Putting that aside, factual impossibility is not a defense in common law jurisdictions. Conspiracy to murder someone who can’t actually be murdered (because they are already dead or, as here, don’t actually exist) is still a crime. Legal impossibility, however, is a defense. Something is legally impossible where it is impossible to meet one of the elements that define the crime. Most crimes require that something physical be done, for example, murder requires the perpetrator to kill the victim (among other things), so you can't commit murder on a dead or non-existent victim. However, crimes in the nature of "Conspiracy to X" or "Attempted X" often only rely upon intention even if it is impossible to do the thing intended. To illustrate the difference: if it’s illegal to smuggle cocaine across the border and I, being an idiot, get caught smuggling what I think is cocaine but is actually table salt, I’m guilty of attempted drug smuggling. This is factual impossibility but a legal possibility. I'm not guilty of drug smuggling because that crime requires that I actually smuggle drugs. This is both a factual and legal impossibility. if, however, the day before I do it, the law against cocaine is repealed, then whether I smuggle table salt or actual cocaine, I’m not guilty of either crime even if I think it’s still a crime. This is legal impossibility. | The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.). | It's not clear what the big deal is. Congress has already passed vast numbers of laws for POTUS to enforce, and has left the details of implementation up to the executive branch. The main limitation is that you need a Congress to fund any new federal government projects. The Constitution anticipates this problem, and there are clauses regarding filling vacancies (clearly applicable to the dead). Assuming that zombies are rioting in the streets, POTUS can invoke the National Emergencies Act, issuing an executive order to call out the National Guard. | You may be interested in a recent New York Times article, "The Lonely Death of George Bell", which described in detail the case of a man who was found dead in his apartment (of natural causes). It took a long time for him to be positively identified, and no near relatives could be located. Affairs were handled by a city official called a "public administrator". Bell's valuable possessions were sold at public auction and the funds added to his estate. Items of no significant value were discarded (a junk removal business was hired to clean out his apartment; a few items were kept by the workers). They did eventually find his will, and at least some of his heirs, so his estate went to them. The public administrator had Bell cremated by a local crematorium, with the ashes stored permanently in their columbarium. The cost was paid out of Bell's estate. If he hadn't had any assets, or hadn't been positively identified, the article mentions that he would have been buried in a "potter's field" at the city's expense. |
Can one take BSD licensed code and distribute it under GPL? Prompted by https://opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/304/can-i-take-bsd-licensed-code-and-distribute-it-under-gpl. The OP asks: Can I take code which is licensed under a permissive open source license (like the BSD license) and distribute it under a copyleft free software license (like the GPL)? Specifically, quoting the following from Wikipedia: In addition, the permissive nature of the BSD license has allowed many other operating systems, both free and proprietary, to incorporate BSD code. For example, Microsoft Windows has used BSD-derived code in its implementation of TCP/IP and bundles recompiled versions of BSD's command-line networking tools since Windows 2000. Also Darwin, the system on which Apple's Mac OS X is built, is a derivative of 4.4BSD-Lite2 and FreeBSD. Various commercial Unix operating systems, such as Solaris, also contain varying amounts of BSD code. And OpenBSD Journal: KernelTrap has an interesting article in which Theo de Raadt discusses the legal implications of the recent relicensing of OpenBSD's BSD licensed Atheros driver under the GPL. De Raadt says, "it has been like pulling teeth since (most) Linux wireless guys and the SFLC do not wish to admit fault. I think that the Linux wireless guys should really think hard about this problem, how they look, and the legal risks they place upon the future of their source code bodies." He stressed that the theory that BSD code can simply be relicensed to the GPL without making significant changes to the code is false, adding, "'in their zeal to get the code under their own license, some of these Linux wireless developers have broken copyright law repeatedly. But to even get to the point where they broke copyright law, they had to bypass a whole series of ethical considerations too." Specifically at stake is the question of whether or not is it legal to take a file or files licensed under a BSD licence, affix a GPL header at the top of such files without making any other changes to the content, place the GPL licence in the root and mention it in README, and distribute the results. If such licence amendment to include GPL (in addition to the BSD licence) is not legal, then why Microsoft's and Apple's practice is. | Yes, you can. To be precise, I claim that one can take BSD-licensed code and distribute it under the combined terms of both the BSD and the GPL licences. We know that, if I receive someone else's code under a BSD licence, I may redistribute it to you under those same terms. This is common practice, and not (I hope) in any way contentious. We also know that I may not redistribute it to you without the conditions that the BSD licence imposes; that is, I may not place less onerous conditions on you than BSD requires (that is, requiring the inclusion of the original copyright notice, the disclaimer, this list of conditions, and a prohibition on claiming the original author's endorsement on any modified version). So the question becomes whether I can distribute that code whilst adding more onerous terms than the BSD licence itself imposes. It is clear that I can. As the question notes, Microsoft is known to have taken code which it received under a BSD licence and used it in proprietary products. These come with very onerous conditions on the the use, modification, and redistribution of the derived code (usually, they permit one instance of it to be run, and no modifications nor redistributions of any kind). For clarity: if I were to seek from Microsoft permission to modify and/or redistribute the derived code, and they were to grant it, they would not be able to free me from the BSD requirements as they applied to the derived code; I would still need to comply with those. But they are perfectly capable of applying new, onerous requirements of their own. The GPL imposes conditions on redistribution that are more onerous than BSD's, but less onerous than those of most proprietary licences. I am therefore perfectly entitled to receive code under a BSD licence, and - with or without making modifications of my own - redistribute it, adding in the GPL's requirements, if I choose to. If I haven't modified the code, those added requirements are probably pointless; if you don't wish to be bound by them, you will go and get the code from the original author, who presumably will happily distribute it to you under the BSD licence. But if I have modified the code, and you wish to use those modifications, then you will need to abide by the requirements of both the BSD and the GPL licences, since both will apply to this new, combined work (the original code + my changes). | Being or not being open source makes fairly little difference in trademark law. If a commercial firm (Yoyodyne, say) had used the name "Portable Network Graphics" and the abbreviation "PNG" in trade, and taken such further steps as would be needed to protect it in the relevant countries, that firm would have a protectable trademark. Note that in some countries, a trademark must be registered to have any protection at all (much of the EU follows this rule). In others, use in commerce can offer some protection even without registration (the US follows this rule). Had this happened (in an alternate reality) Yoyodyne could have sent a cease and desist letter when open source developers started using the mark. If the devs did not cease, Yoyodyne might have obtained an injunction, or damages for trademark infringement, or both. They could also have issued a takedown notie to the site hosting the project. But had Yoyodyne failed to defend the mark effectively and allowed it to become generic, Yoyodyne might have lost all rights to it. Also, had Yoyodyne ceased to use it in trade for a significant period, they might have lost rights. This is a place where the different laws in different countries might lead to different results. Note that "Portable Network Graphics" is rather descriptive, and not particularly distinctive. Descriptive marks, like "Tasty Pizza" generally get weaker protection, while more distinctive marks, such as "LuAnn's Tastee Pizza" are more strongly protected, in general. Again this depends on the country, and the specific facts. In general the first to use, or to register a mark, gets the rights. When one entity is the first to use, but a different one is first to register, things can get confusing, and results will be different in different countries. Note that a Cease and Desist letter is not a legal requirement. It is a threat of possible future legal action, and often an offer to avoid such action if the recipient does as the sender requests. The recipient can comply with the letter, wait for court action, or try to make some sort of compromise deal. Open source projects, as other answers suggest, often choose to comply. | The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case. | You can't patent an algorithm, but I'll assume you are talking about the case where you have patented a machine or process that uses an algorithm, but that adds significantly more, and that the software being distributed implements much of this process. Courts might find an implied licence or promissory estoppel when distributing software under an open source licence that doesn't explicitly exclude patent licencing as part of its terms. It would be prudent to state your patent rights and explicitly exclude a patent licence if you intend to enforce your patent rights. As an example, this software implicates a patent , so they allow "permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation for educational, research, and non-commercial" purposes. Users that want to use the software commercially need to contact the authors who also happen to be the patent owners, and I assume would negotiate a patent licence at that point. | If it is open source code, then usually the requirement is that you produce the source code for the software that you release. Exactly for the software that you release. For example if you took open source software X, and added feature Y, and distributed the combined software outside your company, anyone can request the source code for X including Y. Handing them the source code for X only wouldn't meet the open source requirements. Now all this is not illegal, but it means the copyright holder of X could sue you for copyright infringement. They will do that if they have enough reasons to do so. So let's say you are continuously developing your software and occasional hand out your compiled software. Say you built versions 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 of the software, you gave versions 100 and 103 to customers, and anyone asking for the source code is given the source code for the latest, slightly improved version 104. The copyright holder of X might sue you but: 1. They wouldn't know you are doing this. 2. A judge might side with you and decide that newer, improved source code is good enough (I don't know this, but it seems not unreasonable). 3. The copyright holder might decide that they don't want to sue you for this because you are close enough to meeting the requirements. | Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.' | Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts. | To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code. |
