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Was it legal to shoot down the Chinese balloon? Recent news headlines read: "US fires air-to-air missile and takes down alleged Chinese spy balloon." It happened in February 4th, 2023. The balloon, as far as we know, was not armed and did not contain any ordnance. Though the result of the analysis of the debris may shed some light into this, for the sake of being charitable, let's assume this is true. China claims it was a meteorological balloon that accidentally strayed into US airspace. There are several treaties and UN resolutions regarding civil aviation, some of them are binding to the US. The political aspect is not up for discussion here. A post on Politics.SE might be better suited for that discussion. Regarding international law, treaties, and/or UN regulations regarding civil aviation and the use of force against unarmed aircraft, did the US commit any irregularity by shooting down the balloon.
Probably The US, like all other nations, has absolute sovereignty over its airspace. There is no clear line between airspace and space but 60,000 feet is clearly in the former. The US, like all other nations except Lichtenstein for some reason, is a signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation which, among other things, makes it an act of war to use force against a civilian aircraft. Now, acts of war are not, per see, illegal - there are international laws about armed conflict and there are philosophical arguments about just and unjust wars but war itself is a political rather than a legal construct. Article 5 of the convention gives the right to all other states the right to operate civil aircraft within US airspace (and vice-versa) without prior permission (apart from regularly scheduled flights which do require permission) subject to compliance with the convention. Relevantly, unmanned balloons are dealt with in Annex 4 - it states that permission is not needed for light meteorological balloons but is needed for any other balloon which might enter foreign airspace. The Chinese claim that the balloon was “mainly” meteorological but the convention requires it to be “exclusively” meteorological. It also requires it to be “light” meaning having a payload weighing less than 4kg - unless the payload of this ballon was made of unobtainum, it weighed more than 4kg. They also argue that it drifted off course and entered US airspace inadvertently. This would be a legitimate claim if the entry of US airspace was unlikely at the planning and launch stages of the operation. We simply do not have the information to assess this claim. The US claim that this was a surveillance aircraft. If this is so, then the aircraft is not a civil aircraft and the Chicago Convention does not apply which brings us back to pure sovereignty - the US can do what it likes with things in its own airspace. There is a treaty between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact members dating from the 1990s that allow surveillance overflights of each other’s territories. However, there are two problems with this: China was never a signatory, and the US withdrew during the Trump Presidency. So, if this wasn’t a balloon that inadvertently and unexpectedly drifted off course, the US was allowed to shoot it down.
The United Nations Security Council made Resolution 2216 on 14 April 2015, and reaffirmed the key provisions recently in Resolution 2675 of 15 February 2023 (see the reference in paragraph 1). Resolution 2216, in paragraphs 14-17, imposes an arms embargo for Yemen. In particular, it calls on all Member States to "take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer" of armaments, and to inspect Yemen-bound cargo for the same, "in accordance with ... the law of the sea" and other relevant law. The UK and USA are both Member States of the UN, so they are specifically empowered to implement the embargo. The reason the Security Council can do this is because the UN Charter says that it can. "Interruption of economic relations" and "blockade" are among the possibilities explicitly mentioned (Articles 42 and 43), but this is well within the scope of the Security Council's power. By saying that interdiction should be in accordance with the law of the sea, the UNSC is bringing in well-established rules about the conduct of maritime operations, jurisdiction in the high seas and elsewhere, compensation for wrongful interdiction, use of force, and so on. In other words, they are not trying to override the standard rules. This is not the first embargo in history and there is no need to outline everything in the resolution text.
In the united-states, the Supreme Court would not impose a sentence; it would only consider whether the trial court imposed the correct sentence, which could include a death sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court has permitted death sentences for terrorists who have been captured alive. Most recently, the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty for the Boston Marathon bomber in in United States v. Tsarnaev, 142 S. Ct. 1024 (2022). I don't believe any state or the federal government uses hanging or revolvers to carry out death sentences at this point. Far more common are the electric chair, gas chambers, and lethal injections. Firing squads and hangings are technically legal in some states, but I don't know that any states actually use them. In russia, capital punishment is unconstitutional. When it was in practice, it was reportedly carried out by a single executioner with a handgun. There is talk of reinstating the death penalty, and of course, there is reason to believe Russia continues to carry out capital punishment extrajudicially.
The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.
Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.
Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.
Did the President have to commute or pardon the Russians in US prisons, or is there an existing statutory basis for releasing some prisoners? As far as American law is concerned, in this particular case, it was a "simple" deportation. The defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to time served, based on submissions from the prosecutors and the defendants, which are usually followed by the judge. Alternatively, if the judge had sentenced someone to real prison terms, a commutation may be required. If they want, the prosecutors can also withdraw the charges before sentencing. Obama commuted Iranian citizens in a spy swap deal. In another Iran-USA prisoners exchange, charges were dropped for Masoud Soleimani. Then as "free" men and women who are foreign nationals, they can still be inadmissible to the United States and be deportable aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. Code § 1182 - Inadmissible aliens, § 1227 - Deportable aliens). In this case, there are so many potential grounds to choose from: conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, misrepresentation, national security, foreign policy, etc. The Secretary of State can also revoke their visas at the Secretary's discretion and make their presence unlawful. They have the right to contest deportation if they are considered "free" as far as the criminal law is considered. But, they usually want to go home. The US may choose to prosecute them for other potential crimes if they contest. Then if they are deportable and there is no stay on the proceedings due to judicial or administrative intervention, they can be removed from the United States. Is there a formal agreement in international law between the US and UK? I do not believe the United Kingdom was involved directly to the exchange itself. The prisoner swap was done in Vienna. Agreement needs to be obtained from the Austrian government regarding entry conditions etc. UK revoked Anna Chapman's British citizenship. Igor Sutyagin and Sergei Skripal moved to UK. But those are not really international matters legally. The UK alone determines how its citizenship works and who can enter and stay in the UK.
The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing
Is it theft if you take money (with out permission) but return it the next day? Supposed that a person A used another person's credit card (B) to buy a $1 item (without permission) while A was doing B's shopping but A returned the money. Has A committed theft?
Depends where you are At common law, theft (or more generally, larceny) requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. However, many jurisdictions have removed this element from the crime. For example, s118 of the new-south-wales Crimes Act 1900 says: 118 Intent to return property no defence Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused's own use, or for the accused's own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal.
Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement.
You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.
Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.
The party that made the overpayment would have the right to sue you for "unjust enrichment" or "breach of contract" (since the terms of service no doubt provide or strongly imply that you are entitled to only one payment per sale), if you didn't voluntarily return the overpayment following a demand to do so, even though you received it through no fault of your own. Most of the core cases involve clerical errors in the bank account number used for a bank deposit. In general, there is a right to recover an accidental transfer of property to another, even in the absence of a clearly applicable contractual arrangement. As another example, if you were accidentally given a valuable coat at a coat check by accident and didn't notice it until later, the true owner would have a right to have it returned. The FTC regulation applies (as demonstrated by the link cited in the question) to intentional unsolicited deliveries of merchandise (which would always be tangible personal property by definition) to you through the mail. It does not apply to transfers of money, or to the accidental mis-delivery of property to the wrong person or the wrong address. The law in question is as follows: 39 U.S. Code § 3009 - Mailing of unordered merchandise (a) Except for (1) free samples clearly and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchandise mailed by a charitable organization soliciting contributions, the mailing of un­ordered merchandise or of communications prohibited by subsection (c) of this section constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice in violation of section 45(a)(1) of title 15. (b) Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. All such merchandise shall have attached to it a clear and conspicuous statement informing the recipient that he may treat the merchandise as a gift to him and has the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. (c) No mailer of any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, shall mail to any recipient of such merchandise a bill for such merchandise or any dunning communications. (d) For the purposes of this section, “un­ordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient.
The physical cash in the bank is not your property, at least not in US law (according to Scalia). It becomes your property when the withdrawal is performed by some means specified in your contract. A deposit gives you a contractual right to demand money from the bank. Bank robbery is a crime. Having money deposited with the bank doesn't change that. The only possible chance a robber has at trial is jury nullification. I haven't found records for that in Lebanon, but it does have jury trials. Impartial review classifies Lebanon's justice system as somewhat corrupt, but generally compliant with the basic principles. So it might be possible to get away with it at trial, but a very long shot.
There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.
Point three should include "to the best of my knowledge and belief", or be modified to state that none of those "house or the adjacent shop" have informed the affiant of any such delivery, or delivered any such package to the affiant. It might add that the affiant had questioned such persons and they denied receiving such a delivery. The point here, of course, is to prove that the package was never properly delivered, no doubt in support of a claim on the delivery service. The ordinary assumption is that if a person in the "house or the adjacent shop" had accepted a package, it would normally have been given to the addressee at an early opportunity.
Claiming a copycat version of a well-known, out of print board game is similar to the original Under intellectual property law, is it permissible to create a version of an out-of-print board game that is protected by copyright, but not by patent, by changing its design elements (cards, game pieces, packaging, name, logo, and symbols) while retaining the original game's rules and only writing them in other words, and advertising the game as having the same concept as the original? Example: The new game is called "FlowerPoly" and is a copycat version of the game "Monopoly". In FlowerPoly, instead of estates and streets, there are lands and farms, and instead of buying a hotel or a house, the player buys a Nature Reserve. The currency used in the game is Nature-points instead of dollar bills. Despite these changes, the gameplay remains exactly the same and players who have played both games would recognize the similarities immediately. Note: The original game does not hold a patent. I understand that copyright protection applies only to the design and names, not the mechanics, so using a different design should be acceptable. However, I seek clarification on whether claiming the game is similar to the original would infringe on the original game's intellectual property. (Maybe Trademark? because i am connecting it to the original game) Edit: To clarify my main question is whether claiming the copycat is similar to the original would infringe on the original game's intellectual property.
IP in Game Rules Game rules and other game "mechanics" are not protected by copyright. They are considered to be "ideas, methods or procedures". 17 USC 102(b) provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. If the wording of the rules is not the same, and no art or visual design was copied or imitated, the fact that the gameplay is the same does not afford any copyright claim. Claims of Similarity A comment from the OP says: I seek clarification on whether claiming the game is similar to the original would infringe on the original game's intellectual property. If the maker or distributor of the new game states that it is similar to the old game, something like "This is a Flower version of Monopoly." would that be any sort of IP infringement? Such a statement would in no way infringe any copyright. Would it infringe the trademark rights on the mark "Monopoly". That is harder to say. The key question in a trademark case is whether the use of a mark, or of words or images that refer to or suggest a mark, would cause reasonable people to falsely think that the new product or service is endorsed, sponsored, or approved by the makers of the old, or to falsely believe that the new product or service comes from the same source as the old one, that is, is made by the same firm or the same people. Whether a particular statement of similarity would do that is a question of fact, and would depend on the details of the statement and the overall presentation of the new game. But a disclaimer can and often does avoid a potential trademark infringement issue. A statement something like: FlowerPoly is not endorsed, approved, or sponsored by Hasbro, the makers of Monopoly, and holders of the trademark on that name. FlowerPoly was created by a completely different group of people. One should not rely on the reputation of Monopoly when deciding to purchase or play FlowerPoly. It would be wise to have the exact details of any statement of similarity, of any disclaimer, and of the name itself, reviewed by a lawyer with experience specifically in trademark law. In general, merely suggesting a similarity is not trademark infringement. Specifically, comparative advertising is not infringement. For example, a new drink could advertise that "NewCola is better than Cokle." That would not be an infringement of the trademark "Coke", because it makes clear that the products are different, and come from different sources.
THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not.
Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.
Presumably you are referring to works commonly called "fan fiction." Under copyright law these might be considered "derivative works" and therefore subject to the rights of the copyright owner. However, they might also qualify for exemption from copyright enforcement under "fair use." It appears that the legality of fan fiction is not settled law, and the outcome of legal challenges have turned on facts specific to each case. Decent background on the question is summarized on wikipedia.
This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.
united-states I am going to answer based on US law. But many of the principles would be similar in many other countries. In particular the law in the EU is similar. There are two separate issues here, trademark rights and copyright. Trademark Rights Trademark law provides protection against the use of the mark "in commerce". This means using the mark to identify or advertise goods or services. It does not provide any protection against use not in commerce. Specifically 15 USC 1114 (part of the Lanham Act, the main US Federal trademark law) provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (1) (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (1) (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. If the plane was being used commercially, using someone else's trademark would be infringement and could lead to a successful infringement suit. But if it is not being used to provide or advertise a service or goodsm there is no trademark issue. Copyright 17 USC 106 specifies the exclusive rights that a copyright owner has. One is to make copies, another is to make derivative works. Unless fair use (or fair dealing in the UK) applies, one needs permission from the copyright owner. Without such permission, copying is infringement, and can lead to an award of damages. However, according to the question, the image has been released under a CC-BY-NC license. That grants permission, under certain conditions. One condition is that the image (or text) not be used for commercial purposes. If the plane is purely private, not rente out, these conditions seem to be complied with, so there is no copyright issue either. Conclusion Based on the statements in the question, there seems to br no IP issue here. Be sure that there is no commercial purpose, and that the CC license was issued by the actual copyright owner. A brief consultatuion with a lawyer might be wise.
This question has been addressed directly, with very similar facts, by the federal courts, and the answer, based on those decisions, is: Maybe. The most famous case in this area is Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the defendant had bought a copy of plaintiff's art book, cut out the pages, and affixed them to ceramic tiles, which it sold. The defendant relied on the first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. 109. The first sale doctrine says that if you own a copy of a copyrighted work, you can resell it without the copyright holder's permission. The plaintiff argued that, by altering the original artwork, the defendant had created a new derivative work. The first sale doctrine gives you the right to sell the book to someone else, but not the right to create derivative works, whether by writing and publishing an unauthorized sequel or, they argued, cutting and pasting and tiling and kilning the physical pages. The Mirage Editions court agreed with the plaintiff that the tiles were a derivative work outside the scope of the first sale doctrine, and therefore the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights. However, other courts faced with similar facts have disagreed, and to date I'm not aware of any Supreme Court decision resolving the issue. The bottom line is: you are allowed to sell what you bought; you aren't allowed to transform it into something new and sell that. Where the line gets drawn is muddy and likely to remain so at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue.
united-states The first sale doctrine, (17 U.S.C. § 109), allows one who legitimately purchases a copy of a copyrighted receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. However, it does not allow one to change it. Under US law, doing so would create a derivative work, which would potentially violate copyright, but may indeed fall under the affirmative defense of "fair use" (which is determined on a case-by-case basis). (The rationale is that the first sale doctrine applies to a single article; one who makes a "fair use" derivative work can claim their own copyright, and thus make more copies). The more "transformative" the derivative work, the better chance it stands of being found fair use. Merely ripping up a work, and reassembling it to form a "mosaic effect" is unlikely to pass muster, for example. A derivative work that comments on the original work, especially social or political commentary, or on a sentiment strongly associated with the original work, is more likely to be deemed fair use. Painting polka dots the Statue of Liberty is unlikely to do well, whereas putting images of a political or social commentary nature on the Statue of Liberty is (for example, I believe I've seen one such with faces of individuals of a variety of ethnicities superimposed on the statue, making a statement of America (associated with the statue) and its history of immigration and multi-ethnic makeup). (Although the Statue of Liberty is very much not under copyright, for a number of reasons). Another aspect is how much, and how central a portion, of the original work is used. Using the pedestal the Statue of Liberty stands on would probably be better than the statue its self, for example.
Is monetizing a piano video playing others' sheets illegal? Say, I bought a piano sheet from a youtuber in websites like mymusicsheet. I made some rearrangement to it or not, (does this make any change?) then I uploaded a video playing it in youtube and monetized it. Is this illegal?
Publicly performing a work is one of the rights protected by copyright. Doing so, particularly for money, without authorization would be copyright infringement. It is possible to obtain authorization via a mechanical license. This is a license created by statute. In US law this is covered by 17 USC 115. That section provides that when a musical work has already been recorded and placed on sale or offered to the public, another person may send a notice of intention to make and distribute recordings to the copyright owner, or the copyright office if the owner is not known. The person must pay a royalty established by the law, and comply with various other conditions. Or permission may be obtained from the copyright owner or the owner's agent, often for a fee. In the absence of such authorization or permission, making and distributing recordings of performances of the musical work is infringement, and the copyright owner may sue and collect damages. The site, MyMusicSheet, includes a TOS document that implies that rights are granted to the user when music is purchased. But this document is not at all clear on just what rights are purchased with the sheet music. In particular, it does not say if the purchase includes a license to perform the music, and if so, if it includes doing so commercially. Perhaps after one signs up with the service, more detailed information is provided. If the purchase includes a license to perform the work commercially, and to distribute recordings of such performances, all would be well. If not, doing so might well be copyright infringement unless the user goes through the steps to obtain a mechanical license, or gets permission from the copyright owner directly.
Any use of the song snippets in your App can be copyright infringement (in the US), Fair Use (U.S. Copyright Office) not withstanding. Not distributing the App and/or using the App only in a limited group for the study, or not making money from the App doesn't usually matter when it comes to copyright infringement. Fair Use does have some educational exceptions; read the link above and see if your case may fit. But the final assessment of educational use would be made by a court if you were sued for infringement. If the use in your App doesn't fall under the education exception, you still probably run little risk of the copyright holders finding out if the App use is private and within a small group, but that's your choice to make. You can always Google the name of the music/recording company; most provide ways online to request licensing of samples, but the cost may be prohibitive, or permission may simply not be available for popular songs.
First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not.
Copyright Law: Probably Not so long as you are not hosting anything other than a link. (This is a secondary source) Even if academics and technology enthusiasts prefer an absolute right to link on the Internet, the business world has an interest in regulating what information is shared.66 Businesses will protest free linking to their materials if it interferes with their sales or marketing messages.67 If a website operator *1090 desires to restrict certain content from being linked to or integrated in another site, the operator can require a password to view the site or can technically disable outside sites from in-line linking to images or media hosted by the site.68 Youtube ToS: You may have an issue with ToS 4. D. if you have ads on your webpage. Service here is defined as "by using or visiting the YouTube website or any YouTube products, software, data feeds, and services provided to you on, from, or through the YouTube website " But it does seem to allow you to use an embedded player in your site if you wanted. ToS 4. F.
No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.
You need to make sure you are not infringing upon the copyrights of the music owners. There might be other things you need to do. But at a minimum you will need to have agreements with the music owners that specify the timing and amount of the payments they will receive for allowing you to distribute their music. And any other ancillary terms you or they might want to include depending on the details of your business model.
Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation.
No. You may not do this. As your post points out this is a blatant copyright violation. It isn't remotely in the realm of fair use.
Does the 6th April 2023 date for reduced CGT personal allowance apply to date of sale, or exchange of contracts? We are selling a rental property and as such Capital Gains Tax (CGT) applies on profits. On 6th April 2023, the personal CGT allowance is being reduced from £12,300 to £6000. Our sale is likely to complete around this date and with two owners, that means we potentially stand to pay CGT on an additional £12,600. Somebody told me that the key factor in the date cut-off is when contracts are exchanged for the sale, rather than when the sale is completed. But I cannot find any information supporting or rejecting this claim. Can anyone give an evidence-based answer either way?
It's the date of exchange, referred to as the "disposal date". See the gov.uk guidance: Capital Gains Tax is a tax on the profit when you sell (or ‘dispose of’) something (an ‘asset’) that’s increased in value. And the HMRC Capital Gains Manual: What date did you exchange contracts? This is the disposal date. The contract exchange date is usually when the buyer and seller exchange contracts and is usually when the new owner pays a deposit. The tax year of exchange is the tax year that the disposal is chargeable in, even if completion of the contract occurs in a later tax year.
See Brindley Twist Tafft & James LLP, "Focus on the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc.) 2010 [sic]". If the tenancy was an authorized tenancy under the terms of the mortgage: The Bank may still take possession of the property but they may have to do so subject to your occupation. The practical effect of this is that you would be allowed to remain living in the property subject to the terms of your tenancy agreement but you would see a change in the identity of the Landlord. It is possible for the tenancy to be brought to an end but in accordance with the terms of the tenancy agreement. If the tenancy was not authorized: Under the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc) 2010 [sic] (the “Act”) an unauthorised residential tenant is however entitled to request that possession be delayed for up to two months during which time they should try to find alternative accommodation.
In the general case, when a company is dissolved any assets still belonging to it becomes bona vacantia under Section 1012 of the Companies Act 2006 which means that it belongs to the Crown. The Crown can then choose to disclaim its rights to the asset under Section 1013, and typically will do this where there are risks involved (e.g. leasehold land). The effect of dislaimer, per Sections 1014 and 1015 is that the "property is deemed not to have vested in the Crown" and it terminates "the rights, interests and liabilities of the company in or in respect of the property disclaimed". In the case of freehold land that is disclaimed, it escheats (transfers) to the Crown Estate and the freehold interest is extinguished. According to Practical Law (paywall): Note, if the land is registered, the registered title will remain and the Land Registrar may enter a notice on the Land Registry title if notified (rule 173, Land Registration Rules 2003). The notice will recite the fact of the liquidator's disclaimer or Crown disclaimer but will not otherwise specify that the land has passed by escheat. The Crown Estate then becomes entitled (but not obliged) to take possession of it. The Crown Estate will not assume any liabilities as owner of the land unless it does take possession or exercises control over the property. The result of this is that the only action the Crown Estate will generally take as regards escheated land is to sell the whole of the land to a suitable buyer who approaches the Crown Estate. You can read more about how the Crown Estate subsequently deals with such property (including if and how it sells the property) in their FAQs.
The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.
It depends on whether your tax accounting is on an accrual basis or cash basis. The UK government (at least) refers to the former as traditional accounting. In that method of accounting, whatever it's called, you book the income when you invoice the work (that is, when it accrues). If you're paid in the next year, your balance sheet will show the outstanding balance in accounts receivable. Similarly, you book expenses when you incur them, not when you pay them. So if you bought a new computer for your business with a deferred payment plan, you book the entire expense at the time of the purchase, not the time of payment. Cash accounting is simpler. You can only use it if your total turnover from all of your businesses is less than £150,000 annually. You also cannot use cash accounting if your business is a limited company or limited liability partnership, or is on a list of certain types of businesses: Lloyd’s underwriters farming businesses with a current herd basis election farming and creative businesses with a section 221 ITTOIA profit averaging election businesses that have claimed business premises renovation allowance businesses that carry on a mineral extraction trade businesses that have claimed research and development allowance dealers in securities relief for mineral royalties lease premiums ministers of religion pool betting duty intermediaries treated as making employment payments managed service companies waste disposal cemeteries and crematoria For more information about traditional accounting, see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-calculate-your-taxable-profits-hs222-self-assessment-helpsheet.
She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.
According to dot-gov's Strike off your limited company from the Companies Register page... Does company B need to file corporation tax with HMRC? Yes You must send final statutory accounts and a Company Tax Return to HMRC. ... and annual accounts with Companies House? No You don’t have to file final accounts with Companies House. Does person A need to declare or pay income tax on the company's trading loss? Yes If you’ve made a loss in your final year of trading, you might be able to offset the tax against profits from previous years - this is known as ‘terminal loss relief’. You can claim this on your final tax return. However, you're better off checking with HMRC to be sure.
Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)
Internal country rules for repealing a treaty Most countries have rules and procedures set (usually) in their constitution about how to sign and ratify international treaties and what standing they have compared to the laws and the constitution of the country. For instance, in the US a treaty must be ratified by the Senate unless it's an executive-level-only international agreement, and in france a treaty cannot be ratified if the CC declared it contrary to the constitution. But what are the procedures, in each country, to repeal a treaty or international agreement ? In the US it's pretty clear that Congress has the power to do that with an ordinary law, from what I could see. How does it work in other countries ? I'm mostly asking about France, Germany (since it kinda treats inter-Länder relations as international relations), and other countries are welcome too. Clarification : I am not asking about what are the international rules for untying oneself from an international treaty (because that would mostly depend on the terms of the treaty itself).
germany The German Federal Foreign Office is responsible for the termination of international treaties. Richtlinien für die Behandlung völkerrechtlicher Verträge (RvV) §40 Vertragsbeendigung, Kündigung ... (2) Zuständigkeit Die Kündigung von Staatsverträgen und Regierungsabkommen obliegt dem Auswärtigen Amt. Adressat einer Kündigung ist in diesen Fällen das Außenministerium der anderen Vertragspartei, nicht deren diplomatische Vertretung in Deutschland. Ressortabkommen werden vom Fachressort selbst gekündigt. Adressat der Kündigung ist das Fachressort der anderen Vertragspartei. Adressat einer Kündigung eines mehrseitigen (multilateralen) Vertrags ist der Verwahrer. Guidelines for dealing with international treaties §40 Termination of Contract ... (2) Jurisdiction The Federal Foreign Office is responsible for terminating state treaties and intergovernmental agreements. In these cases, the addressee of a notice of termination is the foreign ministry of the other contracting party, not their diplomatic representation in Germany. Departmental agreements are terminated by the department itself. The addressee of the termination is the specialist department of the other contracting party. The addressee of a termination of a multilateral (multilateral) contract is the custodian. Note: The word Vertrag means both contract and treaty.
The main treaty here is the Outer Space Treaty and its implementation in US law. For your purposes, the relevant sections of the treaty are Article II: Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article VI: States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities...The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty... and Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such an object, and over any personnel thereof... Article II means that setting up your colony doesn't give you ownership over the land it sits on (and Article XII permits anyone to stop by for a visit at any time), but it doesn't outlaw setting up a permanent base. And I hope your "all the resources" includes a small army of lawyers. Between them, Article VI and Article VIII make the United States government responsible for anything you do in space, so there's a lot of paperwork involved in getting permission to do anything above the Karman line.
The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).
When traveling abroad, how does a nation state know that a couple is married? Usually by accepting the couple's verbal statement. Some countries include a remark in a married person's passport with the name of the person's spouse, which is obviously more likely to be accepted in case of doubt, but not all countries do this. The usual formal proof of a foreign marriage is a certified copy of the foreign marriage certificate with an apostille or similar legalization whereby the foreign ministry of the country where the document was issued (or, in some federal contexts, of a constituent entity) attests to the legitimacy of the official who certified the copy and to the authenticity of the certification. This is a fairly burdensome process that is normally associated with proving family relationships in connection with establishing residence in a foreign country. Nobody is going to expect visitors to have such documents. For a casual or temporary purpose such as hospital visitation rights, the certified copy might be helpful even if it is not legalized. On the other hand, in a country where homosexuality is criminalized, the certificate could be used as evidence against the couple. What laws are in place regarding hospitalization and next of kin? This will be governed by national law. Human rights treaties probably have something to say about it, at least indirectly, but if your spouse is in the hospital that's not going to be of much use. Local law and the hospital's policy will control. What happens to a same-sex couple traveling to a nation that is not amicable to same-sex unions, say India? This is rather too broad, especially as it will depend on the sympathy of the people involved as well as on local law. The outcome could be anywhere from according full spousal visitation rights to the arrest of both spouses followed by conviction, imprisonment or possibly worse, deportation, and a ban on reentering the country.
The general rule is that you must comply with all laws. The first thing that means is that you are required to know what the law is, thus ignorance of the law is not a defense for not complying. There are some special circumstances regarding notice, so a law must have been published. Second, whatever the law requires you to do, you have to do it, regardless of any difficulty you might encounter (e.g. you have to pay your taxes even if you don't have enough money). Suppose that a law is so onerous that it is literally impossible to obey it: you still have to obey the law. You have to file a lawsuit against the government challenging the constitutionality of the law, to get the law overturned. Frequently, more requirements are imposed on businesses than on individuals, but there is no legal difference between impositions on individuals and impositions on businesses in terms of laws being difficult to comply with.
For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.
Any country is their own sovereign There is no international law that demands any state to allow anyone free speech of all kinds. Remember that your rights end where the rights of others [incl. society] begin. And in Germany, the right of the society is defined as being not subjected to the symbols of illegal organizations, especially ones that try to violate the liberal democratic basic order Also, Germany is not alone in banning the sentence or the accompanying gesture. They are also illegal to various degrees in Austria, Switzerland, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, and Sweden. It also can be illegal in the US, if disturbing the peace. The sentence is an identifier for a banned organization The sentence is certainly illegal if spoken to express certain things. However, it is legal to be used for example in art (films) and is commonly found in lecture material, as one example of how the nazi party identified. But how? People are often confused, but the rule is actually somewhat easy: If you display any symbol of a banned, unconstitutional organisation (under § 86a StGB) like any of the logos of the Nazi Party and spiritual successors (those with a red bar: banned!) or even the PKK, then you are acting in an illegal manner. And unless you have an exception to claim, the determination can be done entirely on a factual basis by looking at the circumstances. Indeed, the mens rea requirement is so minimal (because the law is written in a way that there is none needed!), that posting photos of a swastika tattoo can get you convicted for jailtime Exceptions However, I mentioned exceptions. Those are in § 86a StGB(3), pointing to $ 86(3)&(4) [eng]: (3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 gelten nicht, wenn die Handlung der staatsbürgerlichen Aufklärung, der Abwehr verfassungswidriger Bestrebungen, der Kunst oder der Wissenschaft, der Forschung oder der Lehre, der Berichterstattung über Vorgänge des Zeitgeschehens oder der Geschichte oder ähnlichen Zwecken dient. (4) Ist die Schuld gering, so kann das Gericht von einer Bestrafung nach dieser Vorschrift absehen. (3) Subsection (1) [and (2)] does not apply if the propaganda material or the act serves civic information, to prevent unconstitutional activities, to promote the arts or science, research or teaching, reporting about current or historical events, or similar purposes. (4) If the degree of guilt is minor, the court may dispense with imposing a penalty under this provision. That is why we have swastikas in German school books, as those tell about the horrors of nazi germany. That is why the logos can be found in research material and history books analyzing the use of the symbols in different countries. That's why the news outlet filming the demo where people yell Heil Hitler show that footage without precautions (unlike those that fly the banned symbol!) That is why you can have the film Inglorious Bastards with all its Swastikas and people yelling Heil Hitler, but its advertisement material was specifically altered to not show those. However, until August 2018, computer games were not accepted as arts. This is why the German versions of Wolfenstein that did get a german release before had been altered to remove Swastikas and voice lines. But the "Sozialadäquanzklausel" had been applied to computer games in August 2018, and the games got (after some other hoops) re-released in their international version on 22nd November 2019. How come some ideologies are banned?! Germany's equivalent of a constitution is the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Its first 20 articles (not paragraphs or sections!) prescribe the rights of any person. The very first and most important one is, and the very first sentence of it makes clear what the very guiding principle of all other laws has to be (emphasis mine) before any of the other basic rights are enumerated. Art. 1: Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. Art. 1: (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. This is the most absolute right anyone can have. There is no provision in any way that would allow (or make it possible!) to strip or reduce the human dignity and every human being, living and dead, has it. Violations of human dignity have been used quite often to repeal laws, such as several incarceration methods or when cuts to the social security system would prevent someone to live a life that would be without dignity. Human Dignity is the measure that can be used to cut all other rights. In fact, it is explicitly the foundational principle of all german laws, that rights are not granted beyond where other rights start and that nobody has any rights when it comes to harming the constitutional order derived from the Grundgesetz (emphasis mine): Art. 2: (1) Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt. (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. Now, where comes freedom of speech? Only in Article 5, and it is absolutely not absolute but has defined limits (emphasis mine): Art 5:(1) Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu äußern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht start. (2) Diese Rechte finden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutze der Jugend und in dem Recht der persönlichen Ehre. (3) Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der Treue zur Verfassung. Art 5: (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Parties and organisations that can't abide by the other rules of law because of their ideology will get banned based on that. In the case of the nazi ideology, it's quite simple: The core idea of Rassenlehre and its believe in Untermenschen is so deeply dehumanizing that there can't ever be a way to get that in line with the very first (as well as 2nd and 3rd) Article of the Grundgesetz. Or to quote the words of Amon: Nazi ideology denies dignity to some humans, goes against the liberal-democratic order, and therefore cannot enjoy the usual protections. Rule of law is still maintained because restrictions to the freedom of expression are codified in law, and violators will get a fair trial. You see, you simply don't even have an absolute right to disseminate your ramblings, because the Basic law itself points to the general laws that ban the dissemination of certain materials. This is how § 86 StGB can ban any propaganda material for organizations and § 86a StGB subsequently bans their symbols, including gestures and slogans.
No, it can't unilaterally scrap such schemes Immigration is a shared competence between the Union and Member States under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This means that the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, it is predicated on a triad: the Commission (proposer of legislation), Parliament (co-decision maker), and the Council of the European Union (co-decision maker). The Parliament would not be able to propose and enact legislation scrapping the schemes by itself. The matter of proposing legislation would fall to the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. Such a proposal would go before the Parliament and the Council of the European Union for a "co-decision". Either side may amend, accept, or reject the proposal. While the Parliament may accept any proposed legislation from the Commission, the Council is unlikely to agree. This is because the Council is comprised of government ministers from each Member State. In the matter of immigration, it is likely that the Home Affairs minister of each Member State would meet as the Council to consider the proposed legislation. Given the obvious conflict of interest for each "golden visa" scheme, it seems unlikely that the Council would agree to curtail or scrap the system given the advantages it provides that Member State, and the need to be "competitive" with other Member States (even though such competition should not really exist, to ensure the harmony of the Union). Therefore, the Council would likely reject the proposed legislation and assuming the subsequent conciliation committee cannot get both the Parliament and the Council to agree on the matter, the proposal will be abandoned.
At what point does combining integrated circuits yield something patentable? I am considering at which point an electronic circuit-based product becomes patentable. If I were to simply design a new electronic circuit by implementing a single integrated circuit (IC) from a manufacturer, I would think that this cannot be patentable. I would also presume that the IC manufacturer has some kind of patent on their own IC. In this case, I would suppose that there is no patentable product and therefore you can sell this product without needing to worry about patent law. But, what about when you combine two ICs that work together to do something than one of the ICs cannot do on its own? At this point, assuming it is novel, useful, nonobvious, and not previously patented, is this patentable? Do I need to begin searching to see if someone else has patented that combination of two ICs before I begin productising an invention? Fundamentally, I would like to understand if combining ICs in a certain way leads to something that is patentable, or is something more complex required?
Electronic designs can be patented provided they meet the criteria for a patentable idea. But patenting a design using specific ICs is probably not a good idea as all someone has to do is redesign the same function using different ICs and they have worked around your patent. The best approach is to patent your circuit function using "functional blocks" that are more generic so that the overall circuit's function, which is the novel idea, it patented and not the specific implementation. Patents can be tricky to navigate. You might do well to consult a patent attorney who can advise you how best to protect your intellectual property.
No, copyright absolutely does not protect anything "novel" or anything related to algorithms or generally anything functional at all. Copyright only protects your "expressed representation of a creative work". Other people can duplicate your work with a different "expression" and not be infringing on copyright. And if there is nothing creative in your work then it's not even eligible for copyright in the first place. For example, if you figure out how to sort an array with fewer computational steps than what anybody else is doing then that is functional code, not creative code, and anybody can reverse engineer/duplicate your sorting algorithm. However, patents do provide the protection you're looking for. If you want to protect your fancy algorithm then apply for a patent. Patents expire an order of magnitude sooner than copyright, but they are the only means of legally protecting this type of intellectual property. Unlike copyright, patent protection is only available if you apply for it, and it has to be approved by the relevant government department in your country (although you can start using the patented technology before approval has gone through).
Notwithstanding in this case takes its ordinary meaning - "despite": Despite anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, any provision of this Agreement which provides for me to assign any of my rights to a Work shall not apply to any invention developed on my own time without using equipment, supplies, facilities or trade secrets… Without having the text of the rest of the relevant parts of the contract, my initial interpretation is that the effect of this, is that you would not need to assign your rights to Works produced in your own time without connection to your paid employment. Also, if this was subordinate to the other clauses you mentioned, then it would have little or no effect. Finally, the general legal principle is that works produced in your own time with no connection to your employment (resources, knowledge or otherwise) are not assigned, unless specifically stated. That is, the contract would generally explicitly state that works produced in your own time with no reliance on your employment are assigned to the Employer. However, such a term is almost certainly unreasonable and could be challenged in court if the employer ever attempted to enforce it.
Critique I'm technically a director of a company ... You either are or you aren't - there is no "technically" involved. ... is not currently trading ... And doing nothing can create a conflict of interest? How? You mustn’t be involved either directly or indirectly with any other trade or business competing in or conflicting with the interests of our Company. "competing or conflicting" is the key here - if the "other trade or business" can adversely affect the performance of your employer then you have a conflict, if not, you don't. are only related in such that they are both technology based but otherwise are unrelated. Sorry, but that is so vague as to be totally useless - what company today is not "technology based"? Pharmaceutical companies are technology based, so are construction companies, so are law firms but one would hardly call them "related". Solution Conflicts of interest are easy: If you don't think you have a conflict of interest and they don't think you have a conflict of interest then you don't have a conflict of interest. If either or both of you do; then you do. Tell them about it! Conflicts of interest are a problem because people think that if you are keeping secrets then you are doing it for a nefarious purpose! In 90% of cases declaring the potential conflict resolves the conflict because the other party says "That! Don't be silly; that's not a problem!" or words to that effect. In the 99.9% of the remaining 10% of cases then sensible people can come up with sensible solutions, for example: If you want to be involved with another business whilst working for us then you’ll need to get a letter from the Director of your area confirming that they’re happy for you to do this.
No, they could not. The conditions of violating a patent don't revolve around monetary gain, so regardless of compensation they would be in violation of the patent.
Many patent applications do not publish until 18 months after they are filed, but can be used as prior art as of their filing date. Therefore, it's not possible to find all the potential prior art that could be used against an application (assuming it hasn't been filed yet, or was filed in the last 18 months). Further, even if all the potential prior art were already public, it isn't especially practical to go through all of it. It sounds as if you've put in a good effort looking for prior art already. At this point, it may be best to file the application and see what the Examiner finds. Also, remember that if you do turn up any prior art that's material to your patent application, you are obligated to disclose it to the USPTO.
In US law, a trademark application only requires that you are now selling, or intend to sell in the reasonably near future, a product (or service) using the specified name. You don't have to provide an example, or a design, and it does not have to be patented. The applicant might be planning to license someone else's patent, or to market off-the-shelf tech not protected by patent. The applicant might be planning to market tech still under development and not yet ready to be submitted for a patent. I do not know Chinese trademark law, but I suspect it is similar in this regard. I have not heard of any country that requires a patent, a design, or an example of a working product along with a trademark registration. However, there is, in many countries, a requirement that actual sales occur within a limited period after the trademark is granted, and if this does not happen, the trademark registration may be canceled. The time allowed varies.
Without a patent, your inventions are not protected (except as trade secrets). If you publish your findings, anyone can use them. It is possible to patent the specific design of your chassis. Design patents, which cover the specific aesthetic design of something, can be less expensive than utility patents, which cover functional aspects. Although your chassis is designed with functionality in mind, it will also embody an aesthetic design. That said, enforcement of patent rights (or any other rights you might hope protect your chassis) is orders of magnitude more expensive (typically millions of dollars) than merely obtaining a patent. Thus, even if you do obtain protection for the chassis design or the method of designing it, your budget may make it impractical to effectively take advantage of those protections, unless a law firm is willing to take the case on contingency.
I have copyright of a precious notebook that its thief bequeathed to a museum that refuses to give me back the notebook. What is my recourse? The museum does not dispute that this historically important notebook belongs to my family. Nor does it dispute how it came into the thieving family's hands. In correspondence the museum offers a "finders keepers" argument, knowing full well it cannot display or make copies of this notebook without my permission. It is in effect, holding it hostage pending my agreeing to grant copyright (which I will never do). In the current situation no one can see, study or benefit from this notebook's immense importance. Have I any recourse?
You likely have no legal recourse Your copyright claim is irrelevant and your title claim is likely statute barred. It is a little unclear exactly what is going on here so I will state my understanding and answer on this basis. There is a historic artifact (the notebook) that contains words and possibly pictures made by someone, now deceased, who was a relation of yours. You believe that in the normal course of inheritance, that notebook should have become a possession of yours or others in your near family. At some point in the (distant?) past the notebook came into the possession of another family. The museum acquired the item from someone in this family; I will assume in good faith - that is, without knowing about your claim to it. Copyright You say you have "copyright of a precious notebook" - this is not true. Any copyright you might have is in the words and drawings in the notebook - they give you no claim to the notebook itself. The distinction here might be illustrated by considering the words of the Declaration of Independence (which are available for the Googling) and the actual engrossed copy held in the National Archives. Copyright is a bundle of exclusive rights that attach to literary and artistic expression once placed in a tangible form. The notebook is the tangible form but it is the words and pictures that the copyright subsists in. Assuming that you own the copyright that does not give you any right over the physical notebook; it only gives you rights to prevent or allow copies or derivative works to be made and only to the extent that those uses are not permitted by copyright law. Based solely on copyright, you could not prevent the museum from displaying the notebook (as an artifact without displaying the copyrighted words), including photographs of it in catalogues or on their website, or even reproducing small parts of it for educational purposes. In any event, copyright only lasts for a set period of time. The exact details depend on which nation's law the copyright was originally created and sometimes when. The US is particularly tricky here but other nations can also make things challenging. In addition, when suing for copyright infringement, the laws of the nation where the infringing copy is produced are also relevant. Title Title is the legal term for the bundle of rights that we commonly think of as ownership of property. For our purposes we are going to limit ourselves to just these: possession: who physically has the property whether they have a right to it or not. right of possession: who has the legal right to be in possession, whether they presently have it or not right or property: is the right which, if all relevant facts are known (and allowed), defeats all other claims These exist in a hierarchy - 3 beats everyone, 2 beats everyone but 3, and 1 beats everyone but 2 or 3. Often these rights are possessed by a single person - when I'm driving my car I have possession, I have the right of possession, and I have the right of property. When I take my car to the mechanic and it gets stolen - the thief has possession, the mechanic has the right of possession, and I have the right of property. Here the museum has possession of the notebook - which gives them the best claim so far. To defeat that, you would need to be able to prove that you either have a right of possession or a right of property. This is not as easy as it sounds. To do this thoroughly, you would need to prove that the original author had one of these rights in the notebook - that he didn't steal it, or buy it from somebody who stole it, or that it wasn't made with stolen paper, or stolen glue etc. This could be presumed unless someone had evidence to contest it. Then you would need to prove that the notebook should have come to you through gift or purchase. This is particularly troublesome. Let's assume that this notebook originally belonged to your great-grandfather (that is he had all three rights above) and, when he passed, he had three surviving children. Unless he specifically willed it to one of those children (or the cat's home) then the three children will inherit the right of property and the right of possession collectively. Of course, unless they share a house, only one of those children can actually possess it. Then each of those children has 3 surviving children; when all three pass on, those 9 will own it collectively - and so on. Now, because this becomes such a bloody mess, governments have passed statutes of limitations that draw a line in how far back people can go in pursuing these claims against the person in possession. These limits vary by jurisdiction but ranges of 2-10 years are typical; they may sometimes be extended in exceptional circumstances by the courts. So, when the other family took possession of the notebook, the clock started running for your family to file a claim to get it back. Unless this happened within say, the last half-decade, you basically have no legal recourse.
The copyright of each photo almost certainly belongs to you if you are the one who took them, but the actual taking of photos may have been unpermitted. Selling them is abrogating the ability of the institution to take their own photos and sell those. You will probably not face copyright issues, but the institution could sue for their destruction and a handover of any profit derived, along with any contractual or academic or other penalties that apply.
Copyright exists from the moment of creation of the work Copyright notices and dates are neither required nor meaningful. They are a courtesy to others. They can also have typos.
The author of the book may have a copyright, because he created a new piece of work from the/a original work. For example, by translating it in another language or in a modernized language, by rearranging the content, by adding images or commentaries etc. You will therefore have to find a book or other source that is not or not anymore copyrighted.
I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing.
Under 17 USC 106 (3) one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is: to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; Distributing an entire book cannot plausibly be considered to be fair use. Nor does the library exception apply. The exception in sec 109 (first sale doctrine) applies only to: the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner... 17 USC 501 (a) says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. Therefore both Bob and Sue have infringed the copyright, and could in theory be sued for doing so. However I cannot see anything in 17USC which makes receiving an unlawful copy an infringement, or any other crime or tort. It seems to me that Alice has no legal liability, whatever her moral position may be, unless perhaps she could be charged with conspiracy to infringe the copyright, which seems unlikely to me in practice, and perhaps not possible even in theory. If Bob has in fact done this only once, for one book, the chancre of the copyright owner learning of it, or filing suit even if the owner does learn, is perhaps not large. But that would be no defense if the owner chose to sue. Some copyright owners choose to explicitly permit actions similar to that of Bob (where e-books are involved), provided that Bob does not charge a fee, regarding it as good advertising. But that is the copyright owner's choice to make, and most commercial publishers do not take that position. Bob could have legally loaned his copy to Sue, and Sue could have legally passed it on to Alice, without anyone infringing the copyright. Making the copy without permission was infringing, and passing on the unlawful copy was also an act of infringement. Receiving one copy or many does not seem to be a violation, unless it is part of a plan to later distribute unlawful copies. Sue did not make a copy. She distributed an unlawful copy, which is also infringement, as the quoted part of Sec 106 says. While in theory the publisher could have authorized Bob to make the copy, this is not plausible and no reasonable person would believe this to be an authorized copy. So Sue has good reason to believe that the copy is unauthorized. So the distribution is infringement.
Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission.
There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.
Statute of limitations in the USA I was reading this interesting article by Bruce Schneier, where he explains how a notorious hacker called Kevin Mitnick "hacked" California Law in 1983 by researching the statute of limitations on his crimes and avoiding prison. I noticed the following comment on the article: No, his attorney was just a bad attorney. Statutes of limitations toll, but jurisdiction is an absolute bar; it does not toll. A competent attorney would know that. I was curious if this were true, and whether someone could explain the difference between the statute of limitations (which can be tolled whilst someone has a warrant) and jurisdiction absolute bar?
The distinction being made here is far more subtle than it is made out to be in the article. There is a whole cottage industry of case law in almost every state (and under federal law) to determine which deadlines are jurisdictional and which are not. The case law is not uniform nationwide, and often, it isn't even consistent in seemingly analogous circumstances in a single state. The analysis is also more results driven than it is logical. And, it isn't unheard of for a state supreme court to decide that a deadline that lower courts have called jurisdictional for decades, but that the state supreme court has never had an occasion to consider, isn't jurisdictional after all and can be tolled. I've seen it happen more than once (although I don't have citations to those cases easily at hand). There may be practical importance to a parole officer deciding that the deadline has run. This might prevent the issue from ever being litigated. But, the person quoted in the article on that point is a non-lawyer government civil servant who isn't the person who will make the final call if the issue were ever litigated, something that would instead be handled by a senior lawyer in the California Attorney General's office. The author, like a lot of IT professionals and engineers, expects the law to be more consistent, logical, and predictable than it really is, and it so happens that this time he got lucky in his own case, so he thinks he's an expert.
The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.
At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances).
Is this something for small claims court Yes. The explicitness of your prior leases overrides the statutory variations that might exist among jurisdictions in this regard. And the total of 50$/month for six or seven years indicates that you would have to pursue recovery in small claims court (at least if the landlord refuses to reimburse you). In Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. See 893.43. Statute of limitations means the lapse of time upon which claims of certain type are no longer actionable. Thus, you would only be able to recover the fees of the latest 6 years except for this year's lease, since your current lease no longer specifies that the landlord will cover that cost. For more information on small claims courts, see chapter 799 of the Wisconsin statutory law.
In many US states (and in the UK), statutory rape is a strict liability offense. This means that there is no intent requirement at all; the only allowable defenses are those that negate the actual act (there was no sex, the person was of age, or sometimes that the action was not a conscious or voluntary action), it falls within a statutory exception to the crime, or there is an applicable defense that has nothing to do with intent. Many general defenses do not apply to strict liability crimes; in particular, "I thought X when Y was true" tries to show there was to intent to commit the crime, which is irrelevant. In Michigan (where the crime took place), statutory rape is evidently such an offense. That throws some standard defenses into doubt, because anything based on negating criminal intent doesn't matter. However, Michigan does specifically say that it is not criminal to have sex with a person under 16 if they are your legal spouse; this is a very common exception to statutory rape laws. So, marriage is a way to not risk jail for statutory rape in Michigan. However, things do vary by state. In Indiana, it is specifically a defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over the age of consent (unless it was a forcible rape).
In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984).
It depends on the jurisdiction (naturally). The answer for Washington is "No, not exactly". RCW 9a.83.030 states that "The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds". The police can seize real property, but must file a lis pendens regarding the property. The bar that has to be cleared for forfeiture is "probable cause". The Institute for Justice has an extensive analysis of civil forfeiture, especially with a state by state summary (they aren't positionally neutral on forfeiture, but they are legally respectable). Then after a inevitable judgment (90 days if the judgment is sooner), the property is transferred. Notice is to be "served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest", so they would notify Bob (assuming they know Bob is the real owner). Or, if Bob learns of the seizure that "If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right". It is possible that Bob's property could be taken (nothing prevents it), especially if Bob's hands are unclean.
No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.
How can a finding of suicide (on the death certificate) by the Office of Chief Medical Examiner be legally contested in the City of New York? Inspired by some real-life case, what is the legal procedure by which a finding of suicide by Office of Chief Medical Examiner can be contested in New York City? An article authored by some Centers for Disease Control personnel suggests that such a procedure might exist in general (without ref. to New York City particulars): if the family opposes a suicide determination and the ME/C finds the evidence supporting suicide lacking in any way, the ME/C may declare the death undetermined to avoid a potential legal dispute (ME/C - there stands for "medical examiners and coroners". The reason for the latter distinction is somewhat complicated, but not terribly relevant here since New York City has abolished coroners in 1918, according to Wikipedia, although other New York [State] counties might not have done that.) So, how can one legally dispute that finding of suicide recorded on the death certificate in New York City, in particular?
Here is the section of NYC law on the medical examiner. §17-207 provides for a "Root cause analysis", in case there is a "significant event". A significant event, as defined in that section, is where there is probably a technical screw-up in the office of chief medical examiner; the designated root cause analysis officer then develops guidelines for determining whether a significant event has occurred, then reporting, and other procedures. Then if it is determined that there was a screw-up, there shall be a report written, and this may get reported to the mayor or city council. Although there is no explicit statement therein about outsiders filing a complaint, you can always file an administrative complaint, and the law does say that there shall not be any disclosure of the identity of "any complainant, victim or decedent". I assume the purpose of this complaint would be to force the medical examiner to change his report. If you simply just want to proffer an alternative claim, you can hire your own pathologists to make a different conclusion. One might care about the suicide / homicide distinction in case there was for instance an insurance policy that depended on the cause of death not being suicide. In which case, you would sue the insurance company, and the jury would look at the evidence for and against the suicide claim. As far as I can tell, there is no mechanism purporting to force the medical examiner to re-write his report and reach a different conclusion (the courts will not compel him to express a particular viewpoint).
This is allowed in Colorado. Colorado's version of the Uniform Probate Code authorizes such a document for tangible personal property which is usually called a "Personal Property Memorandum." This is authorized by Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. The section of Colorado's probate code states: Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. New York State Law NYS has a requirement that the Will is signed by 2 Witnesses and (I believe -- keep me honest) notarized. So I'm hoping this is a way for me to add items to the Appendix without needing to re-sign, re-witness and re-notarize every time I think of something else. Is this strategy valid & enforceable? This is generally not permitted in New York State The legal formalities for the execution of wills and trusts in New York States are among the most strict in the United States (Florida and Maine have been more strict from time to time). This cannot be done in a way that is valid and enforceable in New York State. One can determine this from a review of the relevant New York State Statute which is called the Estate, Powers, and Trusts Law (EPTL), that does not contain a parallel provision to the Colorado statutory section. Therefore, in New York States, all dispositive provisions of a Will related to tangible personal property must be executed with the same formalities as any other Will or Codicil (i.e. it must be signed by the testator and two witnesses, a notarization is not required). Oral and unwitnessed handwritten wills are rarely allowed in New York State New York State does recognize oral wills (called nuncupative wills) and wills in the handwriting of the person making them (called holographic wills) as well, but only in very limited circumstances. The pertinent provision of the EPTL state: (a) For the purposes of this section, and as used elsewhere in this chapter: (1) A will is nuncupative when it is unwritten, and the making thereof by the testator and its provisions are clearly established by at least two witnesses. (2) A will is holographic when it is written entirely in the handwriting of the testator, and is not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities prescribed by 3-2.1. (b) A nuncupative or holographic will is valid only if made by: (1) A member of the armed forces of the United States while in actual military or naval service during a war, declared or undeclared, or other armed conflict in which members of the armed forces are engaged. (2) A person who serves with or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval service during such war or other armed conflict. (3) A mariner while at sea. (c) A will authorized by this section becomes invalid: (1) If made by a member of the armed forces, upon the expiration of one year following his discharge from the armed forces. (2) If made by a person who serves with or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval service, upon the expiration of one year from the time he has ceased serving with or accompanying such armed force. (3) If made by a mariner while at sea, upon the expiration of three years from the time such will was made. Wills valid where executed will generally be honored If a Will accompanied by a Personal Property Memorandum were drafted and executed in Colorado while someone was domiciled there, and then was presented to a Surrogate's Court in New York State for probate, because the person who wrote it was domiciled in New York State when they died, however, the New York courts might honor the Personal Property Memorandum on the theory that the validity of the execution of a Will is usually governed by the law of the place where it is signed and not by the law of the place where it is probated. The alternative of a revocable trust in New York State A workaround somewhat similar to a personal property memorandum could be done with a revocable trust, but this has its own limitations. In New York State a trust or amendment to a trust not created by a last will and testament must be either (1) signed and notarized by the creator of the trust and also by the trustee if there is one separate from the creator of the trust, or (2) signed by the creator of the trust and witnessed by two witnesses in essentially the same way that a will would be witnessed. Unlike most U.S. states, New York State does not recognize trusts that are signed but are not notarized or witnessed, and unlike most U.S. States, New York State does not recognize orally created trusts. Trusts validly formed and amended outside of New York will generally be honored This is, of course, assuming in both cases that New York State law governs the formation of the trust. New York State choice of law rules, however, will generally recognize the validity of a trust formed with formalities that were valid in the place where it was executed if the person executing it was domiciled there.
The Board of Estimates still gave small boroughs like Staten Island more representatives per voter than large boroughs like Manhattan. Therefore it violated the one man, one vote principal which is evaluated with respect to all representatives having votes in a body, not just those that hold a majority. The analysis is to take all at large seats that don't violate the one man, one vote rule off the table and look at the fairness of the allocation of the remaining seats. This was an easy case, not a hard one, for the U.S. Supreme Court. The leading case are: First, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not exempt from judicial review under Article IV, Section 4, as the equal protection issue in this case was separate from any political questions). As Wikipedia explains (links to selected full text opinions added): The "one person, one vote" doctrine, which requires electoral districts to be apportioned according to population, thus making each district roughly equal in population, was further cemented in the cases that followed Baker v. Carr, including Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) which concerned state county districts, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) which concerned state legislature districts, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) which concerned U.S. Congressional districts and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) which concerned local government districts, a decision which was upheld in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Evenwel v. Abbott (2016) said states may use total population in drawing districts (as opposed to eligible voters).
The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question).
The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.
It depends. The police and only the police decide what are and are not police matters. However, although it might not be a police matter, you still have lots of options at your disposal. For example, does your jurisdiction (city, town, municipality, etc.) have an animal control division? i.e., City dog catcher. Most do. If so, I would call the animal control division and file a report. They might possibly do a field visit and take the animal into custody if the animal is still roaming loose. If you sustained bodily injuries, you should get checked by a doctor and have those injuries documented in a medical report. If possible, you could drive by the property and take photos of the unchained dog roaming loose. Then, armed with your evidence consisting of: police report medical injury report animal control report and photographs of the scene You could (with the help of a licensed attorney) file a civil suit against the pet owner. You might be able to win an award for damages, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages as well (check with your attorney). Also, your attorney could advise you if you might have a cause to move for an enforcement action against the dog and/or its owners that might or might not include having the animal removed from the owners custody or in extreme cases of negligence and bad behavior possibly "put to sleep." Your suit might focus on collecting from the homeowner's insurance policy of the pet owner and you could potentially collect a lot of money with the right set of facts and evidence on your side. You might want to look for an attorney who specializes in personal injury. Most PI attorneys work on a contingency. Meaning they don't charge an up front fee and will only get paid if you win your case or settle. In which case their fee is typically about 1/3 of what you get awarded in settlement or judgment.
Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".
The relevant NY law originally said that "Written instrument" means any instrument or article, including computer data or a computer program, containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information, or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person. The modification adds: For the purposes of this article, a card provided to a person by a vaccine provider indicating the date a person received a vaccination against COVID-19, the type of vaccine and its lot number, and bearing a government logo or other indication that it is created by a governmental instrumentality, shall be considered a written instrument. This is an unnecessary modification: a covid card is plainly a "written instrument". Working through the definitions of falsely made, completed or altered, we see that a covid card modified as described is a forged document, and always has been one. Actually using a forged instrument is a crime, and has been so, and even possessing one is as long as you possess or utter it "with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another". So, (1) it is a crime in New York, (2) it has long been a crime in NY and (3) is probably a crime in other states, when there forgery laws are functionally equivalent to NY laws. For example, in Washington, RCW 9a.60.020 (1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud: (a) He or she falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or; (b) He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged. It does not matter if you forge a document in a state where it is legal (if any such state exists) and then transport it to a state where forged documents are illegal. If you possess it and intend to use it knowing that it is forged, it is a crime.
Can a 401k plan exclude Union members? John Hancock manages our 401k at work, they have under eligibility, Excluded employees: Union employees, Nonresident Aliens, and Leased Employees; 21 years of age and 3 consecutive months My workplace isn't even unionized. It just shocks me that a 401k can exclude a Union: obviously the Union can negotiate for the members, but can a company say that if you join the union you'll be kicked out of the company's 401k? Also, what happens then if you have a 401k with the company and a union forms and you want to join it?
The reason for that standard boilerplate is that any union members would be covered by the terms of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (often called the Contract). This isn't an attempt to exclude union members, it's just wording that if you are in a union, your CBA takes precedence.
How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.
All employees in Australia are covered by state-based Worker’s Compensation insurance. This is the workers’ guide for NSW. In theory, your loss of income and medical expenses should be claimable. However, as it seems that you did not follow the required procedures, in practice, you may find it a bureaucratic nightmare. First, you needed to have been seen by a registered Australian doctor and receive a Workers Compensation certificate to get the ball rolling. Do you have evidence that the injury occurred at work? Second, benefits are suspended if you leave the country. There may be exemptions for temporary workers but I am unaware of them. Contact the authority responsible for workers compensation in the state you were injured.
The first question would be whether you are an employee, or an independent contractor. There is more to that determination than how the company labels you, but that is a starting point. Based on the minimal autonomy that you imply that you have, you would probably be found to be an employee. Then there are limits on the number of hours that you can work in a week or day, which they are complying with. The employer is required to record the hours that you worked, and it is a crime to keep false records. It is also required that an employer pay for the time you work. Therefore the employer cannot legally refuse to pay you for your labor, and they cannot legally falsify records. The employer can limit your pay to 15 hours per week, if you work just 15 hours per week. They can also set ridiculous performance standards, whereby at the end of the week you will not have done what they wanted you to do. Their only recourse is to dismiss you. In response, you can file a complaint, but note that the concept of "wrongful dismissal" under the act is about entitlement to termination or severance pay. The arbitrator may find that the employer contravened the act, and can order them to rescind the termination. Or, before you get fired, you can complain and the arbitrator could order the employer to either modify their work requirements or else to pay you for the time worked. The difficult point (for you) in this case is that the act does not address employer performance expectations, and employers are generally allowed to set their own performance standards. If you have a written employment contract, there might be provisions regarding termination which could help you. Without a written contact, there is no statutory provision that prevents an employer for terminating you, but they may have to give you notice and pay for doing so, as long as you are not terminated for "just cause". Hoang v. Mann, 2014 ONSC 3762 is an Ontario case where an employee was terminated for just case based on insubordination, job performance, inability to get along with co-workers and so on. On the front of job performance, the courts have found that an employer must clearly communicate standards to employees, and give employees an opportunity to meet those standards. But they do not generally decide e.g. how many units per hour an assembly-line worker can reasonably be expected to complete.
In the U.S. severance payments are not provided for statutorily, and are rarely made when an employee quits or is fired for cause. However, even when not provided for within contracts it is common to see voluntary severances paid during lay-offs. Furthermore, in the U.S. it is more likely that they would be "laid off" in order to qualify for unemployment insurance. In Pennsylvania one can make claims on the state-run unemployment insurance system only if one is able to work and does not refuse suitable work when offered. If one quits one is not eligible for these payments. Ultimately unemployment claims are born by the employer (since their legally-mandated unemployment insurance premiums are adjusted based on realized claims). So managers with the authority to layoff employees can impose real costs on their companies, both in terms of direct severance payments (which may be optional), and in terms of the inflated unemployment premiums that will hit the company down the road. However, I have never heard of a company attempting to recoup such costs from managers, since such decisions are specifically delegated to managers with hiring/firing authority. It seems much more likely that a manager deemed to have abused the company's purse would be demoted or fired rather than being sued, unless there were some gross fraud involved (e.g., kickbacks).
> What does that last sentence mean? It means that federal law does not provide premium pay on Sundays and Holidays the way MA does. > Should I be getting paid more than I am? No. Check out G.L. c. 151, § 1A: the hours so worked on Sunday or certain holidays shall be excluded from the calculation of overtime pay In other words, take your eight hours on Sunday and subtract that from the total hours for the week. That number minus 40 is how many OT hours you get. This calculation is called crediting - basically the employer credits your time-and-a-half Sunday work against your total hours for the week. Crediting is allowed and it is why you do not get the Sunday pay on top of your overtime. If you want to get in the weeds take a look at Swift v Autozone where the MA Supreme Court describes why crediting is allowed. Also see 29 U.S.C. 207(h)(2) which tells us that extra compensation is creditable..
The "Severance Agreement" is a contract between the company and you. It spells out what the company will do and probably what they expect you to do going forward. Simple enough. The statement you referenced merely says that you are not being forced to sign the agreement. That's all. You don't, presumably, have the option of remaining employed at this company but you DO NOT have to sign this agreement. But if you don't, it's likely that any benefits being promised in the agreement will not be delivered to you. So specifically in answer to your questions: It protects them against a claim that they somehow forced you to sign the agreement. Likely anything that the agreement says the company will do such as pay you a certain amount of money and the like. Bottom line is that if you don't like the agreement, don't sign it. If you want the benefits they are promising in the agreement, then sign it and move on.
Employees of an employer aren't governed by a fault based liability regime in the United States (subject to some usually quite narrow exceptions that vary from state to state, which sometimes also limit tort liability). Instead, employers are required to have worker's compensation insurance policies in place, in exchange for not having any tort liability whatsoever to employees. (An employer who doesn't have worker's compensation in place is strictly liable to the worker for all injuries suffered by an employee whatsoever at work, without the prohibition of a worker's compensation insurance policy plan on paying things like pain and suffering damages as well.) Worker's compensation insurance provides coverage (in principle) for all medical costs incurred, all lost wages, and in the event of a death support for dependents if any and a modest death benefit sufficient to provide a funeral if there are no dependents. Often, in practice, worker's compensation insurance payments tend to be rather stingy. One of the most common big worker's compensation claims these days, especially in office and retail workplaces, is for employees who are seriously injured or killed in crimes at work. Often, a worker's compensation insurer will give an employer a discount if they have a "gun free" zone, because, statistically, doing so greatly reduces the average amount of harm experienced by employees at work. The presence of employees with guns in the workplace, as an actuarial matter, greatly increases the insurance company's risk of having to pay claims.
Can a Lower Court Claim to be "Smarter" than the Supreme Court? In Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski the Supreme Court agreed to review as to whether a denial of a motion to compel arbitration ousts a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal. I understand that the Coinbase case is being stayed since they are waiting for the Supreme Court to issue a verdict. When a matter currently present before a federal or state court is actively being litigated in the Supreme Court, do the lower courts have the jurisdiction to issue an order on the merits of a dispute before the US Supreme Court releases an opinion relating to the issue? As it applies to the Coinbase v Bielski, when a party files a Motion to Stay pending appeal the question is whether the lower courts are required to stay the case until the Supreme Court issues a verdict? In other words, if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? Can a lower court essentially claim that "we know better" than the Supreme Court?
Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.
Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.
Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction.
Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.
Where can I find actual cases where Blockchain (particularly Ethereum Blockchain) was used in a case, or better yet, decided the verdict of a case The results of this query reflect that that has not happened in U.S. courts yet. Mentions of Ethereum in those rulings are marginal and essentially unrelated to the blockchain technology on which major cryptocurrencies are implemented. That being said, the notion of smart contracts in Ethereum is quite distant from the disputes decided under contract law. In Ethereum, "smart contracts" is the term for programs that will execute a transaction in accordance to a predetermined schedule and/or conditions. Its involvement in contract law seemingly might only be in terms of (1) parties not furnishing the requisite keys, thereby frustrating the execution of that transaction, or (2) the implementation of those programs departing from what was agreed upon between the parties. Neither of these aspects has anything to do with the novelties spoken of Blockchain. Moreover, the expertise that programming and Blockchain entail implies that verdicts (or more precisely, the fact-finding therefor) would be premised on testimony provided by an expert witness. The average juror is unlikely to have the knowledge and skills set to assess the evidence (e.g. Blockchain, smart contracts, etc.) more directly.
A motion to dismiss sets no precedent Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case as pleaded shows the defendant has a case to answer. The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent. As to your final question Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs? No one knows. Hence the lawsuit.
This is a Federal court decision There are no state courts involved. This was a ruling by the presiding judge of the original trial There is no appeal involved because the case wasn't final. This is a ruling on a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure spells this out: After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict.
It depends on what the jury said, and if it's criminal or civil. In criminal cases, the judge may almost never set aside a verdict of acquittal. There is a single case in the US in which this happened, and it was a bench trial (no jury). That case featured the defendant bribing his trial judge; the Seventh Circuit held that he was never in jeopardy due to the bribe. As far as I can tell, that's the only one. There have been no cases that I can find of a jury's verdict of acquittal being overturnable. Judges can poll the jury to make sure they're unanimous (at least in federal court), and if they aren't then it's a mistrial, but that's because the jury was never in agreement in the first place. On the other hand, a judge has several ways to enforce an acquittal. In federal court, for instance, the defense can move for a motion of acquittal either before or after the case goes to the jury. If the motion is granted before the verdict, double jeopardy applies to retrial. If it's granted after a conviction, then the judicial acquittal can be reversed on appeal, possibly requiring a new trial. Before the verdict is returned, the judge can declare a mistrial. After the verdict is returned, it's too late for that. In civil cases, things are more complicated: double jeopardy does not exist there. There, there is a notion of a judgment as a matter of law: the judge determines that, based on evidence presented, no reasonable jury could possibly find the other way. This can happen before or after the verdict, and is appealable.
Is the China balloon breaking any laws? It's reported in the news that China have sent a balloon over America. Some say it's a spy camera and some say it's a weather balloon. Has China broken any American or international laws, such as spying or trespass?
First, it is highly unlikely that it would remain continuously exactly at 60,000 feet. I mention this because that altitude happens to be the boundary between Class "A" airspace, and Class "E". (see graphic below) Class A airspace is the domain of a lot of commercial air traffic, so the FAA regulates it closely. Specific requirements for aircraft can be found in 14 CFR 91.135. If no prior coordination was made with FAA Air Traffic Controllers, and no clearance was explicitly given, the balloon would be in violation of this regulation at a minimum. Presuming it would drift above 60,000', it would still be in Class E airspace, which the FAA has jurisdiction over, even if the flight requirements are less stringent. Specific requirements for balloons can be found in 14 CFR Subpart D, 101.33, 101.35, 101.37, and 101.39. Presuming the Chinese did not comply, it would also be in violation of these sections.
Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.
