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How did Dominion legally obtain text messages from Fox News hosts? In the current case of Dominion v Fox News, we saw that text messages from Fox News hosts have been admitted as legal evidence in court. My understanding was that text messages either had to be turned voluntarily, or they had to be forcefully retrieved by law-enforcement if they have a warrant. Either scenario seems somewhat unlikely to me : I cannot imagine Fox News hosts to voluntarily hand over incriminating texts, and I also struggle to see how they would have been forced to enforce it, given how hard defamation is to prove in the US. Does anyone have more details on how these text messages were obtained, and accepted in court? | Because the hosts are part of the defendants. A party in a lawsuit can demand documents to be turned over to them from the opposing party. That is called Discovery and participation is mandatory. Not turning over the documents requested and not providing a good reason why they should not be turned over is contempt of court. Discovery under the Federal Rules is very broad. According to Rule 26(b)(1), "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." The federal rules also provide several tools that can be used to get information from other parties, including interrogatories, depositions, and requests for admission. A party may also compel other parties to give them access to documents, real property, or other things for review or testing. See Rules 26-37. The Delaware rules of Civil Procedure mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure very closely, and their Rule 26 is close to the Federal Rule 34. Especially interesting here is: Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 26 (b) (1) In general. - Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any documents, electronically stored information (EST), or tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial. [...] The hosts are employees of the defendant, the phones contain EST that is regarding the matter and relevant to Dominion's claim, and disclosure is proportional to the needs of the case. As such, The employer has to make them comply with discovery requests by the opposing party and hand over the text messages. | Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this. | You've identified exactly the right question: whether the person's subjective expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, is the "justifiable under the circumstances". (Smith v. Maryland) The Supreme Court hasn't addressed how this test applies to ISPs and website requests. However, this question has been addressed by several circuit courts of appeal. I'll build a list of example cases. Many find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in this information, but there are some cases that go the other way, and there is some nuance regarding exactly what information is being given away. US v. Beckett (11th Cir. 2010): the information consisted of the identifying information transmitted during internet usage and phone calls that is necessary for the ISPs and phone companies to perform their services. It is unreasonable for Beckett to have been unaware that such information was being transmitted to the ISPs and phone companies and so he “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the [information].” United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007): Analogously, e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. Like telephone numbers, which provide instructions to the "switching equipment that processed those numbers," e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party equipment, but rather are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party's servers. Regarding your secondary question about a "secret machine" that the government develops to get access to contents of an envelope without opening it, that is very similar to the situation in Kyllo v US 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (internal quotations removed): [...] obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the home's interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. [...] Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home. | Yes. This is treated as time served as several media accounts of sentencing hearings in these cases have demonstrated. See, e.g., this account in The Atlantic magazine, and this one in the newspaper USA Today, and this one in the newspaper the Houston Chronicle. I also saw a similar account in the L.A. Times but can't provide a link because my non-subscription access limit has been exceeded. | In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible. | Gabbard accusing Harris of obstruction doesn't make Harris guilty of obstruction. There is no legal progression between a statement by one party about the existence or veracity of a fact that could prove a crime by another party, and that other party and the veracity of the facts or the crime itself and forgone guilt, other than the statement by the first party itself could possibly be defamatory by publishing (making public statements) false facts. By saying "If taken at face value (not saying it is actually true)", I think you're confusing obstruction with defamation. If Harris did factually "block evidence", and it rises to the threshold of obstruction as determined by a prosecutor, then Gabbard isn't stating false facts and is not defaming Harris. If Harris did not factually "block evidence", as determined by documents and evidence, then Gabbard could be stating false facts, but both are public figures, so the threshold of defamation is higher in that it requires actual malice by Gabbard knowing her statement is false or by reckless disregard for the truth. To go a step further, to prosecute Harris, a prosecutor has to determine if Harris obstructed according to evidence, and charge her. Harris could have obstructed and not be charged for either political reasons or reasons regarding evidence, but that's a different question. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | This is wire fraud and punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. It is not relevant that the victims of this fraud are people who support a cause that the US government opposes. Nor is it relevant what your friend chooses to do with the ill-gotten money. It is still just as illegal. Whether your friend would be prosecuted would be at the discretion of federal prosecutors, and political motivations could come into play. That is beyond the scope of Law.SE to address. What is certain is that he could be prosecuted. Giving information to the FBI probably won't help, as from your description, the victims of this fraud aren't doing anything illegal. "Donating money to support Russia", while vague, does not sound like it violates any of the current sanctions. |
Is it legal to ignore "Do Not Track" for data subjects who fall under the GDPR? The "Do Not Track" (DNT) flag is an optional header field in HTTP requests sent by web browsers to web servers. It requests that the website not track the user, or not track the user across different websites (the ambiguity remains unresolved, according to Wikipedia). The GDPR provides a number of lawful bases for processing personal data, one of which is consent. If a website is relying on consent for collecting data about the user, would it therefore be a breach of the law to ignore the user's expressed preference in the form of the DNT flag? I ask because it seems that DNT is widely ignored, at least in the US. As I am in the EU, and have DNT set in my browser, I wonder if anyone who tracks me across the Web is thereby breaking the law. | The GDPR actually does require you to follow DNT in Article 21: In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications. I think this is quite explicit. | As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself. | Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to all your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe. So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest. Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can "hurt revenue", but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model. In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice: You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription. You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking. The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure. In any case, GDPR limits how much you can "encourage" consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of "permissible incentive" in their guidelines on consent. In this post, "Europe" means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate. | The 'right to be forgotten', as currently being applied throughout the European Union (EU), does not come from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force 25 May 2018. Rather, the current basis exists in the Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC, article 12(b): Right of access Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller: [...] (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data; This was one of the main points upon which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, the judgement which allowed for individuals to ask for search engines to remove results containing personal data. The CJEU explained that the 'right to be forgotten' was not absolute and should take into account economic considerations as well as other rights (paragraphs 85 - 88). The GDPR, article 17, for purposes of contrast, has a more robust and explicit right of erasure than currently in force: Article 17 Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: [...] Shortened for clarity GDPR, article 17 fleshes out much of the lack of specifics that the Directive's article 12(b). It should be noted that the UK's Data Protection Act 1998 is a transposition of the Data Protection Directive. This means that the full effect of the rights and obligations in the Directive are contained within the Data Protection Act 1998. Furthermore, the interpretation of the rights and obligations of the Data Protection Directive by the CJEU are highly influential on interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998. This is due to the European Communities Act 1972, s 3(2) which states: Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the Communities and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court on any such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be admissible as evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of any of the Communities or of any Community institution Even without the above provision, it would be extremely likely that British courts would take into account Google Spain, given that the foundation of the Data Protection Act 1998 is the Data Protection Directive. The most likely outcome is for British courts to uphold the interpretation in Google Spain and allow for data subjects to request removal from search engines. Of course, it is not entirely possible to know without a test case, but it is doubtful any major search engine would attempt to deviate from the current situation as there is currently legal certainty. The Data Protection Act 1998 will still be in force after the future Brexit agreement and is certainly not contingent on continued EU membership. Update The current DPA will be repealed when Brexit comes in to play and will be replaced by a new one. Read more about the new data protection bill on the ICOs web site, which is based on the GDPR with certain derogations and additions. | Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. Basically, your thoughts are all correct. The Dutch DPA (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) has written a manual how to use Google Analytics compliant with the GDPR without having to ask for consent. But unfortunately it is not available in English. Based on Art. 28 GDPR, you need a Data Processing Amendment with google. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Open it Accept it Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address. A full IP address is considered personal data. It is possible to remove the last octet before it is processed by google. Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Create a screenshot of the change, so you can prove later at which date you made this change. Disable Data Sharing with google. By default Google uses the data for 5 different purposes. Each of them would require consent from the visitor of your website. So you need to switch that off. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxes (Google producs & services, Benchmarking, Technical support, Account specialists and access for sales experts) Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising. This has to be disabled at a different location, for the same reason as the previous step. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options (remarketing and advertising reporting) Click Save Disable the User-ID feature. This is probably turned off by default. But it is important to keep it turned off. So you need to verify this. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Disable it Click Save Even though you don't need consent to use Google Analytics, you still need to inform your users, for example by adding a few lines to your privacy policy explaining: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens still recommends to offer an opt-out for Google Analytics, but it would not be required. As the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens is a DPA as defined in chapter 6 of the GDPR, you have to assume their advice really is GDPR complaint. In the past they also had performed other investigations to the privacy policies of google. | In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;" | GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland. | I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software. |
legality of stopping a foreign ship and seizing goods I read today that in the Gulf of Oman, in international waters, a small Iranian ship was detected by the American navy. They assumed that it transported weapons to Yemen. The Americans contacted the British navy, who sent a frigate to intercept the Iranian boat and confiscate the weapons on board, on the grounds that they were illegal. I wonder what the legality is of this action. | The United Nations Security Council made Resolution 2216 on 14 April 2015, and reaffirmed the key provisions recently in Resolution 2675 of 15 February 2023 (see the reference in paragraph 1). Resolution 2216, in paragraphs 14-17, imposes an arms embargo for Yemen. In particular, it calls on all Member States to "take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer" of armaments, and to inspect Yemen-bound cargo for the same, "in accordance with ... the law of the sea" and other relevant law. The UK and USA are both Member States of the UN, so they are specifically empowered to implement the embargo. The reason the Security Council can do this is because the UN Charter says that it can. "Interruption of economic relations" and "blockade" are among the possibilities explicitly mentioned (Articles 42 and 43), but this is well within the scope of the Security Council's power. By saying that interdiction should be in accordance with the law of the sea, the UNSC is bringing in well-established rules about the conduct of maritime operations, jurisdiction in the high seas and elsewhere, compensation for wrongful interdiction, use of force, and so on. In other words, they are not trying to override the standard rules. This is not the first embargo in history and there is no need to outline everything in the resolution text. | Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed. | It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power. | When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well. | Can any one uses this law to sue US for killing people in Iraq for example? No. This proposed law is limited to suing people or organizations involved in supporting terrorism in the US. The problem with it is if it becomes law and is used, the precedent will be set to allow lawsuits against foreign actors for such decisions. So a middle eastern government, e.g. Iraq or Iran, could pass a law allowing lawsuits against those who could be in some way responsible for war crimes during the Iraq war. So someone could sue the individuals directly responsible, their commanders for not stopping them or preventing them, the organization to which the individuals belonged, the government of the individuals, the members of the coalition, and the United Nations. And this would be done in that country's courts, not international courts with some claim to impartiality. The proposed law is a bad idea, but quite popular. There were some low level members of the Saudi Arabian government who supported actions taken by the group involved in the 9/11 attacks. The families of the victims are understandably annoyed by this. And yes, they are actually seeking justice, just not in the best way. This wouldn't make a good basis for blackmail, as there is no way to stop it. Blackmail is based on offering two alternatives and allowing the victim to pick one. This wouldn't be controllable like that. Once launched, it would be difficult to pull back. | It's probably not a good idea to take action movies as authoritative sources on the law. The law that you're referring to is presumably the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) which says Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There is an article on the act which reviews the pre-history of the act and subsequent congressional authorizations, and there have been many, e.g. the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1894, Espionage Act of 1917, 33 USC 3 pertaining to gunnery ranges, Fisheries and Conservation Management Act of 1976 and so on. The military police are authorized to enforce military law (though not civilian law), see article 7 of the UCMJ, authorized by Congress in Title 10. P. 167 of the article discusses limits on arrest and investigative powers: their powers pertain almost exclusively to the military. | If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime. | It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched. |
Is it legal to hijack a plane to prevent the pilot from committing a murder-suicide? If the pilot of a single-pilot aircraft carrying passengers (not an airliner) attempts to commit a murder-suicide by crashing the plane, is it legal for a passenger, who is not a pilot, to use force to restrain the pilot, hijack the plane, and (attempt to) land it? If the pilot is "successful" in causing the crash, but everyone survives, with what crimes could he be charged? What if the passenger(s) die? What if someone on the ground dies? Assume that it is obvious that the pilot's intent is to cause a fatal accident, and there is clear evidence of everything that happened in the plane. I'm interested in answers from any country. | canada Taking control of an aircraft from a pilot in command without their consent would normally be an offence under s. 7.3(1) and 7.41 of the Aeronautics Act (but I'm doubtful that the act of the passenger in your scenario is "endangering the safety" of the aircraft) and possibly s. 76 of the Criminal Code (I'm also doubtful that the mens rea is met in the specific scenario you describe). Restraining the pilot would be at least plain assault (Criminal Code, s. 265). Regardless, in your scenario, the otherwise illegal acts of the passenger would most likely be justified by self-defence (in response to force or threat of force) or the defence of necessity (no reasonable legal alternative to avoid imminent peril). Possible offences for the pilot: murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, criminal negligence causing death. Oddly, the offence of "endangering the safety of an aircraft" (Criminal Code, s. 77) does not seem to apply here. | I think this is a reference to Section 14-224: (a) Each operator of a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which results in the death of any other person shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any officer or witness to the death of any person, and if such operator of the motor vehicle causing the death of any person is unable to give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any witness or officer, for any reason or cause, such operator shall immediately report such death of any person to a police officer, a constable, a state police officer or an inspector of motor vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or station, and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the accident causing the death of any person and such operator’s name, address, operator’s license number and registration number. There are subsequent similar paragraphs about accidents resulting in injury or property damage. The wording is a little bit confusing and it appears that you don't strictly have to report to the police, if you instead identify yourself to a witness. | The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though. | Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what. | 18 USC 32(a) says Whoever willfully— (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both 18 USC 31(1) defines "aircraft": The term “aircraft” means a civil, military, or public contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, fly, or travel in the air. A personal private drone is not public or military, but it is "civil". In the definitions (b), it also says: In this chapter, the terms “aircraft engine”, “air navigation facility”, “appliance”, “civil aircraft”, “foreign air commerce”, “interstate air commerce”, “landing area”, “overseas air commerce”, “propeller”, “spare part”, and “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States” have the meanings given those terms in sections > 40102(a) and 46501 of title 49. The Title 49 definition (16) say “civil aircraft” means an aircraft except a public aircraft. So on that count alone, it is illegal, a federal crime. On a second count, it is illegal: it would count as destruction of property. In Washington under RCW 9A.48.070 it is a Class B felony: (1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously... (c) Causes an impairment of the safety, efficiency, or operation of an aircraft by physically damaging or tampering with the aircraft or aircraft equipment, fuel, lubricant, or parts. The exact details depend on what state this happens in. FAA restrictions for drones is that they should be flown below 400 ft, specifically §107.51 says A remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small unmanned aircraft system must comply with all of the following operating limitations when operating a small unmanned aircraft system... (b) The altitude of the small unmanned aircraft cannot be higher than 400 feet above ground level, unless the small unmanned aircraft: (1) Is flown within a 400-foot radius of a structure; and (2) Does not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit. If the drone is actually trying to hit you, you can avail yourself of the defense of self-defense, but that is not available if you simply dislike it that someone flies too high over your property. There is no specific minimum distance from the aircraft and the ground, but the operator must fly the thing safely, and not above people. And finally, apart from the criminal aspects of shooting a drone out of the sky, you can also be sued for property damage, and is thus illegal. That said, in light of Boggs v. Meredith, this does not mean you will get anywhere if you sue the gunner for blasting your plane, at least if your venue is the western district federal court in Kentucky. You can sue in state court for trespass to chattels, and the FCC could (but did not) seek an action against the offender for blasting a plane out of the sky, but there is a narrow path for suing in federal court. The district court found that the plane-owner stepped off the path (the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). A state court could decide whether the airspace in question is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the US. | Yes, and sometimes it even makes perfect sense that such an activity would be a crime. For many crimes, attempting the crime is a crime. The attempt may have no actual effect on any person or property, but is still illegal. According to 16 U.S. Code § 1538(a)(1)(C) it is illegal to kill an endangered species on the high seas. A whale in international waters cannot really be considered anyone's "property" (and since it's in international waters there can't even be some weird theory of it being the government's property) but it is still illegal. 18 U.S. Code § 700 purports to prohibit the desecration of a flag, although this was found unconstitutional. 18 U.S. Code § 708 makes it a crime to commercially use the coat of arms of the Swiss Confederation, for some reason. And 18 U.S. Code § 711a makes it a crime to use the slogan "Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute" for profit, except as authorized. (But maybe that sort of thing counts as intellectual property.) 18 U.S. Code § 342 makes it a crime to operate a passenger train under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This really only affects people and property if the train is driven improperly as a result; if you make it safely, you'd probably never even know. But the driver would still be facing up to 15 years in prison if he was caught doing that. And finally, according to A Crime a Day on Twitter: 33 USC §1232(b), 33 CFR §401.101 & §401.94(a) make it a federal crime to violate the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations by not having a copy of the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations while you pass through the St. Lawrence Seaway. | None of the factors you list about Charlie committing a crime, about to commit a crime* or being responsible for the officer's injury apply to whether or not Bob can shoot Charlie on behalf of the officer. On the other hand, if Charlie's actions lead Bob to the reasonable belief that Charlie represents an imminent threat of death or grave bodily injury to anyone then Bob will be justified in using force, including deadly force, to stop Charlie. I'm aware of many states that also allow the use of deadly force to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A normal citizen can go to great lengths to assist the police and stories of citizens coming to the aid of police officers are easily found. There may be some reason the police officer felt the need to use deadly force against Charlie. Bob will need to make his own determination based on all the factors available to him, which may include communication from the officer. If Bob decides to shoot Charlie then an investigation will center on whether it was reasonable for Bob to deduce that the use of deadly force was justified given the information available to Bob at the time. Some states have laws that penalize refusal to aid a police officer. A list of them can be found on this wikipedia page. Notably, California just repealed their statute requiring assistance. *The statutes of some states allow the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of felonies, typically forcible felonies. However, just because a crime is listed as a forcible felony doesn't always mean that deadly force can be used to stop the crime. An example comes from Florida where the statutes state that deadly force can be used to stop forcible felonies, the statutes also define burglary as a forcible felony. However, the courts have ruled that the use of such force is not reasonable where the structure being burglarized is unoccupied. | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 |
Copyright issues when journal is defunct Consider a seminal paper published 40 years ago in a journal that went belly up 30 years ago. Many cite it but hardly anyone has seen it. Can I expect trouble if I make an electronic copy available on my blog? | Factual assumptions ohwilleke's answer is entirely correct. However, it makes factual assumptions based on the standard meaning of "journal" and "author", which I believe to be unwarranted. From the question, it seems likely that we are talking about a scientific paper, which operates under a very different economic and legal model. I am going to assume that: the authors sent a draft of the paper, the preprint, to the journal editor; the journal editor sent the draft to external experts (the reviewers); those reviewers, and possibly the editor, gave some feedback; the authors modified their draft based on that feedback to produce the final version; throughout all this, the authors, editor and reviewers agreed with the journal’s policies; the journal policies require a transfer of copyright to the publisher, a legal entity that "owns" large number of journals and provides some technical services (article typesetting, maintenance of a web site with the journal contents, maintenance of DOIs, etc.); neither the authors, nor the editor, nor the reviewers received monetary compensation for their work (this is a key economic difference from non-academic journals, but as we shall see, it has little legal effect) In theory, all depends on the copyright release agreement When the author(s) submit a draft to a journal, they have to click through an agreement to release copyright. Such a clause could, in theory, be anything the authors and the publisher agreed that does not violate contract law. In practice, because the publishers are a small oligopoly, the agreements are more or less standardized. The "sample publishing agreement" given as example at https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/copyright (as downloaded on March 2, 2023) is more or less representative: I hereby assign to the Copyright Owner the copyright in the manuscript identified above (where Crown Copyright is asserted, authors agree to grant an exclusive publishing and distribution license) and any tables, illustrations or other material submitted for publication as part of the manuscript (the “Article”). This assignment of rights means that I have granted to the Copyright Owner the exclusive right to publish and reproduce the Article, or any part of the Article, in print, electronic and all other media (whether now known or later developed), in any form, in all languages, throughout the world, for the full term of copyright, and the right to license others to do the same, effective when the Article is accepted for publication. This includes the right to enforce the rights granted hereunder against third parties. The authors are the sole intellectual contributors to the preprint version, but a copyright release agreement could still bar them from publishing it. The vast majority of agreements between novel authors and publishing houses forbid the author from selling the book rights to another publisher or posting drafts of the novel on the author’s website (two actions that would result in greatly diminished sales for the publisher). The published version incorporate revisions where the reviewers and possibly the editor contributed significant intellectual contributions. Again, all depends on the copyright agreement - the publisher terms could in theory require that the reviewers and editors release their contribution under an irrevocable license to the authors. In practice, all goes to the publisher. The financial structure is irrelevant The fact that authors (and reviewers, and editors) are not paid by the publisher is irrelevant. Yes, a contract (in common-law countries) requires consideration from both sides; however, consideration needs not be monetary. There is not much doubt that publication of an article is "consideration", at the very least because that is considered prestigious among a significant fraction of the population. In addition, there is ample evidence that funding agencies and university HR staff evaluate and promote scientists based primarily on the papers they publish in scientific journals. In practice, preprint rules are lax The vast majority of academic publishers allow authors to publish the preprint version although conditions vary (only the preprint, only on a personal website, only for a limited time, only after some embargo period, only if you cite the final article with the correct DOI, etc.). I would speculate that this is the result of cultural pressure. Many academics decided to post their articles (sometimes the preprint before sumbission, sometimes the published version) on the internet without much regard to pesky questions of copyright law, because they viewed publishers as gatekeeping greedy monopolistic parasites. The publishers decided to embrace the practice in order to be able to put some limits on it, rather than try to mass-fire lawsuits against the people who provided them with free labor. Regardless of whether that speculation is correct, the current arrangement is not the inevitable result of legal rules, and publishers could conceivably decide to change their preprint sharing policies at any moment. Limitations to the copyright of research papers This section is quite obviously not exhaustive, but given that the original question does not specify a jurisdiction, I did not search beyond what I already know. In the united-states, works produced by employees of the federal government as part of their work duties are generally public domain (17 U.S. Code § 105; do note that subsection (b) means certain works produced by certain institutions still are under copyright). Hence, if the authors were both researchers at a federal research institution, the preprint is public domain and can be republished irrespective of the publisher’s will. (I am led to believe, however, that most US researchers are not employees of the federal governments, but rather of private or state universities.) In europe, as a result of public pressure against publishers (see "greedy monopolistic parasites", above), the European Commission published non-binding guidelines (2012/417/EU) asking that there should be open access to publications resulting from publicly funded research as soon as possible, preferably immediately and in any case no later than 6 months after the date of publication, and 12 months for social sciences and humanities That (non-binding) recommendation has been adopted with varying adaptations in various EU countries. The exact implementation in a given country should be checked before relying on it. For instance, in France, article L533-4 du code de la Recherche allows authors (after the six or twelve months embargo period) to post the published version (not just the preprint), irrespective of what what signed with the publisher, as long as at least half of the funding for the research came from public funds. I will assume neither of those apply. The copyright owner is likely still around Academic journals are born and die regularly. However, academic publishers rarely do (Elsevier is almost 150 years old). As ohwilleke says, the copyright release contract signed 40 years ago is likely still valid; even if the publisher folded, it would apply to the publisher’s legal successor. (The question of how legal rights are liquidated in a bankruptcy would be an interesting question that I am not competent to answer; it is plausible that under certain circumstances the contract would be dissolved.) If the authors can access the copyright release they signed back when they submitted the article, you might be able to determine that posting the preprint or the final article is acceptable. (I realize that this is a fairly ludicrous hypothetical, given that the paper was published 40 years ago.) Otherwise, it is extremely likely that the publisher would be able to sue, even if the publication occurs with the authors’ full support. Whether