Why is place of birth shown on European driving licences? Driving licences issued by the EEA-countries display the place of birth of the license holder. Why is this information so important that it needs to be on the driving license? I've tried to research this topic but all answers boil down to the fact that the directive (Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences) requires it. No answers are given to why the directive requires place of birth to be displayed on the license. | Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license." | england-and-wales NO Unlike some other jurisdictions, there is no requirement for an officer to have "probable cause1" or suspect an offence as the police can stop a vehicle for any reason under section 163 Road Traffic Act 1988: (1) A person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road must stop the vehicle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer. (2) A person riding a cycle on a road must stop the cycle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer. (3) If a person fails to comply with this section he is guilty of an offence. There is no associated power to search the vehicle or its occupants but under section 164 and section 165 the driver must produce inter alia their licence, name, date of birth, address, insurance details and other relevant documents as the case may be. Note that although vehicle stops can be random, police officers are subject to the public sector equality duty under section 149 Equality Act 2010 and not permitted to stop a vehicle solely based on the occupants' protected characteristics. 1The term "probable cause" is not used in the UK, but roughly equates to somewhere around reasonable suspicion / reasonable belief | Question 1. Are technical identifiers personal data? Yes. If they identify a person. For example an IP Address is considered personal data, because a person or household can be identified by an IP. Yes, I know that technically there are a lot of exceptions. But in general, if you have an IP, you can identify the subscriber given the right databases. So if your identifier, lets say a generated GUID, identifies a customer or something the customer can be linked to, it is personal data. Question 2. Can technical identifiers be stored in measurement devices? Just because something is personal data, does not mean you are forbidden from using it. As long as you need it to do your job, you can store it. The internet would not work, if everybody was forbidden from storing any IP address. So to summarize it: yes, it is personal data since it identifies a subscriber. However, it is needed for the job your subscriber asked you to do. So for as long as the job takes, it is legal to store it. Once your job is done, you would be required to delete it. But consent trumps everything. If your subscriber consents to you keeping all data of such incidents to improve your network and handle future incidents better, then it's legal. Just let them sign it with your other legal paperwork. Done. No problem. You could just periodically delete all records that have no consent for long term storage beyond the current incident. Lets say every 24h or 48h. You should get the details on the wording of the paperwork and the period that it is legal to keep the data as "current incedent related" from your data protection officer or legal department. | No, in germany there is no universal requirement as to form (Formfreiheit). This includes associating a signature with a name in block letters. In principle you can enforce a contract in court even if the written contract does not identify the contracting parties by spelled out name, but by signature only. It stands to reason there is no benefit in omitting the full names. The legislature implemented elevated form requirements for certain legal transactions by mandating the use of a notary. Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature. The link between signature and person is established via the notary’s documentation. You could put an alias “Donald Duck” next to your signature, the notarial deed will indicate that in fact Kalle Richter signed the document. As far as I am aware all european-union legal transactions will need to go through their official channels. It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper. Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation. One thing is for sure, the european-union does not impose a “minimum framework” on its member states. I recollect there are some directives regarding electronic signatures, but that is a different story now. | GDPR killing genealogy websites? I could see GDPR totally killing genealogy websites if they follow the rules strictly, but would they really want to do that. Seems to me genealogy has an important historical role. Treat living persons with anonymization I assume you don't have data to identify a person or contact the living person. How would you contact to get consent to show personal information if you only have a name, impossible right? GDPR tries to stop abuse of personal data, yes, and your family tree certainly is personal data. However those who come to your website would mostly want to search and edit the non-living, search back in the history, thus the current generation follows the family tree and are not the point of entry. You can provide certain anonymization to those alive by not displaying the first names in full, maybe just the first letter. You may want to hide address, spouse, children for current generation. You could make those available for view/edit first by going through a secondary login, "not a robot". Further you may remove living people from search results and hide from search engines so they do not have ability to index the current generation. That would make it harder to abuse if you're going after an individual, but at the same time doesn't lock out the people providing information. | Are licenses not required to explicitly state Nah, not at all. Licenses state whatever they want. There is no authority to compel license writers to include any particular statements. In case a license you wanna use does not make sense, you either seek clarification or do not use it. | I couldn't find any decisions on CanLII where someone was punished for a fictitious or out-of-province front plate in Alberta, however the Traffic Safety Act states the following: 1(1)(s) “licence plate” means a licence plate that is issued under this Act and includes an object that is recognized under this Act as a licence plate; (9) For the purposes of sections 1(1)(rr) and 11.1 and Part 8, licence plate includes a licence plate issued in another jurisdiction. 53(1) Except as otherwise permitted under this Act, a person shall not do any of the following: (b) display on a motor vehicle or trailer a licence plate other than a licence plate issued or authorized for use on that vehicle; (c) operate or park a motor vehicle or trailer on a highway with an expired licence plate displayed on it; (Part 8) 168(1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe (a) that a vehicle is displaying licence plates that (i) were not issued for that vehicle . . . the peace officer may seize and take possession of the licence plates displayed on that vehicle. 169(1) A peace officer may arrest a person without warrant if the peace officer, on reasonable grounds, believes . . . (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the following are the provisions for which a person may be arrested without a warrant: (c) section 53(1)(b) relating to the displaying of a licence plate other than one authorized under this Act; While the connection of the extended definition in s.9 to s.53(1) is a little vague, the connection to Part 8 is not, and therefore I can confidently say that the Act clearly states it is a violation to use out-of-province plates on the front of a vehicle. The plates can be seized and you may be arrested. It may further be a violation of the BC Motor Vehicle Act if/when you travel there. | It depends on the issuing country. The primary purpose of a passport is to enable the holder to travel internationally, not to prove citizenship. Most countries only issue passports to their citizens, which has made such passports widely recognised as proof of citizenship — both inside and outside of the issuing country. But at the end of the day it is up to the country to decide whether to follow this established pattern or not. For example, Estonia does not. And, of course, it is up to the country to decide which documents prove citizenship of their own citizens inside. Say in Russia a Russian passport for international travel is not a valid document for identification/proving citizenship. So-called "internal passport", similar to that of German citizenship card, serves for this role. |
How to not infringe copyrights from Nintendo? I am thinking about developing a free Pokedex App with pokémon information (pokémon data and images) for Android, but I do not want to infringe any copyright or use trademarks because I want no trouble. Using pokémon sprites and data from a free wiki, for example bulbapedia would be OK? If not, what advices could you guys give for me to avoid infringing any copyright or trademarks from Nintendo? | You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright. | As far as copyright goes... Pixabay: Yes (with minor exceptions) Pixabay's license is quite broad, and allows for unattributed commercial use with a small number of exceptions. You can't "use images with identifiable brands to create a misleading association with a product or service" or "portray identifiable people in a bad light or in a way that is offensive," but otherwise it would allow for use in a video (there are other exceptions, but they wouldn't really apply to such use). Flickr: It depends on the license By default, images are not licensed for additional use other than viewing on Flickr. However, users are free to license their images as they wish, and Flickr explicitly supports various Creative Commons Licenses, many (but not all—particularly the NC licenses) of which would support such commercial use. Depending on the license, additional requirements, such as providing attribution, may apply. Note that there are non-copyright concerns that might come up in specific situations, such as trademarks (I mentioned one potential issue in my explanation of the Pixabay license) or model releases. Another answer to this question has some good information on these concerns. | I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must. | Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters. | AD&D, like all games, is covered under copyright. HOWEVER, games are not treated the same as books and other works. Rules of a game, including "stats" and other information required to play the game, are NOT protected by copyright. This is Copyright Law, and has nothing to do with a license which a work is published under. Artwork is fully protected by copyright, as is any setting descriptions. In the context of the D&D franchise, the actual wording of any rulebooks, monster descriptions, game modules, and such are all protected by copyright, so you can't wholesale cut-and-paste things. But, that does not extend to the various mechanics of the game. Armor Class, Hit Dice, etc. are all mechanics, and CANNOT be protected. That includes values assigned to monsters or characters or such. A company cannot also protect the particular layout of those statistics, if that layout is considered generic in nature. In the case we are talking about, a table listing the statistics is NOT protected, as it does nothing more than list those statistics, and contains no original, protected material of WotC. In addition, uniquely created monsters, characters, etc. all have their name protected, but not their statistics. But generic names thereof cannot be protected. It is perfectly permissible to have a clone copy of a Drow and call them a Dark Elf (a generic name). One could not copy the description of the Drow from a Monster Manual, but the idea of a Dark Elf cannot be protected, nor can the statistics thereof. It is explicitly permissible by Copyright Law to clone the rules to a game, which in the context of D&D includes a generic name for anything trademarked (thus, no Drow, and no Dungeon Master, but Dark Elf and Game Master), the mechanisms used to play the game -- including the terms used to reference them -- and all related numerical statistics associated with those components of the game. All of this is in addition to any rights the OGL gives you. These rights CANNOT be restricted by the OGL, as they are basic Copyright Law rights, not license rights. I've been writing D&D expansions and such for over 4 decades now (since the late 1980s), and this is what I've repeatedly been told by various Copyright lawyers. In short, provided you don't use the text description of a particular monster (and instead write your own one, using the same concept of what the monster is), and you don't use a trademarked name for it, it is possible to "scrape copy" the statistic summary section of any Monster Manual or the like. Here's an explicit parallel: the game of Monopoly. When creating a clone of Monopoly, here's what you CAN do: Copy the basic layout of the board - a square with the properties laid out in a path around the edge. Arrange the properties as they currently