The 9th Circuit decision actually held that the challenged regulations constitute a prior restraint on speech that offends the First Amendment which is not the same as saying that computer software is speech. A crucial differentiation is that by prohibiting talking about the technology, the regulations imposed a "prepublication licensing scheme that burdens scientific expression", which distinguishes the TikTok case from talking about cryptography. The regulations burden business transactions, which have for a long time not been protected by strict scrutiny. The first hill one would have to climb would be showing that there is a real First Amendment issue. There is no First Amendment right for the Chinese government to spy on Americans. The second issue is whether narrow tailoring means that if someone can come up with an alternative to an outright ban, then the regulation is not narrowly-enough tailored. We may eventually get a clearer guideline on that, since state governments have imposed very many restrictions on constitutional liberties, in order to prevent the spread of covid, when a less restrictive action would be warning people that this is a dangerous disease. Many restrictions have survived strict scrutiny because they were believed to be necessary to achieve that governmental end. The executive order identifies the compelling government interest: TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users, including Internet and other network activity information such as location data and browsing and search histories. This data collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information — potentially allowing China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage. In light of that, it is hard to see that a warning notice would be effective in the face of this threat. Seizing the company and its IP and handing it over to Microsoft would be a less restrictive measure that would probably be as effective and would be protective of the First Amendment rights of teenagers, but it would also be somewhat outside the scope of current US law, so it isn't an actual alternative. I conclude that the ban is the least restrictive effective response to the threat. But it is not entirely clear what the constitutional rules are regarding effectiveness of alternatives (does 20% less restrictive compel a 10% less effective solution?).
Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.
If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.
There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.
This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist.
This has yet to be specifically decided in the federal courts. The Post Office can set "rules of conduct" for its facilities. Prohibiting photographing is plainly a restriction on one's First Amendment rights, and it is established beyond question that a government cannot issue / enforce a blanket prohibition of public photographing. Someone would have to take a case to court to determine whether this limitation on First Amendment rights passes the relevant level of judicial scrutiny. The rationale (as set forth by the USPS) is that such photographing may be "disruptive". One can perhaps analogize the right to film police with a new-found right to film post office, following from a right to public oversight over the government. DHS gives general guidance of its own (with a pile of redacted stuff), directing you to 41 CFR 102-74.420. Permission is thus required, until the courts find that to be an unconstitutional restriction (I would not expect there to be such a finding). But it is not unthinkable that the courts could at some point so rule. The YouTube aspect of the question is irrelevant: if you have the right, you have the right, and it doesn't derive from nor is it blocked by an intent to distribute on YouTube.
Is "not committing a crime" sufficient consideration? Alice sees John attempting to steal her car. For some reason, instead of calling the police, she says "I'll give you $1,000 tomorrow if you don't steal my car." John agrees. Scenario 1 Alice gives John $1,000 and he doesn't steal the car. Has either of them committed a crime (e.g. extortion)? Scenario 2 One of them breaches the contract and the other sues. Is there consideration for a valid contract? Scenario 2A Alice does not give John the money the next day. Can he sue her for breach of contract? Can he legally take her car? Scenario 2B Later that day, before the money is due, John steals the car. Can Alice sue for breach of contract, in addition to the typical theft-related claims? Scenario 2C The next day, after Alice gives him the money, John steals her car. Can she sue to get the $1,000 back?
Forbearance from action can be consideration, but it must be forbearance from something that is one's legal right. It is sufficient that a person has restricted their lawful freedom of action. See Hamer v. Sidway, (1891) 124 NY 538. A promise to not do something that one has no right to do in the first place is not consideration. Throughout your entire spectrum of examples: there is no contract to breach; the intitial attempted theft was an offence; absent consent, it will never be lawful for John to take the car; any money accepted by John is likely an unjust enrichment.
The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK.
Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement.
The clause you highlighted has an "or" in front of it: "..., or in such pretended character...". It's only one alternative. Demanding or obtaining money, etc, is sufficient to violate the statute but not necessary. Looking at the previous clause, it is still a violation if the pretender merely "acts as such", which I suppose is what people allege this person is doing. She can be guilty without having demanded or obtained anything, so the question about whether it's a "thing of value" is moot. As to the "nonexistent agency" issue: a useful source for information about how federal criminal laws are interpreted and enforced is the Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual. (The link may be a past version; they seem to have reorganized their documents and I can't find a version not marked as "archived", but I think the information is still valuable.) 18 USC 912 is discussed in sections 1469-1477 of that version. Section 1474 examines the meaning of the "acts as such" element, and includes this note: It is not necessary that the act be one which the pretended officer would have authority to perform if he were in fact the officer he represents himself to be. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d at 98. Nor is it necessary that there be in fact such an officer as the defendant pretends to be. Caruso v. United States, 414 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1969). Caruso in particular was a case in which the defendant, as part of a scam, claimed to be the Administrator of a Veterans Hospital. He was convicted, and appealed on the basis that the government had not proved that the office of administrator existed. (Just as in this case, the government certainly could not prove that the Freedom to Breathe Agency existed, since it does not.) The Fifth Circuit found that his point had "no merit" and, citing Brafford v. United States (6 Cir. 1919, 259 F. 511, 513), that it was "immaterial whether or not there was any government officer or employee with the precise title [the defendant] assumed". I realize that claiming to be a nonexistent officer is not exactly the same thing as claiming to represent a nonexistent agency, but I would expect that courts would treat it the same.
You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
Barring manufacturer negligence (and even this is a dubious theory, given that recovery would be for pure economic loss), there is probably no legal theory that would allow recovery of any loss of resale value. I am assuming that the promise to replace/repair the engine if it fails is part of the contract of sale. This is typical for a warranty that the manufacturer will repair certain failures. Assuming the manufacturer fulfils what it agreed to in the warranty, then the buyer is getting exactly what they contracted for and there is no contractual theory that would support any further recovery: there is no breach. The buyer bought a car that included a warranty to repair. I cannot imagine that they bought a car that included a promise that it would not fail.
No. Your evidence of registration of the car would suffice to show that you are not receiving stolen property, although you are correct that not informing the police that it has been recovered could get you pulled over if the car has been reported as stolen. Given the circumstances of the question, I don't address the means by which the car is repossessed. Not every use of force would be justified to secure the return of the stolen car. Reporting the theft and recover to the police would also make it easier for you to make an insurance claim. Repossession of a car stolen by fraud (tricking you into signing over the car title to them in exchange for Monopoly money in an envelope that you don't check until after they are gone, or for a forged check), which is then sold to a bona fide third party individual for value, however, might constitute car theft.
What power do I have as a driver if my interstate route is blocked by a protest? I recently read about protests blocking an interstate. I feel like ethically no one no (non-police) citizen has the right to obstruct my travel (on a public interstate for the sake of protest), therefore I'm interested to know if I personally have any legal route to retaliate against the individuals stopping my travel (exercising their rights at the expense of mine). Just because I think I should have the right to slowly push through a crowd unlawfully impeding my travel, doesn't make it the law, unfortunately. But that's why we have laws, right? So we can retaliate against people we feel are impeding our freedom in a peaceful manner. My question is simply of whether I have the ability to legally retaliate against the protesters who may have just made me an hour late for an important event by blocking a public freeway. Edit: Another way to look at it: If a police officer detained me without cause, and there were witnesses and video to verify this, I could sue the police department and win. Why then, can a group of citizens detain me without cause, without also facing legal repercussion? I'm curious to know what legal grounds I would have in this situation to travel unobstructed. Can I only call the police and hope they press charges? Can I video the protesters and press charges against each of them, even sue each protester for damages? In other words, is there any way for me to retaliate against the (unlawful) protesters legally and peacefully? Note: Many are responding with something along the lines of "What if it were an accident? You couldn't press charges on the drivers in an accident for detaining you". There's a huge difference between being detained by an accident, and a group of people intentionally and unlawfully detaining me on a public freeway. So I really don't understand these responses. My initial wording to the question seemed to confuse my intentions and lead to alot of "no, you can't run them over" rhetoric (which wasn't actually my question at all), so I've edited and simplified the question.
tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky.
In most US States (probably all of them) failure to follow the Lawful orders of a police officer is itself a crime, and is grounds for the officer to arrest the person, even if the person had not done anything wrong prior to that. This obviously leads to the question: what orders are lawful? The officer has a pretty broad range of discretion. Ordering a person out of a car, or to roll down a car window, is pretty clearly lawful. Ordering a person to commit a crime would not be lawful. Neither would ordering a person to submit while the officer rapes or robs the individual be lawful. In practice, the officer will usually think that all of his or her commands are lawful, and might feel threatened by any failure to comply. In which case, the officer might shoot. This might not be upheld later if the command was not lawful and/or the officer's fear was not reasonable, but that will do the person shot little good. It is usually wise to comply with any commend, unless it puts you very directly at serious risk. Remember you don't know what else has happed to the officer that day. Has the officer had a fight with his/her spouse that morning? Just been denied a promotion? Been turned down for a mortgage? None of that should matter, legally, but it will affect the officer's attitude, and can lead to escalation, even if the person stopped is in no way at fault. An instruction to "shut up" is probably not going to provoke an officer to shoot if it is disobeyed, but it might help to escalate the situation. It is probably lawful, depending non the exact circumstances. As to the first amendment issues, that would probably come under the 'time, place, or manner" regulations that may be applied to speech. And even if it is not held to be lawful, the time to contest it is in court, not during the stop. If the officer feels safer with the window fully rolled down so that the officer could reach in, that is probably a lawful command.
First, what the law says about "right of way" is who has to yield (nobody "has the right of way"). Vehicles always must yield to pedestrians. One of the principles is that you are to yield to the guy who gets there first -- if the guy on your left gets to the intersection first, you must yield to him. If you arrive at the same time, the guy on the left yields (at least in the US). The rationale is that there has to be a convention for deciding who must wait when two people want to occupy the same space in the intersection. That isn't what you are describing. You can turn left and he can turn right at the same time, and no collision should result. The other general rule is that you can turn only when it is safe to do so. If you can't see traffic coming from the left or from the right, then you can't turn. If the guy on the right is blocking your view of the right and you are blocking his view of the left, you will have to find some other social means of deciding who gets out of the way, the law doesn't help you.
I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police).
The problem with these situations is that you don't get to choose how it goes once it's in the hands of law enforcement. Possible scenarios on bringing a complaint to police or prosecutors: "So you guys had a dispute, but everyone's OK now. We're not pursuing this; we have more important things to do." "Hmm ... that could have gotten ugly. We'll do an investigation and check the records of both you and the bus driver to see if either of you have any priors." "We're trying to make this a more bike-friendly city. And we're cracking down on CDLs especially. Thanks, we'll investigate that driver." "Thanks for the evidence. You're going to get charged with criminal mischief, and the bus driver is going to get charged with assault." Of course, you could also send a complaint to the bus company. They are (hopefully) more likely to worry about what their drivers are doing. The DoT is also concerned with CDL safety, so you can file a complaint with the FMCSA NCCDB.
In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered.
I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions).
What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.
Why are there 23 members of the grand jury? I know that a petit (trial) jury in a criminal case requires 12 jurors and I understand why the number 12 was chosen. But why does our U S Constitution, which is modeled after the Magna Carta, require 23 members of the grand jury when the Magna Carta only required 12 members of a grand jury? Why was the number of members of the grand jury set at 23 instead of 12 by the framers of the Constitution?
I completely agree with Jen's answer and I am writing here to discuss some deeper historical dimensions to the question. Historically, notion of using a 23 member grand jury dates to the reign of King Edward III whose reign started in the year 1368 in England. It is not derived from the 23 members of the Lesser Sanhedrins in ancient Israel. The grand jury was changed from having 12 members to having 23 members at least seventy-eight years after King Edward I expelled all Jews from England in the year 1290, at a time when the expulsion of Jews from England was still in effect. The Grand Jury can also be traced to the time of the Norman conquest of England in 1066. There is evidence that the courts of that time summoned a body of sworn neighbors to present crimes that had come to their knowledge. Since the members of that accusing jury were selected from small jurisdictions, it was natural that they could present accusations based on their personal knowledge. Historians agree that the Assize [court session or assembly] of Clarendon in 1166 provided the ground work for our present Grand Jury system. During the reign of Henry II (1154-1189), to regain for the crown the powers usurped by Thomas Becket, Chancellor of England, 12 "good and lawful men" in each village were assembled to reveal the names of those suspected of crimes. It was during this same period that juries were divided into two types, civil and criminal, with the development of each influencing the other. The oath taken by these jurors provided that they would carry out their duties faithfully, that they would aggrieve no one through enmity nor deference to anyone through love, and that they would conceal those things that they had heard. By the year 1290, these accusing juries were given the authority to inquire into the maintenance of bridges and highways, defects of jails, and whether the Sheriff had kept in jail anyone who should have been brought before the justices. "Le Grand Inquest" evolved during the reign of Edward III (1368), when the "accusatory jury" was increased in number from 12 to 23, with a majority vote necessary to indict anyone accused of crime. A grand jury is an ex parte proceeding run by a prosecutor in secret with only the most minimal judicial involvement. Counsel for the suspects can represent the suspects as witnesses if they are called to testify before the grand jury, but cannot make arguments on applying the law to the facts or legal arguments to a grand jury. To indict, twelve members of a grand jury must vote to indict (no matter how many members the grand jury has), and a majority of the grand jury must support the indictment (which is why 23 grand jurors is the upper limit). So, for example, in a federal grand jury with 16 members, three quarters of them must vote in favor of doing so to indict a suspect. The increase in the size of the grand jury from twelve to twenty-three made it easier to indict criminal defendants by relaxing the unanimity requirement for an indictment that had existed when there were only twelve jurors on a grand jury. The grand jury is supposed to vote to indict if it finds that there is probable cause to find that a defendant committed a crime under the law explained to it by the prosecutor and the evidence that is presented to it by the prosecutor. One grand jury's refusal to indict a suspect does not preclude a prosecutor from presenting the same charges against the same suspect to a different grand jury later on. Federal grand juries almost always vote to indict. At the state level, indictment rates vary widely from one county to another, and from state to state. The grand jury requirement exists in the U.S. under state law mostly in states in the Eastern U.S., while most Western states allow grand juries to be convened but only do so in exceptional cases (usually for political reasons or as a secret means for prosecutors to gather evidence). In the early decades of the United States grand juries played a major role in public matters. During that period counties followed the traditional practice of requiring all decisions be made by at least twelve of the grand jurors, (e.g., for a twenty-three-person grand jury, twelve people would constitute a bare majority). Any citizen could bring a matter before a grand jury directly, from a public work that needed repair, to the delinquent conduct of a public official, to a complaint of a crime, and grand juries could conduct their own investigations. In that era most criminal prosecutions were conducted by private parties, either a law enforcement officer, a lawyer hired by a crime victim or their family, or even by laymen. A layman could bring a bill of indictment to the grand jury; if the grand jury found there was sufficient evidence for a trial, that the act was a crime under law, and that the court had jurisdiction, it would return the indictment to the complainant. The grand jury would then appoint the complaining party to exercise the authority of an attorney general, that is, one having a general power of attorney to represent the state in the case. The grand jury served to screen out incompetent or malicious prosecutions. The advent of official public prosecutors in the later decades of the 19th century largely displaced private prosecutions. (Source) Grand juries were popular in the Eastern states because in the Revolutionary War period and the period leading up to the Revolutionary War in the United States, grand juries were used as a tool of resistance to what was perceived as oppressive British rule by citizens of the American colonies. But, that fervor had faded and the difficulty of finding grand jurors on the frontier discouraged the use of this institution of people migrated to the west to form new states, and as the prosecution of crimes came to be the sole or predominant province of professional prosecutors employed by the state. In states that don't require grand jury indictments in all felony cases, an adversarial preliminary hearing before a judge to screen for probable cause is used in in lieu of a grand jury in some felony cases. The only country other than the United States which still uses grand juries is Liberia, which was founded by freed slaves from the U.S.
In many jurisdictions, there is a "witness fee" that one is required to pay, as a token recognition of the value of a person's time. Fact witnesses can often be obligated to appear and testify, for minimal compensation, but not against themselves. In federal cases, Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the defendant to apply to ask the government to pay the witness fee if they cannot afford it and the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense. The other side of a case (in this example, the prosecutor) could try to impeach the witness's testimony (i.e. make him seem less credible in the eyes of the jury) by demonstrating that the witness is a "professional witness" (i.e. fees from saying things in court are a major part of the witness's regular income). That doesn't seem to apply to the facts you've listed, where the witness just happened to be in that place and time to observe what happened and (assuming for this question) accurately testified as to what he saw. Personally paying the police officer or judge for a favorable result is a different question with a different answer.
Article III, Section 2 of The Constitution requires that The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed Since the Idaho portion of Yellowstone is part of the state of Idaho and is not part of a non-state, ergo the trial shall be held in Idaho, according to The Constitution. One jurisdictional statute, 16 USC 24, says The Yellowstone National Park, as its boundaries now are defined, or as they may be hereafter defined or extended, shall be under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. All the laws applicable to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall have force and effect in said park. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to forbid the service in the park of any civil or criminal process of any court having jurisdiction in the States of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Wyoming. So the crime would be a federal matter. I put emphasis on a sentence that doesn't have a straightforward interpretation. There is another jurisdictional statute 28 USC 131, the problematic one, which states: Wyoming and those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana and Idaho constitute one judicial district. Court shall be held at Casper, Cheyenne, Evanston, Lander, Jackson, and Sheridan. Therefore, the crime must be tried in Wyoming. Moreover, the judicial district of Wyoming also includes that unoccupied portion of the park in Idaho. This statute conflicts with Article III, Section 2, which requires court to be held in Idaho. Since The Constitution has precedence over federal statutes, the instruction to hold court in Wyoming is unconstitutional. The 6th Amendment does not pose a particular problem, with its requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law since the jury could be of Idahoans, and transported to Wyoming – the 6th addresses the nature of the jury, not the location of the trial. It is an open question what the 6th Amendment refers to in talking of "state and district", since district is not defined at a constitutional level. The only district with constitutional stature is the District of Columbia, which is not a state, and therefore there could be no "state and district" if we mean "district, as specifically mentioned in The Constitution". The Judiciciary Act of 1789 first created federal judiciary districts, signed by Washington on September 24, 1789, and the 6th Amendment was passed by Congress the next day. It is reasonable to assume that this is what they meant by "district". 28 USC 131 does say that all of Wyoming plus a sliver of Idaho are a judicial district, so one could have a jury composed of citizens of Wyoming which satisfies the "jury of the district" requirement, but that would not satisfy the "jury of the state" requirement. If anyone lived in that area, those people could constitute a "jury of the state and district", but you would still have a clash between the statutory and constitutional requirements for venue.
It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed.
While trials don't have a set time, generally the length of a trial is based on its complexity (and to a certain degree, also the gravity of the charge). Simpler cases (e.g. breaking and entering) will generally take less time to hear than more complex cases (e.g. a violation of proper calculation procedure of an SEC mandated income report concerning transfers of capital accrued by partially owned subsidiaries). For example, last year I was called to jury selection for a drunk driving case that was estimated to last 2 days; this year, I was called for jury selection, which took over a week before I was dismissed as a potential jury, for a murder trial that was estimated to last over a month. However, I'm sure that OJ's celebrity did play a role in the length of his trial; if nothing else, then it would have lengthened the jury selection and voir dire process significantly.
When you say "blanket immunity," I assume you're talking about transactional immunity -- the witness cannot ever be prosecuted for any crimes they testified about. This immunity is actually broader than that required by the US Constitution (although some states do require it). However, if it's provided, it absolutely covers crimes connected to what John is accused of. One very common use of immunity is to give a co-conspirator immunity to testify against another co-conspirator being charged with conspiracy. If transactional immunity wouldn't cover that conspiracy charge, it would pretty much defeat the purpose.
As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.
You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial.
Are German Police allowed to ask about private contact information? This question is based on a story that happened a couple of days ago. Two friends and I were walking outside. Right now, in Germany there are strict regulations about the number of persons and households that are allowed to meet together. So, as we were seen from a police car passing by, the car stopped and two officers went towards us. One of us, a friend who didn't want any contact with the police, instantly ran away, which was seen by the officers. They didn't try to chase him. They then stopped us and started to ask questions about the friend who escaped. Seems like the fact of us gathering wasn't a problem at all, compared to the fact that one person escaped from them. We told that we were just hanging around as friends, after which the officers asked if we could call our buddy and ask why he ran away and if he could get back. We told that his phone is dead, after which we should prove it to the police by calling him. After a failed call, police asked us to provide them the contact information, which we obviously had, because we tried to call him. We were let go after police got our IDs but it just doesn't feel right that they tricked us to get the phone number of our friend who escaped. I understand that it was our own fault, that we responded to the question if we could call him, but could we just refuse to call him or answer any of their questions in that situation? Were the officers even allowed to ask if we could call him or to ask us to show our phones to them, so they could get the contact information?
From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason.
There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office.
So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.
Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors.
While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork.
Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.
There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf
An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?
How do I find out if I still have citizenship in a country (Romania)? I was born in another country (Romania) and moved to the US but I haven't been back in a while and out of curiosity I wanted to know if I still have citizenship. I found a website (https://romaniancitizenship.ro/services/proof-romanian-citizenship/) but really can't tell if it's an official website or not. Is there any more official way to check or a way to tell whether the site is real?
If you simply moved to the US, nothing more, then nothing would have disturbed your Romanian citizenship. Even if you became a US citizen and officially renounced your Romanian citizenship, under the Romanian constitution Art 5(2) "Romanian citizenship cannot be withdrawn if acquired by birth". It's yours for life.
A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not.
American citizens can have dual citizenship , but if an american citizen who has his/her citizenship renounced (even though the person was originally an american citizen) , then what is a way of obtaining the citizenship back? Possibly, by the same means that a non-citizen could be naturalized. But, immigration and nationality officials have broad discretion and would probably refuse to grant citizenship to someone who had previously renounced it. And can an american citizen without dual citizenship (Meaning that he is only an american citizen), renounce his/her citizenship? Yes. For example, Prince Harry's financee plans to renounce her U.S. citizenship and contemporaneously be granted U.K. citizenship (the paperwork goes through really easily when the Queen is your grandmother in law). Renunciation of citizenship is not necessarily tied to gaining a new citizenship, but leaving yourself stateless would be a foolish thing to do.
Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution.
Per Art 12(6), they are allowed to ask for additional identify verification: where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Additionally, Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. There is no consensus regarding what this means in practice: Must the controller use all measures that they can be reasonably be required to use? Or only those measures to verify the identity to a reasonable level of certainty? I agree with you that asking for a passport is excessive, and that email verification would be sufficient. However, that is just my personal opinion. The GDPR can also be interpreted in a way that asking for a copy of your passport is OK. Where they process a copy of your passport, that is personal data as well. You also have data subject rights with regards to this processing, for example the right to be informed of the purpose of this processing and of when the data will be deleted. If it is only used for the purpose of verifying your identity, the copy of your passport should be deleted immediately afterwards. The data controller may have additional obligations because a passport or ID card is a very sensitive document. E.g. Art 87 allows member states to impose additional rules. Most sensible controllers will therefore want to avoid processing passports, unless they only operate in specific EU member states.
When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.
What could be the consequences of this wedding? They would be married For example, if they break up and end their PACS in France, would they still be officially married in the USA? Yes, and also in France. And if after that they marry other partners, could this be a problem for them when applying for an American visa? Yes, bigamy is illegal in both the USA and France. Does France and the USA exchange information on wedding of foreign citizens on their soil? Don't know, probably not. Could they even end up being officially married in France even without doing any paperwork themselves? Most definitely. France recognises US marriages so they would be married in France (and the U.K., and Australia, and Germany, and ...). This is true even if the French government doesn't know they are married.
That is private. Who you work for is not information that is disclosed publicly by any state actor in Germany, just like your taxes. In fact, that or who you are employed at is often regarded as personal and private information. Nigh impossible through agencies Public agencies like the Fiskus (tax), Agentur für Arbeit, and immigration are not allowed to give any information about a person to anyone but that person or another agency that has the right to that information. Yes, (generally speaking) the tax office may not even say that a person exists (or doesn't) and what their tax number is to anyone but the person in question.
Can I trick an innocent third party into doing something that would be illegal if the third party had mens rea without either of us being guilty? Lets say I want something to happen but doing it directly would be a crime. This is one crime that requires intent or mens rea. So I hunt down an innocent third party, someone naïve, perhaps even a child, and I tell them they should go do some action X. I convince them it's a good thing to do and no harm will come, basically ensure they aren't guilty of the intent I have when I trick them into doing something. Would using a naïve third party allow both the third party and me to get away with the action, since the person doing it lacks mens rea and the law doesn't explicitly make tricking someone else a crime? Or am I still considered to have committed the crime despite using a third party as an intermediary? I'll accept answers for any common law location, though I'm mildly more interested in USA.
It depends on the jurisdiction, but generally speaking, this will not permit you to evade criminal responsibility. In Ohio, for instance, the complicity statute treats the conduct you're describing as equivalent to soliciting another to commit an offense or to aiding and abetting another in committing an offense: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. The penalty for complicity is the same as for the underlying offense, so you don't really get any kind of break for running your offense through an innocent party; you just get a pissed off witness who can testify against you.
It is basically fraud, and there are two ways in which it could be illegal: it might be a crime, and you might get sued for doing it (you would not be fined or imprisoned, but you may have to compensate the hotel chain for their loss). Whether or not it is a crime depends on the jurisdiction. In Washington, there are very many laws against fraud such as RCW 9.38 (credit), RCW 9.45 (numerous things where a business defrauds others), RCW 9.60 (forgery) but none of them would apply to lying about a material fact to a business in order to get a discount. Texas likewise has a long section on criminal fraud. It is not clear from the wording whether a customer lying to a business (not involving forgery, vehicles, credit, or financial institutions) is covered. 32.42(b)(10) says A person commits an offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence commits one or more of the following deceptive business practices... making a materially false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reason for, existence of, or amount of a price or price reduction The question of interpretation that this raises is whether a person who has said "I'm over 70" so that they can get a discount has made a statement "concerning the reason for a price reduction". The ordinary interpretation of "concerning the reason for" would be that it refers to explaining why or under what conditions a price reduction exists. For the moment, I am skeptical that this definition would include the case at hand, but that will require a search through case law and jury instructions. From the lawsuit angle, you would have knowingly made a false material statement in order to obtain a value, which is illegal, and they could sue you to recover the discount.
Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.
My understanding is that the syndicate would be committing an act of extortion. Under the RICO Act, IF the politician conspired with the syndicate OR IF the politician had something like an 'understanding' with the syndicate, then they (any, and all involved) could be charged with the crime (extortion), racketeering and conspiracy. Additional crimes/laws to consider: Campaign finance violations Money laundering Compelled speech (1st Amendment)
Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages.
Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.
There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.
A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.
Do criminals really "have no recourse" if their ill-gotten property is stolen by a third party? From the TV series Better Call Saul (S1E7 - Bingo) main character Jimmy McGill is involved in a case wherein a client of his, Craig Kettleman, stands accused of stealing 1.6 million dollars. A crime which the client truly did commit. Later, Jimmy orchestrates the theft of the money from their client's home and has it returned to the District Attorney. Jimmy blackmails his client saying that "criminals have no recourse" when it comes to theft. The money his client is accused of stealing was, itself, stolen from them. What can their client do in this circumstance? Craig Kettleman is accused of stealing the money but has not been convicted of the crime. Because of these circumstances does that mean Craig would be able to inform the police of the theft without undue legal repercussions associated with announcing his possession of a suspicious amount of money? Filing a police report would surely be unwise, but does would involving the police put Craig in as much legal jeopardy as threatened in the show?
Do criminals really "have no recourse" if their ill-gotten property is stolen by a third party? Basically yes. At sentencing, they can argue that restitution or fines should be limited because the money was in turn stolen from them and they don't have it. For example, I once had a client who was the sole heir to the estate of someone who had a substantial amount of illegal drugs in their possession at the time of the decedent's death (worth perhaps $100,000 USD), but the illegal drugs were stolen after the death of the decedent by someone known to my client. There was no legal way for my client to gain possession that stolen property or its worth.
You don't need to have an existing relationship with a lawyer to refuse to talk to the police. You can tell the police you want a lawyer before answering questions. Generally speaking, this should result in the police leaving you alone, giving you time to reach out to an attorney on your own timeline. This is of course a bit more complicated if you've already been arrested, but in most cases, you'll still be able to make calls out of jail to try to find a lawyer. If you have serious concerns about this kind of situation, having an attorney on retainer would be a good idea. The business end of the transaction is fairly simple. You would likely sign an engagement agreement with the lawyer in which you agree to pay a modest sum -- $500 or $1,000, imagine, and the lawyer would agree to take your calls when they come in and swoop in to deal with the police as necessary. The lawyer would be required to place your money in a trust account and not touch it until you call him to use his services. If you're expecting the lawyer to go further by actually appearing in court for you, filing motions, defending you at trial, etc., the retainer would likely be substantially higher.
So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts.
This is entirely possible in a number of different motions that could have been made. At this point, Vinny had destroyed the Prosecutor's eyewitnesses by showing they had issues that called their testimony into question (The first has a timeline that doesn't line up with events, the second has poor vision and her prescription glasses were not doing their job, and the third had many obstructions blocking his view of the scene). His first witness tears apart the "expert" witness, who was only there to testify that the tires were the same brand (albeit, a popular brand at the time... loads of cars had the same tires). While it might go by a different name in different jurisdictions, the Prosecutor is allowed to make a motion to dismiss at any point prior to the jury goes to deliberation (as is the Defense; Also they might be able to make motions while the jury is in deliberations). If properly titled, the Prosecutor should have made a "motion for nolle prosequi" (not prosecuting). This can mean any number of things including the prosecutor no longer believes the evidence can prove the charges OR even that the prosecutor is no longer convinced that those charged committed the crime. In the "My Cousin Vinny" case, as the jury was seated the case cannot be retried by the State of Alabama at this point. This is possible because the Prosecutor's duty is to uncover the truth behind a crime, no matter what that truth becomes. In this case, despite his previous beliefs, the prosecutor in My Cousin Vinny, upon realizing he was wrong, admitted it and dropped the charges. Given his backstory of having worked as a defense attorney and making the switch after getting a client off some serious charges (and knowing the client was guilty) shows that he was inherently an honest man and dedicated to finding the truth of the matter (as a government employee, he undoubtedly took a pay cut when he switched to prosecution. Private industry almost always pays way more than a government equivalent). With that in mind, it is expected of prosecutors to be perfectly honest with what evidence they have and make the choices in the case based on that evidence. This comes up in another scene when Mona Lisa Vito explains to Vinny that the prosecutor was required to give Vinny all the files he had on the case... because Vinny, by representing the Defendant, is allowed to examine all evidence against his clients. The only dirty trick he pulled was the stunt where his expert witness was not disclosed and while bad, really it's the judge allowing the witness to testify that would have caused a problem with the trial (his response to Vinny's objection could have created a mistrial on appeal). To give a real world example, I was charged with driving on a suspended license which I had no idea I was doing at the time. As it turned out, the license was suspended for an unpaid traffic ticket that I had paid in the last minute... essentially the DMV forgot to unsuspend. A quick call fixed that issue but I still had to go to court over the charge. The day of the trial, I show up in the court room and the prosecutor walks over and tells me that they were going to enter a motion of "nolle prosequi" for the charge... essentially dropping it... because the matter was a clerical error on the state's part and not anything I did wrong. Edit: Additionally had the prosecutor not motioned to dismiss, Vinny certainly could have. In fact there are two points during the trial where Defense attorneys are expected to make these motions. The first is when the Prosecution rests their case. The second is before the jury is given the case to deliberate. As for why it was called a motion to dismiss in the film, it's likely to due with the fact that the audience would not know what a "motion for nolle prosecui" and it is a type of motion to dismiss.
We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.
Bob appears to have committed "attempted larceny" by extortion, contrary to § 155.05(2)(e)(v): (e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: ... (v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; See § 110.00: Attempt to commit a crime. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. And see § 110.10 which covers the "impossibility" that Bob actually had compromising images from Alice's non-existent webcam: Attempt to commit a crime; no defense. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. (NB Bob's sentence, if found guilty, would depend the value of his attempted extortion)
No. Theft is, in most jurisdiction, an action by which the offender takes another person's property with the intent to permanently deprive them of it. The clerk isn't taking any property from the store, and she doesn't have any intent to deprive the store of anything. She is therefore not guilty of theft. If she were doing this intentionally -- either in league with the customer or even without the customer knowing -- she could likely be held liable for the theft, either on a conspiracy theory or perhaps an innocent-agency theory. The lack of criminal liability of course does not mean that there can be no accountability. The employer is free to terminate the employee, and it will have different options -- depending on jurisdiction -- to recover the value of the uncharged printers, perhaps by docking her paycheck or through a negligence action.
I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.
Could open source software illegally provide legal advice? There is a company called DoNotPay. It bills itself as "The World's First Robot Lawyer", and at least in January was providing services such as "Defamation Demand Letter", "Divorce Settlement Agreement", and "Sue Anyone in Small Claims Court", and had an offer of $1,000,000 if anyone let the AI argue a case in the US Supreme Court. After a certain amount of publicity the CEO has said they will back off and focus on consumer rights (arguing with customer service as I understand it). While this certainly does not show that AI can produce useful legal advice, it does seem to show that it is possible for a computer to produce something that would be considered legal advice under the US standard requiring a licenced legal profesional, such that a company providing such for a fee could be charged. Suppose that the founder and author of the code had, rather than founding a company to provide this as a paid service, instead released the code under an open source licence such as the GPL and made it available publically, would there be a risk of prosecution for anyone? If there was a bit of computer code that performed something that would undoubtedly be legal advice if performed by a human, and individuals could get this code, run it on their own machines and take action in response, would there be anyone who could be legally liable for unlicensed practice of law?
Many products can be used for illegal purposes, so selling something that could be used for illegal purposes won't generally result in liability for the producer. Think of software used for computer system and network security testing; it's both useful for legitimate testing and securing systems, but of course it can be used by hackers to find and exploit security holes. Clorox can be used to clean the bathroom or poison someone. If you look at the Terms of Service for https://donotpay.com/learn/terms-of-service-and-privacy-policy/ , you'll see DoNotPay is Not a Law Firm DoNotPay provides a platform for legal information and self-help. The information provided by DoNotPay along with the content on our website related to legal matters ("Legal Information") is provided for your private use and does not constitute advice. We do not review any information you provide us for legal accuracy or sufficiency, draw legal conclusions, provide opinions about your selection of forms, or apply the law to the facts of your situation. If you need advice for a specific problem, you should consult with a licensed attorney. As DoNotPay is not a law firm, please note that any communications between you and DoNotPay may not be protected under the attorney-client privilege doctrine. and Your use of the Service is subject to all applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations. Unauthorized use of the Service is prohibited, and violators can be prosecuted under federal and state laws. Virginia law and Federal law will govern the interpretation and enforcement of these Terms. That's for the web service, but it's useful to point out the distinction between a user using DoNotPay for themselves and getting a script to read in court, and the DoNotPay service actually participating in a court appearance representing the user. The reason DoNotPay pulled the plug on the court appearance, as pointed out in the article https://www.businessinsider.com/donotpay-ceo-says-risks-jail-ai-robot-lawyer-used-court-2023-1 is that DoNotPay's AI "robot" lawyer was going to actively argue in court, and the state bar objected, because that's what only lawyers are licensed to do. If the DoNotPay source code was released and someone used it on their own computer to analyze a legal situation and give themselves options and offer decisions, this could probably be seen as little different than someone reading books that analyze the law and strategies and offer options of how to go about representing oneself in a court. The software would be used to make decisions before and after court; the software is not actively arguing and making decisions for the user in court. Of course, in this brand new world of AI, the final assessment of whether or not AI software can be used to give others (or oneself) legal advice - either in court and/or prep for court - will likely have to be finally determined by litigation and courts. The idea of open source or closed source could possibly come into play to determine exactly how the software works, but would not be the sole criteria to determine if the use of the software is legal or not. The software could be simply a "decision tree" (little different than textbooks) that follows a hard-coded if/else script, such as If you get a ticket, go to court; if you plead guilty, this is what happens; if you plead not guilty, these are your options. Or, the software could have true AI aspects, i.e. it develops arguments for being not guilty from your past legal history, and develops and responds to the court's actions with counter arguments, and actually gives opinions to the user on what they should do. If the software is open source, we all see how it works and if it is a decision tree or real AI (and the software can also be modified by users and other developers.) If the software is closed source, we can't see how it works, and we don't know if it is a decision tree or AI, unless it it is opened, possibly through court order during possible litigation to determine if it is giving legal advice. Again, AI is a brand new thing in the legal world.
It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.
There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.
Disclaimer: I'm from the US and don't claim to know German or Turkish law. So let me discuss some general principles here, but details may well be different in Germany and Turkey. You're mixing together three very different things: trademark, copyright, and patent. Copyright protects the expression of an idea, in this case, the exact computer code, images, etc. If you didn't copy his code, the chance that you would coincidentally write identical code is remote. The fact that you both have a line of code that says x=x+1 wouldn't give him any grounds for a lawsuit. He'd have to show substantial portions of the code were identical. If you didn't deliberately copy his code, this isn't going to happen. Barring some extraordinary and unbelievable coincidence, you can't violate copyright accidentally. Trademark protects names and symbols used to identify a company or a product. If you decided to call your software company "Microsoft", then that other Microsoft could sue you for trademark infringement. Likewise if you copied somebody else's logo or other distinctive graphics. This is very different from copyright. It is quite possible to violate someone's trademark accidentally. Especially if he gave his company or product a rather generic name. Like if someone called his product, say, "Password Manager", someone else might make a product with the same name without ever having heard of the original. Ditto if he has some simple logo or other graphics. If you did accidentally duplicate a name or graphic elements, well, in the US a court would likely order you to change your name or graphics and that would be the end of it, unless you refused, in which case you'd end up in court. US Courts have ruled that very generic names have limited trademark protection. An example I saw recently was "Main Street Auto Repair". A court said that the owner of that name could prevent someone else from opening a shop in the same town with the same name, but he couldn't sue someone in another town who happened to use the same name. This is why, by the way, companies often use made-up words for their product names. In your case, this should be a trivial issue. If he is claiming trademark to the look of the main menu screen, just change the colors or move some buttons around. If it actually went to court, you should be able to argue that the similarity was accidental and when you were informed you promptly changed it, and that should be the end of it. Depending, I guess, on how hard-nosed the judge is, etc. Patents are different still. A patent gives the owner the exclusive right to use an invention or process for a specified period of time. It doesn't matter if you invented the same thing entirely independently. Whoever filed the patent first has exclusive rights. There have been cases where an inventor lost out to someone with a similar invention because he submitted his patent application one day later. If this other person has patents that you are infringing, you are pretty much out of luck.
(Since this is looking rather close to looking for legal advice: "I'm not a lawyer, this is not legal advice, don't sue my pants off".) The relevant section of the license is this (bolding mine): You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital file-sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of any monetary compensation in con-nection with the exchange of copyrighted works. Therefore, if you are using the content licensed under the BY-NC-SA primarily to make money, that is a breach of the license. Any more advice past that is wading seriously into legal advice.
Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.
No, you can't The last paragraph of the MIT License explicitly says the author is not responsible for damages (emphasis mine): THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. A software license is not a contract. You didn't enter a contract with the developer or team. You found software online and decided to use the software. When you install paid software you are almost always presented with the EULA and check-box saying you agree to it. You took an action and agreed to the EULA. You didn’t have to agree to anything before getting access to the code under the MIT license. The software is offered "as-is" which is further protects the author. You'd have to show the author convinced you to use the software fraudulently. You're unlikely to talk to the author at all, and since the entire source code is available for review, it would be very difficult if not impossible to claim fraud. Finally, in the U.S. people have been sued using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. None of the notable cases involve embedding a virus in an open-source project. Of interest is how the CFAA defines a virus (emphasis mine) (A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; Simply writing bad code wouldn't be enough. You'd have to prove the developer acted maliciously. Hobbyists working for free don't usually have much money. The other major contributors to open source are large companies like IBM and Google, which have lawyers on retainer and deal with frivolous lawsuits frequently.
It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright.
What are the possible copyright and other legal issues faced by an individual in the US running a Mastodon server? What are the possible copyright and other legal issues faced by an individual in the US running a Mastodon server? The social network Mastodon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mastodon_(social_network) has become very popular in the past few months as a possible alternative to Twitter, and there are some important differences between the two services: Twitter is a centralized, corporate-based commercial service, running datacenters in different countries, but operated as one service. Mastodon is decentralized and is run on any number of commercial and private servers by individuals and organizations located in different countries, and server administrators can have little or no formal relationship with other administrators. (The Mastodon software is free and open source and there are no copyright issues with using or modifying the software itself.) Twitter is a for-profit business which has a legal team, a corporate structure to protect employees and assets, and insurance for civil claims. Mastodon administrators may or may not be organized under a corporate structure or have insurance for civil clams. One possible source of copyright issues is that Individual Mastodon servers share posts and content by being "Federated," meaning being members of relays that share content between independent servers. This means that content by users who have accounts on other Mastodon servers around the world can appear in the timelines of users on any other independent server, and some of that content my be "cached" or stored on those Federated servers. For the sake of this question, the Mastodon instance owner - who is an individual and who runs a server in the US and has the sole account and is the administrator of the server - will be referred to as AMastodonAdmin. The Mastodon instance run by AMastodonAdmin will be referred to as MyMastodonInstance. Can AMastodonAdmin legally "ban" or block users (and their content) who have accounts and post on other servers but their content is shown on MyMastodonInstance by Federation? Can AMastodonAdmin ban users for any reason? Does AMastodonAdmin need a TOS that outlines reasons for user bans and blocks? Is a AMastodonAdmin liable for copyright infringement committed by users who have accounts and post the copyrighted content on other servers which is then Federated to (and in some instances cached on) MyMastodonInstance? Does AMastodonAdmin running MyMastodonInstance in a US datacenter need to be aware of GDPR https://gdpr.eu/ ? Does AMastodonAdmin need to respond to requests by EU members whose posts were federated to MyMastodonInstance?
To the extent that Admin is running a business rather than a free relay server, Admin will have various legal concerns. As I understand the system as you describe it, a user uploads some content to a machine, operated by AMastodonAdmin, which then makes that content available to others. W.r.t. US law, the admin needs to be concerned with a number of things. Copyright violation is one: he may get sued for contributory infringement. The DMCA safe harbor provision reduce the risk, if complied with. Defamation is another potential issue (a publisher is liable for damages under defamation law, as well as the author). "Section 230" may provide protection, but there is a large body of case law mentioned in there that would heave to be taken into consideration – and two upcoming Supreme Court cases. (Basically, Section 230 says that "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider"). The administrator has a property right to include / exclude anyone they want to, on their machine, except that a contract between Admin and User might limit his right. A TOS is a contract, which typically says "You can use my machine in a specific way as long as you follow these rules". Requiring payment in exchange for access limits Admin's right to do whatever they want. For free-access systems, there is typically a clause saying "we can kick you off if we want", though also implying that they will only kick you off for a specific action ("violating community standards"). In order to legally receive content from User, you need permission from User to redistribute their intellectual property (therefore a TOS is virtually mandatory). This would include a warranty from User that they have the right to upload whatever they do upload, granting a correct license to Admin (read the Stack Exchange TOS), and while you are at it, you should say explicitly that if a user misbehaves, they can be banned. Silence is legally problematic, compared to explicit permission or prohibition, because then there may be a long legal wrangle over whether lack of prohibition is implicit permission. Admin technically should care about GDPR, though enforcement may make this a non-issue. A US company operating as Admin would have a real concern with GDPR, but a guy running a free basement server, having no ties to the EU, might ignore GDPR, the same way they might ignore some other nation's law against apostacy.
Someone similar say While it is quite true that no one can have a copyright that excludes all others from preparing their own unique copy of the Bible or other public domain works for copyright protection, our Bibles and other materials are not exactly like any others and are fully protected by copyright laws in all countries So for example, I could theoretically take an ancient public-domain texts and republish it in some modified form. Copyright does not protect the original, but it does protect my modifications. To the extent that Mechon Mamre does include protected material (of their own creation), and Snunit redistributed that material with permission, Mechon Mamre might sue you for copyright infringement. Since they don't say what their creative contribution is, it's hard to evaluate the merits of their claim.
You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.
The band's logo can be protected by both copyright and trademark. The band's name is probably only protected as a trademark. Trademark would not apply to your personal use, because to infringe a trademark, you need to "use" the mark, and "use" in trademark law generally means selling an item that has the mark on it. As far as trademark law is concerned, no sale means no infringement. Copyright protects the exclusive right of the owner to copy a "work" (it's much more complex than that, but we don't need to get into the details here). Copyright probably applies because you would "copy" the logo, which under copyright law is something only the copyright owner can do (absent authorization from the copyright owner). You would therefore theoretically be infringing copyright by copying the bands logo on a shirt or something you want to wear yourself. That said, while I agree with the first answer that fair use may apply in theory, there would never ever be such a complex discussion about fair use in this case... because in fact there's absolutely no chance an individual would get fined or sued for having copied a band's logo and name on something he/she wants to wear his/herself. Getting sued by the band The band will not notice. If you're lucky enough to meet the band (or somebody close to the band) in person while you are wearing your garment, they would either not notice or not care. At worst, they'll ask you where you bought it in case they suspect you bought it from someone who illegally sells fake merch. Even then, all of this seems very unlikely. If you are extremely unlikely and the band notices it and sues you (and finds a lawyer to take a case like that to court), my inclination is to think the judge would be extremely mad with the band (and its lawyer) for losing the court's time with such a trivial matter. No judge would allow lawyers to waste the court's time pleading such a complex thing as fair use in a case like that. Getting fined The police would not notice either, because the only time the police cares about copyright is when somebody makes a complaint (nobody would make a complaint about you), except when they seize containers full of copyright infringing stuff (that is destined to be illegally sold for profit) in a port or at a border somewhere. The only possible scenario where I could imagine that there would be legal consequences is if you wear a t-shirt with the bands logo in a YouTube video (or in a picture) where the only thing that you see basically is the bands logo on your t-shirt. Even this scenario is extremely far fetched, but let's say the video becomes popular and the band notices. Well, the likeliest scenario is that they would file a DMCA notice and get YouTube to take down the video, with very little chances that there would be more important consequences to you. Have fun!
DMCA allows for a counter-notice. You can submit a counter-notice with a statement that you have a licence to distribute the content. Statements in the counter-notice about the facts relating to your permission to reproduce are under penalty of perjury. You could also sue the content owner to attempt to get an injunction against future takedown requests and you could get costs (not punative damages) awarded under 17 USC 512(f).
I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.)
This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.
There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.
Why all caps first and last names in id cards / passports? I am wondernig what is the reason, if any, that in the national identification cards the names (first and last) are written in ALL CAPS?
Some jurisdictions do that. Others don't (see, for example, the Dutch national identity card). My New York driver's license is in all caps, and I rather suspect that it's a holdover from the days in which licenses were processed using a computer system that had only upper-case characters. But that's just a guess. The real answer is that the premise of the question is incorrect.
The vaccine card doesn't have a specific legal status under US law. There are federal laws against fraud which would encompass vaccine card fraud, but tidying up disparate notices into a single notice is not fraudulent (there is no attempt to deceive), as long as you don't falsify signatures, seals, or specific information. From a practical perspective, though, the official vaccination record from your state is a better and more official way to have a single proof of vaccination. There is probably no practical way to transport vaccinations from a foreign country into the US system, but that is a question best asked on Travel, since it's not about the law, it's about quasi-legal mandates authorized under broad laws that say "in an emergency, the government can stipulate necessary rules".
First, no, given the wording of the question: "by demanding identity first". US courts have never held that citizens must immediately comply with non-emergency orders free of back-talk. Let's assume that the refusal is conditional: "I won't comply until you show me your ID". In most (?) jurisdictions, there is no obligation imposed on police to show ID, though I am excluding home searches. There is a policy requirement in Seattle (§7) that Employees may use a Department-issued business card that contains their name and serial number to satisfy the request for the information. Employees will also show their department identification card and badge (sworn) when specifically requested to do so. Exception: Employees are not required to immediately identify themselves if: An investigation is jeopardized A police function is hindered There is a safety consideration Massachusetts has a law saying that "Such identification card shall be carried on the officer's person and shall be exhibited upon lawful request for purposes of identification". In the domain of search and seizure law, the court reasoned in Doornbos v. Chicago, regarding a seizure by plainclothes police that Absent reasonable grounds to think that identification would present an unusual danger, it is generally not a reasonable tactic for plainclothes officers to fail to identify themselves when conducting a stop. The tactic provokes panic and hostility from confused civilians who have no way of knowing that the stranger who seeks to detain them is an officer... it is usually unreasonable for a plainclothes officer to fail to identify himself when conducting a stop or frisk As you can see, this identification requirement is tied to constitutional search and seizure limits for which there is voluminous case law regarding what is "reasonable". The scenario that you propose is fairly far from the kind of case identified in Doornbos: is the order from a uniformed officer in a police vehicle? That seems to be what you're describing. Now we must inquire as to the legality of the order. Picking on Washington state law, RCW 46.61.015 requires that No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any duly authorized flagger or any police officer or firefighter invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. RCW 46.61.021 requires a person driving to stop for a LEO, and to identify himself: failure to comply is a misdemeanor. There is no statutory provision that a person can refuse to obey these (or similar sections in the motor vehicle title) until the officer provides ID. A police officer (in Washington: and I suspect any other state) does not have unrestricted authority to give people orders, there are specific statutory circumstances giving police the power to order people to do things. Obstructing a police officer is a crime, but obstructing an officer is where one "willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties", and not "doesn't cooperate". There is a provision, RCW 9a.76.030 where A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer and the "knows to be a peace officer" clause implies either that the officer is uniformed, or has provided identification. Finally, we have "failure to disperse" when a person congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and (b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law. These laws are attuned to emergency needs, thus outside the penumbra of your scenario. In short, the primary question must be, when can police lawfully give you an order that you must obey, which narrows the matter down to traffic-related matters. The seizure must be reasonable: it is reasonable to require a person to stop for a uniformed officer. Reasonability does not entail that all officers must produce ID when effecting a seizure, but this may be the case with plain-clothes officers. Even when in Seattle with a departmental policy requiring officers to identify themselves, an officer's failure to identify does not render the seizure illegal.
This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.
It depends on the issuing country. The primary purpose of a passport is to enable the holder to travel internationally, not to prove citizenship. Most countries only issue passports to their citizens, which has made such passports widely recognised as proof of citizenship — both inside and outside of the issuing country. But at the end of the day it is up to the country to decide whether to follow this established pattern or not. For example, Estonia does not. And, of course, it is up to the country to decide which documents prove citizenship of their own citizens inside. Say in Russia a Russian passport for international travel is not a valid document for identification/proving citizenship. So-called "internal passport", similar to that of German citizenship card, serves for this role.
Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant.
In most US states, anyone can buy such lists, covering either the whole state or a specific municipality or election district. Political campaigns routinely buy such lists and use them to organize door-to-door campaigning, as well as postal appeals. Some years ago I was a (losing) candidate for local office in NJ. I bought such a list covering the township I was running in. It showed each voter's name, address, age, party of registration, if any, and which of the last several elections the person had voted in. I think the lists were available from the board of elections, and local lists from municipal clerks. Exact procedures no doubt differ from state to state, as will costs. At that time lists were available in electronic and paper formats. Purchasers had to sign an agreement not to use the information for commercial marketing, as I recall. Updated lists including data from the latest election are not usually available at once, but are available long before the next general election.
Can you ask the company to add the spelled out of the number to the text? If this will make you more comfortable. Also, I sometimes found an English text from European body that use the format of 12456 (no thousand mark at all) or 12 456 (use space).
Can a company own intellectual property created off the clock? In an employment agreement, can a company claim intellectual property created off the clock unrelated to your their core business? Specifically if their core business is in a narrow domain of software, can they claim to owning all intellectual property created by the employee at all times outside of that domain but within "software".
united-states If they have a contract with the employee which specifies that such IP is assigned to the company at creation, such a contract is valid until and unless a court holds that it is void. It might be held void as against public policy,. or as being "unconscionable", but it might well not be so held. An even broader contract, which claimed any and every kind of IP created by an employee, even if crated during off hours and not at the work site nor with company resources is more likely to be held void, but even this is not certain to be held void. In the absence of a contract explicitly assigning such IP to the company, the company might attempt to apply the rule that makes works created by an employee within the scope of employment works-made-for-hire (WFH). This is in 17 USC 101 (the definitions section of the copyright law). This would affect copyrights, but not patents or other IP. There is very little US case law interpreting the "scope of employment". But there seems some reason to believe that work that was not assigned by the employer, not intended to benefit the employer, not used by the employer, not done within usual working hours nor using company resources, and not of the specific type normally assigned to or carried out by the employee, is probably not "within the scope" of the employee's employment. If that is so, the work would not be WFH, and only an explicit written contract, signed by the employee (or the employee's authorized agent) could transfer the copyright.
Be careful of the 10% time “perk”. It is not your own time. It is work time where you are self-directed. Any project unrelated to your work should be on your actual own time not dork time that is free of specific assignment. Fortunately the section 39 of the UK patent law is short and relatively straightforward. It is focused on “the course of your usual duties” not on whose time you were on or whose equipment you were using. It belongs to them if - (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or (b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking. Otherwise it’s yours. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-patent-act-1977/section-39-employees-inventions-right-to-employees-inventions
The relevant section of US patent law was already posted in an answer on one of the questions you linked, but I'll repeat it: 35 USC 271 (a): Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Merely making a patented invention is infringement; it isn't relevant whether you sell it. It is also infringement if you use it yourself, regardless of who made it or whether you paid them, or whether you would have otherwise bought it from the patent holder. There are some special exceptions for things like certain kinds of pharmaceuticals, but I browsed the rest of 35 USC Chapter 28, and didn't see anything that would appear to be relevant in this case.
Yes, they can do that, as long as they tell you about it in advance. Your employer can require you to take all or any of your holiday at a particular time, as long as they give you the right notice at the right time and take into account certain agreements between you. Source Employers can: tell their staff to take leave, eg bank holidays or Christmas restrict when leave can be taken, eg at certain busy periods The notice period for this is at least twice as long as the leave they want their staff to take. Source (official government site)
Critique I'm technically a director of a company ... You either are or you aren't - there is no "technically" involved. ... is not currently trading ... And doing nothing can create a conflict of interest? How? You mustn’t be involved either directly or indirectly with any other trade or business competing in or conflicting with the interests of our Company. "competing or conflicting" is the key here - if the "other trade or business" can adversely affect the performance of your employer then you have a conflict, if not, you don't. are only related in such that they are both technology based but otherwise are unrelated. Sorry, but that is so vague as to be totally useless - what company today is not "technology based"? Pharmaceutical companies are technology based, so are construction companies, so are law firms but one would hardly call them "related". Solution Conflicts of interest are easy: If you don't think you have a conflict of interest and they don't think you have a conflict of interest then you don't have a conflict of interest. If either or both of you do; then you do. Tell them about it! Conflicts of interest are a problem because people think that if you are keeping secrets then you are doing it for a nefarious purpose! In 90% of cases declaring the potential conflict resolves the conflict because the other party says "That! Don't be silly; that's not a problem!" or words to that effect. In the 99.9% of the remaining 10% of cases then sensible people can come up with sensible solutions, for example: If you want to be involved with another business whilst working for us then you’ll need to get a letter from the Director of your area confirming that they’re happy for you to do this.
You need a lawyer There is no magic phrase to do what you want. The company will care about defending their assets, while you will want to defend yours. Only a lawyer will be able to tailor the condition that makes sense based on what your job's domain covers and your side projects. It is entirely possible that your personal projects conflict with your employer's, and you must then put your personal projects on hold or risk getting sued. e.g.) developing two pieces of software that does the same thing. Your lawyer will be able to advise on how that looks and what to do. No random strangers on the internet can give you accurate advice.
That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.
You cannot use a patented invention without permission A patent gives the owner exclusive rights to use it: not just profit from it. The only way you can use their patent is by licensing it. You cannot make any version of the software that uses the patented method, free or otherwise. Technically, the software you have now is infringing even if you never release it. If you had published your work before they filed for the patent, you can seek to have their patent invalidated due to the existence of prior art. If you had been using it privately prior to this some jurisdictions will allow you to keep using it privately.
Are the loans on subreddits r/borrow and r/simpleloans even legal? Many places have a max legal interest rate, and the loans on those subreddits surely exceed those rates. For example, a borrower might say I will repay $150 in 10 days for a $100 loan, and some lender will agree to that. So if the interest is illegal, then are all those lenders committing a crime on those subreddits? If a borrower decides to not pay a lender, will there be protection for the lender (say that they signed a contract before hand)?
Florida Title XXXIX, chapter 687 of the 2022 Florida Statutes covers usury. The technical definitions of what it is are earlier, but the punishment is as follows (I skipped the couple of exceptions to it) 687.04 Penalty for usury; not to apply in certain situations.—Any person, or any agent, officer, or other representative of any person, willfully violating the provisions of s. 687.03 shall forfeit the entire interest so charged, or contracted to be charged or reserved, and only the actual principal sum of such usurious contract can be enforced in any court in this state, either at law or in equity; and when said usurious interest is taken or reserved, or has been paid, then and in that event the person who has taken or reserved, or has been paid, either directly or indirectly, such usurious interest shall forfeit to the party from whom such usurious interest has been reserved, taken, or exacted in any way double the amount of interest so reserved, taken, or exacted. So basically the lender can only collect the original amount loaned, no interest, and if they already collected some of the interest, they have to return that at a 2 for 1 rate. It's a civil law, so I don't know if that's what you meant by "breaking the law/illegal", but they can go to court to recover the interest doubled. The contract wouldn't change anything, as you can't enforce the terms of an illegal contract.
I think that you are distorting the legal situation by describing it as a debt denominated in XYZcoins. According to the LII page "Debt": Debt is a financial liability or obligation owed by one person, the debtor, to another, the creditor. Note that a debt is a financial liability. That means that it is payable in money, in some recognized currency. In the XYZcoin case, there is not a debt, but a contract of exchange. It can only be satisfied by handing over the cryptocurrency specified in the agreement, unless the parties agree to change that. When a person signs a contract to sell a house, for example, that person does not owe a debt denominated in houses. Rather, that person has agreed to deed over a specific house on specific terms. If the seller refuses to close the deal and the would-be buyer brings a legal action, the judge may order specific performance, that is, order the seller to sign the papers needed to transfer title to that specific house. A similar remedy may be available on a contract to sell a painting or other object that is unique, and cannot be replaced easily by a different object of the same type. Something similar may occur with a contract to sell or trade stocks not listed on any exchange, where there is no clear market value, and the purchaser wants shares in that particular company, not a sum of money.
Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose.
I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.
If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.
Yes You have a contract and, while I don't know what it says, its a fair bet that not making payments the contract requires you to make would be a breach of that contract. This would allow the other party to sue you for the unpaid fees as well as interest on them and the consts of collection (collection agency fees, legal fees etc.). In addition they can report you as a defaulter (which you would be) to any and all credit reporting agencies which would wreck your ability to get credit in the future. If the do sue you and succeed (as the probably would) they can seize your assets to sell them to recover their debt - since the time-share appears to have limited value they would probably seize your savings or your car instead. You need to read the contract to find out how you can end it legally.
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
If you are given a paid job, and you do the work, then "consideration has been provided", and 1682 will not apply. As to "referral fees" those sound more like kickbacks, but it depends on what, if anything, the person gets for the fee.
I was offered a job, but the contract concerns me I have been offered a job, but while looking over the contract I found a paragraph that concerns me. I don't want to lose the right to any software that I write or develop outside of the company that I am hired at. For example, if I make a game. Is this a valid concern? The Paragraph: "Employee acknowledges and agrees that all right, title and interest of every kind and nature whatsoever, whether now known or unknown, in and to any intellectual property, including, without limitation, any inventions, patents, trademarks, trade names, copyrights, films, video tapes, scripts, software, computer/software code, formulae, creations and properties invented, created, written, developed, taped, filmed, furnished, produced or disclosed by or to Employee while employed by COMPANY shall, as between Employee and COMPANY, be and remain the sole and exclusive property of COMPANY for any and all purposes and uses whatsoever, and are by Employee’s execution hereof are assigned to COMPANY. Employee and Employee’s successors and assigns shall have no right, title or interest of any kind or nature therein or thereto, or in and to any results and proceeds therefrom. Where applicable, works of authorship created by Employee for COMPANY in performing Employee’s responsibilities hereunder shall be considered “works made for Hire” as defined in the U.S. Copyright Act. All computer/software code shall be solely stored on COMPANY’s servers (or COMPANY’s vendor’s servers) at all times and Employee shall not maintain duplicates thereof." EDIT: After reading this again out loud to myself I can see that the first half refers to COMPANY IP, and the second half refers to work performed by the employee (me) while developing FOR THE COMPANY. Meaning that code that I write at home on personally owned devices is not something covered by this statement. Can anyone confirm?
Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.
How can you get in trouble? If they see any code you wrote for them show up in your open source project. They own the code you write on company time. Even if your code goes into an open source project owned by the company, you still don't own that code. The only way you can own it is if they directly tell you that you may put it into your open source project. If you make your open source project private so nobody else can see the source code, but they see your side business has the same features you wrote for them. You can try to get around problem #1 by hiding your open source project. But if they see the same features in it that they told you to write for them, they can become suspicious. They might force you to reveal the source to them in court. If you don't want them to see it, they may force you to share it with a third party who is bound by an NDA. The third party can compare your code to theirs and report if you copied any code. Even if your work is not directly related to the company products, your work for them can be a company secret. You reveal that, and you are in trouble. You say your work improves internal procedures, but is not directly related the company products. If a company can reduce its cost, it can lower its prices and still make more money than their competition. That gives them a competitive edge over other businesses. By revealing how your employer does its internal work, you give that competitive edge to their competition. Although you say your open source project does not violate rule #4 - "does not reveal company secrets" - all three explanations mentioned above say it does. What can you do? Quit and start your own company based on your open source project. If you quit, you should do it before you write any code related to your project for your employer. Ask your company to fund your project. Talk to your boss and anybody else there who might be a stakeholder. Tell them what you can do. Make a deal with them that you get to work on your project during work hours. Maybe they could turn it into an additional source of revenue for the company. That changes you from a potential loss into a valuable asset. Their competitors might end up buying products based on your code. Many companies would love for their competition to pay them. Ask your employer to allow you to turn your work into your open source project. Some companies require employees who work on open source projects to give their employers a royalty-free license to use and modify the work as they wish. Ask your employer if they would use a product based on your project. You can start a side business (with your employer's blessing), and turn them into your first customer. They get access to a beta product before their competitors do. Promise them they get it free or at a hefty discount for a year or two before the competition even knows what you have. The first option is win/lose. You win and your employer loses. The other three options are win/win. Good luck!
What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake? The contract is voidable unless the employer's subsequent conduct reinforces its legitimacy. The employee's attempt to take advantage of something he knew was a mistake contravenes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on which contracts are premised. South African contract law is not an exception to this: The law of contract underpins private enterprise in South Africa and regulates it in the interest of fair dealing. The employer can resort to records of prior communications between the parties to prove that the stated compensation was intended as yearly, not monthly. Even if those records are not available in a judicial dispute, the employee would have a hard time persuading a court that the salary that was agreed upon is 12 times --or exceeds by a factor of 12-- the market rate for a job position of similar type.
The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.
The user gains the use of the software, the EULA issuer gains the limitations on how the user of the freeware will use it, that for example, prevent the freeware user from exploiting the issuer's labor by reusing it for profit. Consideration doesn't have to be monetary. As a practical matter, sometimes the business model is to give the software away as a loss leader and to have the issuer make their money with training and consulting on how to use it. Also, even in the absence of consideration, a promise upon which the person benefiting from the promise reasonably relies is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Further, EULA stands for "end user license agreement" and there are many times that license agreements aren't full fledged contracts. They are merely limited grants of permission to use something, often not even amounting to a full fledged property right or contract right. For example, if I let my neighbor walk into my living room while we talk and have tea, the right of the neighbor to be in my living room is called a license, even though it is not a contract. A license can be embedded in a contract, but it doesn't have to be.
I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference.
That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.
As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.
What is the thing called RICO? I'm not a law junkie, but I keep hearing this term, RICO, over and over again in different American TV shows (like Better Call Saul, for instance). So could you please explain to me what it is in simple terms (but in a detailed enough manner still)?
I can do it simple, but the Popehat can lawsplain it better. The crucial part is: It's never RICO! I mean, not literally never. But I can say with a very high level of confidence that if you're asking me, it's not RICO. Ok, now, what is Rico? Well, it's short for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and to use it you need to show a lot of stuff as the RICO jury instructions show. By the way, that is you need to prove all these points list: To recover under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must prove (1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity (known as "predicate acts"), (5) causing injury to the plaintiff's "business or property" by the conduct constituting the violation. Judges hate RICO. Some even have pre-written orders to demand whoever brings up RICO to show why they believe it is RICO - and Popehat can show you such a model order.
No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.
Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.
I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
It is unlikely that the US, or any government, would condone any kind of crime. The reason for this is that the law must be seen to be impartial and applied fairly to all those subject to it. What happens if tomorrow, the government decides they don't like you? It is possible that this type of activity, or activity amounting to it, would be sanctioned in specific, authorised cases. But the government throwing a lynch mob at anyone is a bad idea for order and a peaceful society.
The probable answer is right there in the article: the Kim Dotcom case has been a PR coup but a legal disaster. Mr Dotcom has not, at this time, been jailed and it may have become apparent to US and NZ law enforcement agencies that he probably never will be! It is really, really easy to accuse someone of committing a crime; it can be really, really hard to prove it beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law. So after initiating a case that has turned out to be a total disaster, why would you expect them to do the same thing a second time?
If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent?
Calls to 911 are treated as genuine at all times until the complaint is dealt with. This is because most people only call 911 for legitimate reasons and even some criminals call 911 because they want them to know the situation (Bomb scares are an extreme version of this as they cause a lot of disruption; they cannot be ignored because if the cops were to call bullshit and it was proven not to be bullshit, it's gonna be a lot worse than if they treat it as real and find out it's an alarm clock.). From the point of view of the first responders, whether cops, fire, or EMS, the call is always real and to be treated as such. Entering without warrant is legit if they have a probable cause of a crime or a person in distress, such as a hostage or a person in medical need; the emergency call is almost certainly sufficient. As you correctly said, at this point any evidence of a crime in plain sight is good reason to pursue the criminal acts unrelated to the original call. 911 calls are recorded so they can prove to the courts they got a tip and were following up. However, tying up emergency services with fake crimes is still not a proper use of 911 and there are ways to find people making bogus calls. 911 also traces phone calls in case of prank callers or even generally locating people in distress (if the dispatcher has to tell someone who is hiding from robbers in her house to be quiet, they can still dispatch officers to the general area by pinging the phone's metadata) so a string of burners will be noticed. Burner numbers can be traced to point of sale and most stores that carry them will have cameras (staff that remembers, not so much). If using pay phones, in this day and age, again there is likely cameras because the frequency of the latter and the infrequency of the former. Phone Booths haven't been a thing for far longer, so much so that the Christopher Reeves Superman film had a famous gag about how Phone Booths were phased out, when Clark Kent, needing to switch to his iconic Persona, runs to a bank of payphones (all without booths) and desperately looks for a new place to shed his clothes... in the 1970s. Either way, cops would be looking for nearby cameras to identify you and without many pay phones reliably lying around it won't take long. The more dangerous aspect of this is that drugs and organized crime are pretty much hand in hand. It could be the crack house you just called in is well known to the cops, but they're trying to use it to find out who the supplier is. The vigilante could be ruining their sting by calling in a true threat. If he does this too much, the local gang members will be looking out for him and may try to find him too; and whereas the police have rules, the gangs do not.
When can you file a lawsuit against a "parody" website? Hypothetically speaking, if someone were to make a website about 4 different lawyers and 2 different firms and promote it as a parody website using elements of breaking bad, better call saul, etc. Assuming statements are either based on objective facts or in reference to pop culture for comedic reasons: What grounds would those lawyers have to sue you? What legal precedent exists on either end?