they are likely to do so, and whether publishing anyway is ethical, are of course non-legal questions. | Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use". | It is possible to abandon copyright ... maybe. However, this game has not been abandoned. When the owner of the company was liquidated, the copyright became the legal property of the liquidator in trust for the creditors. It is for him or her to decide how to deal with the property but the copyright still exists until 70 years after the author(s) death. If you allow downloads you are breaching copyright unless you have permission (or you meet the Fair Dealing criteria - you probably don't). The person to seek permission from is the liquidator od the company. If you get sued they do not need to demonstrate financial loss - copyright claims can either be pursued for actual or statutory damages, that is, a fixed amount per violation. In addition, in egregious cases, copyright violation is a crime prosecutable by the state. | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | There is a subtle difference between NSF policy and enforceable obligation. The primary stick that goes with the carrot is being excluded from future funding. Current policy does not generally force material in the public domain, but it is a possibility in "exceptional circumstances". There no doubt is a paper record somewhere in D.C. indicating whether such a codicil was added to any of these grants. NSF generally does not have contracts with individuals, they have contracts with institutions who have relations (typically employer-employee) with individuals, so even if there were a policy requiring works to be put in the public domain, NSF would have to go after the institution, who would have to go after the author. Since that would conflict with longstanding NSF policy on copyright, it is unlikely that they would want to pursue such an approach. The statement that McGraw-Hill Book Company announces that the material, which is copyrighted, will be available for use by authors and publishers on a royalty-free basis on or after April 30, 1970 is not itself a license, it is a suggestion that a license will com into existence. A present-tense declaration "this work is dedicated to the public domain effective April 30, 1970" can be interpreted as a license effective of a date certain. Similarly, "will be available to all publishers for use in English after December 31, 1970, and in translations after December 31, 1975" does not say that it is in the public domain effective of some date. One might say that the copyright statement is simply not well written and the author really intended the books to be in the public domain as of those dates. But without compelling evidence that the book was actually released into the public domain, a court is very unlikely to abrogate a person's property rights. | Maybe You linked to the publication of a patent application, not to a patent. Based solely on looking at the format of the number the answer would be, Yes, unless it eventually became an issued patent. As it happens, it did become issued patent US9066511B2. That would make the answer no. Since the application was filed before you started selling them, the fact that you were selling them in 2017 could not be used to challenge the patent. I say the answer is maybe because the patent has been disputed in court and I do not know if the outcome has left the patent valid. You can look this up at the USPTO Public PAIR. Then you need to search with either the patent number or the publication number. When you get to the record of the history of that application look at the Image File Wrapper tab. | Unless the work has entered the public domain (after the copyright expires, or if a copyright notice or renewal was omitted when these were required, or in other ways) there is always an owner of the copyright. If the copyright was retained by the author, who has died, than the author's heir(s) own it. (If there are no other heirs, it becomes the property of the state. This is known as escheating.) If the author has sold or assigned the copyright (say to a publisher) then the buyer or assignee owns it. If the owner is a business that has ceased to operate, but has not sold the copyright, then the shareholders or proprietor has the right to sell or license it (technically the business still owns it). If the business goes through legal bankruptcy, the copyright would be sold, possibly as a part of "and all its other assets and good will", or else would escheat to the state. It can be hard to find the copyright to a work long unpublished. The original author may have died, and the author's heirs may be hard to track. The copyright may have been sold, and the sale may not have been properly recorded. In the US, the Copyright Office maintains records that try to identify the copyright owner of all registered copyrights. The office will search these, for a fee, but there is not always a correct or useful answer. Under current US law, if one cannot find the correct owner of a copyright, and secure permission to use it, one is simply out of luck (except for musing, where a compulsory license is available for some uses at a government-specified fee). Any use is then infringement (unless it is a fair use) and the owner could always turn up and sue. The term "orphan works" has been applied to works whose copyright owner is unknown and hard to find. The same term is also applied to works whose copyright holder is known, but which are long out of print and unlikely to be reprinted, particularly when there is no paying market for them. In the US, there have been several proposals for dealing with "orphan works" by granting a compulsory licensee for them, or by declaring them to be in the public domain, or by taxing them and declaring them to be PD if he tax goes unpaid. None of these have been passed into law in the US, nor have similar proposals been made law in any other country that I know of. (declaring Orphan works PD might cause a problem under the Berne Convention.) To be honest, as there is little economic value in orphan works, no one will spend much money or energy in lobbying for such a law, and the industries that make their money via copyright (music and film in particular) are often suspicious of and automatically oppose anything that weakens copyright in any way, or seems to. In any case, no such law has yet passed. (Edit I now learn that Canada and the EU have laws giving access to orphan works under some circumstances, and other countries may have such laws.) It is true that the owner of the copyright on an orphan work may well be unlikely to sue for infringement of that copyright. The owner may not even know that s/he owns the copyright. But a user could never by fully safe, because the owner (or a new owner after a transfer) could always choose to sue for any continuing infringement, and any past one if the statute of limitations has not run out. This answer is largely based on knowledge of US law, but I believe that this situation is basically the same in most countries. | Adam cannot simply void the contract because he has a chance to publish in a more prestigious journal. What he can do depends on the provisions of he contract to which Adam agreed. It is likely, but far from certain, that the agreement permits Adam to cancel it under specified circumstances. If it does, and if those circumstances now apply, Adam can cancel and then submit the paper to the other journal. It is possible that the contract gives he first journal (J1)_ exclusive rights only for a limited period of time. If this is so, and if that time has passed, then Adam may submit the paper to the other journal (J2) without violating the agreement. It is likely, but not certain, that the agreement has provisions permitting the paper to be republished in another journal. If it does, than Adam may republish by complying with those provisions. They will probably include a requirement that the J@ publication include a notice similar to this: This paper was originally published in J1 in the {date} issue. J2 would have to be willing to include such a notice. The agreement between Adam and J1 will specify some things that J1 must do, as well as things that Adam must do. If J1 has failed to carry out a significant part of its obligations, for example if it never published Adam's paper, Adam may be able to rescind the agreement for materiel breach. Exactly what failures on J1's part allow this varies by jurisdiction. Adam would be wise to consult a lawyer before taking this step. Adam may request permission from J1 if none of these situations applies, and J1 may give permission. It would probably insist on a notice like the one mentioned above. But J1 does not have to grant such permission. If none of the situations above apply, and Adam cannot get (or does not ask for) permission from J1, then submitting the paper to J2 would probably violate Adam's agreement with J1. J1 could sue Adam, and perhaps J2 also. If the people running J2 know of this situation, they may well refuse Adam's paper. Adam may be able to write a new paper, based on the same research as his original paper, perhaps with more recent research added. That would not be covered by Adam's agreement with J1, and he could submit that to J2. |
Would I sue seller or manufacturer for a new appliance that does not function correctly? TLDR We bought a dishwasher. It doesn't work. Mfg just keeps delaying with service visits and attempted fixes. I'm done and ready to buy a new dishwasher and sue for the cost of the old. Who do I sue? Background We purchased a new dishwasher from a big box store. We want to return it for a slew of reasons, top among them being: Dishes do not come clean Dishes smell of chemicals, most likely from detergent not being washed off Sound level is 26 db above rated level (I expected 5-10, but not 20+) These problems can be partially mitigated by running every load twice, but that's wasteful of water, time, energy, etc and not what we paid for. Attempted Resolution I contacted the big box store who told me to talk to the manufacturer first, and they asked me to try a few things, such as: Different types of detergent Different types of rinse aid With and without rinse aid Running the hot water in the sink first After none of these worked I contacted the big box store, and they told me I was past the 30 day return window at that point and had no recourse other than through manufacturer. The manufacturer said they had to sent a tech before approving a return. The tech said these problems were definitely real, and there was no apparent cause, and I should get a new machine. The manufacturer then said they had to send another tech. That tech said the only thing they could guess it might be is a faulty motor that works, but not strongly enough. They offered to replace it, but said it would be 3+ weeks. Now What? At this point I've already lost close to an hour a day double washing and hand washing dishes and pots and pans for a month, and am unwilling to wait any longer, especially since I believe the manufacturer is just trying to delay until I go away. And I didn't buy a refurbished dishwasher, I bought a new one. So I'm planning to just buy another dishwasher, and sue the manufacturer or big box store for the money I spent on the first. Who do I sue? My sales contract is with the big box store. However, the problems seem related to a manufacturer defect or, more likely, faulty design by the manufacturer. And if I win, what do I do with the dishwasher? Limitations I do not have a vehicle to transport this dishwasher I have a back problem and do not want to try lifting this dishwasher to transport it | Would I sue seller or manufacturer for a new appliance that does not function correctly? You have viable claims against both seller and manufacturer, and you may sue both of them in the same complaint. Hopefully the tech's assessment that you "should get a new machine" is in writing, since that evidence seems dispositive (i.e., decisive) and immune to manufacturer's potential denial. Regardless of what approach you choose, the award you might be granted is subject to the prohibition of double recovery. It seems that the seller's directions were purposefully dilatory. Coupled with its subsequent pretext about expiration of the 30 day period, seller's conduct is in violation of legislation regarding unfair and misleading practices. Your post does not specify which jurisdiction in the US you have in mind, but consumer protection laws are rather uniform all over the country. If the provision of 30-day return period is reflected in a document such as the invoice, or in seller's signs/advertisements, you also have a claim of breach of contract for seller's failure to abide by the corresponding clause or policy. A similar rationale applies with respect to the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not entitled to arbitrarily postpone compliance as to the warranty. Seller's 30-day deadline serves as comparison in your argument that the manufacturer's open-ended schedule is excessive, a schedule which is on top of the delay from the interactions with both techs. if I win, what do I do with the dishwasher? Wait for the party who reimburses you or replaces the dishwasher to determine whether it opts to take the defective dishwasher. That party is responsible for transportation costs and related expenses if it decides to pick up the appliance. If the party is not interested in retrieving the defective appliance, make sure it signs a waiver. Otherwise you would be at risk that that party maliciously tries to turn the tables by alleging that you unlawfully got a second dishwasher for free. | It depends on what rights the copyright owners choose to grant. In the case of the skillet, assuming that it was properly licensed, it seems safe to assume that LucasFilms or their agent intended that it be used to create cookies using an image of Darth Vader, so that use was approved by them. Whether commercial use of the image, by selling cookies, was included in such a license, cannot be determined from the info in th4 question. Quite possibly not. Even if such a license was granted, it would be hard for one who bought the skillet second hand to prove that, in the face of a challenge from LucasFilms . So if they brought suit over such a use, they might well win. As to the bakeries where cakes and other good with images of cartoon and movie characters are sold, they should have bought rights that allow them to make and sell such products. They may have. Or they may be infringing, but the copyright or trademark owners choose not to sue. It depends entirely on what agreements the various bakeries may have entered into, and those are not normally public. | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. | It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report). | There are limits to what you are allowed to modify on your car. Federal safety regulations require certain features to be installed by the manufacturer, and to be maintained by the owner in a state that they remain functional. Besides obvious things like brakes, you need working headlights, turn signals, bumpers, wipers, etc. Heated seats is an option. A luxury convenience feature. Most cars don't have heated seats. If you had heated seats, but left them off or the switch broke and they weren't working, there would be no reason for the State Patrol to care one bit that your rump was a bit chilly. So, the state doesn't care enough make it illegal to have heated seats or not. It is entirely your choice. The question then becomes, does the state have any reason to care whether you have a manual switch to turn them on or off, or use a special software code to enable the feature? Logic dictates that if they don't care whether or not you have the feature, and don't care if you are using it or not, they would have not reason to care about the particular method you use to turn it on or off... Therefore the only real question is does BMW care? They might, if you came up with a method of enabling heat without a subscription and it became known to them. Especially if you made money publishing a how-to guide that cost them potential revenue. But that would be a civil, rather than a criminal matter. To me this action would be equivalent to buying a burger at a place that charges $.25 for a packet of ketchup, and instead using your own ketchup. It's your burger, and your ketchup, do what you want! ADDENDUM: Based on discussion on the other answer, as well as a suggestion in comments, I would like to briefly address (my opinion) on the applicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DCMA) of 1998. I actually just looked up this act, and have only a layman's understanding of copyright law, but there is a basic element that needs to be met for a violation to occur: The copyrighted material must be reproduced, altered, repurposed, and distributed in some manner. Private avoidance or selective non-use of a digital feature would not seem to rise to that level. I touched on this above when I alluded to publishing a written hack. It would probably also apply if you offered code that would bypass a feature, or to a car tuner offering to enable the feature for a fee. If there is a commercial benefit, there is a potential "victim", and a copyright issue. However, even code is questionable... There are many examples of companies offering aftermarket Engine Control Module code to enhance performance or improve gas mileage. Of course a manufacturer could always challenge a commercial competitor, but lawsuits cause money and create publicity - positive and negative. About the only "free" enforcement tool a manufacturer has is to not honor the warranty on any owner altered parts. Of note is the fact that seat heating elements are not digital, copyrighted, or otherwise protected work. The digital intellectual property that MIGHT potentially be at the center of a copyright controversy is the function of the pay system and the processing of an access code that unlocks a relay. What that relay sends electrical current to is really immaterial. It could be your stereo, it could be the airbag... One person snipping and splicing wire to avoid the IP "brain" and install a simple on/off switch or rheostat for personal use of seat heat should not be violation of any digital copyright law. | The chief legal problem might be (depending on how you build and operate the thing) the amount of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) that you're causing. You are not exempt from FCC regulations, but § 15.23 Home-built devices. (a) Equipment authorization is not required for devices that are not marketed, are not constructed from a kit, and are built in quantities of five or less for personal use. (b) It is recognized that the individual builder of home-built equipment may not possess the means to perform the measurements for determining compliance with the regulations. In this case, the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices to meet the specified technical standards to the greatest extent practicable. The provisions of §15.5 apply to this equipment. Since the question assumes "the builder knows what he's doing", we may assume the FCC demand "the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices" is met. But that also would assume that the builder knew about EMI in the first place. | You will need to sue them for the money. You may decide that the cost and stress of doing so is not worth it, and just write off the cost. In future you should require a deposit (if you don't already), and not return it until you have checked that the final utility bills have been paid. (I am assuming there was no deposit, or that you have returned it already; if not, you can pay the electricity company out of that deposit.) |
Who would be legally responsible for the application of mainstream wrong psychological/psychiatrist therapies? Several times has happened that the definition of mental disorders/ psychological-psychiatrist therapies/theories have been proven wrong. Yet they have been applied over people causing them problems and harm in their lives. Usually graduated psychologists/ psychiatrists are ignorant which is the supposed proof of these theories. They've been told they have been proven sometimes, sometimes they've been given some details, and they don't know they don't have a real basis behind them until it's massively accepted they are wrong. Personally, I see little to no responsibilities in them. In the other hand, governments and states promote these theories in secondary schools, they teach them and form professionals in national universities, and they hold the power to treat people in trials and to internate someone for being ill under these theories. Some other organizations, which I'm not very aware who they are, but I assume they might be colleges or agrupations of psychiatrists/psychologists regulate their professional's activities, and I assume they might be the ones giving the content to national universities for the formation of professionals under these theories. When one of these theories/therapies are proven wrong and have caused harm over people, who is the legal responsibility? I assume there aren't many cases like this, but I make the parallelism with biological sciences. If an association or group produces a medicament which is proven harmful for people later, and that association teaches doctors to give this medicament to people, with the approval and fundings/places of national government created universities, it would be pretty much the same. Then, in the case stated in the topic question, who would be legally responsible for the application of these mainstream wrong psychological/psychiatrist therapies? | Your question is almost too general to answer, but the basic answer is; being wrong is not a crime. Negligence is, but applying generally accepted medical diagnoses and treatments is not negligent. Malpractice is also a crime (or at least reason to suspend a medical licence); but evolving a theory based on experimental evidence, submitting it to peer review and having it generally accepted, and then later seeing it superseded by another theory is not malpractice, it is the normal scientific method. And no definition has ever been "proven wrong" since a definition, like an axiom, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable. The definitions of disorders vary betweeen countries, and most certainly change over time, but that is not because of any discovery or proof. | Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A. | Intent is an element of the offense of murder. If the prosecution can't prove the required level of intent for murder, the defendant may still be convicted of a "lesser included offense" like Manslaughter or perhaps Criminally Negligent Homicide, or even an offense that doesn't require an actual death like Aggravated Assault or an offense that doesn't require proof of an injury like Deadly Conduct. If the defendant is claiming that the intent was not voluntary because of some hypnotic effect then that is basically an insanity plea. Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity face an indefinite commitment to a mental hospital, which can amount to decades of involuntary hospitalization. To learn more about this situation, read about the case of John Hinckley Jr. I personally doubt any jury would actually believe a hypnosis defense, especially without a woo-woo jury foreman, some outstanding work by the defense attorney, and a team of expert witnesses that includes an unrelated hypnotist and a psychologist who didn't believe in hypnosis until examining the defendant in this case... so a Mulder and a Scully. | When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be. | Are police required to contact a real lawyer if you ask? give opinions from a number of lawyers and police in different jurisdictions. The basic consensus is that in most jurisdictions, such behavior will get the case thrown out of court and often get the police officer who tried this fired. HOWEVER there was a case where this was tried and while the case was thrown out on appeal, it was not as simple as the postings in the above article may have made it appear. This story shows a case where the Tennessee police actually did this. While the lower court allowed it because the defendant was "gullible", the appeals court rejected this argument. [T]he conduct of the law enforcement officers in this case, and in particular Detective Henry, is so egregious that it simply cannot go unchecked. That Detective Henry would illegally pose as an attorney and arrange the circumstances of the defendant’s case to make it appear as though he had successfully undertaken legal representation of the defendant is abhorrent. That the detective would specifically instruct the defendant not to communicate the relationship to his appointed counsel, in what we can only assume was an effort to enlarge the time for the detective to gain incriminating information from the defendant, renders completely reprehensible the state action in this case. Given the unconscionable behavior of the state actors in this case and the fact that the defendant was essentially prevented from proving prejudice through no fault of his own, we have no trouble concluding that the only appropriate remedy in this case is the dismissal of all the indictments. | If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked. | Any society that makes rules will make rules that generally favor the people in power. Police are an essential component of a system that is built to maintain power for the people who are powerful, and there are few incentives for politicians, prosecutors or judges to punish them for maintaining order, even when they do so in ways that most people would think are not civil. Anyone involved in creating the law therefore builds systems to protect themselves -- and each other -- from accountability. The police fail to meaningfully investigate themselves, the legislature erects barriers to accountability (Sec. 614.022, for instance), and the courts routinely provide them immunity for their wrongdoing. So yes, there is a difference in how our legal system treats law enforcement and how it treats everyone else. I don't know anyone with any experience in the law who would even try to pretend otherwise. | This is an objective test When a law requires “worry” (or any other state of mind), it is usually not the state of mind of the particular person but of a reasonable person in the same circumstances. The law does not ask “Were you worried?”, it asks “Would a reasonable person in your situation have been worried?” The fact that you have cynophobia is irrelevant if a reasonable person in your circumstances would not have it. Now, if this occurred at a facility for cynophobia treatment then the circumstances change from a reasonable person taken from the general population to a reasonable person who is attending such a facility; in those circumstances the reasonable person would be someone suffering from cynophobia. By the way, this test (worry or fear of harm) is essentially the same as the criteria of assault between humans. |
How can I prove that I designed the site? I have designed a website for a client, But there is no contract between us. The client does not pay my salary, But our text and voice messages are available. How can I prove that I designed the site and complain about him? | By "complain" I assume you mean "take legal action against him". You would need a legal basis, and a lawyer. When you say that you don't have a contract, I assume you mean that you don't have a piece of signed paper, but you do have an agreement – which is a contract. As far as websites are concerned, there are only a few likely causes of legal action: copyright infringement, and non-payment for services. As far as copyright is concerned, this law may be relevant. If we assume that you and the client are operating in Iran, your copyright is protected, but Iran does not enforce other country's copyright laws (they are not signatories to the Berne Convention). If the issue is that the client is not paying for services rendered, you can sue them. The civil code (in English) is here. See article 219 ff. for the specifics, but basically you show the judge that there is an agreement, and that you were not paid. The client can then argue that you didn't actually do the job agreed to, or that you were paid. There are other possible responses (e.g. the "client" might prove that you agreed to do the work for free), the details of which will come out in your discussion with the lawyer. | You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case. | You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so. | if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate. | The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible. | You already have a contract(s): you do work and they pay you is pretty much all you need to have a contract. Given that there is already a contract, formalising it in writing does not expose you to any greater risk and usually, clearly defining the terms of a contract reduces risk all around. | The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct. | It's not clear whether you mean that the entire agreement is carried out by text message. If you have a paper or electronic document stating what the parties will do, that is the agreement, and signatures are a conventional form of proof that there is an agreement. A handshake or a verbal statement – or text mesage – could also serve as evidence of the agreement, though there could be problems with the quality of the evidence (e.g. how do the witnesses know which piece of paper you agreed to). There is not a huge body of law surrounding text messages (and apparently none regarding text messages and contracts). We know that a text message is not a "printed receipt" (Shlahtichman v. 800 Contacts), and that a text message is a "call" w.r.t. the Do-Not-Call law (Campbell-Ewald Company v. Jose Gomez, Keating v. Nelnet). The closest that I have been able to come in terms of a decision about whether a text message is "written" is Commonwealth v. Mulgrave 472 Mass. 170, which states that While Massachusetts appellate courts have yet to approve admission of text messages or any other writing under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule... The wording "any other writing" implies that the court believes text messages to be "writing", which of course it is if you look at the plain meaning of the word "write". Contracts can be formed and signed by email: 15 USC 7001 states that a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form....a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation so the fact of electronic writing does not make the contract non-written. There must be a venerable and well-known rationale behind the written / oral asymmetry, which presumably has to do with the volatility of memory which would be front and center in a dispute about oral contracts. FRE 1001 "clarifies" that a "writing" consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set down in any form, and that a "recording" consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent recorded in any manner. 15 USC 7001 also states that An oral communication or a recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an electronic record for purposes of this subsection except as otherwise provided under applicable law So a recording of an oral contract would be useful to prove that there was an agreement, but would not change the fact that the contract is oral. |
Hotels and code requirements for living space Do hotels in the United States in New York City for example have to uphold code requirements for living space? If they don't couldn't someone just open up a couple of sheds in their backyard call it a hotel and rent them out? | This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances. | Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble? | I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies. | There are some consequences for you, under the Seattle Residential Code. Per R103.5 Any person violating or failing to comply with the provisions of this code shall be subject to a cumulative civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per day for each violation from the date the violation occurs or begins until compliance is achieved. $182,500 per year. Also under R103.4, Whenever any building or structure is being occupied contrary to the provisions of this code, the building official may order such occupancy discontinued and the building or structure, or portion thereof, vacated by notice. There should be a notation on your panel indicating permit number and approval, but if you have the permit number, you can check if the inspection was done and the work was approved (I think this will report status). The legal burden of assuring that the work was done correctly and paperwork is in order ultimately falls on the owner, though the city at least initially talks to the contractor. Insofar as a customer taking a picture doesn't count as an actual final inspection, I suspect that some cost- and time-saving short-cuts were taken. Following up on the new information about being a tenant, the primary legal question is whether you have a duty of care towards the landlord, since in engaging this company, the landlord's interest may be put at risk. The landlord may have protected his interest via a clause in the lease saying "you must get written permission to modify the property, and you assume full liability for resulting damages", so first thing to check is what the lease says (perhaps look for a "Tenant's duty of care" clause). In lieu of clear evidence that you caused damage to the owner (economic damage, by negligence w.r.t. his need to have proper permits and the whopping fines that follow), I don't see what the risk to you would be in just washing your hands of the problem. | Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused. | My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here. | Not in the state of California. California law prohibits discrimination based on source of income; only discrimination based on amount of income is allowed. See the California Government Code, section 12955. It is not even legal to indicate a preferred source of income in the advertisement; landlords may ask prospective tenants about the source of income, but may not discriminate or indicate preference for a particular source (provided it's a lawful source). Also, you can't really force a city to re-zone based on "I'll make sure this bad thing doesn't happen." If the city doesn't want to re-zone, they won't re-zone. You have no right to force them to re-zone; this is especially true when the property was purchased under those zoning rules (if the buyer didn't like them, they didn't have to buy). | It is legal, unless it is a violation of the rental agreement. Generally, a property owner can have a vehicle towed from their property, although there may be a requirement in the state to post a towing notice. If the lease agreement says that cars must always be street-legal, that is the end of the discussion. If the agreement says that cars without tags or plates can be stored in a person's spot, towing it would be a violation of the agreement. If the agreement doesn't say anything, then the property owner's rights would be the default deciding factor. Since your roommate seeks to override the park owner's ordinary control over the surrounding spaces, there needs to be an explicit provision for that in the lease. |