are, WITH THE CURRENT NAMES on them. Each property's name is not possible to protect, as they are generic names. Free Parking, Jail, and Go To Jail, and Go can all be labeled and placed accordingly. Chance and Community Chest cards can be named as such, and referred to as such. The text on the cards is also (mostly) usable. The costs and values of all Chance, Community Chest, and properties can be copied. The rules of movement, going to jail, etc. can all be copied. Have pieces that are Hats, Dogs, Cars, etc, and both Hotels and Houses, and explicitly refer to them by those names. Here's what you CANNOT do: Use the particular color scheme of the board Use any artwork, including the drawings on any cards. Use the particular graphic presentation of a card. Copy the design of any piece, except the House/Hotel which, insofar as they are very generic, can be extremely similar. You can only use the word "Monopoly" in the context of referring to the Parker Brothers game, not in any other context, as it is trademarked. The specific wording of the rulebook cannot be duplicated. You have to write the rules in your own words. The wording of certain Community Chest and Chance cards, where they are not just generic game instructions, cannot be duplicated. E.g. "Grand Opera Night—Collect $50 from every player for opening night seats" cannot be duplicated, but you can have any other wording for something that would gain you $50 per player. Now, see how that works in comparison to D&D? | Legal unless you violate copyright. Screenshots will probably be fair use. The manuals/how-tos need to be your originals, not copies from anywhere. | Under US law your proposed use would be considered copyright infringement of the film/TV copyrights unless it is considered "fair use." The evaluation for "fair use" defense can only be done by a Federal Court judge as part of a lawsuit. The judge will evaluate the fair use defense using a four part test that evaluates: (1) the purpose and character of your use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market. This is a very fact specific inquiry, so it isn't amenable to easy yes or no answers. However, based on your description your use wouldn't be very transformative under step (1) since you are using frames from the movie unchanged, and you are using it for commercial purposes as opposed to criticism/commentary/education. Nor does step (2) seem to favor you since the anime films are not heavily based in facts that you would be reusing/publishing. Step (3) would likely favor you since the amount of material taken is very small (1 second) compared to the work as a whole. Likewise, step (4) would also likely favor you since your use is unlikely to impact the commercial market for the original film/tv show. If you intend to rely on the "fair use" defense, then you should definitely hire an attorney who can give you an individualized opinion rather than the generalities I've provided here. As to other GIF users in the App Store, they may (1) have licensed the underlying content, (2) be blatantly infringing the copyrights for the content and hoping not to get caught, (3) relying on fair use (see above), and/or (4) claim DMCA safe harbor as a message board so long as user are the ones uploading the GIF content. | Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them. |
Are Windows activation tools illegal? There are several of such tools that activate Windows without buying a license. Such tools works by emulating a KMS (key management service) server that is used to activate Windows in enterprise envroinments. Are these tools illegal? | If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program. | There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained. | This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals. | There are a few ways that this could be illegal, but barring those, there is nothing per se illegal in doing what you describe. It could be a TOS/contact/licence violation to sniff the traffic: Use third-party software that intercepts, collects, reads, or "mines" information generated or stored by the Battle.net Client or the Game(s) The protocol could be protected by patent. (U.S. Patent 5,883,893) The use of the reverse engineered protocol could be illegal (fraudulently connecting to a company's server while posing as an authorized client). | No It means you can use it in accordance with the terms of the MIT license. | It doesn't work like that! If the code is not properly licensed, you can not acquire a license for it. If you don't have a license, you can not use it. Usage without a license is copyright infringement and not allowed: the copyright is with the author, and only the author may make derivates or copies or allow them to be made by licensing it. You do not gain copyright by fixing a licensing error - in fact, you commit copyright infringement if you do not have a license, and providing wrong copyright management information is illegal under 17 USC 1202 | Yes you can. What you do is called mere aggregation. Your app and the GPL container run isolated and do not share memory space: they are clearly separate programs vs parts of one program, so your app does not get infected by GPL. | You don't own those games You have a licence to use them in accordance with the terms you agreed The Content and Services are licensed, not sold. Your license confers no title or ownership in the Content and Services. One of those terms (2G) includes: but you are not entitled to: ... (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; So, did you get Valve's prior written consent? |
What is the standard of proof for violations of the amateur radio regulations? What is the standard of proof for violations of 47 CFR 97, the amateur (ham) radio regulations? Is it preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt? | The FCC addresses this. As a general matter, the standard of proof is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. See, e.g., Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Michigan, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20568-69, paras. 45-46, n.87 (1997); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The traditional standard required in a civil or administrative proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the evidence [and t]he traditional preponderance standard must be applied unless the type of case and the sanctions or hardship imposed require a higher standard.”) Reasonable doubt is the standard for criminal prosecutions, which are not included in 47 CFR Part 97. | It is like an affidavit of sort, sworn out without the jurat and not before a notary. The swearing out of a complaint or rebutting evidence in all Federal civil matters (some states allow for the same) must contain an affidavit or an "unsworn declaration" that swears out the facts to be true and accurate, even though not notarized, and is based on fact and not supposition. It is subject to the same penalties of perjury if one lies as if you swear on a bible and testify in court or on a "sworn" affidavit. Affidavits need not be sworn before God, or on a bible. You have a right to just "affirm" that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth....and not "so help me God". Many courts don't use a bible at all anymore. 28 U.S.C. 1746 relates to these "Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty Of Perjury" It is not b/c you don't believe in God that you'd use this...you always have the option of swearing out even a declared affidavit or testifying without swearing on a bible if you're an atheist. They just leave out the "before God" part. Affidavits are the norm, however, in Federal Courts that have an expedited docket this is typically used when it could take a while to get a notary and the evidence is due. (In some states lawyers are automatically notaries but in others they aren't). The ability to swear out a complaint or contest a deposition without having to wait on a notary can be the difference between making your deadline or not. It's commonly used when records custodians are called to certify the authenticity of documents produced pursuant to subpoena or other formal request. Under F.R.Civ.P 56 declarations usually are not within the type of evidentiary categories that can be used at the summary judgment phase. If it's a small misstatement you would probably be faced with a fine. If it's a total lie, outright, you'd be looking at jail time (say a records custodian removed evidence and swore out it was the complete business record in a fraud case). 18 U.S. Code § 1621 discusses perjury generally (in federal actions). | I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire! | united-states Messaging (and other online communication) are fixed media. A face-to-face conversation, or a telephone call, does not exist at all - except in the mental recollections of the participants. And those are always very problematic as evidence, because people's recall is inaccurate. Whereas communication in a fixed medium is durable: a newspaper, a sound recording, security camera footage. It stands on its own and can be examined by experts. What catches a lot of people off guard about the Internet is they are mostly fixed media. Prior to the Internet, investigation of harassment almost entirely depended on anecdotal evidence. It was difficult to prosecute cases which were entirely based on the victim's word. The closest any of this came to objective evidence was a polygraph, and that wasn't reliable. Of course we want bona-fide victims protected, but what keeps a malicious actor from putting someone else in jail with words alone? Now with the Internet, much of the evidence is rendered in fixed media. This is a "breath of fresh air" for such prosecutions! However, just like any other physical evidence, it must be brought into evidence by the testimony of persons, and that testimony gets to be cross-examined. And this is where your concerns about provenance get addressed. A party will assert that the messages are forged, and that will be examined. The validity of evidence is itself on trial. There are two evaluations: first whether the evidence is even valid enough to present to a jury, and evidence that makes the cut is then examined and cross-examined in front of the jury. Keep in mind that contrary to TV drama, there's no "surprise evidence". Almost any evidence - and certainly ALL evidence in a fixed medium - must be shared with the other party long before trial. Pre-trial, it will be challenged, the phone/device subpoenaed and turned over to experts for analysis. If it is evident that the party "has conveniently deleted or lost" the material, the evidence will be thrown out. And if the party is proven to have falsified the data, they're in much worse shape. A lot of chat services keep chat logs on the server/cloud, in the clear. Getting those is as easy as subpoenaing them, and that will be a canonical answer because the ISP would have no reason to lie. For a service where chat logs are kept in the clear only by individuals who choose to keep them, then "reading those logs into evidence" will involve a cross-examination of the parties involved as to their honesty and motivations. I don't know what and how WhatsApp stores when they log chats, so I don't know if there's any cryptographic information there that could be authenticated. But certainly if "he" presents one chat log, and "she" presents a different chat log, then we're clear around to "he said, she said". But all of it together can be examined. For instance, linguists can look at other chats, discern the writing styles of each party, and then look at the disputed lines and examine who is more likely to have written those. And they give testimony on that. So it is evidence, but it gets two rounds of possible challenge: First as to whether the evidence is reliable enough to even present to the jury, and then experts testifying in front of the jury their opinion of its reliability. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.) | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 |