In the United States, a website that is labeled as parody and that a reasonable reader would, upon reflection, recognize as not stating true facts is protected under the First Amendment, so no liability will attach. The key case on this point is Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). At the time, Campari Liqueur was running an ad campaign in which people talked about their first time drinking Campari, but in a context setting up extended double-entendres about losing their virginity. Playing off that format, Hustler ran a fake interview with Jerry Falwell about his "first time," which can really only be understood if reprinted in full: Falwell: My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg, Virginia. Interviewer: Wasn’t it a little cramped? Falwell: Not after I kicked the goat out. Interviewer: I see. You must tell me all about it. Falwell: I never really expected to make it with Mom, but then after she showed all the other guys in town such a good time, I figured, "What the hell!" Interviewer: But your Mom? Isn’t that a little odd? Falwell: I don’t think so. Looks don’t mean that much to me in a woman. Interviewer: Go on. Falwell: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses on Campari, ginger ale and soda—that’s called a Fire and Brimstone—at the time. And Mom looked better than a Baptist whore with a $100 donation. Interviewer: Campari in the crapper with Mom. How interesting. Well, how was it? Falwell: The Campari was great but Mom passed out before I could come. Interviewer: Did you ever try it again? Falwell: Sure. Lots of times. But not in the outhouse. Between Mom and the shit, the flies were too much to bear. Interviewer: We meant the Campari. Falwell: Oh, yeah, I always get sloshed before I go to the pulpit. You don’t think I could lay down all that bullshit sober do you? Campari, like all liquor, was made to mix you up. It's a light, 48-proof, refreshing spirit, just mild enough to make you drink too much before you know you're schnockered. For your first time, mix it with orange juice. Or maybe some white wine. Then you won't remember anything the next morning. Campari. The mixable that smarts. Predictably, Falwell sued, claiming defamation and extreme emotional distress. A jury awarded Falwell $150,000, and Hustler appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Falwell could not recover for defamation because the ad "was not reasonably believable," and that he could not recover for emotional distress because the First Amendment does permit such claims when "the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here": Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. ... From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been considerably poorer without them. ... There is no doubt that the caricature of respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description "outrageous" does not supply one. Since then, the principles from Hustler have evolved and distilled into a test that generally requires the plaintiff to prove that reasoanble readers would view the material in question as actually telling the truth about the defendant. For your hypothetical, then, the question would become whether people reading the website believed that about it. This is a trickier question than it might sound like. For more elaboration on the boundaries of parody and how we identify, you could check out the decision in Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d 421, 427–28 (6th Cir. 2019).
Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.
If a website takes down something that infringes on your copyright because of a DMCA request, the legal effect is that you can’t sue the website, only the person who put the content on the website. If a website doesn’t respond to a DMCA request, then you can sue the person responsible AND the website. And that’s what you would have to do: Sue them. And in extreme cases copyright infringement can be criminal; in that case the police might go after the website.
It would be copyright infringement. The script that you are planning to copy from is protected by law, so requires the copyright-owner's permission to create a derivative version (your own interpretation). If instead you write a completely different story inspired by the original book, you might not get sued. The problem is that there is a reasonable chance that you would accidentally duplicate part of one of the myriad adaptations, then the jury would have to decide whether it was just a coincidence, or copying.
Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work. This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote.
If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft.
There is really no point in hiring a lawyer until you can identify a culprit. Lawyers can't sue people until they have a way to serve the person at fault with legal process. You need an IT professional instead.
Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.
Wire tap law - Better Call Saul At the season finale of Better Call Saul: Season 2. Chuck records Jimmy admitting to committing a felony. The recording was obtained without Jimmy's permission (the tape recorder was hidden). Wouldn't this recording be inadmissible in court as it violates the wire tap law?
Better Call Saul is set in New Mexico where as long as one-person involved in the conversation is aware that it is being recorded, it is legal. Known as "one-party consent". This varies state to state. http://www.detectiveservices.com/2012/02/27/state-by-state-recording-laws/ http://www.aapsonline.org/judicial/telephone.htm If neither Jimmy nor Chuck knew the conversation was being recorded, then it would be illegal.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.
The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps.
IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.
The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.
The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.
Quick answer "Is a lawyer allowed to follow a client's instructions to hide evidence?" Probably not. I discuss this in the final section of this answer. About this specific case, the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the lawyer (Ken Murray) had intended to conceal the tapes permenantly or that he was aware of an obligation to disclose them prior to trial. As summarized by Austin Cooper, K.C.: Justice Gravely held that the concealing of the tapes for 17 months until Bernardo’s trial had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice, and therefore the actus reus of the offence was proved. On the issue of whether Mr. Murray willfully intended to obstruct justice, because it was feasible that Mr. Murray could have used the tapes for the defence and may well have believed that he had no obligation to disclose the tapes until the trial, he found the necessary mens rea was not proved. Accordingly, he found him not guilty. Deeper answer I'll first attempt to explain the trial judge's reasons (R. v. Murray, 2000 CanLII 22378 (ON SC)). At the end, I answer your more general questions. Facts February, 1993: Ken Murray was retained to defend Paul Bernardo on sexual assault charges; it was this charge for which Bernardo was already in custody at the time of the search of his home. April 30, 1993: The final search warrant of the Bernardo home expired. May 6, 1993: Ken Murray opened a letter from Bernardo that instructed the defence team to retrieve six 8mm videotapes. They located the tapes, removed them, and they committed to not tell anyone about the tapes. May 18, 1993: Bernardo was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related offences. Murray's retainer was expanded to include defence of these charges. Bernardo authorized Murray to copy and review the videotapes and make use of them as appropriate in his defence. Two of the tapes contained evidence of sexual assault and death threats. Others contained evidence about the character and actions of a co-accused which Murray thought could be useful in Bernardo's defence. Early June 1993: Murray made a copy of the tapes and became fully aware of their contents. July 11 and 12, 1994: Bernardo told Murray he intended to deny ever having any contact with the victims that were on the tapes. He told Murray that the tapes were not to be used to contradict this position. July 24, 1994: After learning about DNA evidence and learning what the co-accused told police (all pointing to Bernardo being with the victims in the home), and after confirming that Bernardo insisted on maintaining his position that he had no contact with the victims and that the tapes were not to be used, Murray "felt obliged to terminate the solicitor-client relationship". August 25, 1994: After a period of discussion with John Rosen (a lawyer from another firm), Rosen agreed to take over the defence of the first-degree murder charges. Murray did not tell Rosen about the tapes. Murray would remain defence counsel on the sexual assault charges. August 27, 1994: Rosen and Murray met with Bernardo to explain the change in counsel on the murder charges. August 30, 1994: Bernardo directed Murray to not reveal any of his materials to "other counsel retained on my behalf for other offences that are currently before the Court... unless I specifically direct the release of such materials, in writing." Murray retained his own lawyer who further sought advice from the law society. The law society advised that (1) Murray remove himself as counsel for Bernardo on all matters; (2) Murray give the tapes to the judge in a sealed packet to be subect to court determination; and (3) to tell Bernardo of these steps as soon as possible. Rosen (the new defence counsel on the murder charges) became aware of these plans, learned that the tapes existed, and was concerned the tapes would be turned over without any input from him. September 21 and 22, 1994: After much discussion with Crown counsel, Rosen got instructions from Bernardo to turn over the tapes; the tapes were delivered to the Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Niagara Regional Police. The charge Ken Murray was charged with wilfully obstructing or attempting to obstruct the course of justice. The law The judge applied what is known as the "tendency test". He said: Attempting to obstruct justice is construed as the doing of an act which has a tendency to pervert or obstruct the course of justice (the actus reus). "Wilfully" then constitutes the mens rea -- that is the act is done for the purpose of obstructing the course of justice He noted: The system functions within the broad principles of the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. The Crown must fully disclose its case. The defence has no reciprocal obligation. Application of the law Actus reus In this case, the judge found that Murray had done the actus reus of the offence: On the face of the evidence Murray's action in secreting the critical tapes had the tendency to obstruct the course of justice at several stages of the proceedings. The tapes were put beyond the reach of the police who had unsuccessfully attempted to locate them. Secreting them had the tendency to obstruct the police in their duty to investigate the crimes of Bernardo and Homolka. Further, there was no justification that negated the actus reus. This evidence on the tapes was not privilged; it was not communication between solicitor and client. The judge found that "once [Murray] had discovered the overwhelming significance of the critical tapes, Murray... was left with but three legally justifiable options": (a) immediately turn over the tapes to the prosecution, either directly or anonymously; (b) deposit them with the trial judge; or (c) disclose their existence to the prosecution and prepare to do battle to retain them. Mens rea The Crown had to prove that Murray's intention was to obstruct the course of justice. The judge found that the Crown did not prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge found that Murray may have not intended to permanently suppress the tapes and that Murray may have believed he had no obligation to disclose the tapes prior to the trial. He had presented several theories regarding the potential usefulness of the tapes to the defence which would have required holding back the tapes for their tactical or "surprise" value. Also, the judge noted that the law in this area was confusing.1 While Murray made only a token effort to find out what his obligations were, had he done careful research he might have remained confused. The weight of legal opinion in Ontario is to the effect that lawyers may not conceal material physical evidence of crime, but how this rule applies to particular facts has been the subject of extensive discussion. Lawyers in the United States have been afflicted with the same dilemma. In the materials supplied to me by counsel, there is reference to at least 15 law journal discussions on the issue. Ethical responsibility Doesn't a lawyer have a responsibility not to defend a specific fact that they know is criminal? No. But they do have an obligation to not lie to the court or to allow their client to lie to the court. This is why Murray knew he had to withdraw from the case when Bernardo was committed to the defence that he had never encountered the victims. To answer your title question, "Is a lawyer allowed to follow instructions from his client to hide evidence?", the answer today is "probably not." It has even been suggested that if defence counsel is faced with this issue, they should instruct their client: It is evidence that might convict you; if you give it to me, I may have to turn it over to the prosecution. Take it away and keep it in your residence; if you destroy it, you may be guilty of a crime. The Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct now say (Rule 5.1-2A): A lawyer shall not counsel or participate in the concealment, destruction or alteration of incriminating physical evidence or otherwise act so as to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the course of justice. Any lawyer faced with this dilemma should probably do what Mr. Murray eventually did and retain their own lawyer and/or get advice from their law society. 1. While the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" generally holds true, the mens rea of this offence includes an intention to obstruct justice. The judge understood this to invite an inquiry into what Murray believed the law required of him. This approach has been criticized: see Lucinda Vandervort, "Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse'... Even for a Lawyer", 2001.
Does putting a dollar in a lawyer's pocket entitle you to attorney client privilege (like Saul Goodman from breaking bad) Breaking Bad Season 2 Episode 8, Saul Goodman tells Walt and Jesse (who just kidnapped him) to put a dollar in his pocket so they'll have attorney-client privilege. first things first you're gonna put a dollar in my pocket both ya. You want attorney-client privilege don't you so that everything you say is strictly between us I mean it put a dollar in my pocket come on make it official come on do it that's it come on just a dollar Link to YouTube clip Would this actually give Walt and Jesse attorney-client privilege?
There's no privilege. Under N.M. Evid. R. 11-503., New Mexico's attorney-client privilege protects communications that are: confidential; and made for the purpose of facilitating or providing professional legal services to that client; and between a client and his lawyer. The test doesn't ask if money changed hands, so paying a lawyer does not mean your communications are privileged. There are many services a lawyer can provide for money that are not shrouded behind privilege, and courts will routinely compel the disclosure of communications they deem to be "business advice" rather than "legal advice." Bhandari v. Artesia General Hosp., 317 P.3d, 856 (2013) ("Butler provided the memorandum as a mixture of legal and business advice in his capacity as both in-house counsel and a senior vice president of the Corporation. We hold that the memorandum is business advice and thus unprivileged."). And if money were required, defendants with public defenders or pro bono counsel wouldn't have privilege. Under Rule 11-503, there's no privilege for Saul's conversation with Walt and Jesse. Saul is representing Badger, who is adverse to Walt and Jesse, so there isn't an attorney-client relationship. Further, Saul isn't providing legal assistance to Walt or Jesse; he's providing them advice on how to evade detection. You could try to interpret that as a request for legal advice, but the argument would be self-defeating. Because the advice to procure a stand-in defendant would amount to concealing identity, aiding a felon, and compounding a crime, it would fall within the crime-fraud exception, which says that the privilege does not apply to communications made "to enable or assist anyone in committing or planning to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud." Rule 11-503(D).
The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client.
I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it.
Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.
My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not.
This is a very common situation, and -- assuming this is happening in the United States -- it is pretty clear that Attorney is behaving exactly as he should under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Mother is the "technical" client and the "real" client. Son is not a client in any sense; he is merely a person paying the bills. If Mother wants to involve Son, she can do that on her own, but Attorney is prohibited from disclosing his privileged communications with Mother and from substituting Son's preferences/judgments for those of his client. If Son does not like what the lawyer is doing, he can encourage Mother to direct Attorney to change course, or Son can inform Attorney that he will stop paying for Attorney's services.
As I understand the story, Black recused himself because the attorney was his cousin. I think the joke is that the attorney thought it wasn't necessary for Black to do so, perhaps because the attorney didn't understand how seriously conflicts of interest are taken. I don't think Kennedy misspoke; I think he's just used the generic you construct, in which "you" is used as an impersonal pronoun instead of "one". His sentence could be rephrased more formally as: Hugo Black stands up and stalks out of the room, which among Supreme Court justices is a polite way to say that one is recused. In other words, Black's action is equivalent to him saying "I am recused".
It is possible that a court would hold Comapny X's agreement with Bob to be unconscionable for overbredth and therefore void. This would depend on the state having jurisdiction, and on the specific facts of the case and the language of the contract between X and Bob. Some states do not favor such broad agreements on automatic assignment of IP rights. If the Contract between X and Bob was held to be void, then Sam would own the rights. Otherwise X would own the rights, as their contract came first. As the answer by Dale M says, Bob entered into the contract with Sam fraudulently, by concealing a materiel fact (Bob's existing employment with X). Bob would potentially be liable to Sam for damages. One possible measure of damages would be what it would cost Sam to buy the rights from X.
What are the limits of removing judicial recourse through arbitration clauses? Suppose a FINRA-regulated financial institution is notorious for littering its service agreement with purportedly binding arbitration clauses, but then exercises a policy that amounts to depriving a customer of their assets without any lawful basis. As their line of business is heavily regulated by statutes and regulations, surely there are certain immutable parameters as to how they should operate that cannot simply be contracted away with provisions in their terms of service that one may be required to sign on the dotted line of in opening an account. If such a company oversteps one of these parameters for lawful operation, are arbitration clauses binding in respect of these breaches, in removing judicial recourse for the customer in court, rather than in arbitration venues? And what other scenarios give rise to causes of action that can immutably transcend arbitration clauses?
If such a company oversteps one of these parameters for lawful operation, are arbitration clauses binding in respect of these breaches, in removing judicial recourse for the customer in court, rather than in arbitration venues? In this situation, the arbitration clause (assuming it was actually entered into) is binding and there is no meaningful judicial recourse through a civil lawsuit. It does not bar criminal prosecutions or administrative agency action. And what . . . scenarios give rise to causes of action that can immutably transcend arbitration clauses? Civil actions seeking redress from sexual assaults are exempt from arbitration in the U.S., pursuant to H.R. 4445, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, which was signed into law on March 3, 2022.
Usually, an attack on the validity or prudence of the underlying order is not a defense to court action to enforce it. Usually, the only exception would be when it was impossible, or practically impossible, to perform the court order for some reason. You could seek to modify the order, but that would be prospective in effect only and usually isn't granted unless there has been a change in circumstances since the original order was entered. You could also bring a motion to set aside judgment (usually this has to be done within six months of entry of an order) on the grounds that this provision was included only due to mistake or irregularities in the process or excusable neglect. But, that only would have only prospective effect.
Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)
I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.
No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.
No. Whatever clauses and terms existed in this contract, a second contract between the parties could modify it to remove such a clause, or to directly make such an amendment, or to annul the contract entirely. You can make it a requirement that amendments be unanimous among the parties (as opposed to e.g. unilateral, allowing one party to make certain changes, variously without approval or without notice). Such a clause may also be unenforceable for another reason, but this doesn't fit any of the general points for unenforceability, except perhaps being against public policy if a jurisdiction happened to regulate contracts to that degree.
A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from).
Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.
What happens when the law changes? Assume a criminal offence occurred in the past (for example 2015), before a new law was passed at a future date (for example 2016). What law would be referred to by the judge when it comes to sentencing the offender? I think there is a legal term for this in Latin but I cannot find it. My question is focusing on the United States and the United Kingdom. I have done some research, and it appears that ex de facto law is not allowed in the United Kingdom to follow directions given by the European Union. However, I am not sure if this covers my question, as it is for actions that were previously legal, whereas my question is about actions that were illegal and then had changes made to them.
united-states An ex post facto law criminalizes conduct after the fact that was legal at the time, something that is prohibited under U.S. constitutional law. But, as the question states: my question is about actions that were illegal and then had changes made to them. If something is a crime in 2015 and this criminal law is violated, and the conduct is then legalized in 2016, the conduct committed while it was a crime does not cease to be punishable as a crime and may be punished criminally. Often a judge would consider the fact that the conduct was later legalized when evaluating the seriousness of the crime at a post-legalization sentencing, but a judge is not required to do so. A significant number of pardons and commutations of criminal sentences by Presidents and Governors in the U.S. involve people convicted of crimes for conduct that is now legal or is now punished less severely. But pardons and commutations are purely discretionary. As an aside, France has constitutional protections that give newly lenient treatment of crimes retroactive effect, but the United States does not.
Is such legislation that effectively overrules a court imposed sentence even allowable? Yes. Amnesty legislation is allowed. For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed such legislation with regard to crack cocaine sentences. Legislation changing sentences for crimes is presumed to be prospective only, but this presumption can be overcome with clear statutory language to the contrary. As a political matter, however, district attorneys usually lobby strenuously against amnesty legislation, feeling that it sets a bad (political) precedent. an existing NH truth in sentencing statute would seem to conflict with the notion that any such change is possible. In the event of a direct conflict between an older statute and a newer statute that can't be resolved by any other interpretive method, the newer statute prevails over the older one, even if this result isn't expressly identified in the legislation.
Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period.
The Limitations Act of 1980 and its predecessors apply to civil actions brought by private individuals. It is not a criminal statute of limitations. I will answer with regard to civil cases, rather than criminal ones. Section 40 of the Limitations Act of 1980 incorporates by reference a schedule of transition provisions that govern this question, and when a cause of action is not governed by the 1980 Act it usually defaults to the predecessor 1939 Act. The problem is both bigger than just the fraudulent breach of trust unlimited statute of limitations under Section 21 of the Act, since the deadline only runs from when an action accrues that can be long after the act giving rise to the claim actually happened, and smaller, because the act (and also its predecessor 1939 act) allow statutes of limitations to be extended for equitable reasons under certain circumstances. The 1881 Limitations Act, Section 27 had an exception to the general rule for concealed fraud tolling the statute so long as it was concealed, which probably carried over into the 1939 Act. Section 9 of the transition provisions states in the relevant part that: (1)Nothing in any provision of this Act shall— (a)enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; The 1939 Act limitations ran from when the act was committed, not when it was discovered, until the 1963 Act changes that. A full analysis of the breach of trust issue is found in this law review article.
The question seems to somewhat misunderstand the role of courts in the united-states The United States uses a common-law system, ultimately derived from the law of Great Britain as it was at the time of the US Revolution, and thus incorporating its history largely derived from the practices of English Courts. There was a period in this history where much new law was made by judges, although a great deal of it was also made by statutes, that is by Parliament. In theory such judge-made laws merely "discovered" what the law "had always been" but in practice judges made much new law. Since then the incidence of judge made law has greatly declined in the UK, and has declined even more in the US. I think that it is fair to say that Judges in the US do not now make new law with any frequency. There is, however, a major exception to this. In the US, the Federal Constitution is the "supreme law of the land", and no federal or state statute, regulation or practice may stand if it does not conform to relevant requirements of the federal Constitution. (Nor may any local ordinance, regulation or practice.) But the federal constitution is written mostly in rather broad and general terms, requiring for example that "due process of law" be provided, but but not spelling out in detail what that means. It is therefore up to judges, and particularly to the judges of Federal appellate courts, and most particularly the US Supreme Court, to say when a law, regulation, or practice is in violation of some constitutional requirement, and what must be done to avoid such conflict. One example is the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holding that when admissions or confessions by criminal suspects questioned while under arrest were admitted into criminal trials, this violated the defendants' rights against compelled self-incrimination unless they had been advised of their rights under the law, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel. This introduced a new substantive rule of law as a way to enforce a long-existing constitutional provision. The Wikipedia article says: Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. But the concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing". A more recent example is the case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) in which the US Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment together guaranteed a right to same-sex couples to marry. This again was a new substantive rule, significantly different from the previous practice for most of US history, as a way of defining and enforcing long-existing constitutional provisions. Related to these are cases where a law, or a provision of a law, is held to be unconstitutional, and thus not a valid law at all. An unconstitutional law may not validly be enforced. Such a case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) which held that laws requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance (flag salute) in schools were unconstitutional. These sorts of actions do not occur in those common-law countries which do not have a formal written constitution that is superior to laws passed by the legislature. That is the case in the UK, for example. Aside from that sort of case, where constitutional rights are being asserted or constitutional requirements are being enforced, the main power of US judges over the law is to interpret the law (both statute and regulation) when it is unclear or ambiguous, and to decide exactly what it will mean and how it will be applied. These interpretations can be changed or completely reversed by later legislative action, that is by new laws passed by Congress or by a State legislature. This sort of interpretation occurs in all common-law countries, and also in civil-law countries, although to a somewhat lesser degree in civil-law countries. In general, civil-law countries tend to spell out their law in more specific detail in laws passed by the legislature, leaving somewhat less room for interpretation by courts and judges. By the way, my understanding is that Indonesia is not strictly a civil-law country, but uses a mixture of systems. The Wikipedia article "Law of Indonesia " says: Law of Indonesia is based on a civil law system, intermixed with customary law and the Roman Dutch law. Before the Dutch colonisation in the sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms ruled the archipelago independently with their own custom laws, known as adat. Foreign influences from India, China and Arabia have not only affected the culture, but also weighed in the customary adat laws. I cannot speak to the specifics of how the courts of Indonesia have interpreted the law on drugs in that country.
Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.
As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a "set and forget" thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament.
The law does have examples They are called “judgements” Every case decided by a court is an example, in common law jurisdictions at least. When those cases are decided by an superior court they become precedents - binding “examples” on courts in their hierarchy and persuasive “examples” on other courts. When you go to a lawyer for advice, she doesn’t just parrot back the statute, she looks at the precedents and decides whether the case decided by the House of Lords in 1848 or the High Court of Australia in 1912 more closely matches your situation. Also, statute law often has examples written into them Statues exist in hierarchies, Constitution, Acts, Regulations, Departmental Policies etc. and the lower you go the more specific the law is and the more likely it is to have examples. For example, this answer I wrote for another question quotes examples from the new-south-wales Evidence Act.
Typo in end date of a contract I am working with a contract company in the UK (I am in the US) and we need to terminate our contract with them. We have provided written notice on Feb 2, 2023 stating we would like to end service on April 3. They have replied stating that we are in contract with them until July of 2023. Below is the clause stating dates both parties agreed to: This SOW shall commence on 1 October 2022 ("Effective Date") and continue with no provision for termination (other than the provisions listed agreed in Clause "Termination" below) until 30 June 2022 ("Initial Term"). Unless terminated by 30 April 2022, the SOW shall tacitly renew from 1 July 2022 onwards from full calendar quarter to calendar quarter until terminated by either party with a notice period of two months. The termination clause states we can exit at any time if the company is liquidated (which is not the case). Are we bound to stay in the contract until July 2023 even though the contrat states July 2022?
If the contract commenced on 1st October 2022 the dates 30 April 2022 and 1 July 2022 are plainly a mistake (2022 for 2023). If so, you can give notice before 30th April 2023 to terminate at the end of June. Even if you want to hold them to those dates, the current "full calendar quarter" (which has been tacitly renewing) will end on 31st March, and 2nd February was too late to give the required 2 months notice. Either way, the contract cannot end until 30th June 2023, the end of the next full calender quarter.
Under an assured shorthold tenancy, when the fixed term expires, it automatically becomes a periodic tenancy (also called a rolling or month-to-month tenancy) if no other action is taken. For periodic tenancies, the default requirement is: The notice you give must end on the first or last day of the period of a tenancy, except when your tenancy agreement says something different. The first day of a period of your tenancy is the anniversary date each week or month of when your tenancy began. This is often the same date that your rent is due, but not always. (the above taken from this Shelter guide.) The contract merely restates this. So in other words, yes, this is normal. In this instance, if you give notice on or before 25 Dec, you'll be required to pay rent up to 24 Jan. However, if the landlord finds a new tenant and their tenancy starts after you move out, but before 24 Jan, then you are only liable for rent up to the start of their tenancy.
What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach.
This is covered in §§ 563-564 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, specifically for the death of a tenant. § 563 BGB: Household members continue your contract in your place, with a hierarchy of spouses before children before other members. They can each declare within a month that they decline to continue the contract. The landlord needs a grave objection against a person to decline continuation within a month after the above month. § 563a BGB: The same rules apply to any surviving tenants. § 564 BGB: If the contract is not continued with anyone living in or renting, then the contract is continued with the deceased's heirs. But in this case, both sides can equally terminate the contract within a month. All deadlines from this section appear to start upon the party receiving notice (of the death / the fact that they are continuing the contract). The death of your landlord has no immediate consequence on your contract.
Generally a signature is binding even if you have not read the document you have signed; as far as the law is concerned you should have and it's too bad for you if you didn't. Of course, this presumes the contract is otherwise valid. In the circumstances you describe you should ask to see the document before signing. If that is not possible, then instead of signing you should write "I do not agree" instead and take the printed statement - only 1 in 100 people will actually check that you did sign. If you have signed and do not wish to be bound, you should contact the company immediately in writing and say that and that they can collect whatever goods they have supplied.
I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content.
None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.
Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract.
Employee acting illegally on direction from management I thought of this when reading the Meta case regarding negative testing. Say a state has a law regarding data-retention of log files for banks. A manager instructs an employee to wipe drive of logs. The employee is knowledgeable enough to know that this log, it is for data-retention, but they do not know any laws regarding how long data must be retained, or what needs to be retained (or deleted). Could employees have charges filed against them for such type of actions? Has this already occurred? What obligation does the employee need to know of laws if they have some knowledge, but not expert knowledge. e.g. "Sure boss, I will wipe that important drive. vs I do not think it is legal to wipe that important drive. vs I was informed by counsel that it is illegal to wipe that important drive." How would an employee know that negative testing is illegal in New York? Where in the chain of obedience is the responsibility laid at(corporate officers)?
An employer doesn't have the authority to authorize its employees to violate the law. An employee who personally participates in a crime has both criminal and civil liability for the employee's actions. Private sector employers have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the actions of their employees taken in the scope of their duties. In other words, anything that an employee of a private sector employer is liable for, the employer is also liable for. Governmental employers do not have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the civil rights violations of the employees. Direct civil as opposed to vicarious civil liability, and criminal liability for an employer (governmental or private) is generally limited to acts carried out by employees of the entity at the direction of senior management or pursuant to a policy, explicit or implicit, of the employer. This said, it is the nature of large employers to break tasks into component parts spread over many employees in different parts of the employing entity. In some circumstances, an individual employee's role may be such that the employee lacks sufficient information about the overall course of action of the employer to know that their actions are part of an overall course of conduct by the employer that constitutes a crime or tort. For example, to retreat to an old school example, suppose that there is an employee who sits in front of a shredding machine all day and feeds paper into and clears paper jams, etc. whose job is to shred whatever documents are put in a bin next to his work station. This guy, who makes no decisions regarding what is to be shredded and has no real knowledge of why documents are being shredded, probably doesn't have criminal or civil liability if his labor is used to illegal destroy some documents. For all the shredder guy knows, he could simply be destroying redundant copies of documents to free up space in the filing cabinets while a single archival copy is retained. Typically, criminal laws require some level of mens rea (i.e. intent) which may be intent to do something in particular, it may be knowledge of certain facts, or what have you. An employee is generally only going to face criminal liability is the employee who carries out the wrongful act on behalf of the employer does so with the requisite knowledge and intent set forth in the criminal statute.
Short Answer It might or might not be an anti-trust violations depending upon the states where the employers and employee are located. But, as a practical matter, it is almost impossible for an employee to prove an anti-trust violation without an insider leaking a "smoking gun" document or a company admitting to improper conduct, before a lawsuit is filed. Long Answer There is considerable regional variation regarding the extent to which legal arrangements to limit employee mobility are legal. For example, historically, Massachusetts is notorious for enforcing such limitations strictly. In contrast, California is famous for refusing to enforce such restrictions. In general, the Northeast is strict, the West is lenient and other states are in between, but it is really a state by state issue. (Incidentally, weak non-competition laws have been empirically shown by economists to be better for the economy in the sector where they might be applied but are not applied.) Usually these legal restrictions on employee mobility are imposed unilaterally by the employer without conferring with competitors, and sometimes remedies for a violation of these non-competition arrangements are limited to the employee and not the hiring company (although this is hardly universal - the intentional interference with contract tort historically arose to punish companies that induced employees to violate non-competes and duties of loyalty of existing employees of the suing firm). The anti-trust dimension comes from the agreement between competitors to honor each other's non-competition agreements, which is meaningful because in the states where Apple and Google are headquartered, non-competition agreements are basically unenforceable so this collusion between competitors has an effect in excess of the default legal situation in the absence of collusion. If Apple and Google had instead both been based in Boston instead, where their non-competition agreements were enforceable against both the employee and the new employer as a default rule of law, their agreement would probably not have violated anti-trust laws because they would simply be agreeing to follow the generally applicable law that would apply in the absence of a collusive agreement anyway. Thus, without knowing the default rules of law in the relevant states, and without knowing if there was actually an actual agreement between the competitors, you can't sue for an anti-trust violation. One of the recent revolutions in federal civil procedure, the Twombly case, arose in an anti-trust situation and held that a complaint for an anti-trust violation is not sufficient unless the person bringing suit has actual knowledge of the existence of a collusive agreement between competitors and does not merely infer the existence of such an agreement from the facts and circumstances available to the general public. It is not permissible to sue first and then use subpoenas and other pre-trial discovery procedures to determine if there was actually an express collusive agreement between the competitors rather than having their behavior arise for other reasons (since under Econ 101 microeconomic principles, marketwide price fixing by all participants and completely non-collusive perfect competition are indistinguishable as they both produce a uniform price in the marketplace for a good or service). Since this information is usually impossible to obtain prior to brining suit without an insider who leaks a smoking gun document, as a practical matter, it is usually impossible for an individual employee to prevail in an anti-trust lawsuit alleging collusion between competing firms. Under federal anti-trust laws, circumstances that have the de facto identical results to illegal collusion between competitors, where this is not actually collusion, are usually not actionable (i.e. you can't prevail in a lawsuit based upon those claims).
In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)
Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it.
It is conceivable that A's employer would claim that the intellectual property was actually created by A in the course of their employment rather than B. That would be a question of fact for the lawsuit to determine. Realistically, assuming A and B both testify that B created the intellectual property with no input from A and A's employer had only the IP address as evidence, it is pretty unlikely that the fact finder would find that A created the intellectual property. A's employer would almost certainly need to provide some additional evidence that would show that the balance of probabilities favored the employer's position (i.e. A works at FedEx writing software for package logistics, B is a 12 year old kid with no formal computer science training, and the intellectual property in question involves the implementation of sophisticated graph traversal algorithms that would be common in package logistics applications).
A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.
It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.
Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.
Which security is the social security number about? Everywhere online this seems to be a given, no source even attempts to explain it: If the social security number is about identifying an individual/citizen/taxpayer, why is it not called social identification number? What security is the SSN about?
Social Security numbers are called Social Security numbers because were invented to implement the Social Security Act of 1935, which was one of the important programs adopted by Congress as part of the New Deal during the Great Depression. These individual identifying numbers made it easier for the government to compile and collate information about the payroll taxes on the wages and salaries of workers potentially entitled to Social Security benefits which was (and is) collected by employers to pay for Social Security benefits. Compiling this data was necessary because under the Act one's lifetime history of Social Security payroll taxation history is used to determine if you, or your dependents, are eligible for Social Security benefits at all, and if so, to determine how big the benefit check should be according to formulas adopted by the government agency administering the program. This agency is now called the Social Security Administration. But, this agency has been relocated in the federal government bureaucracy now and then since the Act was passed in 1935 as part of general reorganizations of the federal government bureaucracy. Keep in mind that all of this data collection and collation was done by hand. Computers adequate to assist government agencies in administering government programs wouldn't come into being for another thirty years. The "security" referenced is the economic security that the Social Security Act of 1935 provided to elderly people, widows, and orphans. Before the Social Security Act was adopted, the elderly, widows, and orphans, who often lacked the ability to earn a living wage in the economic marketplace, routinely faced extremely high poverty rates, and employer survivor's and disability benefits were uncommon. In time, Social Security numbers began to be used as a tool for the government to identify people for purposes other than administering the Social Security Act, such as for purposes of administering state and federal income taxes. But, by then, the name "Social Security number" for these identifying numbers originally used to administer the Social Security program was already firmly established.
From Lumen Introduction to Sociology: Many governments provide legal definitions of race for purposes of census-taking and calculating budgets for governmental programs such as those that promote equal opportunity employment. For instance, in the U.S. Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Census Bureau currently uses race and ethnicity as self-identification data items. In this system, the residents choose the race or races with which they most closely identify and indicate what their ethnic origin is (e.g., Latino). The racial categories represent a social-political construct for the race or races that respondents consider themselves to be. OMB defines the concept of race as outlined for the U.S. census as not “scientific or anthropological” and takes into account “social and cultural characteristics as well as ancestry”, using “appropriate scientific methodologies” that are not “primarily biological or genetic in reference. ” The race categories include both racial and national-origin groups. Governmental Use of Racial Categories This image illustrates U.S. real median household income per year by race and ethnicity from 1967 to 2008, as compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. Race and Law Enforcement In an attempt to provide general descriptions that may facilitate the job of law enforcement officers seeking to apprehend suspects, the FBI employs the term “race” to summarize the general appearance (skin color, hair texture, eye shape, and other such easily noticed characteristics) of individuals whom they are attempting to apprehend. From the perspective of law enforcement officers, it is generally more important to arrive at a description that will readily suggest the general appearance of an individual than to make a scientifically valid categorization by DNA or other such means. Thus, in addition to assigning a wanted individual to a racial category, such a description will include: height, weight, eye color, scars, and other distinguishing characteristics. British Police use a classification based on the ethnic background of British society, for example W1 (White-British), M1 (White and black Caribbean), and A1 (Asian-Indian). Some of the characteristics that constitute these groupings are biological and some are learned (cultural or linguistic) traits that are easy to notice. In many countries, such as France, the state is legally banned from maintaining data based on race, so the police issue wanted notices to the public that include labels like “dark skin complexion. ”
No, it is not debt and you are not owed any money beyond what Congress decides to give you. Section 1104 of the act says the benefits are what Congress decides to give out. This was challenged in 1960 and upheld. To quote Wikipedia: Ephram Nestor challenged Section 1104 after he was denied Social Security payments as a deported member of the Communist Party. He argued that a contract existed between himself and the United States government, since he had paid into the system for 19 years. ... The Court ruled that no such contract exists, and that there is no contractual right to receive Social Security payments. Payments due under Social Security are not “property” rights and are not protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The interest of a beneficiary of Social Security is protected only by the Due Process Clause.
This is less of a compliance question, and more of an infosec question. On one hand, you want to be able to restore access to an account to users who have lost their access. On the other hand, you must prevent unauthorized access e.g. from hackers. These factors must be balanced. Whether you'll fulfil a data subject access request will generally follow the same criteria as deciding whether you'll reset someone's access credentials, so I'll mostly discuss identity verification in general. Trying to validate names is generally pointless from a security perspective, since the name on the account might not be real, or because validation documents like scans from a passport can be easily forged. When a service has identity validation measures like requesting a copy of photo ID, or requesting a photo of you holding up a validation code written on paper, that doesn't actually help validating that the person requesting access is the account owner, but that the person requesting access appears to be a natural person, and now documents about their identity are on file. A lot of information like names, birthdates, or addresses is also not at all secret and could be easily guessed by a malicious actor. Most websites work by equating access with control over an email account. If you can receive a password reset code over email, you have access. In effect, this delegates the responsibility of account recovery to the email or OAuth provider. So the issue is what happens when someone loses their email account, which is not entirely uncommon for accounts that are multiple years old. One reasonable (and likely GDPR-compliant solution) is to deny access when someone loses their account. Quite a lot of services operate this way. A milder form of this is to email the old address that someone is trying to take over the account, and turn over the account only if you have other evidence of ownership and there has been no reply over multiple weeks. Since this is part of an identity verification measure, I don't think the GDPR's normal 1 month deadline would apply. However, this approach is very risky: an attack can succeed through the mere inaction of the true account holder, and it would arguably be a data breach if you give access to the wrong person – safer for erasure requests only. Also, emails like “click here or we'll delete your account” look a lot like spam (I get a lot of those about alleged problems with my Paypal account). A potentially more reasonable approach is to use questions about the account to verify ownership. When did they create the account? When did they last use it? Can they answer questions about non-public content of the account? (But don't let an attacker choose the questions!) You see some older sites that ask the user to select a “security question” for recovery purposes. But this isn't a best practice – they are frequently the weakest link in an authentication system. If the user answers truthfully, the answer may be easy to guess or discover for an attacker. E.g. the infamous “what is your mother's maiden name” question is horrendously insecure in the age of Facebook. If the user provides a more secure answer, that is essentially just another password that's even easier to lose than an email account. High-value accounts typically offer a secondary authentication method as a fallback. E.g. my bank can send me new access codes via physical mail. GitHub can optionally link a Facebook account for recovery purposes. But these measures would be overkill for most cases. Especially collecting a physical address for the sole purpose of offering account recovery would likely violate the GDPR's data minimization principle, though it may be fine when the user opts in with freely given consent. To summarize: what you're trying to do is extremely difficult, because you've need to balance different security aspects: keeping malicious actors out, and letting legitimate account owners in. Whereas I'd resolve that by denying any account recovery or subject access requests, other approaches exists with other risk profiles. The GDPR requires you to perform reasonable identity verification measures, but what is reasonable depends on the business context and is ultimately an infosec question.
There is no state that requires you to show ID to obtain medical care. To the extent that this is done it is done at the behest of whoever is paying for the care to determine that you are someone who is authorized to benefit from this payment, and not an imposter, or as a matter of policy of the doctor. (An exception to this general rule applies when one wants to pick up a prescription for a controlled substance or a Sudafed product, where you must indeed show ID to show that your name matches a prescription or to insure that the right name is entered into the Sudafed database.) It might be more convenient for the doctor in terms of collection of bad debt, insurance policy claims (where an insurance card would normally be required, at least), protection against fraud claims from an insurer, and medical record keeping to have a name, so a doctor might make it a policy to require ID, but it is not required by law (except where a government benefit provider like Medicaid or Medicare is involved and has a regulation requiring it). For example, in the Las Vegas shooting, where there wasn't time to process paperwork, hospital triage officials simply assigned an alias to every incoming patient and wrote it in marker on their body to keep the medical records straight, and to allow that alias to track medical costs to be billed when the time came to get the proper intake paperwork filled out and the file sent to the accounting department. There are also other circumstances that do not involve emergency treatment (e.g. STD testing, methadone treatment at free clinics, and clinical trials) where an alias rather than a true name is sometimes used to keep track of patients.
Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here.
Basically how reducible is personal information until it's no longer personal information? When it can no longer be used, alone or combined with other data, to identify a person (or small number of people). Context matters, if you have data on the people in say New York City, (pop. 8 million+) there are only 676 2 letter initials which averages out to about 12,000 each BUT initials are not uniformly distributed: there are a lot more JS out there than XX. In fact XX could be so rare that you can identify an individual in NYC just from this. Of course, if you are using all initials then in, English speaking countries most people have 3 names and so, 3 initials; this not only reduces the number of people in each “bucket” it makes it way easier to identify unique individuals with 2, 4, 5 or more names. If your data set is smaller than this and people have a way of working out who was in your data, then the prospect of being able to identify an individual just from their initials is much greater. For example, my family has 4 individuals and there are 4 unique first initials so in that group, the initial clearly identifies each of us.
Natural persons are not and cannot become juridical persons. Juridical persons are entities that are not natural persons, but which it's necessary or convenient to treat in many respects as though they were natural persons. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is no "contract" involved in citizenship from a legal standpoint (there's a concept of a "social contract," but that's a philosophical justification for government and not an actual legally binding agreement with specific terms); citizenship is not subject to commercial law in any way. Incorporation has nothing whatsoever to do with citizenship; a natural person is not incorporated, and is a citizen as a natural person. That citizenship is the ordinary notion of citizenship.
Washington v Davis in How To Get Away With Murder In How To Get Away With Murder S04E13, a character says In Washington v. Davis, your predecessors decided that even if a law has a discriminatory effect, it is unconstitutional if that was not its intended purpose. Should this instead be any of the following: 'if a law has a discriminatory effect, it is unconstitutional even if that was not its intended purpose' 'even if a law has a discriminatory effect, it is constitutional if that was not its intended purpose' ?
Washington v. Davis held that if a law or other action (in this case, a Verbal Skill Test as part of D.C. police hiring practices) is not necessarily unconstitutional if it results in discriminatory outcome. In order to be actionable against the state, one must prove that the law was intended to discriminate from the creation of the law. Your quoted source is in fact wrong and your number 2 option is the correct summation of the quote. Only laws that are purposefully discriminatory are unconstitutional.
They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction.
The term "racism" is a political one, not a legal one, which refers to a belief. It is not illegal in the US, and it is a belief that is protected under the First Amendment. There is a legal construct, "discrimination on the basis of race", which enters into laws. For example, you may not discriminate in employment on the basis of race: but those law don't distinguish discrimination in favor and discrimination against. Hate crimes are crimes which additionally discriminate on the basis of some protected class (see "discrimination"). Assaulting a person because they are white, black, Catholic, atheist, male or female is a hate crime. Everybody falls into one or more protected categories (everybody has some race, religion including lack, and sex) – hate crime laws add "because of", for those extra penalties. Assalting a white, black, male or female person is not a hate crime, by itself. The government is not the only source of reigning in of speech that you don't like, in fact, it isn't way of suppressing speech that you don't like at all, at least as long as we have the First Amendment. An employer has the right to hire a racist, or to fire a racist, at least until the law changes.
So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.
Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.
The Brandenburg Test This is not a "general test" - it's the test that applies. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: The speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” AND The speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The first goes to mens rea; that the person intended by their speech to incite lawless action. This is a matter of fact based on conduct before, during and after the speech act. That is, intention can be established by what the speaker said and did before they spoke, while they were speaking and after their speech concluded. The second is based on the speech act itself. Here we have no precedent as to whether the incitement must be explicit (Lady McBeth or Iago) or implicit (Marc Antony): Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction. The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment protects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is supported by its self-conscious use of the term "inciting," suggesting that words of incitement are a necessary condition. No doubt, the Court was aware of Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional term, advocacy directed to "producing" the imminent criminal conduct. Arguably, unless the "producing" language was merely surplusage, the Court recognized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized.
We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf
They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both.
Loan contracts with very high interest: are they even legally binding? Say the borrower agreed to a loan contract of repaying $250 for a $200 in 10 days. Obviously, that is a very high annual interest rate, and illegal in many places. First of all, did the lender just commit a crime in signing that contract with the borrower? Now, the borrower decides to not repay the loan, and this case gets brought to court. Would the court enforce this contract and say the borrower has to pay? Would the court ignore this because the interest rate is above the legal limit? Would the court even punish the lender for giving out a contract like this?
In canada, an effective annual rate that exceeds 60% is a criminal interest rate (Criminal Code, s. 347). A person who agrees to receive such interest is guilty of an offence. In british-columbia, credit products with more than 32% annual percentage rate of interest must be licensed and meet regulatory requirements. Contracts that exceed these rates are not necessarily void. Instead, the Court may notionally sever the interest rate to the maximum allowable by law: Forjay Management Ltd. v. 625536 B.C. Ltd., 2020 BCCA 70, para. 59; Transport North American Express Inc. v. New Solutions Financial Corp., 2004 SCC 7, para. 6. At one end of the spectrum are contracts so objectionable that their illegality will taint the entire contract. For example, exploitive loan-sharking arrangements and contracts that have a criminal object should be declared void ab initio. At the other end of the spectrum are contracts that, although they do contravene a statutory enactment, are otherwise unobjectionable. Contracts of this nature will often attract the application of the doctrine of severance.
To add to Nij's answer: You write I have not signed any paper document. You seem to assume that a binding contract can only be entered into in writing. This is wrong. In most countries (certainly in Germany), a binding contract generally does not require a written document. A contract can be entered into orally, or even silently ("Schlüssiges Handeln", "Implied-in-fact contract"). All that is required for a contract is that one party made a proposal, and the other party indicated their agreement, implicitly or explicitly ("Willenserklärung"). Clicking "yes" on a website can mean entering into a contract if you could reasonably be expected to understand that you were accepting certain obligations (such as that of paying a fee). So in your case, you probably entered into a valid contract, and will have to fulfill your obligation under it, which means paying. From a practical point of view: If you choose not to pay, the organizers will probably either drop the claim (if you are lucky), or they will pursue it. In that case, they can send you a "Mahnbescheid" for their claim. At that point you either pay within 14 days, or respond that you reject the claim, then there will be a trial, which you will probably lose, and pay a lot more than 40€. If you do not respond to the Mahnbescheid, you will receive a "Vollstreckungsbescheid", and then a visit by a Gerichtsvollzieher (officer of the court). My advice would be to pay and learn to properly cancel registrations.
Does signing a contract after explaining it was not legally binding count as contract fraud? No. However, depending on the details of the contract, the circumstances, and the parties' subsequent conduct, the donor's ability to prove he actually disclosed it to the couple would strengthen his position. The prima facie elements of fraud are listed in Key Finance, Inc. v. Koon, 371 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2015): (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) known to be false at the time made; (3) made with specific intent that a party would rely on it; and (4) reliance and resulting damage. The donor's disclaimer to the couple "telling them [the contract] was not legally binding" strikes elements (1) and (2). That preempts the relevance of (3). No matter how bizarre it is that the donor eventually bowed to the couple's pressure, that does not change the fact that elements (1) and (2) are stricken. Your description does not reflect whether or how the couple incurred any losses, but the requirement of the couple's reliance is preempted by virtue of the donor's disclaimer. Furthermore, the donor's "history of questionable truthhoods" can only weaken the couple's position of "reasonable" reliance on any representation the donor makes (in case the couple shared back then your concept of donor's reliability). The donor's questionable assertions "[to] further his personal agenda" seems to be irrelevant in this matter because, as you say, "he gained no benefit from the contract". Also, it is unclear from your description whether or not the donor has been sued/charged at all. The donor's mere allegation that he was sued has no legal effect --such as defamation or malicious prosecution-- unless one adds intricate assumptions into this matter. As for "he says the judge chose to 'charge' him", it is possible that he was charged for something else and he is (whether unintentionally or on purpose) mischaracterizing whatever proceedings in which he was involved. The sole act of signing that contract upon proper disclaimer does not render the donor liable for fraud.
When you tendered three pennies, that should have satisfied the debt as the landlord does not have the right in this situation to insist on payment in a money order in lieu of currency. A money order requirement is only effective as a means by which to refrain from accepting personal checks, not cash. This is the ignorance of the property manager at work. At a minimum, refusing to accept the pennies would constitute a violation of the landlord's duty of good faith: § 383.550. "Good faith" obligation Every duty under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. Imposing a late fee in this situation may also be unconscionable: § 383.555. Unconscionability (1) If the court, as a matter of law, finds: (a) A rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result; or (b) A settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego a claim or right under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 or under a rental agreement was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settlement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result. (2) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon its own motion, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid the court in making the determination. This term is defined as follows in § 383.545(16): "Unconscionable" means an act or conduct which is willful and is so harsh and unjust as would be condemned or considered to be wrongful and would be shocking to the conscience of honest and fair-minded persons. The notice should not be effective to bring an eviction action because it states a demand that the landlord is not authorized to make. The notice is probably attempting to comply with this statutory requirement: § 383.660. Tenant's noncompliance with rental agreement - Failure to pay rent (1) Except as provided in KRS 383.505 to 383.715, if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with KRS 383.605 or 383.610, the landlord may deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than fourteen (14) days after receipt of the notice. If the breach is not remedied in fifteen (15) days, the rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the notice subject to the following. If the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages or otherwise and the tenant adequately remedies the breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement shall not terminate. If substantially the same act or omission which constituted a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six (6) months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon at least fourteen (14) days' written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement. (2) If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within seven (7) days after written notice by the landlord of nonpayment and his intention to terminate the rental agreement if the rent is not paid within that period, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement. (3) Except as provided in KRS 383.505 to 383.715, the landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or KRS 383.605 or 383.610. If the tenant's noncompliance is willful the landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees. By not accurately stating the non-payment, the notice may be ineffective legally. The circumstances of your case would not entitle the landlord to attorneys' fees. O'Rourke v. Lexington Real Estate Co. L.L.C., 365 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. App. 2011). My guess is that the late fee is $71.20 because there are really two components of your rent, one of which is $712 per month with a 10% late fee, and the other of which is $83.33 which is probably some passed through charge for utilities or a water and sewer bill or some sort of tax. If indeed the late fee is a percentage of the unpaid rent, then first of all, the late fee shouldn't be more than 0.3 cents (which rounds down to zero), and second of all, the unpaid portion may very well be not rent, but a passed through charge that is not subject to the late fee, depending upon what the lease says about how amounts received are to be applied. If the late fee is indeed a percentage of the amount owing, so that you owed at most 3.3 cents on the day after the rent was due, which rounds to 3 cents. Then, by tendering 3 pennies on that day, you satisfied your obligation in full and they are not living up to their obligation. If the late fee is stated as a sum certain in the lease, however, and not as a percentage, you might be obligated to pay $71.23 by the terms of the lease, even though charge a late fee of $71.20 for paying 3 cents one day late probably violated usury and consumer protection laws in Kentucky, as well as the common law related to liquidated damages which requires penalties in contractual agreements to be proportionate to the breach of the contract. The maximum legal interest rate in Kentucky is set forth at § 360.010 of its statutes is is the greater of the commercial discount rate on 90 day paper plus 4%, or 19%, which is smaller. There is a civil penalty of double the amount of the usurious interest paid. § 310.020. Still, as a practical matter, it may be easier to tender a money order for $71.23 than to deal with a bureaucratic nightmare. Honestly, this is the sort of scrooge-like behavior that TV stations love to splash on the evening news, and contacting one of them might be one of your better options. Another option may be to contact a legal aid society, or to contact the local bar association to see if they have a pro bono lawyer available to take this case. Another plausible option would be to communicate directly to the owner of the property in lieu of the property manager, setting forth the facts in writing. If I were a lawyer for the landlord, I would be embarrassed to bring a case like this one, and the judge would probably chew me out for bringing it.
I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty.
First, refusing to provide proof of income to a lender cannot possibly be a crime per se. Lying about your income to get the loan might be fraud, but whether you agree to provide proof to the lender later cannot be a crime. Second, the loan agreement may contain language which obligates you to provide proof of income as requested. If the lender did not verify income up-front, this is not unlikely. If so, refusal to provide such proof would entitle the lender to any available remedies. It's possible that a loan agreement could entitle the lender to pursue specific performance which, if granted, might compel you to provide proof (or some alternative if this is impossible) or be held in contempt of court for refusing to comply with a court order. More likely, the lender would be able to require accelerated repayment of what they're owed. If, based on your refusal to provide proof of income, the lender suspects you committed fraud when you applied for the loan, they can file a police report and press charges. If the prosecutor thinks they have a case and chooses to pursue that charge, proof of income (at least, when you applied for the loan) might have to come out as part of your defense. This is all very speculative. Most likely you can just ignore the lender's request and avoid missing any payments. I wouldn't expect any favors from this lender going forward.
Generally a signature is binding even if you have not read the document you have signed; as far as the law is concerned you should have and it's too bad for you if you didn't. Of course, this presumes the contract is otherwise valid. In the circumstances you describe you should ask to see the document before signing. If that is not possible, then instead of signing you should write "I do not agree" instead and take the printed statement - only 1 in 100 people will actually check that you did sign. If you have signed and do not wish to be bound, you should contact the company immediately in writing and say that and that they can collect whatever goods they have supplied.
Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.
Is there a general definition for "with good manners"? Is there a general definition for "with good manners"? Like it's used e.g. in relation to termination of employment relationship. The Finnish employment law for example states that termination of employment relationship must be "with good manners" (it's translated as "factual"): https://www-minilex-fi.translate.goog/a/ty%C3%B6suhteen-p%C3%A4%C3%A4tt%C3%A4minen-ja-luottamuspula?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=fi&_x_tr_pto=wapp The employer is always required to provide a reason for dismissal, which in this context would be a lack of trust. This basis must also be factual and weighty. A similar reason for termination is not required from the employee, so the employee can terminate the employment relationship without reason. However, if the expression was interpreted using: with good manners: The treatment of other people with courtesy and politeness, and showing correct public behaviour. then the question arises. In particular, maybe the confusion is from double meaning in Finnish where "asiallinen" may mean both "factual" or "good-mannered". And I actually read the latter, and thought that what it means is that it cannot be based on e.g. a racist or sexist remark, which may be seen as not good-mannered.
The Finnish government's English version of Työsopimuslaki does not refer to "manners". It does refer to "particularly weighty reason" in Ch. 3 §5, and regarding termination in Ch. 7 §1 "The employer shall not terminate an indefinitely valid employment contract without proper and weighty reason". Subsequent §2 states what those reasons are not (illness, strike, politics, religion, filing a grievance). It is not prohibited to fire a person for being rude, if the factual circumstances are "weighty". The official Swedish version refers to "vägande sakskäl" in 7§1 and "sakliga och vägande" in 7§2, which I would unofficially translate as "weighty (factual) reason". The official Finnish version refers to "painavasta syystä" which Google tells me means "for a compelling reason".
It's been a while since I've seen the film (and what I remember of it is the ending), but if I recall, Skinner was conspiring to conceal evidence that the restaurant was legally Linguini's so that Skinner could become the legal owner under Gusteau's will. As such, under French Law, an employer may fire an employee for disciplinary reasons that fall into three categories: "Faute Simple", "Faute Grave", "Faute Lourde". In likelihood, since legally Skinner was attempting to steal from the owner of the restaurant, this would likely fall under "Faute Lourde." This is defined as when "when an employee intentionally and willfully attempts to harm the employer or other employees. In this case, the employer must demonstrate intentionality." If not, it would certainly be Faute Grave, which is the same as "Faute Lourde" although the reason does not have to show the intent was malicious, but that it simply harmed either the employer or an employee. At best, Linguini was within his right to fire Skinner without a notice period or pay for the unintentional concealment of his ownership of Gusteau's, though if I recall, Skinner's malicious intention was clear to Linguini by the time he was declared the legal owner. (source)
What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.
Short answer: yes and no. I've never heard of this term before, but what you are calling "mobbing" does, in fact, sound like the dictionary definition of type 2 sexual harassment, at least if said "mobbing" is done with a sexual bent. http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/types-of-sexual-harassment.html This type of sexual harassment occurs when a co-worker or supervisor in the workplace makes sexual advances or comments to an employee that, while not affecting promotions or the future of the employee's job, makes the working environment of the employee offensive and hostile. In general, the comments tend to affect the employee's ability to do her job. Note that this is completely different from "type 1" or "quid pro quo" style sexual harassment, which is the kind that everyone is aware of; however, this version occurs quite often as well and is pretty well codified. Again, that's straight-up sexual harassment, though; there are other illegal forms of harassment that deal with singling out someone because of their race or creed, for example. That being said, I am no lawyer but the simple act of ganging up on a worker is not, I don't think, in and of itself illegal. If you're being ganged up on because you're black, or because you were a whistle-blower, that's one thing, but if people are ganging up on you simply because they don't like you, well, I'm sorry but you probably don't have any recourse (please note that I am not a lawyer and that this is not a site to receive legal advice from). More info on "mobbing": http://www.manageangerdaily.com/2010/03/how-to-combat-workplace-mobbing/
Does "in the course of providing services" mean "during the same time as providing services" or "for the purpose of providing services" or something else? I ask because I am a programmer who will be working on my own project during the same period as I am providing services to this Client, but after-hours and not for the same purpose or business. I want to make sure that what I create for myself I will own. The best definitions that come to mind off the cuff are "related to" and "in connection with", and both of those phrases appear in the same sentence, so that is quite close to the mark. Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition 1979) (from my hard copy edition) defines "in the course of employment" as follows (citation omitted): The phase "in the course of" employment, as used in worker's compensation acts, related to time, place and circumstances under which accident occurred, and means injury happened while worker was at work in his or her employer's service. Dictionary.com defines "in the course of" as: during the course of. In the process or progress of The best definition I gleaned from relevant case law is as follows: [A]n invention made or conceived in performing, or as a result of performing, the work required by a contract is made or conceived "in the course of" that contract. That would be true even though the invention was not specifically sought in the terms of the contract. An invention is made or conceived "under" a contract when it is made or conceived during the life of the contract and the invention is, in whole or in part, specifically provided for by that contract. Fitch v. Atomic Energy Commn., 491 F.2d 1392, 1395 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1974). The law which forms the background against which the contract term in question is drafted is discussed in the following language from a Federal Circuit patent law case: The general rule is that an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment. There are two exceptions to this rule: first, an employer owns an employee's invention if the employee is a party to an express contract to that effect; second, where an employee is hired to invent something or solve a particular problem, the property of the invention related to this effort may belong to the employer. Both exceptions are firmly grounded in the principles of contract law that allow parties to freely structure their transactions and obtain the benefit of any bargains reached. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A similar contact is applied in the case Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 142 (1st Cir. 2015), but the term was not defined or disputed in that case. This case is still useful, however, for purposes of seeing the kind of issues that are typically raised in a case like this one and to assure yourself that the contract probably is enforceable. For the purposes of this question, the difference between an employee and an independent contractor is immaterial.
As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years).
It is actually because "this is important". Under US law, disclaimers must be "conspicuous" (UCC 2-316). So you can talk regularly when you're just stating the terms, but if you're disclaiming liability, YOU MUST BE CONSPICUOUS ("to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous"). There are many ways to make text conspicuous, so bold or larger type would do, but all-caps is pretty bullet-proof from a technological perspective. Thanks to ohwilleke for salient citations: invalidation of a plain-type buried indemnification clause, all-caps clause held to be sufficient, law review article on the conspicuousness requirement.
At Will Employment - In General An "at will" employee in the U.S. can be fired at any time for any reason without any prior notice or warning. Outside a union shop or a civil service employment situation, even an illegal reason for firing does not give you the right to be reinstated in your job - instead it gives you a right to sue for money damages. Unemployment Benefits and Employment References If you are fired for good cause (or you quit in a situation that is not a constructive termination), you are not entitled to unemployment benefits. If you are fired without cause particular to your conduct (e.g. you are laid off in the employer's reduction in the size of the employer's labor force), or your are fired for a reason that is not good cause (e.g. you are fire because the boss is annoyed because you are such a goody two shoes that you always show up to work on time), you may be entitled to unemployment benefits based upon your term of service and earnings (short time employees are often not entitled to unemployment benefits no matter what). If you apply for unemployment benefits because you assert that you were fired without good cause, and the employer believes you were fired for good cause, the employer can dispute that finding in a summary administrative hearing. Employers fight awards of unemployment benefits for employees who are fired rather than laid off, because it affects the employer's unemployment insurance rates (and because they care, for non-economic reasons, if the integrity of their stated reasons for firing someone are not believed, or if their reasons for firing someone are not considered to be legitimate grounds for termination by a government agency). Even if you are entitled to unemployment benefits, these benefits are much smaller than your regular pay, and generally last less long than the period for which you were employed. A formula or calculator should appear on the Texas Workforce Commission Website. I assume when you say that "They put a few fake tags on me" that this means that they stated reasons that would be valid "for cause" reasons for termination and you dispute those reasons apply to you, but please clarify if I am mistaken. If that is the case, it is likely that you would have to fight for any unemployment benefits you are otherwise entitled to in an administrative hearing as the company is likely to contest your claim that you were not fired for good cause. This also means that if you seek new employment that they will give you a bad reference to someone who inquires about your employment (although many HR departments are afraid to do that for fear of defamation liability and will only confirm the dates of your employment and your position). Wrongful Termination Lawsuits Separate and apart from unemployment benefits, if you are fired, not just without cause, but for an illegal reasons (e.g. race, sex, and select statutory prohibited reasons), you may bring a wrongful termination lawsuit. Some of those reasons (firings related to discrimination by a private sector employer) require you to file an EEOC complaint and have it investigated by them first, other of those reasons (mostly whistle blowing statutes and breaches of written employment contracts that don't allow for termination of employment without cause) allow you to immediately bring suit for wrongful termination. The legal status of firing someone because you complained about another employee's ethical violation depends upon the exact nature of the ethical violation. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided this month (i.e. February/March 2018) held that whistle blower protections under U.S. securities laws apply to people who report securities fraud to the SEC, but not to people who report securities fraud to a supervisor in the company. "My fellow employee was a lying asshole who acted unprofessionally (in non-technical sense of the word), and I complained about this conduct to my supervisor and the employer didn't care" standing alone, would not normally constitute conduct that is covered by a whistle blowing statute that could allow you to bring a lawsuit for wrongful termination of employment, although it might constitute a constructive termination for bad cause by an employer (if you quit) or termination for bad cause by an employer (if you were fired) for unemployment insurance purposes. The legal theory behind the amount of damages that can be awarded in a wrongful termination lawsuit is a bit obscure. As a rule of thumb, six months wages is a pretty typical settlement amount in a wrongful termination case prior to a determination by a court of employer liability. At trial, there is wide variation in what juries award in wrongful termination lawsuits involving similar facts. Sometimes the award is minimal even when the jury finds that the employer wrongfully fired you, and sometimes the award is very substantial, amounting to many years of lost income in amount. Contractual Payment Obligations Generally speaking, unless a written contract provides otherwise, you have no obligation to return a hiring bonus and the employer has a contractual duty (and probably a statutory one as well) to pay you through the date of termination without deduction for a hiring bonus paid. This includes any amounts, including bonuses, that the employer was obligated to pay you, although proving an entitlement to a bonus can be difficult unless that standard for receiving one is clearly defined and you clearly met those standards as a factual matter. Sometimes, you can even win a breach of contract award for a bonus that was not yet fully earned if the only reason that the bonus was not awarded was the employer's bad faith conduct. You could sue to collect unpaid wages in a Justice Court (the limited jurisdiction court for small claims in Texas) if necessary, if the amount you are claiming is under $10,000. If you have a claim for unpaid wages in a larger amount or also have other damages, you would need to bring suit in the appropriate county court or district court, depending upon the amount claimed.
Are deities from classic mythology free to use? For instance the deities (or gods) from Japanese, Roman, Greek, Hindu etc. mythologies. Can they be used in modern times without authorization from any copyright holders?
It is not clear to me how you "use" a mythological entity, and I take no position as to the divine consequences of any unauthorized uses, but you are entitled to incorporate then in your own intellectual creations for two reasons. First, any imaginable copyright on original texts (e.g. the Bhagavad Gita) has long since expired. Not all texts are of such certifiably ancient provenance, so there may be contemporary texts created by a practitioner of Ásatrúarfélagið which is protected. Second, names (Amitāyus, Zaraθuštra, Ngai) are not protected by copyright, so you can use names.
AD&D, like all games, is covered under copyright. HOWEVER, games are not treated the same as books and other works. Rules of a game, including "stats" and other information required to play the game, are NOT protected by copyright. This is Copyright Law, and has nothing to do with a license which a work is published under. Artwork is fully protected by copyright, as is any setting descriptions. In the context of the D&D franchise, the actual wording of any rulebooks, monster descriptions, game modules, and such are all protected by copyright, so you can't wholesale cut-and-paste things. But, that does not extend to the various mechanics of the game. Armor Class, Hit Dice, etc. are all mechanics, and CANNOT be protected. That includes values assigned to monsters or characters or such. A company cannot also protect the particular layout of those statistics, if that layout is considered generic in nature. In the case we are talking about, a table listing the statistics is NOT protected, as it does nothing more than list those statistics, and contains no original, protected material of WotC. In addition, uniquely created monsters, characters, etc. all have their name protected, but not their statistics. But generic names thereof cannot be protected. It is perfectly permissible to have a clone copy of a Drow and call them a Dark Elf (a generic name). One could not copy the description of the Drow from a Monster Manual, but the idea of a Dark Elf cannot be protected, nor can the statistics thereof. It is explicitly permissible by Copyright Law to clone the rules to a game, which in the context of D&D includes a generic name for anything trademarked (thus, no Drow, and no Dungeon Master, but Dark Elf and Game Master), the mechanisms used to play the game -- including the terms used to reference them -- and all related numerical statistics associated with those components of the game. All of this is in addition to any rights the OGL gives you. These rights CANNOT be restricted by the OGL, as they are basic Copyright Law rights, not license rights. I've been writing D&D expansions and such for over 4 decades now (since the late 1980s), and this is what I've repeatedly been told by various Copyright lawyers. In short, provided you don't use the text description of a particular monster (and instead write your own one, using the same concept of what the monster is), and you don't use a trademarked name for it, it is possible to "scrape copy" the statistic summary section of any Monster Manual or the like. Here's an explicit parallel: the game of Monopoly. When creating a clone of Monopoly, here's what you CAN do: Copy the basic layout of the board - a square with the properties laid out in a path around the edge. Arrange the properties as they currently are, WITH THE CURRENT NAMES on them. Each property's name is not possible to protect, as they are generic names. Free Parking, Jail, and Go To Jail, and Go can all be labeled and placed accordingly. Chance and Community Chest cards can be named as such, and referred to as such. The text on the cards is also (mostly) usable. The costs and values of all Chance, Community Chest, and properties can be copied. The rules of movement, going to jail, etc. can all be copied. Have pieces that are Hats, Dogs, Cars, etc, and both Hotels and Houses, and explicitly refer to them by those names. Here's what you CANNOT do: Use the particular color scheme of the board Use any artwork, including the drawings on any cards. Use the particular graphic presentation of a card. Copy the design of any piece, except the House/Hotel which, insofar as they are very generic, can be extremely similar. You can only use the word "Monopoly" in the context of referring to the Parker Brothers game, not in any other context, as it is trademarked. The specific wording of the rulebook cannot be duplicated. You have to write the rules in your own words. The wording of certain Community Chest and Chance cards, where they are not just generic game instructions, cannot be duplicated. E.g. "Grand Opera Night—Collect $50 from every player for opening night seats" cannot be duplicated, but you can have any other wording for something that would gain you $50 per player. Now, see how that works in comparison to D&D?
"Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem.
You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.
Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?
YES, if you can get an image of it, you can use it A work that old is not under copyright protection in any country in the world. Under US law any work published in 1924 or before (as of 2019) is in the public domain. Unpublished works may be protected for up to 120 years after creation under US law. But no work that is over 600 years old has any copyright protection. In any case, merely owning the physical work does not mean owning the copyright. In the case of a work sufficiently recent that it is under copyright, say from the 1970s, the copyright initially belongs to the artist. If the artist sells or gives the painting to a museum (or anyone else), the artist retains the copyright unless that is explicitly included in the deal, in a written agreement. If the artist dies, the copyright is inherited, just as any other property that the artist leaves, as directed by will or law. If a museum owns a painting that is out of copyright, it can restrict access to it and prevent people from photographing or copying it, because it can restrict what people do on its property. But if an exact copy (known as a "slavish copy") gets out, the museum has no copyright in it, because making a slavish copy does not create an original, copyrightable work under US law. See the case of Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) and Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) The law may be different in non-US countries, but the reasoning of the Bridgeman case has bene followed elsewhere. A "slavish" copy is one that attempts to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, without adding or removing or changing anything. A photo of a painting in a frame on a stand with people standing beside it is not a slavish copy. The images of art one sees in books on art are usually slavish copies. So are the images one sees on museum web sites, as a rule. The term implies that the copyist had no more freedom than a slave in making the copy. At least that is the metaphor. Slavish copies do not get separate copyrights because they are not original works. Photos of 3D works such as sculptures require choice of angle, lighting, etc, sufficient t make them original works -- no two photographers will produce quite the same image of a sculpture. But some courts have ruled that wire-frame models of 3D works of art are slavish copies and not protected by copyright.
If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission.
No. Copyright does not have exemptions for obsolete works, use with credit, or non-commercial use. Depending on the purpose for the distribution, this could be fair use, but it is unlikely that a court will consider this fair use when the only reason is for other people to be able to play games. Perhaps you could try contacting Adobe; it's possible that they will give you a license to distribute the Flash Player. This isn't directly relevant to the legal aspect of copying Adobe's Flash Play, but to answer the underlying issue of legally playing Flash games, perhaps you/others could try Gnash, a libre reimplementation of Flash. I have not used it, but apparently Gnash can run some Flash software without using Adobe's player.