Why are trials on "Law & Order" in the New York Supreme Court? On the TV show "Law & Order", when they cut to the trial it's usually accompanied by a chiron (along with the trademark "dun-dun" sound) saying something like "New York State Supreme Court, Part 7". Is this an accurate representation of where trials like these would be held? Isn't the NY Supreme Court an appeals court, like SCOTUS? These are always ordinary jury trials. (Considering the contorted logic the prosecutors employ, I expect that most of these convictions get appealed, but the show never goes that far.) | As described at the State of New York Court of Appeals website, the supreme court is the system of trial courts for serious cases. The highest court in New York is the Court of Appeals. It serves the same role as what many other states call a supreme court. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more "special verdict" questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called "courts not of record", a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare | Judges and justices can file lawsuits like anyone else, but ordinarily the judges who are colleagues of the judge or justice would recuse themselves and it would be assigned to another venue at trial (in the case of a trial court judge), and on appeal would be assigned to judges who don't have a personal relationship with the judge (possibly sitting by assignment from another appellate jurisdiction or by senior judges who weren't on the bench when this judge was on the bench). A U.S. Supreme Court justice's suit would not be considered recusal worth by an unfamiliar lower court judge who is only theoretically in the jurisdiction of the justice and no suit by a U.S. Supreme Court justice has ever been deemed cert worthy. If it did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice would be expected to, but not required in any enforceable way, to recuse from hearing the case. | Generally speaking, a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is binding only in the District of Columbia. Courts of other jurisdictions are not required to adhere to its decisions. If the issue came up again in Virginia or Maryland, courts there would have no obligation to follow it. Virginia tort law is different from D.C. tort law, so Virginia courts would need to determine whether their law is different on this particular point. | Yes It's not uncommon. In fact I am aware of at least one case where the trial judge referred it to appeal before he made his decision on the basis that whichever way he decided the law was so unsettled that grounds for appeal would occur. In that case the court of appeal called up the trial judge to sit on the 3 judge appeal a) because he knew the case and b) because you don't get to not make a decision because it's hard sonny-jim. |
Legal recourse if fellow patient recorded and distributed group therapy session Person A is participating in a PTSD/Abuse recovery program in Tennessee. During a private conversation (not part of any official therapy) they divulge to patient B highly personal information regarding why they (Patient A) are in the program. Patient B, without Patient A's knowledge or consent, records the conversation and sends the recording to dozens of other patients in the program. What legal recourse does A have, if any? | What legal recourse does A have, if any? It mostly depends on whether person A had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The fact that the session was a group therapy suggests that such expectation is not reasonable. Tennessee is a one-party-consent state, thereby entitling any participant to record the session. Also, your description nowhere indicates that patient B has a duty of confidentiality toward person, A or that the group therapy has a rule that overrides that entitlement. Under Tennessee law the invasion of privacy is a tort, but it requires the intentional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns", Harris v. Horton, 341 S.W.3d 264, 271 (2009) (overruled on other grounds; citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts at 652B). The term "group therapy" seemingly strikes the notion of solitude or seclusion. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though. | One of the biggest problems here is in proof of injury attributable to an individual... With asbestos, you can prove that direct exposure in a certain instance caused a long-term harm. Just because you were around asbestos doesn't mean you get lung cancer, so if you don't actually suffer any harm (or any harm yet), you won't get awarded damages. Similarly with lead, you have to prove both the exposure, the entity which exposed you to it, and harm that you suffered. Just being around a lead pipe or paint doesn't mean you get damages, you need to have suffered harm. The problem with second-hand smoke is that you can be exposed to it from many different sources. Any problems you have (lung cancer) would need to be proven as a direct consequence of one specific (or prolonged) exposure. I could see this working if a non-smoking spouse developed cancer from a smoking spouse being exposed to it for years, but you can't just say "I walked by Joe Camel in the street while he was smoking now I have cancer and it is his fault". So the issue becomes who is responsible for your damages. You can't narrow it down to one smoker (or even cigarette smoke, as lung cancer can develop from other sources), so just proving that your cause-effect is directly related to smoke will be difficult. After that you can't say one single person caused it (unless they forcefully locked you in a room and chain-smoked for a year). So who do you sue? All of smoking society? You might just as well sue God for putting those people on earth, really the only recourse you would have is to sue the tobacco companies, the individual smokers are not going to be held liable as a group. | An expert witness must be independent A former (or current) employee of a party is not independent. The court may accept their independence if the relationship was decades in the past but not otherwise. If you want the said psychologist to testify about things that happened in the jail they aren’t acting as an expert witness anyway - they are acting as a witness of fact. | This practice is known as "rescission". It is legal under 45 CFR §147.128 in some circumstances. The regulation says (a) A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must not rescind coverage under the plan, or under the policy, certificate, or contract of insurance, with respect to an individual (including a group to which the individual belongs or family coverage in which the individual is included) once the individual is covered under the plan or coverage, unless the individual (or a person seeking coverage on behalf of the individual) performs an act, practice, or omission that constitutes fraud, or makes an intentional misrepresentation of material fact, as prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage. The law also prohibits surprises: A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must provide at least 30 days advance written notice to each participant (in the individual market, primary subscriber) who would be affected before coverage may be rescinded under this paragraph (a)(1), regardless of, in the case of group coverage, whether the coverage is insured or self-insured, or whether the rescission applies to an entire group or only to an individual within the group. (The rules of this paragraph (a)(1) apply regardless of any contestability period that may otherwise apply.) Note that the regulation pertains to insurance plans, and not employers. The employer may in good faith believe that you are stuck with the medical bills, but their opinion does not matter as far as this regulation goes. However, the employer also does not have the right to "declare" on behalf of the insurance company that your wife was covered. If you assume that she had coverage because the employer (mistakenly) said you did, but there was actually no coverage, then that is between you and the employer, or possibly you and the doctor. A prior question is whether she was actually covered in that past period. The contract between the insurance company and the employer might hypothetically state that only employees are covered, and may have accidentally submitted enrollment information with mistaken information ("X is an employee"). Since there was no intentional misrepresentation (we assume), coverage cannot be rescinded. Also note that rescission is retroactive cancelling, not prospective cancelling ("henceforth, you are not covered"). | As is often the case with the recording statutes, the meaning of the law is refined by case law. Specifically, the consent requirement holds when the parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The statutory language limits the restriction to "private communication": therefore, a person does not gain veto power over a public recording session simply by walking into the arena. Consent is implied when the fact of recording is self evident (you can see the operating recording device): by continuing to speak knowing that your speech is being recorded is implicit consent. Also, consent is only required for participants in the communication, and a person who happens to wander into the scene is not a participant in that communication. You may not want to test the edges of the law, in case a person wanders into the scene oblivious to their surroundings and talking on their cell phone. There might be a scenario where you're recording yourself but they are unaware of that fact, and they are having another private communication. The law does not prohibit accidentally overhearing someone else's private communication, it prohibits recording it. An unavoidable sign may aid you in your quest to not get sued. | Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction. |
What are the precise criteria for making a place a legal residence for a person in Denmark? I would like to know the legal requirements for a dwelling to be considered legal and fit for registering as a residence with the government, in Denmark. I would prefer a complete, clear checklist, if possible. For example: Is there a specific size that the space must be, per person? How might this affect things like tiny homes, or a family member sleeping in a small family apartment’s couch, or a spouse spending lots of time with you even though the room is a small single, or a bunch of people packing in to one apartment to save money? I feel like there is probably some law that you can’t have a certain number of people in one room, but I wonder how that affects someone who genuinely wants to live in a tiny, tiny home, like a little shack/mini-cottage, basically. In order for it to have an address, if it were somewhere rural, would it be mandatory to be connected to physical roads, and then apply for a street address with the local government, who approve it? In other words, how much or little freedom do you have to create a new address somewhere - i.e., buying a cheap, empty piece of land in a remote area, and simply stating that this is your residence on paper, even if there’s no house there, and no official street name. I know that situation would be turned out, but when does it cross the threshold into permissible? Can one normal residential property, like a house, choose to split their sidewalk space in half, and have a second address and mailbox, for maybe someone they sublet to, who now technically lives at a different address, of their own? Also, I would appreciate hearing the distinction between illegal and enforced, illegal but less/not enforced, and legal. Thank you. | In practice, the legal requirements for a dwelling to be considered legal and fit for registering as a residence with the government in Denmark are often enforced by the local municipalities, which have the power to interpret and apply the laws and statutes according to their specific circumstances and needs. The checklist provided below is based on the general principles and guidelines set out in the relevant legislation and regulations, but it may vary depending on the local context and the specific characteristics of each dwelling. The Danish Building Act (Byggeloven): The Danish Building Act sets out the basic requirements for all buildings in Denmark, including dwellings. It defines the minimum requirements for size, health, safety, and location, and provides guidelines for construction, renovation, and demolition. The act is constantly updated to reflect new building technologies and changes in society's needs and expectations. The Danish Water Supply Act (Vandforsyningsloven): The Danish Water Supply Act sets out the requirements for the quality and safety of drinking water, as well as the responsibilities of the water supply companies and the consumers. The act ensures that all buildings have access to clean and safe drinking water and that the drainage system does not cause pollution or health hazards. The Danish Wastewater Act (Spildevandsloven): The Danish Wastewater Act regulates the disposal of sewage and other wastewater, and sets out the requirements for the treatment and discharge of wastewater. The act ensures that all buildings have proper drainage and that the environment is protected from pollution. The Danish Planning Act (Planloven): The Danish Planning Act sets out the guidelines for land use planning, including the designation of residential zones and the approval of building permits. The act ensures that all buildings are located in appropriate areas and that the surrounding environment is protected from inappropriate development. The Danish Rent Act (Lejeloven): The Danish Rent Act regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants, including the rent level, the notice periods, and the rights and obligations of both parties. The act ensures that all dwellings are rented out fairly and that the tenants have adequate housing standards. The following laws seem to be relevant when we start considering applying them to your conditional checklist: Size Occupancy Problem There is no minimum size requirement for a dwelling in Denmark, but there are regulations that specify how much space is required per person. The Danish Building Regulations specify that a dwelling must have a minimum floor area of 20 square meters per person. However, this does not necessarily apply to tiny homes or other non-traditional forms of housing, as long as they meet the minimum space requirements and other safety and health standards. The maximum number of occupants allowed in a dwelling is determined by its size, layout, and facilities, as well as the health and safety requirements set out in the Building Act and other regulations. Overcrowding is not permitted. Health Care Facility The Danish Water Supply Act sets out the requirements for the quality and safety of drinking water, as well as the responsibilities of the water supply companies and the consumers. The act ensures that all buildings have access to clean and safe drinking water and that the drainage system does not cause pollution or health hazards. This act deals with land property too. The dwelling must have adequate access to emergency services, such as fire, police, and ambulance. Enforced by this, residence must have it. The water supply and drainage system must meet the requirements set out in the Danish Water Supply Act (Vandforsyningsloven) and the Danish Wastewater Act (Spildevandsloven) in residence. Legal and enforced If a dwelling does not meet the legal requirements for size, health, safety, or location, it is considered illegal and can be subject to fines, demolition, or other enforcement measures by the local municipality or the Building Appeals Board (Huslejenævnet). Illegal dwellings are those that are not approved for residential use, or that have been altered without the necessary permits and inspections. The local municipality has the authority to enforce the Building Act and other relevant legislation and regulations. Permits and approvals: Depending on the specific circumstances, a dwelling in Denmark may require various permits and approvals from local authorities, such as planning permission or building permits. There might be many more laws, bindings, and promises to make, but these are compulsion with some relaxation to above situations. The question examples and requirements deal to land reforms, and health-care facility. | You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys. | You have two questions here. A search by the government must be reasonable, under the 4th Amendment, meaning that a warrant is required or exigent circumstances must exist. Simple entering (without searching) is governed by Civil Code 1954. The law governing residential rentals is not explicit, because a a dormitory might be considered not to be a "residential dwelling unit". Some states explicitly exclude university dormitories, but that seems not to be the case in CA. There are some specific exclusions where dormitories are excluded (such as 1946.2 regarding termination), so the lack of an exclusion for dormitories can't follow from an assumption that a dormitory is not a residential dwelling unit. Clearly, a normal apartment that happens to be owned by the university and is rented out to students (as exist in many universities) clearly is an ordinary rental. So it seems that a dormitory is not legally exempted from 1954: they can only enter with permission or in specific circumstances. | Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony. | There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state. | Yes 15 USC 1501, which is part of the Lanham Act, the basic US trademark law, provides in subsection (a)(2) that: (2) The application [for registration of a trademark] shall include specification of the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark. This clearly implies that the applicant may have a citizenship other than US, or else ther ewould be nbo point in specifying the citizenship in the application. subsection (e) of the same section provides, in relevant part: If the applicant is not domiciled in the United States the applicant may designate, by a document filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the name and address of a person resident in the United States on whom may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. This makes it cleat that an applicant need not be resident in the US., 15 USC 1141a provides that: (a) In general The owner of a basic application pending before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or the owner of a basic registration granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office may file an international application by submitting to the United States Patent and Trademark Office a written application in such form, together with such fees, as may be prescribed by the Director. (b) Qualified owners: A qualified owner, under subsection (a), shall— (b)(1) be a national of the United States; (b)(2) be domiciled in the United States; or (b)(3) have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the United States. 1141a (b2) and (b)(3) make it clear that an applicant need not be a national (citizen) of the US. The USPTO's page "Trademark FAQs" lists under the heading "General - Trademark Help - Getting Started - Other" the following Q&A: Must I be a U.S. citizen to obtain a federal registration? No. However, your citizenship must be provided in the application. If you have dual citizenship, then you must indicate which citizenship will be printed on the certificate of registration. | I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down. | Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive. |
Why did FBI establish such intense surveillance to prove Jeremy Hammond's guilt? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Hammond Jeremy Hammond was a computer hacker who attacked Stratfor firm. Once FBI was able to pinpoint the real identity of the person behind one of the nicknames who claimed they hacked Startfor, they started extensive investigation on Hammond. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/03/stakeout-how-the-fbi-tracked-and-busted-a-chicago-anon/ While sup_g may indeed have been a "credible threat," he was in the end no match for the overwhelming federal resources of the FBI agents hunting him down. Over the last month, federal agents staked out his home in Chicago constantly, dug up old police surveillance records, tapped his Internet connection, used directional wireless finders to locate and identify his wireless router, and relied on Sabu back in his New York City apartment to let them know when sup_g went on or offline. "sup_g" was one of Hammond's nicknames. Why would FBI go to such great lengths if they already revealed the identity of the perpetrator? Why FBI considered it not enough to correlate an Internet nickname to a physical person? If they required evidence, why did they just not search Hammond's computers after making sure one of aliases that claimed to have hacked Startfor is indeed Jeremy Hammond? | The cited Wikipedia article explains why the FBI took the case so seriously, and in a serious case, the FBI is meticulous about being able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt on all possible charges. It also didn't know what other crimes or conspiracies might be involved and needed to be able to prosecute any newly discovered offenses. The Wikipedia article notes, in the pertinent part: On March 5, 2012, Hammond was arrested by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in the Bridgeport neighborhood of Chicago for his involvement in the December 2011 cyberattack on Stratfor, a private intelligence firm. The intrusion compromised 60,000 credit card numbers, $700,000 in fraudulent charges, and involved the download of 5 million emails, some of which were subsequently published by WikiLeaks. . . . He was one of six individuals from the United States, England and Ireland indicted. The FBI was led to Hammond through information given by computer hacker Hector Xavier Monsegur ("Sabu"), who became a government informant immediately after his arrest in early 2011, and subsequently pleaded guilty in August 2011 to twelve counts of hacking, fraud, and identity theft. . . . Information from Monsegur helped lead the authorities to at least eight co-conspirators, including Hammond, and helped to disrupt at least 300 cyberattacks. . . . Sabu was detained pending trial; in denying bail, Judge Loretta A. Preska described Hammond as "a very substantial danger to the community." . . . In May 2013, Hammond pleaded guilty to one count of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Upon his guilty plea, Hammond issued a statement saying, "I did work with Anonymous to hack Stratfor, among other websites" . . . Hammond was sentenced on November 15, 2013, to the maximum of ten years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. | Potentially, yes - especially if its the government you lie to in your CV/resume or course of work. Wayne Simmons, a regular Fox News commentator who claimed to have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for almost three decades, was arrested on Thursday for allegedly fabricating his agency experience. CNN Money reports that Simmons appeared in court on Thursday, where he faced charges of major fraud against the United States for falsely claiming to be a former “outside paramilitary special operations officer”—a padded resume that federal officials say he used to successfully gain government security clearances. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/wayne-simmons-cia-arrested-fox-news/ Simmons claimed to have been an "outside paramilitary special operations officer" for the CIA from 1973 to 2000. Not only did he use that claim to get guest appearances on Fox News, but the government claims he used it to gain security clearances and a defense contractor gig that included advising senior military personnel overseas. He's now being charged with wire fraud, major fraud against the United States, and making false statements to the government and could face 35 years in prison. https://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2015/10/can-you-get-arrested-for-lying-on-your-resume.html Making false or fraudulent statements also may be punishable by fine or imprisonment. https://www.usajobs.gov/Help/working-in-government/fair-and-transparent/signature-false-statements/ | Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed. | This question needs more detail. As a cybersecurity professional I can provide some technical context around what I believe to be the situation. While I do not know the legal precedence, technically, IP addresses cannot typically be attributed to an individual person. There are a number of reasons for this. In a local network, IP addresses are not unique. Rather, they are distributed by the DHCP server, and are reassigned at intervals. Forensic attribution to an individual in most environments would require a DHCP log linking the IP to the machine’s MAC address, with time stamps that correlate to the individual’s logon to that machine at the same time. If the IP correlation involves a VPN, it gets more difficult. I would need to know where the log/evidence was obtained to determine what the IPs in question actually correlate to. If the evidence was obtained in local area network of the suspect, the IP addresses are likely assigned by the DHCP server (see previous). If they are obtained after encryption in transit to decryption, then very little can be determined. If they were obtained at the VPN server log, these IPs likely belong to an ISP which in turn may or may not be able to show what machine initiated the conversation. Digital photos often contain EXIF data, which is metadata about the photo. This data can contain details like, device make and model, sometimes location, time and date... If the defendant owns a Nikon such and such and the photo was taken with a Nikon such and such, and was uploaded using a VPN the defendant has an account with, and the defendant was in that location at the time and place of the photo... there may be enough there... but I’m not a lawyer. I believe the discovery should include any EXIF metadata and logs to be used as evidence. You may need a special technical whiteness to educate the court on what can and cannot be determined (technically) given the evidence. Things to consider for such a witness could include: EXIF, forensic certification, network administration experience, VPN, TCPIP, OSI Model, Network Address Translation (NAT). Again, nothing here should be considered legal advise. Seek professional legal counsel. | Most secret service details are protection for heads of government/state and thus their details would be afforded Sovereign Immunity (Such as POTUS, VPOTUS, and First and Second Families) OR Diplomatic Immunity (visiting dignitaries and leaders of other nations). Typically there are more diplomatic ways to handle the cases in the latter. In the former case, thus far, it has not been handled. During visits, the traditional Executives and Families are usually closely guarded by the Service with additional law enforcement form local jurisdictions called in to aid in the protection, usually to secure routes the Motorcade will take to a designation (I speak from personal experience, POTUS coming to town is a nightmare on traffic). If they are speeding, they are typically doing so down a completely empty highway with police escort. From this point, most under of the Service would be monitored and controlled so closely, at least one Agent would notice if any protected was committing a crime and would have to write it up in a report. There is also considerable debate in legal circles if the President and Vice President could be arrested for a crime while in office, with the general acceptance being that they could not and would need to be impeached by congress. Secret Service will continue to protect former Presidents and Vice Presidents for life, along with their spouses and children up to a certain age. With all that in mind, it would not so much be that the Secret Service would prevent arrest of an individual under their protection so much as the Secret Service would be the arresting authority. As they are law enforcement agents under the Federal Government, they can legally arrest people and then hand them to the proper law enforcement agency to effect the arrest. This would mostly happen with candidates for office OR former presidents OR family at any point in time as the scenario described is a bit harder to make a legitimate arrest. In fact, the Secret Service does have arrest authority with one of the highest conviction rates of any Law Enforcement Agency in the Country. It's just most crimes they arrest have nothing to do with threats to those under their protection. The Secret Service is also charged with investigation of counterfeiting of US currency and they are very good at it. This was actually their original sole function in the U.S. government and they still exist under the Treasury Department to this day. At this point, if you're wondering how they got the job of protecting important people in the executive branch from that, well, it's simple. At the time of his assasination, the legislation to create the USSS was on Licoln's desk. At the time of their creation, the only other Federal Police services were the U.S. Park Police, the Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Marshals. The first two had specific jurisdictions and the Marshals were undermanned so the USSS was tasked with investigating all sorts of financial crimes and quickly became the most successful U.S. Law Enforcement Service. They were also the first U.S. Intelligence and Counterintelligence agency (though they no longer are part of the Intelligence Community) until the FBI took on those duties. So following the Assassination of William McKinley in 1901, Congress authorized them to take up full time Presidential Protection because at the time, they were pretty much doing everything else. | I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it. | This isn't strictly a legal question, but there are many reasons that a police force might delay. These include, but are not limited to: The case is a low priority so resources are devoted elsewhere, and no one ever gets back around to dealing with it. The case may implicate another ongoing undercover operation which the arrest would disrupt. It is likely that if the police wait that they will be able to bring much more serious charges, when the conduct they have evidence for is not as serious if they wait and monitor the suspect for future criminal conduct or leads to more serious past conduct. For example, the police may only have evidence of a single incident of harassment but may think that if they wait and watch that they may get evidence of extortion or attempted murder. There is a concern that prosecuting immediately would lead to community uproar that would undermine community safety or impair police operations generally. In the same vein, public opinion might produce a tainted or unfavorable jury if charges were pressed now, but the jury might be less likely to have pre-existing opinions or to consider the case a hot button issue once publicity around an incident has died off. The police may intentionally be exercising discretion not to press charges because it seems unjust to do so, or the perpetrator had some justification, or otherwise deserves a second chance. Pre-charge negotiations might be ongoing between prosecutors and defense counsel. The perpetrator already faces more serious charges that are highly likely to result in his incarceration and the new charges would be served concurrently and not add to his sentence, so pressing charges is not a priority. There are doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence or there is a belief that more evidence may be obtained soon (and nobody bothers to check back and try to press the case when that potential lead doesn't pan out). A modest delay in pressing charges for any number of reasons causes a witness to become unavailable or evidence to be lost. Generally speaking, law enforcement has wide discretion to decide which cases to focus on and try to have prosecuted, and which cases the leave be. No law enforcement agency has the resources to prosecute (with prosecuting attorney assistance) every possible case that they could prove. | So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts. |