What are "equity" and "equitable remedies"? What is equity and/or an equitable remedy? How does it relate to the common law? | In legal systems descending from English law, the term equity refers to an aspect of those legal systems that has origins distinct from positive law and the traditional common-law writs. Equity traces its origin to the Court of Chancery. Much of what follows can be found in Snell's Equity. Equitable remedies (equitable relief) are those remedies available through rules and principles of equity, today applied by courts of unified jurisdiction. Some distinctions Equity as part of law: equity is certainly part of law in the sense that it is part of the legal system, applied by courts, and can result in equitable remedies. "Equity in this sense has been a feature of many legal systems from ancient times" (Snell's Equity, §1-002). Equity versus law: equity is distinct from "law" (or common law) in the sense that equitable remedies are meant to supplement "legal rights." The common law and equity operated in their own areas of specialisation. Even in cases where common law and equitable rules touched on the same subject matter, the rationale of equitable intervention was not to conflict with the common law. The Chancellor's jurisdiction over the parties was in personam and enforceable by specific remedies, unlike those of the common law which were generally for the orders for the payment of money. (Snell's Equity, §1-012). Legal and equitable remedies: "The division between legal and equitable remedies is an accident of history which cannot be explained in any other terms. No defining characteristic sets the remedies developed in Chancery, as a class, apart from the remedies developed by the common law courts." (Snell's Equity, § 14-001) History and the present A well-accepted unifying feature of "equity" and "equitable remedies" is their origin in the Court of Chancery of specialist equitable jurisdiction (Snell's Equity, §1-003). Even though today, this distinction in jurisdiction has been abolished by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, equity still means that body of law with its origins in Chancery. While equitable rules and principles have certainly continued to evolve, they all trace their pedigree to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (Snell's Equity, § 1-004). Equitable doctrines have retained their distinctiveness as "secondary" to legal rights. They impose an overlay: that "primary legal rights should be exercised consistenly with good conscience" (Snell's Equity, § 1-033). This view from Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 SCR 534 highlights the messiness and debate about the confluence and remaining distinctiveness of equity and law: I am aware that reservations have been expressed in some quarters about this fusion or, perhaps more accurately, mingling of law and equity... But no case was brought to our attention where it has led to confusion, and there are many cases, some of which I have discussed, where it has made possible a just and reasonable result. It simply provides a general, but flexible, approach that allows for direct application of the experience and best features of both law and equity, whether the mode of redress (the cause of action or remedy) originates in one system or the other. There might be room for concern if one were indiscriminately attempting to meld the whole of the two systems. Equitable concepts like trusts, equitable estates and consequent equitable remedies must continue to exist apart, if not in isolation, from common law rules. But when one moves to fiduciary relationships and the law regarding misstatements, we have a situation where now the courts of common law, now the courts of equity moved forward to provide remedies where a person failed to meet the trust or confidence reposed in that person. There was throughout considerable overlap. In time the common law outstripped equity and the remedy of compensation became somewhat atrophied. Under these circumstances, why should it not borrow from the experience of the common law? Whether the courts refine the equitable tools such as the remedy of compensation, or follow the common law on its own terms, seems not particularly important where the same policy objective is sought. Equity prevails Even though equity has developed as supplemental and secondary to the common law, "in a conflict between the two, equity would prevail" (Snell's Equity, §1-010). For example, where a contract would be enforceable by its terms at common law, an equitable remedy developed called recission that allows for the "extinction of a contract and the resotration of the parties to their original positions" (Snell's Equity, § 15-001). This has been codified in some jurisdictions. See British Columbia's Law and Equity Act, s. 44: If rules of equity and law conflict, equity prevails 44 Generally in all matters not particularly mentioned in this Act in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity prevail. Where this distinction can matter This distinction can still matter. As just one example: "Different rules of following and tracing have evolved at common law and in equity" (Snell's Equity, § 30-052). See Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank Canada, [1997] 3 SCR 805 at para. 58: In my view, a distinction should be made between the imposition of liability in “knowing receipt” cases and the availability of tracing orders at common law and in equity. Liability at common law is strict, flowing from the fact of receipt. Liability in “knowing receipt” cases is not strict; it depends not only on the fact of enrichment (i.e. receipt of trust property) but also on the unjust nature of that enrichment (i.e. the stranger’s knowledge of the breach of trust). A tracing order at common law, unlike a restitutionary remedy, is only available in respect of funds which have not lost their identity by becoming part of a mixed fund. Further, the imposition of liability as a constructive trustee is wider than a tracing order in equity. The former is not limited to the defence of purchaser without notice and “does not depend upon the recipient still having the property or its traceable proceeds”; see In re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts, supra, at p. 276. If a remedy is understood to be a legal right, then the innocent/wronged party is owed that right once the wrong is recognized by a court. However, if the remedy is understood to be equitable, no one ever has a claim as of right to the remedy, and it will always be subject to the discretion of the court to grant the remedy even if accepting the wrong underlying the claim. Some equitable remedies Wikipedia gives one list of equitable relief consistent with much of what is in Snell's Equity. Here I'll only list some of those that you'll most likely recognize: injunctions (Snell's Equity, § 18) specific performance (Snell's Equity, § 17) rescission (Snell's Equity, § 15) rectification (Snell's Equity, § 16) tracing (Snell's Equity, § 30-051) equitable estoppel (as a family of related doctrines), as distinct from common law estoppel (Snell's Equity, § 12) Maxims of equity Wikipedia also lists various maxims of equity also consistent with much of what is in Snell's Equity, § 5). I'll only highlight a few that are still widely relevant and known: "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands" "Equity aids the vigilant and not the idolent" (the principle behind laches) "Equity looks on as done that which ought to be done" (the principle behind equitable assignment) | You have read it: legally It doesn’t matter if you haven’t read it in fact. At law, you have. Therefore you cannot avoid obligations or consequences by saying “ I didn’t read it”. It’s an extension of the common law principle that if you affix your ‘mark’ to a document you were acknowledging that you understood it and would abide by it: even if your mark was an X because you were illiterate. There are protections. At common law an unconscionable term is unenforceable and may void the contract entirely. Additionally, many jurisdictions have passed legislation to make unfair contract terms unenforceable, particularly in contracts of adhesion. Further, consumer protection laws often have non-excludable warranties that operate in spite of the contract. | Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable. | Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side. | Actions in common law tort exist for both scenarios. Potential torts are negligence, trespass to chattel, and/or conversion. Putting the largely apparent tort of negligence aside, since that is nearly always available when something and/or someone is damaged by another (requiring only the [negligent] act, causation and damages) I'll focus on the other tort potentially applicable to scenario 1. The minority rule concerning trespass to chattel can be established even when the interference is negligent, whereas the majority rule requires intent to deprive. Interestingly, when the Restatement 2d of Torts talks about minority rule vs. majority rule, it really means "least often applied" vs. "most often applied", rather than merely "in some (fewer or greater) defined jurisdiction(s)". With these type of uncommonly pled torts, you could find a huge jurisdiction like California having lower courts (especially small claims or district courts) applying both the minority rule in some courts and the majority rule in others. This, all within one judicial jurisdiction if that state's law court has not weighed in on their interpretation of preference. The Restatement 2d (Second) of Torts § 217 and §218 define liability in trespass to chattel as "intentionally (negligently - minority rule ): (a) dispossess(ing) the other of the chattel, or; (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or; (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or; (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest. Trespass to chattel can consist of mere "intermeddling with or the limited use of the possession" and no damage need occur to the property, as damage is per se; however in your scenario, actual liability would occur in the destruction of the possession. The 2nd scenario would lie in the more serious tort of conversion. The tort of conversion will always requires intent to deprive the owner of his property, and the majority view is that the deprivation is intended to be total or forever (whether by continued deprivation or by destruction). There are 3 elements required to establish conversion: plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the alleged conversion; defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff's property rights; damage(s). While anticipating the follow-up question to either scenario, being "what about the fact that you didn't take the ball, but rather it ended up on your land, and shouldn't that count for something"...the answer (to the unasked question :~) is no. The act of taking possession over property to satisfy the necessary prong in both torts may take any number of forms, but need not be wrongful to begin with. All that is required to establish possessory control over the chattel in a tortious manner is merely interfering with the plaintiff's right of possession, which is a wrongful deprivation of something the owner was entitled to possess (so in other words, even if you didn't go and take it, once you know it's there, it's not yours, and you seek to keep it, either temporarily, permanently – the act of wrongful possession has occurred. The way the property was acquired is not at issue. Conversion and Trespass in Chattel are often spoken of interchangeably despite the fact that they are different. The difference between a cause of action for conversion and one for trespass against chattel is measured only by the degree of interference with the plaintiff's rights in their chattel. While the distinction seems subtle in a vacuum, in the old English cases where these torts were typically decided, conversion was one small step from criminal activity, whereas today conversion may be the civil adjunct to a criminal suit. *for those not familiar: chattel is any possession that is not real estate. | How can he compel the seller to cancel the new auction and sell him the item as they contracted to do? Expectation damages are the typical remedy for breach of contract The general measure of damages for breach of contract is expectation damages: "the plaintiff will be entitled to the value of the promised performance" (Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co., 2002 SCC 43 at paragraph 26); "the purpose of expectation damages is to put the plaintiff in the same position it would have been if the contract had been performed (Grandeur Homes Inc. v. Zeng, 2021 ONSC 4005 at paragraph 19). This is a general principle of common-law contract law rooted in English jurisprudence. See Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850, p. 855: The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. This was recently confirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court in Morris-Garner v. One Step (Support) Ltd., [2018] UKSC 20: Damage for breach of contract are ... a substitute for performance. That is why they are generally regarded as an adequate remedy. The courts will not prevent self-interested breaches of contract where the interests of the innocent party can be adequately protected by an award of damages. Specific performance is not usual Specific performance (cancelling the new auction and forcing the first sale) is an exceptional remedy for breach of contract. Specific performance is an equitable remedy. As an equitable remedy, it is always discretionary; the wronged party does not have a right to specific performance. Specific performance may be ordered when: expectation damages are inadequate as a remedy where the contract was for a sale of a particular piece of land (but even this has been limited in some jurisdictions to circumstances where the property is particularly unique) difficulty in quantifying damages Specific performance is typically not ordered when a substitute is available by which expectation damages would be demonstrated. See generally Chitty on Contracts, §30-015–30-025. | Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A. | would it be interpreted in favor of the person who did not draft the terms? Yes, provided that the interpretation is reasonable. That is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here, the term "deliverables and associated documents" might entail a contradiction if that term [allegedly or literally] encompasses "source code or content". That depends on what definition(s) of "deliverables and associated documents" can be adduced from the contract. The term could refer to items that are not "source code or content", such as the binary files (i.e., executables and DLLs), instructions & documentation on how to operate and troubleshoot the application, and so forth. In that case, there would be no contradiction because there is no overlap between these items and the source code. if term A) is written on line 10 and term B) is written on line 11, is it resonable to assume term B) takes precedence or modifies term A? No. The sequence of clauses/terms itself does not determine which one outweighs or qualifies the other. Instead, the language used in the contract is indicative of the parties' intent and therefore how the terms of that contract relate to each other. |