Could the U.S. Federal government constitutionally enact laws that duplicate the de facto regional differences caused by circuit splits? Circuit splits have the effect of treating people in America differently with regards to the law depending on where they live, due to differing interpretations of the same statute. Some of these differing interpretations involve what seems like major questions of rights that such as in these cases about warrentless seizures of a person based on suspicion of the person having committed a misdemeanor. Would it pass constitutional muster for the U.S. code to enact de jure laws that have these de facto effects, i.e. a law that says in Texas police have this power and in Florida they do not, etc.? If not, is there any legal scholarship arguing that whatever legal principle would prevent the law from being made intentionally should also preclude the de facto situation being allowed to stand rather than having some forcing mechanism for resolution, whether through congress or the Supreme court? I know this obviously isn't the case now as circuit splits do exist and have these effects, just wondering if anyone in the Academy is putting forth arguments against it.
(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.
The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.
Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.
Advisory opinions violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The "case or controversy" clause helps enforce this separation. The judicial branch is responsible for resolving legal disputes by interpreting and applying existing law. In doing so, it may incidentally modify or extend the law. Courts are only supposed to do this to the extent necessary to resolve disputes. Outside a legal dispute, the legislative branch is solely responsible for making changes to the law. If courts were allowed to issue advisory opinions, they would be effectively be altering the law without addressing an actual dispute. As such, advisory opinions violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The "case or controversy" requirement exists to ensure that the judicial branch does not usurp the powers of the legislative branch. Relevant quote from page 45 (PDF page 10) of Separation of Powers: An Old Doctrine Triggers a New Crisis: [...] one of the major arguments [...] against advisory opinions is that they violate the separation of powers doctrine. Judicial power, it is said, should be limited to deciding litigated cases. When justices issue opinions on contentions that have not yet been the subject of legal dispute, these justices approach the status of lawmakers.
Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is.
Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim "State Soverign Immunity" which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity.
To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter). Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case Shao v. Roberts that was appealed to SCOTUS. The Justices all recused themselves rendering the court short of a quorum and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case sua sponte in place. However, Justices essentially police themselves. As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business. Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices exist because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order. As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see my answer here for further details). Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't.
No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).
Is it legal to scan a copyrighted book for personal use? Is it legal to use a scanner or camera to digitize a copyrighted book if it's only for personal use? I own the book, and I have no plans to sell it or give it away. If so, once the copyright expires, can I share my copy, or do I have to scan it again?
US copyright law does not distinguish "personal use" from "non-personal use", though it does distinguish commercial from non-commercial, where stronger sanctions can arise from commercial infringement – which can include "private financial gain". Copying a whole book which you own is copying which is what define infringement, and because of the extent of copying, it is unlikely to be found to be fair use. There is a special provision for software in 17 USC 117 that allows for making backup copies, which is not applicable to physical books. You are not a statutory archive, which is another escape hatch.
In Australia at least I am not sure that the usage you describe has ever been legal. The University of Melbourne Copyright Office sets out when you may copy a television program for personal use and fair dealing for research and study. In short for personal use, you may: use any format you like - if you can find a working VCR; go for it. Not lend or sell the material; it must be for your own private use. This means you must be there when it is displayed and it must be in a private place. For example, you can invite friends to your place or go to a friends place and watch it together. The thing you are copying must be legal - you must have bought the original, have a current pay TV subscription (at time of recording) or it must be a free-to-air broadcast.
It would be copyright infringement. The script that you are planning to copy from is protected by law, so requires the copyright-owner's permission to create a derivative version (your own interpretation). If instead you write a completely different story inspired by the original book, you might not get sued. The problem is that there is a reasonable chance that you would accidentally duplicate part of one of the myriad adaptations, then the jury would have to decide whether it was just a coincidence, or copying.
The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant.
The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal).
united-states The license won't let you sell the .stl file. Probably you have created a derivative work, which means you can't sell it without a copyright license (and the CC-A-NC won't do). If it were licensed under CC-A you could sell it without problems (you'd have to give attribution, of course). You could also sell it under the CC-A-SA, but once you do you have no control over the result -- anyone you sold it to could give it to someone else under the terms of the license. This could work, though, if it were (say) a commission and you only expected to sell one copy. I don't know what the situation would be with the physical objects printed under any of these licenses.
It is legal Because of the first sale doctrine a person may freely sell a copy that they legitimately own. Copyright preserves the owner's right to make copies - Copy-right; once they have made (or authorised) a copy then the physical embodiment of that copy (record, CD, DVD, book etc.) is personal property and can be bought and sold like any other piece of personal property. The prohibition on copying its contents remains.
What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.
In the USA what state's laws do I have to abide by when rafting on a river boundary? Lets say I'm rafting in a river that marks the boundary between state A and B. While in said river I perform an action legal in state A but not in state B. I want to know if I broke the law. How do I know which state's laws apply? Is it based on whether I am closer to one state's side of the river than the other? Do I have any defense for breaking breaking state B's law if I assumed I was still in state A's jurisdiction?
In most cases, the state boundary line controls. For example, Kentucky owns the Ohio River along its border with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. In essence, the boundary between Kentucky and these three future states is the low point of the Ohio River's northernmost bank. This was established by a Congressionally passed law in 1792. The boundary is defined by federal statute on a case by case basis for each of the rivers that is a boundary between U.S. states. Most codifications of a state's statutory laws also restate the federal statute defining the state's boundary at the beginning before the actual portion setting forth state laws begins. In the case of the Rio Grande river, which is a boundary between the U.S. and Mexico, an international boundary treaty determines where the boundary between the U.S. and Mexico is for this purpose. International treaties similarly define all other international water boundaries of the United States. This isn't the end of the story, however, because many activities that take place in the "navigable waters of the United States" (which basically means with respect to rivers, rivers wide and deep enough to be used for commercial transportation, like the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers and the Colorado River) are governed by federal admiralty law, rather than by state law (even if both sides of the river are in the same state). For example, the employment law of ship crews operating on the navigable waters of the United States are governed by admiralty law, and so are most laws governing tort liability in collisions between boats/ships, and most laws governing salvage of boats/ships that have sunk. Some admiralty law cases must be litigated in the U.S. District Courts (i.e. in the federal court system's trial courts) which have exclusive jurisdiction over some admiralty law issues, while other admiralty law issues, while still governed by federal admiralty law, may be litigated in either state or federal courts which have concurrent jurisdiction over some admiralty law issues. Still, to the extent that admiralty law does not apply, the state law of the state in which that part of the river is located will govern. Fun fact: As a young lawyer I once was part of a group of lawyers litigating an admiralty law case arising out of an incident taking place on the Colorado River near Grand Junction, Colorado. Do I have any defense for breaking breaking state B's law if I assumed I was still in state A jurisdiction? No. You could argue at trial that you really were in state A jurisdiction. But if the finder of fact at trial determines that you were in state B, then state B law applies.
You would need to be able to prove that he encroached on your land (or your tenancy to land) with his pesticide/herbicide. You should speak to him and let him know that you feel his herbicide made its way (it could've come with the wind if its just on the borders) to the land, and as a result your animals were harmed. It's always better to see if you can handle this by appealing to his sense of responsibility. Just ask him to not spray the border, or not spray on a day with any breeze if he insists on spraying the entirety of his land. If he denies spraying the border (or at all), you can try to catch him in the act and film it, or find neighboring witnesses, such that you can file a complaint for trespass. It is probably not illegal in the true sense of the word, but it may subject him to damages. You may try contacting your department of agriculture. If he is a commercial applicator there are likely regulations that dictate the necessity of following label instructions or specific regulations or laws in your community that may also subject him to liability under common law, if the pesticide drift enters the properties of others (like yours) and causes damage. While pesticide particles carried by air may cause harm to people, your type of damage or damage to another's agricultural crops is the typical claim made and the typical measure of damages. More-so when they drift to organic crops. Generally, plaintiff(s) must show that defendant(s) breached either the label instruction or a regulatory provision to succeed in recovering damages outside of common law. Typically, there are labeling instructions or regulatory provisions that limit spray drift. Is he spraying whole fields such that you think he is purchasing commercial amounts? If he is just spraying his small field or plot of land, you will have to establish a claim for trespass in order to recover damages. You also must be able to prove damages – e.g., veterinarian bills, loss of use of the animals for plowing or whatever. You have to have show the act (spraying), causation (the cause and effect) and damages (the actual effect to you that brought about specific damages) to make a claim. So far, you don't seem to have actual evidence of the act, although if you can acquire that, causation seems to be met, as well as the potential to show specific damages. Unfortunately, the pain and suffering of animals does not have the same impact or carry any of the same rights as people incurring some sort of physical harm. It must be some actual quantifiable damage to you. Only you can determine what this is. In neighborly disputes, the measure of damages is often not worth the cost of litigation. Sad but true. As a plaintiff (if it comes to that), you'll need to establish trespass or another common law cause of action as a basis for the recovery. Or you could seek equitable relief (ask the court to order he stop the practice). These claims prove challenging for plaintiffs to establish because of the common usage of pesticides. Also, strict liability is generally not available as a cause of action. You may have a claim in nuisance, but you still must show those three elements of proof. There are typically laws that preempt negligence claims concerning labeling (like in the US), and remaining negligence claims tend to be difficult to prove, for the very reason you stated (you didn't see him do it but you know he did). This means that in order to show you (or your chattel) were injured by spray drift you will probably have to file a claim in trespass. However, chemical spray drift is so intangible it is difficult for plaintiffs to meet the requirements for a trespass claim. States’ approaches to trespass for securing damages resulting from spray drift vary, and this can mean that a plaintiff must carefully plead interference with exclusive possession (your right to the land) together with injury meaning substantial property damages or damage that is physical, to establish their cause of action in trespass.
What is one supposed to do if they want to take an extended trip somewhere? Or is one basically not allowed to take such trips if they are a US citizen eligible for Jury Duty? In the US you are not required to seek permission to travel, or prove your past whereabouts to the government if you happen to miss some civic duty. They generally call up way more people than they need for this sort of reason. The length of time you are gone or where you choose to travel is irrelevant. In my experience you are given about a month heads up. If you didn't receive the notice until you returned from out of town, and they send a follow up, simply inform them of the fact that you were gone and didn't receive the notice until you returned. Jury duty is an obligation to some extent, but it is also a right and a privilege. It isn't a criminal offence you are liable for if you didn't get the notice. If it were that important to verify your availability ahead of time the notification would be sent registered mail with a signature required.
In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105.
If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.
Gun control laws The moment you enter the 12 nautical miles zone of a country, you need to abide by its weapon laws. Most functioning large-caliber and fully-automatic weapons are not allowed in civilian hands globally. The moment the ship leaves the 12 nautical miles zone, the country law of its flag applies, so unless you happen to start in the US with a duly registered curio/relic deck gun with proper stamps... you'll have a hard time being allowed to have the thing on board in the first place, and entering any other country's water is pretty much violating their gun control laws and gun import laws. Ship hulls don't support them. That deck gun there is a type of Bofors 40mm L/60 twin mounting - 40x311mmR. That means, its installation weighs upwards of half a ton, as that's the smallest carriage setup according to Wikipedia. Navweapons helpfully provides gun weights of roundabout half a ton per gun. That puts the minimum weight at about that of a PAK 40, but as Navweapons tells us, a US Mark 1 Twin clocks in at 4.4 to 5.8 tons including guns. All on the one mounting spot. With the bulk they are, no fiberglass ship hull could support that much load on the gun's small footprint. It needs a steel-hulled superyacht to even bear the deck load of such an installation. If your ship is the size of a coastguard or navy vessel, it probably is such a ship redesigned, a commercial fishing boat (similar specs), a cargo vessel, a large cruise vessel, or built to your specifications from the ground up.
Obviously the police isn't checking all the time that all the speed limit signs are still where they should be, so in practice you would get a speeding ticket, which the police officer would give you with a good conscience. And you might very well think that you missed the sign, and pay the fine without complaining. If you are sure there was no sign, you could say to that officer "I didn't see any speed limit sign, where was it? " and hopefully he or she would tell you where that sign was supposed to be. Then you might go back, find the sign on the ground, take a photo, take it to the police officer who would then take action to get the sign back up, and would most likely make that speeding ticket invalid. There are exceptions: A speed limit sign can actually allow you to go faster than you would be allowed without the sign. For example in a town the normal speed limit without any signs might be 30mph, and the sign said 40mph. If the police officer stops you going 45, you have no excuse because without the sign the limit would have been 30. Or you have one sign 30, followed by a sign 40. Same situation if the "40" is taken down. Or the police should have put up repeating signs every two miles, but put them every mile. If one sign is down, they could still be within the legal limits. And last, assuming the police didn't put the sign up just for fun, there is probably something making it unsafe to go 60mph if there was a sign 40mph. If that is something you should have seen, and doing 60mph was dangerous for reasons you should have seen, then you might get a ticket for driving at an unreasonable speed. Even if there never was a speed sign. You are never allowed to drive at a dangerous speed.
Suppose I live in State A, but am on vacation to State B. While on vacation, suppose someone living in State C, but currently in State D, accesses my bank account to take money out illegally. The bank has a central headquarters in State E, although my branch of the bank is in State F. In which of these states could I file a lawsuit? Any of them? All of them? The thief would be the defendant in a lawsuit brought by you. The fact that you are on vacation in State B is irrelevant. You can always sue someone where they are domiciled, so State C is one forum where you could sue the thief. You can also always sue a natural person (as opposed to an entity) in a State where they are physically served with process, so if a summons from the courts of State D were served upon the thief while the thief was in State D, then State D could handle the case. You could also probably sue in State A on the grounds that intangible property is deemed to be located where the owner is domiciled and the theft of intangible property was a harm directed a State A. But, there is an argument that if the thief has no way you knowing that you lived in State A as opposed to State F where your branch is locate, that the thief's actions were targeted at State F. State E would not be a very plausible state to argue that there is jurisdiction. A federal district court has geographic jurisdiction only over cases that could be heard in the state courts of the state where it is located, so a federal court case would be brought only in the states where a state lawsuit could be brought. A federal court cases would either have to seek at least $75,000 (since there is diversity of citizenship between you and the thief), or would have to state at least one theory arising under federal law (which might or might not apply to this case). The you can choose which state to file in from those that are available. Which of these states could file charges against the person? A state can prosecute if the crime happened there, or if the crime caused a harm there. In this case the answer to both of those questions could be muddy. Basically, State A or F is probably where the crime caused harm, and it isn't clear from the OP facts where the crime was committed by the thief (we only know where the thief is now). These acts would also probably violate some federal crime that could be prosecuted in federal court, mostly likely the federal courts in State A or State F. Which of these states could file charges against the person? Could the federal government file charges as well? Would more than one prosecution violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment? What if these were countries instead of states? The double jeopardy clause applies to prosecutions within a single U.S. state, and in addition to any state prosecutions, a single prosecution can be made at the federal level. Likewise, prosecutions in different countries do not count against each other for purposes of a double jeopardy clause. Many U.S. states have a binding or non-binding policy of not prosecuting crimes that have already been prosecuted by another U.S. state or by the federal government, the U.S. Justice Department likewise has a non-binding policy of not prosecuting cases which have already been prosecuted by a U.S. state or another country. But these policies do not have constitutional dimensions and are not required by the 5th Amendment. if I use a Canadian Wi-Fi network without authorization from within the United States, would US or Canadian law apply? In criminal cases, choice of law and jurisdiction over the case are the same thing, because a state or country can only apply its own criminal laws. In civil cases, choice of law is a question distinct from jurisdiction. A court applies the law with the most significant connection to the disputed legal issue in question (sometimes more than one set of laws in a multi-issue case), even if it is the law of a different state or country, which is a standard that affords a judge considerable discretion. Either U.S. law or Canadian law could be plausible to apply in this case depending on the detailed circumstances and the legal issue that is disputed.
Is it common to cross out part of a contract in USA? My wife is doing a master in New York and we have 2 weeks here, and we found an apartment but we are confused with the way they handle the contracts. First they told us via email that pets are allowed but the contract they later sent said that pets are not allowed. After we asked about that (because we don't want to sign it as we have a pet) they said that we can cross out that part. Is this a common practice in USA? In my country when this happens the contract is rewritten and reprinted. Another doubt is, we are running this contract with a broker, so they are a third party company, but my wife and I are the first who need to sign, is it possible for the landlord to un-cross out what we crossed out about the allowance of pets?
It isn't uncommon to interlineate contract language, or to cross out contract language, with the initials of the parties to the contract. This is normally only done with smaller businesses, however, where there is someone who has the authority to do so. Some contracts, such as insurance contracts, for example, have to have their language approved by state regulators before they can be used and can't be modified in that fashion.
I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.
If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.
Legal answer A blanket "no pets" clause is unenforceable, and would remove even the requirement for you to ask before keeping pets (ref:landlordlawblog). This is why the clause contract has the phrase "the Landlord’s consent [...] will not be unreasonably withheld". You shouldn't take this phrasing to mean that the landlord is happy for pets given certain conditions; rather the landlord doesn't want pets, but has used the letting agent's standard contract which has been written with advice from lawyers. Withholding consent with no explanation is unreasonable (see landlordlawblog ref above). The landlord simply wanting no pets, in and of itself, is almost certainly unreasonable. Given that you proposed damage repairs and cleaning, I am personally convinced that the rejection is unreasonable. That said, the landlord might be able to reasonably withhold consent on noise grounds (parrots can annoy neighbours!), but can only do so by stating that to you (which he hasn't done). (Im)practical answer 1 You can try fighting it out in the courts if you like. You could well win, but this will cost you money (and probably a lot of stress) and antagonise your landlord. The landlord will then want to get rid of you (both because you're doing something he doesn't want to the property, and because you took him to court). He'll want to get rid of you with the minimum notice possible; if you're in a fixed term, that's the end of the fixed term; if you're in a periodic tenancy it's probably 2 months. In theory landlords can't carry out retaliatory evictions. But your only chance of fighting a retaliatory eviction is... the courts! Cue more cost and stress. And it's very possible that the landlord might successfully come up with another reason to justify the eviction, e.g. "I want to sell the property", "I want to provide my nephew with a home", or if he tries putting the rent up and you refuse "I can get more rental income by re-letting the property". (Im)practical answer 2 You could just get the parrot anyway. The landlord won't find out until his next inspection, and even then will find it difficult to evict you in the middle of a fixed term for such a minor breach of contract... but that doesn't stop him evicting you at the earliest possible "no reason" eviction date. This would again be either the end of the fixed term or 2 months if you're on a periodic tenancy. And you wouldn't be able to fight this as a "retaliatory eviction", as there will be no registered disagreement between you. Practical answer Your legal rights and your practical options aren't the same thing, unfortunately. Your best option is probably to give up on the idea of getting a parrot.
Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).
In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this.
Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.
I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.
Can "agreeing not to know anything" be enough to constitute "knowledge" of a waiver? For example, if I waive my rights to know what you'll be doing with my internet search history, is that a knowing and intelligent waiver?
The question is rendered moot because Cal. Civ. §1798.100 declares that Any provision of a contract or agreement of any kind, including a representative action waiver, that purports to waive or limit in any way rights under this title, including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement, shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable. This section shall not prevent a consumer from declining to request information from a business, declining to opt out of a business’s sale of the consumer’s personal information, or authorizing a business to sell or share the consumer’s personal information after previously opting out. You can fail to request such information, and you can tell a business that you don't plan to ever exercise that right, but you cannot be bound by such promises, which is to say, this is an un-waivable right. For another right, you might be able to waive that right. Your 5th amendment rights can be waived, but we would have to know more of the circumstances to know if that was a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Can defense request findings of fact before resting? Is it possible for the Defense to avoid presenting affirmative defenses (like Self Defense) before the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime? If so: How? No, no and not applicable. A verdict is a singular declaration by the jury (or judge) that the state has or has not proved their case. Affirmative Defence These are all affirmative defenses which defeat or mitigate the consequences of the unlawful conduct and the onus of proof lies with the Defence, not the Prosecution. An affirmative defence must be pleaded in a timely manner. If the Prosecution fails in their burden to prove the unlawful conduct the affirmative defence does not get engaged. This is a threshold decision point for the trier of fact and the judge should so instruct the jury. Of necessity, affirmative defences require some admission of fact, however, these facts may not be in contention anyway. Where they are in contention, it requires a strategic choice by the defendant as to whether to use the affirmative defence or not. Is there some theory or principle that illuminates why this is not considered a violation of the Defendant's fifth-amendment rights? Because the defendant is not compelled to make these defences.
Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the "outside of reach" rather than "outside of claim of reach" situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care.
There is no search analog to the Miranda requirement. The Supreme Court in Miranda didn't just decide that people had to be told their rights, for all rights in all contexts. Miranda applies just to 5th and 6th Amendment rights, in case a person is being held coercively. If you are free to go, you need not be apprised of your rights: so, if the police are just asking questions when you are not being held, they are not required to give a rights warning. Likewise, they are allowed to request permission to conduct a search. It is true than many people do not understand that a request is distinct from an order. A useful phrase to remember is "Am I free to go?". If the answer is no, you are busted and they can search you. If the answer is yes, you don't have to let them search you (to avoid the ambiguity of silence, refusing permission to search is not a bad strategy, unless you want then to search you – e.g. if you want to get on the plane).
This is called the "waiver trap," and it can be quite harsh indeed. Rule 8 and Rule 12 require a defendant to assert most affirmative defenses almost immediately -- either in their answer or in either a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Failure to assert them does indeed result in a waiver of the defense. For instance, in Hunter v. Serv-Tech, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on defects in service of the complaint. The defendants' motion purported to "reserve the right" to challenge personal jurisdiction, as well, but did not actually move for dismissal on that basis. After the service issue was resolved, the defendants actually moved to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion, saying that Rule 12 requires an actual assertion and argument in support of the defense: The Court is aware that the outcome it reaches today is a harsh one, especially in light of the fact that it appears that, absent waiver, this motion might well be granted. But the Court is duty-bound to apply the law as it is written, and as written the Rules enact a policy of requiring all 12(b)(2)-(5) defenses to be made by motion, once, prior to filing an answer. Given this policy, Offshore’s “reservation” language is not sufficient to preclude waiver. So the court acknowledges that the defendant had a winning defense, but it must nonetheless continue to litigate. The rule is applied quite strictly in cases involving Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) defenses. There is quite a bit more wiggle room for other affirmative defenses, i.e., defenses that allow the defendant to escape liability regardless of whether his conduct was wrongful, but it still remains quite dangerous to omit any available defense from your first responsive pleading. See, e.g., Am. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1537 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In any case, we need not consider these points since SFC waived its right to advance the statute of limitations defense by its failure to assert this affirmative defense in any pleading filed below in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)."). As a practical matter, then it is not usually sufficient to simply say "I disagree" in response to a claim, unless your defense amounts to either a denial that the facts supporting the claim are true or a denial that the facts as alleged creates a cause of action. If you intend to assert an affirmative defense – such as personal jurisdiction, statute of limitations, failure of consideration, accord and satisfaction, immunity, etc. – you must say so clearly. So if your first responsive pleading is an answer, it is typically sufficient to simply say, "The claim is barred by the statute of limitations." But if your first responsive pleading is a motion to dismiss, you need to both assert and argue your defense; otherwise, you risk waiving it as in Hunter. Note, though, that there are some affirmative defenses that are not waived by failing to assert them immediately. Failure to join a necessary party, for instance, can be asserted at any time up until trial, and subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at basically any time at all.
This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.
Normally, the term "benefit of the doubt", if it was used, would mean that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the person entitled to it. This could be applied to contract interpretation or to statutory interpretation. Here is an example: When dealing with restrictions on campaign spending and speech, a court's construction must “give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment's command that ‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech’ demands at least that. Colorado Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 75–76 (Colo. 2008) (ultimately holding that union activities to organize volunteers to walk precincts with a political candidate did not constitute a "campaign expenditure" of a union within the meaning of a state law restriction campaign contributions by unions).
In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices
If I obfuscate someone else's source code, can I avoid copyright infringement? I know the answer is probably no, but I'm confused about something. The underlying algorithm is never copyrightable. So as long as you "learn from the code" someone else has wrote, and re-implement it, you are allowed to reuse what you learned. But isn't this the same as making a few changes to the source code, i.e. reordering things, changing names etc.? So does this mean running source code through a code obfuscater would avoid copyright infringement issues? I know it's a strange question, but I'm serious. I'm talking about small portions of code, less than 100 lines, not whole programs. I ask this question after having read Does copyrighted code protect intellectual property rights on novel algorithms it implements? and Algorithm (pseudo)code in academic papers -- what is the copyright/license status?
No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.
Non-commercial copying of a copyrighted work is still copyright infringement. Realistically, a copyright or trademark infringement lawsuit is unlikely, uneconomical, and bad press, but ultimately, the owner of a copyrighted work has a right to control how it is used.
The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected.
The current version of copyright law in the PRC is here. Art. 10 states what is protected, which includes the standard rights of distribution, copying, modification and so on (which makes software cracking illegal). Article 22 gives the equivalent of the Fair Use limitation on copyright protection: a work may be exploited without the permission from, and without payment of remuneration to, the copyright owner, provided that the name of the author and the title of the work are mentioned and the other rights enjoyed by the copyright owner by virtue of this Law are not infringed upon for 12 specific reasons (translation into Braille or a minority national language, free public performances, quotation to make a point end so on), which includes some potentially applicable reasons (1) use of a published work for the purposes of the user's own private study, research or self-entertainment (6) translation or reproduction, in a small quality of copies, of a published work for use by teachers or scientific researchers in classroom teaching or scientific research, provided that the translation or reproduction is not published or distributed (7) use of a published work by a State organ within the reasonable scope for the purpose of fulfilling its official duties It is unclear what "State organ" refers to and it is unlikely that a university is a "State organ". It is unlikely that (1) and (6) are interpreted as an across-the-board "education exception" to copyright, but that could be an avenue for legality. The standard misconception of copyright law is that anything done for educational purposes is allowed, and the PRC law seems to have at least the seeds of such a misunderstanding. However... software protection is subject to separate regulation in Decree No.339 of the State Council, an English version being here. The regulations recapitulate the basics of copyright protection; software cracking is regulated under Art. 23, which says that anyone who commits any of the following acts of infringement shall, in light of the circumstances, bear civil liability by means of ceasing infringements, eliminating ill effects, making an apology, or compensating for losses:... (5)to alter or translate a piece of software without the authorization Art. 24 continues, saying that it is forbidden (3) to knowingly circumvent or sabotage technological measures used by the copyright owner for protecting the software copyright; (4) to knowingly remove or alter any electronic rights management information attached to a copy of a piece of software That covers cracking. Article 30 covers the situation of someone using pre-cracked software: A holder of copies of a piece of software that neither knows nor has reasonable grounds to know that such copies are infringing ones does not bear liability of compensation but shall cease the use of, and destroy, the infringing copies. Nevertheless, if the cease of use or the destruction of such copies is likely to cause heavy losses to him, the holder of such copies may, after paying reasonable remuneration to the software copyright owner, continue to use such copies. A mere user who is discovered simply has to stop, unless they should have known that the copy was illegal in which case they would be responsible for compensating the rights holder – I have no idea what the standards are for having reasonable grounds to know.
US law simply prohibits copying, not possession of a pixel. If you copy 90% of a work, you are still copying, infringing on the creators exclusive right. Same is true if you copy 20%, and so on. The pertinent first question is, how do the courts decide if there has been copying? This is a factual matter decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Defense will argue, very persuasively, that it is more likely that the presence of an identical pixel in two works is purely coincidental (likewise, the appearance of the word "is" in two texts is purely coincidental"). We can imagine future technology with megabyte pixels, where the particular "white" pixel is unique to the original work, and no reasonable fact-finder could hold that the later word accidentally stumbled onto exactly that pixel. The second thing that has to be established is that the degree of copying "matters", starting with Perris v. Hexamer, so that to be infringing, the degree of copying must be more than minimal. Courts have long relied on the notion of "substantial similarity", where you know it when you see it, that is, ordinary observation would cause it to be recognized as having been taken from another work. There is no bright line drawn by Congress of SCOTUS regarding how much copying is "material". It is extremely unlikely that a reasonable line could be drawn that would render single-pixel copying "material".
To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.
Basically, you cannot do it. You are required to include the MIT license in any derivative work. However, that holds only for the parts that you import from this other project. You can identify which parts of the final product are copied from the MIT-licensed program (and indicate "these parts are subject to the following MIT license"), and then you can do whatever you want with the remainder that you wrote. The downside of not licensing your material is that nobody can use it. To use it, people would need permission, which is what a license is. If you don't license it, you don't give permission, so people can't use it. You presumably want to subject your own contribution to different licensing conditions, so then you would state those conditions and clearly indicate what parts of the code you wrote.
Patents are not that relevant in this case. Software patents are unenforceable in most parts of the world anyway. What matters here is copyright. Every work contract has a clause that everything an employee creates as part of their employment is copyrighted by the company. So using company-owned code to build an own project would be a copyright violation. There are also other legal tools in some jurisdiction which can be used against employees trying to misuse intellectual company property. But that's a topic for Law Stackexchange. Also, this isn't really related to a BYOD policy. Being able to bring your own device to work and then back home might make data theft more convenient, but isn't required. There are many other ways to steal sourcecode, like USB drives or uploading them to the internet. To prevent the first you would have to design your software development offices like a supermax prison facility with meter-high walls (so nobody can throw a device over it) and strip searches on everyone leaving the building. This is neither feasible nor reasonable for anything below matters of national security. To prevent the second, you would have to completely prevent internet access from developer workstations, which would greatly impede the productivity of any software developer. So most companies do not even try to physically prevent employees from stealing sourcecode. They rather rely on the legal safeguards and on maintaining a mutual trust relationship with their employees. It might seem counter-intuitive to some, but when you do not treat your employees like potential criminals they are in fact less likely to betray you.
If the employer tells me via text message that I will be paid 2 weeks of severance, how much obligation is he under to fulfill that statement? If an employer promised me in informal writing (text message) that I was owed 2 weeks of severance pay and then fails to pay me or present me with any formal contract, is he under any form of legal obligation to get me something? These were the exact words: Also it wasn't mentioned in the meeting but you'll be getting 2 weeks of severance pay The jurisdiction is California.
Contracts do not have to be written and signed on pieces of paper, except in a few cases specified by law. Writing style (ordinary style of talking vs. high-register formulaic language) does not affect the validity or a writing in contract law. You do have something in writing. What matters most is what he actually said (exact words, not your belief of what it must have meant), and how it relates to any existing contractual obligation. For example if the message says "You're fired, turn your badge in at the desk. I'll think about giving you two weeks pay", that's not an enforceable promise. But your existing contract might say "You get 2 weeks severance pay when we fire you", and that can't be walked by by saying "I'll thinking about it". And it also depends on whether there are any laws mandating severance pay (but California does not have any mandatory severance pay law).
Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die.
A text message is just as legally binding as a letter, and the lion's share of the cases have held that a text message from a known sending phone number is equivalent to a signed letter. One would have to carefully parse the exchange of communications to see if they amounted to a binding offer and acceptance, but the fact that it was in a text message, rather than on a piece of paper is irrelevant. Indeed, generally speaking, such an offer and acceptance, if the words exchange show that, could be binding even if made orally, if it could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedurally, however, once a judgment has been entered, as is the case here, the process of proving that you have complied with a stipulation regarding what is to constitute payment in full may be challenging. I'll leave the question of civil procedure in Connecticut small claims court to someone more knowledgable about it than I am as that could vary a lot from state to state, or even from court to court based upon local practice within the state.
If you have already claimed unemployment, this might be considered a job offer. If you have not yet field a claim, then it doesn't matter, only offers after a claim is field affect unemployment benefits to the best of my understanding. You could ask for a job offer in writing. If one is not provided, that is pretty good evidence that there never was an offer. If one is provided, you will have a clearer notice of the offered terms and duration, and that the offer is authorized, and can better judge what to do.
When does a CEO (or the investor or the board) have to notify employees they will be unable to pay them for work already done? Directors and officers (which includes executive officers like the CEO) but not investors have a duty to ensure that the corporation does not trade while insolvent. In this context, "trading" means incurring new debts and "insolvent" means being unable to pay their debts as and when they fall due. Unfortunately, it is a judgment call by those directors and officers and the exact point where it occurred is generally only clear with hindsight, if then. For example, you describe a "tumultuous week"; quite likely the company was urgently seeking additional sources of funds and until it was clear they had no prospect of getting those, they weren't insolvent. The director's duty is to act reasonably (a broad range of activities) and not be overly pessimistic nor optimistic about the company's prospects. As far as I know, they don't have a positive duty to inform their creditors that they can't pay. If that happens their obligation is to file for bankruptcy and their obligations cease - the bankruptcy trustee then invites creditors to prove their debts. Does an investor have a responsibility to ensure all employees are paid? No. That is pretty much the purpose of limited liability corporations: to shield the investor from the debts of the company. Do the employees have any recourse? Yes. Employees are typically priority creditors in Colorado and rank ahead of many other creditors. However, if the company is not based in Colorado different laws will apply. Of course, you must be an employee of the company - this priority doesn't apply to true independent contractors. Also, the liquidator's fees rank ahead of anyone and unless the bankrupt company has adequate realizable assets, even employees are unlikely to get a dividend. You also need to be clear who you work for as you say "that last Friday was paid for/fronted by the HR company". Do you work for the bankrupt company or this (non-bankrupt) HR company? If the latter then they owe you your wages and the bankruptcy of their principal is their problem, not yours. Is "secured debt" real? And does that reduce the likelihood of receiving a paycheck in a bankruptcy settlement? Yes. There is a priority in the payment of creditors in liquidations and it varies by jurisdiction but a typical arrangement might go like: Liquidator's Fees Employee wages and entitlement accrued within the last 6 months Certain taxes Secured creditors (who may have a ranking among themselves) Unsecured creditors (including employee entitlements more than 12 months old, other taxes, trade creditors etc.) Shareholders (who may have a ranking among themselves) Basically, the lower you rank, the less likely you are to see a dividend. Does any of this change if the company doesn't file for bankruptcy? Sure. Until the company does this it is still a going concern and it has to pay its debts. If it doesn't it's creditors can sue and recover their monies as best they can which may include forcing the company into bankruptcy.
There seems to be one national law about leave, the Factories Act, 1948 §79, which grants an adult employee 20 days of paid leave after a year of employment, assuming the person has worked the required number of days within the year. Sub-section 3 addresses accrued leave at the end of employment (for whatever reason), that he: shall be entitled to wages in lieu of the quantum of leave to which he was entitled immediately before his discharge, dismissal, quitting of employment, superannuation or death, calculated at the rates specified in sub-section (1), even if he had not worked for the entire period specified in sub-section(1) or sub-section (2) making him eligible to avail of such leave In the case of a person quitting, the law continues and such payment shall be made (i) where the worker is discharged or dismissed or quits employments before the expiry of the second working day from the date of such discharge, dismissal or quitting As for accumulation of leave, sub-section (5) says If a worker does not in any one calendar year takes the whole of the leave allowed to him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, any leave not taken by him shall be added to the leave to be allowed to him in the succeeding calendar year: Provided that the total number of days of leave that may be carried forward to a succeeding year shall not exceed thirty in the case of an adult or forty in the case of a child So there is a statutory "use it or lose it" element. That said, the question is whether you are a "worker" as defined by that act. The definitions say: "worker" means a person employed directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer whether for remuneration or not in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union Tech work is typically not considered to be "factory work" and is not obviously part of manufacturing, but writing software might be work "connected with the manufacturing process". There is an act implemented at the state level (Maharashtra version here), the Shops and Establishment Act. Ch VII of the act governs leave: the terms are similar to the above act in terms of accrual, number of days, prior service. However the payout on termination wording is different: If an employee entitled to leave under sub-section (1) [or (1-A)] is discharged by his employer before he has been allowed the leave, or if, having applied for and having been refused the leave, he quits his employment before he has been allowed the leave, the employer shall pay him the amount payable under section 36 in respect of the leave The important difference is that the payout condition is conditioned on either being fired, or having applied for the leave and being refused (after which point you may resign). If you don't make a claim for leave and you resign, then the conditions of that law don't appear to apply. But, in another state, the wording could be different, so it depends on your state. The definition of "commercial establishment" includes "legal practitioner, medical practitioner, architect, engineer, accountant, tax consultant or any other technical or professional consultant". It is possible that a different state's version of the act includes a payout requirement.
It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.
An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.
Can personal dashcam footage recorded by a third party be used for traffic violation enforcement? X is sitting at a red light (in the US). Another car (driver Y) behind X swerves around X to drive through the red light. X's vehicle has a recording dashcam which captures the license plate of Y's vehicle as well as showing the clearly red light. X sends the video of the incident to local law enforcement. Is the dashcam evidence admissible in a traffic violation proceeding, and can the evidence be used to issue a ticket against Y? I understand that this may be somewhat locale-specific, and various states do have policies regarding use of video cameras for automated traffic enforcement, use of dashcams, and the admissibility of dashcam footage in court (generally provided by the defendant to prove innocence or police to prove guilt). However, the laws are somewhat imprecise regarding: What sources of video footage are admissible for traffic violation enforcement? Can third-party tips and willingly-provided evidence of illegal driving be used to raise traffic violations? Perhaps in certain states?
If a police officer reviewed the footage and then went out and issued a citation in person to the offender, this could probably be used. Many states limit tickets issued by mail based upon camera evidence alone. But, while some state laws have specific requirements, but in general, authenticated video recordings are admissible evidence in court proceedings, and a citizen complaint can be a basis for initiating a traffic offense prosecution. To prove some offenses, like speeding, dashcam evidence of a third-party may not be very good evidence, but for running a red light or a stop sign, it could be powerful evidence.
I don't think there would be such a case. The Supreme Court itself does not allow cameras in its courtroom. Also, when Florida wanted to bring cameras into Florida courtrooms, the Supreme Court said in the 1981 case Chandler v. Florida: Absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions to these defendants, there is no reason for this Court either to endorse or to invalidate Florida's experiment. It's also worth noting that "the jury may not be filmed" and "The Florida Supreme Court has the right to revise these rules as experience dictates, or indeed to bar all broadcast coverage or photography in courtrooms" were two of the specific rules that the Supreme Court noted Florida had implemented. Although those particular rules were not at issue in this case, the Court made no further mention of them, and thus perhaps tacitly approved of their constitutionality. Given that there does not seem to be a general right to film in a courtroom, it seems unlikely that there would be a right to film jurors in particular. Furthermore, this page lists the courtroom camera rules for several states. In many of them, filming jurors is prohibited. Presumably, if there was a ruling that this was unconstitutional, they wouldn't have those rules.
First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.
Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60.
In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work.
New York has a "stop and identify" law which says that a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. However, there is no requirement to carry an identifying document or to prove your verbal statements of identity. For that matter, there is no requirement that you have your license in your possession when driving, you simply have to be duly licensed. In this case, the officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime, so you do have to tell him your name, address, and what you were doing. In Washington, there is no stop-and-identify law, so you don't even have to tell the police who you are. There does exist a requirement to identify yourself if you are stopped for an traffic infraction: (1) Any person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop. (2) Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction. (3) Any person requested to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself or herself and give his or her current address. However, the proposed scenario does not fall under this requirement because you weren't stopped. Also note that the limited ID law of Washington does not compel you to provide a document, it compels you to provide information. It is a misdemeanor to drive without a valid Washington license, but it is only an infraction to drive having been issued a license but not having it in your possession, as long as you provide an alternative ID document. So if you drive without a license in WA and are stopped, you have to show an ID document or suffer the misdemeanor alternative. But again, in this scenario you were not driving and were not stopped, you will not be forced to provide a document. Because driving without a license is a misdemeanor and the officer did not observe you driving, under Washington's arrest without warrant law, he cannot arrest you for suspicion of having committed the misdemeanor of driving without a license. (The arrest without warrant law is a bit more complicated, see the 11 exception subsections, none of which apply here). If your goal is to try to be forced to show your driver's license, you might try Indiana, where the law says A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person's: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver's license, if in the person's possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor. But again, you were not stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation, so you may keep your license in your wallet.
Yes, you can use it as evidence Canada clearly requires what is called a one-party consent for recordings. Section 184(1) of the criminal code makes it a crime to "knowingly intercept a private communication." However, Section 184(2)(a), the "Saving Provision," says the prohibition "does not apply to": (a) a person who has the consent to intercept...of the originator of the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it." Because you: a) either originated the conversation or were the person your landlord intended to talk to; and b) gave your consent by making the recording; therefore, c) you are covered by this clause. For more details, you can read nice summaries by lawyers here and here.
A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural).
GDPR - Are technical identifiers personal data? I've built devices for an internet service provider company (in EU) to measure internet speed at subscribers' home. The devices are used by company technicians when fixing network speed problems reported by subscribers. For every measurement the devices store the location and the time of measurement, and the measured network speed. The location is stored as the technical identifier of the subscriber's network endpoint, which basically identifies the "internet cable" installed at the subscriber's home. Question 1. Are technical identifiers personal data? Inside private company databases, they are definitely linked to subscriber data. They are also printed on invoices sent to the subscriber. But they are not public information. Question 2. Can technical identifiers be stored in measurement devices? The devices I made only measure a physical parameter, the network speed, for a given location in the company's IP network. I think this has nothing to do with the subscribers themselves. Someone told me endpoint identifiers should not be stored in the devices, or at least should be deleted after a while, "because of GDPR". I think deleting the endpoint identifiers would make the measurements unusable, because the location of the measurement is very important for solving network problems. Delayed deletion is also problematic: if there is a 2nd speed problem months later, then it would be useful to have previous measurements at the same location. What should I do?
Question 1. Are technical identifiers personal data? Yes. If they identify a person. For example an IP Address is considered personal data, because a person or household can be identified by an IP. Yes, I know that technically there are a lot of exceptions. But in general, if you have an IP, you can identify the subscriber given the right databases. So if your identifier, lets say a generated GUID, identifies a customer or something the customer can be linked to, it is personal data. Question 2. Can technical identifiers be stored in measurement devices? Just because something is personal data, does not mean you are forbidden from using it. As long as you need it to do your job, you can store it. The internet would not work, if everybody was forbidden from storing any IP address. So to summarize it: yes, it is personal data since it identifies a subscriber. However, it is needed for the job your subscriber asked you to do. So for as long as the job takes, it is legal to store it. Once your job is done, you would be required to delete it. But consent trumps everything. If your subscriber consents to you keeping all data of such incidents to improve your network and handle future incidents better, then it's legal. Just let them sign it with your other legal paperwork. Done. No problem. You could just periodically delete all records that have no consent for long term storage beyond the current incident. Lets say every 24h or 48h. You should get the details on the wording of the paperwork and the period that it is legal to keep the data as "current incedent related" from your data protection officer or legal department.
In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards.
If you publish a website, you are the data controller for this website. Serving a website necessarily implies processing (but not collection) of personal data. You have chosen to host your website on GitHub Pages. Is GitHub then a joint controller with you, or is GitHub your processor with which you sign a DPA? In 2019, I asked GH customer support about this. Their response: Our Privacy Statement, combined with our Terms of Service, is intended to serve as a data protection agreement for individual accounts — we specifically wrote our Privacy Statement to provide the information required by Article 28 of the GDPR, including a list of our subprocessors. Our Privacy Statement and our Terms of Service serve as our agreements with you, as the controller, instructing us as the processor, and you can always contact us to provide additional instruction. Should we receive a data subject request that relates to data we process on your behalf, we'll always let you know promptly and work with you to comply. — Github, 2019-04-10, private communication At the time, their Privacy Policy described GH Pages as follows: If you create a GitHub Pages website, it is your responsibility to post a privacy statement that accurately describes how you collect, use, and share personal information and other visitor information, and how you comply with applicable data privacy laws, rules, and regulations. Please note that GitHub may collect Technical Information from visitors to your GitHub Pages website, including logs of visitor IP addresses, to maintain the security and integrity of the website and service. (Update 2022: the privacy notice has since changed, and the quoted part is no longer part of the privacy notice.) Under this theory: you are the controller, and GH is your processor the terms of service incl. GH privacy policy form an effective Data Processing Agreement you have instructed GH to collect Technical Information in the sense of the privacy policy, for the purpose of maintaining security and integrity of the website, which can be covered by legitimate interest you have not instructed/allowed GH to process any other data from your site It is your call whether you subscribe to that theory. Note that GH organizations can opt-in to their corporate terms and sign an explicit DPA which will mostly contain the same provisions. Does it matter that you don't have access to the Technical Information? No. Being a controller means that you decide the purposes and means of processing, not that you store data. You as a controller can always decide to point your domain name to a different server if you no longer want to use GH as a processor.
First, when using profiling third party services (Analytics is "profiling" as defined by the GDPR), your main concern is not such a trivial thing as cookie compliance, but the security of processing I've analyzed Google's IP anonymization in some detail (as part of the DPIA I do for clients). My conclusion is that for most of the web-sites we manage, Google's IP anonymization is adequate to ensure security of processing as required by the DPIA process. However, on some sites that are likely to visited by users interested in what the GDPR calls "special categories of personal data" (Article 9), we either do not use Google Analytics, or we add additional layers of security in case the USA Government orders Google to disregard the stipulations in the DPA and hand over the data (yes, the US Government can legally do that - read the fine print in the Privacy Shield accord). As for Facebook Analytics, I think you've simply misunderstood their policy. Nowhere in that policy document does Facebook say that they "are not collecting Personal Identifiable Information". AFAIK, they collect tons of it, in all sorts of obnoxious and sneaky ways. What they actually say about PII in the context of Analytics is this: We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. Let me remind you that one of their "analytics partners" was Cambridge Analytica, so if this promise not to share is true, it looks like a pretty new policy. OK, moving on to cookie compliance. To you (the controller), both Google and Facebook are processors. Given the history of the NSA and the methods it have used and AFAIK still use to get US-based companies to hand over the personal data about Europeans through orders issued by secret FISA courts, plus the fact that total nutcases currently are in charge in the USA, I am not going to rely on the privacy policy of any US-company for protection of personal data. So if I make use of Google Analytics (and I often do, they provide a great service), I always make sure that my users opt-in on that (hard cookie concent), even I make use of their IP anonymization feature (YMMV). As for Facebook, the fact that they promise not to share PII with third parties is irrelevant because they collect personal data. You will always need consent from your users to hand over their PII to Facebook in the first place. This is not optional. PS: If was a user, that consent would never been granted, no matter how great or valuable your site might be. If you have any sort of relationship with Facebook, I'll give you my personal data when you pry it from my cold, dead hands.
The GDPR applies to such sites if they offer services in the EU/EEA. If they clearly wanted to avoid being subject to the GDPR, they should block visitors from the EEA. For the GDPR, only location matters. Other concerns like residence or citizenship are generally irrelevant. Personal data does not turn non-personal just because it was public. So the GDPR still applies when the data was collected from public sources. However, the data controller (who determines the purpose of processing) often has to balance your rights and interests against other interests (e.g. when using legitimate interest as a legal basis for some processing). For the purpose of publicly displaying your data, only showing data that was already public anyway makes it easier to argue that this is fine. But when the GDPR applies, you have data subject rights. Relevant rights include: a right to access, to see all the data they have about you a right to rectification, to correct wrong data they hold about you a right to restriction, effectively an opt-out a right to erasure (also known as the right to be forgotten) These rights apply both against the website and against Google Search (arguably, both are doing the exact same thing). Google correctly points out that they can't remove information from the Web, but they can hide information from search results. If you feel that your requests have not been resolved correctly, you can issue a complaint with your country's data protection authority. In theory you can also sue them. In practice, GDPR enforcement against overseas data controllers can be quite difficult and has not yet happened.
The material scope of the GDPR (Article 2) is limited to the processing of personal data (including mere storage) by automated means or as part of a filing system. The question of whether your activity falls within this scope hinges on what you actually do with the data once you take possession of it. You have mentioned saving the contact information of people you have met at conferences, which could refer to simply retaining it for later use, or to the technological process of storing data in a computer. The former, if not done in any structured way (a filing system) would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. The latter, even if poorly executed, such as a photo stored on a business smartphone or a text document thrown onto your workstation's desktop, would always fall within scope as computerised data is processed "by automated means". When the contact information you receive identifies a specific person, as distinct from just a corporate switchboard number and company name for example, it is personal data. When you get that personal data from the person it identifies (data subject), and you're otherwise in scope, Article 13 is invoked, requiring you to provide a list of information, "at the time when personal data are obtained", unless "the data subject already has the information." This is known as the right to be informed. The requirements differ when personal data are not obtained directly from the data subject. I would argue it is unreasonable to be expected to provide the information to the data subject over a cup of coffee or in a quick business card exchange, but if you start entering it into a spreadsheet or your CRM, you need to provide the required information, which may be as simple as a follow-up email thanking them for their time and letting them know you'll keep their contact details on file, along with a link to your organisation's privacy policy, assuming it covers this use, or if not, a specific privacy notice. You will of course be required to comply with other requirements such as the principles of data minimisation and identify a lawful basis, maintain adequate security by implementing technical and organisational measures, hold contracts with any third parties who process personal data on your behalf, and have a process for upholding data subject rights and responding to requests to exercise them - among others - but you should already be doing that for your other processing activities unless exempt. Additional information Edits have been made as clarifications and questions were forthcoming. Email marketing You need to consider the applicable country's implementation of Directive 2002/58/EC as amended ("ePrivacy Directive"). For example, in the UK you could send such messages without consent to contacts at incorporated companies or public sector bodies, but would have required consent for sole traders, private individuals, or partners in an unincorporated partnership. In Ireland, you have an exemption to consent for existing customers who were offered the opportunity to opt out when their email address was collected, but must use the email address for marketing within 12 months. Each EU country will have a different implementation of the Directive. In the Netherlands, Article 17 of the Telecommunications Act implements Directive 2003/58/EC and thus provisions for direct marketing by email. Processing by automated means Processing by automated means refers to processing of personal data in electronic, rather than manual form. All electronic processing is within the material scope of the GDPR, while only manual processing that forms or is intended to form part of a filing system is. Recital 15: The protection of natural persons should apply to the processing of personal data by automated means, as well as to manual processing, if the personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system. Art. 4(2): ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means ICO guidance What is personal data?: The GDPR covers the processing of personal data in two ways: personal data processed wholly or partly by automated means (that is, information in electronic form); and personal data processed in a non-automated manner which forms part of, or is intended to form part of, a ‘filing system’ (that is, manual information in a filing system).
GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs.
The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist).
Do courts generally run at a loss, run at a profit, or generally break even? Pursuant to a previous question, about a case where the courts seem to have incurred a significant loss in hearing it, what is the general/average position? For example, many types of routines matters may be decided in a 5 or 10 minute hearing during a block listing, and they may cost upward of $100/£100. I imagine that these are mostly fairly profitable for the courts as they may hear dozens of them per day. Against these fees of course, the judges and other court staff must be paid, along with the court's utility costs etc. Other types of more complex litigations requiring multiple day trials presumably are heard at a loss. But what is the aggregate position, generally speaking, for courts? I'm primarily interested in the situation across the common law world, but all jurisdictions are nonethesless most welcomed.
This isn’t a matter of law in (in the US at least), but rather politics and civil service design. Courts are a public service and should run at a loss. Likewise the police department. Water and sewage are public works and might break even. Public works may run at a loss and may be supplemented by taxes. It may in some cases be more efficient (aka cheaper) to make them regulated industries instead. And although there is no law against it, courts making a profit are an abomination and should at the least result in disbarment and being kicked out of office as appropriate for all concerned if proposed. When a public service becomes a source of revenue, then providing the service is no longer the goal and it becomes a business at best, but more likely simply a corrupt organization, either way the supposed service is going to become unimportant. As a matter of practice courts are not profit centers.
You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all
You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented.
I checked actual cost. It is just under $400 per month for one license. Here is a cost breakdown if you want some things a la cart and others blanket license. They are a LOT of money and are cost prohibitive unless they are used as a part of your legal practice. That said, everything available on Lexis or Westlaw are available at other, free sites. If you are looking for state and federal statutes, as well as precedent setting cases, those can be found on Findlaw (and other similar sites). Each state also publishes all of their statutes online, as well as law court decisions. The same is true of statutes and legislation. Legislative history can be obtained at any law library. These places also have free access to West and Lexis on their public computers. So they charge a premium for the convenience of having everything in one spot, as well as a variety obtain of other services that wouldn't be relevant to lay persons (like Accurint). I should amend to say Lexis/West does have things that you cannot just get online such as treatises practice guy, forms, etc. What I meant when I said that you can get pretty much everything for free online was statutes, case law, regs, etc.
There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.
Fee Shifting In Various Jurisdictions Spain (at least as of 1984) has rules on fee shifting (or the lack thereof) very similar to the American rule. The other countries of the E.U. (as of 1984) had rules similar to those of Britain's loser pays rule, although there was significant variation in detail from country to country that made this less of an omnibus statement than it might seem. See Werner Pfenningstorf, "The European Experience With Fee Shifting", 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 37 (1984). Most countries with civil law systems (i.e. those systems based upon the civil code tradition of Continental Europe rather than the common law tradition of England or something else entirely) outside of Europe in Africa and Asia are derived from the French Civil Code (most of West, Northwest and Central Africa, for example), or the German Civil Code (Korea and Japan, for example), and probably have followed in the footsteps on their parent legal traditions on this issue. This is also true of most formerly Communist Eastern European countries. Most countries in Spanish speaking Latin America, however, have legal systems derived from the Spanish legal tradition (and national constitutions modeled on that of the U.S.), so other countries besides the U.S. and Spain without automatic fee shifting to a prevailing party are probably located in Latin America. Some of these Latin American countries, however. probably adopted fee shifting rules of their own, and many of these countries declared independence from Spain before Spain adopted its civil code, so the extent to which those countries follow the Spanish model may not be as complete as in countries that gained independence later on. It is also worth noting that, however, in most civil law countries, the fees that an attorney can charge are usually significantly more highly regulated than in the United States, so the possibility of extremely high litigation fees is lower. Furthermore, civil litigation, in general, involves lower attorney fees on average in civil law countries (and in Islamic law and Chinese style Communist countries) than in the United States, in litigated cases, because the process is less attorney resource intensive due to civil procedure differences. So far as I know, fee shifting is also not used in Islamic law countries, where the basic assumption is that the parties are often pro se (i.e. without lawyers) and the institution of a professional legal class post-dates the establishment of the relevant legal rules. I do not know what the situation is in the People's Republic of China or similar legal systems. The American Rule It also bears noting that there are many exceptions to the "American rule" in U.S. law. While the American rule does not shift attorney fees, fees for out of pocket litigation expenses such as filing fees, copying charges, and expert witness fees are shifted as a matter of course to the prevailing party. Most professionally drafted written agreements have fee shifting provisions. Many specific statutes (e.g. civil rights actions and many labor law and consumer rights enforcement cases) also have fee shifting provisions (sometimes one sided, sometimes two sides). Fees can also be awarded in certain kinds of breach of fiduciary duty litigation contexts and in cases involving a dispute over a "common fund". In divorce cases, litigation costs of both sides are often (really usually) allocated by the court in proportion to ability to pay, as "winning" and "losing" are ill defined. The biggest areas where fees shifting would be unusual in the U.S. would be in common law tort lawsuits, such as negligence cases (e.g. automobile accidents and slip and fall cases), strict liability products liability cases, defamation cases, intentional harm cases, and fraud actions. The American rule also applies in cases of oral contracts or contracts drafted by inexpert non-lawyers. Even in those cases various kinds of litigation misconduct can result in fee shifting. In U.S. tort cases, defendants usually have their attorney fees paid for by their insurance company, and plaintiffs often have an attorney paid on a contingent fee basis. Furthermore, awards by juries for non-economic damages and/or punitive damages often makes it possible for a prevailing plaintiff to receive full or nearly full economic loss compensation in such lawsuits, with the non-economic and/or punitive damages awards effectively providing resources to pay the attorney for the plaintiff on top of economic loss compensation for the plaintiff.
Someone has pulled a sample motion of this type off of PACER (the public access Internet portal to civil filings in federal court). The example is more formal and structured than a lot of state court motion practice would be, however (e.g. few state court's require or encourage motions with a table of contents and a table of authorities). This example is 36 pages long, and many states don't even allow motions to run for more than 10-15 pages without leave of the court to do so in advance. There is a New Jersey federal court example here which is also on the formal and fussy side (although, in part, because the motion isn't just an arbitration motion and is also raising several additional unrelated issues which if omitted would cut it in half). See also one here. Another example, from a California state court, is closer to the mark for a typical state court filing. A court that handles residential landlord-tenant matters is probably even more "casual" and probably expects motions to get to the point more quickly. The core content is probably solid, although it would have to be customized to reference the state law statutory and procedural rules rather than the federal rules of civil procedure, and to analyze and set forth the facts of your case rather than those of some random person whose pleading is linked. This would also have to be adopted to state court practice standard, which typically uses different formatting for captions, signature blocks, whether or not line numbering is required, etc., and is often subject to other requirements. Some require that a certificate of service be filed as a separate document, while others routinely incorporate it in the main document. Many state courts require that a proposed order be submitted with a motion as a matter of state or local court rules, a few states require a cover sheet to be filed with motions, many states require you to confer with the other side in the case and to recite their position opposing or supporting the motion, or something in between, before filing it, and some courts require you to notify them once the deadline for a response has passed, regarding whether an opposition has been filed to the motion's request for relief or not. Similarly, some states courts require that motions be "verified" (i.e. have their allegations confirmed under oath) or supported by an affidavit setting forth the factual matters alleged in them. New York State structures a lot of motions as "orders to show cause" in which the court preliminarily reviews the relief requested and issues an order telling the other side that it will do something if they don't file an objection showing good cause for the court not to rule in that way by a given day, which must be formally delivered (i.e. "served") upon the other side by a deadline. I don't know if New Jersey local motion practice is similar. Many court systems also charge a "new case" filing fee for motions to compel arbitration that does not apply to other kinds of motions. Ideally, you'd want to review some motions (about pretty much anything) to get a feel for how this is usually done in New Jersey.
I'm not sure if you are asking for each of the countries listed, but I am assuming that they are there merely for example. In the US, the are a variety of different rules for its different court systems. As a rule, each State can make its own rules for its court system, and the overarching Federal system has its own rules as well, although they run off of the same principles. As such, the answer varies on which state the court is located in and possibly the type of document. In California, for example, different documents have different retention times for different documents. For example, documents for civil cases default to 10 years of retention, while adoption paperwork is retained permanently. For a criminal matter, the judgement (the final product that says if the accused is found guilty or innocent, and for what crimes) is retained permanently, while all other documents are retained for the greater of 50 years or the maximum length of sentence imposed. When the retention period for a document is over, the document is not automatically destroyed(at least in California). Instead, the appropriate official sends an official notice to all the parties in the case that the document is to be destroyed, and if no response is received to transfer the documents, the documents can be destroyed. (Source:http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=68152) Note: I have said "document" throughout, which originally meant a piece of paper. However, recently, documents have been submitted electronically, and sometimes older documents are electronically scanned.
Is creating and selling "cheats" or "hacks" for games illegal? I sell game hacks for a living, but wanted to learn more about the laws regarding what I do. Most of you probably haven't heard of this, but there are people like me who reverse engineer games, and make software that exploit the games code and memory in order to gain an advantage. Basically, we have to reverse games to know where the game stores different information, like your players health, position, and weapon. Reverse engineering involves taking an executable you get when you buy the game, and seeing where the code stores information. Based on this information, you can make a program to access the information you found while reversing, and modify it to give you an advantage. I've only read some stuff on the DMCA, but I am unsure if this qualifies for it. Most games have an "anti-cheat" which try to detect people who use cheats and ban them from the game. As a cheat developer, you have to bypass these counter measures, and sometimes these counter measures are present in the executable in the form of packing / obfuscation which just makes it harder to analyze. If I take information from an executable given to me since I bought a game, and make a game cheat based on the information then sell, is this illegal? If you have any questions, let me know. I live in the United States.
Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!
It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.
The image is almost surely protected by copyright. The model used in the game would probably be a derivative work of the original image. As such, permission from the copyright holder on the original image would be required. In the absence of such permission, the copyright holder could sue for infringement, and have a reasonable chance of winning. Whether such a holder would choose to sue cannot be predicted. It would depend on whether the holder ever learned of the infringement in the first place, whether it could be proven, and the degree of damages that might plausibly be claimed. It would also depend on the holder's attitude toward such circumstances. In addition, the gun makers might claim trademark infringement. This would depend on how recognizable the guns are, and what trademarks the makers have secured protection on. If a logo is visible and recognizable, that would strengthen a claim by the maker. On the conditions described in the question, trademark infringement seems a bit unlikely, but exact details will matter in such a case, so one cannot be confident in any generic answer on that point.
...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.
IF part of your code and data is non-open-source, you can't release this software under the MIT license. However, from what I know, CS:GO uses real-life weapons, and their names aren't protected by copyright. Weapon stats aren't copyrightable either. With skin names, you should be safe as well, since there isn't enough (or any) lore around them to establish them as literary works. However, if you are using any in-game descriptions or images, they are copyrighted content and can't be legally copied without permission from Valve. Which might be easy to obtain by writing them.
Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.
Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged.
Imagine if the answer was a simple yes: adding a disclaimer was enough to exempt you from any and all copyright and trademark law suits. If that was the case, there would be no point in copyright or trademark law at all, because everyone could just include this disclaimer and never be sued. That doesn't mean every disclaimer is useless, but it does mean that copying and pasting some vague wording without understanding what it means is very unlikely to help you very much. The example you give is a good example of doing just that; the terms it uses are real, but they've clearly been thrown together without real understanding: Copyright is the right to control and profit from a creative work. This is relevant because images of Pokemon characters created for games, manga, etc are copyrighted by their creator. Trademarks are words, symbols, images, etc exclusively associated with a particular company or product. Trademark law aims, among other things, to avoid customers thinking they are getting an official product when they are not. "Nintendo" and "Pokemon" are both themselves trademarks. They are also the names of different companies. My limited understanding is that "The Pokemon Company" will be the owner of all the copyrights and trademarks related to those games, manga, etc. Naming them is a way of showing that you have researched this and understood their rights. "This app is not affiliated , endorsed or supported by Nintendo in any way". This is a disclaimer on the trademarks. Whether this is sufficient to protect against claims of counterfeiting depends on how prominent it is compared to other branding - you need to make it obvious to users that the product is unofficial, not bury this in small-print for the lawyers to find. "also some images used in this app are ... supported under fair use" - fair use is a US legal concept which allows copyrighted works to be used in certain specifically limited ways. Saying your use is covered does not make it true, you need to actually understand what provisions of the law allow your specific use. "no copyright infringement intended" This is a fluffy apology that has no legal standing. A more useful statement might be "every care has been taken to adhere to copyright and trademark law, if you notice a violation please contact X"; but you're still relying on goodwill, and it won't stop someone sending the lawyers in if they decide to. Which brings us back to the real question: The apps mentioned before are in the store since 2015 and they haven't been removed yet. The real reason for this has nothing to do with the poorly-written disclaimers, it is that Nintendo / Pokemon co haven't bothered. If an app is directly competing with an official app, or receiving a lot of attention (even if no money), the lawyers will descend; if it's a buggy image gallery with a dozen downloads, they might decide they have better things to do. If they do notice, they might just get Apple and Google to de-list the app, but not spend the time and money pursuing a legal case. On the other hand, at any time they might decide they need to tighten up control of their intellectual property, and make an example of a few authors picked at random. The only way to avoid that is to actually avoid violating their rights, rather than just saying so in a disclaimer.
What is the status of Rand Paul's criminal referral to the DOJ relating to allegations levied against Dr. Anthony Fauci? On July 26th 2021, Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky sent a letter to Attorney General Merrick Garland to criminally investigate Dr. Anthony Fauci for allegations of lying to congress on May 11, 2021, specifically, the alleged violation of 18 U.S.C Section 1001. This issue still seems to be a perceived concern in conservative media and specifically Rand Paul. However, I have not seen any formal legal progress on this front, such as a justification for dismissal as to why it is frivolous. Hence my question: Question Has there been any further legal fillings made, or investigations started relating to Rand Paul's letter to the DOJ as described above?
The exchange between Fauci and Paul was reported in "‘If anybody is lying here, senator, it is you,’ Fauci tells Sen. Paul in heated exchange at Senate hearing" from CNBC. The formal referral was reported in the news story "Rand Paul sends official criminal referral on Anthony Fauci to DOJ" from The Hill An October 2021 Washington Post editorial "What the fight between Anthony Fauci and Rand Paul is really about" discussed the accusations from both men but did not mention any further investigation by the DoJ. The October 2021 Rolling Stone story ["‘Molecularly Impossible’: Fauci Blasts Rand Paul for Covid Lab Theory"], also discussed the accsuations by Paul, but made no mention of any DoJ investigation. The October 25, 2021 story "Fauci disputes NIH-funded research at Wuhan Institute involved gain of function as Rand Paul calls for his firing" by The Insider again mentions the accusations by Paul and the counter-accusations by Fauci, but makes no mention of any DoJ investigation. In December 2021 The Independant published "Rand Paul says Fauci should be jailed for five years for lying to Congress – something fact checkers insist he did not do". That story quotes Paul as saying: But he should be prosecuted for lying, but at the very least he should be taken out of his position because I think he cost people's lives through misinformation and goes on to cite various inaccurate statements by Paul on Covid-related issues. The story does not mention any action taken by the DoJ on the referral, roughly six months after the formal accusation. In a story from NBC "Fauci says Sen. Paul's attacks 'kindle the crazies' who have threatened his life" dated Jan 11 2022, there is mention of the earlier exchange but still no mention of any investigation being undertaken by the DoJ. In fact, I can find no mention of the US DoJ ever having opened or conducted any investigation into Fauci lying to Congress. The DoJ is not required to start an investigation for every referral or letter asking it to do so, not to announce its reasons for not starting an investigation. Nor does it publicly announce all investigations that it starts or closes. The (lack of) evidence available is consistent with the DoJ having simply ignored Paul's letter of referral, but it does not prove that. There could be a non-public investigation in progress.
If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech.
In lay terms, the Raich case cites authority pursuant to the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution of the United States; specifically, that the government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, to the degree that crops of individuals (whether directly or indirectly, or not at all, in commercial circulation) can be regulated by Congress, citing the Filburn case, which had nothing to do with "marijuana" or "cannabis", or "THC" or "CBD"; in essence, the government has the power to tell a private individual which crops they can cultivate or not, depending on the intent of Congress in enacting the law. The premise being that since the intent of Congress in regulating "marijuana" within the scope of the CSA was for the express purpose of maintaining higher prices (including so-called "black market" prices) for "marijuana", an individual cultivating "marijuana" which was not intended to enter the "stream of commerce" nonetheless impacted the price of the crop (or commodity) by cultivating the crop at all (i.e.g., greater supply of available product reduces the price of the product in any market, whether "black market" or not; having access to the product by means of private cultivation reduces the resources necessary to acquire the crop) - thus resulting in the overall price of the crop not being higher, thwarting the intent of Congress in regulating that specific crop or commodity. Of importance, Congress has concluded that "marijuana" had (and still does not have) any medical purpose (various bills have been written over the years to exempt "marijuana" from Schedule I classification in the CSA; "medical marijuana" exemptions, etc.), or at least no medical purpose recognized by Congress (save for specific research done by Dr. ElSohly, and a very limited number of private individuals (patients) to consume the crops produced by Dr. ElSohly, et al. pursuant to licenses issued by a federal administrative agency). It is interesting to note that the United States holds a (potentially defensive) patent (and has so for several years as of 2018) on various medical applications of CBD via the National Institutes of Health. The "property rights" aspect of your inquiry can be categorized into two parts which are independent of each other, that is both actions can be ongoing simultaneously The government has the power to regulate the cultivation of any crop or commodity on private property pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the intent of Congress, irrespective of if that crop enters the stream of commerce proper or not The government can pursue medical research, apply for and be granted patents (intellectual property), by the government itself, for technologies relating to the medical use of crops or commodities defined by Congress as not having any recognized medical application (e.g., the identical crop or commodity at 1.), potentially for defensive purposes, investment in a potential future market (i.e.g., licensing of patented technologies to pharmaceutical or private equity concerns) for profit, or other undisclosed purposes
Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.