Is a copyright license by default revocable or irrevocable? If I grant someone a license to use a copyrighted work of mine, do I need to detail my ability to revoke the license within the terms of the license grant, or is that ability inherent to all licenses? I understand that a copyright license could have terms like, "This license is irrevocable" (as the GPLv3 does) or, "This license may be revoked under any of the following circumstances..." Absent any explicit language about revocability or irrevocability, what is the default rule for revoking a license? I'm interested in copyright licenses that are granted publicly to anyone who wants them (e.g., how open source software licenses are typically granted), but also interested in the general rule, including licenses granted to specific parties. | Basically, if you own it you get a chance in 35 years to make changes. You must provide notice, date, 2-10 years before the date, and record the notice with the copyright office. Any derivative works during the time of the license continue to be licensed even after revocation. Companies that have a GPL and want to change it typically just increase the version number and change the license at that time. There, the new license applies to that version on, and the older versions stay with the GPL. 17 U.S.C. S203: In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant may be effected by that author or, if the author is dead, by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author’s termination interest. [There are many conditions on if one person or another has rights.] . . . Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier. The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners of termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the grantee or the grantee’s successor in title. (A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsection, and the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before that date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect. (B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation. (5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant. | Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk. | In practice, it is abundantly clear to which entity the “Free Software Foundation” refers, even if the FSF were to change its name, even if there are unaffiliated organizations with the same name. Version 3 of the GPL also contains a link to the FSF website, making it clear which organization this referred to in 2007 when the license text was published. If there are doubts about the identity of the FSF in the future, it will be possible to trace the identity back to the 2007 FSF e.g. through public filings that the FSF is required to make available as a non-profit. Previous versions of the GPL contained an address for the FSF, which similarly disambiguates the identity of this entity at the time of writing. The FSF also holds a trademark for the brand "Free Software Foundation" in the US and EU, preventing an unaffiliated organization from using this name in an international context. Of course this doesn't affect an organization in Uruguay, but it's very clear that such an Uruguyan entity is not the FSF that wrote the GPL. The interesting questions is what happens if the FSF is dissolved. Can it assign its responsibilities and rights as the GPL license steward to someone else? I assume it can, and that the subsequent license steward would be able to produce sufficient documentation to substantiate this claim. If not, those are likely to be some interesting court cases. | The relevant concept is dedicating a work to the public domain, that is, saying in the work something like "This work is dedicated to the public domain". I understand that this isn't entirely reliable in European civil law. The preferred alternative is to license it to the public. However, you have to decide how "free" you want the work to be made. The normal state of affairs, where you do nothing and just rely on copyright law, is that you have the sole right to allow copies to be made and derivative works to be created. Thus if someone were to make a derivative work based on your composition, they would need your permission: but then they would have the right what they created (such as a translation). If you just abandon your property right to the work, you impose no obligation on others, and a person can freely create a translation (which is now their property). If you execute the right public license, you can allow people to use your work as long as they include that license in their versions. A fairly common public licensing scheme is the Creative Commons licenses. That article gives a decent summary of relevant rights and how particular licenses correspond to configurations of permissions. I would say that the most difficult thing to do is to figure out what you don't want to happen, and pick a license that matches that interest. | It does not matter whether the document is authentic, because it is true, by law. Under copyright law, you must have permission of the copyright holder to copy any protected work (original creative work not created as a work of the US, as an example under US law). This is true whether or not the copyright holder tells you that copying requires permission. A matter for more concern is "false permission", where a person without the right to grant permission utters something that the courts would usually interpret as being "permission", for example releasing a Harry Potter book under CC-0. The legal requirement is that you have actual permission, not that a prohibition was not communicated to you. It is in your interest to know whether the actual person making available a work under some license actually has the right to grant a license. But there is no way to know for certain who holds copyright. You can, however, attempt to determine that a work has been registered with the US copyright office, looking here. Works are still protected when not registered, so failing to find a copyright registration does not guarantee that the work is "open access". It would tell you who the registered copyright holder is. There is no "innocent infringement" defense, but under §504(c)(2), your liability for statutory damages can be reduced to as little as $200, if you can prove that there were no indications that the work is protected. | The YouTube Standard License is described in the terms of service. It means that you retain your copyright: you retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. But you also grant YouTube very broad permissions to your content: by submitting Content to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the Content in connection with the Service and YouTube's (and its successors' and affiliates') business Yes, that means YouTube could allow others to use your content by "sublicensing" or "transferring" their license. I never heard of YouTube doing that, but the license terms would allow it if they would decide that they want to. But without an explicit permission from you or from YouTube, people are not allowed to reproduce your content. Agreeing to those terms (or alternatively to the Creative Commons CC-BY terms which do allow others to use your content as long as they give attribution) is a condition for using the platform. You can also put different license terms into the video description. This is called "dual licensing". But that means that people get to choose under which license terms they want to use the content. They can either use YouTube's terms, or your own. | The origin of a lawsuit will not be a license, but copyright law. Licenses are exemptions from copyright law enforcement. The original author holds the copyright. That person did offer a license O to the third party, but that third party did not take up that offer. Hence, there is a copyright violation, and a cause for a lawsuit. It is up to the original author what might be demanded there, but the usual demand is such suits is for damages. However, it is common practice to settle the case amicably outside the courts by agreeing to the original license O, although this may come with undisclosed extra terms. The problem with a lawsuit is that enforcement of the original license offer O is hard, because copyright law generally does not cover such licensing. The license terms L are mostly irrelevant as that person is not a copyright owner so there is nothing to be licensed. | What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere. |
Why does the term "counsel" typically refer to barristers rather than solicitors? It seems arbitrary that it seems to conventionally refer to one rather than the other, but is actually even more confusing that it refers to barristers rather than solicitors when one typically seeks advice from a solicitor by consulting them for their opinion of the legal position, and not from a barrister. By the time to instruct a barrister to appear in court on one's behalf, it seems that one is largely clear on one's position already and has rather to instruct the barrister on what they wish for them to represent to the court, rather than to seek their counsel. So, what is the basis for this nomenclatural convention? | The use of the word counsel for barristers has a long history. It was used in England before the modern legal profession developed. Baker, Counsellors and barristers: an historical study (1969) traces homo consiliarius back to the 13th century plea rolls: The sum of [a pleader or counsellor's] functions may be termed "counselling" in its widest sense, and the subject of the present study must be what the plea rolls call homo consiliarius, the counsellor. Even this compendious name can mislead. It eventually became synonymous with "barrister," in the sense of "jurisconsult," while some of the counselling came in fact to be done by attorneys and solicitors. Sense 8(a) of counsel (n.) in the OED ("A body of legal advisers, engaged in the direction or conduct of a cause") is dated back to the Confessio Amantis (1393): Help, that I hadde counseil here Upon the trouthe of my matere. Sense 8(b) ("A single legal adviser; a counsellor-at-law, advocate, or barrister") is first quoted in 1709, but seems also to cover sense 8(a)'s quotation of Greene's coney-catching pamphlets (1591), by distinguishing between counsel and attorney: [He] hath his mind so full of cares to see his counsell and to plie his Atorney. As barristers came to replace the serjeants at law, the association of counsel with barristers may have become entrenched with the appointment of Sir Francis Bacon as the first King's Counsel (1603). According to Holdsworth, A history of English law (1924), vol 6, p 472: It soon became clear that the king's attorney and solicitor could not by themselves do all the work which their office imposed upon them. It is to this cause that we must ascribe the rise of a body of "king's learned counsel," who are the ancestors of our modern king's counsel. It would seem from D'Ewes that a body of persons so designated was known at the very beginning of Elizabeth's reign [1558 – 1603]. | For question 2, there is a firm requirement on barristers to inform the client if different counsel would be called for. To quote the Bar Standards Board handbook: rC17 Your duty to act in the best interests of each client (CD2) includes a duty to consider whether the client’s best interests are served by different legal representation, and if so, to advise the client to that effect. The guidance specifically mentions that if something should be handled by more (or less) experienced counsel, there is an ethical duty to tell their client. | Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so. | I've retracted and replaced my previous answer. It is a citation to legal authority. It is probably a reference to the book "Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown Hale PC" (originally published 1736 with later editions also printed) (see 4.2.3) with Hale abbreviated "Hal.", "pl." being an abbreviation for "plea" (see 4.2.2) and "cr." being an abbreviation for "crown". Standard citation form is to spell it out, but if it is cited repeatedly later instances might be abbreviated. The link is to a scanned version of the out of copyright historical legal treatise on criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Wikipedia also discusses it as does a law library Wiki. | You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel. | The scope of attorney-client (solicitor-client) privilege includes the advice received from the lawyer. As long as it "arise[s] from communication between a lawyer and the client where the latter seeks lawful legal advice." If one could be compelled to reveal the advice received back from a lawyer (or if a lawyer could be compelled to reveal advice they provided to a client), that would effectively obliterate the privacy the privilege seeks to protect. The privilege belongs to the client, and the client may waive that privilege. In order for the communication to be privileged, it must arise from communication between a lawyer and the client where the latter seeks lawful legal advice. Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser ... the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at [the client's] instance permanently protected from disclosure by [the client] or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived. (R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445). The scope of the privilege does not extend to communications: (1) where legal advice is not sought or offered; (2) where it is not intended to be confidential; or (3) that have the purpose of furthering unlawful conduct (Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809) The prima facie protection for solicitor-client communications is based on the fact that the relationship and the communications between solicitor and client are essential to the effective operation of the legal system. (R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263) | It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment—specifically the ratio—that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today) | The word argumentative can mean a number of things. However, when defined as in the passage quoted from Wikipedia, it is not the opposite of 'conciliatory.' It has nothing to do with whether the witness is cooperating with the lawyer examining them. In this context, an argumentative witness is one who gives evidence about a legal conclusion (that is, the answer to a legal 'argument'). This is not allowed, because witnesses must give evidence of fact and not opinion. Sometimes, the distinction is murky. The example given is 'was the driver negligent?' The answer could well be seen as 'conciliatory' if it is consistent with the case being advanced by the advocate. It is still an impermissible argumentative question, because it is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. Suppose the lawyer wants to prove that a driver was negligent. An eyewitness could give evidence about what he or she saw and heard. A qualified professional could give expert evidence about what can be inferred from the physical evidence or agreed facts (eg. whether anybody was speeding). In the unlikely event that the driver admitted fault but a trial was still necessary, the driver could give evidence that they were drunk or not paying attention. None of these witnesses can express an opinion as to whether or not the driver was negligent, because that is the argument that the court has to decide by drawing inferences from the witnesses' factual evidence. In this context, the opposite of argumentative could be admissible, factual, direct or non-opinion. |
Why are barristers in England and Wales not officers of the court? In Assaubayev v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1491, in a discussion about the court's supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors, Christopher Clarke LJ said [32]: Those who appear before the Court but who are not, and do not purport, to be, solicitors or recognised bodies, do not come within the jurisdiction. The most obvious example is barristers. They owe duties to the Court but are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court over its officers, which they are not. All those who appear before the Court, whether lawyers, litigants, witnesses or watchers of proceedings may, of course, face the sanction of contempt if they misbehave … But neither contempt nor criminal conduct of itself brings them within the supervisory jurisdiction. To my knowledge, the term officer of the court is understood differently in the rest of the common law world, and would invariably include a person practising in the manner of a barrister – that is, a qualified lawyer appearing for a client as an advocate in court. For example, the Legal Profession Uniform Law that applies in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia provides that an Australian lawyer (which includes barristers and solicitors) is an officer of the Supreme Court of the relevant jurisdiction. Is England and Wales the only jurisdiction where barristers are not considered to be officers of the court? What are the historical reasons for this? Are there any practical consequences? | The following is my attempt at the question after a very brief historical research. The history of the court system and of the regulation of legal professions in English is just... chaotic until late 19th century, so there will be many points that are incorrect or can be more precise below. At the advent of legal system, advocacy was a different from representation. Barristers advocate at the bar under instruction; attorneys and solicitors represent their clients. At their roots, attorney means one appointed as an agent (e.g. power of attorney = power to act on behalf of someone), and solicitors are called solicitors because they solicit causes on behalf of a client. Champerty and maintenance, or the encouragement of disputes by non-affected parties, were and remain (though with various modifications) in several jurisdictions illegal or contrary to public policy. The profession of lawyers, who are not parties to a dispute, is also concerned, even today (e.g. the controversy about contingency fees). Barristers were the original men who were learnt at (English) law and the King allowed them to give counsel as their profession against payment without being found guilty of maintenance or champerty. It was only in 1967 that a person other than a barrister may represent another person in a litigation before a court (although various exceptions existed) in England. At the same time, barristers considered themselves learnt men who should not practice laws only for the fees, but for the advancement of public good and justice; this is also why the lawyer fees are still sometimes called honorarium. Attorneys and solicitors were not originally persons who learnt law "properly", at least in the eyes of the Inns, and could not represent their clients before a court without violating the prohibition against maintenance, as law was not their profession. The high fees and limited number of barristers, as well as the explosion of commercial and industrial activities, made it attractive for people to consult "lesser" legal practitioners, such as those who were in the business of soliciting (acting as an agent in) causes for a master (e.g. instructing a barrister on behalf of a client). The Inns of barristers were not very happy about it; it should be noted that Inns are professional guilds that have an interest in having a monopoly over their profession (much like the case of many professions, including legal ones, in modern times). But non-barrister legal practitioners became commonplace anyway and the regulation of these non-barristers became necessary. While initially solicitors were not seen as independent professional advocates, a limited right of audience was gradually granted. As the regulation becomes necessary to protect the public, attorneys in common law courts, and solicitors in equity courts, were given the privilege of practicing the law in limited form by the courts themselves. An attorney or a solicitor was sworn and accredited as an officer of their respective court by a judge, whose court controlled the legal practitioners (other than barristers) in their court and regulated them in absence of royal or statutory intervention. The courts maintained rolls of admitted attorneys and solicitors, which still exist today. The Roll of solicitors (the profession most attorneys were absorbed into) is now maintained by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (originally by the Master of the Rolls in the Chancery court, then by the Law Society, then by the SRA). In England and Wales, solicitors today are subject to statutory regulations under the various Solicitors Acts (notably the 1974 one). They are statutorily officers of the Senior Courts who retain disciplinary power over the solicitors admitted to practice before them. Barristers on the other hand are mostly self-regulated by the Inns. Although the regulation of barristers now has a statutory basis and subject to public supervision (from the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 to Legal Services Act 2007), they are not as extensively subject to rules set by the Parliament or government as solicitors. To summarize, the barristers always had the "vibe" of being the learnt men (and now persons of all genders) of law who are independent, honourable and capable of self-regulation, while the profession of solicitors developed from mostly unregulated legal service agents, who were eventually regulated at the motion of the courts in the way of requiring them to be sworn as officers of the courts (such to give the courts disciplinary powers over them). With the development of modern legal system, the distinction between barristers and legal professions has become less clear in some jurisdictions and ceased to be relevant at all in others. As to the reason why the distinction is still so much more pronounced in the UK than elsewhere. I would guess the following. The legal, justice and judicial systems in the colonies benefited from the fact everything was started from the beginning, without historical baggage of the several different English courts which were not consolidated until 1870s. And it is also easier to never afford such privileges in the first place, or to take them away without the historical baggage, than to take away existing privileges with historical claims in England. The general anti aristocratic attitudes in colonies probably also restricted the rather elitist tendency of the likes of the Inns of barristers. The governments were more willing to regulate the legal profession in its state capacity. The articles Counsellors and Barristers. An Historical Study, Solicitors and the Law of Maintenance 1590-1640, and the book Introduction to English Legal History (chapter 10), were particularly helpful during my research. | The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact. | Technically anyone can sit on a jury. Lawyers are not automatically excluded from juries anymore, as being called for jury duty is a right and a duty that the law abhors automatically excluding people from. That is the official line on this. However, in reality, lawyers will always be stricken from serving by one of the lawyers trying the case. Each lawyer has a certain number of preemptory strikes (the ability to get rid of a juror for any reason, aside from those protected by law, such as race, religion, etc). They also have unlimited "for cause strikes," which are when a juror is biased in some way. Lawyers trying the case almost always try to use a cause strike to get a lawyer off, saying that they are biased toward either Defense or Plaintiffs based on the type of law they practice. The judge will usually not let them use a cause strike, saying that an attorney is ethical enough to apply the facts to the law and not sway the jury based on their personal biases that everyone has; plus, we're officers of the court so we have a duty to be ethical. Hence, they are typically forced to use a preemptory strike to get a lawyer off, but they will, every time. (If the lawyer just tried a similar case, then they'd get to use for cause.) The real reason that the lawyer from one side or the other definitely wants a lawyer off is that the jury instructions presented by each side to the judge are crafted in a way that each word carries specific meaning and, with that, is designed to lead to a certain way of thinking. Once the lawyers have fought over the instructions and the judge decides what will be presented, the jury only gets them in writing...in some states not even in writing, they only get them read to them without a copy to take back to the room. If a lawyer is in the jury, that person will undoubtedly be able to explain exactly what the law requires for a finding, or exactly why a certain finding should be had. They will advocate one way or another; this is undeniable. The instructions are purposefully confusing. The reason is this: when we fight over jury instruction, inherently, one of us will want an instruction that is hard to understand, for a lay person. This is because we want them to apply the law as it is commonly (mis)understood, not as it truly is, because that's not good for our case. To have a lawyer on the jury would defeat the finely crafted instruction and its potential to confuse. They would undoubtedly explain the instruction to the jury. One may think this would be helpful, however, juries are told that any special knowledge they have about anything pertaining to the case shall not be shared as it could sway the jury. This is most true when it comes to a lawyer sitting. When a jury doesn't understand a jury instruction, their only recourse is to send a question to the judge. In states where they have the instruction in writing, all he can say is "read carefully;" he cannot give his interpretation of what the instruction means. If a judge did give his own interpretation that is grounds for a mistrial or an appeal at least. A lawyer on the jury would be able to explain, "Oh, what this really means is X," and this is bad from one side's perspective, almost always. We all have biases, and even finely determined rules of law can be subtly pushed toward one direction or another with the use of a certain word over another, or the placement of one element before another. Generally, unless the side who would most want the attorney off had exhausted their preemptory strikes, and lost the argument to remove for cause, there is very little chance a lawyer will serve. The fact of the matter is that both sides are very likely to want a lawyer stricken from the jury pool, (even from the side who may believe the lawyer to have leanings in their favor). It is essential to control as many factors as possible in a jury trial, and an attorney on the panel is just a wild card. The potential always exists that if a lawyer ends up on the jury, they could explain the elements of the case to their fellow jurors, who may then not rely as fully upon the carefully crafted language in the instruction(s). This could backfire on either side when certain portions of the language used may be intentionally vague or difficult to parse though for someone who doesn't practice law. Anyone interested in the process of choosing and striking jurors (in the U.S.), through the process of voir dire, this is a fairly comprehensive article on the topic. | The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview | I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract. | I conclude (contrary to an earlier expression) that there is no such list, nor can there be, because the term "officer" is not well enough defined. The inferior officers are those officers who are not principal officers (as specified in the Constitution, e.g. ambassadors, cabinet members, judges), since there are only two kinds of officers. There is no constitutional or statutory definition of "Officer of the United States", so we have to figure it out from case law. As noted in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. Officers of the US cannot be appointed by Congress (Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so that narrows down the possibilities – if in fact an appointment can be made by Congress, that is not an inferior office (since Congress has no such authority). That court also said that We think that the term "Officers of the United States," as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. To take a specific example, "special trial judges", authorized in 26 USC 7443a are an example of an officer. We know they are officers, because Freytag v. Commissioner 501 U.S. 868 says so (since they read Buckley): A special trial judge is an "inferior Office[r]" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. Such a judge acts as an inferior officer who exercises independent authority in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The fact that in subsection (b)(4) cases he performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status. The Dept. of Justice offers an analysis of "Officer of the United States". The main elements in their opinion are that the position must possess delegated sovereign authority of the Federal government, and the position must be continuing. There are other criteria possibly applicable (things that were invokes at some time) including method of appointment, having been established by law, taking an oath of office, an emolument (not a volunteer), and receiving a commission. Still, Congress authorizes (by law) the hiring of federal employees, and not all employees are "officers". An earlier memorandum on the topic is here. Footnote 54 notes that It is at least arguable, however, that the authority exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees. Warrant officers and non-commisioned officers would likewise have quite limited authority. Since the definition of "Officer of the United States" is up for grabs, there can't be a complete list of inferior officers, especially if all military officers are included. There is a long list of civilian officers under the executive branch published in United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, after each presidential election. The so-called Plum Book is on a government web page here in the 2012 version, and here for 2016. However, you will not find special trial judges of the tax court in the Plum Book, which were held in Freytag to be officers, and are civilians in the executive branch. The special trial judges are apparently listed here, as are the sitting judges (who are also not in the Plum book). | I did the Googling: Prior to the case described in this article, a notice was to be deemed served if the sender can sufficiently prove that the letter was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted. Law - Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 The case made it clear that the same law also sets a condition, where if the letter was not received at said mailbox, or too late received, the notice is to be deemed not served. The receiver is not required to prove that the letter has not arrived in the mailbox. Also, if your mail has been tampered with, you should contact Royal Mail - they will perform an investigation and put your mailbox in order. I work with tenants and landlords, thus lots of official notices. In this practice, it's often a recommended action to follow up on a notice and make sure the receiver has indeed received and acknowledged the notice. I don't know if it's a legal requirement, but often in disputes (which go to arbitration by a 3rd party), if one party states they did not receive the notice and the other party can't sufficiently prove that they did everything in their power to contact and confirm the delivery of the notice, the notice is regarded as not served. I believe you cannot deny post. If it's in your mailbox, it's your responsibility to check and read it. | Legal Education Compared In the U.S., the customary way that one learns about the law for purposes of being admitted to practice as a lawyer is by completing three years of course (with no thesis or dissertation) at the graduate level, after completing a non-law related undergraduate degree (customarily four years but including non-legal studies), and then taking a several week bar exam preparation course and passing the bar exam. In many other common law countries, the customary way that one learns about the law for purposes of being admitted to practice as a lawyer is by completing a three or four year preprofessional undergraduate degree, with a primary concentration in law but also including other general education requirements, followed by preparation for and sitting for a bar exam, and sometimes a period of apprenticeship or internship. In most civil law countries, the customary way that one learns about the law for purposes of being admitted to practice as a lawyer is by completing a bachelor's level undergraduate degree which is taken by both people who want to become practicing lawyers and also by people who want to go into business with legal knowledge, followed by very extensive bar exam preparation in the context of an internship or apprenticeship somewhat similar to that of a U.K. barrister. This is complicated somewhat by the fact that the U.K. and most civil law countries have multiple different legal professionals rather than a unified legal profession like the U.S. The U.K. has barristers (trial advocates) who have more education through the "inns of court" and solicitors. Civil law systems typically have more kinds of legally trained professionals with legally trained notaries with transactional law practice infused with the keeping of public records, prosecutors, judges, trial advocates, sometimes specialist public law lawyers, and legally trained non-lawyers (typically in business) all belonging to separate professions with different roles in the legal system. No entry level lawyer who has been admitted to practice knows the whole of the law in the country where that student has studied, and generally, even very experienced lawyers will be experts in some parts of the law, and have only a vague notion of where to learn the law in other areas where the lawyer practices only infrequently or not at all. In common law countries, legal education focuses on "edge cases" and the way that edge cases are argued, and leaves instruction to many "black letter" rules of law to be learned in bar exam preparation and after entering the practice of law to learn on the job. In civil law countries, legal education focuses on providing students with a comprehensive outline of the "black letter" law rules of law in the area of private law and criminal law and a few bits of public law, and learning methods of argument, advocacy and edge cases is reserved for learning on the job in practice. In both systems, the primary way that one learns the law as a future lawyer in the first instance is from textbooks, rather than primary authorities, although common law country law school textbooks have a heavier mix of excerpts from court cases selected by a professor, while civil law country law school textbooks have a heavier mix of statutory language excerpts and exposition form the professor writing the textbook. Lay Understanding Of Particular Areas Of Law Please estimate: what is the difference in amount of work needed in these two systems to become familiar with an area of law? Please estimate for a well-educated person (with a college degree or higher) but is not a lawyer and does not plan to become one. A well-educated person with a college degree or higher but is not a lawyer and does not plan to become one faces a very steep learning curve in either system to become familiar at a functional level with an area of law. Most of what a lawyer learns in school is the larger context and method of analysis, research skills and an ability to identify legal issues. In common law countries, a lot of this is learning how the case law making system works and having an unwritten outline of key issues in areas of law that would be codified in civil law countries. In civil law countries, a lot of this is learning how general parts of civil law codes interact with more specific provisions, and being aware of the "gloss of interpretation" (often in scholarly work by law professors) that is given to a superficially very vague and short provision like the section of a civil code imposing tort liability, and also how to research legal issues in that system. You really need to know all of this general material to have a competent and comprehensive understanding of specific legal issues, whether you have one that you are investigating or twenty. So, it is extremely inefficient for a non-lawyer to master a single legal issue. The difference in the learning curve between civil law systems and common law systems from pure primary sources is greatly reduced because both are intermediated by secondary sources that explain them in a more efficient and pedagogically sound manner. Rather than largely being a difference between say, the French system and the Colorado system, for example, the biggest difference in the learning curve involved the nature of the particular legal issue that you want to know about within a particular system. For example, in both the U.S. and in France, the body of law that governs child custody and child support is very self-contained. If you master the legal principles and authorities in that area of law, you can fairly swiftly know all of the substantive law issues and research issues involved. On the other hand, in both the U.S. and in France, the body of law that governs a property division in a divorce is absolutely sprawling. This is not because the law of property division itself, in sensu stricto, is terribly vast, but because applying the relatively simple law of property division to any set of facts, presupposes and requires a comprehensive knowledge of the private laws of property, contracts and other legal obligations, and associated tax laws, which can be quite vast over the full range of legal and property rights the might need to be divided in some divorce, sometime. It is the opposite of being self-contained. Similarly, immigration law or patent law questions can often be resolved and understood almost entirely within the four corners of a small number of statutes and regulations, while tax law questions, like property divisions in divorces, interface with a vast expanse of property, contract and legal obligations that might arise. As a general rule, laws pertaining to personal status tend to be self-contained, while laws in areas implicated property ownership and legal rights more generally, tend to require an expansive knowledge of many areas of law. Starting From Scratch While codification v. case law doesn't make much of a difference in the amount of work needed to become a lawyer or to understand a particular legal issue, codification does provide a decisive advantage in the case of a country seeking to adopt a new legal system from scratch, and many former European colonies have done, which is why civil law systems are so much more common globally. From the perspective of a legislature and judiciary starting from a more or less clean slate, it is much easier to adopt a mildly edited set of civil codes as the starting point for the law of your country, than it is to incorporate centuries of case law from some other country into the law in a country that has never used a common law system case law system "organically" prior to adopting its own set of laws. Even then, it is much harder for legislators to be clear on precisely what laws it is that they are adopting at the outset in a common law case law based system where many legal rules are implicit in decisions that are only imperfectly indexed, rather than explicitly codified. And, from a legislator's perspective, adopting a comprehensive new legal system without any clear delineation of what laws you are actually adopting in your new country, is very undesirable, unless you are merely grafting onto a common law legal system that has already long been in force in your country prior to starting its new legal system, with which all prospective legal practitioners in your country are already intimately familiar. |