What is the duty of a medical office to properly bill one's insurance? (USA) In the US, it is typical for patients to sign contracts with a medical office assigning whatever benefits are applicable from their health insurance to the doctor's office and leaving the patient financially responsible for what is left unpaid. Is there a minimum standard for doctor's offices to actually complete the insurance process before passing on the rest of the bill, and if so, what kind of remedy is available if they don't? Example: A doctor's office sends to the insurance company details of a procedure to be paid, but left off one fact that the insurance company needed to complete the claim. The insurance company informs the doctor's office that in order to finish the claim, they have to complete the missing bit of paperwork. Instead of doing so, the doctor's office leaves benefits the client is entitled to unclaimed and proceeds to bill the patient for the unpaid amount. Is this a valid bill under that standard kind of contract? Is there some kind of minimum due diligence required on the doctor's part, and if so, is there some area of tort law that is available for redress? | To my knowledge there is no actual law requiring a provider to file anything on your behalf. Most do it as a courtesy but if you read the terms of service that you almost certainly agreed to, it will say that YOU are the responsible party. If the insurance company doesn't pay, even if the provider doesn't submit a claim, the responsibility is still yours. There is nothing stopping you from filing your own claim using whatever forms or procedures that they have established. I'll also note that many provider networks have rules that providers must adhere to in order to remain in that network. Some may include language about timely filing of claims but that is in no way universal. These days many providers have taken to billing the patient the full amount immediately and then will issue a refund to you if/when the insurance pays. | There aren't any specific laws or regulations about medical charges. Instead, this is a matter of general contract law, where you have to agree. You have to consent to be treated, and a signature is taken to be evidence of consent. The law does not say that they have to ask permission for absolutely everything they do, the action just as to be in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community as that of the person treating, examining, or operating on the patient for whom the consent is obtained This law insulates doctors from getting sued. In a situation where treatment is provided against a patient's instructions, you may have a cause of action for e.g. battery. In general, a doctor can't poke you, draw blood, make "offensive contact" etc. without consent, and consenting to one procedure does not "open the floodgates" of consent for any othre procedure. Of course, if the procedure was not performed, you obviously are not liable for the cost (and they are not liable for a non-occurring battery). This may in fact constitute gross negligence. During trial, the primary issue is likely to be whether there is proof that the procedure was expressly rejected. The doctor would probably provide the consent form, and that form may or may not indicate that the test would be conducted. It would not be surprising if the patient never saw an actual form and instead just electro-signed, having been told that this is authorization to treat. Corroborating witnesses would be helpful. From a practical perspective, especially if the billing department is being recalcitrant, this is probably a matter best handled by an attorney who would start with a formal letter summarizing the consequences of unauthorized medical treatment. | Dead people have to pay their debts just like everybody else It is one of the primary roles of the executor to make sure this happens. Dead people can dispute a debt just like everybody else Just because someone says you owe them money, that doesn't mean you owe them money. In fact, the onus of proving the debt lies with the person claiming the money. It is perfectly reasonable for an executor to ask the creditor to do so. Some questions that are appropriate to ask: Presumably, the entitlement arises under a contract; when was the contract entered into? What were its terms? Where is the evidence the deceased agreed to these terms? Do the terms comply with (consumer) law? Have the prices been calculated in accordance with the terms? Have previous invoices been submitted and paid on the same basis? All the issues you mentioned. These are all things the creditor would need to prove if they went to court. If they can provide satisfactory answers to these then pay the bill. If they can't then try to agree to a settlement amount acceptable to both parties. If you can't do that, let them sue the estate and let a judge decide. The debts of the deceased person are payable by the estate of the deceased person for which the executor is the trustee. The executor has a duty to the beneficiaries of the estate to act in their best interest. This means paying bills that they are satisfied are justified, contesting those that aren't but ultimately, making commercial decisions that benefit the beneficiaries. Getting bogged down in a court case may not be in their best interest especially if it delays finalisation of the estate. In any event, the executor is not liable personally for the debt, or for anything they do or fail to do if done or not done in good faith. | Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment). | Employers with 20 or more full-time-equivalent employees are usually mandated to offer COBRA coverage. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/insurance/11/intro-cobra-health-insurance.asp He is not required by law to offer it to you, but is probably trying to work with you. After employment, the individual is required to pay the entire premium, and at times it may be topped up with an extra 2% toward administrative charges. They can charge you administrative fees on top of what you would have paid. Being that he does not have to offer it to you by law, he can do what he wants. | The contract remains valid. Most contracts don't need to be written at all. Even if yours did need to be written under the Statute of Frauds or some other law, you're saying that it was made in writing, even though you later tore it up. The fact that the contract is missing or destroyed doesn't change the fact that it exists and obligates the parties; it just makes it harder to prove what it said. | It is legal for a doctor to charge for each procedure that they perform, so if it is necessary to remove more teeth, the doctor can charge for that additional removal. A patient may not fully understand what the scope of their contract with the dentist is, thus one might think that they have paid $18K for a "complete solution", irrespective of what has to be done. More likely, the contract is for specific work, and if more work needs to be done, more money has to be paid. When a doctor (mechanic, contractor, lawyer...) gives you a ballpark figure for likely costs given their understanding of the work probably required – based on current knowledge – you should understand that as an estimate, which may be inaccurate given new discoveries. Of course, if a person knowingly and deliberately misrepresents the scope of work required, in order to persuade the customer to sign on with their service, that is probably legally actionable. If you can prove that the doctor actually knew that the scope of work was greater than what he claimed, you could have a legal case. Otherwise, you have the option of taking your business elsewhere, or paying the additional charges. | A Lawyer may hire paralegals, clerks, secretaries, and other assistants. The lawyer may hire as many as s/he pleases, and assign them whatever tasks s/he chooses. However, some kinds of documents may need to be signed by the lawyer (which ones will depend on the jurisdiction, in the US on the state). During the so-called "robo-signing scandal" it was held that, in some US states at least, a lawyer who signs certain kinds of documents without reviewing them has failed to perform the duties imposed on the lawyer by the law, and the documents may be invalid. Large numbers of mortgage foreclosure cases were dismissed when it became known that the lawyer signing relevant documents had not in fact reviewed them (or in some cases had not even signed them, but had permitted a non-lawyer to sign the lawyer's name). In addition, some functions in some jurisdictions must be performed by an actual lawyer. For example, paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot validly give legal advice. Only a lawyer can represent a client in court. And so on. I question whether one lawyer could in most kinds of practice keep up with the work of "hundreds" of non-lawyers, but that would depend on the kind of work done by the firm. In the US, some law firms are essentially collection agencies. There a single lawyer with many many assistants suffices, I understand, and that structure is not uncommon in the US. |