Since the treason statute is quite vague, you have to discover what the details of the law is by looking at precedent. Almost all federal treason convictions in the US have involved declared wars. There is the case of John Fries, an early tax rebellion case in 1800, who was pardoned by the president thus rendering the need for legal appeal moot, but this involved armed insurrection and is thus not analogous. All other federal cases have involved people supporting the enemy in case of a declared war. In this specific case, the allegation is that by advocating not working with Syrian Kurds in an assault on Raqqa (because it was thought to be in the best interests of the US in terms of our relationship with Turkey, given the position of the Turkish state w.r.t. Kurds), Flynn benefited ISIS. Compared to various wartime treason convictions, such as Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally, the difference between imaginary "aid" in the case of Flynn vs. actual aid in the other cases is so stark that there is no case to be made for a treason charge.
The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator.
The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement.
Your main misunderstanding is that opposing counsel cannot testify. He can ask a question, such as "Did you say ...?", which provides Einstein an opportunity to answer in a way that maintains the credibility of his testimony, but consel cannot just enter his own testimony into the record. In addition, counsel on "his side" has the opportunity to pose appropriate clarifying questions, e.g. could ask "Did you repudiate that idea 88 years ago?", though there is a problem that the attorney may not have the technical expertise to recognize the subject-matter question that they should ask. Expert testimony does not attempt to determine the state of scholarship in an area, it attempts to resolve a specific factual matter. The two are not the same thing. Einstein would not testify as to what his general and special theories of relativity say, except in a bizarre universe where some person is accused of the crime of denying the theory of relativity. Instead, he might be testifying for the defense, where the defendant is accused of an act that (it turns out) is physically impossible in light of the theory of relativity. If Einstein had been in the habit of posing random mutually-contradictory conjectures on a weekly basis, opposing counsel's question could be relevant to establishing that the witness's testimony is not reliable. Theoretically, counsel could "hint" that the witness is scientifically flighty, so Einstein would have to have a credible explanation for changing his position. It is easy to demonstrate that scientists in general do change their positions as knowledge expands, so Einstein's burden would not be very substantial.
Is sharing anime songs downloaded from youtube with my family across countries illegal? Say, I live in America, my family are in Turkey. If I download anime songs like this from youtube, then I send them to my family, is this illegal? If it is, and someone sue me, what would be the sentence? Does it make any change if the medium contains cartoon scenes like this?(Note that the earlier sample doesn't, it just contains a still picture.) What if it only contains the photo of the singer like this?
Let's examine some laws that may apply to your case Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) There are criminal penalties for willful infringement for personal financial gain. If you are only sending it to one family member through a private communication (eg not posting it publicly) and not selling it and one copy of the music video has a retail value of $1,000 or less then there will be no criminal penalties. But you may be liable for civil penalties. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) Courts have ruled that ToS violations do not constitute unauthorized access (or exceeding access) so you aren't in violation of the CFAA Civil Liability By downloading a video off of YouTube you are in violation of their ToS. There isn't enough prior case law for me to tell you the outcome here. You may be committing some sort of civil wrong by the act of downloading. In addition, you are distributing a copyrighted work without permission which would open you to more civil penalties. The real question is how likely is it for this to be enforced? Not likely.
Pretty much everything you need to know about the ownership and licensing of your material on Medium is in the Medium TOS you contractually agreed to when you signed up with the service. Basically, you granted Medium a license to use the work, but you did not agree to an exclusive license nor turn over copyright to them. Part of that Terms of Service – Medium Policy reads: Content rights & responsibilities You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. You’re responsible for the content you post. This means you assume all risks related to it, including someone else’s reliance on its accuracy, or claims relating to intellectual property or other legal rights. You’re welcome to post content on Medium that you’ve published elsewhere, as long as you have the rights you need to do so. By posting content to Medium, you represent that doing so doesn’t conflict with any other agreement you’ve made. By posting content you didn’t create to Medium, you are representing that you have the right to do so. For example, you are posting a work that’s in the public domain, used under license (including a free license, such as Creative Commons), or a fair use. We can remove any content you post for any reason. You can delete any of your posts, or your account, anytime. Processing the deletion may take a little time, but we’ll do it as quickly as possible. We may keep backup copies of your deleted post or account on our servers for up to 14 days after you delete it. Pertaining to presenting Medium content in an iFrame on another site, this is reasonably close to not allowing that: You may not do, or try to do, the following: ... (2) access or search the Services by any means other than the currently available, published interfaces (e.g., APIs) that we provide;... You can use Embed Code Generator | Embedly to embed an iFrame of a Medium page on another site. But contacting Medium via the email at the bottom of the TOS would tell you for sure if it is OK. Comments on your pieces on Medium do belong to the owner. And You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. appears to cover the idea of copying your material from Medium to your own site. If in doubt, ask them.
You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.
Under the DMCA(United States Federal Law: Digital Millennium Copyright Act) and its Safe Harbor provisions, yes, Youtube is protected from copyright claims, provided they comply when they receive a notice. But....the DMCA that gives Youtube (and its parent company Google/Alphabet) this shield is US law, but Youtube does large amounts of business in other countries, making it liable in those countries, which don't necessarily have the same protections. Case-in-point, the EU. Under some other nation's law, Youtube may be liable for infringement if they wait to be notified. Alternatively, part of the agreement that was being hammered out between Youtube and the content companies might very well be some sort of indemnity agreement, that protects Youtube from the content companies so long as they uphold their end of the agreement. Additionally, even if Youtube isn't liable for the copyright infringement itself, since they serve ads on such videos, they could conceivably be sued under the theory of "unjust enrichment". (Similar to the logic that the EU is currently trying to get Google to pay their "link tax" for Google News on). There are also non-legal considerations to consider: Benefit to Self: Youtube is now selling/renting copyrighted content such as movies and TV shows as well. By becoming a distributor, it's in their interest to not also allow free versions of what they are selling on their platform. Cost-to-implement: As Ron Beyer points out, a call center/email center/mail room to receive the DMCA notices would be an enormous cost. What's more, it's a continuous, recurring and likely-growing cost. Youtube/Google is also not short on software engineers. It's much cheaper to pull some devs off of their current project for a couple days, implement a solution and call it a day, with occasional maintenance, especially as they are going to be paying those engineers' salaries anyway. Business Relationships: Youtube/Google make most of their money from advertising (and off of user data, but that is often tied to advertising in the other direction). The content companies are often their customers. Angering your customers is generally not a good idea. Ultimate Desires/Future View:Youtube doesn't care about the lost content. They don't care about the fight. If the copyrighted material is blocked, their users are far more likely to find something else than leave the site; if the material is blocked before uploading, most users won't even realize it was ever there. As such, Youtube doesn't care if copyrighted content is blocked, as that is not their main market.
According to the Wikipedia article "List of countries' copyright lengths" the only country currently having no copyright law is the Marshall Islands, and that country is said to have a non-copyright-based law providing that "Unauthorized sale or commercial use of sound & audio-visual recordings is prohibited"[1] However, if a person goes to the Marshall Islands, makes unauthorized copies of works there, and posts those copies to the net, the copyright owner could obtain an injunction under US copyright law requiring the site operator or host to remove the infringing content or be shut down.[2] Similar orders can be obtained under the laws of other countries. In addition, the copyright owner could send a takedown order under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).[3] A copyright suit could be brought by the copyright owner in any country where the unauthorized copies are distributed and, if damages were awarded, property subject to the jurisdiction of the court could be seized to pay them. In the US, infringing copies could be seized by customs officers when they are imported into the US.[4] Also, If an infringement suit is won, the court an order any infringing copies to be seized adn destroyed.[5] Conclusion Of course, if such copies were made in small numbers and distributed privately, the copyright owner might not learn of it. And in any case the copyright owner might not choose to take legal action. But merely making such copies in the Marshall Islands will not make the infringer safe from civil actions, nor will it make the copies lawful in the US, nor in most other countries. Notes [1] Unauthorized Copies of Recorded Materials Act, 1991 [20 MIRC Ch.2]". [2] 17 USC 502 (a) provides: (a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright. [3] 17 USC 512 (c)(1)(C) and 17 USC 512 (c)(3) [4] 17 USC 602 (a) provides: (a)(1) Importation.—Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501. (a)(2) Importation or exportation of infringing items.—Importation into the United States or exportation from the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under sections 501 and 506. [5] 17 USC 503 (b) provides: As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction or other reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.
The Youtube terms of service allow you to play music, and they do not impose any condition to the effect that you have to be alone in a soundproof room to play music. The school district might have a rule prohibiting the playing of music on school grounds (presumably with an exception for music classes), but there are too many school districts in Alabama to research that question. You might ask the superintendent of your local district about such rules, if it's important. Copyright law does include a separate requirement for permission to perform publicly, for example the music played in a store requires a performance license. Under 17 USC 106(4), the copyright owner has the exclusive right to authorize a person "to perform the copyrighted work publicly". The definitions section says what it means to perform publicly: (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. It does seem that we're in the realm of a "public performance", since the law does not specifically say "intentionally play so that others can hear it" (we don't know whether the teacher is being unintentionally overheard). However, the purpose of the performance license is to cover businesses that rely on playing music to make a buck, and is not intended to force people to watch out if strangers / co-workers are listening. There is a classroom-use exception, whereby teachers can perform music for instructional purposes, which this probably isn't. However, the Youtube TOS does say that all content-providers also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to access your Content through the Service, and to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display, and perform it) only as enabled by a feature of the Service. Therefore the teacher has permission to perform: except if the content is illegally uploaded by someone lacking the right to grant permissions (and to upload, in general). If you suspect that someone has illegally uploaded some artist's content to Youtube, you can contact the copyright holder with relevant information. They may or may not pursue a DMCA takedown; if they do, and they are really gung-ho, they could try go to recover lost licensing revenue. It isn't clear that there is a license for "teacher laying music that others can hear".
Is it legal to make a video compilation of websites that use our product for promotion of our company? [...] We would only be showing brief clips of client's products, strung together for a short video. This will most probably be both copyright violation and trademark infringement. Copyright is generally violated if you copy a creative work produced by someone else - which is what you want to do. Trademarks are generally violated when you use someone else's trademarks (such as their logo or company name) to promote your product - which, again is what you want to do. There are various exceptions available - copyright may not apply if the work is very simple, trademark use may be allowed e.g. in comparative advertising, etc., etc., but the rules for this are complex, unclear and very different in various jurisdictions. You could risk it and hope no one sues you (and maybe no one will), but the safe route is to ask permission first.
You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)
Can a person in BDSM relationship legally protect themselves? A large part of BDSM lifestyle is the "SM" part - namely, a desire by two sides of a couple, to inflict pain on another, or have pain inflicted on them (if done right, obviously in a consensual manner, duh). Often, this is done in ways that would - outside the context of BDSM relationship - be classified as a crime (assault, battery, etc...). Clearly, this produces a sizeable legal risk. As such, is there a way for a "S" partner in a relationship (the one inflicting pain), to protect themselves legally in a reasonable way in either the case of third-party exposure (e.g. some nosy person calls the cops on the couple); or worse yet, the relationship breaking down and the "M" partner of the relationship filing charges over what they supposedly consented to previously? Just to re-iterate, the scope of the question is activity that is (at the time it happens) fully consensual. In general societal context, obviously there is a way to engage in consensual violence without being charged - for example, a boxer or martial artist would never be charged for participating in a martial arts competition or training, which involves acts that - outside of them - would be criminally penalized. Is there a way to do that in a BDSM relationship context - that would actually stand up in a judicial setting? In other words, anyone can sign any "BDSM contract" (probably the only thematically accurate BDSM related topic in the otherwise deplorable "50 shades" series); but did any such contract ever stand up in court when one of the partner was charged with perpetrating violence on another? I'm mostly interested in an answer related to criminal justice system; but an answer covering civil charges from one partner on another also would be welcome, if the two answers differ. Jurisdiction is USA, if more precision is needed let's say New York City where BDSM is common enough that things like this probably actually made it to court.
canada The law "The [Criminal] Code requires 'ongoing, conscious consent' to 'each and every sexual act' and can be revoked at any time." See R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, citing R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28. "The definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy this requirement, even if she expresses her consent in advance." R. v. J.A., para. 66. The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide "whether or in which circumstances individuals may consent to bodily harm during sexual activity" (R. v. J.A., para. 21). However, in the context of a non-sport fist fight or brawl, one cannot consent to another intentionally applying force that causes serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm: R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714.1 And at the provincial appellate level, it has been held that "consent is not a defence to a charge of sexual assault causing bodily harm in circumstances where the accused has deliberately inflicted pain or injury upon a person that gave rise to bodily harm" (R. v. Quashie (2005), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.)). Consent would be irrelevant in a charge of criminal negligence or manslaughter, if the activities were to escalate this far (R. c. Deschatelets, 2013 QCCQ 1948, para. 175-77). The content of advance negotiations is not relevant to whether the complainant was consenting to the impugned conduct, however, it may be relevant as evidence of expectations about how consent would be communicated between the parties throughout the conduct. See R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, para. 93 (citations omitted): For example, in some cases, prior sexual activities may establish legitimate expectations about how consent is communicated between the parties, thereby shaping the accused’s perception of communicated consent to the sexual activity in question at the time it occurred. American scholar Michelle Anderson puts it this way: “… prior negotiations between the complainant and the defendant regarding the specific acts at issue or customs and practices about those acts should be admissible. These negotiations, customs, and practices between the parties reveal their legitimate expectations on the incident in question.” These “negotiations” would not, however, include an agreement involving broad advance consent to any and all manner of sexual activity. As I will explain, a belief that the complainant gave broad advance consent to sexual activity of an undefined scope will afford the accused no defence, as that belief is premised on a mistake of law, not fact. See also R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, para. 141: ... consenting adults may enjoy the personal autonomy to establish rules such as “no means yes”. If so, in my view, this passage suggests a corollary requirement to establish an alternative “safe word” or other mechanism to ensure that each party is also able to maintain their personal autonomy to put an end to unwanted sexual activity. Application A contract cannot provide advance consent, therefore it is irrelevant as to proof of consent during the acts. However, advance agreements can (and several courts suggests should) set out the expectations about how consent will be communicated. Any evidence of such agreements would be relevant to establishing the defence of "mistaken belief in communicated consent." None of this would assist an accused in the circumstance where a court finds that any consent was vitiated because the accused deliberately inflicted pain or injury that gave rise to bodily harm (this position has not been confirmed by the Supreme Court). If you are simply asking how to prove a fact in litigation, see this Q&A. 1. Since this is a judicially-developed limit, the conception of "bodily harm" used here does not necessarily have to match that codified in the Criminal Code. But: "The common law definition of 'bodily harm' has been substantially incorporated in s. 245.1(2) of the Criminal Code, and means 'any hurt or injury to the complainant that interferes with the health or comfort of the complainant and that is more than merely transient or trifling'" (R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633).
Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else.
Denver lawyer David Lane has said, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning. (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld: Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “fucking queer,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld: Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court. (You get no jury for contempt cases.) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."
A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest.
The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable.
Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.
The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.
Lawyers may break confidentiality with client permission. You can also break your own confidentiality and talk to the prosecutor yourself. The prosecutor's response is up to the prosecutor; however, they tend to not be super excited about giving immunity to a witness for the defense if they might want to prosecute the witness later (and courts often are fine with that), so the more they suspect about your true role the less likely they are to grant it. No. If the feds later find truly independent evidence (they have the burden of showing it's truly independent), they can prosecute. Some states give transactional immunity to witnesses (you can't be prosecuted for crimes you testified about for any reason), but the Fifth Amendment doesn't require it and at least the feds aren't bound by state transactional immunity. It's hard to prosecute, but is possible if prosecutors play their cards right. Yes, it does allow civil liability. There is no right against self-incrimination in civil matters, only criminal liability. If the forced testimony leads to a lawsuit that bankrupts you, too bad.
When speaking to a judge in court, what do barristers mean by "May I take instructions?" I know what instructions to a barrister are, BEFORE court. When it is appropriate to use a barrister, the barrister is sent ‘Instructions' (when asked to give an opinion on a case) or a 'Brief' (if the barrister is to appear in court). Good instructions should give background on a case and will generally include the following: Who you are and whom you act for Who your dispute or potential dispute is with, and the nature of it (e.g. ‘unfair dismissal claim by former employee’ or ‘boundary dispute’) A brief background which usually sets out the relevant events in chronological order Any relevant deadlines (e.g. limitation dates, hearing dates or time limits for serving evidence) What you want the barrister to do There are no set rules on how the instructions or briefs should appear or what papers should be sent. However, where you are asking counsel to draft pleadings or appear in court, you should consider the following additional points: But "instructions" appear to mean something else, when blurted by the barrister himself IN court TO a judge! What's this second sense of "instructions"? Geoffrey Robertson QC in British Board of Film Classification, R (on the application of) v Video Appeals Committee [2008] EWHC 203 (Admin) (24 January 2008) MR ROBERTSON: May I take instructions on another matter? MR JUSTICE MITTING: Certainly. (Pause) Paul Bowen (now KC) in Public Interest Lawyers Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 3259 (Admin) (05 November 2010) MR BOWEN: May I take instructions? Gavin Millar QC in MGN Ltd & Ors, RE Application for Leave To Appeal [2011] EWCA Crim 100 (25 January 2011) MR MILLAR: May I take instructions so that I can find out what our position is? THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes, by all means. I am speaking for myself -- and if my colleagues have anything to say on it they will say so themselves -- my only concern relates to the five people we have called the "young witnesses". David Blundell (now KC) in Fawcett, R (on the application of) v Health Safety Executive [2012] EWHC 2364 (Admin) (24 February 2012) MR BLUNDELL: I am very grateful for that judgment, may I take instructions for a brief moment? There was a consultation on the point that I am going to address your Lordship, I am taking instructions on in just a moment. MR JUSTICE BEATSON: Whilst you are getting instructions let me explain to -- can you wait a minute? What I have done is you have failed but if you heard what I said then you will see and I have not made an order of costs against you, and of course Mr Blundell may try to persuade me that I ought to, but I have not because of what I have said in the judgment. Yes Mr Blundell? MR BLUNDELL: In fact I will just take instructions. (Pause) My Lord I am very grateful for the indication your Lordship has given. Those behind me have taken instructions, we are not going to seek to persuade your Lordship to make any other order. Richard Moules in Wheeler v Norfolk County Council [2014] EWHC 2232 (Admin) (13 June 2014) MOULES: Indeed. May I take instructions on one final matter? Your Lordships do have discretion not only to quash the order, but also to remit the matter back. Insofar as my client has incurred costs resisting Mr Dixon's application in the Magistrates', that matter falls due to be decided. MR JUSTICE CRANSTON: Do you want time to think about it?
Lawyers cannot act for their client without instructions. "May I take instructions" is a request by the barrister to have a conversation in confidence with their client about what to do next or how to respond to the court. Sometimes this is just a momentary discussion, but if necessary, this can even result in the court standing down for a short break, or fully adjourning to another day. It is not a euphemism used to disparage the client.
David Siegel's answer correctly explains how appellate courts consider laws and arguments not addressed in the courts below. To clarify on the comparison to the Court of Cassation, though: A trial court is generally limited to considering the facts that are properly introduced by the parties, though a court may also take "judicial notice" of certain facts that are highly unlikely to be disputed. On review, courts of appeal are generally limited to facts supported by the evidence in the trial-court record, though they may also take judicial notice of other facts. A party is generally unable to introduce new evidence during an appeal. It is not correct that an appellate court will not review factual determinations, as those reviews probably happen in more cases than not. But -- just as with legal determinations -- those reviews can happen with varying levels of deference. For instance, if a case is tried to a jury, an appellate court will be exceedingly deferential to the jury's factual determinations, on the theory that the jury is best positioned to evaluate the evidence, gauge credibility, make reasonable inferences, etc. A judge who makes a factual determination based on in-court testimony will enjoy a similar measure of deference. But if a court makes a factual determination based only on documents submitted in support of a motion, or otherwise lacks an opportunity to evaluate a witness in person, the appellate court will be more open to different interpretations of the evidence. Legal determinations are likewise subject to varying levels of deference. At one end is the abuse-of-discretion standard. If a trial court determines that evidence is admissible or inadmissible, for instance, an appellate court will apply the abuse-of-discretion standard, which (to oversimplify) asks not whether the ruling was incorrect under the controlling law, but whether the ruling was reached without regard to the controlling law. On the other end is de novo review, in which the appellate court gives virtually no deference to the trial court and undertakes its own independent legal analysis. Perhaps even more deferential is plain-error review, which asks (to oversimplify) whether the trial court's error is so apparent that it barely needs to be debated. If the error is obvious enough (and satisfies several other criteria), the appellate court may reverse the trial court.
These are different terms for initiating documents. What one court or jurisdiction calls a petition, another might call an application. "Complaint" may not have a technical meaning in some contexts or jurisdictions, but often it is used to refer to the initiating document at a specialist tribunal. There are other names for initiating documents: notice of civil claim, notice of action, etc. There is no way to know which terms have a technical meaning and what those meanings are without looking to the rules and practice in a particular jurisdiction. "Indictment" is an initiating document in a criminal prosecution. But there are also "informations" (generally implying lesser charges).
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
According to Consumer Rights 2015, is there a deadline from when the issue is raised to the trader to then taking action to fix it, or is it based on what deadline I set on my letter? The "deadline" is one that is reasonable in the circumstances. See s.23 of the Act: [...] (2) If the consumer requires the trader to repair or replace the goods, the trader must— (a) do so within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience to the consumer, and (b) bear any necessary costs incurred in doing so (including in particular the cost of any labour, materials or postage). [...] (5) Any question as to what is a reasonable time or significant inconvenience is to be determined taking account of— (a) the nature of the goods, and (b) the purpose for which the goods were acquired. [...] If I do send a letter, for instance, notifies him for court, to which address should I send it to? His official one in gov.uk, where he claims he didn't notice or his yard? The Civil Procedure Rules Pre-Action Protocols do not dictate where such a letter (referred to a letter before claim and described here and here) must be served but the usual requirement is to an address at which the potential defendant resides or carries on business within the UK. See Rule 6.8(a) for example.
There are two important points you need to consider: jurors cannot be challenged (in the US sense), and the judge has wide discretion to handle any problems that arise in his court. If a juror has prior knowledge of the case, or could not be expected to be impartial, the judge (or sometimes the bailiff) will excuse him, and bring in one of the three replacements. If either side's lawyers dislike the look of a juror, they may if the judge allows ask questions to elicit such reasons, and then ask the judge to disqualify (I was on a jury where one of my colleagues was a policeman, and the defence suggested that he could not be impartial; the judge asked some questions and then excused him, and I understand he was never actually empanelled that week). But you are not permitted to select jurors you think will favour you or (equivalently) to ask to dismiss a juror without a factual disqualification; you can't, for example, ask about a juror's politics. Disqualifying a juror is thus rare, and the chance of four jurors having ties to a particular case is so remote as to be not worth worrying about. The second point, and the reason why written authority is hard to find, is that the judge has almost unlimited discretion over any action in his Court that does not infringe statute. There was a case in the newspapers recently where a juror discussed the case he was hearing in the pub, and was therefore dismissed from the jury; the judge consulted prosecution and defence and decided to proceed with eleven jurors rather than start the trial again. This does not mean that 'any trial can be heard with eleven jurors'; it means that in that particular case justice was best served by continuing. There is always the option to request a mistrial (which may or may not be granted) or to say that, a fair trial now being impossible, you intend to appeal on this point; but failing that the judge's decision on any procedural point is binding.
Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.
Overview This would not be uniform for all courts, even in a single state, nor would it be the same for all kinds of evidence. Also, few rules regarding the timing of disclosure of evidence are absolute. A judge's handling of a request to introduce late disclosed evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo, on appeal, so a judge is afforded some leeway in how the general rules are applied. In General Jurisdiction Courts In courts of general jurisdiction (i.e. those that handle large claims), disclosure of evidence well in advance of trial is the norm. The two big deadlines are usually the close of discovery (a deadline usually set in the pre-trial process), and to a lesser extent, the deadline for disclosing a final set of witnesses and exhibits shortly before trial in immediate pre-trial disclosures. (There are parallel deadlines at different steps in the process for adding new parties to a lawsuit and for raising new legal issues.) There are two main exceptions to that principle. Impeachment, Rebuttal And Authentication Evidence One is that evidence for impeachment of someone else's testimony or rebuttal to something offered by the other side, especially if the statement to be impeached or rebutted was unexpected (e.g. when the testimony to be impeached or rebutted comes from a third-party witness not in close coordination with either party), is generally allowed even in the absence of disclosure. Late disclosure of evidence solely necessary to authenticate evidence that has already been disclosed is likewise usually treated very leniently. The Good Cause Exception The other is that late introduction of evidence is usually allowed only for "good cause" (e.g. the evidence was only discovered or only came into being at the last minute). And, in "good cause" cases, often the other side will be given the opportunity to continue the hearing or trial to allow them additional time to prepare to respond to the new evidence (an opportunity that most litigants will waive in practice to avoid the long delay associated with getting a new trial date). An analysis of "good cause" also considers the prejudice to each side of excluding the evidence and the materiality of the evidence. For example, if the late evidence is something created by the defendant, even if it wasn't formally disclosed, a judge is much more likely to allow it to come in than a judge is if the other party has never seen the evidence before. Similarly, a judge will often be quite lenient about late disclose of exhibits that merely compile or summarize evidence that has already been disclosed because it is not prejudicial and could save time. Judges are also loath to exclude highly material "smoking gun" evidence that would otherwise be admissible and clearly resolve the case on the merits, but are likely to rebuff efforts to introduce evidence not disclosed in a timely motion if it is cumulative or secondary in importance or addresses only a satellite or collateral issue or credibility in general. A judge is more likely to admit late disclosed evidence if the other party was in some way responsible for its late discovery (e.g. by excluding it from an index in a case where the volume of documents disclosed was voluminous, or encouraging a third-party not to disclose it). Judges are less lenient towards late disclosed expert witness testimony than they are to admit late disclosed fact witness testimony. Limited Jurisdiction Courts and Special Proceedings In courts of limited jurisdiction (especially small claims court), in contrast, there is often little or no pre-trial disclosure of evidence and new evidence can be presented at any time until you "close" your case (either because you say you are done presenting evidence or because the judge limits the time you have to present evidence and cuts you off). Requirements to disclose evidence in advance also tend to be more lenient in specialized proceedings (e.g. probate disputes, evictions, foreclosure, mental health proceedings) and is usually absent in evidentiary hearing of pre-trial relief (like evidentiary hearings to determine if a court has jurisdiction, temporary restraining orders and pre-judgment attachments) in cases in general jurisdiction courts. Post-Trial Relief Proceeding Exceptions It is sometimes possible to introduce newly discovered evidence as late as a motion for post-trial relief (or even in an even later motion to set aside a judgment), but usually, the very latest point at which you can introduce evidence is the close of your case at trial (in the case of a plaintiff, often at the halfway point in a trial as a plaintiff is not always permitted to present new evidence after the defendant closes his or her case). Consequences Of Evidence Disclosure Deadlines Evidence disclosure deadlines provide important value by preventing the previously common practice of "trial by surprise" that often led to unjust results. But, the idea that there is a time limit on disclosing evidence is quite counterintuitive for the average person because it is contrary to how people usually prove things to other people in every day life which is more of a dialog and less of a one sided presentation. Failing to follow these requirements, or not realizing their importance and finality, is one of the most common ways that people not represented by counsel make mistakes that impair their chance of prevailing at trial. Many litigants who are unfamiliar with the courts have a very hard time understanding that there is a deadline for disclosing evidence prior to trial, and often, even in trial, will say things like "I have this evidence that I could show you to show that I'm telling the truth" when in reality, at trial, it is your last chance to present evidence and you can't supplement your evidence after the fact.
Avoiding a speeding ticket by refusing to tell who the driver was? This hypothetical question is based on a real incident I saw in the news. Suppose that a car is driving over the speed limit by a significant amount, causing a police car to turn around and go after the car. When the police get to the car, it’s parked in a rest stop and all passengers are sitting in the back seat of the car. When the police asks who the driver was, all passengers deny being the driver. What happens in such a situation? Clearly someone was driving the car, but only one of the multiple passengers. Suppose that there is no evidence of who the driver was (no camera footage, for instance). Maybe one of the passengers is the owner of the car, but that doesn’t guarantee that they were the one driving.
In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work.
Hot Pursuit What you're describing is a hot pursuit, and in the US, common law says that police officers crossing state lines while in hot pursuit is absolutely allowed. An active pursuit is considered an exigent circumstance, which gives police all kinds of temporary powers they don't normally have.
The policeman ordered, right as he took a step out of his car "Turn it off!" - which is a lawful demand to prevent the biker from possibly kicking the gas and running. As the driver did not seem to comply (from the policeman's PoV) during his walk over to the bike, he enforced the order himself by turning off the bike and confiscating the key for the moment. Having made it safe that the driver couldn't leg it, he guided traffic around him so he could get to the side of the road. We don't know what happened after the driver reached the curb to be lectured and/or arrested, the bike could be impounded or the confiscation might be temporary. So all we can do here is discuss the action of demanding that a motor vehicle be turned off, the doing of such and taking the keys. Demanding a vehicle to be shut off is standard procedure in police stop, as it is ensuring the safety of everybody involved. In a somewhat recent case (trying to find it again!), a driver did not shut off the car and had to stand on the brake to keep it where it was. As commands came conflicting (keep your hands where we can see them, get out of the car!) and he could not comply or the car would jump forward and ram somewhere, things escalated and the driver was shot. But back to the first step. Was the stop lawful? ACLU in NY tells us: Police may stop and briefly detain you only if there is reasonable suspicion that you committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Don’t bad-mouth a police officer or run away, even if you believe what is happening is unreasonable. That could lead to your arrest. There was a crime committed: Splitting is illegal in NY (among others: Section 1122, overtaking on the right), so the stop was justified under NY CPL 140.50. From my own experience, it is not uncommon for bikers to try to evade police by swerving back into traffic and using their higher mobility to get away. On its face, this makes it reasonable to demand the bike be shut off as the policeman advanced, and I'd like to congratulate the officer for taking the less escalating step and just turning the bike off himself on the noncompliance instead of drawing his gun and possibly escalating it to a use of force. Most lawyers suggest to drivers pulled over to do things akin to "After you brought your car to a complete stop [on the curb], roll down your window and shut off the engine". Like this one. Possibly confiscating the keys might be an overreach by the policeman, but the demand to turn it off clearly is not.
You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe.
Assuming, pending information about the jurisdiction, that this happened in the US, the answer is it depends. As described in Justia's Vehicular Searches article and Wikipedia's Motor vehicle exception article, Under US law police can search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. This doctrine was first stated by the US Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and later modified or repeated in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court broadened the rule to evidentiary searches. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) the Court ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrant-less search at the convenience of the police. Subsequent cases have widened the scope of the exception, although the probable cause requirement has remained, and stops must have at least "articulable and reasonable suspicion". In the case of an ordinary traffic stop, the police may conduct a Terry-type search, based on "articulable suspicion". However, if the police arrest the driver, that is grounds to search the car under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) Under Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.(and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 note 9 (1982).) police may remove the car for a search elsewhere if they have probable cause to believe that there is contraband (such as alcohol, drugs, or weapons) in the car. Thus the arrest justified a search, as described in the question. It might not have justified the tow if there was not probable cause to suspect contraband. But that depends on the detailed facts, and judging those is beyond the scope of this site. In Collins vs Virginia (2018) the Court ruled that a warrant-less search of a car parked on the owner's property and within the curtilage was not justified. (The "curtilage" is the area near the house which gets additional Fourth Amendment protection, almost as if it were inside the house). However, in that case no arrest was made at the time of the search, and the search was based on an officer recalling the car having been used to elude arrest some two months previously, not just a few minutes before, so that case may not apply in the situation described above. If there was no probable cause, any evidence found might be subject to suppression, and a suit for damages under sec 1983 might be brought against the officers and the police force, but that would depend on the specific facts, and would in practice require a lawyer skilled in such matters.
Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No
Silence is not cause. However, this may not prevent a search. The officer does not need to tell you that he has probable cause, he must simply have it in order to conduct a search. If he obtained the probable cause before he pulled you over (this is likely), then he will order you out of the car and search over your vociferous (and silent?) objections. If the officer does not have probable cause, searches anyway, and can't come up with a convincing one in time for the court date, then yes you have a claim. But remember, just because the officer didn't inform you of the cause doesn't mean it didn't exist. Always consult an attorney before any legal action.
No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.
Does uploading music to a site imply responsibility for copyright infringement? In a game called ROBLOX, users can monetize their games through a program called DevEx. Many users who use this program what seems to be obvious copyright infringement issues in their game to a certain degree at least. I understand that this isn't ROBLOX's liability based on their Terms of Service, but I'm unsure of how to determine user liability. Users may upload music for a virtual currency fee to the site and often upload a plethora of popular songs, and game developers can use those uploads for free in their own game. If the owner of a copyright files a complaint, does it fall under the responsibility of the user that uploaded it originally or the game creator?
Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them.
Jurisdiction is generally a matter for courts to decide. For example, in Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294 (2012), the plaintiff, having had their work published in Sweden, had filed a claim there, and lost. They then took the claim to the United States. Copyright infringement is generally actionable per se - no damage needs to actually be proven or sustained. Typically, the rule is that the proper law will apply. This is the state that seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case. Now, where there is more than one jurisdiction in which a claim may be brought - as in your example - a plaintiff may research the relevant statutes to determine which jurisdiction is most likely to afford them the most favourable outcome. It's called forum shopping. It is likely that the proper law will be that of A or C. This depends on a number of factors: Whether the infringing party profited from the infringement. If the infringing party profited from the act, then you are likely to want to bring the matter in A, so that you can recover damages. Whether the infringing party has any presence in B. If the party has a presence in B, then a claim in B is likely to be more cost-effective. Again, depending on the laws of the country, it may not be possible for the artist to bring a claim against the infringing party if they have no local presence. Some countries have laws that explicitly allow extraterritorial service. Whether the hosting service was aware of the copyright infringement. If the hosting service was aware of the infringement and failed to prevent it, then you may be able to claim for contributory infringement - they could then, depending on their contract/agreement with the infringing party, be able to claim for damages. The Napster case may be somewhat relevant to this, but it's hard to say anything concrete when working with hypothetical countries. At the very least, a claim against the hosting service - which may just be an injunction ordering the removal of the content - could be fruitful. The actual laws of the countries involved. If the artist has sufficient money, they can just choose the forum that is most favourable to them. In short, private international law is a tricky subject and there are so many factors that need to be accounted for.
Under US law, the use of the converter is irrelevant. The legal situation would be the same if they were posted in MP3 format, or downloaded and played in whatever format they are posted in. The point is making and distributing copies without permission. The first question is: Is the music protected by copyright at all? If the work is old enough, there is no copyright on the composition. For example, most works of classical music will be long out of copyright. However, the recording itself can be copyrighted, even if the composition is not. In general, if recording was published before 1972, it will not be protected by US copyright. There are some other edge cases where the the recording will not be protected. See This chart for details. Assuming the recording is protected, the second question is: is the posting legal? That is, was the music posted by or with the permission of the copyright holder? If not, any download or further use would be copyright infringement, although holders are unlikely to sue individuals who download for personal use only. If the posting of a protected work was legal, the key question is, did the user have permission or some other legal basis. It is generally considered that when music (or other content) is posted to the net, there is an implied permission to download it for personal use. Alternatively and to the same effect, this might be considered in US law to be a case of fair use. But this will stop at personal use. Any making of additional copies, redistribution of such copies, or public performance of the music will require permission from the copyright holder. In the absence of such permission, it will be infringement, and the holder could sue. Permission may be granted directly, by contract, or by a permissive license. But permission in some form is required for such use to be lawful. I should add that the creation and distribution of a new (cover) version of a copyrighted song or other music may be permitted under US law by a compulsory license, known as a "mechanical license". This is provided for under 17 USC 115. There is a specific procedure to follow, which involves notifying the copyright holder and paying royalties at a specified rate. Failure to follow this procedure, unless permission is obtained in some other way, means that making and distributing recordings (phonorecords) is copyright infringement.
Copyrights, in general, relate to the right of copying or reproduction. Another’s copyright may be substantially violated and causing harm even if one doesn’t monetize on it: A free access to the work of art may mean that anyone who would otherwise pay for a copy or any sort of license will not pay. This is the reason why in most countries torrenting is illegal. The last question is rather difficult to answer in a meaningful way: If one doesn’t get caught ever then one doesn’t get caught; if one does, then he does. I haven’t found the channel through which such unauthorized copies would enter “the public domain” and therefore it is hard to even make a guess on the probabilities of such infringement to be discovered and one getting sought damages on. There are exemptions under “fair use” rights mostly in common law jurisdictions, and there are examples of non-enforcement or decriminalization in certain other jurisdictions under certain conditions. (See also: Is it illegal to infringe copyright if your boss or your client ordered you to do it?)
Unless they have permission or pay the required royalty: yes. If they are playing it for personal entertainment or at a private function then they can make a fair use/dealing defence.
The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.
The lyricist and composers already have copyright. Copyright exists for the moment of creation: registration is not necessary to enforce copyright rights and to grant licences. Registration in the US is merely useful if you want to prove that you own the copyright which otherwise would require providing evidence of the date of creation, priority etc. Most countries do not have copyright registers. Similarly, you will have copyright in the derivative work of the soundtrack from the moment of its creation.
There are three questions relevant to this issue: Who owned the copyright in the first place? Was the copyright transferred? If not, was a license given to the site to use the content? In general, under most countries' laws, the person who creates an original work owns the copyright. The person with the copyright has the right to copy and distribute the work, and the right to prevent others from doing so. In some cases, such as where a work is created as a "work for hire" by certain employees under certain circumstances, the initial copyright is held by a third party. You will need a lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction and your circumstances to determine if this is the case. Finally, even if you own the copyright, you can license others to use your content. This may be in an express written document, or it may be an implied license--implied, for instance, by the act of posting it on their blog. The existence and scope of such a license is, again, something that will have to be determined based on your country's specific laws and your specific situation. The bottom line is: if you submitted articles to that blog, you can't complain that they posted them. Depending on the license in effect, you might be able to get them taken down, or you might not. You need a lawyer, not the internet, to tell you what your rights are in this very specific case.
one person contract Can a person write a contract with themselves? Say that a person works in a second-hand car store. Let's assume that the same person intends to sell their car. Can that person sign a one person contract, representing seller of a car and also representing an employee of a specific second-hand car store? Thank you.
Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract.
First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.
Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).
You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.
You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts.
Possibly In most contracts, the parties sign in their capacity as people (or agents for other people). However, some contracts are signed in the capacity as the owner of a piece of land and the contract transfers with the land. The liability rests with the current owner and, if unpaid, creates a lien over the property. These are particularly common in contracts with utilities or where the contract involves the a structure on the land. Surprise, surprise, the situation you describe involves both. You need to refer back to your contract for the land as these types of contracts are usually disclosed (unless they are a function of local law because everyone just knows - I don't know anything about Pa. law on this) and the original contract with the gas company. Your settlement may have also involved you paying a figure to purchase the gas in the tank as at the date of settlement. For example, in new-south-wales, council rates and water rates attach to the land as a matter of law and the vendor pays the purchaser for any amount they have paid in advance (or vice-versa if they are in arrears). Electricity and piped gas don't; the vendor ends their account on or before settlement and the buyer opens a new account on or after settlement and each pays for their own use. Propane for portable bottles doesn't but for fixed installations does as a matter of contract with the gas company.
In general, you cannot neither change contracts nor restrict/nullify other people's rights by your acts alone. The people who hired you personally have a contract with you, not with your LLC. So, if someone has a claim against you, then their claim should not be contingent of your LLC going bankrupt or not; they have a right to have their damages restored by you (who was the entity they hired). Otherwise, fraud/liability delinquency would be trivial: get debts on your name and, when the things get difficult, create a shell LLC and let it go bankrupt.
Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.
How are civil judgments most typically settled? A is suing B, and the court has awarded A £5000. Who decides how this balance should be paid, and what is the most common method of payment? Is it usually done through a bank transfer or a cheque? Can A insist on a cash settlement?
I can't say how they are typically settled, and there are no hard-and-rules that I can find. However, Gov.uk offers this: You’ll have to pay the person or business you owe the money to, or their solicitor. The name and address will be on the judgment form. Do not pay the court. Make sure you can prove you’ve paid. Send a cheque or postal order by post, or make a bank transfer. Do not send cash through the post. Keep a record of your payments and make sure you pay in time. If you’re paying in instalments, ask the person or business you owe the money to about the best way to pay. You may want to set up a standing order to pay the money directly from your bank account. As for A insisting on a cash payment, it's B's debt and as long as it's not unreasonable and in accordance with the Order B should decide on how it is settled if they can't come to an amicable arrangement.
The main free resource is Bailii. I've sometimes also found cases on Casemine, which is free. The most popular paid resources are Lexis and Westlaw. In general, the paid databases are more complete and provide additional useful features such as cross-referencing statutes and cited/citing cases, information on whether the case is still good law or not, and others. For this luxury you will pay a heavy price: typically a few thousand a year depending on what type of subscription you take out. If you are lucky you can get free access via a university course. With that said, Bailii can sometimes have judgments not found on the others; particularly unreported judgments. Ideally as a professional you would have access to all three if you can afford to do so. If you want a specific case and can't find it on any database you may be able to ask the court to provide a transcript, usually for a fee.
The reference to £8,000 suggests to me the question relates to civil, rather than criminal, legal aid in england-and-wales so, subject to a few exceptions, ... ...an applicant will be eligible for civil legal aid where their monthly disposable income does not exceed £733 and their disposable capital does not exceed £8,000. Source Notwithstanding the exceptions and considerations to take in to account when calculating disposable capital, the starting point is ... ... the value of every resource of a capital nature belonging to the party on the date on which the application for remission is made, unless it is treated as income by this Order, or it is disregarded as excluded disposable capital. Source
You are looking for the Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, which had its sixteenth edition published in April 2022. This book sets out the range of compensation based on the type of injury suffered. The scale is very detailed. For example, we can find in Chapter 7, (G) Injuries to the elbow (a) A severely disabling injury - £39170 to £54830 (b) Less severe injuries causing impairment of function but not involving major surgery or significant disability - £15650 to £32010 (c) Moderate or minor injury (i) Injuries fully resolving after about one year - In the region of £3530 (ii) Injuries with the majority of symptoms resolving within 18 to 24 months but with nuisance level symptoms persisting after that - In the region of £6500 (iii) Injuries recovering after three years with nuisance symptoms thereafter and/or requiring surgery - Up to £12590 There are lots of other rules about the calculations, which are beyond what can be summarised in a text box. In the case of assault, one might find reference to Chapter 4, which is on psychiatric effects including PTSD, as well as to the physical injuries. Probably the most important note is that they are Guidelines, not Rules, and so the court can deviate from them at its pleasure. But this is what the judge will have at their fingertips during the proceedings. Because these concern damages, receipt of an award will depend on whether the respondent actually has the money. For that reason, there is a statutory scheme, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, which can make additional payments to victims of violent crime. CICS awards are reduced based on civil damages already paid, because you can't be compensated twice for the same injury. They are also calculated after any insurance payout, so it's in the nature of a final resort. The CICS tariffs are not the same as the JCG ones. Taking the elbow example, CICS 2012 rates damage to one elbow with substantial recovery at £1500 (level A2), and with continuing significant disability at £6200 (level A7). Other eligibility rules and procedures are different as well. In practice, the majority of CICS awards are for between £1000 and £2400 (bands A1 to A4); there is a proposed simplification of the bands into fewer levels, but this has not yet been implemented.
The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.
Civil cases are frequently decided by arbitration (a non-court process), so there's nothing particularly problematic here. Both parties have to agree to participate in the process, and one may (but need not) assume that there is a clause that the losing party has to live with the outcome. Odds are good that the parties are paid to participate, so there would be incentive to accept the verdict. One difference between this show (apparently) and a normal binding arbitration clause is that with the latter, this is part of the original contract which would state that all disputes must be resolved by such-and-such arbitration firm. Such verdicts are generally enforceable, unless there is some extreme impropriety (e.g. the defendant bribes the arbitration firm to flagrantly overlook the law). In the present case, torts as well as contracts can be the subject of a show, and the arbitration agreement would be separate from and after any underlying contract. A lot depends on the agreement that the show has participants sign. The Facebook-jury would, of course, not pass any form of scrutiny in a real court. So it is possible that afterwards, an unhappy party can press the case in real court, without prejudice.
If the accident was your fault, the person harmed by the accident has a right to sue you for the amount of damages incurred, and will prevail if they can prove your fault and their damages in court. You don't have to settle the case at all. You could simply wait for them to sue you, although doing so would result in a claim against your car insurance policy that could increase your insurance rates if they did, in fact, sue you. Whether or not you find their representation concerning the amount of damage they suffered sufficient is up to you. They will only get paid if you decide to write them a check in the amount that they are asking to have paid. Usually, you should also insist that a complete release of liability be signed by the party harmed in connection with any settlement payment.
It has to be 'liquidated damages', since a penalty clause is unenforceable. It has to have a reasonable relation to the party's legitimate interest. The point is that it has to represent a good faith estimate of the actual damage.
Before Terry, did the Fourth Amendment require a warrant for all searches and seizures or only the "unreasonable" ones? I'm trying to understand the direct meaning of the Fourth Amendment as best as possible. The Amendment states the following (emphasis added): The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Is the statement that warrants require probable cause limited to the context of "unreasonable" searches and seizures, or was the idea that all searches and seizures, reasonable or otherwise, require a warrant? And in case Supreme Court precedent made the answer time-specific, I'm asking specifically how the Amendment would have been understood before Terry v. Ohio, as I want to know, as best as possible, which interpretation was originally held. Before Terry, did only "unreasonable" searches or seizures require a warrant?
was the idea that all searches and seizures, reasonable or otherwise, require a warrant? No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This means that unreasonable searches are prohibited. A prohibited search can't require a warrant because the search is prohibited. If a warrant was issued for an unreasonable search then the warrant was issued in error.
In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.
There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is.
I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police).
In most cases, the failure to use Robert's Rules of Order will not be a violation of due process. To be a violation, (1) due process must be required; and (2) the procedure must either (a) fail to satisfy the elements of due process (notice and a hearing); or (b) be inadequate. Was due process required? As a threshold matter, the Fifth Amendment provides due-process protection only when you are going to be "deprived of life, liberty, or property." The vast majority of government action comes and goes without anyone being deprived of any legally cognizable life, liberty or property interest. This would probably include votes to approve a budget, name a street, designate a holiday, and so on. In those cases, no one is entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment. Was due process provided? But the government often does implicate those interests, in matters across the spectrum of seriousness, from imposing the death penalty to imposing jail time to seizing property to handing out parking tickets. Determining whether the Fifth Amendment is satisfied involves two tests. First, you'll look to see whether the basic elements of due process are satisfied. That means looking for (1) notice of the decision to be made; and (2) an opportunity for the affected person to make their case; (3) before a neutral decision-maker. In the absence of those elements, there is no due process. Was the procedure adequate? But even when those elements are present, the process may still be "inadequate," as you're suggesting the committee procedures are here. When the government provides procedural protections, they must be "tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). You've suggested that Robert's Rules would be the appropriate way to provide due process. Under Eldridge, a court would determine whether that additional safeguard (or any other) was required by balancing three considerations: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action." Is the government trying to take your home and sell it to developers or is it holding your car until you pay off your parking tickets? It's not clear what kind of committee you're imagining, but the greater deprivation it can work, the greater greater protections it must provide. "Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Is there any objective evidence that the current system is getting the wrong results? Is there any reason to think that the proposed change would result in more accurate decisions? If there's some reason to think that Robert's Rules is going to result in better decisions, it's more likely to be required. If it's not, don't expect a court to require it. I'd argue that this is the most important part of the test. "Finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." How important is the objective the government is trying to achieve? Ensuring public health and safety are toward the top of the list, so the government will get a little more leeway in determining how to handle them. Fining people for letting their grass get too tall is less important, so the government isn't going to be given as much license to screw around. Then, given the importance of those functions, this basically becomes a test for practicality. Would the proposed change impose serious administrative burdens? Would it be cost-prohibitve? You can impose Robert's Rules probably for nothing more than the cost of a copy of the book, but properly applied, it's an incredibly complex process that imposes serious administrative burdens. Without knowing what kind of committee action you're talking about, it's hard to say how these rules would apply, but I'm comfortable guessing that Robert's Rules would not be required. But assuming that the committee has the power to work some kind of deprivation of life, liberty or property, it probably would be a due-process problem if they had no rules of order whatsoever. This was sort of the same problem that arose in CNN v. Trump just last month.
canada It depends on the right. See Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147-0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32: To claim protection under the Charter, a corporation ⸺ indeed, any claimant ⸺ must establish that "it has an interest falling within the scope of the guarantee, and one which accords with the purpose of that provision." Regarding section 12 (right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment): the text “cruel and unusual” denotes protection that “only human beings can enjoy” Regarding section 7 (right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or security of the person other than in accordance with principles of fundamental justice): A plain, common sense reading of the phrase “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person” serves to underline the human element involved; only human beings can enjoy these rights. But, regarding section 8 (right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure): the Court accepted, without discussion or explanation, that the s. 8 right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure could apply to corporations. And section 11(b): the Court extended the s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time to corporations on the basis that any accused, corporate or human, has, as Stevenson J. said, “a legitimate interest in being tried within a reasonable time”
The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.).
In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105.
For a criminal attempt, when is an act more than merely preparatory? In several jurisdictions, the actus reus of a criminal attempt is taking an act beyond mere preparation towards the completion of a criminal offence. What is the test for determining when an act is beyond mere preparation?
canada Maybe it is unsatisfying, but there is no bright line test. The statutory language The Criminal Code says: The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law. Some judicial expressions "[A] precise and satisfactory definition of the actus reus is perhaps impossible." And "[n]o abstract test can be given for determining whether an act is insufficiently proximate to be an attempt." See R. v. Cline (1956), 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.): The consummation of a crime usually comprises a series of acts which have their genesis in an idea to do a criminal act; the idea develops to a decision to do that act; a plan may be made for putting that decision into effect; the next step may be preparation only for carrying out the intention and plan; but when that preparation is in fact fully completed, the next step in the series of acts doen by the accused for the purpose and with the intention of committing the crime as planned cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as remote in its connection with that crime. The connection is in fact proximate. Here is a summary from R. v. Root, 2008 ONCA 869, citations removed: [96] The authorities have yet to develop a satisfactory general criterion to assist trial judges in making the crucial distinction between mere preparation, on the one hand, and an attempt on the other. We leave the determination of where on the continuum the conduct lies to the common sense judgment of trial judges. [97] The distinction between preparation and attempt is a qualitative one involving the relationship between the nature and quality of the act said to constitute the attempt and the nature of the substantive offence attempted in its complete form. [98] To determine on which side of the preparation/attempt divide an accused’s conduct falls, a trial judge should consider the relative proximity of that conduct to the conduct required to amount to the completed substantive offence. Relevant factors would include time, location and acts under the control of the accused yet to be accomplished. [99] Relative proximity may give an act, which might otherwise seem to be mere preparation, the quality of an attempt. Further, an act on its face an act of commission does not lose its quality as the actus reus of an attempt simply because further acts are required, or because a significant period of time may elapse before the completion of the substantive offence. [100] To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, the act of an accused need not be the last act before the completion of the substantive offence. To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, an act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to amount to more than mere preparation to commit it. This requirement of proximity, expressed in the divide between preparation and attempt, has to do with the sequence of events leading to the crime that an accused has in mind to commit. To be guilty of an attempt, an accused must have progressed a sufficient distance (beyond mere preparation) down the intended path. An act is proximate if it is the first of a series of similar or related acts intended to result cumulatively in a substantive crime.
The concept of "innocent until proven guilty" is inherent in our constitutional protections for due process. As far as I know, the Supreme Court first formally recognized it as a rule in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-59 (1895): Now the presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty. In other words, this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created. The key phrase -- for purposes of your question -- is "sufficient evidence." At a criminal trial, sufficient evidence consists of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on “all the essential elements of guilt” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). But if the government wants to lock up a defendant pending trial, the question is not whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, but rather whether he poses a danger to the community and can be trusted to appear for trial. 18 U.S. Code § 3142(e)(1). And on those questions, he retains the presumption of innocence, but the government's burden of proof when arguing otherwise is substantially lower. The courts recognize both the potential of fleeing from the court and the prevention of additional crimes as legitimate bases for pretrial detention. In cases like Avenatti's, where the government is seeking pretrial detention because the defendant is a danger to the community, it needs to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S. Code § 3142(f)(2). However, if the government is seeking to hold the defendant because it does not believe he will appear for trial, it need only prove its case on that question by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (“For detention to be proper, the government had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure Martir's attendance at trial.”). As a side note, I'd agree with some of the answers that in practice, the bond system is regularly abused to the point that its underlying principles become unrecognizable. My answer is meant only to address the actual legal rules your question implicates.
Forbearance from action can be consideration, but it must be forbearance from something that is one's legal right. It is sufficient that a person has restricted their lawful freedom of action. See Hamer v. Sidway, (1891) 124 NY 538. A promise to not do something that one has no right to do in the first place is not consideration. Throughout your entire spectrum of examples: there is no contract to breach; the intitial attempted theft was an offence; absent consent, it will never be lawful for John to take the car; any money accepted by John is likely an unjust enrichment.
Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics
No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.
Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.
The Brandenburg Test This is not a "general test" - it's the test that applies. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: The speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” AND The speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The first goes to mens rea; that the person intended by their speech to incite lawless action. This is a matter of fact based on conduct before, during and after the speech act. That is, intention can be established by what the speaker said and did before they spoke, while they were speaking and after their speech concluded. The second is based on the speech act itself. Here we have no precedent as to whether the incitement must be explicit (Lady McBeth or Iago) or implicit (Marc Antony): Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction. The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment protects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is supported by its self-conscious use of the term "inciting," suggesting that words of incitement are a necessary condition. No doubt, the Court was aware of Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional term, advocacy directed to "producing" the imminent criminal conduct. Arguably, unless the "producing" language was merely surplusage, the Court recognized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized.
Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages.
Is deadly self defense in Germany legal? Since I am an American in Germany I have had this discussion with a few Germans but haven't got a concrete answer. If i am at home in Germany and someone breaks into my house and I see that they have a gun am i allowed to use a gun that I have legally or a knife as self defense?
Deadly self-defense is legal in Germany. The self-defense law (in particular Sect. 32 of the Criminal Code) makes no restrictions as far as the type of aggression and the type of defense is concerned. That means that - in principle - you can defend yourself against an attack by any means that is necessary to stop it. The principle behind that is "das Recht muss dem Unrecht nicht weichen", which translates to "the law does not have to yield to the unlawful". That particularily means that: You do not have to run. You do not have to yield. You do not have to wait for help from public authorities (notably the police). You can defend yourself (against any attack on you, be it life, limb or property), no matter if that would mean commiting a crime (even if that crime is killing a person). This is called "Trutzwehr" or "schneidiges Notwehrrecht", which can be translated to "active defense" or "aggressive defense" as opposed to passive defense. However... This regulation is not without pitfalls and limitations. There are quite a few, which means that in practice deadly force could be considered unlawful in self-defense. Books have been written about this subject alone, so it can not be exhaustively handled here. Some examples for corner cases are: Attackers that clearly can not understand the severity of their actions have to be spared from extreme effects of your self-defense. The classical book case is that you can't shoot little children stealing apples from your tree. If there is a massive discrepancy between what you want protect and the damage the attacker has to endure (called "qualitativer Notwehrexzess" - translating to "qualitatively eccessive self-defense"). If someone insults you, shooting him might go to far, since while your honour is attacked (which is protected by Sect. 185 Criminal Code), the attacker's life (protected by Sect. 212 Criminal Code) by far outweighs it. Note that, to ensure the effectiveness of the self-defense laws, the discrepancy must be extreme. And it does not mean you can't defend yourself. You just have to choose a less severe measure. So you might get away with knocking the insulter out. After the attack is over you hit the attacker once too often, which causes his death (called "quantitativer Notwehrexzess" - "quantitatively eccessive self-defense"). The attack was over at the time of the deadly blow, so your right for self-defense had ended. You might get away without punishment, if it was impossible for you to realize that the attack was over. If you only think an attack is happening, but it is not (for example someone attacking you with a rubber knife on Halloween). In this case there is no attack and so technically there is no right for self defense (called "Putativnotwehr"). Similar to the cases of excessive self-defense, it depends on your individual case (notable if you had a chance to realize the attack was false) if you are punished or not. To sum it up: You have the right to defend yourself by any means necessary, but you are held responsible if you go to far (not just a little, but really really to far).
The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.
Almost certainly, there is no such right. It's illegal under 18 USC 831 to possess "nuclear material" without specific authorization. 18 USC 832 forbids the possession of a "radiological weapon". If there is intent to use the device to cause death, serious bodily injury, or damage to property or the environment, that's also a violation of 18 USC 2332i. I don't think these laws have been explicitly tested against the Second Amendment, but related cases suggest they would hold up (if the challenge wasn't simply dismissed as frivolous). The Second Amendment doesn't grant a blanket right to own weapons. Federal law, 18 USC 922 (o) makes it unlawful to own a "machinegun" (as defined in the statute), and in the case of Hollis v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit held that this law was constitutional, because, as they said, the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are in "common use [...] for lawful purposes like self-defense." This case doesn't seem to have been appealed further, but the reasoning cited by the Fifth Circuit comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in D.C. v. Heller. If machineguns aren't in "common use", and therefore not protected, surely the same would apply to nuclear weapons.
The "Hitlergruß" In germany, statements and even gestures that are identified with the nazi ideology are a criminal offence under StGB §86a (Dissemination of Means of Propaganda of Unconstitutional Organizations) and StGB $130 (Volksverhetzung), leaving a gap only for art, science, research or teaching. This makes the "Hitlergruß" with or without the accompanied statements of "Heil", "Sieg Heil" or "Heil Hitler" an offense that can end you in prison unless you can point to one of the allowed exceptions: up to three years for the dissemination of means of propaganda and at least three months but at max 5 years for Volksverhetzung, especially §130 (3) & (4), the general sentence frame thus would be three months to three years, unless other factors allow for more - the typical sentence is 6 months or a quite hefty fine (some have been known to be 5000 €) austria bans the same gesture and sentences via Verbotsgesetz §3g as promoting the national socialist ideology through means that are not in §3a-f (which span more or less trying to keep the nazi party alive and violent crimes) and punishes it with (theoretically) up to 10 years and for extreme cases double that. In switzerland, the gesture is a hate crime if you promote the nazi ideology with it. slovakia as well es the czech-republic also deem this gesture, with or without the words, a criminal offence (up to 5 years in both parts of former czechoslovakia), sweden deems it a hate crime (see here) and italy deems it the same if associated with the Italian Fascist Party. Several other jurisdictions, including in the united-states, do recognize that performing this form of "speech" can be either a hate crime or an offence against public order of some sort. This makes the gesture of "extending the right arm to neck height and then straightening the hand so that it is parallel to the arm" (and possibly using the 4, 8 or 10 letters together with it) the shortest illegal statement - which atop that is possibly the single statement that is also illegal in the most jurisdictions worldwide and not a true threat.
This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals.
[…] that prior to 2016, Germany had some outdated […] laws. […] The changes of November 9, 2016, BGBl. I 2460 ff, were brought forward under the impression of the 2015 NYE spike in reported sexual assaults. Particularly incidents around the Cologne train station/cathedral area were widely received. […] outdated rape laws. No, there was no change in the subsection concerning rape. Only editorial changes were made, now following the “new orthography”, less pompous wording/update to today’s parlance, and change in numbering. This meant that no did not mean no, […] If I ask you to “touch me down here” and you say “No” and I take your hand regardless and, without (physical) resistance from your side, place it at the respective location, then it’s sexual assault now, because you said “No”. Previously, it would have required force, e. g. grabbing your hand, to constitute a criminal offense. […] the victim would have to demonstrate injuries from self defence. […] Legally – what the law says – it is not necessary. You will not find a single reference in the law “the victim must demonstrate injuries”. However, successful persecution will be difficult in a he-said-she-said situation. If the court cannot be convinced, it will decide in dubio pro reo (i. e. acquit the accused). This is a general issue of criminal prosecution, though, but people get particularly agitated if it is concerning sexual self-determination. It is notable that a change in law does not bring improvements in that regard. […] a victim being too drunk to consent was not enough […] Previously, there was “in a defenseless situation”. Courts (not the police) interpreted this mostly restrictive. Being drunk does not automatically mean being defenseless (and arguably some people even like drunken sex/having sex while on drugs). Now there is an additional alternative “taking advantage of a person’s physical or psychological condition causing a significant impairment in forming or expressing his will, unless he gives his express consent”. This is a shift toward a subjective assessment of criminality. A sexually very experienced person is well-versed in his capability of giving consent to sexual interactions, whereas a sexually-inexperienced person exhibits “significant impairment” at an earlier level. It is yet to see how courts deal with that. […] When did Germany officially implement this law, […] The changes took effect the next day, on November 10, 2016. Technically, there’s no “implementation period”. However, on November 10, 2016, no lawyer could have definitely answered, for instance, the question “What is a legal definition of ‘against apparent wish’?”
The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.
I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.
Attributing the Assistance of an Online Translator for a Book's Chapter---Is It Necessary? I have recently finished a work in which one of the chapters is based upon a translation of a nineteenth century document in which I have made use of a free online translator. Where the translator seemed to be at fault, I have done the translation myself; though in the end, the major portion of the whole translation used in that chapter relies on the output of the online translator. The book, in three volumes, contains sixty chapters, only one of which, includes output from the the aforementioned translator. QUESTION: Am I obligated to acknowledge the use of this free online tool; and if so, how should that be done? Can the writer of the software legally demand some sort of royalties when the book is published? I anticipate that it will be published in the United States. UPDATE A follow-up to this question is found here: Copyright Ownership of a Translated Article Appearing in a Book in Which an Online Translator was Used
Using software generally does not entail any legal requirement to acknowledge the use of that software, and would only arise as a licensing condition. Google services, including Translate, are subject to certain terms of use especial the part about what they expect of you. They do not impose any requirement regarding acknowledgment, therefore they cannot later demand any royalties. If a translation program imposes any demands on your usage of the program, that has to be part of the original agreement whereby you were allowed to use the software at all.
Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.
As @amon stated in a comment, copyright requires creativity. If the author of a tool wants to claim copyright on the output of that tool, then that output must contain something that required the creativity of the tool author. For a tool that just re-indents its input, the output is created from the input with a mechanical, non-creative, transformation and the output does not contain any creative content that wasn't already present in the input. For that reason, authors of such tools can't claim any copyright on the output. For a tool like bison, which was mentioned in the comments, the output contains a measurable amount of creative content that was not present in the input, but which was provided by the authors of bison. For that reason, the authors of 'bison' do have a copyright claim on the output of the tool (for which they give a broad permission to use). So, the basic question becomes, how much of the (creative) content of the output can be traced back to the tool itself and not to the input that the tool processed. For linters/formatters, that is likely to be very little. For code generators, it can be anywhere between very little and all of the output. The license restrictions on the code produced by the tool itself are by default the same as the license restrictions on the source of the tool, but the tool author can choose to apply any other license to the tool code that ends up in the output. If the output of the tool is, at least in part, dependent on an input file, then the authors of the input file also have a copyright claim on the tool output (as their creative work influenced the output), so the tool author can not claim exclusive ownership. The usual situation is that for tools that don't add creative content to the output, the author explicitly states that the don't have any copyright claims on the output. For tools that do add creative content, that content might be released under very permissive conditions (like, "you can use the output as a whole for any purpose, but you can only separate out the code that comes from the tool's codebase if you adhere to the <X> license")
Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."
Unless the work has entered the public domain (after the copyright expires, or if a copyright notice or renewal was omitted when these were required, or in other ways) there is always an owner of the copyright. If the copyright was retained by the author, who has died, than the author's heir(s) own it. (If there are no other heirs, it becomes the property of the state. This is known as escheating.) If the author has sold or assigned the copyright (say to a publisher) then the buyer or assignee owns it. If the owner is a business that has ceased to operate, but has not sold the copyright, then the shareholders or proprietor has the right to sell or license it (technically the business still owns it). If the business goes through legal bankruptcy, the copyright would be sold, possibly as a part of "and all its other assets and good will", or else would escheat to the state. It can be hard to find the copyright to a work long unpublished. The original author may have died, and the author's heirs may be hard to track. The copyright may have been sold, and the sale may not have been properly recorded. In the US, the Copyright Office maintains records that try to identify the copyright owner of all registered copyrights. The office will search these, for a fee, but there is not always a correct or useful answer. Under current US law, if one cannot find the correct owner of a copyright, and secure permission to use it, one is simply out of luck (except for musing, where a compulsory license is available for some uses at a government-specified fee). Any use is then infringement (unless it is a fair use) and the owner could always turn up and sue. The term "orphan works" has been applied to works whose copyright owner is unknown and hard to find. The same term is also applied to works whose copyright holder is known, but which are long out of print and unlikely to be reprinted, particularly when there is no paying market for them. In the US, there have been several proposals for dealing with "orphan works" by granting a compulsory licensee for them, or by declaring them to be in the public domain, or by taxing them and declaring them to be PD if he tax goes unpaid. None of these have been passed into law in the US, nor have similar proposals been made law in any other country that I know of. (declaring Orphan works PD might cause a problem under the Berne Convention.) To be honest, as there is little economic value in orphan works, no one will spend much money or energy in lobbying for such a law, and the industries that make their money via copyright (music and film in particular) are often suspicious of and automatically oppose anything that weakens copyright in any way, or seems to. In any case, no such law has yet passed. (Edit I now learn that Canada and the EU have laws giving access to orphan works under some circumstances, and other countries may have such laws.) It is true that the owner of the copyright on an orphan work may well be unlikely to sue for infringement of that copyright. The owner may not even know that s/he owns the copyright. But a user could never by fully safe, because the owner (or a new owner after a transfer) could always choose to sue for any continuing infringement, and any past one if the statute of limitations has not run out. This answer is largely based on knowledge of US law, but I believe that this situation is basically the same in most countries.
On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
The creator of the derivative work has copyright in the derivative work. The copyright would protect only the new elements of the derivative work. Wikipedia is a good place to start. In the case of a book with updated grammar, depending on the extent of the changes, it would probably be easier to copy the original directly than to eliminate the updates from a copy of the derivative work.
That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995.
Using licensed merchandise and copyright law I was in a thrift store the other day and came across a cast-iron cookie skillet. It was in the shape of Darth Vader's helmet and had a relief of the face. I had to buy it and make Darth Vader chocolate chip cookies. The Dark Side never tasted so good! Looking at the cookie skillet - there was none of the original packaging - I see no marking on it other than what I assume is the manufacturer. I have no idea if it was a legally licensed product from LucasFilm... But let us assume it was. Not that I will, but could I use this cookie mold to make and sell Darth Vader cookies? Or would that violate copyright? Also, what about bakeries themselves? You can go in buy a children's birthday cake and ask for a theme like Star Wars, Harry Potter, whatever and they will sell it to you... Is that legal? Or is it illegal and copyright holders just dont bother enforcing it?
It depends on what rights the copyright owners choose to grant. In the case of the skillet, assuming that it was properly licensed, it seems safe to assume that LucasFilms or their agent intended that it be used to create cookies using an image of Darth Vader, so that use was approved by them. Whether commercial use of the image, by selling cookies, was included in such a license, cannot be determined from the info in th4 question. Quite possibly not. Even if such a license was granted, it would be hard for one who bought the skillet second hand to prove that, in the face of a challenge from LucasFilms . So if they brought suit over such a use, they might well win. As to the bakeries where cakes and other good with images of cartoon and movie characters are sold, they should have bought rights that allow them to make and sell such products. They may have. Or they may be infringing, but the copyright or trademark owners choose not to sue. It depends entirely on what agreements the various bakeries may have entered into, and those are not normally public.
Each episode of the show as a whole, and all the individual images in it, are protected by copyright, but the idea of a holophonor, or indeed any idea, is not. The more closely anyone else's drawing of a gadget resembles one from the show, the more likely it would be to be found to infringe copyright. The same is true of a character image. The more distinctive and original the image, and the more closely someone copies it, the more likely a finding of infringement would be.