Can a court-declared unconstitutional law become valid when it's added to the constitution? Idaho is one of the states with citizen initiative and referendum rights in the state constitution (hereafter referred to as "Init.".) State constitution changes are not allowed under this right. Only the legislature can pass constitutional amendments, then subject to voter approval of just >50% votes. There have been conflicts over the Init. right because the legislature sets the conditions in state laws to get a petition onto the ballot. The constitution statement is: The people reserve to themselves the power to approve or reject at the polls any act or measure passed by the legislature. This power is known as the referendum, and legal voters may, under such conditions and in such manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature, demand a referendum vote on any act or measure passed by the legislature and cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people for their approval or rejection. The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws, and enact the same at the polls independent of the legislature. This power is known as the initiative, and legal voters may, under such conditions and in such manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature, initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to the vote of the people at a general election for their approval or rejection. Essentially, the citizen initiative and referendum rights have been used as checks and balances by the people against the legislature. The legislature has become hostile to citizen initiatives and referendums after some laws were overturned and some laws were passed by citizens on popular subjects the legislature refused to pass or even consider for years. In 2018, the legislature changed the law to make it much more difficult to get Inits. on the ballot. Previous law (and current as of 2023) requires that valid signatures must equal 6% of the total votes cast in Idaho in the last presidential election, and at least 6% of signatures must come from each of 18 of Idaho's 35 districts (51%). The new law required 6% of signatures from all 35 districts (100%). Because of Idaho's vast geography and many rural districts, this makes the process nearly impossible. It effectively empowers just one district out of thirty-five (3%) to effectively veto the Init. from getting on the ballot for all of the state voters to decide for themselves whether to make it law or not. To illustrate the challenge of getting rural signatures in Idaho, legislators are paid extra money for constituent services like fuel to drive around to speak with voters and are paid according to the square miles of each county. Urban county legislators are given $400, while some rural county legislators are paid $3,200 to reach out to their constituents. Those vast distances are what make some areas too difficult to gather 6% of the required signatures. However, the state supreme court unanimously declared the law unconstitutional because it "was so restrictive that it violated a fundamental right under the state’s constitution." Judicial quotes included: "the legislature’s duty to give effect to the people’s rights is not a free pass to override constitutional constraints and legislate a right into non-existence, even if the legislature believes doing so is in the people’s best interest." "dramatic check on the ballot qualification process without showing a compelling need for such a check," "all qualifying initiatives or referenda are already subjected to a statewide vote." "The legislature’s actions amounted to ... a law that made the initiative and referendum process more difficult for proponents of future ballot propositions, while simultaneously making it more difficult for those opposed to the new law to pass a referendum to repeal that very law." An example given was that the largest urban district, Boise, could stop an agricultural initiative that is popular in the other 34 districts. When Medicaid expansion was passed in 2018 by the citizen initiative process (61%), one single rural district could have vetoed the question from even getting onto the ballot where all voters (urban and rural) got to decide on it. This year, 2023, the legislature is close to passing a constitutional amendment that does the same thing as the law that was ruled unconstitutional. Because the people have no power to change the constitution, it's likely to be a permanent death for citizen Inits. 1. Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? 2. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? | Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone. | Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) ("The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) ("It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids."); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’") (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty."). | Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance? There is not really any legal precedent for prevailing in such a lawsuit. Obviously, of course, the detailed facts and circumstances matter. If a state statute prescribed other terms, for example, and expressly gives someone standing to enforce the statute, then that is another matter. In many states, standing to enforce violations of municipal laws governing their finances and contracts is vested by statute or the state constitution in the state attorney general. Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? Probably not. Certainly not in court. Usually, individual citizens or taxpayers do not have standing to bring suit related to acts which affect all citizens or taxpayers equally or proportionately, but do not constitute an individualized injury to the particular taxpayer. Municipal governments have broad discretion to enter into contracts with other municipalities on rates that they deem fit which do not have to approximate cost or be profit maximizing. Some states and cities allow citizens to petition to have legislation that has been adopted (agreements are generally adopted by city ordinance) to be placed on the ballot for a vote if a sufficient number of people vote on it within a sufficient time of the ordinance or law being passed (this is called a "referendum power"). But, most do not. Otherwise, your sole recourse is to get a majority elected to city council and a new mayor, to change the policy when the agreement expires. wouldn't the city have to prove that there IS a benefit to the city? No. Assuming for sake of argument that someone suing the city had standing to sue, the burden of proof is always on the person bringing the lawsuit. Ordinances are presumed valid unless this is disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example: It is an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) The constitutional test in the face of an equal protection challenge (assuming for sake of argument that there was standing) would be a "rational basis test" and there would be a rational basis for (1) saying that the city benefit from its neighbor not having adequate fire protection which could spread to them, (2) on the basis that the marginal cost might be low, and (3) on the basis that the municipality probably has a legal duty to aid a neighboring municipality if it has the ability to do so in the absence of an agreement without necessarily having a right to compensation under a doctrine called mutual aid when the proper conditions are met (sometimes formalized by agreements and/or governed by state statutes such as the Tennessee's Mutual Aid and Emergency and Disaster Assistance Agreement Act of 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated § 58–8–101, et seq.,). The rational basis test is met if you can describe some rational reason why the law might make sense for the city to pass (which is not expressly prohibited by law or a constitutional right), even if the rational reason is not empirically correct, and even if the rational reason wasn't the actual reason for passing the law. This ordinance would almost certainly pass the rational basis test. In general, a disagreement over the price term of an agreement being too high or too low almost always fails. A municipality is not obligated to negotiate a "fair market value" or "fair" price for services that it provides to other municipalities. | The direct answer is simple -- the US Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2) provides that electors are appointed in the manner that state legislatures direct -- so the answer is the state legislature decides. But state legislatures don't exist in a vacuum, and the reality is not so simple. State legislatures direct the manner of choosing electors by passing state laws, which, in the case the state decides to choose electors by holding some sort of popular election, include laws for how and when ballots can be cast or received, and how recounts are to work, etc. Normally, state laws are interpreted by state courts, and state courts can strike down or modify state laws if they find that the state laws violate the state constitution. And more fundamentally, state legislatures derive their authority from state constitutions, so in principle, state legislatures should not be able to perform any act that does not conform to the state constitution (which is interpreted by the state courts). However, the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) overturned the Florida state supreme court ruling on how to conduct recounts in the Florida election for presidential electors. Normally, federal courts do not get involved in state law issues, but the decision was mostly made on equal protection grounds, and the equal protection clause is part of the federal Constitution. So federal courts can get involved if there is an issue that relates to federal law or Constitution. In the Bush v. Gore case, there was an interesting concurring opinion that said the Florida supreme court had acted contrary to the Florida legislature, but this opinion was only joined by 3 justices, so it is not binding. Recently, the issue came up again when the US Supreme Court declined to stay a decision by the Pennsylvania state supreme court that said the Pennsylvania constitution required mail ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to 3 days after Election Day to be counted, even though the state law said they must be received by Election Day. Notably, although the US Supreme Court declined the stay, the order listed that 4 conservative justices dissented and said that they would have granted the stay. This was before Justice Barrett was confirmed, so, now that she is confirmed, depending on her legal position on this issue, there might now be a majority of 5 justices that would intervene against the state court if such an issue were to come up again. The order did not list the legal reasoning for each of the dissenting justices, so it is unclear what legal justification they had in mind in agreeing to overrule the state court. | They don’t, or not necessarily The primary purpose of a constitution is to define the structure, operation and limits on government. It contains the laws that the government cannot change except by any procedure included in the constitution. It isn’t necessarily to spell out the rights of citizens. Some do, some don’t. The median age of constitutions is 19 years - half of them are older than this, half of them are younger. Coincidentally, or perhaps not, this is close to the 20 years that Thomas Jefferson thought a constitution should last since “the earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead.” The US Constitution is the oldest (and shortest) still in modern use - it’s influential but it’s a poor example of what modern constitution’s are like. For some particular examples: the United Kingdom (a unitary state) does not have a written constitution. It’s unwritten one has only one clause - Parliament is sovereign. UK citizens have a bill of rights but that is under an Act of Parliament, they are not constitutional rights. New Zealand (a unitary state) has a constitution but that constitution is an act, or more precisely acts, of Parliament and their bill of rights is also an act of Parliament. Australia (a federal state) has a constitution which is an act of the UK Parliament with a single right (freedom of religion) and no bill of rights. Australians have an implied right of political discourse because the High Court has determined that that is necessary for the democracy described in the constitution to work. Their other rights are those that exist at common law. People in the state of Victoria have a bill of rights (made by Parliament) but no other state or territory has adopted one. the French (unitary) constitution creates the position of “Defender of Rights” but what those rights are and the procedures for defending them are delegated to parliament to decide. | This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court. | The actual method of amending the Constition is spelled out in Article V – originalism would reject the position that there are other ways to amend it. We can see the result in the ratified amendments. Originalism is a theory of interpretation, not a theory of drafting, and it hold that the words of the law, be it the Constitution or a particular statute, are to be understood as would be understood by people originally. (There are numerous versions of originalism, so one can't be more precise than than until you decide whether you mean original understanding or original intent, the latter now being a minority viewpoint). It does not hold that new laws should be drafted in the language as it existed in the 18th century, as indeed they are not. Thus the 26th Amendment is written in contemporary style befitting the fact that it was drafted recently, and the 27th Amendment is written in older style befitting the fact that it was drafted in 1789. As for "changing values", each ratified amendment represents some change of values, whereby originally a right was not recognized (or was), and by the amendment, that value changes. The 18th Amendment represents on change in values, and the 21st reflects a change in that value, though not back to the status quo. | Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section. |
Should a hung jury mis-trial create reasonable doubt for acquittal? Read all of this and tell me where I'm wrong. So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. If we don't believe in this basic math result then we shouldn't trust having a jury as an integral part of the legal process. If we use this current failed logic of our legal system then why not just from the beginning have 24 or 36 or 48 or 96 jurors and come up with some magical percentage that removes reasonable doubt in their decision. Let alone it will cost the defendant another $100,000 to go to trial again for a mistrial. Every trial thereafter is adding yet another 12 jurors, however it doesn't change the fact that there still remains, after 2 or 3 trials, a juror or jurors who found reasonable doubt out of the 24, or 36 jurors that could not convict. This basic logic to continue trying the defendant with even one past juror saying not guilty by having reasonable doubt, whether the juror is flawed or not as we can't judge a juror, negates the original intent of the Constitution. The Constitution doesn't say you have a right to "an unflawed perfect human jury of your piers", it says just simply "a jury of your piers". For the prosecution to get the right to roll through as many jurors as they want beyond 12 to "fish" for a group that concurs to get a conviction is also unconstitutional. | You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial. | The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides. | Part XVIII of the Criminal Code addresses the power and procedure for appeals. Appeals of indictable offences are appealed to the provincial Court of Appeal. The Crown can generally appeal where there is an error in law. The Crown has a limited appeal on the basis of questions of fact. This includes appeals for unreasonable verdict.1 However, the Crown cannot appeal on issues of credibility unless it amount to an error in law. The Defence can appeal both issues of fact and law.(ss. 675 and 676) R. v. Kendall, [2005] O.J. No. 2457 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 46 from a Canadian Criminal Procedure Wiki. Unlike in U.S. law, the government can directly appeal an acquittal on certain grounds in Canada (without regard to whether it was a jury trial or a bench trial), although those grounds aren't quite as broad as those of the defense. This would also be true in modern English law. In practice, it is somewhat easier to appeal a verdict in a bench trial than in a jury trial, because in a bench trial you know why the judge says he or she came to the verdict and can determine if those reasons were incorrect, while in a jury trial, the appellate court presumes that the jury followed the law and use any even implausible basis for their opinion even if that isn't what really happened. The complete bar on appeals of acquittals of criminal charges in U.S. law due to the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, is a rare exception to the global norm. | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). | California law has a general defense of necessity. It appears that it's not in statute, but rather comes from common law. It's described in what appears to be the official jury instructions at CALCRIM 3403. The defendant is not guilty of (insert crime[s]) if (he/she) acted because of legal necessity. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that: (He/She) acted in an emergency to prevent a significant bodily harm or evil to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else); (He/She) had no adequate legal alternative; The defendant’s acts did not create a greater danger than the one avoided; When the defendant acted, (he/she) actually believed that the act was necessary to prevent the threatened harm or evil; A reasonable person would also have believed that the act was necessary under the circumstances; AND The defendant did not substantially contribute to the emergency. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each of the six listed items is true. It seems like all six requirements would apply in your hypothetical case, so if you could prove them, you'd be off the hook for a violation of Cal. Penal 148(a)(1) as cited by user6726. | There actually is a practical effect to a "not proven" v. "not guilty" verdict in Scotland, but it is mostly sociological or social in nature rather than legal. If your question is, are there future legal concerns, than no. Not proven is, to be sure, an acquittal. However, it is an acquittal that the tells the public something important: that the trier(s) of fact thought the person likely guilty. That's a fairly substantial distinction. In Scotland, a criminal case may be decided either "in solemn procedure", which is simply the Scot term for a jury trial v. "in summary" or in "summary procedure" which is the U.S. equivalent of a bench trial. The difference between the two (and the divergence from the U.S. procedural vehicle) is that for lesser crimes the accused doesn't have an automatic right of a jury trial for any criminal matter. In some ways this lesser included makes up for the fact that the Scottish accused is without absolute right to choose jury or bench trial, which in the U.S. can be very meaningful from a tactical perspective. Think of how important the make-up and emotional proclivities of juries are to both convictions and acquittals. A bench trial can be beneficial to the truly unlikable defendant, or in especially brutal crimes, where juries may convict out of fear or sympathy for the victim, even if the case is weak. At the same time, they may nullify the conviction for the sympathetic defendant. Juries are notoriously emotional and bias driven. Being able to choose a bench trial where the judge will follow the evidence and avoid the emotional response of a jury can be invaluable. Just as a sympathetic defendant can appeal to the emotions of the jury for acquittal or jury nullification, on the opposite spectrum. In Scotland, lesser crimes are always (with limited exclusions) tried by a judge, while more serious allegations always (again w/ limited exclusions) get a jury trial, automatically. The defendant does not choose the type of trial he is afforded. Hence, a defense or a prosecution cannot fiddle with the balance of proof based on emotion or lack there of. They get what they get. There are various rules procedurally that differ in comparison, but since this isn't the question that is the general rule and should suffice for background. Also hugely important is the fact that in Scotland, jurors decide a case by majority vote (like a civil trial in the U.S.); hence, there are no hung juries and they don't need a consensus. So, one way or another the verdict will be given in a Scottish criminal action. Scots also get comparatively huge juries to any other country (15 jurors) and they only need 8 in agreement to reach a verdict. Tactically, the "not proven" is a lesser included verdict (like U.S. uses lesser included charges in cases that are weaker for the prosecution). This lesser included finding can be used by choice when the Prosecution has a sympathetic defendant or when the defendant is probably guilty or unlikable. If the jury thinks the defendant (called "accused") probably did the crime, but the prosecution has failed to prove the elements, they can/will issue a "not proven" verdict. This sends a big message. This, again, is typically only reserved for those cases when there is strong but not conclusive proof that someone committed a crime. They don't want to profess their innocence with a not guilty verdict, so they are still acquitted, but with he stigma of the "not proven" verdict attached. Some estimates have from 1/5 to a full 1/3 of all acquittal verdicts by Scottish juries as "not proven" as opposed to "not guilty". Not proven can also be used by judges in the bench trial (summary procedure), however it's much less common. The proportion of 'not proven" acquittals in general is higher in the more severe cases; but so then are the proportion of acquittals versus convictions. These would likely be hung juries in the U.S.. Both in the "solemn" and the "summary" acquittals, not proven is interpreted as indicating that the jury or judge, respectively, is not convinced of the innocence of the accused; in fact, they may be morally or even factually convinced that the accused is guilty, but do not find the proofs sufficient for a conviction under the elements of the crime on the jury instruction/verdict form. I look at this as similar to the adage oft used in the U.S., which is an acquittal, despite the fact that the verdict is termed "not guilty" does by no means indicate the person is in fact "not guilty", it just means the prosecution couldn't prove its case. Sociologists in the U.S., as well as legal scholars, have studied the phenomenon, and it appears that most not guilty verdicts in fact let go a guilty person. This can be intuited by the evidence the jury never saw, either by suppression from bad searches, by the exclusion of witness testimony due to procedural rules like hearsay, privilege, etc., and other forms of keeping relevant evidence from the jury to protect the rights of the accused. But in the U.S. the person can go forth and say, "Hey, I was proven not guilty!" Scotland also has another interesting rule of criminal procedure, whereby a criminal can't be convicted without corroborated evidence. What this means is that if all the prosecution has is the victim witness, by way of proof, testifying, and no physical or corroboration testimony, Scottish law requires acquittal, but often will be so by the verdict "not proven". This is huge, if you think about it. Use, for example, a rape trial. A woman testifies, saying that Joe Schmoe climbed through her window and raped her. She knows Joe - he's her neighbor. Nobody saw him climb in. But she knows it's him. He leaves no physical evidence, having shaved his entire body and used appropriate protection (gloves, condemn, etc.). She has a rape kit done. Rape is obvious, but the only proof is her testimony. Joe goes free. But in Scotland, he goes free with a stigma attached. He's found "not proven" rather than "not guilty". I think this corroboration rule has a lot to do with why this verdict system still exists. In the U.S. the trier of fact would weigh the testimony and decide if one person was substantially more believable than the other, and a verdict would issue. That is a substantial difference, procedurally. Since Scotland doesn't have the hung jury because there is no consensus required they use the "not proven" in the same way a U.S. jury uses the hung jury when one or more jurors thinks the prosecution didn't prove their case but it's fairly clear the defendant is, in fact guilty. Then, you will often get a "hold out" juror, and since the U.S. requires a unanimous verdict, the hold out hangs the jury. It's sort of the opposite of jury nullification. The person knows that the evidence fell short, but their conscience can't reconcile letting the person go free, so they will vote guilty to hang the jury, almost ensuring the prosecution gets another shot. There has been a lot of debate about this three verdict system in comparative law circles, with many legal scholars saying it's antiquated. But I think it serves an important purpose. It carries the stigma of likely guilt for those people who probably committed the crime but got off. Further, the hung jury cost tax payers millions of dollars in the U.S., and this is often the side effect of people not wanting there to be absolutely no recognition of the fact that the accused probably committed (especially serious) crime(s). The Scots, on the other hand, have found away to accomplish this without the cost and emotional toll multiple trials takes on all the players involved, from witnesses and victims, their families, the accused, and even the lawyers and the prosecutions, who have to put in all the work of a trial just to start anew. Here is a really good scholarly article that deals with this interesting phenomenon not seen in (I don't believe) any other country: https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/iiclr/article/viewFile/17848/18019 | I'm curious as to how the US legal system determines who should present evidence and how much evidence is required by them to prove one side of an argument against a counterargument. In General In both criminal and civil cases in common law legal systems (legal systems derived from the English legal system, basically, the U.S., U.K., Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), the burden of proof is on the party seeking to have a court do something. So, if the absence of evidence, the party seeking relief loses. Proof Of The Elements Of The Charge Or Cause Of Action Presentation of Evidence and the Prima Facie Case The party seeking court action presents their evidence first. If at the close of their opening case that party has not presented enough evidence to meet their burden of proof with respect to every "element" of the list of legal elements that they must prove to prevail in court, that party has not established a "prima facie case" and the case is dismissed without granting relief. If the prosecution or party bringing a civil case establishes a prima facie case, or if the defense does ask to have the case dismissed for failing to establish a prima facie case at the close of the evidence of the party asking the court to do something, then the defense presents their evidence if the defense wishes to do so (this is optional). (If the defense does present evidence, the prosecution or civil party seeking relief can then present a rebuttal case to disprove the new points of evidence in the defense case, and so on, back and forth until all evidence is taken.) Evaluating The Evidence In Light Of The Burden Of Proof Once both the party asking the court to do something and the defense have presented all of their evidence, the trier of fact (i.e. the jury in a jury trial, or a judge in a bench trial) decides if every element of the case of the party asking the court to do something has been established by the relevant burden of proof. In a civil case, the burden of proof is usually a "preponderance of the evidence" (i.e. that the evidence more strongly favors that the element was established than that it was not established); some elements on some claims in civil cases must be established by the higher standard of "clear and convincing evidence." In a criminal case, the burden of proof is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". Affirmative Defenses In addition to elements of a case that must be established to make a prima facie case, there are also "affirmative defenses" to a request that a court do something. Examples of affirmative defenses include self-defense, statute of limitations, immunity from suit, a pardon in a criminal case, etc. A defendant can win ether by showing that the party asking the court to do something has failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to one or more elements of the case, or by showing that an affirmative defense bars the request. In both criminal cases and civil cases, the burden is on the defense to show that there is at least some evidence that justifies consideration of an affirmative defense. This is called a "burden of production." In a civil case (and in some criminal cases in some jurisdictions), the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by preponderance of the evidence. In some criminal cases in some jurisdictions, once the defense has met a burden of production with regard to an affirmative defense, the prosecution must rule out the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt to prevail. Deciding Who Wins Once both the party asking the court to do something and the defense have presented all of their evidence, the trier of fact (i.e. the jury in a jury trial, or a judge in a bench trial) decides if an affirmative defenses prohibit the party asking the court to do something from prevailing. The party asking the court to do something wins unless the defense can show that this party did not meet the burden of proof as to any one element of a particular criminal charge or civil cause of action (for each charge or cause of action), or that an affirmative defense bars that particular charge or cause of action. Often cases have conflicting testimony regarding what happened. The jury (or judge in a bench trial) can choose to belief that one person is telling the truth and that the other statement is either a lie or is unintentionally inaccurate for some reason. If the jury (or judge in a bench trial) isn't at all sure whose statement is true and whose is not, this favors the defendant if one is not more credible than the other. Complex Cases In a simple case, there is just one charge or cause of action, and there is just one defendant. But, often, there are multiple charges or causes of action, and each one must be evaluated as to each defendant of the multiple defendants in a single trial. In a civil case, sometimes there are counterclaims that defendants are trying to prove against plaintiffs, or cross-claims that defendants or counterclaim defendants are trying to prove against each other that have to be evaluated. Also, in civil cases, sometimes one or more of the defendants is also prosecuting one or more separate causes of action against someone other than the original plaintiffs or co-defendants. In that case, that defendant is also a third-party plaintiff, and someone other than the original plaintiff and defendants is a third-party defendant (third-party defendants can also bring third-party counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff, third-party crossclaims against third-party codefendants, or their own claims against new parties or against the original plaintiffs). Other Rules Special Statutes Regarding Proof Of Facts Sometimes, there are particular kind of facts for which a statute says that a "prima facie case" is established automatically if a certain kind of evidence is presented. For example, it is common for the law to say that a prima facie case regarding ownership of real estate, or the status of a bus as a school bus, is established by presenting a copy of an official document that says so. Usually, when a statute says something like that, the prima facie case can still be overcome, for example, by presenting a subsequent document that shows that the real estate was then sold to someone else, or that the school bus status of the bus was later revoked. But, when a statute like that is present, the plaintiff or prosecutor doesn't have a duty to prove the negative that there was no subsequent sale of the real estate or that the school bus status certificate was still in force on the date of the incident. Rules of Evidence There are also "rules of evidence" that govern what kind of facts can be presented at a trial to prove a case. For example, in a U.S. criminal trial a fact cannot be established with evidence that is hearsay, such as an affidavit or a statement that a witness heard someone else say and is retelling to the court. A very important rule of evidence in U.S. criminal trials that flows from the United States Constitution, is the evidence obtained by law enforcement illegally may not be presented by the prosecution, even if it definitively shows that a defendant is guilty. This is called the "exclusionary rule." Application To Facts Is it up to the prosecution to present full and complete evidence that the system only takes pictures when the bus is stopped (presumably reviewing source code or conducting tests) or is there some kind of legal concept of "good enough at a glance" evidence where they've met some minimum burden of proof that the picture is taken when the system is turned on and it's only on when the bus is stopped, therefore it must be functioning as expected? The prosecution has to convince the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) that every element of the crime as define in the statute has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that any affirmative defense upon which the defense meets a burden of production has been overcome by the relevant burden of proof. Usually, this is a broad legal standard, and the jury (or judge in a bench trial) has to decide if the burden of proof has been met by the facts presented which were legally admissible as evidence. It wouldn't be uncommon for a defendant to present no new evidence in a defense case (other than having cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses) and merely argue at the completion of the prosecution's case that the evidence presented didn't establish a particular element of the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, the defense might argue that the picture presented by the prosecution was not taken when the bus was at a complete stop, and if the prosecution didn't present some convincing evidence that the bus was at a complete stop when the picture was taken (e.g. the testimony of the bus driver and other witnesses), the defense should win. But, it is almost always up to the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) to decide if the prosecution's evidence is good enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved the case. Often a defendant will not want to call any witnesses beyond the witnesses presented in the prosecution case, because a defendant's witness might cause the jury to overcome its doubt that a fact only weakly proved by the prosecution was actually true, for example, when only one not very credible prosecution witness had testified regarding the same fact. If the identical case were presented to two different juries, one jury could decide to believe the bus driver who said that the bus was at a stop when the picture was taken, and a different jury could decide not to belief the bus driver, and both decisions would be valid. Consequences Of A Verdict If the judge or jury acquits the defendant in a criminal case, the case is over and there is no appeal. If the jury is hung (there is no unanimous ruling to convict or acquit (but see endnote)), in a criminal case, there is a mistrial and the defendant can be tried again. If the jury convicts, one of the grounds for an appeal by the defendant is that the evidence was insufficient to prove some element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the appellate court agrees than the conviction is overturned and there can be a retrial (or in some cases, the defendant is acquitted). Appellate Review Of The Sufficiency Of The Proof The law recognizes that different juries could interpret exactly the same facts in different ways and will reverse a conviction because the burden of proof was not met only if "no reasonable jury" could have interpreted the evidence in a manner consistent with a conviction. For example, on appeal, an appellate court will always assume that the jury thought that every pro-defendant witness, whose credibility was questioned in any way by the prosecution, was lying and that the jury believed that every pro-prosecution witness was telling the truth, even if the defense presented evidence that could have caused a reasonable juror to question the truthfulness of a prosecution witness. Appeals for failure to prove something beyond a reasonable doubt can be easier in a bench trial than in a jury trial because following a bench trial the judge will often publicly state the actual reasons in terms of findings of fact and law that the judge used to reach a conclusion. So, the defendant need only show that a key fact actually found by the judge was not supported by the requisite proof. END NOTE Oregon State, and prior to 2019, Louisiana, did not require juries in all criminal cases to be unanimous. | The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months). |