Can a company director simply appoint another company director? I found the following article in my company constitution: The directors of the company may appoint a person as a director of the company. The company must confirm such an appointment by resolution passed at a general meeting within 2 months after the appointment is made. If the company does not confirm the appointment, the person ceases to be a director of the company upon the expiration of 2 months after the appointment was made. Does this mean any director can appoint another director and that director can serve for 2 months without approval? Won't this provide avenue for a board coup? Meaning a director can simply elect directors to support him and make changes to the company constitution. | What you quoted does not say "a" director can appoint a director. It says "the directors", plural, can appoint a director. I assume that would be by a vote. Elsewhere in the document it might or might not be made clear if this requires only a majority and/or if this is only in cases to fill a vacancy. | It is not uncommon for a company to issue additional shares to shareholders instead of paying a cash dividend. This is known as a "stock dividend". Such payment may (less commonly) be in shares of another, often related, company. If that is the source of the stock in question there is nothing illegal about it. Your broker should have a record of your transactions and whether any stock came from a stock dividend or some other source. Accordion to the Investopedia article on "Stock Dividend": Also known as a "scrip dividend," a stock dividend is a distribution of shares to existing shareholders in lieu of a cash dividend. This type of dividend may be made when a company wants to reward its investors but doesn't have the spare cash or wants to preserve its cash for other investments. Stock dividends have a tax advantage for the investor. The share dividend, like any stock share, is not taxed until the investor sells it unless the company offers the option of taking the dividend as cash or in stock. A stock dividend may require that the newly received shares are not to be sold for a certain period of time. This holding period on a stock dividend typically begins the day after it is purchased. Understanding the holding period is important for determining qualified dividend tax treatment. The Wikip[edia article "Dividend" says: Stock or scrip dividends are those paid out in the form of additional shares of the issuing corporation, or another corporation (such as its subsidiary corporation). They are usually issued in proportion to shares owned (for example, for every 100 shares of stock owned, a 5% stock dividend will yield 5 extra shares). (emphasis added) So dividends payed in the stock of another company are perfectly possible, although less common. | Normally, an employer can decide whether someone is allowed to go on leave or not. If someone has a covered disability, that must be accommodated, except to the extent that the disability makes the person unable to perform a bona fide job qualification that cannot be accommodated by any practical means. Employers have some latitude and discretion in evaluating this question and a doctor's opinion, while it is relevant evidence that an employer should consider, isn't binding on the employer. This is because physicians can differ in their opinions on a particular case, and because physicians don't necessarily know exactly what is and isn't necessary to perform a job satisfactorily. Business owners are entitled to decide what duties go with a job, and within reason, what kind of performance of those duties meets their standards. As the case summary linked to in the comments explains: "Counseling is a medical appointment and the determination as to whether it can be required for employment is dependent on whether it is “job related” and consistent with a “business necessity” as described in the ADA." Under the circumstances described in the question, it is likely that this requirement would be found to have been met. Also, an employer could place an employee on medical leave without requiring counseling or therapy as a requirement to return, so long as some other performance standard was established for the employee. On the other hand, the employer's discretion is not unlimited. If a judge or jury finds that an employee was clearly capable of performing the job in a satisfactory manner (e.g. by noting that the disabled employee outperforms many non-disabled employees in the same position who are not put on leave), then that finder of fact could conclude that the employer had engaged in illegal discrimination based upon disability, rather than legally exercising an employer's discretion. There are, inevitably, gray areas, and no one doctor's opinion is enough to resolve that question definitively. | It is certainly possible to incorporate companies with the same name in two different states. If neither company does business in the other person's state under that name, it isn't actionable for either company. If one company was already doing business under its name in a state where another company is formed under that name, it would usually be possible to force the new company to cease and desist from using that name, either with an action directed at the infringer and the Secretary of State (or other official charged with business incorporations in a state) of that state, or in an action directly against the infringer alone. Also, even if a trademark isn't formally registered, it can arise at common law simply through use of a name in a particular market in a particular place. This is harder to prove and the remedies for violating a common law trademark a more limited, but it is not entirely unenforceable. | Does this mistake make the agreement invalid? No. Having worked at that company for six years already, it will be extremely easy for the company to prove that you clearly knew with which entity you were entering the contract. That is what matters in contract law. Thus, the discrepancy of name in te contract is inconsequential. This is similar to what I explained in this other answer. Are employment agreements for employees valid for share holders and officers of the company or should there have been a different one. In the U.S., there is no prohibition to that effect. What matters is that the parties' rights and obligations are stated and accepted with reasonable clarity. | No As the official Rules Of The Senate say in section VI (Quorum): A quorum shall consist of a majority of the Senators duly chosen and sworn. No Senator shall absent himself from the service of the Senate without leave. If, at any time during the daily sessions of the Senate, a question shall be raised by any Senator as to the presence of a quorum, the Presiding Officer shall forthwith direct the Secretary to call the roll and shall announce the result, and these proceedings shall be without debate. Whenever upon such roll call it shall be ascertained that a quorum is not present, a majority of the Senators present may direct the Sergeant at Arms to request, and, when necessary, to compel the attendance of the absent Senators, which order shall be determined without debate; and pending its execution, and until a quorum shall be present, no debate nor motion, except to adjourn, or to recess pursuant to a previous order entered by unanimous consent, shall be in order. Thus there must be a majority of the US Senate, that is at least 51 Senators, present to do any business, and in particular to pass any bill or resolution. The scenario described in the question, where less than a majority can control the action of the Senate, thus cannot occur. MY understanding is that when any Senator rises to question whether a quorum is present, in addition to the reading of the names on the Senate floor, lights flash indicating a quorum call in the office of each Senator, and if the Senator is present and did not expect a business session, that Senator would be likely to get to the floor, and if the senator is not in the office but even one staff member is, that staffer would be very likely to call the Senator wherever s/he might be. Moreover, section VII of the Rules provides that: Until the morning business shall have been concluded, and so announced from the Chair, or until one hour after the Senate convenes at the beginning of a new legislative day, no motion to proceed to the consideration of any bill, resolution, report of a committee, or other subject upon the Calendar shall be entertained by the Presiding Officer, unless by unanimous consent: Provided, however, That on Mondays which are the beginning of a legislative day the Calendar shall be called under rule VIII, and until two hours after the Senate convenes no motion shall be entertained to proceed to the consideration of any bill, resolution, or other subject upon the Calendar except the motion to continue the consideration of a bill, resolution, or other subject against objection as provided in rule VIII, or until the call of the Calendar has been completed. This ensures that the Senate cannot simply take up a bill the moment it convenes. Moreover, there is a public Legislative Calander. This calendar: Displays time and date the Senate is next scheduled to convene The CRS report "The Senate’s Calendar of Business" says in relevant part: The Senate’s Calendar of Business lists bills, resolutions, and other items of legislative business that are eligible for floor consideration. When a Senate committee reports a bill, it is said to be placed “on the calendar.” It is not in order for the majority leader or any other Senator to move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of a measure that is not on the calendar, though the majority leader could ask unanimous consent to do so. ... The Senate’s other calendar, the Executive Calendar, lists treaties and nominations—which constitute the Senate’s executive business—that are available for floor action. Both of these documents are published each day the Senate is in session and distributed to Senators’ personal offices and to all committee and subcommittee offices. ... The front cover of the Calendar of Business gives the dates on which each session of the current Congress convened and adjourned sine die and the number of days the Senate actually has met during each session. It also shows the date and time at which the Senate is next scheduled to convene. ... Also included in the Calendar of Business are the following: calendars for the current month and year, showing the days on which the Senate met and the anticipated dates of future nonlegislative periods; ... "bills and joint resolutions read the first time” and awaiting the start of the next legislative day when they will be read by title for a second time; after this second reading, each such measure probably will be placed directly on the calendar under the provisions of Rule XIV instead of being referred to committee. Note that this means that no bill can be acted on on the same day that it is introduced, and every Senator's office is notified of bills that had a first reading. Thus no bills can be snuck in and acted on without every Senator having notice that the bill is coming up. Also, as I understand it, a Senate meeting cannot be scheduled without notice of the date having been given in the Calendar, or else to every Senator's office. So the sort of "private Calendar" and "private meeting" suggested in the question would not work, unless the rules are first changed. | As the sole director and shareholder, the cleanest approach is to pay the invoice from the company account as if it were issued to the company's name. This way, you don't need to keep records (such as a director's loan account) to explain why the company is claiming a deduction for expenses paid from your personal account, and you are not paying income tax on the reimbursement. The problem with this approach, and the reason why larger companies don't use it, is that you now need to be able to prove that the invoice relates to a legitimate business expense. For a one-person company, that will usually be pretty obvious from the nature of the expenses and if not, you'll remember what happened, but this does not scale up for businesses with employees claiming reimbursement. | What does it accomplish? It guarantees that all corporations doing business in New York can be served. (A company's having an agent for the service of process does not prohibit people from serving the corporation directly. The secretary may be "the agent upon which process may be served" but is not "the sole agent upon which process must be served." And besides, process need not be served on an agent; it can be served on the company itself, at its office or on one of its officers.) With this requirement, New York makes it impossible for a company to avoid service of process by closing or moving its offices, by sending its officers and employees out of state, or by making itself unavailable by any means. No matter what steps a company might take to avoid service of process, the process server can always resort to serving the company's agent: the Secretary of State. |