The images as displayed are quite similar, similar enough that one could violate the copyright of the other. But that is not enough to know if there was in fact a copyright infringement. There are several possibilities: Although using different names, the developers could in fact be the same company. One developer might have obtained permission to use the image from the other. Both images might be based on the same 3rd-party image which both are using with permission. Both images might be based on a public domain image. Copyright is only infringed if a protected work, or a derivative version of the work, is used without permission from the copyright holder. Without knowing who the rights-holder is, and if permission has been obtained, one cannot know if an infringement has occurred. There is no independent or 3rd-party entity that checks for copyright infringements. By the way, the similarity here is close enough that there might also be an issue of trademark infringement. But again, infringement requires use of a protected mark without permission, and so some of the same possibilities arise. (The source of a trademarked logo doe not matter. On the other hand there cannot be trademark infringement unless the mark has been registered, or actually used in commerce. If the same image is used on products in very different industries, say games and hammers, there may or may not be infringement.)
Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.
There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.
This falls within the penumbra of Feist v. Rural Telephone. The principle articulated there is that facts are not subject to copyright protection, but the expression of facts can be. Quoting from the ruling, "no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates...however, it is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright". The distinction between protected vs. not protected hinges on originality: "The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author". But it is not sufficient that the work is created by the "sweat of the brow" of an author: it must possess at least some minimal degree of creativity. Thus "[t]he writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like". As a concrete example, the ruling states "Census-takers, for example, do not 'create' the population figures that emerge from their efforts; in a sense, they copy these figures from the world around them...Census data therefore do not trigger copyright because these data are not 'original' in the constitutional sense." But, compilations of facts can be protected: Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite originality. The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws An email list requires nothing more than brow-sweat, and even then, not much. A cleverly annotated and arranged email list would involve substantial creativity and would be subject to protection. That does not mean that you didn't sign some agreement that prohibits you from copying or using the list, but it isn't a matter of copyright.
No. These companies seem to be saying that they are entitled to sell music under some sort of mandatory licensing agreement authorized by the law of the Ukraine, or by a licensing agreement specific to the Ukraine. Even if this were true, it would only give them the right to distribute the files in the Ukraine. If an American, sitting in the U.S., makes a digital copy of a file on a Ukrainian server by copying it to his or her U.S. hard drive, they have to have a license to do so issued either by the U.S. copyright holder or authorized by U.S. law. A license to distribute in the Ukraine doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. A Ukrainian statute doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. If the end user doesn't have that license, he or she is violating the copyright holder's rights and may be civilly or criminally liable. There is no scienter requirement for copyright infringement. In fact, it's not at all clear that any Ukrainian site is operating even under this dubious legal cover. This report on Ukrainian licensing agencies by an industry group claims that many Ukrainian licensing authorities are actually scams that have no rights to distribute music under any license--one of the "rogue licensing agencies" discussed is Avtor, referenced in your first example. There is some legal confusion over what group does have permission to license music and collect royalties in the Ukraine, but it's clear that Avtor doesn't, and it certainly doesn't have permission to distribute them in the U.S. If a guy came up to you on the street and told you he had written permission from Disney to videotape their latest movies with a camcorder and sell them to you for a dollar, are you violating the law if you buy it? The answer is yes, and it's the same for these Ukrainian sites.
You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)
Copyright Ownership of a Translated Article Appearing in a Book in Which an Online Translator was Used As a follow-up to Attributing the Assistance of an Online Translator for a Book's Chapter---Is It Necessary?, and at the suggestion of @DaleM: QUESTION: Would an author of a book who incorporates an English translation of an article which was first published in the 19th century (and presumably, in the public domain worldwide) by relying heavily on an online translator (such as DeepL Translate free version or Google Translate)---own also---a copyright, specifically, on the translated article which appears in that book?
Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.
Section 108(a) is the most useful for an infringer who posts an entire copy of a protected work in public. Subsections(b,c) require that the copy not be made available outside the premises, which precludes internet posting; (d) requires a user request to make a copy; (e) applies only to items that are off the market and transferred to a specific user; (h) allows more copying in the last 20 years of the period when a work is protected (not applicable here). Subsection (a) allows a library or archive to make one copy of a work, as long as there is no commercial advantage to making the copy, the library is relatively public (it might restrict access to bona fide researchers), and a copyright notice is included: this has the fewest restrictions on copying. The internet downloader is not a library or an archive, so the downloader is not granted any permission under 108 to make a copy. Under 108(a) a library can make no more than one copy available, but every uploading or downloading is "making a copy". A library would be contributorily liable for the illegal downloadings of their "customers". It is difficult to know exactly what one can get away with under 17 USC 107 a.k.a. "fair use". I am fairly sure that posting a copy of a contemporary book in the open is not "fair use" even if the intent is to make it possible for dummies to study chemistry: such copying is not at all transformative, totally unlimited, and provides a significant market substitute for the protected work.
The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.
The English translation is a copyrighted work While the original Greek is public domain, the English translation is a new literary work with its own copyright running for 70 years after the author(s) death(s). The French translation of the English work would require the permission of the author(s). A French translation of the original Greek wouldn't. This assumes that the translation was not simply mechanical; like running it through Google translate. A purely mechanical translation lacks the originality required to create a literary work - an English translation obtained algorithmically is a copy; just like a zip file is a copy.
It should not surprise you that copyright protects the right to (among other things) make copies. There are limited exceptions that are considered "fair use", like if you reproduce a limited amount of text for educational, reporting, or review purposes. Giving your friend a copy of a large portion of the text just because they want it would almost certainly violate copyright. Whether the book is available or out-of-print has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on who holds the copyright or whether your actions violate it. This is very different from giving your friend the book itself. The book itself is covered under the "first sale doctrine", meaning that by buying a copy of the book, you buy the right to sell, transfer, or dispose of that particular copy, but it doesn't give you the right to make more copies. I will note that in practice, it is vanishingly unlikely that the copyright holder would ever learn of your isolated instance of limited infringement in the first place (especially since it's out of print), much less bring legal action against you for making a single copy that did not affect their bottom line.
"The Holy See owns all copyrights in the works published under its name or created on its commission (art. 5)." Since this painting was commissioned by the Vatican for the Sistine Chapel, they own the copyright to it. The first sentence just says the Vatican owns all copyrights that exist, it doesn't speak to whether any copyrights exist in the first place. Earlier in that article, it says "The law provides for copyright 70 years after the death of the author, or 70 years after publication for works with no named author." I don't know off-hand when Michelangelo died, but I'm pretty sure that it was more than 70 years ago. So if there is a copyright, it has long since expired, and who owns it is a moot point. The painting is well in the public domain. If there were a valid copyright, a sculpture would be a derivative work and would require a license.
At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.
You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code.
When an author sells the underlying copyright to a third party, where does the publisher now send the royalties? A book publishing contract typically starts with an author who owns a copyright and licenses it to a publisher for the term of the copyright. The publisher (or the literary agent) sends royalty checks to the author. (I'm using royalties as a stand-in here for all the various obligations the publisher typically owes under a contract.) Here's the wrinkle: Suppose the author, while alive, transfers the underlying copyright to a third party. Where does the publisher send the royalty check? To the author, or to the new copyright owner? Another way of asking the question: Does the publisher's contractual obligation flow to the individual person (the author) who signed the publishing contract, or does it flow to the owner of the copyright, whoever that may be? If the first is true, then a separate transfer of contractual obligations would presumably be needed to vest the third party with all rights. But if the second is true, then the shift of royalties (obligations) would be automatic. (A related question: In the normal case, the author still owns the copyright when he dies, at which point the heirs succeed to the author's rights under the publishing contract. No problem. But if the copyright ownership has been transferred to a third party during author's lifetime, does that third party have any claim to the royalties going forward?) Geographically, this question pertains to the U.S. (but it would be interesting to hear if other jurisdictions have different approaches).
Any obligation to pay royalties comes from the agreement between the publisher and the copyright holder. In a particular agreement, "the Author" is defined as the specific person, and the royalties clause says that "During the legal period of copyright Publisher shall pay to the Author...". Whether or not Author retains copyright (merely grants a non-exclusive license) or transfers copyright to Publisher is specified in the agreement. If (per the hypothetical) Author has the right to transfer copyright i.e. has not transferred copyright to the Publisher, this does not extinguish the Publisher's original obligation to pay royalties – unless that is what the copyright agreement says (I've never seen such a clause, but who knows). Change the Royalties clause to read "shall pay the owner of the copyright", then you get a different result.
The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal).
Adam cannot simply void the contract because he has a chance to publish in a more prestigious journal. What he can do depends on the provisions of he contract to which Adam agreed. It is likely, but far from certain, that the agreement permits Adam to cancel it under specified circumstances. If it does, and if those circumstances now apply, Adam can cancel and then submit the paper to the other journal. It is possible that the contract gives he first journal (J1)_ exclusive rights only for a limited period of time. If this is so, and if that time has passed, then Adam may submit the paper to the other journal (J2) without violating the agreement. It is likely, but not certain, that the agreement has provisions permitting the paper to be republished in another journal. If it does, than Adam may republish by complying with those provisions. They will probably include a requirement that the J@ publication include a notice similar to this: This paper was originally published in J1 in the {date} issue. J2 would have to be willing to include such a notice. The agreement between Adam and J1 will specify some things that J1 must do, as well as things that Adam must do. If J1 has failed to carry out a significant part of its obligations, for example if it never published Adam's paper, Adam may be able to rescind the agreement for materiel breach. Exactly what failures on J1's part allow this varies by jurisdiction. Adam would be wise to consult a lawyer before taking this step. Adam may request permission from J1 if none of these situations applies, and J1 may give permission. It would probably insist on a notice like the one mentioned above. But J1 does not have to grant such permission. If none of the situations above apply, and Adam cannot get (or does not ask for) permission from J1, then submitting the paper to J2 would probably violate Adam's agreement with J1. J1 could sue Adam, and perhaps J2 also. If the people running J2 know of this situation, they may well refuse Adam's paper. Adam may be able to write a new paper, based on the same research as his original paper, perhaps with more recent research added. That would not be covered by Adam's agreement with J1, and he could submit that to J2.
Contracts don’t have to be in writing Generally, there are specific exemptions. For example, in some jurisdictions, copyright transfers have to be in writing. Written contracts do not have to take any particular form Again, in general, some specific contracts may need to be in particular forms or explicitly deal with particular matters. Writing doesn’t mean ink on paper Of course, ink on paper is “writing” but so is an email, a text message, a Facebook post, a photo, a comic book. In law, writing simply means a semi-permanent record. Signatures are not required Unless, of course, they are in the specific circumstances. Your examples The plumber’s promise is both binding and unnecessary - the plumber is responsible for his own negligent acts and omissions even without such an agreement. On the other hand, if you promised not to hold him responsible, that promise would be binding. The designer’s agreement to transfer copyright is binding even where such agreements must be in writing because it is in writing. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?
Under U.S. copyright law, the First Sale Doctrine protects such conduct. As the U.S. Justice Department explains: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). U.S. law with respect to the First Sale Doctrine is typical, and copyright law is fairly uniform internationally due to some relevant intellectual property treaties. But there are hundreds of countries in the world, and some of them might not include the First Sale Doctrine in their jurisprudence. For example, I do not know how this would be handled under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or under Islamic law.
Your title and your question are totally different. If someone pirates a book, makes printed copies, and sells them for profit, that's the point where it switches from plain copyright infringement to being criminal copyright infringement. Which means jail instead of paying damages is possible. If you buy one of these printed copies, not knowing that they have been created illegally, and not being willfully ignorant that the printed copies were created illegal, then you didn't commit copyright infringement yourself. Since you are asking the question, it's obvious that you now know that there was copyright infringement, and buying any more copies would be encouraging copyright infringement with no excuses for you. You can be sued for damages. It is unlikely to happen since suing takes likely more effort than getting any damages from you is worth. The correct thing to do is ask the seller for your money back and destroy the copies. If they don't refund your money you can inform the copyright holder.
First, the seller has not violated copyright law by selling you this book. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. provides the precedent. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Sale doctrine applies to "grey market" imports of books, so buying a book cheaply in another country and then shipping it to the USA is entirely legal, regardless of what the publisher would like. The court wrote: Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the “first sale” doctrine applies to protect a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. Can that buyer bring that copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, someone who purchases, say at a used bookstore, a book printed abroad subsequently resell it without the copyright owner’s permission? In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. Wikipedia also has an article on the case. As for your recourse against the seller, this would seem to be very limited unless they specifically promised you the US edition, or the content is materially different between US and Indian editions. You don't say what kind of book this is. Textbooks typically have identical content. Fiction and other entertainment books generally have local idioms and terminology changed (e.g. "pavement" versus "sidewalk") but will otherwise be the same. You might be able to claim that this is a material difference, but its likely to be difficult.
If it was illegal to make the entire copy, it is illegal to copy half the file. See also, e.g., Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) In response to the question of whether moving it to someone else's servers makes a difference: it is the act of copying, not the possession of the copy, that is the violation of copyright law. As for the copy a service assists someone to make, contributory liability would be the issue. You don't need to be the person making the copies to be contributing to the infringement--material contribution to the copying process and knowledge of infringement run a serious risk of creating contributory liability. If seriously considering such a service as a business model someone would need to consult a copyright expert with technical knowledge or pay counsel with technical knowledge for a good bit of time to do some research. There are major civil and criminal consequences if the industry or the government decides to go after a service doing this, so legal expenses would be a significant and important cost of doing business that would significantly increase barriers to entry. In addition, the service would likely be in violation of its agreement with storage vendors, who would want to minimize their legal exposure and might well discontinue the service when they learned what it was doing.
Why don't courts punish time-wasting tactics? Inspired by the lawsuit filed amidst an ongoing controversy in the chess world. In brief, one player (Carlsen) accused another (Niemann) of cheating, and Niemann filed a defamation lawsuit against Carlsen + two other defendants (Chess.com & Nakamura) in response. In an article about the lawsuit, the Chessbase writes: On December 2, the legal counsel of the plaintiffs, notably Magnus Carlsen, Chess.com, Danny Rensch, and Hikaru Nakamura filed a 25-page memorandum seeking a summary dismissal with prejudice of the lawsuit, citing irreconcilable flaws such as the inability to properly prove a conspiracy among the plaintiffs. “It is so plainly without merit that it could have been brought only as a public relations stunt,” lawyers for Chess.com stated in the filing. Carlsen’s lawyers added, “After years of trying to curate a reputation as the bad boy of chess, Plaintiff Hans Niemann wants to cash in by blaming others for the fallout from his own admitted misconduct.” While it seems unlikely a dismissal will take place, this sort of maneuvering is standard and was to be expected. Since a dismissal is unlikely, this is basically time-wasting. Why then do courts not punish this kind of time-wasting? Although this question is inspired by this particular lawsuit, the question is more general, since as Chessbase writes, this sort of maneuvering is standard and was to be expected. I've tagged this with united-states because the suit is being argued in a US court.
I haven't reviewed the filings, but I can tell you that it's perfectly routine for lawyers to describe the other side's position as "plainly without merit," with no regard for the actual merits. The lawyer's job is to make his client look good, in court and in public; the existence of this question shows that he's doing a good job at least on the latter half of that equation. But in truth, it's such a generic thing to say that no lawyer who hears it will actually think it means anything. In all likelihood, the filing is like most others, in that it makes a good case on some points and a bad case on others, and the opposing lawyer's job is to argue that all of them are bad. In the rarer case that a filing is actually "plainly without merit," courts can and sometimes do impose penalties under Rule 11, which allows for sanctions against parties and attorneys who make factual assertions that are not supported by reality or arguments that are not supported by the law.
I've had a good look at the Vagrancy Act, and I have to say that i can't find the text that you're looking for. It's possibly been repealed, in which case it's not, in fact, the law - even if it were, it is unlikely that this provision would have applied to most games, as it appears to be Games or pretended Games of Chance that it targets.
Most class action litigation involves a whole mass of people who suffered minute injury, whereby it wouldn't be cost effective to bring individual suit. There are exceptions, as with every rule. So, for instance, (I'll use one I was involved in): BARBRI, who established the curriculum, study aids, and taught nearly all of the prep courses for the bar exams in every state, illegally colluded with Kaplan, who ran nearly all of the prep courses for the LSAT (the law school entrance aptitude test) to create unfair trade advantage by price fixing and agreeing not to offer each others' service, thereby creating a monopoly. Because of this, there was no way to cheaply prep for either of these major events – it was use BARBRI or Kaplan, respectively, or study without these invaluable classes/aids. They were expensive but necessary to excelling on these very important tests. It wasn't that they weren't great test prep courses, it was that they created an environment free of any competition where you were forced to pay whatever they were asking. I got notice of class action, didn't opt out, and about 3 years later got a check for nearly $300. Perfect from my perspective. They taught me a ton, I did good on the LSAT and the Bar Exam and the money came at a perfect time. For those exceptions to the rule, opting out may be the best course of action, but as @nomen agentis noted, it does bar you from recovery as part of the class (although that is usually nominal) if you fail to bring private action, miss the statute of limitations, or fail to recover via settlement or trial award. As a further example based on my experience with BARBRI/Kaplan: say you were a person who couldn't afford to take the bar prep course, and because of the price fixing and limit on competition (monopoly) couldn't find any other alternative review course. If you studied on your own, looked for alternative study aides/courses to no avail (there were literally no others) and then failed the bar exam, and you could show that because of this, it was more likely than not that it was the reason you failed, you might have a case individually, arguing that your quarter-million-dollar education was functionally meaningless without a license to practice, and you couldn't get a job that paid enough to repay the loans because you couldn't get a job, etc. This would be the type person to consider opting out. Typically, these (the more injured person) are the people the attorneys search for who end up named as the representing party to the class, but not everyone can be a named plaintiff that suffered more than the nominal injury. Because of this, not everyone who had a more serious injury will be adequately compensated by the class action. These suits are meant to get a lot of people a little justice and to teach a lesson, not to get a few people largely compensated for substantial injury. They are also quite nice for the lawyers who make millions, because they get a percentage of the entire pie. But, if you suffer a serious injury for which a class action suit exists, then it would probably behoove you to opt out, after consulting with a lawyer. It's important to understand that for most people it's more beneficial to be in the class. These are typically the type injuries that on the aggregate equal substantial injury, but individually, no lawyer would take on a contingency and it wouldn't be worth while to pay to litigate, as the recovery would be nowhere near the cost of the litigation/attorneys' fees. If you are (like the example above) the odd individual who suffered a much greater injury than the remainder of the class, then opting out would not be wise. However, you don't automatically get more just because you sue individually, and there is no collateral estoppel or issue preclusion because you are suing on a different theory of damage. If you opt out, you start over. If you waited, you may benefit from any admissions in court, which can be used against them, but not any findings. However, a class suit will typically run much longer than an individual, so you would probably finish your suit before the class action concluded. If you are the person who suffered substantial injury, when you get the class notice you should consult an attorney right away, to see if you have a provable case and if opting out is the right choice for you. Statute of limitations need to be examined, as well as other procedural things. Generally speaking, those other reasons for potentially opting out that are in the question are not typical considerations.
Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics
The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc.
No Chapter 1, Section 10 of the FAA states that a court may vacate an arbitral award only if it finds that one of the following limited grounds applies: (1) the award is a result of corruption or fraud; (2) evident partiality or corruption of an arbitrator; (3) arbitrator misconduct, such as refusing to hear pertinent and material evidence; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award was not made. There is no “the arbitrator screwed up” basis. This is pretty much universal across jurisdictions for arbitration. One of the features (whether you think it’s a good or bad feature is up to you) is that arbitration is, for all practical purposes, final. That’s it, we’re done. The law is written that way because parties to an arbitration freely and voluntarily chose this method of dispute resolution over the courts. In theory, at least. Having made their choice, the courts will not unmake it.
I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation).
Either is possible Let's look at a very recent example: Dominion sued Guliani and Powell separately. But Smartmatics sued both plus Fox at once. Their allegations are even very similar. The benefit of Smartmatics' approach is, they only need to file documents once, and only meet one time the filing fee. Parties may try to get their case split off, then they become a separate case and it becomes the Dominion strategy. The benefit of Dominion's approach is, that the separate cases are harder to dismiss for each party on their own and they have no standing to weigh in on the other case. If the court consolidates the cases, it becomes the Smartmatics strategy. Also note, that the court can act on its own against a joint lawsuit: parties might get dismissed from it that were improperly joined. Those dismissals are without prejudice and can be fixed by just re-filing the lawsuit against the dismissed defendant alone.
How can Magnus Carlsen, a Norwegian, be sued for defamation by Hans Niemann in Missouri? Hans Niemann is suing multiple people for defamation (full complaint): Among the defendants, Norwegian Magnus Carlsen is listed. I don't get how this is possible: they're two separate countries with separate legal systems, and Missouri's legal system is not a recognized authority in Norway. It seems like Carlsen could just ignore it without problems (unless he goes to the USA, or Missouri), unless there's some kind of international treaty I'm unaware of. Question: How can Magnus Carlsen (from Norway) be sued for defamation by Hans Niemann in Missouri?
It is not required that you sue each defendant in their own courts. Two of the defendants are natural persons living in the US (Utah, Florida), one is a US company (Utah and California), one is a Norwegian company, and one is a Norwegian natural person. This is one case, not five unrelated cases. If the court find against Carlsen, the plaintiff would need to go to Norwegian courts to enforce the claim. This is helped by the Norwegian Enforcement Act of 26 June 1992, the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 and the Arbitration Act of 14 May 2004, which basically say that if you're found liable for a tort in US courts, you can collect via the Norwegian courts. Here is a more detailed analysis of the Norwegian legal situation. It is possible that under Norwegian law the US judgment against Carlsen would be reduced, depending on how big the award is. The suit involves, in part 15 USC Ch. 1 (antitrust law) where the US has asserted jurisdiction if there is a nexus to the United States (not just American companies), and under 28 USC 1367, plaintiff asserts that federal courts have supplementary jurisdiction over the state claims.
We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.
I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation).
Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.
Mongolia apparently has a list of banned words (list is NSFW) that websites can't use. And according to this State Department report: Additionally, the regulation requires Web sites with heavy traffic to use filtering software that makes the user Internet Protocol addresses of those commenting or sharing content publicly visible. The report also says: The law places the burden of proof on the defendant in libel and slander cases, and both defamation and insult are criminal charges. NGOs reported that these laws were used more frequently than in previous years to control the press. Canada is probably a better choice, even if it isn't perfect.
Yes, a statement made to only a single other person can be defamation, at least in the US (you don't mention the jurisdiction that you or the accused person are in, and it may matter). Only the accused person can normally sue, and that person would need to establish that the statement was made, and that it was false. In most cases actual damage to reputation also needs to be established. However, a few limited categories are considered defamatory per se. these include an accusation that a person is guilty of a serious crime. (The exact line for defamation per se will depend on the jurisdiction.) If a statemant is defamatory per se actual damage need not be proved. Strictly speaking saying that someone "is a pedophile" only says that that person is sexually attracted to children, but it is usually taken to mean that the person has in fact sexually abused children, which is a crime, and would I am sure be considered defamatory per se. Even so, proof of actual damage to the reputation of the person defamed might be important to the measure of damages to be awarded. often the number of people to whom an accusation is made is relevant to the degree of damage to the reputation, and thus to the damages to be awarded, but the relation is not always 1-to-1. Particularly with a very serious accusation, the damage to reputation could be significant, even if only one or a few people heard the false statement. By the way, the word is spelled "pedophile" (or paedophile in UK English), it is from two Greek words meaning literally "lover of the young". A now obsolete related term is "pederast", with much the same meaning.
Without regards to the actual case and the particular countries involved, I am wondering how it is even possible that a court in one country orders the whole another country to do something, let alone when the two countries do not even formally have diplomatic relations. The main statute that is relevant in the U.S. is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) of 1976. In general foreign states are immune from liability in U.S. courts (and most courts of the developed world) subject to certain exceptions, the most common of which are as follows: Foreign state waives its immunity explicitly or implicitly Commercial activities by foreign state in or directly affecting the United States Property taken in violation of international law is at issue Rights in U.S. property acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are at issue Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury, death or damage to or loss of property caused by its tortious act or omission, occurring in the United States Enforcement of an arbitration agreement made by the foreign state with or for a private party Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking or their support, if the foreign state is a designated sponsor of terrorism Admiralty lawsuit to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, based on commercial activity The exception above in bold was probably the one applied in the North Korean case. The only countries to which that exception applies are North Korea, Syria, Sudan and Iran. (There are also separate similar rules related to countries with whom the U.S. is in a declared war.) There is sporadic ongoing constitutional separation of powers litigation in the U.S. over whether a FISA authorized lawsuit can proceed over the objections of the President as expressed by the U.S. State Department. The argument that FISA is unconstitutional in this context is that diplomacy and foreign policy is exclusively an executive branch power to the exclusion of Congress and the judiciary, but for the most part, this extreme position has been rejected in recent years. A conservative U.S. Supreme Court, however, could revisit this question (conservative judges tend to favor more absolute executive branch authority in foreign affairs). Once a party wins, however, the winner needs to identify foreign assets subject to the jurisdiction of the court from which to collect the judgment, such as gold deposits or U.S. governmental or corporate bonds or ships docked in U.S. ports, owned by the country. In strong contrast to the case above, the UK media recently overtly demonstrated disobedience of a New Zealand court name suppression order: a man arrested in NZ for allegedly committing an appalling crime was granted temporary name suppression, and that was ignored by the UK media. I am wondering if there is anything that would stop a New Zealand court to hold the UK to account just like the US court just did North Korea. In the New Zealand case, the remedy would be to bring suit against the particular newspapers or reporters involved, rather than the state. But, the U.K. might not enforce those judgments if those defendants lost, so enforcement might be limited to New Zealand based assets and persons, and then, only if the New Zealand court found that it had jurisdiction over the defendants under New Zealand law. So, this isn't really analogous. So, in general, are there any internationally recognised laws/treaties/protocols etc. that define if/when a court in one country can assert jurisdiction over the whole another country and hold it to account? Or is that completely up to the court and whatever extremes it dares to come up with? See above in the U.S. case. Most countries have similar statutes or case law to FISA which codified the case law applying customary international law at the time that it was adopted. One example that comes into my mind is the European Court of Human Rights: if a country signed the European Convention on Human Rights, it can be held to account by the court. But what conventions, if any, can be applied to the two cases above? The European Court of Human Rights case is one of consent to the jurisdiction of an international body by treaty. Countries like the UK and NZ have statutes or treaties governing when a foreign judgment (e.g. a judgment from a New Zealand court) will be recognized domestically. There are also usually laws governing when people present in one state will be extradited to another, usually in the form of a bilateral treaty between the affected states.
The custom is that the person who brings the case is named first. This will be the plaintiff in a civil case. But when the plaintiff wins, and the defendant appeals, the case in the appeals court may have that person (often referred to in older cases as the "defendant appellant") named first. More recent practice is to keep the name of the case the same. But it used to be considered a separate case with a separate name in some jurisdictions. In any event, this is merely a custom, and not a law. The court has discretion to name cases as it chooses in its judgements, and if a court chooses for whatever reason to follows a practice that differs from the usual one, that is the name of that particular case. Without a full citation or a link, so that the actual opinion could be consulted, three is no way to know what reason, if any, there was for the order of parties in the particular case mentioned in the question. A quick Google search did not turn up the case.
Can people who are mistaken in their beliefs be convicted of criminal attempts? For example: Self proclaimed exorcists who claim to put curses and blessings on people. If that person performs a ritual, fully believing it will kill the person they are cursing. Or some guys hanging out with various militias believing they can assist them in their plans to commit acts of terrorism. Can they be convicted with criminal attempt?
canada The fact that the chosen means could never have actually killed the target does not preclude an attempt conviction. See United States v. Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462: The only relevant distinction for purposes of s. 24(1) of the Criminal Code is between imaginary crimes and attempts to do the factually impossible. The criminal law of Canada recognizes no middle category called “legal impossibility”. Because Mr. Dynar attempted to do the impossible but did not attempt to commit an imaginary crime, he can only have attempted to do the “factually impossible”. For this reason, Mr. Dynar’s proposal that s. 24(1) criminalizes only attempts to do the factually impossible does not help him. An example of a "factual impossibility" cited by the court was "impossibility due to inadequate means... For example, A tries to kill B by shooting at him from too great a distance or by administering too small a dose of poison." That this man’s design is premised on a mistaken understanding of the facts does not make it any less his design. A mistaken belief cannot be eliminated from the description of a person’s mental state simply because it is mistaken. Example 1: the curse In your examples, the person who took steps to kill a person via inadequate or factually impossible means could be guilty of an attempt. Of course, this is subject to proof of the required mental state (intention to kill) beyond a reasonable doubt. Example 2: hanging out However, the actus reus of attempt in Canada is that the accused must have taken "some step towards the commission of the offence attempted going beyond mere acts of preparation." You haven't described anything about the person who hangs out with a militia that would constitute a step beyond a mere act of preparation.
It is possible that someone is convicted. Destruction of evidence an constitute circumstantial evidence that a crime was committed, and other evidence, such as testimony, could pin the crime to one of the four possible suspects. A jury has broad discretion to assess the weight of the evidence.
england-and-wales Automatism If a defendant ... can show that they committed a crime as the result of an involuntary act they may be able to plead the defence of automatism. Note that: It is up to the jury to decide whether the defence is made out and that the defendant was acting involuntarily due to an external factor.
In the United States, the question that determines whether it's perjury is whether or not you believe what you said was true. Whoever— (1) having taken an oath..., willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) ... willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury. So if an attorney asks if you saw the defendant, and you believe you saw the defendant, "yes" is generally going to be the correct answer. You're free to qualify your answers or answer questions that weren't put to you, but you aren't obligated to do so. Generally speaking, our adversarial system puts the burden on the defense to ask if you're sure, how the lighting was, whether you were wearing your glasses, whether you were drunk, etc.
An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.
They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.
Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.
I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.
Right of way: U-turn vs right turn (California) I see this all the time, and it's often a topic of debate among friends. I'm curious to know what the answer is. I can see it going either way. Car at red light making right turn and another car coming from the right making a u-turn. This car has a green light. The car at red light should yield, as it has a red light. But how does the car at red light know that the intersection allows for u-turns? There are no signs for the car in 1 to see the intersection allow for u-turns, and there is no signal on the vehicle coming from the right to indicate it's making a u-turn. If you see the signal for left, wait until you know it's not making a u-turn? It's California, and none of the laws here make sense ;0
The person turning right with a red light must yield to cars that have a green light. From the California DMV Driver Handbook: Right turn against a red traffic signal light–Signal and stop for a red traffic signal light at the marked limit line. If there is no limit line, stop before entering the crosswalk. If there is no crosswalk, stop before entering the intersection. You may turn right if there is no sign to prohibit the turn. Yield to pedestrians, motorcyclists, bicyclists, or other vehicles moving on their green traffic signal light. (Emphasis mine) It's up to the driver who wants to turn right on red to make sure the lane is clear before the person turns into it.
depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed.
If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.
Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.
As has already been said, as far as the vehicle registration, the officer likely already knows who the vehicle is registered to and whether it's expired or not before he walks up to your car, or at the least, he can easily find that information out. The proof of insurance is a different matter. The officer will need to see it to know if you have insurance or not. To him, it doesn't matter what the reason is that you don't provide it to him. Left it at home, misplaced it, lost it, destroyed it, or just refuse to provide it because you feel you have the right to refuse. He can't "force" you to provide it (unless he is able to search your car and happens to find it there). He can only issue you a ticket for not providing it. But your attitude could play a part in what happens next. Being upfront and letting the officer know you have left your documents at home could help your situation. In my experience... one time that this sort of thing happened to me, the officer agreed to hold my drivers license and allowed me to bring the documents to the police station and retrieve my license. Another time, in a parking related matter, I was issued a ticket, but I was allowed to bring the required documents to the police station where they then "invalidated" (cancelled) the ticket. Of course this won't always work, and is not at all likely to work if you are far from home. Keep in mind, (as far as I know, in most states) the real infraction is that you "don't have insurance"... that you failed to provide proof when asked, is secondary. In many cases (likely nearly all cases), if you show up in court and provide documents that your insurance is current, and was current at the time the ticket was issued, the judge (or the prosecutor) will likely dismiss the case with no penalties. But, what the officer has written down on the ticket about your attitude and what you told him at the time, may have an effect on how this all plays out.
The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification.
This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Reading those clauses, you can see that you can park in an emergency. You can park with your vehicle dies and you can't move it. You can park if it is specifically allowed (maybe a sign saying "unrestricted parking allowed here"). Otherwise, you may park on a parking lane (or roadway, or shoulder) but subject to conditions also listed: "unless there is a clear passage for other motor vehicles, and your vehicle can be seen for 60 metres (200 feet) along the roadway in both directions". Regardless of the name of the piece of road, you are allowed to park there but only if your car is clearly visible, and there is room to get around you.
Does the gavel have a legal significance, or is it purely ceremonial? Judges in US courtrooms famously use a gavel at appropriately dramatic points in a trial. If a judge fails to use a gavel, or uses it at the wrong moment, is this legally significant? Or is the gavel purely ceremonial?
It is purely ceremonial. The tendency in modern jurisprudence is towards the practical and away from legalisms and technicalities. Even if a judge used a gavel in some way inappropriately, it would be unlikely to have any legal significance for anyone but the judge. An argument based on gavel misuse would fall into the "fringe-on-the-flag" category of legal arguments (yes, there are people who think that the court's powers are determined entirely by the fringe on the courhouse flag). The gavel is a traditional trapping of a common law courtroom, but has no legal significance.
Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.
I am guessing that the question is about the United States, since the "objection!" procedure is not the same in other places. The Supreme Court has held that even though you have the right to represent yourself, this is conditional on your maintenance of proper conduct. If you disrupt proceedings and disregard judicial directions, then the judge can find you in contempt of court, just as with anybody else who was doing that. In Illinois v Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), a self-represented litigant "started to argue with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful manner", threatened the judge's life, and made clear that he intended to filibuster the process, saying "There is going to be no proceeding. I'm going to start talking and I'm going to keep on talking all through the trial. There's not going to be no trial like this." The judge ordered him removed from the courtroom on several instances of this behavior, and also appointed professional counsel. Following a series of appeals against all this, the Supreme Court ultimately said: Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464 (1938), we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course. be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.
"Why" someone did something is potentially off-topic, but in regards to your hierarchical image - it lacks provenance so cannot be tested, however according to the official judiciary website: The Master of the Rolls is second in judicial importance to the Lord Chief Justice.
The custom is that the person who brings the case is named first. This will be the plaintiff in a civil case. But when the plaintiff wins, and the defendant appeals, the case in the appeals court may have that person (often referred to in older cases as the "defendant appellant") named first. More recent practice is to keep the name of the case the same. But it used to be considered a separate case with a separate name in some jurisdictions. In any event, this is merely a custom, and not a law. The court has discretion to name cases as it chooses in its judgements, and if a court chooses for whatever reason to follows a practice that differs from the usual one, that is the name of that particular case. Without a full citation or a link, so that the actual opinion could be consulted, three is no way to know what reason, if any, there was for the order of parties in the particular case mentioned in the question. A quick Google search did not turn up the case.
I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.
This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.
Yes. It will hold up in court. IMHO, there is no difference in the admissible portions of the two testimonies. "Few minutes" vs. "One hour" is immaterial The difference between "a few minutes" and "one hour" IMHO is immaterial given: the witness was unconscious and say, between 45 and 60 minutes would match both descriptions of the time interval. What other people saw and heard is hearsay Testimony about what other people saw and heard (with a few notable exceptions) is hearsay and not allowed into evidence because it is generally unreliable and not subject to cross-examination. So after the rejection of the hearsay portions, there is no difference in the admissible portions of the two versions. Qualification By "hold up in court," I mean it will be allowed as evidence. The weight and veracity of the testimony would be determined by the (judge or) jury after cross-examination.
Social Security Card Uses? In my years living in the United States, I've used my SSN several times, but I've never been required to use my Social Security Card. Is there any process or activity that requires the card that your Social Security Number is printed on?
They can be used for ID. For government purposes various type of cards have points and a certain number of points is needed for various purposes. A social security card can be used as such. For example, when we go to get a drivers license, you can bring an ATM Card, Passport, Utility Bill, SS Card (as examples) for ID. Each of those has a different value (passport high, utility bill low). They add the values you present and they have to be above a threshold.
The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date.
Verifying the identity of the person making an SAR is a requirement (for fairly obvious reasons) but there's no specified way this is to be done. As the ICO puts it: If you’re not sure the requester is who they say they are, you must check this quickly. You shouldn’t ask for formal ID unless it’s necessary and proportionate. Instead, you could ask questions that only they would know, about reference numbers or appointment details for example. Or you can ask for ID that you can actually verify. There’s little point insisting on photo ID if you don’t know what the requester looks like – it should be proportionate. The key word to take account of here is "proportionate" - and this is going to hinge on not just the data the SAR is asking for but the type of data that the Data Controller/Processor is handling. A police force is likely to be storing far more sensitive data about the data subject than e.g. a retailer and you'd expect a more robust identification process. The fact that the law doesn't specify ID requirements is what will lead to different organisations having different requirements - they've ultimately had a large amount of leeway in determining what is appropriate themselves, and that leads naturally to variation. In general terms (rather than specifically for SARs) requiring two forms of ID is not uncommon, it does after all increase the security of the process. Pick-pocketing someone's wallet will often get you their driver's license but it will rarely get their wallet and their recent utility bill. Successfully intercepting a utility bill won't get you their driver's license. It's not perfect but it raises the difficulty of circumventing the check. Are there rules on what requirements may be deemed unlawfully or excessively onerous as preconditions for complying with a SAR? If Bob feels the ID requirements are too extreme they can complain to the ICO and if they agree they can "advise" the data controller to ease up on the requirements and if this fails to reach a satisfactory outcome Bob ca take legal action - but I doubt the examples given would raise any concern. Even the two-forms level is only on a par with the requirements many agencies have for renting a car. why do they need your address (and what if you are a vagabond/nomad with NFA?) In addition to the ID-aspects having your address may be necessary in terms of communicating with you regarding the SAR. If you're someone of no fixed address this requirement may provide difficulties of course - but SARs are by no means unique in this regard. Talking to the data controller and seeing if they would be willing to accept either an alternative second form of ID or waiving the requirement altogether would be the logical first step in such circumstances.
Social Security numbers are called Social Security numbers because were invented to implement the Social Security Act of 1935, which was one of the important programs adopted by Congress as part of the New Deal during the Great Depression. These individual identifying numbers made it easier for the government to compile and collate information about the payroll taxes on the wages and salaries of workers potentially entitled to Social Security benefits which was (and is) collected by employers to pay for Social Security benefits. Compiling this data was necessary because under the Act one's lifetime history of Social Security payroll taxation history is used to determine if you, or your dependents, are eligible for Social Security benefits at all, and if so, to determine how big the benefit check should be according to formulas adopted by the government agency administering the program. This agency is now called the Social Security Administration. But, this agency has been relocated in the federal government bureaucracy now and then since the Act was passed in 1935 as part of general reorganizations of the federal government bureaucracy. Keep in mind that all of this data collection and collation was done by hand. Computers adequate to assist government agencies in administering government programs wouldn't come into being for another thirty years. The "security" referenced is the economic security that the Social Security Act of 1935 provided to elderly people, widows, and orphans. Before the Social Security Act was adopted, the elderly, widows, and orphans, who often lacked the ability to earn a living wage in the economic marketplace, routinely faced extremely high poverty rates, and employer survivor's and disability benefits were uncommon. In time, Social Security numbers began to be used as a tool for the government to identify people for purposes other than administering the Social Security Act, such as for purposes of administering state and federal income taxes. But, by then, the name "Social Security number" for these identifying numbers originally used to administer the Social Security program was already firmly established.
You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.
Generally, yes, you do have to have 10 years of work for Medicare, though the formula is based on "credits" and is a bit more complicated. See https://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html#h1. It can in some cases be possible to "count" overseas work towards eligibility, due to agreements with certain countries. See https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/international.html. However, according to the Agreement Pamphlet for Japan: Although the agreement between the United States and Japan allows the Social Security Administration to count your Japanese credits to help you qualify for U.S. retirement, disability or survivor benefits, the agreement does not cover Medicare benefits. As a result, we cannot count your credits in Japan to establish entitlement to free Medicare hospital insurance. Note: I am also not in the legal profession, which is also the case for most people on this site. Even of those who are lawyers, they're not your lawyers, and nothing you see on this site is legal advice.
Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.
Yes. It is legal for them to do so. Also, they are often required, by their insurers and lawyers, if not as a matter of law, to maintain them for seven years in most cases, so that the information is available if a lawsuit arises from any of their dealings with you (e.g. if they receive notice of a lawsuit involving a Zipcar you were allegedly using or had under your control at the time of an accident, or if there is a class action lawsuit over alleged breach of contract or consumer laws involving their charges to you). There are virtually no circumstances, with the possible exception of certain credit card account information, when someone has a duty to destroy records maintained about you under U.S. law. In this particular instance, everything on your driver's license is a matter of public record in any case, so your privacy interest is reduced for this reason as well.
How much effort could have gone into composing the judgement for Meads v. Meads? Any intelligent/educated guesses by people who perhaps work more or less full time as lawyers as to how much time it would have taken the judge to research and to write up all of the precedents and to address all of the different aspects of the vexatious party's peculiar quirks would be welcome. Alternatively, are there any mechanisms by which one could possibly learn on a less speculative basis, perhaps by a FOIA request or the local equivalent, for the judge's timesheet entries that might have logged his efforts deliberating and working on that case as a government employee? Or simply writing to him on an informal and candid basis inquiring as to how long this impressively comprehensive reference on vexatious litigation tactics took him to produce?
Judges don't have timesheet entries (and are often expressly excluded from FOIA obligations). They get paid salaries and are expected to work hard enough to clear their dockets in reasonable periods of time, however long that takes. If you wanted a more direct evidentiary estimate, you could estimate that a judge and his clerk together probably work 90-120 hours a week, figure out how many trials and hearings of what length were conducted and deduct that time spent on that from the total, and then divide the remaining hours by the number of opinions one can estimate that the judge wrote (or better yet, a reasonable estimate of the number of pages of opinions that one can estimate that the judge wrote). Typically, a lot of the legal research grunt work and more boilerplate parts of an opinion are written by the law clerk under some general instructions from the judge, with the judge writing the more substantive sections personally and heavily (or lightly, depending upon the quality of the law clerk) revising the draft opinion as a whole. The longer the opinion, the more likely it is that a substantial portion of it was written by the law clerk. For similar kinds of legal writing (e.g. appellate briefs and motions for summary judgment and proposed orders or written closing arguments) one to six hours per page from all professionals working on the document would be in the right ballpark. Judicial opinions come with some efficiencies, because once a judge decides a point of law or reaches a factual conclusion it doesn't have to be belabored in the same way that a litigant who isn't sure if their reasoning will be persuasive or not must. But, judicial opinions also typically have to spell out a greater proportion of legal and factual foundation for the end analysis that isn't hotly contested, will summarize all of the material points from the evidence presented in the case, and will frequently also recap in some detail the arguments made by the advocates for both sides of the case before actually engaging with those arguments in an analysis section. On balance, those factors probably pretty much balance out. If the judicial opinion is shorter, elegantly written, contains pithy turns of phrase, and/or contains lots of legal citations or factual analysis not raised by either party, it is probably closer to five or six hours per page or more. If the opinion is longer, has a rote and mechanical feel to it, and has very little factual analysis or references to law not mentioned by the parties, it is probably closer to one hour per page or even less. When some of these factors go one way, and other of these factors go the other way, it is probably in between in terms of hours per page. This said, sometimes it takes a judge a long time to write an opinion, but the end product is very short and elegant. In these situations, often what happened is that the judge and the judge's clerk spent lots and lots of hours writing a long and detailed first draft, then got an insight that provided a much more efficient and succinct way to reach a resolution to the case. In those circumstances, there would be dozens or scores of hours of work that went into the discarded first draft, only to be superseded by a half a dozen or dozen hours devoted to a much shorter final draft. In those cases, the final draft of the opinion might be ten or twenty hours per page or more once you include the time spent on the discarded draft. Of course, another factor is that some judges are just more efficient legal writers than others, and some judges have more familiarity with some areas of law than others. A opinion that might take one judge twenty hours to write might take another judge presiding over the very same case and producing an opinion of the same length and quality a hundred hours to write. The opinion in Meads v. Meads was 176 pages. If I had to make a best guess, I'd estimate that it probably took about 600 hours to write, probably about two-thirds of which was law clerk hours and probably about one-third of which was judge time.
Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.
I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake.
It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.
We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.
In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.
Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.
If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement.
What is the "fringe on the flag" argument? Another answer on this question refers to the "fringe on the flag" category of arguments. What is the "fringe on the flag" argument?
See Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, para. 272 OPCA litigants who advance these schemes will often focus on certain aspects of court formalities. Like Mr. Meads, they may scrutinize the court for some hidden indication of its true nature. A strange but common belief is that a flag with yellow or gold thread ‘fringes’ “denotes a military jurisdiction, not common law”. In R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 2, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199, Chief Justice Drapeau of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected a motion by Lindsay “... removing the gold‑fringed Canadian flag that has adorned the Court of Appeal’s hearing room for years ...”. This motion, and the argument that “[t]here is no lawful reason for a Canadian flag to be present other than the regular statutory authorized flag” was frivolous and vexatious: para. 9.
If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.”
There are problems with the claims. In summary: someone that in Sweden acts to defend themselves while "in peril" when subjected to — or are in imminent risk of — a criminal attack, will not the convicted, unless the act is "blatantly unjustifiable". Context We have a problem here in Sweden with people being ill-informed about the right to self-defence, and this is compounded by people with opinions spreading myths about it. Often these myths err on the side of claiming you have less rights than you really have. So, two things before we go on... The characters may have been unreliable. Do not ever assume that just because a character says something in a work of fiction, that the character is meant to know what they are talking about. And even if they are meant to know what they are talking about... The author may have been unreliable, and done their homework poorly. Keep this in mind... That said, the right to self-defence is not infinite. The law According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2 and 6... If you intentionally kill someone, you get convicted of "murder" If you intentionally kill someone, but there were mitigating circumstances, you get convicted of "manslaughter" If you act in reckless disregard for the risk your actions are causing, and this leads to the death of someone, you get convicted of "causing the death of another", or what we here can call "reckless killing" And Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 24, § 1 states that an act performed in "peril" shall only lead to a conviction if the act was "blatantly unjustifiable". "Peril" is enumerated to exist in cases of... A commenced or imminent criminal attack on person or property A person has gained or trying to gain unauthorized access to a room, house, yard or ship A person refuses to leave a domicile after being told to If — when caught red-handed — a person uses violence or threats of violence to resist stolen property from being retaken When judging whether an act is "blatantly unjustifiable", the prosecutor must look at... the nature of the attack that caused the peril the significance of that which the attack was aimed at (such as a human life) other significant circumstances That last bit is interesting because it takes human psychology into consideration, and let the defendant's assessment of the peril be the standard by which the act is judged. The claim Let us start with the easy bit first... "if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time." Murder? No. According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2, a person that kills an intruder in their home could at the most be charged with manslaughter, because there are mitigating circumstances, i.e. the person felt threatened and there was a home invasion in progress. In order for this to become murder, she would more or less have to have invited the assailant or in any other way drawn them in with the intent to kill them. Yes, she prepared to defend herself or a potential intrusion, but without knowing for certain that the assailant would come at certain time or at least a certain day, any kind of premeditation towards killing is more or less impossible to prove. With this, murder is off the table. That claim is simply wrong. Whether it is the author or the character that is erring, I cannot say. So, manslaughter then, or the even lesser degree, called "causing the death of another", or reckless killing. Manslaughter would come up of she — when whacking them with the club — did so with the intent of killing them. The operative word here being intent. The prosecutor has to prove that intent. Sure, we can dream up scenarios where this is the case; the classic reason for why people do get convicted even acting in peril is when they keep harming the assailant after the danger has passed. But — again — just preparing for a potential intrusion is not enough to prove that intent. Finally, reckless killing. This is where such cases usually ends up. And — again — this usually happens because the defendant did something when the danger has obviously passed; the criminal attack was no longer imminent but passed. Conclusion Unless the protagonist in question had set up lethal traps; unless they had foreknowledge of an attack; unless they invited the assailant in with the intent to kill them; unless they fend off the attack and gets themselves into a perfectly safe situation and then proceeds to beat the assailant to death; and unless all of this can be proved, then it cannot become murder. Manslaughter or reckless killing, yes, there will be an investigation for that, but from the description of the situation — the protagonist fearing the assailant is dangerous and means them harm — preparing a home defence with strategically placed golf clubs does not in any way preclude the prosecution being dismissed as justifiable self-defence. Only(!) if the home invasion was obviously harmless, and/or the protagonist keeps harming the assailant after the home invasion has been staved off / neutralised, can a conviction for manslaughter or reckless killing become a possibility. Summary Yes, in Sweden a prosecutor will look at the case when you kill someone. But — no — in the situation described, a home invasion by someone perceived as wanting to cause harm, this is very unlikely to become "murder", for lack of premeditation. The remaining possible charges — manslaughter or reckless killing — will only result in a conviction if the situation was obviously and provably harmless in the eyes of the defendant, and they still killed the assailant.
The article says: Defense lawyers say the evidence does not show a celebration of violence. Which implies that the prosecution claimed exactly that, or at least that the defense anticipates the prosecution to claim something along those lines. The article also says [bold italic emphasis mine]: Defense lawyers for Rhodes have previously addressed the dinner, saying that prosecutors’ theory of the episode is incorrect. Rhodes’ lawyers said in a court filing the dinner is evidence that the militia leader wasn’t working to foment a revolution. “The conditions would never be better. Yet, Rhodes and the others left the Capitol grounds and went to Olive Garden for dinner,” lawyers for Rhodes wrote. “The answer is quite simple: because stopping the certification, overthrowing the government, was not Rhodes’ intent. It was not the Oath Keepers’ intent.” So, from the CNN article, it seems that the prosecution interprets this as celebrating a successful attack whereas the defense argues that leaving the Capitol to go for dinner instead of continuing the attack proves that they didn't want to overthrow the government. Why does it matter where they go for dinner and how much they spend? It doesn't matter where, exactly they went, which restaurant they went to, and that it was an Olive Garden. For the prosecution, what matters is that they appeared to celebrate, for the defense, what matters is that they left the Capitol. It also doesn't matter how much, exactly, they spent. What matters is that the amount of money can be used as a proxy (by the prosecution at least) for how many people attended the "celebration", how long it lasted, and how much value was placed on the "celebration". (In general, people spend more money when they are celebrating something than when they are just getting a bite because they are hungry.) So, in short: Prosecution: Celebrating how close they came to overthrowing the government proves that was their goal. Defense: Going for dinner when they had the chance to finish the job proves it wasn't their goal.
A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law.
No. The Flag Code is not a criminal law, so the government is not permitted to bring criminal prosecution for violating it, and it therefore cannot secure a proper conviction for such a violation.
Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."
Google england law flying flags First result Flying flags: a plain English guide - GOV.UK ... Some flags require formal consent (permission) from the local planning authority, whereas others like the Union Flag do not. The detailed controls over flag flying are set out in detailed regulations (see links below). ... All flag flying is subject to some standard conditions ... Subject to compliance with the standard conditions, there are 3 categories of flag: (a) flags which can be flown without consent of the local planning authority (b) flags which do not need consent provided they comply with further restrictions (referred to as “deemed consent” in the Regulations) (c) flags which require consent (“express consent”) ... (b) Flags which do not require consent provided they comply with certain restrictions [include for example] ... the Rainbow flag (6 horizontal equal stripes of red, orange, yellow, green, blue and violet). ... The regulations governing the flying of flags in England are set out in the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 2007 (as amended in 2012 and in 2021). These regulations, including relevant amendments to flying of flags, can be viewed on the government legislation website: Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2021 ...
"Jingle bells, Batman smells, etc" -- any copyright or trademark problems in that now-famous song lyric? "Jingle bells, Batman smells, Robin's laid an egg" -- any copyright or trademark problems, per se, in that now-famous song lyric?
The original Jingle Bells song was first published as a Thanksgiving Song in 1857 and has lapsed into public domain. The Batman lyrics constitute parody which would further put their singing under fair use. You may sing it as part of your own musical arrangement with little discourse from Warner Bros, the current copyright holders of Batman and related properties OR the original parody lyricist, who has not to my knowledge done anything to protect his copyright claim to the song. You may not sell the version of the Batman version as sung by Mark Hamil in the 1992 Batman: The Animated Series episode "Christmas with the Joker" without permission of Warner Bros.
A character can not be copyrighted. Only a work (picture, text, movie etc.) featuring that character can. However, a character can be registred as a trademark (more specifically, its name and its appearance).
One reason could be because of the scènes à faire doctrine. Many of the things you notice as similarities are not infringement. I don't know the counts of lawsuits for music infringement vs screenwriting infringement. There may just be more songs than screenplays. Screenwriters/producers do get sued, though. See Cinar Corporation v. Robinson 2012 SCC 25.
Details depend on the juristiction. For that, consult a lawyer if you plan to publish your app anywhere. But generally, even simple texts from exercises can be covered by copyright. Compare song lyrics, which are not much longer (and might not involve more creative thought than a good exercise ...). For vocabulary lists, it gets more tricky, but those can be covered as well if the assembly of the list was a creative effort. So if you simply list the 1,000 most common worlds in English and their translation, you are possibly fine, but if the words are divided into units and lessons, that's creative work.
As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.
Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine.
Ideas are not protected by copyright, only arrangements of words are protected. If you "rephrase" by only a minor change of wording, leaving much of the wording intact, that is still a copyright infringement unless an exception such as fair use or fair dealing applies (and that seems a bit doubtful in this case). If you "rephrase" so that the wording is quite different, even though the idea is the same, there is probably no infringement. Copying elements of computer code or other IT commands that are essential to making an example work is not infringement. Where there is only one or a very small number of ways to naturally express a fact, copying such expression is not infringement, as facts are not protected by copyright. Adding examples but keeping significant wording unchanged is still likely to be infringement.
It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation.
Assuming a one trillion dollar coin exists, and is stolen, is there are sequence of events that could lead to someone legally owning it? A funny (and seemingly legal, if absurd) proposal during the current debt ceiling debate is to mint a one trillion dollar platinum coin and deposit it with the Treasury to reduce the debt below the limit. This leads to the amusing hypothetical case of someone stealing said trillion dollar coin from the Treasury, or the coin somehow going missing (gets lost in a couch and the couch is sold as-is in a federal auction). Are there any means by which someone could become the legal owner of this coin, and thereby have a one trillion dollar plus net worth, without actually earning one trillion dollars and buying it? I figure if it's actually stolen property, even if all statutes of limitation have passed and even if you committed no crimes in acquiring it, you'd probably be required to return it, but I'm not sure on this, especially in cases where you committed no crime yourself (e.g. if the auction scenario mentioned above occurred because the thieves dropped the coin on their way out of the building with the buyer legally and inadvertently acquiring the coin as part of the auctioned item). We can ignore the practical issues with proving it's "the real coin" rather than a counterfeit; I'm just curious about the legality assuming the coin was made in some way that rendered it immune to counterfeiting (handwaves explanation). Yes, this is a hypothetical, but I'd be willing to bet if any such coin existed, there'd be at least one movie made that involved either stealing it or becoming an overnight trillionaire by accident, so I figured I'd get the jump on the plausibility of such a movie.
As current law stands, it would be property of the US Mint if coined, US Treasury, if printed as a treasury note, not federal reserve note. This was decided by appellate court in regards to 1933 gold double eagles, coins that were struck, but never released to public. 3rd circuit pdf
You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.
Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question.
The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered.
I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court.
Because transferable is not the same as negotiable Most property is transferable. That is the owner of the property can legally transfer ownership to someone else (by contract, deed, or gift). This may require various degrees of formality: transfers of land must be in writing, transfers of motor vehicles usually require a change to a government register, transfers of a can of soft drink require no formality. Bills of landing serve to formalize the ownership of goods in transit and are so ubiquitous that the transfer of one is the transfer of the other. But that doesn’t make them negotiable. For normal goods, a person cannot pass on better title then they themselves possess. So, if I steal something or acquire it by fraud or otherwise dishonesty, I don’t own it. If I sell it to you, you don’t own it either even though you are a possessor in good faith (I, as the thief am a possessor in bad faith). The actual owner can recover the goods from whoever possesses them even if that person legitimately acquired them. Negotiable instruments are a special kind of transferable property where the mere possession of them (in good faith) makes you the owner of them. The most familiar type of negotiable property is cash. If I rob a bank and use that cash to legitimately buy something from you (and you don’t know the cash is stolen) then you own the cash. The original owner can go after me but they can’t come after you.
Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.
There is no law against driving a hard bargain If you were describing real estate owners rather than YouTube channel owners we’d have a term for them: a motivated seller. There is no law against using the fact that someone is desperate to sell to negotiate a lower price: that’s just good business. In general, common law legal systems do not involve themselves in whether a price agreed between two parties was fair: if you want to sell your original Picasso for $1 or pay $1m for a used tissue, that’s up to you. If you have ethical issues with that, don’t do it but it’s not illegal. Legal issues can come up where you are the cause in some way of the motivation. A lender foreclosing on a mortgage is ok. A lender offering to buy the property to avoid foreclosure is not. The first is just enforcing the terms of the contract, the second looks like undue influence and unconscionable conduct. Some countries have laws against profiteering and you would need to look at the legal definition to decide if this is or isn’t profiteering. In the US, it isn’t because their laws only deal with profiteering that damages the government. Some US states have laws against price gouging but these are usually to prevent charging too much, not too little. Which clauses of YouTube's Terms of Service would be violated? None. YouTube does not have any terms about selling your digital assets and we know it happens. Which US sanctions would be violated? It’s impossible to say without reading the sanction. If it’s illegal to transfer money to the sanctioned people then the whole plan falls over because you can’t pay for the channel in the first place.
EU Employer demands birth certificate - Why? My brother is Irish, he starts a job as manager of a bar in France. He provided his Irish Passport for id, and the employer wants an original birth certificate. My understanding is birth certificate, without being notarised, are not recognised outside there country of issue. In addition, they are not official documents for id (since they lack a photo). However, my understanding is passports are officially recognised internationally as id. Two other brothers live in Germany and Spain, both residents of those countries, both obtained their residency without any need for birth certificates (just passports). Birth certificates can be used as part of identity theft so alarm bells ring for me. Is there any reason why an employer might demand a birth certificate? Is there any reason why an Irish passport would not suffice?
This is weird. Within the EU, a passport is proof of identity, and it is also proof that you are allowed to take a job in the EU. There is nothing that a birth certificate would add to this. Either the bar manager is badly misinformed, or he doesn't want to give your brother a job, and will come up with something even more ridiculous if he gets the birth certificate.
The PDF you linked also lists "REAL ID Driver’s License/ID Card" as an acceptable document in Group B. So, it seems that an out-of-state driver's license may be used to verify DOB, but only if it complies with the REAL ID requirements. Apparently, all 50 states are now issuing REAL IDs, but only 38% of all licenses nationwide are currently REAL ID compliant.
The issues you describe have existed with signatures from the beginning of their use. There exists a tradeoff between ease of use and reliability, both of forgery and of people falsely claiming forgery. Originally, the closest thing to a signature was the use of seals and signet rings. While relatively hard to forge, it only showed that the possessor of the object agreed. Signatures, especially in cursive font, were developed later. They were in some ways easier to forge(you didn't need to get access to a physical device), but more difficult in others(the seal symbols tended to be used on everything and various improvements in technology had been made), and harder to falsely claim forgery(because most people can't alter their handwriting well). You were affixing your name to the document, indicating that you agreed. Often, the signatures were required to backed up with the signatures of other people as witnesses. They didn't have to agree to the document, they just had to agree to testify that you signed of your own free will. Because witnesses, especially trustworthy and independent witnesses, are hard to come by, some places have dropped that requirement, such as checks and signing a aper receipt when using a credit card. But for some important documents, certain jurisdictions still require witnesses, including large transactions (a document relating to a car insurance payout I recently had required a witness to confirm my signature) and marriages. However, with electronic media, the point of a signature is more to indicate deliberate acceptance of terms, with verification of an individual being left to other processes (e.g. IP address, MAC address, linkage to a specific email account, etc.), so forgery is less of an issue. I have also seen "signatures" amount to checkboxes and "I agree" buttons. Generally, the higher the stakes and "more legal" the agreement, the more likely to these have been the "typed signatures" that you describe, but this seems to be decreasing in frequency, suggesting that its purpose was to stop gap a hole in legal acceptance by judges/courts/laws with regards to electronic communications. Addendum: It should also note that the replacement of seals by signatures is not universal; for instance in Japan, seals are still used over signatures in the majority of cases.
As far as your visa is concerned, both, France and Germany are in the Schengen area, so a visa in one of those countries will give you access to both. As for as your work permit is concerned, at least in Germany you will need some participation of your new employer. They will have to prove that they can find nobody else in the EU. So they'll probably want you to sign the employment contract. As far as getting out of such a contract in Germany, you have to differentiate between a fixed-term contract (e.g. for 2 years) and an indefinite contract. Once you sign a fixed-term contract, it is difficult to get out of it before its normal end. Unlimited contracts in Germany usually come with a 6 month probation period, where both, the employer and employee can end the contract immediately. In this specific case you might be able to get out of the German contract. I don't know though if the employer would go through the trouble of obtaining a work permit for you without binding you for a fixed amount of time to them.
Based on Irish law, specifically the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, can I live abroad after naturalizing as an Irish citizen and retain my citizenship just by filling that form? Yes, subject of course to factual disputes. The statute (as amended) provides that this revocation is not possible when the citizen has "registered annually in the prescribed manner his name and a declaration of his intention to retain Irish citizenship with an Irish diplomatic mission or consular office or with the Minister": Revocation of certificates of naturalisation. 19.—(1) The Minister may revoke a certificate of naturalisation if he is satisfied— (a) that the issue of the certificate was procured by fraud, misrepresentation whether innocent or fraudulent, or concealment of material facts or circumstances, or (b) that the person to whom it was granted has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State, or (c) that (except in the case of a certificate of naturalisation which is issued to a person of Irish descent or associations) the person to whom it is granted has been ordinarily resident outside the State or, in the case of an application for a certificate of naturalisation granted under section 15A, resident outside the island of Ireland (otherwise than in the public service) for a continuous period of seven years and without reasonable excuse has not during that period registered annually in the prescribed manner his name and a declaration of his intention to retain Irish citizenship with an Irish diplomatic mission or consular office or with the Minister, or (d) that the person to whom it is granted is also, under the law of a country at war with the State, a citizen of that country, or (e) that the person to whom it is granted has by any voluntary act, other than marriage or entry into a civil partnership, acquired another citizenship. To be precise, filing this declaration does not protect the citizen from revocation of naturalization under another subsection of section 19(1). But if we assume that the annual declarations were all filed promptly (or that there is a reasonable excuse for any failure to file promptly), and that there is no dispute about this, then it is plain from the statutory text that the minister has no discretion to revoke the certificate of naturalization under 19(1)(c). If it were a country like UK or New Zealand, it would straightaway revoke citizenship by claiming misrepresentation of the intention to reside. This is not necessarily true. If there is a reason for the decision to leave, the naturalized citizen could seek to rebut any presumption that there had been misrepresentation. In the case of Ireland, filing the annual declaration does not protect the naturalized citizen from denaturalization under 19(1)(a), so even if the declarations are filed, it could be necessary to show evidence that there was a genuine intention to reside in Ireland at the time of naturalization, and that the intention changed subsequently. If that intention did not in fact exist, then the minister could assert that the certificate had been obtained by fraud, and if the naturalized citizen is unable to rebut that assertion, the minister could revoke the certificate under 19(1)(a). Also see Part IV of the statute for other ways in which Irish citizenship may be lost. In practice, I don't think it is presently very common for countries that generally tolerate (or explicitly permit) multiple nationalities, such as Ireland, the UK, and New Zealand, to seek to denaturalize their naturalized citizens who move abroad. Denaturalization seems to be largely confined to politically sensational cases such as those of terrorists. Since Ireland is a party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, one way to protect your Irish citizenship may be to renounce your other citizenship(s), if that is possible. However, I do not see any related provisions in the 1956 act linked above.
I don't believe GDPR makes a distinction between 'real life' and 'online'. It's all real life. You can tell anyone that they don't have consent to keep your personal data, but that doesn't mean they always have to delete it. There are six lawful bases for processing of personal data, so if an organisation is using and can justify one other than consent then they don't necessarily have to delete your data when they ask. The six bases are listed by the UK Information Commissioner's Office: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/#ib3
Is it actually necessary for businesses (such as a Small Town News USA Inc) that do not reside in EU to care about GDPR? Only if they offer goods/services to or monitor behavior of people in the EU (Art. 3(2)). Note that: having a commerce-oriented website that is accessible to EU residents does not by itself constitute offering goods or services in the EU. Rather, a business must show intent to draw EU customers, for example, by using a local language or currency. If it is then how (and by whom) would compliance be audited and/or enforced? Supervisory Authorities will care of it.
The Czech Consulate General in New York has a page about this. Presumably a similar situation would prevail at other Czech consulates, so this answer should help even if you do not reside in its territory. The page notes that if you are not "a relative" you can "enclose an explanation letter why do you need the duplicate of the birth [or marriage] certificate." So it's possible that they'd give you a copy anyway, but, to increase your chances, you might want to include a letter explaining that you need the document to demonstrate your own Czech nationality. You can also include a copy of your birth certificate as evidence of your relationship. The page links to the forms you have to submit with the request for the certificate. They reflect the same possibility, slightly more specifically. The birth certificate application says 6. V případě, že nejste v tabulce, uveďte vztah k dítěti nebo jiný právní zájem: 6. In case you are not the person in a table, relation must be stated or any other legal interest: As far as I can tell "the person in a table" means "a person in the list of birth certificates being requested with this form." That is, you don't need to explain yourself if you are the child whose birth certificate it is, nor if you are one of the parents shown on the certificate. The marriage certificate form similarly says 6. V případě, že nejste osobou uvedenou v tabulce, uveďte vztah k osobám nebo jiný právní zájem (If the applicant is not listed in the table below as the Husband or Wife, please provide an explanation of the relationship or legal interest which authorizes this submission.): This last sentence hints at the one thing that I unfortunately do not know, which is the criteria for judging whether a given explanation is legally sufficient to authorize the release of the certificate to the person who submitted the application. I guess your case is as good as it gets, but it's possible that the law prevents the certificates to be issued to you while your parents are still alive.
What is the difference between typeface derivative works and a "document created using the font" I like the Humor Sans font and have been using it to create infographics. These are png/jpg files and do not contain information about the font typeface, nor do they contain any of the source code of the font ttf files. The font/ttf files are licensed under this license, which states; [This license] allows the licensed fonts to be used, studied, modified and redistributed freely as long as they are not sold by themselves. The fonts, including any derivative works, can be bundled, embedded, redistributed and/or sold with any software provided that any reserved names are not used by derivative works. The fonts and derivatives, however, cannot be released under any other type of license. The requirement for fonts to remain under this license does not apply to any document created using the fonts or their derivatives. My understanding of what constitutes derivative works comes from this online document, which states that; A derivative work is based on a work that has already been copyrighted. My initial assumption based on this was that producing an image file that is generated using the font is a form of derivative works. However, this assumption has led me to some confusion, as I am now reading the two bold sentences as contradictory: The fonts and derivatives, however, cannot be released under any other type of license This seems to tell me that my image has to be licensed under the same license. The requirement for fonts to remain under this license does not apply to any document created using the fonts or their derivatives. My lay understanding here is that an image file is almost certainly a document created using the font. So this seems to suggest I am exempt from any licensing requirements. So which is it? I live in Australia, but my content will be published from a webserver in the United States.
A document, or an image of a document, created using a font would not be considered to be a derivative work of that font. If it were, our system of licensing fonts would need to be significantly different. In any case the part of the license which reads: [This license] allows the licensed fonts to be used, studied, modified and redistributed freely as long as they are not sold by themselves. It specifically permits such use of the fonts. By "derivatives" the license seems to mean modified versions of the fonts, which it permits the licensee to create and use subject to certain restrictions. This seems to be confirmed by the license text which says: The requirement for fonts to remain under this license does not apply to any document created using the fonts or their derivatives. The plain meaning of this is that derivatives of the fonts are used to create documents, not that they are documents themselves, and that in any case "any document created using the fonts" is not subject to the license restriction.