Is it legal for a parent to take items from their children Hypothetically, if a child has a cell phone that they paid for with their own money that they saved by doing chores or whatnot, can a parent take it away as a punishment for doing something wrong? Please don't send a complicated answer, just a yes or no. I am not a lawyer. | Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions. | No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | If you buy a house and your wife signs a quitclaim deed to you, that transfers to you whatever rights she has in the house. Similarly, if you and your wife sign an agreement that anything deposited in a particular bank account in your name would be your separate property, that would override the pre-nup as far as that account was concerned. Such an agreement could include a dollar limit per month or per year, or an explicit purpose, such as savings for a down payment. (It could be thought of as a gift to you of her share of any funds deposited.) Giving property to your parents or others with the understanding that it will be returned on your request might be seen as an attempt to evade the pre-nup, and a court might hold that the property was actually shared, if you ever do divorce. There might also be gift tax issues if the value is high enough. Whether asking your wife to agree to a quitclaim or any sort of agreement to modify the pre-nup would help or harm your marriage I cannot know, nor did you ask that. But I would think that for most people being open would work better than going behind a spouse's back. None of this should be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer. | I assume you are not legally emancipated. To evict anyone, there is a legal process – nobody can just kick a tenant out, without the appropriate court order. These guys describe the process for evicting an adult child (where the child does not have a lease and is a tenant at will). A custodial parent has a legal obligation to provide, among other things, a place for the child to live. Kicking a child out is contrary to that obligation, and could constitute child abandonment ("neglect" under CRS 19-3-102), and that is a crime. A court would not grant a parent's motion to evict a minor child. If a landlord takes the law into his own hands, as it were, he can be sued under CRS 38-12-510. | The United States has a fairly strict definition of where you have an expectation of privacy, a public bus certainly isn't a private place. In public, anyone can take pictures and video of anyone or anything else. You may have some sort of case if the girl were to use those photos to knowingly help your father violate the restraining order, but it doesn't sound like you believe that was the case. | Fraud involves gain. It does not have to be financial gain. By the way, he's probably right about free education etc. to some extent - as the father he will be (partially) responsible for child support. | Children own their own stuff Legal guardians are legally responsible to preserve it and use it in the child’s best interest. If doesn’t matter if that stuff is real, personal or intellectual property. |
GDPR, PII, and UUIDs GDPR states that An individual is ‘identified’ or ‘identifiable’ if you can distinguish them from other individuals. and also that The GDPR provides a non-exhaustive list of identifiers, including: name; identification number; location data; and an online identifier. With that in mind, I am trying to wrap my head around what that means in practical terms. If I have two database tables, both encrypted. One table is globally available and contains user sessions. For the sake of conversation assume that globally means it's physically hosted in countries that EU might now deem equivalent in terms of protection. It holds no PII, just session status and expiry time. It also holds a user UUID that's been randomly generated but is tied to the lifespan of the user i.e. once assigned to a user it does not change. The other table is physically hosted in EU, and holds a UUID to email mapping. If a breach results in the first table being leaked the data is anonymous, it is only when joined with the second that that the user session can be tied to PII (email address). Does this mean that both tables fall under GDPR and thus must be placed in EU (or equivalent), or is it sufficient that only the table containing PII is located there? | The way you describe this UUID, it is pseudonymous data (see GDPR Art 4(5) and Recitals 28–29). That is, it is not directly identifying, but you have a mapping between pseudonyms and identifiers that can be used to re-identify this data. Effective pseudonymisation requires not only that the data is logically separate, but that there are effective organisational and technical measures preventing re-combination by unauthorized persons. Alongside with encryption, pseudonymisation is one of the safety measures that the GDPR explicitly requires whenever appropriate (see Art 25, Art 32). Pseudonymous data is still personal data, because you can easily re-identify the data. The PII concept is US-specific and is misleading in a GDPR context, where it is not the inherently identifying characteristics of the information that matters, but the realistic ability of the data controller to single out data subjects to whom this data relates (compare Art 4(1) and Recital 26). However, were you to irrevocably erase the UUID–email mapping, things are more tricky. There is no longer any connection with directly identifying data, so this data might be anonymous. On the other hand, such a persistent UUID still allows you to recognize/distinguish persons, so it might still be personal data. This might be the case especially when the UUID is used in long-lived cookies of website visitors, thus matching the GDPR's concept of an “online identifier”. This conclusion could be avoided by limiting reuse of UUIDs, e.g. creating a new UUID after some context-dependent appropriate duration. The GDPR does not require all data to be stored in the EU, but requires international transfers of personal data to have sufficient protections. If you're processing these data in countries without adequate legal protections (like the United States), additional safeguards have to be used. Pseudonymisation could be part of such safeguards, and has been suggested by some data protection authorities in the wake of the Schrems II ruling. However, pseudonymisation alone does not make the international transfer legal, it is more of a strategy to reduce remaining risks. I think that your systems has a good chance of being OK, but not neccessarily so. If in doubt, perform a DPIA and possibly consult your data protection authority under GDPR Art 36. If feasible, storing/processing data only in the EEA or in countries with an adequacy decision will simplify compliance. Safeguards such as pseudonymisation could be strengthened by rotating UUIDs, and by restricting access to the table with identifiers. | The university has a legal obligation to collect certain data from attendees, including employees an visitors. It has decided to keep these records in digital form, and offers a smartphone app as a convenience. The university has outsourced the data processing activity to a third party. This is perfectly legal under the GDPR, if that third party is contractually bound to only process the data as instructed, and not for their own purposes. Whereas the university acts as a data controller (Verantwortlicher), the third party would be a data processor (Auftragsverarbeiter). I have some doubts though whether an app or a website is indeed the solution that offers the best data protection, especially taking into account the GDPR's data minimization principle. Requiring updates when entering or leaving any room is potentially excessive. Given the sensitivity of the data, the university should have performed a data protection impact assessment to weigh the consequences of this measure. At least for employees, the measure would likely have to be approved by the union (Personalrat) as well. | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | In short, no. Article 20 of the GDPR covers the “Right to data portability”, which essentially says two main things: The data subject had the right to an exported copy of their personal data in a common format And The data subject has the right to have this data transmitted directly from one controller to another where technically feasible. Neither of these rights as stated in the GDPR require the data controller to provide a button to initiate either a data export or a transfer to another controller. | The GDPR does not prescribe how information should be pseudonymized and does not even define the term properly. Yet, pseudonymization is suggested as an safety measure in various places, so that pseudonymization should be implemented wherever appropriate. The most useful guidance the GDPR gives is by contrasting pseudonymization with anonymization, where it says that pseudonymized data is still personal data because the data subjects can be identified using additional information (see Recital 26 GDPR). In contrast, re-identification is not reasonably likely for truly anonymized data. A common technique for pseudonymization is to replace identifying information with a pseudonym, for example replacing a name with a random numeric ID. However, this can only be considered pseudonymous if the mapping between the ID and the real value is not available to whoever uses this data. Replacing individual fields in a data set might not be sufficient for pseudonymization because apparently non-sensitive fields could still enable indirect identification. This requires careful analysis taking into account the entire context of the data, so it isn't possible to say whether merely removing names + email addresses achieves pseudonymization or anonymization. What you are doing is redacting parts of sensitive data. I think this is a pretty weak pseudonymization method since it still leaks partial information about the true value, and leaks information about the length of the redacted value. It is possible to argue that this is OK (e.g. if you can show that you have multiple similar redactions so that you achieve a level of k-anonymity). But by default, such partial redactions are likely to be unsafe. Completely removing the sensitive data is much safer. The “Article 29 Working Party”, a pre-GDPR EU body, has published an opinion on anonymization techniques in 2014 (PDF). It does not account for the GDPR's specific phrasing, but provides an overview of pseudonymization and anonymization techniques and puts them into context of European data protection law. It considers how such guarantees guard against attacks such as singling out data subjects, linking multiple records of the same individual, and making inferences about the data subject. In this guidance, pseudonymization techniques that are suggested include encrypting or hashing the sensitive data. However, the guidance warns that such techniques do not provide strong protection against singling out or linking records of the data subject. A bit earlier, the UK ICO had published guidance on personal data, including on the matter of anonymization and pseudonymization (PDF) with some good examples. For determining whether a data set has been successfully anonymized (or pseudonymized), they suggest a motivated intruder test: could someone without specialist knowledge or skills re-identify the data subject? In your example, such a person should not be able to infer that a record about Stxxx Axxdxrxn is about a Steve Anderson. In my opinion, your pseudonymization approach would fail the motivated intruder test unless you have multiple records that could all be about Steve Anderson (compare k-anonymity). | Whether or not you are protected by GDPR depends on the location of both yourself and the party processing your data. Citizenship and residence statuses are completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence If the party processing your data is established in the EU, then you are protected no matter who you are or where you are (Art. 3(1)): This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not. If the party processing your data is not established in the EU, then you are only protected if you are in the EU (Art. 3(2)): This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union | You ask the wrong question first What do you save in the database? Let's take an example of a door: Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save who passed this door? Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save when the door was opened? Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save both? Only now, once you have established that you have any interest in the door passing at all, you have to start to figure out if it is personal data - if you have no interest in saving it in the first place, there's little reason to figure that out. Let's say you have a legitimate interest to save both, because behind the door is the server room, and physical access is limited to authorized personnel and you want to know when who was in there for figuring out if or who was responsible for changes. Now, which of the data is Personal Identifiable Data for you? You know where the door is. That's in itself Location Data, but if you don't know who or when the door was opened, then it is not PII. It becomes PII if you connect it with a person. A pin-code used by the whole department is not always PII, but can become PII in a very small to medium-sized department. e.g. one of all the 20 000 employees in a facility is just saying "an employee" and is not identifiable, but one of 20 is much more likely is, as you can correlate that with other data to possibly identify a smaller group. The Employee ID or Card would be most definitely PII if saved. Similar, if the login date is saved to the account list on some server. The timestamp on itself is not a PII, if only the timestamp is recorded and no other information exists. Like, if the front door only logs "The door was opened/closed" but not who did it, to count customers or schedule maintenance. However, together with other information - such as the door being access restricted and the paystubs from timekeeping when all those access carriers were in the building and having a tight access restriction to a decently small group (see above) - that can quickly become PII. It is enough that the information from different information sources compiled can become enough to say "it was one of these few people", as that is enough to make it identifiable under GDPR Art.4. Once you know it is PII, you need to handle it as PII. As such, you need consent or a legitimate interest. That's why I pulled the other test before figuring out if it is indeed PII: Ic you have already figured out that this data is required for some legitimate reason, such as that you need to know the door operation log to ensure some other compliance, then you can proceed through the other parts of the GDPR compliance. Now, OP asked about a login timestamp. That is by necessity bound to an identifier, such as a login name. As such, it is the Keycard or Employee ID example and automatically PII because it is tied to a PII. Definitions The GDPR defines PII in Article 4 ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The US Department of labor defines quite similar PII is defined as information: (i) that directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address, social security number or other identifying number or code, telephone number, email address, etc.) or (ii) by which an agency intends to identify specific individuals in conjunction with other data elements, i.e., indirect identification. | GDPR recital 64 says: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. The GDPR does not specify exactly what methods of verification are "reasonable". GDPR Article 11 paragraph 2 provides: Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. This is amplified by Recital 57 which says: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. GDPR Article 12 paragraph 6 provides: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. All of the above seems to indicate that the Data Controller must follow reasonable practices, but is not required to guarantee a positive response to a Data Subject who cannot supply reasonable evidence of identity. Moreover the Controller is required to reliably ascertain the identity of the Subject before providing information or acting on a request. Incidentally, good security practice is that the site does not retain the actual password. instead it hashes the password with a good cryptographically secure hash function, and stores the hash. This means that the site cannot reliably determine if a password is unique among all passwords saved by the site, and searches among passwords are not normally done, and would not be reasonable. A site using an email address as the User Identifier would normally enforce at the time an account is created that the email is unique among all emails registered on the site. A user who cannot provide the email would typically be rejected as not able to be identified, unless the site retains additional ID info not listed in the question. I think such a practice would be considered to be reasonable in the current state of technology. |
No online access to online only bank? I have an account at an online only bank. There are no physical branch locations for me to visit. 8 months ago I had an issue trying to log in and called their customer support to try to get it resolved. They told me it's a technical issue, gave me a case number and told me they'd contact me once it's resolved. I've since called a few times and each time they tell me that it's already been escalated and as a technical issue they don't have any timeline for how long it will take for my access to be restored. I can still check my balance etc. over the phone, but I can't use mobile deposit for example. Are there any legal requirements for allowing access to my account that I might be able to cite when trying to get this issue further escalated? (When I asked what I was supposed to do about not being able to mobile deposit, I was told I could send the check in by mail to get it processed, so I'm not sure if they could claim I still legally have access to my account, or if there even is such a concept as having legal access to an account.) | Online banks in the US are not legally special: they have to comply with the obligations of brick and mortar banks. I assume that this is actually a US bank, and not a Nigerian bank that you access from the US. However, there is no regulation that requires a bank to be able to handle mobile deposits. If the problem is just that you can't make online deposits, that is legally allowed. For example, my own bank did not have the facility for processing mobile deposits until a few years ago, and even now I have to use a smart phone to make such deposits (it is a traditional bank). The only way in which your situation would be legally problematic would be if your contract with the bank promises that you can make mobile deposits. You could reasonably argue that an 8 month delay in solving the problem was unreasonable. Presumably there is some benefit to maintaining this bank, one which you'd like to keep rather than closing the account and moving on. It might be something like "if you close this account, we will claw back the interest that we paid". That is the point at which it might be worthwhile to talk to your lawyer about taking legal action. | It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service"). | Yes, you did something wrong; you used both the university's trade mark and copyright without their permission. I don't know the law in India, however, if it is similar to Australia it is unlikely that the police will be interested in doing anything about it. While it is technically a crime, criminal prosecution is usually reserved for egregious breaches on a for profit basis. I suggest you apologise and agree to stop distributing your app. | An incomplete list: Getting the money. How did you plan to get paid? Credit card? Paypal? Integrating those into a website in compliance with their terms of service is not easy. (I wouldn't touch credit card numbers, in particular, even with a ten-foot pole. Too much liability risk for weak implementations. Too many highly skilled attackers to pounce on any mistake.) Distributing the App. Places like the Apple App Store have their own terms of service, especially regarding payment and in-app purchases. At a guess, Apple would reject your app, but if they allowed it, how does your withdrawal policy fit with the 30% cut they want from the initial transaction? Holding the money. So there are user accounts with a credit balance that can be withdrawn again. Would you be able to repay them if all users withdraw at the same time? Where do you keep the money? Currency risks. Say international customers pay in currency A, which the payment provider transforms into currency B. Then they want their money back, but exchange rates have changed. What do they get? Knowing your customer. There would be money laundering concerns. Do you have the infrastructure to identify your customers? Can customers change the (re)payment method from one account to another? Can you handle withdrawals if a user no longer has the same credit card, for instance? Scammers leaving you to hold the bag. Say a scammer tricks a victim into making a deposit, and then finds a way to redirect the withdrawal (see above). Would you be able to deal with the legal and administrative fallout? | Yes, you are then an online bank. This is an issue that computer games have had to figure out, when it was possible to move money both ways, cash to game gold and game gold to cash. (think Diablo's Real Money Auction House). If you allow people to store cash value in the game, and then take the cash value back out, then you are banking. Even though it's a game, you'll have people using it as a bank, and not playing the game at all but merely using it for funds storage and movement. Even if you surcharge significantly to deter this (i.e. $1 buys 90 game gold, and 110 game gold pays $1), there will always be people willing to pay the surcharge -- criminals. This is the whole point of the Homeland Security-driven "Know Your Customer" laws. The government doesn't want criminals using your real-money-trading platform to launder money. I know that you imagine a business model where this would be awesome. Actually you'll spend most of your time dealing with this kind of thing: Ann Onymous signs up and does nothing on your platform except load the account with money and send it to someone. Harold Hack is longtime customer who is active on the platform in all the normal ways. One day Harold adds a card, and loads an unusual amount of money onto the account. Both of them transfer money to Boris Badguy, who withdraws it. All fine, working as intended. But then, Ann and Harold's credit card payments reverse. They were stolen credit cards. But you're angry at Ann and Harold, and you dun them ferociously to make good their payment per your Terms of Service. Ann is unreachable. You don't believe Harold because deadbeats lie. It takes you awhile to realize this isn't first-party credit card fraud, and Harold's account was actually hacked. Harold doesn't normally post from Moldova at 3:30am. By this time, Boris is in the wind. Unfortunately, your business model doesn't let you make enough money to offset these kinds of losses. And it's hell on customer relations. You finally get arrested for using customer deposits to pay payroll, because you should've been keeping it in escrow. Being a bank is not for amateurs. | Who authorized the transfers? Banks don't transfer money without someone telling them to do so. Assuming it was your son there are several possibilities: You didn't log off from a banking session allowing him to access it. Legally, you authorized the transfers. You stored your sign-in credentials on the computer allowing your son to access them. Legally, you authorized the transfers. You gave your son your sign in credentials. Legally, you authorized the transfers. Your son hacked your account. Your son has committed fraud. Your contract with your bank may protect you from this, however, the bank will pursue your son for recovery and will likely refer the matter to the police. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | They must give you a refund By saying they don't give refunds that are required by law they are engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct which will expose them to some serious fines. Report them to the relevant Italian authority. Presumably, you paid for this service with a credit/debit card. Contact your card provider and dispute the transaction - they will put the money back in your account and that will probably the last you hear of this company. |
Isn't a hung jury proof of reasonable doubt? I don't understand the logic with allowing additional trials after a hung jury. Isn't the fact that the prosecution can't get 12 jurors to agree the accused is guilty proof that guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and so he should be acquitted? Why does a not guilty verdict have to be unanimous as well? | No. It means the existence of reasonable doubt is in doubt... One cannot conclude the question of guilt in either direction, so one must try again to see if a different jury can answer the meta-question, to then answer the legal question of guilt. ... or is not being addressed If only one person is voting against the consensus, or as many as are allowed by the jurisdiction, they are overruled. That's the allowance made for bias that has somehow reached the jury despite the filtering done beforehand. If more people are voting against the majority so that consensus is not possible, it is potentially because someone has made up their mind on the question of guilt regardless of what (some significant part or the weight of) the evidence indicates, defeating the purpose of the trial and providing all the evidence. A person not accounting for all the evidence can't be said to have reasonable doubt of guilt, since the doubt may be excluded by the remaining evidence. Similarly, guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be supported by only partial evidence, as exculpatory evidence may be among the part not accounted for. ... or cannot be addressed by that jury at all. Finally, a jury split on the decision of how to weigh the evidence cannot claim either to have or to have dismissed reasonable doubt, because they cannot agree on what a reasonable doubt is, in the first place. | Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair. | Everyone goes free. Each individual in the room is considered innocent until proven guilty. If the prosecution cannot prove that Bob was guilty of the murder then Bob is considered innocent. The same goes for each of the other 19. However if all 20 people were part of some other crime which led to the death of Jake then they might be found guilty under accomplice liability. | In California (as in all states) there is a justifiable homicide defense which might be used in such a situation. For the force to be justified, you have to reasonably believe you are in danger of being harmed, that you need to use force to avoid the harm, and you may only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat. It then is a matter for the jury to decide whether those principles were followed in your particular instance. The reason why it's hard to predict the outcome is that it depends on a subjective evaluation by the jury, as to whether the shooter had a reasonable fear and whether lesser force was a viable option. The jury's decision is guided by instructions to the jury (#506, #506) which focus on relevant distinctions. The jury will be told that "Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be", and that you have to reasonably believe there is "imminent danger of great bodily injury". My evaluation is that that does not describe the scenario in the question. There is some possibility of future harm... but not imminent harm. People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470" states that "the rule developed at common law that killing or use of deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense was a forcible and atrocious crime" and "Examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem, rape and robbery", and that could support application of a justifiable homicide defense in a bank robbery. But in the present instance, the bank is being robbed and the shooter is a by-stander. Despite all of the bank robberies in California, there is no relevant case from which one could draw an analogy. | There are many cases where it is quite obvious that A has illegally killed B, but where it is much less obvious whether this was first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter. The usual approach is to charge A with all three, and then convict for the highest that the jury agrees with (for example, the jury might agree that it was at least second degree murder, but not agree that it was first degree murder beyond reasonable ground). A prosecutor who wants a first degree murder conviction might charge with first degree murder only, hoping that the jury will agree with the charge rather than letting a proven killer go free. This may fatally backfire. If a proven killer is only charged with first degree murder, and there is insufficient evidence for first degree murder, then yes, with a responsible jury that killer will go free. If the only charge requires proof of premeditation, and there is no proof, then that charge will not succeed. | Based on these two sources: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/juryselect.html http://criminal.lawyers.com/criminal-law-basics/reasons-for-rejecting-potential-jurors.html my understanding is that in an official sense there's nothing that's considered an invalid reason to challenge a juror for cause. In other words, whatever it is that the attorney feels makes the juror unsuitable, he can take it to the judge, and the judge will rule based on what he thinks. | What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial). | The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error. |