Conflict of interest when removing a director I work for a UK limited company with two shareholders, and two directors. I am one of the directors and the majority shareholder (over %50 of total shares). The company's articles of association are the Model Articles from Companies House. If I want to remove the other shareholder as director for poor performance, is it sufficient for me to call a general meeting with 28 days advance notice, and pass an ordinary resolution with my majority shares? Would the Companies Act 2006 allow such an action, especially in regards to conflict of interest law? | You have a fiduciary duty as a director to act in the best interests of the company. Not your interests, not his interests, not the shareholders' interests (individually or as a group); the company's interests. You must also separate the other guy's performance as an employee from his performance as a director. If he is not performing as an employee then the correct course of action is to sack him as an employee, not as a director; and vice-versa. If he turns up to the board meetings and considers the information he is given as a director then he is not "performing poorly" in that role. However, provided you follow the law and your company's constitution I have no doubt this would be legal. You need to consult a lawyer before you do anything - it can't be the company's lawyer because he does have a conflict of interest. Notwithstanding its legality, it's a stupid idea. It doesn't fix the fundamental problem: you are in business with someone you don't want to be in business with. You need to find a way to not be in business with him and to start that process by ticking him off is a bad move. You need to reach agreement on how to end your relationship: just shoving him out while he is still a shareholder will have him looking for the first opportunity to sue you and the company the instant it underperforms. | Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that. | Because HRA1998 says so, but it's not an absolute limit and is subject to discretion by the court: (1)A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— (a)bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act. (5)Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of— (a)the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place; or (b)such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question. | This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement. | In Australia a person must have ostensible authority as an agent (agency by estoppel) to bind their corporation. If a person claims the authority and a reasonable person would believe in the circumstances that they have the authority then their actions bind the company. See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s769b.html for the law and http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/386390/Contract+Law/Companies+and+perils+of+ostensible+authority+the+danger+of+paying+money+to+a+third+party+and+not+to+the+creditor for a case. To take your example (and putting aside the fact that the purported contract is probably unenforceable in itself), if a reasonable person would conclude you had the authority (in your capacity as director or senior executive) then it would bind McDonalds; if you were a store manager or burger flipper, it wouldn't. | A distinction has to be made between incompetent and unsatisfactory. Beware defamation laws, when you accuse someone of being professionally incompetent. Poor communication is not grounds for breaching a contract. It is not entirely obvious that your P30s problem is a breach of contract on the accountant's part – it might be, depends on what the contract says. You should hire an attorney to scrutinize the contract, as well as looking into the question of the accountant's duty to you as a customer. It might turn out that the accountant has been negligent, or you may have higher expectations than you contracted for. But you might have grounds to sue the accountant in which case terminating the contract would be preferable (from the accountant's perspective). | These offer letters typically state explicitly that the offer is contingent on approval by the relevant governing board. This is sufficient to thwart promissory estoppel. Such highest-level overturning are frequent enough in the US that a reasonable person would know that the principal (for instance) does not have final authority to make a contract. There is no requirement that the board justify their decision to you. If you file a lawsuit alleging racial or religious discrimination, and if you can make a prima facie case for discrimination,you might survive the motion for dismissal, and the board might be required to say why they didn't hire you. | There is no legal requirement for an Assured Shorthold Tenancy agreement in England and Wales to be witnessed. Signatories to the agreement are legally free to have it witnessed. Some people may prefer it to be witnessed. |
Extreme case of double jeopardy I have a very unique and interesting theoretical debate I’m trying to find the answer to. Suppose that I am accused and found guilty of murder of a person (ex. Bob). I serve my time for the murder and am released from imprisonment. Suddenly, Bob is found alive (therefore I didn’t murder him). At this point, I’ve done my sentencing for the murder of Bob and he’s still alive. Since this has happened, am I able to “murder” Bob and not be charged with his murder (since I have already done a sentencing for his murder)? Or would I still be charged with his murder since it’s a different criminal instance? | canada Or would I still be charged with his murder since it’s a different criminal instance? Yes, this is the correct intuition. Different instance/wrong; different basis for the charge; not precluded by double-jeopardy. In Canada, the term of art is autrefois convict. Section 609 of the Criminal Code lays out the standard for what it means for the count to be the same: the matter on which the accused was given in charge on the former trial is the same in whole or in part as that on which it is proposed to give him in charge The later charge for murdering Bob would be a wholly different circumstance or "wrong" or "delict" than the first conviction was based on. The later charge would not be precluded. | There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2. | Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court. | It depends on what the jury said, and if it's criminal or civil. In criminal cases, the judge may almost never set aside a verdict of acquittal. There is a single case in the US in which this happened, and it was a bench trial (no jury). That case featured the defendant bribing his trial judge; the Seventh Circuit held that he was never in jeopardy due to the bribe. As far as I can tell, that's the only one. There have been no cases that I can find of a jury's verdict of acquittal being overturnable. Judges can poll the jury to make sure they're unanimous (at least in federal court), and if they aren't then it's a mistrial, but that's because the jury was never in agreement in the first place. On the other hand, a judge has several ways to enforce an acquittal. In federal court, for instance, the defense can move for a motion of acquittal either before or after the case goes to the jury. If the motion is granted before the verdict, double jeopardy applies to retrial. If it's granted after a conviction, then the judicial acquittal can be reversed on appeal, possibly requiring a new trial. Before the verdict is returned, the judge can declare a mistrial. After the verdict is returned, it's too late for that. In civil cases, things are more complicated: double jeopardy does not exist there. There, there is a notion of a judgment as a matter of law: the judge determines that, based on evidence presented, no reasonable jury could possibly find the other way. This can happen before or after the verdict, and is appealable. | Could the acceptance of the pardon then have any bearing on the case in the other jurisdiction? Possibly, but not much. There is very, very little case law on this point since: (1) pardons are rare (especially federal ones), (2) people who are pardoned generally do so because everyone in the criminal justice process in the prior case agrees that the person is reformed and they are usually correct, (3) the statute of limitations has often run on a new prosecution, and (4) many cases where these issues arise, are probably not appealed (either because the neither parties attempts to, or because a defendant is acquitted and there is no appeal), but an appeal is necessary to give rise to binding precedents. Can the admission of guilt be used in the new case? The criminal collateral estoppel effects of a pardon flow from the adjudication on the merits which is vacated. Also, comity between sovereigns and public policy mitigate such a rule. The pardon power would not be very interesting if it routinely resulted in a new prosecution that was conducted on a summary basis via a preclusion doctrine such as collateral estoppel. In many cases, the statute of limitations will have run on the original crime or there will be no parallel state law crime, but this is not always the case. Also, I would disagree with the statement that a pardon always implies an admission of guilt to the crime for which a pardon was granted, even though that statement is often used rhetorically. For example, one important use of the pardon power is to commute the sentence of someone who asserts that they are factually innocent but have been convicted of a crime, potentially in a manner that is not subject to further judicial review, and treating that as an admission of guilt doesn't make sense. As the Wikipedia entry on Burdick notes in the pertinent part: Legal scholars have questioned whether that portion of Burdick [ed. about admission of guilt] is meaningful or merely dicta. President Ford made reference to the Burdick decision in his post-pardon written statement furnished to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives on October 17, 1974. However, said reference related only to the portion of Burdick that supported the proposition that the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. I would read this as dicta, as this portion of the holding was not necessary for the court to reach its conclusion and the fact pattern in Burdick was a typical fact pattern where guilt was not disputed. It didn't raise the concerns present when a pardon is requested based upon a claim of innocence, and granted following a conviction. Instead, the holding of Burdick was that there was no pardon because the pardon was rejected (in a manner very similar to a common law disclaimer of a gift), so its holding didn't need to reach the effect of a pardon that is accepted to resolve the case. Can it be used as "reasonable cause" for various actions? This is a bit too vague to know what you are getting at. I suppose that a pardon could constitute reasonable cause for some things favorable to a defendant who is pardoned (e.g., potentially in a motion seeking to reopen a termination of parental rights entered on the basis of the conviction). I suppose it could also be used in a manner potentially unfavorable to a defendant (e.g. showing a pattern of past conduct that demonstrates modus operandi in connection with a prosecution for a new crime). I don't think it could be used as grounds to deny an occupational or business license for bad character. Still, without more clear context it is harder to know what you are really looking for in this regard and I'm not confident that my examples address that. Does the defendant lose their right to refuse to testify in the new case? I haven't reviewed the case law, but my intuition is that if it has never been waived before, it wouldn't be waived by the pardon, but that if it was waived in a previous proceeding resulting in a conviction that was then pardoned, that the prior sworn testimony might be admissible evidence in the new action since it is not hearsay and isn't itself evidence of a prior conviction. The context of the prior testimony might have to be concealed from the jury. As noted by @Putvi, the defendant could not claim risk of conviction for the federal crime as a ground for invoking the 5th Amendment if a pardon is accepted (something that is implied in Burdick), but if there was an overlapping state law crime, risk of conviction for the state crime could constitute a grounds upon which to invoke the 5th Amendment. Burdick does stand for the proposition that a pardon not solicited by the defendant, that is rejected, cannot provide a basis for removing the 5th Amendment protection with respect to a risk of conviction for federal crime. I would also be inclined to think that matters disclosed in an application for a pardon might be admissible evidence as a non-hearsay statement of a party-opponent, if the statement was stripped of the pardon application context (which would be unduly prejudicial since it would imply a prior conviction which otherwise wouldn't be admissible). | With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.' |