Can I sell below parody T-Shirts? Sure, you can sell those shirts. But there is no guarantee that your own determination and claim of Fair Use for a parody would prevail in court. The determination that your use of those derivative designs - Fair Use as a Parody - is not yours to make; it is for a court to make, if and when the copyright holders of those two franchises choose to take you to court. Your determination of Fair Use could only be valid in the US; there may be no Fair Use law in your country, and any relevant international laws and agreements will impact what the legal steps the copyright holders can take against you. Read Fair Use again for exceptions to the law and about international laws such as as Berne Convention and World Intellectual Property Organization. Warner Brothers (Superman) and Paramount (Godfather) could decide at any time to confront you with a cease and desist letter or a lawsuit to challenge your claim of Fair Use. They may win; you may win your defense of their lawsuit. That's a risk you will take. The fact that other people currently produce shirts with similar designs doesn't mean anything. They may not have been confronted by the copyright holders; or the copyright holders may not care to confront small producers of possibly infringing designs and products.
The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.
Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.
There are no copyright restrictions, since tax forms are government works and statutorily not protected. The IRS in fact says that you can use a substantially identical form for W9, as long as you don't do certain things and do do other required things. You do not submit W-9 to the IRS, but they provide a document describing substitute tax forms. Basically, they say "The IRS accepts quality substitute tax forms that are consistent with the official forms and have no adverse impact on processing". You can't "just do it", without approval, but you might be able to get approval if your document follows the rules. If the output exactly reproduces the official form except for the parts which you must remove, then it would probably pass muster and it would not matter that the engine that you use is HTML. You can also remove the color screening -- read the rules to see what all is immutable vs. changeable.
To examine this further and answer your question, we need to look at Copyright (and fair use) as well as Defamation. Alas, I am unsure as to how taking legitimate headlines from around the world and attributing their source is 'fake news' - but I'll accept that it's 'fake news' for the purposes of exploring this topic. A lot of the potential (or motive) for a person or company to litigate against you will be context specific and detailed to how you have used their work and portray their journalists and characters - misquotes etc. As an exception to British copyright law, fair dealing is governed by Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which outlines three instance where fair dealing is a legitimate defence: If the use is for the purposes of research or private study; If it is used for the purposes of criticism, review or quotation; Where it is utilised for the purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) However, where you may come into problems is: A statutory definition for fair dealing does not exist; it will always be a matter of fact, degree and interpretation in every fair use case. Nor is there a percentage or quantitative measure to determine fair dealing. The Intellectual Property Office lists the key factors used to determine the validity of whether a particular dealing with a work is fair as follows: Has the use of the work impacted negatively on the market for the original work? If the creator or owner has lost potential revenue through the re-use of their work, it is not likely to be fair. Was it reasonable and necessary to use the amount of work that was taken? Also: Fair use for parody, caricature or pastiche The UK copyright law on fair use of works for the purposes of creating a parody or pastiche is also listed in Section 30A, Schedule 2 (2A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. References to all here. Guidance from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) states that fair use needs to be “fair and proportionate” and does not protect an individual from any other rights an author may have. Those other rights may involve claiming defamation if this material creates fake news and uses the names of real journalists or companies etc - and if they allege that your AI fake news has caused serious harm in any way to their reputation - they could sue you for breach of the Defamation Act 2013. All of this is entirely contextual however as to how your AI might display or make fake news and how Google caches it and displays it - and if it could be portrayed as 'real' or believable for example. You are also doing this at a time where 'anti fake news' law is evolving... and even though you say it's fake news for AI experiment purposes - it's a growing field of concern for many. (see here) Copyright law is a vast and evolving area - and nothing is clear cut. It really depends if a major news company didn't like what you were doing and took exception to it and issued challenges on many areas of law based on that.
Under U.S. law (17 U.S. Code § 101 ) A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” But probably, focusing on this definition doesn't get to the heart of the question you seem to be asking. A more important matter becomes what protections does a copyright exclude? This is covered in § 102 (b), which says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The similarities you describe seem to be more ideas and concepts rather than Heinlein's expression of those ideas. I have looked no closer than the description used in the question, but the movie seems unlikely to have violated a protected right. Others might disagree.
First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.
What is the U.K. GDPR? I understand that the DPA implemented the GDPR in British law as an act of Parliament. Then there was Brexit, and the U.K. GDPR was introduced to stand in for the no longer binding EU GDPR, with only very few minor differences. Why was the U.K. GDPR even necessary as a replacement for the eu GDPR? Why isn’t simply having an active statute (ie DPA 2018) remain on the books enough?
The 2018 Data Protection Act specifically implemented the GDPR EU Regulation in the UK - while the regulation itself was directly binding it required member states to create their own legislation for implementing the details - setting up the required supervisory and accreditation bodies etc. The various 'opening clauses' in the regulation also provided the means for the members states to implement specifics in local legislation (so long as that legislation exceeded the minimums set out in GDPR). At the end of the Brexit transition period the UK was no longer a member state (and it's citizens were no longer EU citizens), keeping the DPA 2018 as was would have actually meant that UK citizens weren't eligible for the very protections it was intended to provide them! Therefore the basis of the law needed updating (as well as certain minor provisions that no longer made sense) hence the "UK GDPR" provided a substitute. The fundamentals are the same and crucially it also codified the necessary basis for the UK's data protection laws to have what is referred to as "adequacy" - which means that the EU considers the UK GDPR/DPA to provide "essentially equivalent" levels of protection and therefore data is allowed to continue to flow between the UK and the EU.
The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.
Yes, phone numbers would generally qualify as Personal Data under GDPR. It would be so irrespective of whether you have also stored other information along with the phone numbers or not, since also information that indirectly could identify a natural person is Personal Data (provided that there are, somewhere else, public or not public, a register of who holds the specific phone number). See Article 4(1) GDPR. (One could possibly argue that the phone numbers would not be considered personal data if there is no actual register of who owns a specific phone number with any other party. Or if such register is in practice not available for anyone. It might be so in some cases, although I would not rely on it.) Whether you have the right to process the phone numbers must be assessed based on its lawfulness (see Article 6 GDPR). It could be based on consent, performance of contract, legitimate interest or any other ground set out therein.
The GDPR applies regardless of where and how data is processed. But it is necessary to look at what the processing activities in question are, and who is the controller for these activities by determining their purposes and means. This argument is supported: by the absence of relevant exemptions in the GDPR by the GDPR's broad definition of the data controller by the ECJ's analysis in the Fashion ID case GDPR Exemptions For certain constellations (e.g. controller = natural person, purposes = purely personal or household activities) that processing is exempt from GDPR compliance (see GDPR Art 2(2)). However per GDPR Recital 18, the GDPR would still apply “to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing data for such personal or household activities.” For example, this means that I am able to use WhatsApp to process my friends' contact information for purely personal purposes because I'm exempt from the GDPR with respect to that processing, but Facebook is still subject to the GDPR regarding how they process personal data collected via WhatsApp. Already on the basis of the GDPR providing no exception for processing on someone else's computer, I disagree strongly with the answer you cited (and have already written a competing answer). It seems entirely counterfactual. How to figure out who the controller is. Per GDPR Art 4(7), controller is whoever “alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”, although other laws might provide more specific criteria for individual purposes or means. We will return to that definition in the next section. The ICO has provided a checklist to figure out if you're a data controller or perhaps a joint controller. Some of the questions are aligned with the above definition, like “We decided what the purpose or outcome of the processing was to be”. Other questions are there as a contrast to the data processor role, e.g. “We have complete autonomy as to how the personal data is processed”. Analysis of the Fashion ID case (ECJ C-40/17) This judgement provides a detailed analysis of who the data controller is, and is therefore relevant to the question. Fashion ID had embedded a Facebook “Like” button on their website, thus causing the visitor's browser to transmit personal data to Facebook. Fashion ID asserted that they were not the data controller, since they had no control over what data was collected by the Like button and how it was subsequently used by Facebook. Fashion ID relied in part of the argument that they weren't the controller because processing happened on the visitor's computer. This ruling was made on the basis of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 which was repealed by the GDPR. However, since the DPD and GDPR have effectively identical definitions of “controller” and “processing”, the court's analysis remains highly relevant. In the following I'll “translate” all DPD references to the GDPR, in analogy to GDPR Art 94(2). The court found that Fashion ID was a data controller for the processing by the Like button, and that it was a joint controller with Facebook for this processing. However, Fashion ID was only a controller for those processing activities in which they played a part, not for subsequent processing of the data that was controlled by Facebook alone. Relevant details from the Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2019:629): Paragraphs 65–66: The GDPR tries to achieve a high level of data protection through a broad definition of “controller”. Thus, an overly narrow interpretation that counteracts this goal is incompatible with the law. Paragraph 68: An entity is a controller when it exerts influence over the processing for its own purposes, thereby participating in determining the purposes and means of processing. Compare the GDPR Art 4(7) definition of “controller”. case law: C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, paragraph 68: “However, a natural or legal person who exerts influence over the processing of personal data, for his own purposes, and who participates, as a result, in the determination of the purposes and means of that processing, may be regarded as a controller”. Paragraphs 67, 69–70, 82: It is not necessary to have a single controller, there can be multiple joint controllers. The joint controllers can be involved to different degrees. You can be a joint controller without having access to the personal data. case law: C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, paragraph 69: “Furthermore, the joint responsibility of several actors for the same processing, under that provision, does not require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned”. case law: C-210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, paragraph: 38: “In any event, [GDPR] does not, where several operators are jointly responsible for the same processing, require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned.” Paragraphs 71–74: Processing can consist of many different individual activities. A controller might only be involved in some of them, and can only be a controller for those activities for which they (jointly) determine purposes and means of processing. Paragraphs 76–79: Fashion ID was able to determine the purposes and means of processing regarding data collection and transmission by the Like button. The act of embedding the button showed that they had decisive influence over the processing: without the embedding, the data processing would not have occurred. To summarize the relevant conclusions: someone is a data controller when they participate in determining the purposes and means of processing for some processing activity for joint controllers, this holds regardless of whether they have access to the data or participate in the processing itself one cannot be a controller for a processing activity for which they cannot determine purposes and means. Conclusion and application to the question This analysis reaffirms my competing answer to the cited answer that it is important to determine who the data controller is. The Fashion ID case shows that is important to perform this analysis on a fairly granular manner, on the level of individual processing activities. For processing on a data subject's computer by a program written by another provider, this means: some processing activities might be solely under the user's control, then they are the sole data controller (or might be exempt from GDPR) for some processing activities, the software developer might decide alone for which purposes and through which means the processing is carried out for other activities, the user and data controller might be joint controllers. This does not require explicit agreement but can result implicitly. This does not require that the software developer has access to the personal data undergoing processing. For example, a spreadsheet application might be used by an end user to process personal data on their own computer (or via a cloud application, with the same conclusions). We can consider different processing activities performed by the software: sorting, transforming, and other processing of the data in the spreadsheet is solely under the end users control, so they are the data controller (if they aren't exempt) collecting usage analytics (where those analytics signals are personal data for which the end user is the data subject) is solely under the software developers control uploading crash reports (where those reports contain personal data from the end user and contain contents from the currently opened spreadsheet) is more complicated. The software developer is definitely a controller. The end user has a dual role here as a data subject and a joint controller (if they aren't exempt) because the crash report processes personal data for which they are the controller.
It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc.
The 'right to be forgotten', as currently being applied throughout the European Union (EU), does not come from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force 25 May 2018. Rather, the current basis exists in the Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC, article 12(b): Right of access Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller: [...] (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data; This was one of the main points upon which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, the judgement which allowed for individuals to ask for search engines to remove results containing personal data. The CJEU explained that the 'right to be forgotten' was not absolute and should take into account economic considerations as well as other rights (paragraphs 85 - 88). The GDPR, article 17, for purposes of contrast, has a more robust and explicit right of erasure than currently in force: Article 17 Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: [...] Shortened for clarity GDPR, article 17 fleshes out much of the lack of specifics that the Directive's article 12(b). It should be noted that the UK's Data Protection Act 1998 is a transposition of the Data Protection Directive. This means that the full effect of the rights and obligations in the Directive are contained within the Data Protection Act 1998. Furthermore, the interpretation of the rights and obligations of the Data Protection Directive by the CJEU are highly influential on interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998. This is due to the European Communities Act 1972, s 3(2) which states: Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the Communities and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court on any such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be admissible as evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of any of the Communities or of any Community institution Even without the above provision, it would be extremely likely that British courts would take into account Google Spain, given that the foundation of the Data Protection Act 1998 is the Data Protection Directive. The most likely outcome is for British courts to uphold the interpretation in Google Spain and allow for data subjects to request removal from search engines. Of course, it is not entirely possible to know without a test case, but it is doubtful any major search engine would attempt to deviate from the current situation as there is currently legal certainty. The Data Protection Act 1998 will still be in force after the future Brexit agreement and is certainly not contingent on continued EU membership. Update The current DPA will be repealed when Brexit comes in to play and will be replaced by a new one. Read more about the new data protection bill on the ICOs web site, which is based on the GDPR with certain derogations and additions.
If you are not processing the personal information of EU citizens yourselves then you are unlikely to be classed as data processors under GDPR (check Article 3: Territorial Scope, p.32-33). If you were to operate a Software-as-a-Sevice (SaaS) solution then you would be a data controller/processor (or both) and GDPR would certainly apply if you have EU citizens as customers/users. While I can't see any reference to software vendors in the GDPR text, as a software vendor it would be in your interest to ensure your products meet the criteria set out in Article 25 (Data Protection by design and by default, p.48) in order to help your customers to comply, such as: Implement appropriate technical measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. Implement appropriate technical measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons. These along with similar organisational measures are the responsibility of the data controller, but unless your software helps them to comply they may be forced to consider alternative solutions which reduce their overall risk. If your software already has a number of such controls in place it may be worth putting a white-paper or similar communication together which can inform your customers of how your software helps them to comply. There does not appear to be any direct liability to the software vendor through GDPR. If a data breach is the result of a design flaw or implementation bug in the software and your customer gets fined as a result, they may be likely to pursue you on grounds of the software not being fit-for-purpose and lacking the appropriate technical controls required to ensure data privacy. In this event, your defence will rely upon records of designing and implementing controls, records of software testing and remediation, and having in place suitable procedures to ensure security patches can be quickly deployed to your customers when required. Further clarification as requested: If your organisation doesn't process the personal data, doesn't have any third parties process it on your behalf (includes hosting companies) or have any access to it ever, then you're neither a controller or processor. However, if your customers ever send you personal data or grant you temporary access to personal data as part of troubleshooting issues with your software, then you would be a processor in this context and would need an appropriate contract in place and would need to ensure the appropriate technical and organisational controls are implemented to comply with GDPR and reduce risk of a personal data breach. Additionally, if international data transfers take place as part of this (e.g. sending/accessing files over the Internet) you would need to ensure your organisation is able to provide an equivalent level of protection for the rights of the data subjects - for example if you are in the U.S. you would likely need to voluntarily join up to the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield or use the EU's Model Contract Clauses within your contracts in order for it to be legal for EU-based businesses to use you as a data processor. For more information about international transfers read the EU's Data Transfers outside the EU page. Ref: GDPR
Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question.
The difference between the first available exit and any other exit Alberta's driver's guide says "when you intend to use the first available exit, approach the circle (even though you are already in the circle, intending to exit ...) using the right lane. It also says "when you intend to leave at any other exit, approach the circle (you are already in the circle, but the guide tells you to approach it again ... confusing) using the left lane. My question is: What's the difference between the first available exit and any other exit? I thought if you are in the right lane, you have to stay in that lane when exiting. And if you are in the left lane, you have to stay in that lane when exiting. This is all very confusing to me. Please help and thank you! "Exiting circular intersections Always wait to activate your right turn signal after passing the exit that is before your intended exit. This tells other drivers that you intend to leave the circle at the next exit. When you intend to use the first available exit: • Approach the circle using the right lane. • Use your right signal as you approach. Leave it on until you have exited the circle. • As you approach, scan for pedestrians and cyclists at the crosswalks at the entrance and exits of the circle. • Yield to traffic in the circle. • Exit the circle using the right lane. When you intend to leave at any other exit: • Approach the circle using the left lane. • Activate your left signal to communicate that you do not plan to use the first exit. • As you approach, scan for pedestrians and cyclists at the crosswalks at the entrance and exits of the circle. • Yield to traffic in the circle. • Exit the circle using the left lane."
I think you have understood it correctly. And the diagrams make things clearer as to why, when you are intending to use an exit other than the first exit, it is better to enter the two-lane roundabout via the left lane. The reason is because if you are in the right lane and do not exit, you must be alert to the need to yield to left-lane traffic that might be exiting. Using the left lane when you have planned ahead-of-time that you will not be using the first exit helps avoid a potential yield situation. The guide seems to emphasize that the lane you enter is the lane you should stay in throughout and is the lane you should end up exiting from. This is clear from the diagrams showing that you can exit directly from the left lane (by crossing through the right lane on the way out); it's captioned "Vehicle H must yield to vehicle G." As far as I can tell, none of that is prescribed by regulation other than the requirement to yield to left-lane traffic. But the material in the guide might inform the standard of care (see also an Alberta example), and following the guide might be expected as part of a driving test.
I know this is not the answer you want to hear but your situation of having to merge into another lane due to a lane closure is not exceptional. You need to merge so you must ensure that there is enough room in the other lane to do so safely. I looked at several sections of the California DMV Driver Handbook. The other driver could be considered an aggressive driver. The DMV says to avoid; let them pass, etc. The Handbook does suggest that a driver let others merge when possible, but it's not a requirement (page 84). This is similar to merging onto a freeway. The freeway traffic has the right-of-way. While the DMV suggests that a driver already on the freeway should speed up or slow down to help traffic that's trying to merge onto the freeway, it's not a requirement.
As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.
As mentioned in the comments, the simple answer is 'probably not' because you probably haven't yet gotten around to taking your halftrack in to get the necessary paperwork to demonstrate eligibility for registration, even if said halftrack was eligible for registration. I'm also going to confine this answer to whether you can legally drive the halftrack on public roads. I am not aware of any special laws about merely owning a halftrack that (say) you keep on a farm as decoration, but in any case I think you are more interested in whether the vehicle in question can be registered. Vehicle registration standards are (mostly) dealt with under State and territory law. I can give you an answer for Victoria, to at least illustrate the issues and where to look for answers. However, (at least some of) the relevant standards appear to be uniform across Australia. The starting point is that it is an offence to operate a vehicle on a public road without registering said vehicle: Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), s 7. The Act provides that: the Regulations may prescribe how registration is applied for and granted or refused: s 9; and the Minister may prescribe standards for registration by notice in the Gazette: s 10. The standards cover "the construction, efficiency, performance, safety, design and equipment of, and the method of identifying" vehicles. I'm not good at searching Gazettes so I'm going to wave my hand over a gap and skip straight to things like: 'Guide to Modifications for Motor Vehicles' on the VicRoads website (VicRoads being the road traffic authority in Victoria, the government agency in charge of registering vehicles): https://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/~/media/files/documents/safety-and-road-rules/vsinumber8guidetomodificationsformotorvehicles.ashx?la=en 'National Code of Practice for Light Vehicle Construction and Modification (NCOP)', which is an Australia-wide document: https://infrastructure.gov.au/roads/vehicle_regulation/bulletin/vsb_ncop.aspx This is one of those areas where you probably need a mechanic more than a lawyer. Once you have satisfied yourself that your halftrack meets the applicable standards, you need to go and get a 'VASS Approval Certificate' ('Vehicle Assessment Signatory Scheme') from a certified tester and then register the vehicle with VicRoads. Happy driving!
united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect.
The police performed an "open air sniff". Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case.
You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here.
germany Ah, okay, there isn't any easy answer/number/table for this. In general, the "Aufsichtspflicht" results from Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 1631 Inhalt und Grenzen der Personensorge. There are not clear cut lines or given ages. This is mainly because it does not make a lot of sense. A very independent and mature 6 year old can do things a less developed or even disabled person might not be able to do, even at the age of 18+. Generally speaking, the parents have the duty to care for the child, anything else can be handled by contracts. For example a contract with a kindergarten. Or School. Or private/public pool. From personal experience I can say this: Germany is very safe. Kids go to school on foot, on bike or longer distances by normal public transport among all the other adults. We do not have "school busses". Between 07:00 and 08:00 public transport is packed with kids of all ages going to school. Schools do not normally have their own stops. Kids get off at the nearest stop and walk the rest of the way. Around the school you will see streams of children coming from all directions on bike or foot. It is rare to see adults accompanying them, unless it's the first weeks of elementary school or the last day before school holidays where parents pick up their kids to do something fun after school. When I was a kid, I walked to school every day, almost from day one of elementary school. The first few weeks an adult would accompany us (one of the parents, they had a rotation going), then we walked on our own, as a group of 3-4 kids in the same class from the same neighborhood block. Google maps says it's a 10 minute walk of 800 meters. If any teacher had stopped me from leaving the school building on my own when school was finished, I am sure people would have wondered why. That only happened for mentally handicapped kids. Even kids who needed transport for one reason or another would just know to wait in front of the school. No teacher or other adult would be there. At 5th grade, I know half my class came by bike and in the winter or on rainy days by public transport, because they did not live in walking distance to the school. Neither did I, but I lived close enough to not get the public transport ticket subsidized, so the kids from our street got there by bike, or on foot when the parents deemed riding a bike to unsafe in snow and ice in winter. Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended? The parents. Unless the contract says otherwise, or circumstances are exceptionally dangerous. There is no exact written guideline for this, because it would not make sense. The adult has to know what is exceptionally dangerous and what is not. It can be perfectly safe for a 10 year old to walk home through the woods. If that is what the parents deem okay, then it is okay. Yet as the adult in charge, you have the duty to keep them back, if you know the woods are on fire today, or a criminal escaped into the woods or something similar that would make it significantly more dangerous then the parents had in mind when they made their general decision. If a 10-year-old child says that their parents "said they could go home alone", can I reasonably stop them? If you have a contract that says they cannot go home alone, sure. If there is a special situation that implies the conditions have changed from what your contract said (lets say the radio broadcasts a storm warning and you see that the weather is horrible and branches flying around could injure a smaller kid) you can (maybe even have to), even if you do not have a contract. Otherwise... why would you? It’s their parents decision. If they had wanted you to keep an eye on their kids when the time is up, they would have made a contract that says so.
Under what law could Peter Doig have been liable for saying he did not paint a painting? It is in the news that Peter Doig has won a case, including being granted $2.5 million in fees, after he said he did not paint a picture. From the NYT at the time the case was submitted, the claimant says "His suit contends that Mr. Doig is either confused or lying and that his denials blew up a plan to sell the work for millions of dollars." After seeing the facts of the case, it seems obvious that Mr. Doig was neither confused or lying, but what if he was? None of the articles state exactly what law may have been broken here. Under what circumstances could someone sue another for either being confused or lying about the fact of if an item was created by them?
The original lawsuit was filed "seeking damages for their alleged tortious interference with Plaintiffs' prospective economic advantage by taking action that scuttled the auction of a painting owned by Fletcher, and also seeking a declaration that Doig painted the painting", insofar as Doig denied being the painter of the work. To simplify matters, Fletcher came to possess a painting, (purportedly) believed that it was painted by Doig, and sought to sell it for a large amount of money. Doig stated that he did not paint the work. Doig acted to prevent the sale of the painting – that is against the law. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgement, that the painting was made by Doig. In a trial subsequent to the above ruling, the court actually declared that the painting was not done by Doig, and Doig sued for "vexatious litigation", being awarded a sanction of $2,525,958.35.
I don't know of any legal reason to care whether people consider reverse graffiti to be graffiti, since graffiti is not itself a legal concept. The act when done without permission is, however, trespassing, which is against the law. Painting a building is legal, if done with permission; painting a building in a pattern is legal, if done with permission. Strangely enough, cleaning a building without permission, whether entirely of selectively in a pattern, is illegal. There are in fact specific laws about defacing property, so the illegality of the act does not rely solely on trespass laws. The NYC law is here, the California law is here, and there are many similar laws. In Washington, illegality arises from a more general prohibition against causing physical damage, which is defined here, and boils down to "costs money to fix". These laws are not limited to "applying opaque material to a surface".
Against Bob: yes; Against Cindy: no I'm going to borrow @Trish's example because it's a good one although the conclusions they reach are wrong. Alice made a green box. Bob signs an NDA never to tell anyone that Alice made a green box, and there is a clause in it that if the NDA is breached, the box is red. Bob tells Cindy that Alice made a green box. Cindy has a patent on making green boxes. Cindy sues Alice and in the lawsuit puts Bob on the stand. Situation 1 So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. Bob is on the stand and is required to answer questions honestly and no contract can prevent him from doing so. He testifies that the box is green. This would be a breach of contract except that a clause that requires a breach of the law (perjury in this case) is void for public policy reasons so Bob cannot be sued for this. However, he can be sued for the initial breach - he may have a public policy defense here because Alice was breaking the law, however, it’s easy enough to construct a scenario where Alice was innocent but suffered loss from Bob’s disclosure. Cindy can say what she likes because she is not bound by the NDA. Cindy wins, Alice loses. Situation 2 Cindy dies - after a long and happy life so we won't grieve too much. To Bob's surprise, he inherits Cindy's green box patent of which he was previously in complete ignorance of. Bob sues Alice for breaching Cindy's now his, patent. So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. However, Bob agreed with Alice in the contract that the box is red and so, legally for matters between Alice and Bob the box is legally red (notwithstanding that everyone knows it's green) and is not in breach of Bob's patent. This sort of stuff has a name - a legal fiction. Adoption is a legal fiction - adoptive parents are (legally) parents; biological parents of adopted children are (legally) strangers. Alice wins, Bob loses.
"Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent.
Bottom line I'd tread pretty carefully here. If you paid $2000 for the photo, you might want to check to see if it came with a licensing agreement. Background One way to view this is through the lens of privacy. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A subjects privacy invaders to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. Because you mention public personas and your facts don't involve disclosing private details, negative publicity, or interfering with seclusion, one might think appropriation of name or likeness applies. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. Comment (a) to this section explains that a person's identity is in the nature of a property right. Courts have tended to recognize an individual's interest in the exclusive use of his or her own identity, going so far as to require licensing for usage. The most common way to violate this "property right" is by appropriating someone's name or likeness to promote a business or product. Cases abound on the subject, but a classic one is White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). To summarize, Samsung ran a picture-based ad featuring a futuristic robot dressed in an evening gown and turning "Wheel of Fortune"-styled letters. Vanna White was nonplussed and brought suit, which she won on appeal. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit argued the operative question wasn't how Samsung appropriated her likeness, but whether they had done so. The point of citing White here is simply to observe that a person's "likeness" probably extends even further than mere photo reproduction. Back to your facts: posting actual images of celebrities for a commercial purpose appears a much more clear cut appropriation of likeness than White. While it may seem similar, I'd distinguish your situation from that of restaurant "Walls of Fame"---which showcase signed photos of celebrities with the owner---in that the celebrities you mention weren't using your product or service at the time of the photograph. You might argue the photos aren't being used for advertising, but the plaintiff would counter that you posted them on a client-facing business website. In the Ninth Circuit this would be a question of whether there was an appropriation, not the way in which it was accomplished. For argument's sake, assume the court agrees your usage isn't commercial. Even that doesn't necessarily mean you're in the clear. In § 652C, and varying state-by-state, non-commercial purposes are also subject to scrutiny: Comment (b). Apart from statute, however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of the name or likeness. It's important to remember the Restatement isn't binding: it simply attempts to "restate" what courts (which are binding) have had to say on the topic. If you paid a lot of money for the photo, it might pay to see if it came with a licensing agreement.
The fault lies with the people who vandalized your house. In general, whoever causes you damage is responsible (liable) for that damage. This is true whether or not you are selling your house, having guests over, letting a friend stay over for a night or a week, or whatever the circumstance is. Insurance is there to cover many such losses: if a friend trashes your house in a drunken rage, your insurance will cover the damage, but they will invoke the doctrine of subrogation whereby they get to go after the friend, and you have to cooperate. In a situation where nobody has a clue who did the damage, the only possible way that the agent has any responsibility is if they were negligent in their duty to take care of the house. For your specific case, you'd need to discuss the forensic facts with your attorney. But generally speaking, the issue would be whether the agent had breached his/her professional duty of care, which is best understood as comparing his actions (or lack) compares to actions of other professionals in the same circumstance. If a house has 3 or 4 sets of visitors simultaneously, it is really not possible for an agent to supervise all of them at once. So the question would be, was this the result of one concentrated vandalism attack, or serial vandalism. The former is more in the realm of "stuff happens", and the latter is indicative of an endemic lack of care. To repeat, the fault lies with the miscreants who vandalized your house. You, or your insurance company, may nevertheless have to bear the financial burden. Your insurance company will certainly have an interest in spreading responsibility to the realty firm, if warranted by the facts.
Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.
All torts have to be proved. In 99.99% of cases the proof is by admission of the tortfeaser. That is, they agree to pay damages with or without admission of liability. Where liability is contested, there are never any “slam dunks”. There are strong cases, even very strong cases, but when someone else is deciding the case, there are no certainties. Remember, if your opponent thought they were going to lose, they’d settle. Looking at your examples, it seems that the tort you are thinking of is negligence. In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Where the issue is not one of evidence, that is, the facts are as you say and are not in dispute, the question is not “what happened”, but “is what happened negligence”. For all the examples, 1, 3, and 4 are probably not in dispute: there was a duty, the conduct caused damage at law and the plaintiff actually suffered harm. The question to be decided is whether the driver failed to conform to the required standard of care. For examples 2 and 3, most courts would conclude they didn’t. For example 1, some courts might decide that the way the driver drove did conform to the required standard and others that they didn’t. The legal argument would not be about “proof”, it would be about the standard the law requires.
Peanut butter - may contain peanuts Some products have disclaimers that serve no apparent purpose or which are obviously redundant. For example, a peanut butter jar that lists the ingredients as peanuts, and then provides a warning right under it which says may contain peanuts.* If a company sells a product without such a warning, what arguments could be used in court against them by a person who claimed that they read the ingredients, understood that it listed peanuts, but consumed it anyway because they weren't warned that it may contain peanuts and was injured? * I'm aware that it usually says may contain nuts because peanuts are technically legumes, but this is just an example.
When the dangerous nature of a product is or should be known to a manufacturer and the product is being used in the usual and expected manner, the manufacturer has a duty to warn of the danger. Breach of that duty can lead to liability. The case Billiar v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg contains some useful precedent for understanding the issue. It is well settled that New York law holds the supplier of a product which it knows or should know is dangerous if used in the usual and expected manner to a duty adequately to warn users of the product of the danger unless the danger is obvious or well known. ... When the user is fully aware of the nature of the product and its dangers, however, the supplier cannot be held liable for failure to warn him.... The rationale for this "knowledgeable user" exception is that knowledge of the danger is equivalent to prior notice; no one needs notice of that which he already knows. In this particular case, plaintiff was injured mixing an electrical resin at work, but was (deemed to be) an unskilled worker. The court recites various cases where individuals with some relevant knowledge were nevertheless harmed (and won their cases), because the warnings were insufficient. Food allergies have a special treatment, thanks to the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004. Peanuts (and other things) are "mandatory warning" substances, where the label must say "Contains peanuts". Omitting the warning makes the food misbranded. Also note that warnings carry a "prominence" requirement, which does not exist for ordinary ingredients which are typically in illegible microprint. Paragraph (w) spells out the labeling requirement, which is well worth reading for its complexity. The law does include the escape clause that if the name of the product contains the name of the allergen, you have been warned. If plaintiff is suing the manufacturer pro se and stipulates, in lieu of competent legal advice, that they knew that peanut butter contained peanuts and that they were allergic to peanuts, but they ate it anyhow, the manufacturer will not be liable.
Does (Customer) have any claim or recourse against (Store)? No. The store's conduct altogether preempts a finding of unconscionable tactics. The store's conduct would not be found in violation of Oregon's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). See ORS 646.605(9) et seq. (I am not verifying the multitude of cross-references in the UTPA, but the language of explicit items gives a general idea of what types of conduct the statute sanctions) The store's decision to decline orders, preorders or money for the product impliedly alerts customers not to grow premature expectations on acquiring the product. Also the store's disclaimer of out of stock weakens a customer's possible allegation that customer relied on a promise of availability of the product. Accordingly, the store prevents a customer from credibly arguing that he incurred losses as a result of the store's conduct. Does it matter if (Product) was available in other stores or just never produced at all? Does it matter if other stores have (Product) but charge more than $N? No. The fact that the store [unsuccessfully] attempted to get stock indicates that the shortage --and hence the failure to supply the product-- is not willful. This implies that the matter is not actionable even if the customer "suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property". See ORS 646.605(10) and .638. That being said, it is noteworthy 646.683(8)(a) lowers the requirement of willfulness [of violation] to one of recklessness in the context of class actions.
Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine.
Could a phrase "Don't buy from X" with indirectly implied material be considered defamatory? No. The phrase is only an order, wish, or instruction, which is different from making a direct or veiled statement of fact. Even in jurisdictions where a statement of opinion could be actionable, a stated wish of that sort cannot be construed as defamatory. anyone that reads the marketing material would indirectly have a false picture about company X. It depends on the contents of the marketing material, on which you did not elaborate. Persuading the customers on the basis of truthful representations as to why X's product is better than A's does not mean that people have a false image about X. The context and exact wording of someone's statements could amount to omitting and/or juxtaposing facts in a way that conveys some falsity, but your description gives no indications of that being the case here.
No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.
Can I sue If I was served a real burger after requesting a veggie burger I agree that this inquiry significantly overlaps with the post of which this one is marked by NuclearWang as possible duplicate. Thus, the answers (such as why breach of contract is inapplicable) and comments provided there largely apply here. I will only address the slight differences. I walked up to the cashier and asked was this a veggie burger? He said no. I stated that it was I ordered. He said he would make a new burger. A claim of fraud would fail in court because you will be unable to prove that the restaurant knowingly misrepresented to you (that is, despite knowing it to be false) that it was serving you a veggie burger with the intention that you would rely on that representation. Two hints indicate that the restaurant didn't act with that fraudulent intention: (1) When asked, the cashier told you that yours was not a veggie burger; and (2) he promptly indicated his intention to mend their mistake by telling you that he would make a new burger. A claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) would also fail. You wrote: After we left, my daughter who was still in the restaurant stated that they started laughing at my husband and I. The fact that the employees waited till you and your husband left reflects that they refrained from intentionally inflicting any emotional distress. A significant factor that will favor them is the fact that they stopped laughing once your daughter asked them why they were laughing: My daughter asked why were they laughing, when her parents were in the car sick from eating meat. They stopped laughing. Even if you genuinely feel disrespected by their subsequent laughter, there are no legal remedies because their laughter insofar an expression was neither obscene nor disparaging nor threatening/harassing. Laughter can be an understandable way, and possibly a psychological need, to relieve the stress from a situation like this in a context of hours of hard work in exchange for low wages with which to pay their bills. Moreover, the same fact [that they waited till you and your husband left] contradicts the allegation that they laughed "at" you. Strictly speaking, the restaurant could viably sue your daughter for defamation if the restaurant incurs any losses (including court-ordered sanctions against the restaurant) as a result of falsely attributing to it the hostile or belittling behavior implied by the particle at. By this I intend to illustrate how certain actions under pretext of extreme "sensitivity" can backfire. People elsewhere are victims of much worse misconduct or offenses that have detrimental effects and long-lasting ramifications. The court system is --if only in theory-- intended to redress wrongs which are more serious than a mistaken order at a burger restaurant.
This was at least a feature of Athenian law. In the Aristarchus of Isaeus (early 4th century BC), it is recorded that "the law expressly forbids any child—or woman—to contract for the disposal of more than a bushel of barley". This is a sufficiently ancient and transmissible principle of law that there well may have been Egyptian and Sumerian analogs. You might get the details that you seek by focusing on medieval English common law.
The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.
Is citing research publications in a blog post enough, or are there additional rights one must obtain? Say someone is writing a blog post on some science topic, and wants to show some mathematical expressions in the piece. What are the rights one has in showing equations that appear in published articles? I imagine if the equation is a well-established, oft-used equation that nobody owns the expression/content (e.g. the equation for entropy or mutual information). But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? For example, in theses one must obtain the rights to reference articles in addition to providing the citations. One can imagine how arduous this would be (obtaining rights) for frequently published blog posts. And how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature?
how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes.
Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission.
It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting".
Short Answer No meaningful intellectual property protection is available for BCI calculus, BI calculus, or SK calculus. Long Answer Copyright Protection There are several categories of things that can’t be copyrighted. A common thread to most of them is that they lack the necessary creativity to be eligible for copyright. Ideas This includes procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries. Plans, methods, and devices, are also not protectable. However the particular manner in which they are expressed or described in a writing can be copyrighted. (Source) Copyright can protect a particular expression of an idea (e.g. the layout and exact language of a page in a textbook about BCI calculus that is not the only possible way to present it), but not a concept or system like BCI calculus. The same reasoning means that it is probably not possible to copyright BI calculus or SK calculus, even though a particular textbook expressing them in a particular way might be possible to protect with copyright. Also, since BCI calculus is derived from publications in mathematics journals made in 1924 and 1930 by its two lead creators, anything derived from the original publications would probably be in the public domain by now. In the United States: every book and tale published before 1927 is in the public domain; American copyrights last for 95 years for books originally published between 1927 and 1978 if the copyright was properly registered and maintained. It is likely that the copyright for the 1930 journal article in question was not registered and maintained, as it was not routine practice for mathematical journals to do so at the time. Even if it was, the copyright for the 1930 paper would be almost spent and would expire in the year 2025. The Alternative Of Patent Protection Patents can protect ideas of ways to implement something, but also has limitations that probably exclude BCI calculus as something that could be patented: Certain things can never be patented, regardless of how well they meet these four standards. They include the elements, theoretical plans, laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. So patenting fire or the wheel is out, though some people have tried. (Source) Any patent received for BCI calculus prior to the year 2002 would also have expired bringing the subject matter of the patent into the public domain. Also, since BCI calculus is something that has already been disclosed to the public, it is barred from patentability as a form of existing prior art. The existence of prior art would also prevent BI calculus and SK calculus from being patented. Trade Secret Protection Considered It also probably isn't possible to protect BCI calculus (or BI calculus or SK calculus) as a trade secret, because it has been disclosed to the public and hence isn't secret. (Source) Trade Mark Protection Considered It might be possible to protect the name "BCI calculus" as a trademark under which services teaching people to use it are marketed, but that wouldn't protect the underlying system or concepts. But there is a strong argument that this would not even qualify as a trademark because it is merely descriptive and does not have a "secondary meaning" particular to a particular user of the label for the system.
In general this kind of brief literary reference is not unlawful, and such things occur in both novels and commercial games with some frequency. Making such a reference a major part of the plot, such as by using a name from a previous work as a major character, particularly if other aspects of that character are also used, is far more likely to cause a problem. In the united-states this would be a matter of fair use. In general, when only a very small part of the source work is used, such a a single name; where the use is "transformative", that is used for a rather different purpose than in the source work; where the use does not harm the market for the original work; and where the use does not serve as a replacement for the original, it is likely to be held to be fair use. But fair use decisions are always fact-dependent, and are made case-by-case, so it is hard to be absolutely sure of one in advance. But the kind of literary reference described in the question is very unlikely to be held to be copyright infringement.
Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.
You are correct that it is quite expensive to patent something in U.S. law. Under U.S. patent law, once an idea is publicly published, if no one else has a patent application for the same idea that is pending, the idea enters the public domain and no one can obtain a patent of that idea. The publication become "prior art" with respect to any future patent application which cannot be protected by patent law. Of course, if you publish an invention which you discovered independently, that someone else already has a patent application pending for that will be approved the following week, the fact that you published it after the patent was applied for doesn't prevent the person with the pending patent application from having it approved. The term "invention" rather than "idea" is what I will use for the remainder of this answer, because there are many ideas which may not be patented, while the lion's share of patentable ideas are appropriately described as "inventions." But, understand that as used in this answer, the term "invention" is being used to refer to the concepts and ideas necessary to make the invention, and not to a particular instance of a product made using those concepts and ideas. When an invention is in the public domain, anyone can utilize the invention free of charge without a license. People who use the invention are not even required to acknowledge that you invented or discovered it. An invention is also not eligible to be patented if more than a year has elapsed since the first sale of a product using it. But, in that case, the invention can still be protected as a trade secret until it is voluntarily disclosed in some fashion to someone who is not subject to a non-disclosure agreement. (I say voluntary, because the fact that, for example, an unauthorized corporate spy sees the trade secret doesn't end the status of the invention as a trade secret.) Some inventions, are effectively publicly disclosed and published the moment that anyone looks at it closely. The patentable element of other inventions are invisible to an end user, or to observer of an end user. For example, if the invention involves something in the interior of a device, or the invention involves something not visible to the naked eye (e.g. a process for synthesizing an industrial chemical from other chemicals where the chemical formula of the ingredients and end result can't be determined without a microscope or analytical chemistry tests), merely showing someone a product made using the invention will not put it in the public domain. It is generally legal to reverse engineer or independently come up with an invention which is merely a trade secret. It is not legal to use a patented invention or process, even if it is not directly copied and is instead reverse engineered or independently discovered, during the lifetime of the patent. There is no straightforward way to put an invention into the public domain while retaining any right to acknowledgement that you invented it or otherwise exercise control through a licensing agreement without patenting it.
Suppose Publisher printed 10,000 copies under the terms of the contract, and within those two years they sold 7,000 copies (and paid royalties). If you did not receive leftover copies at the end of the 2 years, then either (1) they broke the contract or (2) at the last minute they sold the remainder to some third party. If the latter is the case, they would be obligated to pay royalties on that last sale, and the numbers should add up (assuming you know how many were printed initially). If they failed to pay royalties, or they continued to sell the book, you would need to send your lawyer after them. Another possibility is the lost-email excuse – "We emailed you asking if you wanted the books, and you didn't reply, so we sold them" (disposing of does not necessary mean "destroy"). The burden would be on them to prove that they offered you the remainders and you elected not to purchase (if that is the wording – the contract could have required a specific refusal, not just a failure to respond). Under the contract, Publisher can't just decide to keep printing the book, nor can they continue to distribute it (but a third party could distribute existing copies forever). You would have "legal exposure" i.e. some risk of being sued if you republish, but it might be minimal – definitely get your attorney to advise you on that. Vendors might refuse to sell the republished work if they think it is an unauthorized edition.
Can someone's legal name be all lowercase? Can a person's legal name be all lowercase or all capital letters or some strange mix, or are there restrictions about it? Or maybe capitalization is not even part of the name, it is just a part of grammar for proper nouns, with traditional/linguistic exceptions for names like "McDonald" or "von Neumann"? (This is just a curiosity question so it doesn't matter to me which countries/states the answers are based on.)
Or maybe capitalization is not even part of the name That's pretty much it. No court would fail to recognize the name "John Doe" in the string "JOHN DOE"; similarly, if someone established or claimed to establish their legal name as "john doe" then the only violations committed by someone writing it as "John Doe" or "JOHN DOE" would be violations of style, perhaps, or of etiquette. Now, just in case this is related to the crackpot conspiracy theorists from the "sovereign citizen" or "freeman on the land" movements, a few words are in order. If you don't already know about this, you might find it interesting. In general, this is a school of thought that attempts to establish the illegitimacy of government authority by employing a number of illogical and willful misinterpretations of (often obsolete, foreign, or otherwise irrelevant) legal texts. Among these is the idea that the capitalization of a name is significant. From Wikipedia's article on the sovereign citizen movement: In a criminal case in 2013, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington noted: Defendant [Kenneth Wayne Leaming] is apparently a member of a group loosely styled "sovereign citizens". The Court has deduced this from a number of Defendant's peculiar habits. First, like Mr. Leaming, sovereign citizens are fascinated by capitalization. They appear to believe that capitalizing names have some sort of legal effect. For example, Defendant writes that "the REGISTERED FACTS appearing in the above Paragraph evidence the uncontroverted and uncontrovertible FACTS that the SLAVERY SYSTEMS operated in the names UNITED STATES, United States, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and United States of America ... are terminated nunc pro tunc by public policy, U.C.C. 1-103 ..." (Def.'s Mandatory Jud. Not. at 2.) He appears to believe that by capitalizing "United States", he is referring to a different entity than the federal government. For better or for worse, it's the same country. From its article on strawman theory: One argument used by proponents of the strawman theory is based on a misinterpretation of the term capitis deminutio, used in ancient Roman law for the extinguishment of a person's former legal capacity. Adherents to the theory spell the term "Capitis Diminutio", and claim that capitis diminutio maxima (meaning, in Roman law, the loss of liberty, citizenship, and family) was represented by an individual's name being written in capital letters, hence the idea of individuals having a separate legal personality. Proponents of the theory believe the evidence is found on the birth certificate itself. Because many certificates show all capitals to spell out a baby's name, JOHN DOE (under the Strawman theory) is the name of the "straw man", and John Doe is the baby's "real" name. As the child grows, most legal documents will contain capital letters, which means that his state-issued driver's license, his marriage license, his car registration, his criminal court records, his cable TV bill, correspondence from the IRS, etc., pertain to his strawman and not his sovereign identity. (Note that there was no distinction between majuscule and minuscule letters in the Latin alphabet in ancient Roman times; this distinction arose in the 8th century, a few hundred years after the fall of the western empire.) And finally, from Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII): [323] Given the obsessive focus of the OPCA movement for documentary and procedural formalities (real or imagined), it is unsurprising that they have developed a wealth of arbitrary name-related rules. For example, Canadian courts have evaluated and rejected the following nomenclature-related schemes: a person is not immune from court action if that person identifies himself by an entirely different name, for example, “Mythlim‑Axkw” instead of “Kazimierz Chester Crischuk”: R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 31-32, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 at para. 11 (I.R.B.); Services de financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6; structuring a name in the format of [Firstname]-[Middlename]: [Lastname], i.e. “David-Kevin: Lindsay”, does not mean one is a separate person from “David Kevin Lindsay”: R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 193; R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203 at para. 7, [2009] 1 C.T.C 86, affirmed 2010 BCSC 831, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 174, affirmed 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; structuring a name in the format [Firstname] of the [family] of [Lastname], i.e. “John Donald of the family Sargent”, does not mean one is a separate person from “John Donald Sargent”: R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at para. 29, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448; there is no legal distinction between a name in upper case and lower case letters, and a name all in capital letters: R. v. Linehan, 2000 ABQB 815 at para. 13, 276 A.R. 383; R. v. Loosdrecht, 2008 BCPC 400 at para. 36, [2009] 4 C.T.C. 49; R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at paras. 45-46, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291; a claim that the person named in litigation is incorrectly identified by a “war name” or “nom de guerre” is irrelevant: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 25-29, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; and a name all in capitals is not a “legal fiction” and not different from “a flesh, blood and bone man”: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Boyle, [2006] O.J. No. 2181 (QL) at paras. 3-5, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 127 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
I know of no legal restrictions on using the title of Doctor in the United states. I know next to nothing about Canadian law and can't speak on that. Falsely claiming to have a license to practice medicine is probably illegal, depending on circumstances, and practicing medicine without a license is most certainly illegal, and there a numerous federal and state laws that would apply. But simply styling one's self as Dr. is unlikely to be held by a court as a claim to hold a medical license, or a particular degree. It's, of course, misleading and generally frowned to use the Dr. prefix unless one has earned an MD or PhD. Some holders of honorary doctorates use it as well, though some debate whether that's acceptable or not.
They can still be sued - they just can’t be found liable For example, as an adjudicator, I have immunity for acts and omissions done in good faith as an adjudicator. A suit could be brought alleging lack of good faith and/or acting as other than an adjudicator. If these were proved (and barring corruption it’s a very high bar) the adjudicator would be liable. However, adjudicators are often joined with the claimant (usually the Respondent is the plaintiff) and the ANA (Authorised Nominating Authority - the organisation that appointed the adjudicator, who also have immunity) not so they can be held liable but so that they can be subpoenaed and forced to give evidence - if they aren’t parties to the suit they can refuse to do this. My standard response when this happens is to write to the court saying “I submit to the decision of the court save as to costs” meaning I am not going to contest anything unless you try to make me pay costs - which I don’t have immunity from.
There's really no difference. Quoting from here, What if I change the person's name? To state a defamation claim, the person claiming defamation need not be mentioned by name—the plaintiff only needs to be reasonably identifiable. So if you defame the "government executive who makes his home at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," it is still reasonably identifiable as the president. What does the whole thing depend on? It depends on how easy it is to identify the pseudonym-using plaintiff. They don't have more recourse, per se - nor do they have more protection under the law - but it may be harder for them to win the case. On the upside, the statement might not cause them as much harm when compared to a person using their actual name.
No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.
There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.
Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.
Legally, nothing Grammatically they mean what parenthesis always mean, that the parenthesised words are less important i.e. parenthetical. Organisationally they serve to group legislation together. This is particularly common in regulations and other subordinate legislation where the tradition is that the regulation takes the name of the Act it is created under. Where there is more than one, the specific function of the regulation is put in parentheses. For heavily legislated areas, like Housing, some parliaments do the same thing for Acts.
Do I have the right to protect my personal property ? In most part of US, people have the right to protect their own personal property with an appropriate amount of force.With this concept of personal property and a persons right to protect as background, the scenario is:- An intruder enters your home using the internet, then intrudes into your personal computer which is inside the home,steals data and decamps. Can the property owner use any form of force to protect their property using violence ? Would such an attack be considered lawful ? ( You called 911 and the dispatcher thought that the call deserved a 51-50 psychiatric hold, while the intruder stole documents from your laptop and installed a ransomware) How would you "defend" your property in this situation ? If you "attacked" the intruder, would it be deemed unlawful ?
I interpret the sentence "intruder enters your home using the internet" in the question as not as physically entering the home but as virtually entering the home, in other words hacking into the victim's home network remotely. When that interpretation is incorrect, please comment. Note that an action can only be considered self-defense when the self-defense prevents a crime currently in progress from being completed. When A hacked into B's computer and then B punches A in the face later, that's not self-defense, that's illegal vigilante justice. The self-defense argument would only work if it actually prevents the completion of the crime. For example, if A and B were in the same room, A sees B hacking into A's computer right now and uses physical force to prevent B from completing the hack (like yanking the keyboard out of B's hands). Also keep in mind that the intensity of self-defense must be appropriate for the severity of the crime. What is and is not appropriate is for a court to decide in each individual case, and the guidelines that are to be applied vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But causing bodily harm to people when the crime they are committing does not cause bodily harm is often not considered within the limits of self-defense. For further information about what is and is not allowed in self-defense, I recommend the series about self-defense by Law Comic.
Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule.
The law on self-defence in England is very clear Under Common law, a person is allowed to use necessary, reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves, another or their property from imminent attack. Further, Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose. Is John's action self-defence? It would appear that John could avail himself of both the common law, because he is being attacked, and statutory defences because the attack would appear to be a criminal assault. Both defences require that the force used be reasonable. The definitive statement on reasonable force comes from Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814, 832: The defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no abstruse legal thought. … Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. … It may in some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent danger he may have [to] avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack is all over and no sort of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any link with a necessity of defence… If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. Essentially, if the jury is satisfied that John struck out to stop an ongoing attack, this would be self-defence. If the attack was over, and John struck the aggressor as they were leaving, this would not be self-defence.
The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.
The power of arrest is a common law power that predates police forces, that is, every citizen had an obligation to maintain the king's peace by arresting criminals. With the rise of modern police forces, the police inherited this general right to make arrest but it still remained a power of every citizen. How much of this right remains depends on your jurisdiction and how the common law of "arrest" has been transformed by statute and case law. The common law right only extends to arresting someone in the commission of a crime. In the example you cite, the arrests are probably unlawful and amount to the crime of kidnapping/deprivation of liberty/whatever its called where you are because the person is not at that moment committing a crime. To arrest someone who you believe committed a crime in the past, you need a warrant or a power granted to you by some other statute (e.g. powers granted to police officers). In either case, a person making an arrest is allowed to use reasonable force to do so.
The quote doesn’t say they are lawful: just that they aren’t assault Indeed, it specifically says: But there are some specific offences that relate to threats to harm in the future, e.g. there is an offence of threatening to kill in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Assault is defined as putting someone in fear of imminent harm. Issuing threats of a more distant kind is a different crime.
A person has no protection against a valid warrant The fourth amendment is crystal clear on what it protects and what it doesn’t: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Courts usually find probable cause when there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been committed (for an arrest) or when evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for a search). Tony’s a gangster and the police went to a judge and laid out their “reasonable basis for believing” that a sneak-and-peek would get evidence of a crime. The judge believed them and issued the warrant.
Is it a correct inference that the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be "fundamental," and people routinely say "the state violated the Fourth Amendment" instead of "the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government." Courts will say "the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth." But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities.
What can someone do when scammed in the crypto world? How to report the scam and recover your crypto? Do the police work against scammers and fraudster in the crypto world? How can someone report to law enforcement a fraud in crypto space?
How can someone report to law enforcement a fraud in crypto space? united-kingdom The City of London Police have the national lead for fraud and, via Action Fraud, they adminster the online reporting tool or one can make a report by... ... calling 0300 123 2040 Monday to Friday 8am - 8pm. If you are calling from abroad please call +44 300 123 2040.
Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.
This would not be "legal jeopardy" per-se, really the only remedy that Stack Exchange would have in a case like this would be to ban both accounts. It would be different if you caused SE some kind of monetary/reputation damages to the site itself. From SE's Acceptable Use Policy: Identity Theft and Privacy. Users that misleadingly appropriate the identity of another person are not permitted. It seems your described scheme would violate that term. But this isn't a legal problem, just an operational one. You aren't violating any law (unless there are local laws against this) by paying somebody to "be you" on SE. The most that this would earn you and your cohort would be a ban and probably removal of the contributions.
No. You have to pay taxes no matter what currency you are paid in, or for that matter, in most barter transaction as well. You would have to pay taxes even if you were paid in goats. Also, the counter-parties in transactions in which you are paid in Bitcoin and earn money often have an obligation to file information tax returns to the IRS. If you don't report the income, both you and any counter-party subject to reporting requirements could be liable for the tax as well as for penalties and interest and possible criminal charges as well for intentionally evading taxation and filing false tax returns.
The criminal complaint against Sarao can be found on the US Department of Justice's website. He was charged under four different sections of US Code: 18 USC 1343, which prohibits the use of inter-state or foreign telecommunications in the furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. 18 USC 1348, which prohibits fraud concerning securities and commodities markets. 7 USC 13(a)(2), which prohibits manipulation of commodities markets. 7 USC 6c(a)(5)(C), which specifically prohibits "spoofing" of commodities markets. It's this last one that you seem to be most interested in. Spoofing is defined as "bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution." In other words, it's legal to change your mind after you place an order, but it's not legal to place an order that you have no intent of following through on. This section was actually enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, which took effect a few months after the "Flash Crash"; the charge against Sarao under this section stemmed from actions he took later, in 2014. The charges against Sarao specifically relating to the "Flash Crash" were under the wire fraud and securities fraud statutes instead. In the end, Sarao pled guilty to one count of wire fraud (covering his ongoing actions from 2009–2014) and one count of spoofing, presumably as part of a plea deal.
There's a good answer in this thread by Trap_Door_Spiders Assuming the car was really stolen, not "stolen" in the sense my friend borrowed it and never gave it back, you could absolutely recover the car. The reason you could, is because you can't steal your own property. Theft is very specifically the taking of ANOTHER's property. Here the property and the title to it has remained with you, because it was stolen. A thief never gets title in stolen property--it's called a void title. A void title is no rights at all as compared to a voidable title which has no rights against the true owner, unless you are subsequent transferee for value without notice (Bona Fide Purchaser). Now we can even take this slightly further. Imagine our thief stole your car and now sold it to Hapless John and all the remaining facts are the same, can you still take the car? Yes, because title in property tracks from the seller of the property. You can only over transfer as good a title as you have in the property. So thief has a void title. When he sold Hapless John the car he transferred a void title, which is no interest at all. So when you see the car and take it back, Hapless John calls the police and reports it stolen too. As long as you could demonstrate it was stolen first, that's the end of the issue. Hapless John has to go find the thief and get his money from thief. Now obviously this all assumes you see the car on say a street or whatever. If you saw it saw it in a driveway, you could end up being charged with trespass unless your state privileges the recovery of stolen property by peaceable means. You still wouldn't be liable for theft, because of the void title, but you can get the other charges. All that said, you are better off having the police come and assist you. If you are even slightly wrong you get hit with the full force of the consequences. It's better just to have a police officer come and assist from a criminal liability stand point.
I want them to give me the promised price ... You can’t make them do this. A business that has posted an incorrect price is not obliged to sell for that price. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/4466/344 ... and I want them to stop the Misleading advertising You can’t stop them yourself but you can report them to the relevant authorities. These are the ones you linked to: NSW Fair Trading for state law breach and the ACCC for Commonwealth breaches. Misleading pricing is a breach of both state and Federal law. Can you please give a practical advice? No. If you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. What can I do? Where should I complain? See above.
First, return addresses are intended simply to provide a mechanism by which an undeliverable or returned letter can be returned to the sender. If you have a practical concern then consider the following: I worked for the postal service and never experienced an instance where anyone cared whether there was an accurate return address except in the following cases: As mentioned above, a letter was refused or otherwise undeliverable, and an attempt will be made to return the letter to the return address. In cases of a false, unreadable, or non-existent return address, the letter will be marked undeliverable and likely destroyed or recycled. Someone is trying to scam the system by putting an identical address on each the delivery and return address of a mail piece, especially on mail pieces that have insufficient postage. If caught, this mail piece will go to the delivery address the same as any other case of insufficient postage, with a postage due requirement for the recipient. However, in this case this piece will be held and eventually destroyed rather than returning to sender, since it does not have a non-identical return address. The content of the mail piece is illegal (e.g. anthrax, drugs, etc. made apparent by forensic equipment or by a piece of mail being inadvertently opened/destroyed by a machine and discovered by a postal employee). In these cases the mail piece will be sent to the postal inspection service (most plants have one in-house). These postal inspectors might have use for a return address in the event that the sender was dumb enough to include an accurate return address on an illegal mail piece. 18 U.S. Code § 1342 penalizes those who commit crimes under false names, and uses broad language to include people who use pseudonyms to avoid detection, since these actions make the job of postal inspectors much more difficult. The final language also makes opening mail address to people other than one's self illegal, though this is likely described elsewhere, too. It does not pertain to false return addresses, unless someone were to open the letter upon return, despite that person not being the return addressee, or committing some other crime using the postal service. The only situations where I can see your hypothetical situation becoming a concern for postal inspectors or postal regulators would be: The mail piece masquerades as a certified, registered, or other special class of mail. There are many junk mailings out there that look surprisingly similar to the protected classes of mail, but are distinct enough to not raise any serious concerns (e.g. "CONFIDENTIAL", "URGENT", or various green or red markings). The penalty would probably be a fine in the amount of each identified letter times the price for the corresponding postal product. The return address is for a governmental entity, or possibly an annoyed person or company, but not actually sent from these locations. I suspect this is the possibility most relevant to your question. However, this is unlikely to raise any concern, unless a recipient or other affected party raises a fraud concern (18 USC 1341, 1342 & 1345; 39 USC 3005 & 3007) with the postal service. This would be taken on by the postal inspection service, which would investigate the content of the mailings for any signs of the actual sender, and they may attempt a variety of other methods (e.g. tracing letter meters, surveillance) to locate the source of the mail. However, the legal penalties would probably be fraud-related and might fall outside postal regulations per se, but could include federal laws about committing crimes that leverage the mail service, and various other laws if this is done across state lines (also this might invite FBI attention).
Is there a hidden meaning in this EU regulation? In Regulation (EU) No 540/2014 Annex VIII Section IV is stated, that: "Switch Any mechanism to enable the driver to halt the operation of an AVAS (‘pause function’) shall comply with the requirements of paragraph 6.2.6 of UNECE Regulation No 138, Supplement 1 to the original version of the Regulation, 01 series of amendments (OJ L 204, 5.8.2017, p.112)." The UNECE Regulation No 138 paragraph 6.2.6 - "Pause function Any pause function as defined in paragraph 2.7. shall be prohibited" 2.7 says - "Pause function means a mechanism to enable the driver to halt the operation of an AVAS." What is purpose then to link to different document, instead of just saying in 540/2014, that Switch for AVAS is prohibited? The mentioned supplement 1 also says "Paragraph 6.2.6, amend to read: ‘6.2.6. Pause function Any pause function as defined in paragraph 2.7 shall be prohibited.’"
If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.
GDPR defines consent like this in Art 4(11): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Further conditions on consent are given in Art 7 GDPR. For you, the important aspects are: Consent must involve an affirmative action (opt-in). Thus, consent cannot be the default and must not be pre-selected. The Planet49 judgement provides relevant case law on this. Consent must be an unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. Consent must be informed. This requires access to the full privacy policy. Abuse is discouraged because the data controller has burden of proof that valid consent was collected (see Art 7(1)). How does the RedHat consent tool measure up? The consent appears to require an affirmative action and seems unambiguous: no option is pre-selected, and you need to click on “Out” or “In”. The selected option is then highlighted. However, I agree that the radio buttons are not entirely clear once a selection has been made. I also agree with you that the terms “Out” and “In” are not self-explanatory. They rely on the user knowing the terms “opt-out” and “opt-in”. This could indicate that the user's action isn't unambiguous. That the privacy policy page also shows a cookie consent popup could mean that consent isn't sufficiently informed. So together, this isn't a particularly good design for a cookie consent tool. There are some potentially fatal problems that could render the consent invalid. However, it isn't obviously non-compliant – I have seen far worse.
It says They shall not confer the right [[to attend any meeting of members] and [to exercise one vote for every share held]]. The elements joined by a conjunction such as "and" should be grammatically parallel. Since the part after the conjunction is an infinitive verb phrase, the thing to which is it joined by the conjunction should also be an infinitive verb phrase. However, it is normal in English to use "or" when joining elements in a negative statement. For example, if it is forbidden to sing and it is forbidden to dance, one could post a sign saying "no singing or dancing." If the sign said "no singing and dancing" it could be interpreted as a prohibition only on doing both at once. So the sentence should read They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or to exercise one vote for every share held. Perhaps less ambiguous: They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or the right to exercise one vote for every share held. But the drafting error is unlikely to change the meaning of the text, since it is fairly easy to identify it as a drafting error.
I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
First of all, the wording in your question hints at the UK deliberately launching a missile (even if it is a test one) towards the USA. Nothing in the news piece you link to support that supposition, the general idea is a missile that was launched towards the Atlantic Ocean that steered off route. From your link: The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states. The NPT limits other states from researching (including testing) nuclear weapons and/or delivery vehicles. In exchange, they get access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Treaty preambles are general, introductory texts that explain the intent of the treaty. They are not binding, and the language clearly shows it (Hint: It states "Desiring to", "Recalling to". Binding agreements use "Shall", "Shall not", "May" or "May not", and are more specific about what are the restrictions). As stated above, the test was not "in North-America". It was from international waters "towards Africa", probably to be sunk before it reached land1. There is no notion anywhere that there was an intention of violating the airspace of any country. Certainly, the UK would be responsable if one of their missiles test fails and the missile ends causing damages, and the USA can protest any violation of its airspace, even if unintentional. But it is not "a test of ballistic missiles in North America", and certainly the USA has no more rights outside its territorial waters than, say, Gambia does. The only restriction would be the internationally stablished procedures for testing missiles, which are setup to avoid any kind of issues (the test scheduled date and path is published2 with time enough for third parties to take notice). So yes, it is business as usual. 1Idea: African countries are countries, too, and they have the same right as the USA for their airspace not to be violated by the military from other countries. 2Both to allow for air traffic to avoid dangerous areas, and to ensure that anybody detecting the launch does not think that it is an attack.
Not Allowed Under the GDPR The suggested method does not seem to comply with the GDPR, and would not be lawful for a Data Controller that is subject to the GDPR. Specific Provisions Let's consider some specific provisions of the GDPR: Article 4 Article 4 paragraph (11) states: "consent" of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; If the choice is "obscure" then it is not clear, and legal consent has not been given. Article 7 Article 7 paragraph 3 reads: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. It does not appear in the situation described that the data subject has been clearly informed that consent is being given. Recital 42 Recital 42 reads in relevant part: In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. ... Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. The specified means do not seem to comply with R42 Recital 32 Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. The format in the question seems to rely on inactivity as a way of giving consent, and is surely not clear.
These clauses are called recitals. Taken together, they are a form of preamble. The tradition of preambles is quite ancient. The Code of Hammurabi, for example, has a preamble. This preamble serves to establish the authority of the one enacting the laws, however, rather than his motivation. United Nations instruments typically use a series of participial phrases as preambular paragraphs (pdf) rather than subordinate clauses, but they have the same function of establishing context and motivation. I have not been able to locate the origin of this particular form of preamble, however. It seems to have evolved gradually from freely constructed preambles. I could not identify when this form became fixed.
"This policy" is referring to the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines as amended (basically a Terms of Service (TOS) agreement). If so, does it mean adherence to Guidlines is fixed to version current at the moment of commencement of employment? Not really. It means that Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines are primarily guidelines for members of the general public who are not employees, and that different unstated policies delivered to employees are what govern employees instead. There are consequences for Mozilla employees failing to honor the current version of the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines, but those consequences are set forth in an employment contract with the employees rather than being limited to the consequences and procedures set forth in the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines for members of the general public who aren't employees.
How often do people who make complaints that lead to acquittals face repercussions for making false complaints? In response to a recent question and others related to it, it appears that defendants who are found guilty, despite lying, are rarely punished further apart from the conviction. However, what happens if the allegations are found to be patently fabricated? The most controversial case of this would be in accusations of sexual assault. In this case, the defendant is acquitted, but how often does the complainant, whose complaints are found to have been concocted for vindictive purposes, face consequences for making the false complaint?
Prosecutions for falsely reporting rape are at least as common as perjury convictions (and usually don't count as perjury since the initial report is rarely made under oath), and even when charges are brought by prosecutors involving false statements made under oath, prosecutors tend to favor lesser misdemeanor false reporting charges over perjury charges. See, e.g., cases with news reports of such cases in Colorado and Wyoming on May 24, 2021, September 11, 2015, August 29, 2014, and March 18, 2008. This isn't to say that these cases are terribly common although they tend to generate headlines when they are brought. The State of Colorado commenced 1,801 felony sex offense cases in the 2021 fiscal year, for example, which was not atypical, and false reporting of sex offense cases are brought in Colorado maybe once every year or two. The conviction rate in sex offense cases that are prosecuted isn't 100%, but something on the order of 90%-95% of sex offense cases result in a guilty plea, and well over half of the remaining cases result in convictions at trial. As an order of magnitude estimate, perhaps one in fifty to one in two hundred cases where sex offense charges are pursued, but there is not a conviction, gives rise to false reporting charges against the alleged victim. Many acquittals and dismissals of charges that do occur are best characterized as cases where there is a reasonable doubt because jurors believe that it is reasonably possible that there may have been a good faith witness misidentification, or because charges were dismissed because a confession or evidence obtained in a search was unlawfully obtained and had to be suppressed. It would be very rare for a defendant to be acquitted (after a judge in a preliminary hearing found that probable cause was present) because the jury believed that the testimony of a victim was believed to be intentionally false, and there is no way to tell from the verdict itself that the jury reached this conclusion. The problematic aspect of charges of false reporting of sex offenses is the there have been famous instances of women being convicted for falsely reporting rape (see also here focusing on a different case), only to subsequently have the allegations for which the victims were punished confirmed to be true with DNA and other evidence. The number of cases where true allegations of sex offenses are made but not pursued because law enforcement finds the allegations to not be credible, almost surely greatly exceeds the number of cases where false reports of sex offenses are made to police, although this ratio varies greatly from one police department to another based upon the institutional culture of the police department in question.
The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial.
No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act.
england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia
In the United States, jeopardy attaches to a criminal trial when a jury is empanelled, the first witness is sworn in or guilty plea is accepted. Before that point the prosecution can dismiss the case without prejudice, allowing for charges to be brought again. After that point the prosecution can only dismiss the case with prejudice, effectively resulting in an acquittal and preventing a new trial on the same charges or charges based on the same facts.
In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.
Not necessarily. It depends on the type of dismissal. The term prejudice helps better describe your question. You have described a dismissal with prejudice: the case can not be re-litigated. But it's just as likely the case could have been dismissed without prejudice. Meaning, the plaintiff could restart the case at any time. Or, alternatively, file a new case on the same facts. (You might be thinking about double jeopardy which is prohibited and applies to criminal cases involving an acquittal.) The with prejudice vs. without prejudice decision is often left to the discretion of the judge (or adjudicator) depending on the type of proceeding. And sometimes the decision is determined by procedural rule. You must read the notice or order of dismissal to determine what type of dismissal it was.