In US, does an investigator always present the evidence of guilt of a suspect no matter what? In US criminal justice system, must the investigator always provide the evidence that the particular suspect is the one who indeed perpetrated the crime, no matter what investigation procedures and assets were used(access to a particular computer system or software, access to encryption keys, IP logs, etc.)? I ask such goofy questions because US has so many interesting laws that make nonsense to me and this is the reason why I ask some of the basics which should make sense in any justice system. | So typically, in the U.S., the investigators (police) will give the case to a prosecutor who will review the case and the evidence and decide if they will present the case to a judge and if so, what will be charged. The prosecutor is the ultimate authority of how to present the case to the court. The investigator(s) will likely be called to testify as their expertise's and actions that lead to certain evidence is required. If there is a certain expert in some type of evidence, that person may testify on conclusions of their findings (for example, if the coroner's report concluded that some was the victim of a homicide, the coroner who wrote the report will be called in to testify to his findings... but since the coroner did not have access to the Detective's witness, they wouldn't talk about the evidence with respect to that which came from eye-witness statements. If you're basing you question off of TV or Film depictions of Court rooms, keep in mind that many court room scenes are not accurate and the investigator presenting all of the case could be a result of a limited cast, budget, or time for specialists to present the case. Some shows explicitly separate the roles (Law and Order and its spin offs are a one-hour shows, with half an hour being police procedural and the second half being a legal drama. CSI and its spin-offs would frequently bundle the CSI field workers as investigators for storytelling purposes (in the original show, most of the cast were not detectives and did not interrogate witnesses. Jim Brass was specifically the detective who affected the arrests, often having the CSIs explain the science. The show also never got to the trial phase, and in some cases, what if any crime was committed is never stated, as the story focused on getting to "how and why something happened" not the legal ramifications. In one episode, Grissom explicitly tells someone he doesn't have enough evidence to prove the fraud in criminal court... but the insurance companies will see his report and it's enough that they would be able to refuse to pay. In shows that are not explicitly legal procedurals, it might be that the cast of characters is not sufficient to cast for all the witnesses AND/Or the characters are not in professions where they would know how to properly run a court. For example, in one episode of the Brady Bunch, the Brady kids, all of them are High School age or less, hold an ad hoc trial with Alice (the family's maid) as the judge. The case descends into childish bickering and Alice calls a recess when she realizes that her Roast is burning. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree. | The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence". | Anyone can be arrested, as long as the police (and in some cases, anyone) have probable cause to do so. This generally includes two points: You are in the process of committing a criminal act The police have probable cause, generally through evidence, that you are in the process of, about to, or have committed a criminal act. This usually requires obtaining a warrant for the arrest. However, it's important not to conflate searches with arrest. Arrests are when you are being taken into custody for the reasons mentioned above. Searches are when your personal belongings (i.e. property), are searched to collect evidence. It is not up to police to convict someone. This is the job of the judicial system. There's a bit of terminology here: convictions basically mean being found guilty of an offence. Police don't have the ability to convict someone of an offence. They do have the ability to arrest, and charge with an offence. To charge someone with a crime basically means to accuse them of having done something. Now let's get to the actual crime. Since you haven't mentioned a specific jurisdiction, I'm going to use Canadian cases and law, but in general, it should apply worldwide. If the police have reason to believe that you are engaging in unlawful hacking-related behaviour, then they have the authority to arrest you. They simply need to have a reasonable belief that you are engaged in the crime. Something such as connecting you with an IP address and connecting that you were online at the time is enough. If the police need to find out more information (which they generally do, to investigate further into the matter) - they can obtain a search warrant afterwards. With this, they can legally search into your computer, and investigate. Any evidence that they collect can be used in court. I've recently done some research into cyber crimes. One rather infamous case involved the attack on multiple large scale websites, including Dell, Yahoo, and Amazon, in 2000. This sparked a large scale investigations, between the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and the FBI. The attacks were claimed by some to cause nearly 1.7 billion dollars of damage. The hacker was charged with 58 different offences. You can imply from the linked article that he was arrested before his computer was searched. | I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case. | What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles. | If the victim is unable to prove who the culprit was, then it will be impossible to prosecute that person criminally or sue them for civil damages. Incidents like these are rarely enough to cause a police department to throw sufficient investigative resources at it to crack the case without some reason to believe that it is part of something bigger. An unfortunate fact of life is that most perpetrators of crimes and torts get away with it and are not caught. And, if the only available witness is willing to lie to cover up the name of the guilty party (probably out of a desire to not have the dog put down), it is that much harder. A private investigator might be able to solve the case, but the cost of hiring a PI would probably exceed the benefit that could be obtained if the PI was successful. |
Why is the standard for proof of guilt much lower in civil law systems? and a lot of guarantees like right against self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. What is the reason behind this? It is said that the stakes are much lower in civil cases, but how is that? I mean civil cases in common law systems. I misunderstood that a country can have multiple legal systems since its stated that my country (India) has a mixed legal system | I understand that by "civil law systems" the OP means to refer to civil (vs criminal) cases, not to the civil law (vs common law) systems. The standard for proof of "guilt" (which is not actually called "guilt") is indeed "much lower" in civil cases, but the reason for that is not that it has to be so, but that the standard of proof in criminal cases has to be much higher. In civil cases none of the parties face criminal conviction. One party will just lose some money or property, will have to perform some work, will lose some opportunities etc. So, initially, both parties play the same game and each of them is in to lose it down to a similar level of peril. What follows is that, at the baseline, neither of the two parties should be in more advantageous position to prove their rightness than the other. In other words, if any of them proves that they are more than 50% likely to be right than the other, they should win. Indeed, why would one party have to prove their rightness beyond reasonable doubt? If it was so, it would mean that the other party would effectively have to prove their rightness to only a small degree, which would be utterly unjust. lot of guarentees like right avainst self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. what is the reason behind this ? False. If saying something from a witness stand would risk you being prosecuted, you can refuse to say it regardless of whether you are giving evidence in a civil or a criminal case. | Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement). | Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant. | There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all. | You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial. | Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair. | There actually is a practical effect to a "not proven" v. "not guilty" verdict in Scotland, but it is mostly sociological or social in nature rather than legal. If your question is, are there future legal concerns, than no. Not proven is, to be sure, an acquittal. However, it is an acquittal that the tells the public something important: that the trier(s) of fact thought the person likely guilty. That's a fairly substantial distinction. In Scotland, a criminal case may be decided either "in solemn procedure", which is simply the Scot term for a jury trial v. "in summary" or in "summary procedure" which is the U.S. equivalent of a bench trial. The difference between the two (and the divergence from the U.S. procedural vehicle) is that for lesser crimes the accused doesn't have an automatic right of a jury trial for any criminal matter. In some ways this lesser included makes up for the fact that the Scottish accused is without absolute right to choose jury or bench trial, which in the U.S. can be very meaningful from a tactical perspective. Think of how important the make-up and emotional proclivities of juries are to both convictions and acquittals. A bench trial can be beneficial to the truly unlikable defendant, or in especially brutal crimes, where juries may convict out of fear or sympathy for the victim, even if the case is weak. At the same time, they may nullify the conviction for the sympathetic defendant. Juries are notoriously emotional and bias driven. Being able to choose a bench trial where the judge will follow the evidence and avoid the emotional response of a jury can be invaluable. Just as a sympathetic defendant can appeal to the emotions of the jury for acquittal or jury nullification, on the opposite spectrum. In Scotland, lesser crimes are always (with limited exclusions) tried by a judge, while more serious allegations always (again w/ limited exclusions) get a jury trial, automatically. The defendant does not choose the type of trial he is afforded. Hence, a defense or a prosecution cannot fiddle with the balance of proof based on emotion or lack there of. They get what they get. There are various rules procedurally that differ in comparison, but since this isn't the question that is the general rule and should suffice for background. Also hugely important is the fact that in Scotland, jurors decide a case by majority vote (like a civil trial in the U.S.); hence, there are no hung juries and they don't need a consensus. So, one way or another the verdict will be given in a Scottish criminal action. Scots also get comparatively huge juries to any other country (15 jurors) and they only need 8 in agreement to reach a verdict. Tactically, the "not proven" is a lesser included verdict (like U.S. uses lesser included charges in cases that are weaker for the prosecution). This lesser included finding can be used by choice when the Prosecution has a sympathetic defendant or when the defendant is probably guilty or unlikable. If the jury thinks the defendant (called "accused") probably did the crime, but the prosecution has failed to prove the elements, they can/will issue a "not proven" verdict. This sends a big message. This, again, is typically only reserved for those cases when there is strong but not conclusive proof that someone committed a crime. They don't want to profess their innocence with a not guilty verdict, so they are still acquitted, but with he stigma of the "not proven" verdict attached. Some estimates have from 1/5 to a full 1/3 of all acquittal verdicts by Scottish juries as "not proven" as opposed to "not guilty". Not proven can also be used by judges in the bench trial (summary procedure), however it's much less common. The proportion of 'not proven" acquittals in general is higher in the more severe cases; but so then are the proportion of acquittals versus convictions. These would likely be hung juries in the U.S.. Both in the "solemn" and the "summary" acquittals, not proven is interpreted as indicating that the jury or judge, respectively, is not convinced of the innocence of the accused; in fact, they may be morally or even factually convinced that the accused is guilty, but do not find the proofs sufficient for a conviction under the elements of the crime on the jury instruction/verdict form. I look at this as similar to the adage oft used in the U.S., which is an acquittal, despite the fact that the verdict is termed "not guilty" does by no means indicate the person is in fact "not guilty", it just means the prosecution couldn't prove its case. Sociologists in the U.S., as well as legal scholars, have studied the phenomenon, and it appears that most not guilty verdicts in fact let go a guilty person. This can be intuited by the evidence the jury never saw, either by suppression from bad searches, by the exclusion of witness testimony due to procedural rules like hearsay, privilege, etc., and other forms of keeping relevant evidence from the jury to protect the rights of the accused. But in the U.S. the person can go forth and say, "Hey, I was proven not guilty!" Scotland also has another interesting rule of criminal procedure, whereby a criminal can't be convicted without corroborated evidence. What this means is that if all the prosecution has is the victim witness, by way of proof, testifying, and no physical or corroboration testimony, Scottish law requires acquittal, but often will be so by the verdict "not proven". This is huge, if you think about it. Use, for example, a rape trial. A woman testifies, saying that Joe Schmoe climbed through her window and raped her. She knows Joe - he's her neighbor. Nobody saw him climb in. But she knows it's him. He leaves no physical evidence, having shaved his entire body and used appropriate protection (gloves, condemn, etc.). She has a rape kit done. Rape is obvious, but the only proof is her testimony. Joe goes free. But in Scotland, he goes free with a stigma attached. He's found "not proven" rather than "not guilty". I think this corroboration rule has a lot to do with why this verdict system still exists. In the U.S. the trier of fact would weigh the testimony and decide if one person was substantially more believable than the other, and a verdict would issue. That is a substantial difference, procedurally. Since Scotland doesn't have the hung jury because there is no consensus required they use the "not proven" in the same way a U.S. jury uses the hung jury when one or more jurors thinks the prosecution didn't prove their case but it's fairly clear the defendant is, in fact guilty. Then, you will often get a "hold out" juror, and since the U.S. requires a unanimous verdict, the hold out hangs the jury. It's sort of the opposite of jury nullification. The person knows that the evidence fell short, but their conscience can't reconcile letting the person go free, so they will vote guilty to hang the jury, almost ensuring the prosecution gets another shot. There has been a lot of debate about this three verdict system in comparative law circles, with many legal scholars saying it's antiquated. But I think it serves an important purpose. It carries the stigma of likely guilt for those people who probably committed the crime but got off. Further, the hung jury cost tax payers millions of dollars in the U.S., and this is often the side effect of people not wanting there to be absolutely no recognition of the fact that the accused probably committed (especially serious) crime(s). The Scots, on the other hand, have found away to accomplish this without the cost and emotional toll multiple trials takes on all the players involved, from witnesses and victims, their families, the accused, and even the lawyers and the prosecutions, who have to put in all the work of a trial just to start anew. Here is a really good scholarly article that deals with this interesting phenomenon not seen in (I don't believe) any other country: https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/iiclr/article/viewFile/17848/18019 | if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU The European Union is by no means a homogeneous area of law. I will assume france because it is the one I am most familiar with, but bear in mind that much of what follows might not apply to Spain/Germany/etc. The USA is a federal state. In particular, Louisiana law is heavily influenced by civil law for historical reasons. Other states and federal law do, however, follow more or less the same general principles. in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not The first part is true. Common law usually hold the principle of stare decisis according to which precedents are binding. That means that the holding of a court binds the same court to rule the same way on similar matters raised later. I would note, however, that courts can be... let’s say "creative"... in finding ways to differentiate the case at hand from the previous one, when the judge is motivated to do so. The latter part is false, or at least, exaggerated. It is true that courts in civil law are not bound by previous holdings; an appeal that raises as its only argument "the court’s decision in my case was different from that in another case without offering any differentiation" would be rejected. However, there is the concept of jurisprudence constante where repeated precedent is highly persuasive. In practice, even simple precedent is persuasive. Furthermore, lower courts are bound by the holdings of higher courts, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions. (That’s more or less the meaning of "higher court".) in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition That is a distinction between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. The distinction does not exactly map to the civil/common law systems, but in practice the criminal part of civil law systems is often inquisitorial whereas common law systems are often adversarial. I will first note that the "inquisitorial" part where the judge conducts investigations is vastly overblown. That only occurs in complex cases that require extended investigations with more coercitive powers (for instance seizing documents etc.) Wikipedia says: In 2005, there were 1.1 million criminal rulings in France, while only 33,000 new cases were investigated by judges.[5] The vast majority of cases are therefore investigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of [the equivalent of district attorneys]. The numbers sound plausible to me, but here’s the ref it gives if you want to check (which I did not bother to do). The most visible part of the distinction is the way witnesses at trial are handled. In an adversarial system, the parties will ask to cite certain witnesses. There are pre-trial motions to exclude certain witnesses for certain reasons, but parties have a wide latitude of which witnesses they want to call. Each witness will come labelled as to which party asked for its appearance. At trial, the witness will be asked questions by the party who called them (direct examination), which will usually take a long time and include nondisputed background information (who are you, for how long have you worked with the defendant, etc.). Then, the opposing party will ask questions (cross-examination), emphasizing points that cast doubt on the witness’s reliability (because they are lying, because they do not remember well, etc.) or on the other parties’ narrative (highlighting details that were conveniently "missed" in direct examination). In an inquisitorial system, witnesses are chosen by the judge. Parties can ask to have witnesses added to the list, but the list does not come with labels that X is coming from the prosecution, Y from the defense. When a witness is called, the judge will ask most of the questions at the start, before giving the floor to the parties. Roughly speaking, the judge does the direct examination, and parties do a cross-examination afterwards. Note that in many cases the parties will ask few or no questions - high-profile cases that you read about in the media are abnormal in that respect. In particular, an inquisitorial-system court maintains a list of expert witnesses, which are called when technical points are required. That expert is paid by the court, not by the parties (however, when one party requests an expertise and the other party opposes it, the requesting party has to pay the cost upfront - they will shift it to the other party if they win the case). That is very different to the adversarial system of having each party introduce testimony by an expert they commissioned and paid. distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system I am not sure I understand that question. It is true that "private" (tort) law operates in an adversarial system both in civil-law and common-law. Therefore, one could argue that the distance between civil-law’s criminal system (inquisitorial) and tort system (adversarial) is higher than between common-law’s criminal and tort systems (both adversarial). However, that is in my view a highly artificial distinction. The distance between practice areas within a single (common law or civil law) jurisdiction is large in any case. You would not want a lawyer specialized in drug-dealing cases to take your case about sexual harassment or unlawful dismissal, and vice-versa, in any jurisdiction. |
Received an unexpected check for a "settlement" - should I cash it? I received a check in the mail for about $1000. It's from "Huntington National Bank", and the issuer is "Saylor v. RealPage Inc. c/o Settlement Administrator". I've never heard of these people or this settlement. What's going on? The letter attached to the check includes the following excerpts: payment you are entitled as a Settlement Class Member Who Disputed or a Claiming Settlement Class Member from the Claims Fund in the Saylor v. RealPage, Inc settlement pertains to a lawsuit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act you will be sent a Form 1099 reflecting the total amount received in 2023 cash or deposit this check within 60 days | There is a class action lawsuit, Joshua Saylor v. RealPage, Inc., where it is alleged that Defendant fails to take reasonable steps to ensure that its reports do not inaccurately identify people as sex offenders. Defendant routinely fails to consult either the United States Department of Justice’s National Sex Offender Website or the online state sex offender searchable databases before falsely labeling consumers, including Plaintiff, as sex offenders. Based on Defendant’s pattern and practice of related violations, Plaintiff asserts FCRA and NJ FCRA claims on behalf of himself and the Classes A settlement was proposed; they indicate that if you "do nothing" then you would get about $300, but the amount depends on circumstances. There's no way to know why you received a check at all: perhaps you rented a residence and were "screened" by the offending company. | You rightly went to http://www.classactionrebates.com/settlements/talentbin/ which is a reliable source. I would say it was a safe site. A quick search found this court document: https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=5778378514805192456&q=Halvorson+v.+TalentBin,+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&as_vis=1 which proves the existence of the case. I would say everything is legitimate | If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back. | Let’s say I go to a cash machine, ask for £100, and the machine gives me £10,000. I use my banking app and see that £100 left my account, not £10,000. At this point I haven’t done anything illegal. If I asked for another £100 and got £10,000 again, that might be illegal. But the extra £9,900 are not mine. They are the bank’s money. If I try to keep it, that is simply theft. | In contract law in the United States, this is a "liquidated damages" clause. It provides that when one side breaches the contract, it has to pay a certain amount of money to make up for it. Normally this is done where it is difficult to calculate the actual damages in the event of a breach, or where the parties would rather avoid calculating the actual damages--a common example is where you put in an earnest money deposit on a house and then forfeit the earnest money if you do not buy. However, there are restrictions on what kind of damages are permitted. Notably, a "penalty" usually refers to an unreasonable amount that is unenforceable as against public policy. It would ordinarily be unreasonable to make someone pay a hundred million dollar penalty for breaking a ten thousand dollar contract, for example. Liquidated damages clauses frequently say "this is not a penalty" and "the parties agree this is reasonable" to make it harder to invalidate them on public policy grounds. Instead, if the liquidated damage payment is a payment meant to reflect actual damages that are just hard to calculate, it is much more likely to be enforceable. You would need to research liquidated damages and penalties in the state whose law governs the contract to determine whether the particular clause is permissible under state law. See https://www.google.com/search?q=restatement+of+contracts+penalty&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8 | I would like to give you a clear definitive answer, but there isn't one. This depends entirely on the scope of the easement which is determined on a case by case basis in light of the facts and circumstances. It is frequently ambiguous. These cases come up frequently and usually either get resolved fairly quickly via mediation or negotiation, or escalate into very ugly lawsuits that can last years. I have a case like this that has been pending eleven years, is on a final appeal to the state supreme court, has involved about $800,000+ of legal fees between all parties involved, has been to the court of appeals following about six times so far, and has led to five evidentiary hearings in addition to depositions, motion practice, etc. Obviously, this is an extreme example, but long, costly litigation if a negotiated resolution isn't reached is pretty common. | If you are going to sue, and can prove they overcharged - consider going to the small claims court. It should cost you $15 + time - unless you loose quite badly - in which case its conceivable the court could award costs against you (I don't know if this is true of the small claims court in NY). You can represent yourself, so no heavy legal bills. It will take a a few hours of your time to prepare and have the hearing. Of-course, very often, just by filing you will get the opposing party to sort out the issue - and probably won't even need to go to court. | As explained in more detail here: The IRS instructions on Form 1099-MISC are pretty clear as to when and how you must file that. You don't need to file a 1099-MISC if total payments to an entity in a tax year are under $600. And if you don't need to file tax forms, you don't need to request a W-9. (If in doubt as to the entity receiving the money, you demand a W-9 from whomever is receiving a payment and use that as the basis of reporting payments.) Furthermore, if you transmit the funds using a payment settlement entity who will report the transaction on a 1099-K, then you don't need to report the payment on a 1099-MISC. (See "Form 1099-K" ibid.) PayPal is a payment settlement entity, so you don't need to worry about reporting payments you send through them ... with one big exception: PayPal does not report "payments to friends and family," and so if you're using that to avoid their fees then the IRS would consider you liable for reporting those payments on a 1099-MISC. |
Is it legal to 3D print your own firearms? Lets say Bob wants to 3D print his own firearms that are not considered NFA items. Is it legal for Bob to 3d print his own firearms? Is it legal for Bob to gift the 3d printed firearm to his son? Is it legal for Bob to sell his 3d printed firearm via a private transaction? | Bob can probably print the firearm for personal ownership if Bob is not prohibited from possessing a firearm himself, but after that it gets problematic. This is ignoring any potential safety violations and liability issues or patent violations which might arise. According to an ATF spokesman quoted in this article : it is legal for Americans to build their own firearms without a license so long as they are not prohibited by law from possessing firearms, the firearms are legal to own, for personal use, and not for sale or transfer to others. Whether the gun parts are printed, created by other ways of manufacturing, or legally purchased from a licensed dealer has no impact on whether it is legal for an American to build a gun for personal use, though some states like California have placed additional requirements on the process. So transfer of ownership is possibly problematic. It's notably not a way to avoid normal firearm possession restrictions : Knight [the ATF spokesman] emphasized it is not legal for felons or somebody otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms to build their own guns under any circumstance. "Title 18 of the United States Code, section 922(g) prohibits several categories of persons (i.e., persons convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year) from possessing firearms in or affecting interstate commerce," Knight said. "Title 18 of the Unites States Code, section 922(d) prohibits persons from disposing of any firearm to a person the transferor has reason to believe is prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law." Finally there's a rather crucial point to note about the design of such firearms : He said the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 outlaws the manufacture or possession of firearms that can pass through a walk-through metal detector or X-ray machine commonly employed at airports without being detected. "A person or manufacturer cannot produce an undetectable firearm as prescribed in Title 18 of the United States Code, section 922(p)," he said. So making a weapon that's undetectable by a metal detector is not allowed (at least according to the ATF). | It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit. | If the train operator allows it, yes, you would be permitted to do so. There are no laws specifically against the carrying of bows and/or arrows, nor is a licence required for their purchase. Bows can be carried openly with less issue, but arrows (because of their ease of use as a weapon) should be stored securely and safely, because this protects you and others from accidental injury; it prevents others using the arrow as a weapon; it is affirmative evidence for a defence of lawful purpose, if you are accused of carrying an offensive weapon. The latter is the greatest risk you may face from a legal perspective, so you should follow best practise similarly to firearms and ammunition: store and transport the bow and arrows safely, securely, separately. | The relevant regulations in 49 CFR 1540 refer to weapons, not firearms, and unless you are specifically permitted, you cannot carry a weapon in your carry-on luggage. The interpretation of "weapon" is given here, which says Weapons are objects that may be used to attack another. TSA considers an item to be a weapon under 49 CFR 1540.111 if it is created for use as a weapon or is so similar to an item created as a weapon that it appears to be, or is easily used as, a weapon. Weapons include firearms, as well as realistic replicas of firearms that may reasonably be thought to be actual weapons. Such realistic replicas are prohibited because their similarity in appearance to real weapons may allow them to be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew. The screener has the discretion to determine when a replica is so realistic that it should be prohibited. Other toy weapons will be allowed in the sterile areas and cabin. Partial weapons and parts of weapons also are prohibited because they may be carried separately by collaborators for assembly subsequent to entry or boarding. In addition, partial weapons may appear to be operative and could be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew. | If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime. | The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience. | There is nothing illegal about selling used bikes online. Importing goods is subject to legal regulation such as customs duties. These goods might even be subject to punitive steel and aluminum tariffs since bike metal could easily be converted to metal for other purposes. And, if the bikes have fake trademarks, they might be interdicted, although the "first sale rule" makes import of bikes with real trademarks legal. There is nothing remotely related to copyright at issue in your proposal. | It could probably be argued that a bullet intentionally shot from a gun is abandoned property, and thus the shooter has no claim to its return. In addition, such a bullet might be evidence of a crime, to be seized by law enforcement, although that would not affect its ultimate ownership, at least not in the US. Intent matters in such cases. A person who shoots a gun probably does not reasonably expect to retain possession and control of the bullet, whatever may have been shot at. Well, someone shooting at a properly controlled target for practice on his or her own property probably retains ownership of the bullet. |
Is "not available for resale" a legally enforceable statement? I've seen this label on coke cans at one point, and I was wondering: is this legally enforceable? If it's not, is it possible for a retailer in any way to disallow the resale of an item purchased? Something like, I don't know, maybe a license you have to agree to in order to be allowed to purchase said item? This comes in the larger context of these new tech releases (GPUs, consoles) and how the producers/retailers could legally prevent scalpers. | united-states No, the first-sale doctrine makes this unenforceable Once a product is sold to a retail consumer, it is generally theirs to do with as they wish, including reselling it. The company likely intends this restriction to apply to distributors/retailers with whom it has contracts: it would likely be a violation of their distribution contract to, say, open a 12-pack of Coke and sell the individual cans. An exception to this doctrine is licensed software. Because it is licensed and not sold, there's not a product that the consumer could legally resell; the license is not required to be transferrable. As far as license agreements to prevent this go, it's been tried: Lexmark sold toner cartridges with a patent license agreement banning refilling and reuse. It ended up at the Supreme Court in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., where Lexmark lost. | Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book. | In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime. | No They will list the price they are charging you. This will normally be greater than what they paid because that’s how business works. The amount they are allowed to charge is what you agreed in your contract with them (which may incorporate a price list) or, if the contract is silent, a reasonable amount. What is reasonable will be related to what the market in your geographical area charges. While this is indirectly related to the input cost of a given item, business can and do charge what the market allows. | Warranty is company policy. It could be considered part of the contract of sale, but it would still be what the company stated it - at time of purchase - to be. Unless the warranty lists accidental damage as being covered, it looks like the company are following their policy and fulfilling the contract. If you were looking for legal redress since accidental damage resulted from using the product as intended, you'd have more chance of success looking at unsatisfactory quality or the product being unsuitable for the intended purpose under Part 1 chapter 2 sections 9 and 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It's worth sticking to objective details (for example that the port broke, and that you had used the device as intended). The company are not assuming you broke it (anyone or anything could have caused the accidental damage), and they are not refusing a warranty repair as it appears that accidental damage is not covered by their warranty policy, so this is not one. | In general, a seller may make different and inconsistent sales terms with different customers on whatever basis the seller chooses. In some jurisdictions, for some kinds of transactions, specific laws may regulate this. They may require similar treatment, or advertised prices, or whatever. I do not know of any such laws governing the sale of oil, but there might be some. This will depend on the exact jurisdiction (country, state/province, and perhaps city or other locality). Please edit the question to specify the jurisdiction if you want a more specific answer. Price discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination laws, such as race or religion under US federal laws, would be illegal. Proving that the basis was unlawful might be hard, however. | Written promise pre-purchase vs signed agreement, what's stronger? The signed agreement is decisive because it "states that it supersedes any previous agreements". The language portrays that the customer no longer considers the refund option a requirement for moving forward with the transaction. Signing that contract without the right to a refund releases the supplier from having to do good on his previous promise. what about false advertising? There is no false advertising. False advertisement is the supplier's act, whereas the subsequent waiver --by signing the agreement-- is the customer's act. The fact that the customer's informed decision benefits the supplier has nothing to do with false advertising. | The Advertising Standards Authority is the body in the UK that regulates advertising, and is backstopped legally by Trading Standards. In both the "CAP" code that covers non-broadcast media (leaflets, print adverts, signage etc) and the "BCAP" code that covers broadcast media such as radio, TV etc there is in section 3 "Misleading Advertising" the following (emphasis mine): 3.31 Marketing communications must not falsely claim that the marketer is about to cease trading or move premises. They must not falsely state that a product, or the terms on which it is offered, will be available only for a very limited time to deprive consumers of the time or opportunity to make an informed choice. And the "Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations" have this to say under the list headed "The following practices are banned outright": 6. Limited time only Falsely stating that a product will only be available for a very limited time, or that it will only be available on particular terms for a very limited time, in order to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of sufficient opportunity or time to make an informed choice. Both of which would seem to apply here. Of course where Bob has purchased I expect any liability the seller would have would be likely limited to the cost of the product/service. Where Bob hasn't purchased anything? Bob could of course bring the misleading advertising to the attention of the ASA who may act regardless, they don't care whether Bob has purchased anything or not, of course Bob probably wouldn't get any compensation or the like because they have no damages. |