Is a contract valid if one of the party doesn't even read it? You might think someone must be stupid to sign a contract without even reading it. Yet I see it happen all the time, when contracts are just too long and there's no time to read stuff you suppose you already know. Typical examples are contracts you "accept" online, like TOS's and privacy policies. Nobody reads that. And the funny thing is that the other party usually knows you haven't read it. Websites know that nobody reads their huge TOS's or privacy policies, and it has also been demonstrated (researches, polls, articles). And the salesman telling you "just sign here, it's the usual stuff", they know you haven't read it because they saw you sign it without reading it. In the case of online contracts, you don't even have a copy of them, so the other party could change the terms and you wouldn't even have a way to know it. Stackexchange could tell me that I agreed to post at least a question per month, or my profile would be deleted. Well, did I agree to that? Maybe, who knows, I don't know what was really written in the TOS when I clicked, and now they might have changed the terms and there could be no trace of the old contract. So are these contracts valid? What makes a contract valid and binding? If jurisdiction is important, I'm interested in the EU and the US. | Typical examples are contracts you "accept" online, like TOS's and privacy policies. Nobody reads that... Websites know that nobody reads their huge TOS's or privacy policies, and it has also been demonstrated (researches, polls, articles)... To target this specific portion of your question, this was addressed in Zappos.com Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation (MDL No. 2357), U.S. District Court, District of Nevada. Consumers won a small victory. From Zappos.com Loses Arbitration Bid in Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit: The main problem, according to the court, is that the arbitration clause is buried as a “snippet” in a 4-page Terms of Use contract, which can only be found by clicking on an obscure link on the site. “We cannot conclude that Plaintiffs ever viewed, let alone manifested assent to, the Terms of Use. The Terms of Use is inconspicuous, buried in the middle to bottom of every Zappos.com webpage among many other links, and the website never directs a user to the Terms of Use. No reasonable user would have reason to click on the Terms of Use, even those users who have alleged that they clicked and relied on statements found in adjacent links, such as the site’s ‘Privacy Policy,’” the court said. Later, the court blasts Zappos for trying to bind users into arbitration simply because they browse the site. According to the court: “The arbitration provision found in the Zappos.com Terms of Use purportedly binds all users of the website by virtue of their browsing. However, the advent of the Internet has not changed the basic requirements of a contract, and there is no agreement where there is no acceptance, no meeting of the minds, and no manifestation of assent. A party cannot assent to terms of which it has no knowledge or constructive notice, and a highly inconspicuous hyperlink buried among a sea of links does not provide such notice. Because Plaintiffs did not assent to the terms, no contract exists, and they cannot be compelled to arbitrate.” So it seems the court recognizes there is no meeting of the minds in some instances. | First, if by "they say" you literally mean they use spoken words, and not a printed advertisement, or an advertisement on the internet that you can print out, then you may have a hard time proving what they said. If you can prove what they said that would be very helpful, a seller may be in trouble if their contract is not the same as what they promised. If things go to court, then a judge will first figure out what the contract is (let's say both sides have a copy of the contract - but the words are different, then a jury decides). That's not what we have here. Then the judge decides what the words in the contract mean. If the words are ambiguous, then the judge interprets the words in favour of the person who didn't write the contract. | Not on its own, no Overview A ToS can be of some value, but will not fully protect the site operator (host). For one thing, a ToS is probably not binding on the user based on a contract of adhesion such as "by using this site you agree to...". A specific act, such as clicking a checkbox that defaults to clicked or activating an "I accept the terms" button is probably required to make a ToS binding on the user. But a host must do more that obtain an agreement to its ToS. Once it has actual knowledge of illegal content, a host must take action to remove or disable it, or else it may be liable as if it had posted the content itself. It also depends what kind of "something illegal" is involved. The most common form is perhaps content that allegedly infringes copyright. Safe Harbor In the EU Article 14 of the EU Directive on electronic commerce (Directive 2000/31/EC) will apply (note that being a directive, rather than a regulation, 2000/31/EC) depends on implementation in national law, which may vary from one country to another. Article 14 reads: Hosting Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 14 means that when a host obtains actual knowledge of infringing or otherwise illegal content, the host must promptly delete that content or disable access to it. Such knowledge could come via a takedown notice. According to the page "Copyright infringement and remedies in Germany": One of the main situations refers to platform operators. Once they have been informed about a specific infringement on their platform, they are required to remove the specific infringing content and to implement measures in order to prevent future violations. See also the Wikipedia article "Notice and Take down" which discusses Article 14, and points out that it does not define a specific notice and take down procedure, unlike the US provisions of 17 USC 512 (which includes the DMCA notice and take down procedure, and the related Safe Harbor provisions). Since Article 14 clearly envisages some sort of notice procedure, but not specific procedure has been defined in the laws of most EU member states, including Germany, some people use the US DMCA notice format, as describesd in this article. Such a notice may serve to give a German host "actual knowledge" and impose liability if the host fails to respond promptly. There have been recent legal cases which affect the procedures in such cases, as reported in "Copyright 'safe harbours' for service providers need to be consistent" from Pinsent Masons and "Germany: Time To Hit Pause: Copyright Infringement On User Generated Platforms – When Is The Platform Provider Liable For Damages?" from Morrison & Foerster LLP. The Morrison & Foerster article reads: Previous rulings by the CJEU have addressed both the application of the safe harbor principle set out in the EU E-Commerce Directive1 that shields hosting providers from liability for hosted unlawful third-party content of which they have no actual knowledge and, separately, the extent of infringement of copyright by hosting of, or linking to, copyright infringing third-party content under the EU Copyright Directive. But it is still unclear under which conditions the providers of the various online platforms that store and make available user-generated content, can rely on the safe harbor privilege applying to hosting providers to avoid liability, or whether they must not only take down the infringing content when they obtain knowledge of such content but also compensate the rightsholders of such content for damages for copyright infringement. The Pinsent Masons article reads: [A] ruling last year by a German court has highlighted an anomaly in the way 'safe harbour' protections ISPs enjoy under EU law apply in the case of copyright enforcement. It has confirmed that applications for blocking orders and injunctive relief are treated differently, despite the economic effect of those measures being the same. The safe harbour protections stem from the EU's E-Commerce Directive. That legislation prohibits service providers from being put under any general obligation to monitor for illegal activity by users of their service. In addition, where the service providers are mere conduits to infringing activity by others, they cannot be held liable for that activity unless and until they obtain 'actual knowledge' of the activity. At that stage, a service provider must act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information if they are not to be held liable themselves for infringement. However, EU copyright law cuts into these 'safe harbour' protections. It makes clear that rights holders can apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe copyright. In Germany, however, changes made to the Telemedia Act in October 2017 have spurred debate over the admissibility and the requirements of blocking injunctions. Other unlawful content Other sorts of illegal content are possible, such as neo-Nazi propaganda and Child Pornography, which are criminal under German law. In theory Article 14 applies to such content as well as to alleged copyright infringements. But since these are serious crimes, the degree of promptness expected from a host will probably be greater. Conclusion A hosting provider will need, at the least, to respond to notices alleging copyright infringement or other illegal content, and provide an address to which such notices can be sent. A host might do well to implement the full DMCA takedown procedure. ToS provisions will not provide a shield against liability after a notice is sent to the host. A host may be required to block future access by those whose previous uploads have been found to be unlawful. This may require soem sort of log-in procedure. Thus a simple ToS provision, as described in the question, particularly in the absence of any log-in mechanism, and of any enforcement of the ToS provisions, will not be enough to shield the host from liability for unlawful content posted by users. | canada Not merely because of the length or legalese, and not the entire contract. But there is a line of authority in Canadian law that can lead to exclusion-of-liability clauses being unenforceable, and length is a factor. When there are unusual exclusion clauses, inconsistent with the main purpose of the contract, executed in hasty circumstances, where the contract is long and/or small and the signer's attention is not drawn to the exclusion clauses, courts have been wary to enforce them. Karroll v. Silver Star Mountain Resorts Ltd., 1988 CanLII 3294 (BC SC): [18] ... to allow someone to sign a document where one has reason to believe he is mistaken as to its contents, is not far distant from active misrepresentation. [19] In the usual commercial situation, there is no need for the party presenting the document to bring exclusions of liability or onerous terms to the attention of the signing party, nor need he advise him to read the document. In such situations, it is safe to assume that the party signing the contract intends to be bound by its terms. [20] But situations may arise which suggest that the party does not intend to be bound by a term. In Tilden the hasty, informal way in which the contract was signed, the fact that the clause excluding liability was inconsistent with the overall purpose of the contract, and the absence of any real opportunity to read and understand the document given its length and the amount of small print on its reverse side, led the Court to conclude that the defendant should have known that the plaintiff had no intention of consenting to the onerous exclusion in question. In these special circumstances, there was a duty on Tilden to take reasonable measures to bring the exclusion clause to the attention of Mr. Clendenning. Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning, 1978 CanLII 1446 (Ont. C.A.) said: In modern commercial practice, many standard form printed documents are signed without being read or understood. In many cases the parties seeking to rely on the terms of the contract know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract does not represent the true intention of the signer, and that the party signing is unaware of the stringent and onerous provisions which the standard form contains. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such terms should not be able to do so in the absence of first having taken reasonable measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and, in the absence of such reasonable measures, it is not necessary for the party denying knowledge of such terms to prove either fraud, misrepresentation or non est factum. In the case at bar, Tilden Rent-A-Car took no steps to alert Mr. Clendenning to the onerous provisions in the standard form of contract presented by it. The clerk could not help but have known that Mr. Clendenning had not in fact read the contract before signing it. Indeed the form of the contract itself with the important provisions on the reverse side and in very small type would discourage even the most cautious customer from endeavouring to read and understand it. Mr. Clendenning was in fact unaware of the exempting provisions. Under such circumstances, it was not open to Tilden Rent-A-Car to rely on those clauses, and it was not incumbent on Mr. Clendenning to establish fraud, misrepresentation or non est factum. Having paid the premium, he was not liable for any damage to the vehicle while being driven by him. As Lord Denning stated in Neuchatel Asphalte Co. Ltd. v. Barnett, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 356 at p. 360: "We do not allow printed forms to be made a trap for the unwary." | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself. | are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright. | In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices |
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