What you are describing is closely related to "acquitted conduct sentencing". On the first point, "Carl's" previous acquittal cannot be considered evidence that he committed a later crime; the subsequent crime must be tried on its own merits, in isolation. However, for your second question, once convicted of that crime, his previous acquittal (rather surprisingly) can be taken into account during his sentencing. Many legal minds have found the practice of "acquitted conduct sentencing" extremely troubling, and there are hopes the US Supreme Court could prohibit the practice in the near future. But for the moment, it is still an allowed practice. Summary article here "This practice allows judges to use conduct a defendant was acquitted of by a jury to increase a defendant’s sentence or punishment for a separate crime. This tool essentially allows judges to veto a jury’s decision when they merely disagreed with their conclusion." Another good article on the topic Of the seven charges, [he] was convicted on two. Under federal advisory sentencing guidelines, the two convictions generally warranted a sentence of 24 to 30 months in prison. The district court, however, calculated a range of 87 to 108 months, based on the charges on which [he] had been acquitted. [he] was then sentenced to 84 months (seven years) in prison. [He] was indicted on seven charges, convicted of two, and acquitted of five. But his sentence was exactly the same as it would have been had he been convicted by the jury of all seven charges — and three times as high as it would have been had the judge considered only the two charges of which the jury convicted [him].”
Is my title part of my legal name or does it hold any legal meaning? When filling out a form there is often a field for entering a title (such as Mr, Mrs, etc.). Am I free to put whatever I want in this field or do titles have a legal meaning?
Although your "title" may not of itself have legal force, that doesn't necessarily mean you can do as you please in every situation without fear of liability. For example, if you falsely claim to be a medical doctor or lawyer, you could find yourself liable for civil damages to defrauded clients; you may also violate criminal laws. (An anonymous bureaucratic form probably won't create that problem, because as another answerer pointed out nobody really cares or pays attention to titles most of the time. But stranger things have happened; and by "form" you could mean "tax form" or some declaration made under penalty of perjury. Lawyers generally avoid blanket "that's fine" answers, because there are almost always many ways that it might not be fine.)
When selling a residential property in the UK, you normally fill out a form called the TA10 Fittings and Contents Form, which outlines everything in the property included in the sale. This isn't a legal requirement, but your conveyancing solicitor will normally recommend it. Anything else left in the property after the completion of the sale is still, legally, a possession of the previous owner and the new owner is obliged to inform them of these possessions in writing. So, you do have to return it (and most people in such situations do return the possessions without question). However, if the presence of those possessions means you can't be reasonably expected to move into the property, then you can claim compensation from the previous owner for alternative accommodation (i.e. a hotel) until the situation is rectified. Or if the previous owner refuses to collect the possessions, you can likewise claim compensation for the costs of disposing of it. Alternatively, if they do want the possessions back, but take their time getting it, you can charge them fair storage costs.
"Reasonableness" is meant to be vague, because what is reasonable in one case or contract or industry is not always reasonable in another. Generally, though, you'll probably find courts interpreting it to take into account normal practices in your geographic area, in your industry, and between you and the other party. If one party looks like they're trying to unjustly enrich themselves or is asking for something that people just don't agree to in the real world, it's probably going to be unreasonable. If people are asking for the fair value of their work on terms that are normally agreed to when they're the subject of negotiations, it's probably reasonable. Dropping the reasonableness language would probably leave the assigning party in a bad position, as they're not required to make the assignment, with no qualifications as to the terms. The assignee could argue that they're free to take the IP on any terms whatsoever, though courts often read in a reasonableness requirement anyway. This answer is based on U.S. law, but there will be probably be pretty strong parallels if you're in a common law jurisdiction.
Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces.
Two people can have an equal interest in real property without being married, and being incarcerated doesn't affect a person's property rights. What matters is that now your ex-wife has a legal interest in the property. As a separate issue, she presumably also has a legal obligation w.r.t. the mortgage (otherwise the quitclaim deed makes no sense). The easiest solution is for the other party to voluntarily transfer their interest in the property to you via a quitclaim deed. A difficult solution is to use the judicial process to remove a person from the title. This could be done if there was fraud involved in the property transfer process, for example if the quitclaim deed was forged (presumably not the case here). You might sue to correct an error which doesn't reflect the terms of the transaction, via a reformation action, but that doesn't seem to be the case (a party not understanding the consequences of transferring an interest isn't an error in the relevant sense). You need to hire an attorney to solve the problem (he will look at all of the documentation relevant for your case for a possible solution).
My gut response without really analyzing it (which is honestly what a lot of these cases boil down to in the end) is that the proposed name would imply an affiliation with the company that does not exist. A case challenging that name could be expensive and come out either way. Instead, "The [Wife's Name] Toy Museum" with descriptive material in brochures and on a website saying that the exhibits were manufactured by "Toy Company", which is a nominative use that does not imply an affiliation with the Company would be a wiser move.
I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement.
Does Amazon prohibit a family of adults from sharing a single Amazon account? No, or at least it seems unlikely. As outlined in my answer & comments on Law Meta, a domestic or family-oriented character is palpable in the clause. That weakens the notion that Amazon's intent is to preclude scenarios which are of a personal-domestic nature and short of commercial/sublicensed use. The language "You are responsible for [...] restricting access to your account" seems more permissive than something akin to "only you are allowed to access your account". The former language is consistent with the term "non-exclusive", which otherwise seems to have no relevance or purpose in the clause. Users' ability (if any) to enter multiple payment methods with different names (i.e., card holder name) could be an additional indication that the scenario you have in mind is acceptable to Amazon. It is easy for a company to implement a validation for the purpose of identifying significant discrepancies of holder names and/or to have the user confirm that all payment methods refer to one same owner. The latter approach is more conclusive for scenarios where a woman has changed names as a result of getting married or divorced. The fact (?) that Amazon declined to include that simple validation weakens the notion that the company is genuinely interested in sticking to a rule of one-person per account.
Why was nine-pin bowling illegal in most states, unlike ten-pin bowling? In the 1800s, ten-pin bowling was invented as a way to circumvent the ban on nine-pin bowling that was placed by all states except Texas. However, ten-pin bowling was not banned by any state. I don't see any difference in the two sports other than the number of pins and a few minor differences in the rules and equipment, so I think any reason applicable to one should be applicable. Why wasn't ten-pin bowling banned, for the same reasons as nine-pin bowling? If the reasons were no longer applicable after ten-pin bowling was invented, why didn't most states re-allow nine-pin bowling? My reference is this video, and the part of it that applies to this question starts at 4:39 and ends at 4:59: When the game made its way over to America, nine-pin bowling was banned because it promoted gambling. The legend goes that people cleverly came up with ten-pin bowling to get around the law. Whoa, totally different game. Today in the US, nine-pin bowling is only played in Texas because it was the one state that didn't ban it, instead charging it tax.
Moral panic Nine-pin bowling was the violent video game of its age - the people who were in power didn’t like it, didn’t like the type of people who played it, linked it with vice - like gambling and laziness - and, therefore, banned it. It’s a perennial that older people, who tend to be the ones in power, despair over the dissipation of youth and the disintegration of society that will inevitably result. Or rich people, who also are the ones in power, despairing over the recreational activities of working-class people. It’s probable that there was gambling involved - people will bet on anything, and this was a game of skill and chance, a perfect vehicle for gambling. The games and gambling would not have been regulated, so there would almost surely be some criminals who got involved. However, the biggest driver was taking this grain of truth and then blowing it out of all proportion. As other answers have pointed out, the laws usually did not specify the number of pins. Eventually, the moral panic declined, and the laws were repealed. However, times had changed, and the 10-pin form of the game is what came back backed by larger commercial interests rather than the artisan style of 9-pins. 10-pin bowling uses much bigger alleys with gutters and is suitable for mechanisation. a 9-pin alley can fit in a relatively small room, and standing the pins back up again is not much more demanding than pulling pool balls out of pockets. It's not unusual that after government suppression is lifted, things come back different to the way they were before the suppression started. For example, prohibition fundamentally changed how Americans drank - before, men in saloons drank; after, it was an activity of all genders at home and in bars and restaurants. There was also proportionally more wine and spirits drunk compared to beer because these drinks are more alcohol-dense, so bootleggers got more alcohol per gallon smuggled, so they became relatively cheaper.
In the United States, the First Amendment generally protects your right to communicate using gestures. Probably the most common example of efforts to outlaw specific gestures involves the "middle finger," which is a symbolic "fuck you" to its target. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943), that symbolic gestures can be "a form of utterance" protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and it addressed the middle finger specifically in a decision last year. In Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021), a school suspended a student from its cheerleading team because she posted a picture to social media showing her and a friend "with middle fingers raised" (and bearing the caption "Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything."). But the Supreme Court held that this violated her right to free speech, as her post "did not involve features that would place it outside the First Amendment’s ordinary protection. That decision aligned neatly with decades of lower-court decisions holding the same. E.g., Bad Frog Brewery v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Sandul's action was not fighting words and therefore was speech protected by the First Amendment."). Of course, First Amendment protectiosn are not absolute, so although the government almost certainly could not criminalize dabbing itself, it would be easier for a governmental body to prohibit it during its public meetings, easier still for a government employer to justify disciplining a working for dabbing, and easier still for a public school to justify disciplining a student for dabbing.
I have a really good pizza place near my home but the bastards won't deliver when I go interstate! Now, that's discrimination! Yes, it's discrimination. However, it's not unlawful discrimination. Discrimination is not unlawful unless it is on the basis of a protected class. Geography isn't a protected class of itself. It can be if it's used as a proxy for a protected class, such as excluding certain neighbourhoods which correspond with racial or religious groups, but that's not the case here.
Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.
It is not obvious that is it illegal in Washington state. Everett WA has local ordinances against "lewd conduct" (there are versions of this at the state level and in most municipalities). Having sex and masturbation are included in the class of "lewd acts", and are also included in "sexual conduct". An activity is "obscene" if three things are true. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest and when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. I think having sex or masturbating could pass these two tests. The third condition is that the act explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of... [sex, masturbation, or excretion] The prohibition is more narrow: A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he or she intentionally performs any lewd act in a public place or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public. If lewd conduct were completely illegal, you could not excrete or have sex withing the city limits. Now we have to turn to the definition of "public place": an area generally visible to public view, and includes streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether moving or not), buildings open to the general public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them, and businesses contained in structures which can serve customers who remain in their vehicles, by means of a drive-up window Focusing not on the probable intent but on the words, it is primarily defined as "an area generally visible to public view". Your house qua building is probably generally visible to public view, as is a public toilet or hotel. The inside of your bedroom is probably not generally visible to public view, nor is the inside of a toilet stall. While the building is probably a public place, a closed stall within the building does not meet the definition (nor does a hotel room). It might however qualify under the clause "or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public". The statute does not give a definition of "observe", but under ordinary language interpretation, observation may be seeing or hearing. Silent sex, masturbation or defecation might not qualify as being public. Obviously, excretion in a stall of a public bathroom cannot be a lewd act, presumably because the average person does not generally consider ordinary excretion as appealing to the prurient interest: but there could be contexts where it does. Another avenue for prosecution is the Indecent Exposure state law which is when one intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. It is totally non-obvious that sex or masturbation in a toilet stall is "open". There is a slippery slope regarding quiet sex or masturbation w.r.t. knowing that the conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. Because the contexts where sex and masturbation are not clearly spelled out by statutory law, the matter would depend on how courts had interpreted previous cases. There have been arrests in Washington of people having bathroom sex, but I don't know if anyone has ever or recently-enough been convicted for having quiet sex out of view in a toilet stall, or similar place. There is a potentially applicable case, Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wn. App. 64, which seems to involve public sex, and the conviction was overturned because the complaint was defective, in not including the element "that the defendant must know 'that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm'". It is not clear from the appeal what the act actually was – it probably was for public nudity. There is also an decision by the state appeal court division 3 (not publicly available) in Spokane v. Ismail which, in connection with a charge of public urination declares that "A toilet stall is not a public place. The center of Riverfront Park during the lunch hour is a public place", in connection with an ordinance just like the Everett one against public lewd acts.
The key difference is the motivation for denying service. Generally, a business can deny service for almost any reason, or for no reason, and doesn't have to explain its reasons for doing so. However, laws may make it illegal to deny service for certain specific reasons. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So a business may not deny service for those specific reasons. In the Colorado case, there was a similar state law that also forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If they deny you service because of your political views, or the way you dress, or because they just plain don't like you as a person, that's legal. If they deny you service because of your sex, or race, or on the other bases in the Civil Rights Act, that's illegal. Obviously, since a business doesn't have to say why they're denying service, or could lie about the reason, this could make it hard for a plaintiff to prove that denial was in fact based on (e.g.) race. They might be able to do so by finding out about internal discussions within the business, or by showing a pattern of denial to customers of a particular race. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker made it easy by explicitly stating that he was denying service because of the customers' sexual orientation, or at least because of the same-sex nature of the marriage in question. This would appear to violate the Colorado state law. Had he just said no without giving a reason, it would have been harder for the plaintiffs to make their case. (A state commission held that the baker did violate the law, but the US Supreme Court reversed because, they said, the commission had improperly taken the baker's religion into account.) But there is no such law that forbids discrimination on the basis of political views, so Alex Jones can't make a similar case.
It is illegal to marry while you are already married This is the crime of bigamy in all 50 states. A marriage ends with the death of one of the couple, a divorce or (in some very limited circumstances) an annulment. The US will recognise any of these wherever they happen so it’s your choice whether you get divorced in your home country or the US. By the way, don’t cause the death of your husband, that’s also illegal.
In the US usa, at least, the concept of ex post facto laws, which is what you have described, are specifically prohibited: Article I, Section 9, Clause 3: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
Copyright contract vs license? What is a difference between a license and a copyright contract? It seems that they achieve the same thing. So what are the use cases for both?
This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software.
It would not be a copyright. Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright, but it could be a trademark under common law ( e.g. state law in the U.S.) or could be registered. Some people think a trademark defines a product. That is not the case, a trademark identifies the source of a product or service.
You probably own the copyright, since this wasn't an explicit part of your job. However, there may be other legal reasons which preclude you from using them anyway; copyright isn't all there is. Since you are in the middle of an active dispute, you should consult an actual lawyer (which I am certainly not) for legal advice.
(For the data you use, you might not have to follow the license. But let’s assume you have to.) The license only applies to the content you distribute (or publicly perform, but that’s likely not relevant in your context): "Distribute" means to make available to the public the original and copies of the Work or Adaptation, as appropriate, through sale or other transfer of ownership. It doesn’t matter what’s saved on your server, it only matters what’s published (i.e., distributed). So you don’t have to publish the database. You have to attribute the content from the database when and as long you show (i.e., distribute) it. Not earlier nor longer than that.
The designer/company owns the copyright to the original work, you own the copyright in the derivative work (the screenshot). However, your work is subject to whatever rights your license to use the game gives you and fair use/fair dealing. An example of a company attempting to enforce copyright from screenshots/screen recordings can be seen by the Nintendo Creators Program.
The copyright Act gives copyright owners certain rights: right to reproduce the copyrighted work right to prepare derivative works based upon the work right to distribute copies of the work to the public right to perform the copyrighted work publicly right to display the copyrighted work publicly The audiobook you create from a copyrighted work is a derivative work (perhaps it is a reproduction; for the analysis it does not matter). It works the other way also. A derivative work is a work based on or derived from one or more already existing works. Common derivative works include translations, musical arrangements, motion picture versions of literary material or plays, art reproductions, abridgments, and condensations of preexisting works. It is a violation of the copyright to create derivative works without permission. The commercial nature of the derivative work does not come into play in this situation. Commercial use might be an issue in a fair use defense, but fair use is not applicable based on these facts. Fair use might apply given facts such as: Ten students own copies of the printed work. These students are blind. A teacher reads the book and provides the recording to the students.
What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere.
Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts.
What happens if a prosecutor refuses to file charges? Inspired by the answer to a previous question I asked. Let's say Alice assaults Bob, and Bob goes to the police. I gather from the answer to the linked question that what happens in principle is that the police would investigate, and the local prosecutor would file charges against Alice. But suppose Alice is a billionaire and she bribes the local prosecutor to not prosecute. What happens next? Presumably, if Bob can show the prosecutor was bribed he can make a new accusation against the prosecutor, but what if the bribe was clandestine? Presumably the prosecutor would just fend off Bob saying something about limited resources, lack of evidence (even when the evidence is clear), etc. This seems to say that Bob has no real recourse unless public pressure changes the prosecutor's mind (!?). Is that really the case? If so, it seems quite incredible—criminal accusations are for serious crimes, and it's surprising that the decision whether or not to press charges can rest on one, possibly biased, potentially influenced person. If the country matters, assume the USA.
united-states Bob could do any number of things to try to convince someone to prosecute Alice: call the prosecutor's boss, or the district attorney (or their equivalents in DOJ if it's a federal crime), or his elected representatives; he could also go to the media, or post on social networks... But if none of that works, the article is right: Prosecutors can't be legally compelled to prosecute someone Crime victims don't have any rights to control whether a prosecution happens—the government is the plaintiff. A prosecutor can even file charges over a victim's objections. Federal law and some states have Crime Victims' Rights Acts, which do grant some rights. But note the particularly relevant exception in that law: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction. This is also a separation of powers issue: the executive branch has the exclusive right to determine how the laws are executed. Neither the legislature nor the judicial branches can compel the executive to prosecute someone. Note that none of this affects Bob's civil remedies: he can still sue Alice for damages. But that won't result in her ending up in prison.
I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.
You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished.
If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.
No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.
The US legal system deals with this by punishing you for the crimes of which you are convicted. That is, those where the evidence (whatever it is) convinces a jury that you are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If there is insufficient evidence, for whatever reason then you would not be convicted. The prosecution can, subject to admissibility, put forward whatever evidence they like in order to convince the jury. This can include a pile of ash that they allege contained convincing and unambiguous evidence of guilt. Of course, if that's all they've got the prosecution would probably be censured by the judge for wasting everybody's time and money, more likely, a prosecutor wouldn't lay charges in the first place. As to punishment for an evidence tampering conviction: you have been convicted of evidence tampering, not drug production so you will be punished for evidence tampering, not drug production. The legislature sets different punishments for these for a reason, possibly a reason known only to them but a reason nevertheless. The judge has discretion to apply anything between the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed. A conviction for evidence tampering in a drug case rather than, say, a jaywalking case, is likely to get a more severe sentence all else being equal.
The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.
No That is nothing but fiction. Assuming that this is in the US, the police would (probably, there are some exceptions) have had to deliver the well-known "Miranda" warnings, that the suspect has the right to silence, the right to consult a lawyer, and the right to have a free lawyer if unable to afford one, and that statements may be used against the subject. If, after those warnings, the suspect chooses to confess, or to make a statement, that confession or statement would be fully admissible, even if the suspect did not have a lawyer present, unless there was some other reason for the statement to be excluded. No such reason is mentioned in the question. It is simply not the case in the US that a confession is excluded just because no lawyer was present, nor is that the law anywhere that I know of. If the police failed to give the warnings when they were required, then any statements or confessions would be excluded. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) says: law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Footnote 4] As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. That tells you exactly what the police are forbidden to do. Nowhere does it say that a lawyer must be present. Indeed it says the opposite: The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That means that s/he can confess after being warned, and such confession would be admissible, provided that s/he knew and understood those rights.
court appearance when stay order from higher court In India for a relative's divorce case, a petition is filed in high court against a case in lower court. The higher court has issued a stay order. But my relative's lawyer in lower court says he still needs to appear in lower court on court date. I feel that the lawyer is just trying to get a fee. Any one with this information?
It's basically a question about the rules of court. While I can't say for sure about this case, a scheduled court date that isn't canceled, even in a stayed proceeding, is to be held. Non-appearance of a party or their representing lawyer is a bad idea as it might incur contempt of court. Such a court date can be used to (once more) inform the court and other parties of the stay. Paperwork that might have been delayed in postal service is then given over under the eyes of the judge, pretty much ensuring that the other parties did get them and nobody may cry foul play. Possibly the meeting can be used by the attorney to reschedule other court dates or depositions if the stay has a specific time length. Also note, that not all stays are for the whole case but might only rule to stay parts of it: a divorce case that includes a case for visitation of a child might stay the visitation part till a related case about where the child will live in the future is solved, but continue on the parts that try to sort out the divorce itself. Such non-stayed proceedings do proceed even under the stay of some others.
There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.
While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.
Typically an Answer would have two parts. The first part presents the Defendant's side of the story raised in the Petition in an effort to assert that the Petition when viewed in light of the actual facts hasn't demonstrated a right to relief. The second part sets forth "affirmative defenses", most of which are procedural in nature. An affirmative defense raises some set of circumstances not discussed in the Petition that make it appropriate to deny relief even when, but for the defense, if everything in the Petition was true, this would suffice to establish grounds for relief. For example, procedural defenses might include: failure to meet a deadline, failure to give notice to the proper persons, failure to pay a filing fee, failure to include required information (such as a case number or a statement of facts or a signature) in the Petition, or lack of standing to file the Petition on behalf of the child because parental rights or legal guardianship are absent or because the person filing the Petition isn't an adult. The notion is that the Reply, in theory, should limit itself to responding to the newly raised procedural defenses stated in the Answer, or to new documents provided with the Answer, instead of trying to argue and resolve every dispute of fact or credibility issues between the Petition's version of the facts and the Answer's version of the facts. When in doubt, talk about it in the Reply. At worst, it is beyond the scope of what should be included in a Reply and can be ignored by the hearing officer as harmless. And, sometimes the hearing officer will decide that they want to know what is said even if it isn't strictly within the proper scope of a Reply. Certainly provide any documents that weren't previously provided that rebut the claims in the Answer.
A court would "dismiss" an action, a claim, or a defendant, but I don't know of any American court that would "dismiss" a motion. Instead, a motion would be "denied," or perhaps "overruled." If I saw this language in a motion, I would assume it was just a lawyer doing the stereotypical redundance thing.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.
Venue The location where you file the claim is the court that will hear it unless: you both agree the judge orders a different venue based on submissions from the parties (unlikely in a small claim) Costs Costs awards in small claims are rare and generally do not extend to the legal fees and if they do, the amount is capped. Costs for reasonable expenses of witnesses are slightly more common. In general, costs are limited to what is reasonable - to get the costs of travel and accommodation for the Liverpool solicitor, the party would have to argue that there was no available equivalent representation available locally. This might be arguable if you need a QC expert in say, international maritime law, it seems unlikely for a small claims matter. Personal Comment Don't go to court for £100 - settle the damn thing or walk away. In the time and worry you spend on it you could earn that sum five times over.
Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.
Is it a crime to engage in sexual talk with a stranger that pretends to be a little girl but actually isn't? I was watching the Hansen vs predator series. In there a random guy called Chris Hansen goes online and pretends to be a 13 years old girl. When people chat with him, he tries to steer the discussion on a sexual level ("I'm just coming out of the shower", etc.). Then he lures them into his house, where there is a real life decoy (a 19 years old girl). After some talking, the decoy goes away and Chris Hansen appears. He then starts to question them, and he "let them go" out of the garage where the police arrests them. They are charged with "criminal attempt to commit risk of injury to a minor". My understanding is that Chris Hansen is a total random guy who does not work for the government. That is, he is not an undercover police agent. Question: Is it a crime if I engage in sexual discourse with a random stranger that pretends to be a little girl, but he isn't? I mean, he is not an undercover agent but a random guy who appears to do this for money/views or whatever.
canada Is it a crime [to] engage in sexual discourse with a random stranger [who] pretends to be a little girl [but isn't]? This could be the offence of child luring (Criminal Code, s. 172.1; and R. v. Morrison, 2019 SCC 15). Section 172.1 makes it an offence to communicate using telecommunication with a person "who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 18", for the purpose of facilitating one of several listed sexual offences. While some child luring would rise to the level of an actual attempt to commit the underlying offence, s. 172.1 captures even earlier activity (R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, para. 25): [s. 172.1] criminalizes conduct that precedes the commission of the sexual offences to which it refers, and even an attempt to commit them
First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.
The state argued, and the jury was convinced, that Mr. Holle turned over his keys specifically intending to facilitate the robbery. They necessarily found that Mr. Holle was not telling the truth when he said he thought it was all a joke. I don't know what evidence they had to demonstrate that, but I could imagine that there was testimony indicating Mr. Holle knew that these people had engaged in similar acts before, that the group spoke of the plan with a level of specificity that made him aware they were not joking, or that he saw them taking other steps to prepare that let him know they were planning a crime. It doesn't matter if he wasn't renting the vehicle or didn't have an agreement to divide the spoils. The question of "why" he facilitated the crime is technically irrelevant to the legal question of whether he facilitated the crime. Nonetheless, I could imagine several reasons why he would have lent his car: he wanted to ingratiate himself with this group, he was bullied into doing it, he believed he would get some of the pot they stole, he didn't like the target, and so on. The fact that he was risking prison time is a uniquely poor argument that he didn't know what he was doing. The risk of punishment is always present for committing a crime, and yet we know that people commit crimes all day, every day. Why do they do it? Probably a good question for psychology.SE.
Sexual contact that is not consented to is a crime. Physical contact where the receiver is under the apprehension of imminent risk is the crime of battery. However, spanking in the context of a consensual sexual encounter does not have that apprehension and is therefore not battery. It is akin to the consent given by people who take part in a contact sport. Contracts cannot permit criminal actions. The permission given by the submissive in this agreement would be valid only at that point in time that the contract was made and could be revoked at any time: such revocation could be explicit or implicit. As continuous consent is required for a sexual act and revocation of permission would introduce the apprehension of harm. Whenever the permission was revoked the agreement would be unenforceable. At best, you have a agreement that is enforceable when the permissive wants it to be and not otherwise: more likely, you have a totally unenforceable agreement. More generally, contracts that involve sex acts as consideration are enforceable to the extent that prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction. However, an order for specific performance would not be granted where either of the parties was no longer consenting to the sex act because that would be a court order to commit a crime. Other remedies for breach like damages would be available. For example, if you contracted with a prostitute and refused to pay for services delivered, you could be successfully sued for the fee, any damages, costs and interest.
It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.
If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.
The specific elements of the crime in question are going to be defined by Maltese law, which appears to be a blend of a European-style civil code with English-style common law. However, under ordinary Anglo-American standards, the alleged acts do seem to meet the legal definitions of these terms. At common law, an "assault" consists of placing someone in fear of an unwanted touching, and a "battery" is a completed assault; that is, an actual unwanted touching. If Mr. Suda, as alleged, took the victim's hand and touched it to his own genitals, without her consent, he committed an assault and battery. Any touching can constitute a battery, from a tap on the shoulder to a bullet in the head. Likewise, at common law, "violence" is any degree of physical force. If he tricked her into touching his genitals, that would not be a crime of violence; if he physically moved her hand to his genitals with his own hand, then he used physical force, or violence, to commit the crime. Again, what actually needs to be proven will depend on specifics you would need a Maltese lawyer to go into--but under general common law principles, neither "assault" not "violence" are particularly surprising.
CRS 18-3-402 states that (1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: (a) The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will which is to say, sex must be consensual. The essence of a legal order for specific performance is that the party's "consent" is irrelevant. This is not limited to Colorado, and would hold in any jurisdiction where prostitution is legal. A court would not order specific performance in this case, neither in Colorado nor Nevada. Nor would the court order specific performance in case the contract allowed one party to beat the other to a pulp. The contract itself is illegal in Colorado, but not in Nevada (certain counties excluded). In that case, the other party is out $5 in Colorado. In Nevada, they would be entitled to a refund (amount to be determined, depending on the facts of the meat pie).
What authority grants the US to extradite and Charge Non US citizens for violating US sanctions? Context: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54270739 What dominion does the United States have regarding the enforcement of sanctions? Can the US impose extradition of foreign nationals like Ms. Meng for a foreign company's sale of goods (especially non-weapons) to US-sanctioned countries (Iran)? Where, if any are the bright lines? Narco-trafficing seems to be "fair-game", however, telecommunications is not the same class.
This issue was addressed in United States v. Meng, 2020 BCSC 785. The authority to extradite is via the extraditing state's treaty with the U.S. and its domestic implementing legislation. In Canada, this is the Extradition Act. Extradition requires consent of the extraditing state and for the requesting state to follow the extraditing state's domestic procedure. The question you raise is how sanctions of requesting state affect the interpretation of the domestic offence for the purpose of establishing the double criminality requirement. Critical in this case was that the charged offence was fraud against HSBC (albeit based on alleged concealment of sanctions violations). See para. 23: The double criminality question in the committal hearing is therefore whether Ms. Meng’s alleged conduct, had it occurred in Canada, would have amounted to fraud contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Ms. Meng argued: that the conduct cannot amount to fraud because in essence the proposed prosecution is to enforce US sanctions laws against Iran, measures that are not part of Canadian law and which, indeed, Canada has expressly rejected. The Attorney General argued: that the double criminality analysis may properly take the US sanctions into account as part of the foreign legal backdrop against which the essential conduct is to be understood. The court agreed with the Attorney General: The effects of the US sanctions may properly play a role in the double criminality analysis as part of the background or context against which the alleged conduct is examined.
As a general rule, most countries have what's called Bi-Lateral extradition treaties, which means that Country A (Cedricstan) will only extradite to Country B (Bobtopia) for crimes that were committed in Bobtopia AND are crimes in Cedricstan. So, in this scenario, you, a Cedricstan citizen purchase the book "The Big Book of Banned Things in Bobtopia" and send it to Bobtopian Bob by international mail. Bobtopian Ministry of Banned Stuff police (BMBS) find Bob in possession of the book and through creative interrogation (cause all countries that ban books are surprisingly creative in interrogation techniques) figure out that you sent it to him. The would file an extradition petition with the Cedricstan Embassy, who then call up the Cedricstan Ministry of Justice (CMJ) and discuss the charges (if there's no extradition treaty, the process is basically the embassy staffer politely taking the note and giving it to the Ambassador, who tries not to laugh too much as he dumps it to the bin. If there isn't even diplomatic relationships, this is the same process, but now it's the Swiss Ambassador laughing instead of a Cedricstan Ambassador). Anyway, assuming Cedricstan and Bobtopia have an extradition treaty with each other, it's going to be Bi-Lateral, meaning Cedricstan will only extradite you for crimes committed in Bobtopia that are also crimes in Cedricstan. So, first off, you did not possess the book while in Bobtopia, so the crime didn't happen in Bobtopia and they have jurisdiction over the crime. The legal ramifications are that of Cedricstan, not Bobtopia, so they apply here. Given you bought the book in Cedricstan, you're likely to not face any legal ramifications (well... more on this in a moment). Suppose then, we some how get to the point where you are proven to have been in Bobtopia and possessing the book of very naughty knowledge, Bobtopia Ed. In this case, Cedricstan would have to consider if it is a crime here (kinda... more on this as well). Since Cedricstan has Constitutionally protected Freedom of Speech and Press, there is no equivalent crime for possessing Forbidden Knowledge II: Bobtopia Boogaloo, which not only is legal to own, but a Cedricstan Times Best Seller for the 104th week running. So in this case, Cedricstan laughs in Free Speech and refuse to extradite you. There are again, no legal ramifications (well... more on this in a moment... which would be next paragraph). So, of course, this assumes you're not going to go to any country ever in the future. Obviously, Bobtopia agents from the BMBS will happily greet you if you ever go to Bobtopia... creatively of course... But you should probably review the diplomatic relationships of other nations with Bobtopia and their laws on banned literature... it could be that their extradition treaties will allow an agent of the third nation to arrest you and extradite you to Bobtopia... if you realize this is about to happen, your best bet is to find a Cedricstan Embassy or Consulate and high tail it there. But otherwise there shoudln't be any issues. The other problem here is that nations may have additional rules. For example, the United States does not allow for libel tourism... which is using another nation to sue an American for defamation that doesn't rise to the Defamation under U.S. Law (which is notoriously stricter than most similar nations. Historically, close relations between United States and UK would mean that defamation of a UK person said in the United States could be tried in the UK and the U.S. speaker would be under their jurisdiction... The ban here prevents that by saying the United States would not enforce decisions unless their own courts found the case in a similar way. On the other end, Canada will not extradite murderers to the United States, if said Murderer is eligible for the Death Penalty... but a Prosecutor promising to not seek the Death Penalty in sentencing if guilt is found is good enough for Canada to extradite the murderer back. TL;DR: As long as you stay in your country, you should not be extradited for crimes that are not mutually recognized... be careful when you leave though.
The decision will be made by whichever country arrests him first (although a minority of countries allow for the trial of people who break their criminal laws in absentia). Needless to say, if nobody manages to arrest him ever, he will not face any criminal consequences except the issuance of an arrest warrant possibly accompanied by a pre-existing conviction in absentia if arrested in countries that allow for such a proceeding. Normally, in these circumstances, either country would have jurisdiction under its own laws to prosecute and punish the criminal, and many extradition treaties would not require the extradition of someone who committed a crime punished domestically in the state in whose custody the criminal is as part of the same course of events. Many countries will not extradite someone if they could face the death penalty in the receiving country. But, sometimes law enforcement in a country with a less serious penalty will intentionally defer to law enforcement in a country with a more serious penalty that is simultaneously trying to arrest him. Ordinarily, law enforcement is not authorized to use deadly force to arrest someone who is simultaneously being arrested by law enforcement from another country against either the arrestee or the law enforcement from the other country. Indeed, using deadly force against another country's law enforcement officers who are carrying out a lawful arrest in their own country would ordinarily be considered an act of war. U.S. double jeopardy provisions of the constitution do not prohibit a second prosecution of an offender in these circumstances because of a first prosecution by another sovereign, but many prosecutors in many countries would decline to prosecute someone a second time for the offense that they have already been convicted of in exercise of their discretion, and many judges would consider time served in another country for the same offense as a factor in setting their own sentence.
If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime.
If Tratatoria has anti-discrimination laws, or provisions in its constitution forbidding discrimination, the Minister's actions might be illegal under them. But if it does not, or if it does not enforce whatever laws it may have, there is no international authority that can enforce any rule against discrimination. People and groups in other countries could denounce such actions as biased and discriminatory, if they chose. There is no legal standard for such announcements. This might bring pressure on Tratatoria. But that would be a diplomatic and political matter, not a legal one. There really is no effective international law on discrimination unless it amounts to genocide, and even then it is essentially a matter of diplomatic pressure or potentially war to enforce regime change, not a true legal process.
Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization.
It really depends on what "services" you are providing, but generally speaking you would be in violation of the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). These regulations are spelled out in 31 CFR §560.205 and 560.420 and apply to US citizens and residents wherever located. Specifically, the action that is prohibited is the "exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran. Here "Services" is broadly construed to mean anything of value even if no money is exchanged, including providing technical assistance to an Iranian national or Iranian institution. See See § 560.204; §560.410. The civil penalty for violation of these sanctions would be $250,000 or an amount "equal to twice the amount that is the basis of the violation". Criminal penalties may include fines up to $1 million and 20 years in prison. Now there are some exempt transactions outlined by § 560.210 (c) which may be applicable here, however it would be up to you to prove that these are "information or informational materials" as defined by § 560.315. For more information, 31 CFR Part 560, Subpart B refers to the prohibited transactions with Iran. Since you are not specifically spelling out what services you intend to provide, it is difficult to say for sure you would be in violation of them. It should be noted though that the US Government uses publicly funded money to run a proxy server through which Iranians can access otherwise blocked websites such as social media in Iran.
Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
Why rush to class action lawsuits against acetaminophen when the case looks difficult to win? There are currently a number of places recruiting for a class action lawsuit against Tylenol, and other medicines that use acetaminophen, due to the supposed risk of mother's use of it during pregnancy having children being born with autism. These law firms apparently expect some real profit from this since they're willing to pay for advertisement on social media just to recruit more people for their lawsuit. From what I can tell this is all based off of a Consensus statement that basically says "we don't know for sure the potential side effects, we should be cautious with its use just to be safe". It's not proving a casual link to anything, much less autism. It's pretty much just restating what most physicians have already considered wise advice, you're taking a drug we don't fully know how it works and which can be OD on so be careful. Even if there was a casual risk, I doubt we have proof that the manufacturers of the medications knew about such a, still unproven, link or were negligent in their actions. Ie from my, admittedly limited outsider view, it seems there is very little basis for expecting to win a lawsuit against these manufactures. So I'm wondering why these law firms are all so gung-ho to pursue legal action that would be, at best, a very difficult case to win? Are they simply hoping for a settlement to shut them up without having to take the case to court? What is the motivation here?
Class action suits can be very costly for defendants, particularly pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, some such companies have been willing to make significant settlements, even when proof of damage and liability were far from clear. Such settlements can result in significant income for the law firms involved. Thus, some firms are willing to spend significant money to find and sign up potential plaintiffs, either in hope of a settlement, or in hope of an eventual winning case. Either is a gamble, but the potential payoff is large, so such firms (so-called "Mass Tort" firms) may find it worth putting up the money to seek potential plaintiffs. There is no rule requiring any degree of proof or assurance to run such a campaign. If only 1 in 20 such campaigns results in a good settlement, the sponsoring firm may do quite well.
In lay terms, the Raich case cites authority pursuant to the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution of the United States; specifically, that the government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, to the degree that crops of individuals (whether directly or indirectly, or not at all, in commercial circulation) can be regulated by Congress, citing the Filburn case, which had nothing to do with "marijuana" or "cannabis", or "THC" or "CBD"; in essence, the government has the power to tell a private individual which crops they can cultivate or not, depending on the intent of Congress in enacting the law. The premise being that since the intent of Congress in regulating "marijuana" within the scope of the CSA was for the express purpose of maintaining higher prices (including so-called "black market" prices) for "marijuana", an individual cultivating "marijuana" which was not intended to enter the "stream of commerce" nonetheless impacted the price of the crop (or commodity) by cultivating the crop at all (i.e.g., greater supply of available product reduces the price of the product in any market, whether "black market" or not; having access to the product by means of private cultivation reduces the resources necessary to acquire the crop) - thus resulting in the overall price of the crop not being higher, thwarting the intent of Congress in regulating that specific crop or commodity. Of importance, Congress has concluded that "marijuana" had (and still does not have) any medical purpose (various bills have been written over the years to exempt "marijuana" from Schedule I classification in the CSA; "medical marijuana" exemptions, etc.), or at least no medical purpose recognized by Congress (save for specific research done by Dr. ElSohly, and a very limited number of private individuals (patients) to consume the crops produced by Dr. ElSohly, et al. pursuant to licenses issued by a federal administrative agency). It is interesting to note that the United States holds a (potentially defensive) patent (and has so for several years as of 2018) on various medical applications of CBD via the National Institutes of Health. The "property rights" aspect of your inquiry can be categorized into two parts which are independent of each other, that is both actions can be ongoing simultaneously The government has the power to regulate the cultivation of any crop or commodity on private property pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the intent of Congress, irrespective of if that crop enters the stream of commerce proper or not The government can pursue medical research, apply for and be granted patents (intellectual property), by the government itself, for technologies relating to the medical use of crops or commodities defined by Congress as not having any recognized medical application (e.g., the identical crop or commodity at 1.), potentially for defensive purposes, investment in a potential future market (i.e.g., licensing of patented technologies to pharmaceutical or private equity concerns) for profit, or other undisclosed purposes
The concept of "controlled substances" has a special meaning, and stems from the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, resulting in Chapter 13 of Title 21. Ordinary presecription drugs are the result of an older act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which is also implemented in Title 21. The basic distinction is the difference between "potential for abuse" vs other stuff, and potential for abuse was the historically first desideratum in restricting pharmaceuticals in the old days. There are 5 "schedules" (lists) regarding controlled substances, ranging from the absolutely forbidden Schedule 1 (weed, 1-pentyl-3-[1-(4-methoxynaphthoyl)]indole which probably has a shorter street name) down to Schedule V small doses of opium. Pharmaceuticals fall into three categories: over-the-counter, prescription, and controlled. Things like ibuprofen over 200 mg is not a "controlled substance" though does require a prescription, as do anti-cholesterol drugs (since they are thought to pose "some risk"). There are also completely unregulated substances, such as green tea, olive oil, vitamin c, which so far are not subject to federal regulation (since they have not been deemed to pose a risk). OTC substances can be bought without special hoops, though they cannot be marketed without passing through hoops. Prescription and controlled require a prescription from a DEA-authorized physician. Ephedrine and pseudephedrine are a recent zombie class of pharmaceutical which do not require prescription, but are subject to purchase quotas. Controlled substances are subject to much higher levels of scrutiny, to ascertain that the prescription is legitimate and the recipient is the intended recipient; there are also stricter laws about possible justifications for prescribing regular prescription drugs vs. those on one of the 5 schedules. (And the rules are different for the 5 schedules). It is generally unknown whether doctors can prescribe non-prescription pharmaceuticals, in order to shift the cost to insurance. There is no specific statute prohibiting that, but doctors are also subject to contractual restrictions between themselves and the insurance networks they deal with, so they may have agreed to not engage in such conduct. As far as I can tell, it is not actually illegal for a doctor to write a prescription for OTC Tylenol.
In the US, it stems from some statute, such as RCW Ch. 71.05 in Washington state, which starts by stating the rationale for the law, and which are to protect the health and safety of persons suffering from behavioral health disorders and to protect public safety, and prevent inappropriate commitment of persons living with behavioral disorders and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from involuntary commitment etc. The various laws in this chapter make it possible to commit a person to a mental institute or to undergo involuntary therapy. There is a separate chapter, RCW 71.34, applicable to minors. In general, this law calls for professional evaluation and treatment, without legislating science. The trigger is generally evidence of a tendency towards serious harm or grave disability, with a requirement that the action be requested by a certain kind of behavioral professional. There are not many hard-coded limits on what can be ordered: while RCW 71.05.215 "has a right to refuse antipsychotic medication", that right is overridden when "it is determined that the failure to medicate may result in a likelihood of serious harm or substantial deterioration or substantially prolong the length of involuntary commitment and there is no less intrusive course of treatment than medication in the best interest of that person". Along with the legislation cited, there are also regulations which don't require legislative action (they are "empowered" by the statutes), which could specifically forbid a treatment, but again choice of treatments are left to the professional. In some other jurisdiction, it's possible that a certain treatment would be explicitly outlawed.
Suing them and winning may not be that difficult, and you can generally sue a business even if it ceases to operate as a going concern. Collecting the judgment you win, however, is likely to be very difficult. Still if you are going to sue, the sooner the better, because outside of bankruptcy, the general rule is that the person who is first in time to actually seize the available assets of a company with more debts than assets is first in right to those assets. Also a squeaky wheel is often the one that gets the grease. "Shaming" companies on social media often works for going concerns, but is rarely effective when a company is actually going out of business soon. There are special remedies available against recipients of improperly diverted funds when funds are deliberately sucked out of the organization without receiving anything in exchange for its money (this is called a "fraudulent transfer"), but those cases are expensive to bring and hard to prove. Often in the case of a legitimately failing business, operating losses and not improper diversion of funds from the company, is the reason that it doesn't have enough money to pay all of its debts in full, so this remedy is not available. Winning a lawsuit simply gives you a piece of paper stating that the defendant owes you money which you can then use to seize money and property from the defendant and/or people who owe the defendant money, if you can find either of those things. But, you can't get blood out of a turnip, and the alternative formal collection mechanism (forcing an involuntary bankruptcy) requires the coordination of multiple significant creditors and may not provide much better results if the company has genuinely run out of money, although unpaid wages are often entitled to priority in bankruptcy up to a certain dollar amount which is a preference that is not generally available outside of bankruptcy court. There are sometimes laws that can be invoked to hold people affiliated with the management of a defunct business personally responsible for unpaid wages (sometimes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and sometimes state wage claim acts). And, very rarely in egregious cases that affect lots of people where there was an intent to stiff you before you finished earning new wages at the company, a local or state prosecutor will prosecute a company or its officers for "wage theft". Finally, "freelancers" often have far fewer rights in efforts to collect wages than true employees, so a mere independent contractor is in a weaker position and should consider that fact when deciding whether or not to settle. Bottom line: consider seriously accepting a settlement because the cost of collection and the unavailability of assets to collect from once it goes out of business may make a bird in the hand worth more than two in the bush.
In the US, it depends on why you are doing this, and how you go about performing the operation. There are approved devices and procedures, and there is the other stuff. In an emergency that is life-threatening or threatens severe debilitation, it is permitted for a physician to try an extreme measure – if the state has a "Right to Try" law. Otherwise, a review and official approval by the relevant IRB is required. The devices are regulated by the FDA, but the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so the feds don't have a say in whether a procedure is allowed. Nevertheless, use of unapproved devices can be taken to be evidence of failing to meet the required standard of care, in the case of a malpractice suit or punitive action by the state regulatory board. There is no specific law prohibiting removing lots of organs and replacing them with prostheses, though arguable what happened was that the brain was removed (it's not that a replacement shell was built around the person). Ordinarily, intentionally "killing" a person is illegal (except in case of sanctioned execution or self-defense). There is zero case law that would tell us whether removing a brain from a body "kills" the person. Most likely, there would be a prosecution for unlawfully causing a death, and either the legislature would tune up the law w.r.t. the definition of "causing death", or the courts would do so.
In the US, people are generally allowed to charge arbitrary amounts for services, as long as they do not violate various anti-discrimination laws in doing for. For example it would be illegal to charge people of one race less than they charge people of another race, because of federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Three primary factors govern the legality of a particular form of discrimination. One is the type of interaction, for example "voting rights", "public accommodation", "employment", "housing" – medical treatment would generally fall under "public accommodation". The second is jurisdiction – there can be federal, state, and municipal laws governing a particular kind of discrimination (the lower in the hierarchy you go, the stricter the laws tend to be). Finally there is the "protected class", that is, the basis for discrimination. Protected class is extremely variable, given the preceding two factors. Age discrimination is legal in ways that race discrimination is not. "Has insurance" is not a protected class anywhere, so this does not violate any discrimination laws (per se). There are numerous legal forms of discrimination which are analogous, for example to shop at Costco at all, you have to be a member; there are numerous businesses that offer "member discounts"; some doctors work on a "subscription" basis where they don't treat you unless you are a (paid) service subscriber. The idea that a service has to treat all comers identically is legally incorrect. Co-pay rates are dictated by insurance companies, and can vary depending on the specific insurance carrier that you have. To the extent that there are no specific laws saying otherwise, a service provider is legally entitled to charge less to a person who does not make a claims for coverage by medical insurance – or they could charge more. Indeed, the "without insurance" cost of medical services is typically higher, and the insurance company insists on doctors accepting lower compensation. A "practical" but somewhat risky solution is that if you know that the copay is higher than the street price, you can simply not reveal that you have insurance. However, sometimes an office visit results in a finding that some treatment is needed, and the street price for that treatment may be substantially higher than the insured price. At any rate, contractually-determined co-pays are legal. I should mention a remote possibility for applying anti-discrimination laws, owing to sec. 1557 of ACA. See this article on health care discrimination litigation, where the law enabled "private right of action for disparate impact claims opens the door to class-based claims challenging facially neutral health care policies, treatment decisions, and insurance coverage on the basis that they disproportionately affect members of protected classes". Under this regime, if a policy effectively discriminates on the basis of a protected class, without explicitly mentioning the class, the policy could still be found illegal. If there is a strong enough correlation between race and having health insurance, then "having health insurance" could be found to be a substitute for discrimination on prohibited grounds. There isn't enough case law on this issue, that we can clearly say that such an argument would or would not work.
Because the law of negligence has developed to include a duty of care between physicians and patients and the standard of care encompasses the things you describe. The common law conceives of the doctor and patient in such a close relationship of neighbor-ness that it makes sense to impose such a duty. The harm that flows from breach of that duty is often reasonably foreseeable. Another distinction is that you come to a physician with an illness and expect care and they purport to deliver it. Their care and advice is often not a product/service that you might have the option of not buying. There is no competing legal duty that pulls the physician in any other direction than to meet the standard of care. There is no corresponding duty of care between an instructor and student to instruct any particular syllabus content. It would be a novel addition to the common law if this were to be recongized. There is no standard of care dictating the content of the syllabus. Any obligation to deliver a particular syllabus would be placed on the professor by the university (perhaps further dicated by professional accrediting bodies). I do not foresee the common law developing to include such a duty of care between professor and student. The value of academic freedom weighs against the law imposing a strict duty on syllabus content and the kind of harm that might flow from presenting out-of-date information is vague and not often reasonably foreseeable. Such a duty could give rise to a spectre of of indeterminate liability. And it isn't clear that the interest in presenting the latest and current theories always outweighs the interest in presenting a historical perspective. These are all reasons why I highly doubt the common law would ever evolve to recognize the duty you're proposing.
Is it legal to resell products purchased from distributors? I was trying to contact the manufacturer of a building product. He told me he wouldn't sell it to me and that I needed to go through their licensed distributor. I called the distributor and he agreed to get me the product. Now, I noticed that the distributor typically works on a contractor basis. This means that he doesn't sell directly to the customer, but acts as an installer. His clients typically order the service to install the product. However, he was fine with me buying the material and installing it myself. I was wondering if I could have an e-commerce website where I would sell the product directly to the end customers. I would still fulfill the purchase by buying from the distributor, although they would ship to the end user. This way, DIYers could purchase it directly without the need to talk to the distributor. I do realize I would need to handle the returns, but my question is: is it legal without consulting it with the distributor?
There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model.
Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.
When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.
Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.
What does your contract with your client say? What does your contract with your sub-contractor say? Typically the client contract will not specify HOW the work gets done, just the deliverable(s), the price and the liability. Unless your client contract says otherwise, it's perfectly legal for you to farm out the work. It's also perfectly fine for you to deduct the cost of the sub. As long as that's profitable the IRS will have no problem for that at all: that's a perfectly normal business practice. Things are a bit more complicated if you farm out at a loss since that could be interpreted as a tax evasion scheme. However, as long as it's reasonable, that's fine. If there are defects in the work product, the client will come after you, regardless of who did the work. It's generally your responsibility to fix the issues, cover damages etc. You, in turn, can try to recover your damages from the sub, but that depends on the nature of the contract you have with the sub.
united-states There is no general rule against one company or person buying both broadcasting rights and merchandising rights to a particular piece of content in the US. There are anti-monopoly/anti-trust laws, but those generally only apply if a particular entity holds a monopoly or a commanding market position in a whole market sector. If one firm held the rights to 80% of all online games, for example, an anti-trust action might well be warranted. But a single game or property is not generally considered to be a market sector for anti-trust purposes. Exactly what the proper market sector is in such cases is often a complex, technical, and highly disputed issue. The "original owner of the IP" can decide who s/he wishes to sell that IP to -- nothing requires, or forbids, that different sets of rights be sold to the same buyer. The original owner will attempt to get the best deal available. Sometimes that is a very lucrative deal, and sometimes it is far from that. As long as unlawful methods are not used to induce a sale, whatever bargain the parties make is generally acceptable to the law. I do not know who did, or did not, buy any of the rights to Squid Game, and that info might not be publicly available. But there is no law that I know of against the same party having both broadcast and marketing rights to it, and perhaps other rights as well.
This is a case of nominative use. In general, it is fine to use trademarks to refer to the products trademarked, provided that a reasonable person would not be confused about who creates or provides the product, and would not think that the trademark holder has endorsed, authorized, or sponsored the book or other product that refers to the trademark. It is common to include a disclaimer stating that trademarks are owned by specific parities, and the author or publisher is not claiming them, nor claiming any endorsement or affiliation. Such a disclaimer makes the nominative function of the trade mark use clearer, and would make it harder for the trademark owner to prevail in an infringement suit. See This law.se question and answer for more info.
There is no law against driving a hard bargain If you were describing real estate owners rather than YouTube channel owners we’d have a term for them: a motivated seller. There is no law against using the fact that someone is desperate to sell to negotiate a lower price: that’s just good business. In general, common law legal systems do not involve themselves in whether a price agreed between two parties was fair: if you want to sell your original Picasso for $1 or pay $1m for a used tissue, that’s up to you. If you have ethical issues with that, don’t do it but it’s not illegal. Legal issues can come up where you are the cause in some way of the motivation. A lender foreclosing on a mortgage is ok. A lender offering to buy the property to avoid foreclosure is not. The first is just enforcing the terms of the contract, the second looks like undue influence and unconscionable conduct. Some countries have laws against profiteering and you would need to look at the legal definition to decide if this is or isn’t profiteering. In the US, it isn’t because their laws only deal with profiteering that damages the government. Some US states have laws against price gouging but these are usually to prevent charging too much, not too little. Which clauses of YouTube's Terms of Service would be violated? None. YouTube does not have any terms about selling your digital assets and we know it happens. Which US sanctions would be violated? It’s impossible to say without reading the sanction. If it’s illegal to transfer money to the sanctioned people then the whole plan falls over because you can’t pay for the channel in the first place.
Is lying at all in a testimony considered perjury? Say Bob was murdered at a coffee shop, and Jerry was a witness at the scene. At the trial, he is under oath, and gives his testimony. In his testimony, he explicitly claims that he was watching America's Funniest Home Videos up to the point when the murderer entered the shop. Later in the trial, video evidence, while first and foremost showing that the defendant did indeed murder Bob, also showed that Jerry was watching something that wasn't America's Funniest Home Videos at the point when the murderer entered the shop. For the purpose of simplicity, let's assume that what he was watching is perfectly fine legally speaking. Let's also assume that he knowingly lied about what he was watching, and didn't make a simple mistake. Even though this detail was virtually irrelevant to his testimony, he still technically lied under oath, which is the definition of perjury. Could this result in Jerry being criminally prosecuted and/or his entire testimony becoming invalid?
Take the US federal perjury statute as an example: Whoever having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true ... The key word is material, meaning relevant, important, essential. From your description, the specific show that Jerry was watching is not material to the proceeding in which the testimony was given, so Jerry has not perjured himself. Other common law jurisdictions will likewise have materiality as an element of perjury.
Gabbard accusing Harris of obstruction doesn't make Harris guilty of obstruction. There is no legal progression between a statement by one party about the existence or veracity of a fact that could prove a crime by another party, and that other party and the veracity of the facts or the crime itself and forgone guilt, other than the statement by the first party itself could possibly be defamatory by publishing (making public statements) false facts. By saying "If taken at face value (not saying it is actually true)", I think you're confusing obstruction with defamation. If Harris did factually "block evidence", and it rises to the threshold of obstruction as determined by a prosecutor, then Gabbard isn't stating false facts and is not defaming Harris. If Harris did not factually "block evidence", as determined by documents and evidence, then Gabbard could be stating false facts, but both are public figures, so the threshold of defamation is higher in that it requires actual malice by Gabbard knowing her statement is false or by reckless disregard for the truth. To go a step further, to prosecute Harris, a prosecutor has to determine if Harris obstructed according to evidence, and charge her. Harris could have obstructed and not be charged for either political reasons or reasons regarding evidence, but that's a different question.
As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.
Your belief in the truth of a statement is of only limited value in a defamation suit. Saying that a person is incompetent in that person's profession can certainly be defamation, and may even be defamation per se, depending on the jurisdiction. If the person sues and the speaker asserts truth as a defense, the speaker may have to prove that the statement is true. Why would one need to say anything at all in such a situation? Whether such a statement was a factual statement or a statement of opinion would depend very much on the detailed circumstances. But it is at least possible that a suit might be filed and won on this fact pattern. See this answer for more on defamation under US law.
Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose.
False statements are generally protected by the First Amendment. If the video was an obvious gag or work of fiction, in which a reasonable person would understand that you were not truly endorsed, your false statement would almost certainly be protected by the First Amendment. But many false statements are not protected, typically because of their negative effects on other parties. Classic examples include defamation, perjury, and fraud. A lie about an endorsement could easily fall on either side of that line. If you are making the video in a context in which reasonable viewers would be led to believe that you truly were endorsed by that company, I could easily imagine a set of circumstances that would lead to liability: If you're releasing the video as part of a commercial endeavor, you're looking at possible claims for false advertising, unfair competition, and trademark violations (false designation, dilution, etc.). If your video is harmful to the company's reputation, you're facing a potential claim for product disparagement or trade libel. These are the corporate equivalents of the libel actions most people are more familiar with, and they generally require proving the same kinds of facts. A right of publicity/misappropriation of identity action is possible but very unlikely. Most states are very stingy about allowing businesses to bring these claims, so this one would probably be very jurisdiction-specific. Proving the case generally requires the company to show (1) that you made a commercial use of their identity, (2) that they did not authorize it, and (3) that the use caused economic harm. Beyond those, there's a whole host of business torts that I could try to squeeze this into but that are probably less likely given the hypothetical you've presented. I'd also note that your assumption about proving damages is not well-founded. Especially among the largest companies, businesses are very protective of their brands, and they invest absurd amounts of money to protect them. Pick any company with a high enough profile that someone would want to fake their endorsement, and I'd be willing to bet that their legal department could pretty quickly prepare a detailed estimate of the related damage to their brand. If a case went to trial, you'd normally expect to see an economist present an expert report calculating damages, which would begin (but not end) with any unjust enrichment you experienced because people thought you had the company's endorsement.
united-states The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant in a criminal case the right to “confront one’s accuser”, and the Supreme Court has taken a notably originalist view of this right, holding that this means face-to-face cross examination under virtually all circumstances. While there are some small exceptions related to minors and to witnesses who became unavoidably absent after giving a sworn statement (none of which could apply to Alice), and while the Supreme Court hasn’t explicitly ruled out cross examination over videoconference, the idea of anonymous testimony in a criminal case is unthinkable. Part of an effective cross examination is arguing why the witness’s testimony might be unreliable, and a defendant who didn’t know whose testimony it was would be hamstrung at that.
You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished.
Would it be legal to have an infinitely long middle name? In the United States, would it be legal to have an infinitely long middle name? It appears that it would not be a problem, since most of the time people only use the first letter of the middle name. When a middle name is asked for, it is usually permissible to truncate it if it does not fit in the field provided. Some notes: We will assume that the name in question is computable. That is, there is an algorithm that given a natural number n outputs the nth character of the name. All the characters in the name are standard characters of the English alphabet.
You cannot have an infinitely long name because a name has to be something that can be written down or spoken to be used. An infinitely long name can't be written down or spoken.
We could start with what the statutes say (HSC 102425) (a) The certificate of live birth for a live birth occurring on or after January 1, 2016, shall contain those items necessary to establish the fact of the birth and shall contain only the following information; (1) Full name and sex of the child. It says nothing about the form of that name. Therefore, any prohibition of the letter Æ (or æ) etc. would have to come from the administrative interpretation of California Department of Public Health, Vital Records. There is a long handbook, which on p. 112 states the rule regarding child names. The rules note that The form must be completed using the 26 alphabetical characters of the English language with appropriate punctuation, if necessary. No pictographs (☺), ideograms (⇑), diacritical marks (è, ñ, ē, ç), or extraneous entries are allowed. So the short answer is, unless you feel like making a court case out of the matter and you have a lot of money, this name will not be allowed. The rule might be challenged in court as exceeding statutory authority, and might well be deemed to discriminate w.r.t. race and national origin. The rule could be defended on grounds of necessity, if we presume that the department is incapable of recording information other than the 26 letters and "appropriate punctuation" (undefined, presumably only apostrophe). It's not that in principle Unicode doesn't exist, it's that their system may not be capable of dealing with it (numerous problems would arise from the non-unique mapping from visual representation to Unicode number). There does not seem to be a court ruling on the matter.
The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date.
In the United States, no. For something to be illegal in any meaningful way, you have to be able to point to a law that makes it illegal. If there's no law to break, it's not illegal. I would wonder if your colleague was thinking about question of whether cryptocurrencies are legal tender. For something to be "legal tender," there would need to be some kind of law or regulation requiring people to accept them as payment. There is no such requirement in the United States, so Bitcoin, for instance, is not legal tender. But that doesn't make it illegal tender; it just means that people can decide whether to accept it or not.
Under US law, there is no requirement for a child to have the same last name as the legal father, the biological father, or the mother. Initially the last name is specified on the birth certificate, often taken from the name of the listed father, but that is not required. But the name can be changed at any time, by a custodial parent or guardian while the child is minor, and later by the child directly.
No, copyright protection does not exist for single words or even short phrases: see this. A word can be protected, in a certain context, by trademark. To take one example, the word "Apple" is protected in the domain of computer products, because Apple computers has registered "Apple" as their trademark, and you can't then start selling a line of computers named "Apple". You can however sell fruits called "apples", or you could sell knives with that name (unless someone has registered "apple" as a brand of knife). There are currently 45 "classes" for trademark protection. "Arcane" is a normal word of everyday language (YMMV), which means that there is relatively little protection for the word, as contrasted with "Microsoft", a word created by that company. It is unlikely that the courts would recognize "Arcane" as being distinctive. You can search the trademark database here: there is nothing for "arcane magic", and little for "arcane".
No If they have prior usage then they have the trademark already and are the only ones who can register it. Trademarks arise through use - registration is not required.
Any legal issues for writing about your parent(s)? No. Furthermore, the answer you got from the Free Legal Aid Clinic is wrong. There is no need for pseudonyms or ambiguities such as "a family member". As long as your statements of fact are truthful, identifying actual individuals in your narrative is lawful (this applies to US as well as Canada defamation law). A word of caution, though: Your post reflects deficiencies in how you explain yourself. This has more to do with your way of articulating ideas than the possibility that English might not be your first language. Although it is palpable from your post that you do not intend to defame someone, reading it raises some concern that you might inadvertently convey a defamatory falsehood when you talk about matters which are understandably sensitive. Knowing how to transmit your message clearly and accurately is far more important --and safer from a legal standpoint-- than avoiding ironic acronyms such as "A m o m f".
Do milk crates have registered owners? Is there an actual milk crate registration system? What is the law by which use by other than the registered owner is punishable? Is there an index I can use to see who these milk crates are registered to? Where can I register my milk crates to reserve my rights?
Here is the state of California code regarding the question. I am sure a state by state inquiry could reveal other statutes. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&file=565-566 In California there is no specific registry but registration is performed by marking the container with a registered brand.
"Lemon laws" are about new cars and manufacturing defects. Used vehicles are sold "as is", except that dealers are obligated to offer a 30 or 60 day warranty that the vehicle will continue to function. Using the term "owner" suggests that this is not a dealership sale. Generally speaking, you are out of luck, except for the verbal add-on to the sales agreement. If there is no written agreement, just a verbal contract and exchange of money for truck, you may be able to enforce the contract in regular court. The prospects decrease if there is a written agreement that does not include the money-back guarantee, and become effectively zero if there is a clause that says "This is the whole agreement, the car is sold as-is". Assuming there is no written agreement, then you and perhaps the third party would testify as to the money-back guarantee, the seller would testify that there was no such guarantee (or that you misunderstood what he said), and the court would decide which version of the story is more believable.
It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.
My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.
There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.
There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder.
It might be illegal, depending on where you are. If it is known to the person who owns the vehicle occupying your space prior to doing so that wheelclamping may be the result, then the common law doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to a willing party, harm is not done") would lead to a conclusion that one who knowingly places themselves in a situation where harm may befall them is not entitled to bring a claim of tort against the other party (in the United States assumption of risk is a similar doctrine, but doesn't apply here because wheelclamping is an intentional act). In your situation, this means that the owner occupying your space cannot bring a case in tort against you. While it is generally applied to harm to people, there is precedent (albeit in British case law) for the doctrine to be applied to vehicles, and specifically, to the situation you describe - see Arthur v Anker and Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest. While cases from other jurisdictions are not binding, I have not been able to find any similar cases in the United States, and so it is possible that such cases will be persuasive. Note that this is highly jurisdiction-specific, and there may be laws in your state that make it unlawful - at least one high-profile case involving a McDonalds and its parking lot operator cites California law authorising only law enforcement to impound vehicles, and considering wheelclamping such an act. However, I have not been able to find the record of a judgement on this matter. It is also likely that if the payment you request is excessive, the owner would be able to seek relief, in the form of reducing the payment owed to a reasonable amount. However, if the parking space was not marked in some way to signal that it was reserved for use, then the owner of the vehicle may be entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages from a court. This would be on the basis of, if you only wheelclamped the car and declined to remove the wheelclamp upon the owner's request, the tort of detinue. But, if you attempted to request payment from them, then as Dale mentioned in his answer, you have committed extortion (wheelclamping is actually listed as a crime of extortion).
I believe you are correct. It doesn't seem illegal for a private individual to use a bee pesticide (following label instructions) to remove a beehive from property that you own. There are federal laws regarding the commercial use of pesticides which are regulated under the EPA (not the FDA). People are encouraged to report bees being killed to the EPA from commercial operations. However, if you do have a problem with a honey bee nest on your property I would highly recommend that you contact the local beekeepers association first. Usually they can have somebody out the same day to remove and relocate the nest. Removing and relocating bees is actually not that hard (for a trained individual). Honey bees don't pose a risk unless somebody is allergic, and they are not aggressive. My neighbor usually has four or five hives on his property, and we see the bees all the time. My kids enjoy watching them climb into flowers or buzz around the garden. They really are a natural resource that should at least be attempted to be preserved if at all possible.
How is Christmas' status as a federal holiday legal? It seems the United States federal government's establishment of Christmas, a religious holiday, as a federal holiday would be illegal under the establishment clause of the First Amendment. How is it legal? Or is it case of no one has bothered to change it yet?
It is perfectly legal and, many would argue, reasonable to have secular reasons to do something that happen to align with religious reasons. In other words, just because there's a religious reason to do something doesn't invalidate secular reasons to do the same thing. The New York Times had an article in 2013 that explained the origin of the federal holidays in 1870: Congress acknowledged that Jan. 1 is "commonly called New Year's Day" and Dec. 25 is "commonly called Christmas Day." and further on in the article: If you read the language of the [1870] bill, it's clear that Congress chose dates commonly celebrated as holidays by the American people, not for religious reasons but because of a history of recognition and celebration on those dates. The federal holidays make sense from an efficiency perspective. If a significant number of federal employees will be taking those days off for celebratory purposes then it doesn't make sense to open federal offices if there's not enough staff. Federal holidays only apply to federal employees and the District of Columbia. There's no requirement that your private employer, state employer or you recognize those holidays.
Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is.
There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.
How come this is viable? Because it’s legal. What if people use their service to commit crimes? What if people use a Ford in a bank holdup? Or a Glock in a murder? Or the US Postal Service in a Nigerian letter scam? If the goods or services are legal and not provided for an obviously illegal purpose, nothing happens.
In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.
Taking the US as an example, the Constitution states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Congress or a state government hasn't prohibited you from comparing platforms. Another private entity has. And, that's fine. You're free to launch the app as a separate website, or print out the flyers and hand them to people on the bus, or publish your own monthly magazine comparing various platforms, so you still have freedom of speech and of the press. As an example, if you write a letter about how great the government of North Korea is to the letters department at Stamp Collectors Magazine, and they don't publish it, have they violated your human rights? The app store restriction may be quite dumb. After all, the built-in web browser allows the reading of the exact same news. But there's no law against being dumb.
First off, the people of Finland say that Santa lives in Korvatunturi, which would mean he is subject to Finnish jurisdiction. But if he were born, resided and worked at the North Pole, as the original question states, this spot is in international waters, and under the Convention on the High Seas that would be terra nullius. Therefore no nation can claim sovereignty over his home (we must also assume he is not on a plane or ship flying the flag of some nation: article 11 allows the detention of a ship on the high seas only under order of authorities of the flag state). That might immunize him from civil forfeiture of his home, but there is more to jurisdiction than where your home is. Under Article 14, all states "shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State". Article 15 says what "piracy" is, which could be interpreted as referring to crimes against persons and property (but not possession of marijuana). Eritrea is not a signatory to this treaty, so they might claim legal jurisdiction, though enforcement of the claim could be challenging. The US has technically not ratified this treaty either, but we mostly observe it. Klaus could also be subject to US law (for example) in specific cases. The high seas are in the "special maritime jurisdiction" and the US can claim jurisdiction for offenses against a national of the US. Other states may have similar laws. A person whose IP had been copied can sue in their home country, so the lack of a North Pole jurisdiction would not protect Claus. B&E is prosecuted where the offense happens; he would be free of business license laws; when he enters US airspace, he is subject to FAA regulations, and would be required to have a visa and passport to enter the US. In fact, most of the alleged crimes take place within the jurisdiction of a state.
Both Congress and the state legislatures are expressly forbidden by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder. That means neither can ever pass a law that names an individual and says "they are suspended." It is so important that it's one of the very few restrictions on government that the original Constitution (before any amendments) prohibited in bot state and federal governments. (Also, a "bill" is not a law. It's what a legislature is considering making a law.)