Can patents be featured/explained in a youtube video i.e. are patent descriptions/images in public domain? Is it legally allowed to use images, which are obtained from patent forms, possibly with modifying/coloring them or left as is, inside youtube videos? In the same vein with images how about the text i.e., are patent description texts in the public domain so that the patent description can be contained in a video? | The government's position is that material in the patent documents is generally in the public domain See Public Domain Copyright Trademark & Patent Information Schedule: As part of the terms of granting the patent to the inventor, patents are published into the public domain. And slightly more specific, see Terms of Use for USPTO websites: Patents: Subject to limited exceptions reflected in 37 CFR 1.71(d) & (e) and 1.84(s), the text and drawings of a patent are typically not subject to copyright restrictions. 1.71(d) allows for the patent author to specifically indicate that some of the material is protected by copyright. But that position has not actually been tested in courts However, there is no actual statute explicitly exempting material in the patent documents from copyright nor any case law holding that in the absence of a notice, the material in fact becomes public domain. See Alderucci, "The surprising consequences of exempting patents from copyright protection (2016), at p. 13 and footnote 62. | I see that channel offers playlists and "videos" of popular music by several artists. The one video I tried had the music with no accompanying video or images. The channel's about page says that then operator does not own the copyrights to the music and cannot grant others permission to play it. It is possible that the channel operator has obtained permission from the artists and is thus operating under a valid license. It is possible that the channel is committing copyright infringement, but the various copyright owners have not noticed the channel, or have noticed it but decided not to take action. There is no easy way for an outsider to tell which of these is correct. If the operator has not obtained proper permission, then it seems that this would be copyright infringement. If so, any copyright owner could send a takedown notice, use YouTube's own copyright complaint mechanism, or could file a copyright infringement suit. But nothing compels the owner to act if the owner chooses not to, it is entirely the owner's choice. I do not see that the US fair use or any other exception to copyright would be likely to apply here. If the owner brought suit and won (and a win seems likely to me, from what I can see), the operator would be liable for damages, which might be sizable, or mild. In the US at least the owner could also obtain a court order (injunction) requiring the operator to stop using the owner's copyrighted music. If the owner complained to YouTube, the site could add a "copyright strike" against the operator's account. After a few strikes (I think three) YouTube will cancel the account, according to its posted policies. Similar outcomes could face anyone else who posted or made available for streaming copyrighted content (such as music) without permission from the copyright owner. But again, everything depends on action by the copyright owner. If the owner chooses, for whatever reason, not to act, then nothing is likely to be done about the infringement. | I know of an app that did similar. They sold membership access and linked Youtube videos. One of the Youtuber's started to take legal action against them. I don't know what happened but the app blocked their content from being shown. Updated this comment to remove incorrect information. After looking at Youtube's recent terms and conditions; you aren't allowed to link, embed or use the API if you want to put content behind a paywall, or show it alongside advertising: Under the section: Permissions and Restrictions https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms So long as your app is free, and doesn't contain advertising you are probably okay. | It depends. Wikipedia is quite strict on its policies, and it only allows uploading images (and other media) that either are in the public domain or with a licence that allows to be reproduced (often, Creative Commons, CC). If you go to the details of the image it claims that the picture is licenced under CC, with attribution to Saffron Blaze. So most probably Saffron Blaze got permision to take the picture, and he distributed it with the CC-Attribution licence. When scrapping a web site for data, Google and other engines usually search for metadata (the robots.txt file) that tells them what to index and what to not. If a user gives them permission to index a picture by not stating restrictions in the robots.txt, they can do index it. Of course, in both cases it might be that someone uploads a picture that he does not have permission to share. In this case the situation will, of course, depend on jurisdiction, but many laws have provisions that ensure that, if the content provider is dilligent in addressing copyright issues caused by the users, they are protected. For example in the USA the Digital Millenium Copyright Act establishes "safe harbor" provisions that protects content providers if they give a way to denounce copyright infringiments and address those in a given timeframe. | Yep, you are. You still need to keep the LICENSE and NOTICE files in the repository, if there were any in your copy of the project. These files contain the terms and conditions for the project, and provide attribution to the original developers. If you're trying to attribute in the UI of your application, you probably should. It's considered courteous and in the spirit of open source as well. This is also related: Do I need to include the full text of the MIT license in the UI of my app? | Although you aren't interested in the TOS, you should be. You are not allowed to make any copy of other people's stuff without permission. The TOS is how you get permission. First, the author uploads his material to You Tube, because he has an account and the TOS associated with the account specifies the license that he grants to You Tube and the world – same thing with Stack Exchange. The TOS says (roughly) "when you upload stuff, you give permission for others to access your stuff using the You Tube interface". Content-consumers likewise are allowed to stream content using their interface, but not generally download. (The license terms changes over time – previously there were more license types). Specifically, You are not allowed to: access, reproduce, download, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, alter, modify or otherwise use any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as expressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if applicable, the respective rights holders; and they don't expressly authorize ordinary download, you have to use their interface. You might also directly contact the author of the work in question and negotiate a deal where you can directly acquire a license from the rights-owner. But if you want to access the material via You Tube, you have to do it in a way that is permitted, and You Tube says that you're not permitted to download. Any "copying without permission" is infringement. | Per a decision of the US Copyright Office last month, AI generated images are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want1, but so can anyone else. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be. Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US. 1 Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See the other answer for more details. | Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark. |
Are there any precedents for sombody being held accountable for a mistake in a textbook? In most modern-day textbooks, especially the ones I've read, a disclaimer is always present which states that the author or the publishing body has tried its best to siphon out all errors, however, in case of any losses due to the errors present the author or the publisher shall not be held accountable. It was always amusing to see such a disclaimer, however I was wondering: Has there ever been a case when there was no such disclaimer and the author or publisher was sued? Or is was there some incident which lead to this disclaimer being added? | In the US, due to free speech protections (i.e. the first amendment), it seems that the majority of lawsuits for negligent publication fail. It's worth noting that the author might be more liable than the publisher, since the publisher typically isn't expected to have the expertise to catch such errors. More cases and details can be found here. The only case I've found where a publisher was held liable for negligent publication of a textbook is the following. Note that it's somewhat old, and standards for products liability have likely changed since. D. Wallis, "Negligent publishing" Implications for University Publishers: On September 4, 1980, a jury in the U.S. District Court in Springfield, Massachusetts awarded C. Carter $100,000 in her suit against Rand McNally Publishing Company. C. Carter, an eighth grade chemistry student had been severely burned during a chemistry class while attempting an experiment described in a textbook published by Rand McNally. This experiment called for the use of methyl alcohol, a highly inflammable substance. The plaintiff argued, and the jury agreed, that her injuries were caused, in part, by the publishing company's negligent failure to adequately warn students and teachers about the dangerous qualities of these experiments. Rand McNally did not appeal the verdict. This case is of special interest to publishing companies because it is the first time a book had been considered a "product" and the first time products liability theory has been used to impose liability upon a publishing house for an injury caused by technical information contained within a textbook. In this case it's not clear whether the disclaimer was present or not. However, there is nothing magical about a disclaimer that would stop lawsuits from occurring, nor do they automatically protect against liability: The "disclaimer," although it will rarely be effective in shielding the publisher from liability if the court finds that the publisher breached its duty of care to the reader, is more likely to be effective by demonstrating that the publisher did not make any specific guarantees regarding the safety or reliability of the contents of the publication. | I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing. | Literary references are generally considered to be a form of Fair Use in the US, and a form of Fair Dealing in those countries that have that legal concept. Mentioning that a character has read a fictional work, or likes a character in na fictional work, or even models his actions on such a character, or thinks he is that character is not treated as an infringement of copyright. Indeed, even "cameo" appearances of a literary character are not usually treated as infringements. A character in a period mystery might briefly meet Sherlock Holmes or Hercule Poirot, say, without that being an infringement. If significant sections of the new work involve imitating the plot of the source work, while the delusional character tries to act out his or her delusion, that might make the work a derivative work of the source (here DC comics). Creating a derivative work requires permission from the copyright holder. Whether a work is derivative depends on the specific facts, and cannot be judged from the information in the question. The more of the specific details from the source work that are used, and the more extensive the use is within the new work, the more likely it is that the new work would be held to be derivative. The details will matter, and ultimately it would be a matter for the judgement of a court if a suit were brought claiming that the work was derivative. | Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this. | This is not "libel," which is a form of defamation (publishing a false and defamatory statement that injures another). "Bait and switch" is a type of violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law. That Law makes it illegal for a business to engage in any false or deceptive practices, or to perform any false or deceptive acts, in commerce. Read more about it on the Massachusetts' state government site. If the restaurant's conduct was deceptive and it caused you harm (for instance, you would not have gone into the restaurant and ordered at all if you had known you had to order a drink to get the favorable price on sliders,) there may be a violation. | The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her. | Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful. | That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995. |
What does a search warrant actually look like? How can I recognize one? Suppose the police come to my door. “Open up,” they say. “We have a warrant to search the premises.” How can I tell if they are telling the truth? Do they show me the warrant? If they do, how do I know I am looking at one? What does a real search warrant look like? I could not find a single example online. (In the U.S. there is some sense in which it doesn't matter, because if it later transpired that the claimed warrant didn't exist, the fruits of the search could be suppressed. That is not the question I am asking.) | The exact form used can vary based on the court. At the federal level, the Administrative Office for the US Courts has a standardized form, although I don’t know that district courts have to use it. State courts obviously wouldn’t be expected to use the federal form, and I’m having a harder time turning up a blank state warrant form. The standard elements are in the federal form, though. A search warrant will have a header identifying it as a search warrant and will have something identifying the court that issued it. It will be signed by some sort of judge. The body of the warrant will be written as a command to the police to do a search, telling them where to search and what to look for. There will generally be some standard language about what to do with the property once it’s seized. | Yes, they can. There was a time when no warrant was required at all. There was a time when it was thought that the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant only applied to criminal cases. It was expected that administrative and civil cases did not require a warrant. For example, in 1959 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Frank v. Maryland that the conviction of a Baltimore City person who refused a warrantless search by a Baltimore City health inspector was valid. However, in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in Camara V. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco which held: ...that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such search, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. The standard for issuing such a warrant, the court ruled, is probable cause. Further: Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g, a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. The court also held that nothing in their ruling requiring warrants would preclude a warrantless inspection in an emergency situation. Portland, Oregon describes on their web site their process for obtaining such a warrant. | In most jurisdictions a peace officer can arrest anyone they have: a warrant to arrest probable cause to arrest, that is, a reasonable belief that that person has committed a crime They (and others) will conduct investigations to determine if they believe they can secure a conviction. If they do they will lay charges and justice will steer it's majestic course to conviction or acquittal. | In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. | Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card ("does that invalidate all evidence against you". What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search ("the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons", US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a "social cost" consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The "social costs" consideration was specifically related to "social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large", but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century). | If you comply without protest, this will be taken as consent to a search, and make anything found admissible. One can verbally object. The ACLU suggests the form "I do not consent to searches" to any request to search your car, your house, your person or any other property of yours or under your control. There is no need to give any reason for your refusal. However, one is required to follow any "lawful orders" given by police officer during a traffic or pedestrian stop.[1] Failure to follow lawful orders may well be a separate crime. Even if the lawfulness is suspect, it is usually better to comply and challenge the order later, in court. One might make a second objection, such as "I don't see that you have probable cause for a search, and I do not give consent. Are you ordering me to permit a search?" If the officer clearly orders you to open the trunk, one might place the keys in reach of the officer, while not opening the trunk oneself. That might help establish that there was no consent to the search, and require probable cause to be established before anything found could be used in a trial. One might also repeat, as the officer opens the trunk "I am not consenting to any search." If it is possible for any person present to record video without obstructing the officer(s) that might hrlp to establish the absence of consent and other relevant facts, later. People in general have a right to make such recordings, but not to obstruct or interfere with police activity. Duty to Obey The Washington Post in an opinion article dated July 23, 2015 "Sandra Bland and the ‘lawful order’ problem" wrote: The Bland video brings up an overlooked problem with the law of police-citizen encounters. The police can back up their orders with force because it’s often a crime to disobey a lawful order from a police officer. But from a citizen’s perspective, it’s often impossible to know what is a lawful order. As a result, it’s often impossible for citizens to know what they can and can’t do during a police encounter. The first problem is knowing what counts as an “order.” If an officer approaches you and asks you to do something, that’s normally just a request and not an order. But if there’s a law on the books saying that you have to comply with the officer’s request, then the request is treated as an order. You can’t know what is an “order” unless you study the law first, which you’re unlikely to have done before the officer approached you. In the case of Oregon v Rose Mary ILLIG-RENN, 42 P.3d 62 (2006) The Supreme Court of Oregon held that ORS 162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to "refuse[] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer." is constructional against challenges under the Oregon and US Federal constitutions. Sources [1]: Virginia Code section 18.2-464. Failure to obey order of conservator of the peace Virginia Code Section § 18.2-463. Refusal to aid officer in execution of his office. Florida Statutes 316.072(3) "*OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.—It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer, traffic crash investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, or member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency. *" (Oregon) ORS 162.247(1)(b) Interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer ... Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. California Vehicle Code - VEH § 2800 (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. North Carolina § 20-114.1. Willful failure to obey law-enforcement or traffic-control officer (a) No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic. | I'm not aware of case law on point, other than Riley, which you mention (which doesn't mean that there isn't any - I'm not a specialist in this area). But, I think that the answer would be that you do have an expectation of privacy because the Riley holding that there was an expectation of privacy in a smart phone didn't really hinge in any meaningful way on the existence of a password. The linked summary of the Riley decision explains the court's reasoning as follows: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest. The 4th Amendment expressly protects "papers" in your possession, which can't be password protected, and a smart phone file is analogous to a "paper" for 4th Amendment purposes. Your expectation of privacy in an unlocked smart phone flows from your exclusive possession of the phone as a piece of tangible personal property containing information, and not just from the password protection. In the same vein, I don't think that you would need to have a lock on a diary to have an expectation of privacy in it. This said, this is a cutting edge area of the law and password protection for a smart phone provides both more practical protection and potentially a less ambiguous cases of legal protection from search (since it brings you closer to the facts of Riley), and is therefore still a good idea. |
States' rights and the 14th amendment The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a "states' rights" kind of issue. My #1 question then is, what if something is illegal in all 50 states and US territories at the state level? Is that not a de facto Federal Law that all citizen's should have the equal protection of, even if they reside outside of the United States? I don't want to dish too much dirt, but the specifics are I'm a US citizen, full time resident of Peru. I have a son who is a US/Peruvian dual citizen, and an estranged Peruvian wife. She has been abusing him mentally, physically, and possibly sexually, and I have ABSOLUTELY 0 LEGAL STANDING HERE TO DO ANYTHING. To make matters worse, the National Police here have been unwittingly helping her continue her abuse and continue the whole fraud that predicated our marriage and his birth etc. So, basically I'm now having to literally watch my back now that they know I've got them on the hook. | The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a "states' rights" kind of issue. Your understanding is incorrect. The primary original purpose of the 14th amendment was to prevent states from passing laws that treated former slaves differently from other citizens, and indeed to clearly declare that they were in fact citizens, thus reversing the decision in Dred Scot v Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That decision held that black people could not be US citizens and had no rights granted to citizens under the US Federal Constitution. Of course the amendment is applied in a much wider scope than merely granting citizenship to the former slaves freed by the 13th amendment. The Equal Protection Clause** generally requires that laws not make arbitrary and unjustified distinctions between people, nor treat different people in the same legal situation differently. The clause does not, however, prevent laws from treating who are in some significant legal sense in different positions differently. What is and is not a violation of the clause has been the subject of many legal cases and much debate. The clause requires "state action" to be invoked. and is generally only applies to state and local governments, and those in their employ or acting on their behalf. However, the US Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) that the 5th amendment imposes a similar requirement of equal protection on the Federal government. The amendment, and the equal protection clause, do not guarantee any particular outcome in judicial cases. It is not clear from the question what equal protection issue, if any, might be at issue in the particular matter described. If the issue is one of treatment under the laws of a country other than the US, even though the people involved are US citizens, the US constitution, including the amendment will not apply. | @DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result. | It isn't a double negative, although it is a bit of an usual phrasing. The context that you are overlooking is that the United States Constitution does not say who is or is not allowed to vote because that authority is not vested in the federal government. There is no affirmative right to vote in the United States Constitution, there is merely a right not to be denied the right to vote for certain particular reasons. Responsibility for determining who is allowed to vote is vested in state governments. The right to vote for the House of Representatives is derivative of that decision pursuant to Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. The 19th Amendment prohibits state's from denying the right to vote on account of sex, but does not prohibit states from denying the right to vote on account of other grounds not specified in the 19th Amendment, such as property ownership, education, criminal record, possession of identification, etc. When the 19th Amendment was ratified, in 1920, some states (e.g. Colorado) already allowed women to vote, while others did not. Similarly, when the 15th Amendment was ratified some states prevented people from voting based upon race and others did not. And, so on. In practice, the modern trend is for states to enact laws allowing all U.S. citizens age eighteen or over to vote, subject primarily to limitations that vary quite a bit based upon criminal record or incarceration status. But, historically, when the power to set the franchise was vested in the states, race, gender, property ownership, age (in excess of eighteen), poll tax payments, and "civics" tests, have all been used at sometime or another to limit the right to vote. There is, however, some incentive for states not to be restrictive, because certain kinds of restrictions reduce the population of the state under the U.S. Constitution for purposes of allocated members of Congress and electoral votes. This is set forth in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (ratified in 1868) which states: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. (Incidentally, there are no longer any people who qualify as "Indians not taxed" in the U.S. due to federal legislation that was adopted after 1868.) This set a presumptive baseline that males twenty-one years of age not disqualified by a criminal record are allowed to vote, but with a penalty for not doing so imposed at the state level in apportionment rather than in the form of a prohibition against doing so, before express prohibitions against certain kinds of restrictions of the franchise were adopted in the 15th, 19th, 24th and 26th Amendments. It is also useful to compare the examples of the 15th Amendment (ratified 1870), the 24th Amendment (ratified 1964) and the 26th Amendment (ratified 1971), which are parallel to the 19th Amendment and wouldn't make sense against a backdrop that the population, by default, is allowed to vote. Article XV (Amendment 15 - Rights of Citizens to Vote) The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXIV (Amendment 24 - Abolition of the Poll Tax Qualification in Federal Elections) The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXVI (Amendment 26 - Reduction of Voting Age Qualification) 1: The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. affects 15 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. | Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way? | While the point made by user6726 is not wrong with respect to this particular statute, it doesn't address a more basic point about how the supremacy clause works. Federal criminal laws govern punishments for federal crimes in the federal criminal justice system. Federal prosecutors bringing federal criminal charges against criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system can and do secure death penalty sentences against criminal defendants in states where there is no state death penalty. One recent case where that happened was the Boston Marathon bombing case where a defendant was sentenced to death in federal court for the crime for violation of a federal criminal statute, despite the fact that Massachusetts has no death penalty of its own. This is not a supremacy clause issue. No state law had to be changed or invalidated because of the existence of the federal law. States law governs how the state criminal justice system works, not the federal criminal justice system. When we say that a state has abolished the death penalty, we mean that it has abolished it in the state criminal justice system. This doesn't absolutely foreclose the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed in that state on federal charges, although it does make it far less likely that the death penalty will be imposed. Partially, this is because "blue collar" crime is handled by the states. Partially, this is because out of comity and a concern that juries in states without a death penalty are less likely to vote for a capital sentence, federal prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty in a state without capital punishment than in a state with capital punishment. For example, there are 2,902 people on death row as of 2016, in the U.S. Almost 98% of death penalty convictions that have not yet been carried out were obtained in state courts. Only, 62 involve civilian death penalties imposed in federal courts (mostly in states that have the death penalty) and another 6 involve death penalties imposed in military courts (mostly in states that allow the death penalty or abroad). All of the other cases arose in state courts. | It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch. | The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court. | The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc. |
Where can FOIA requests be found? United States federal (e.g. FOIA) and state law allow people to request public records. The requests themselves are public record. Does any public or private entity maintain a database of those requests? | Here is an example for Washington state under RCW Ch. 42.56. First, you cannot request "all public records requests", because (RCW 42.56.080) (1) A public records request must be for identifiable records. A request for all or substantially all records prepared, owned, used, or retained by an agency is not a valid request for identifiable records under this chapter, provided that a request for all records regarding a particular topic or containing a particular keyword or name shall not be considered a request for all of an agency's records. Second, there is no central agency that maintains all records – you would have to make a request of the State Patrol for all State Patrol records, the Department of Transportation for all Transportation requests, Department of Labor and Industries for their records, Ecology; Gambling; Liquor etc. There are numerous private persons willing to take your money to make records requests, but they all seem to be "name-driven", that is, they get records about a specific person (pursuant to RCW 42.56.080). There is no Department of Central Records to whom you can make such a records request. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | This very much depends on where you are. Different jurisdictions have wildly different laws about this. Some places are very permissive. You can record a conversation that you aren't even a party to so long as nobody has any reasonable expectation of privacy. In others, affirmative consent is required from every party to a conversation before it's legal to record it. The laws run the entire spectrum. Some places allow you to record anything you're a party to without permission, but you can't record others' conversations. Some places require you to disclose, but not obtain explicit permission. Some allow you to record but restrict who you can disclose it to. Some allow you to record or ban recording only under certain circumstances. It's a really wide gamut of laws. Since you don't say where you are, who you're recording, or why, there's no way to really answer the question. Here's a good rundown on the United States. This Wikipedia article covers lots of different countries, but only with regard to phone calls. | Where can the patient report this infraction of the HIPAA requirements? You file a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). If you believe that a covered entity or business associate violated your (or someone else’s) health information privacy rights or committed another violation of the Privacy, Security or Breach Notification Rules, you may file a complaint with OCR. OCR can investigate complaints against covered entities and their business associates. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services website for complaints is: http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/. From there you can file the complaint either electronically via the OCR Complaint Portal, or on paper by mail, fax, or e-mail. The language from the Final Rule (CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients' Access to Test Reports) that describes enforcement is section V part L: Comment: Commenters asked whether a laboratory could be subject to penalties for charging more than the reasonable cost-based fee allowed by the Privacy Rule, for failing to comply with an individual's request for completed test reports within the appropriate time period, or for failing to comply with an individual's request altogether. Response: HIPAA-covered laboratories that fail to comply with the Privacy Rule's access provisions are subject to an enforcement action for noncompliance by the Department, which may include the imposition of civil money penalties. Walkthrough to file a complain through the OCR Complaint Portal (which is linked on http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/), in the case mentioned in the question: Done! | FL 810.145 (c) - "Place and time when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy" In Florida, there is no expectation of privacy in public. You can legally record both audio and visual anything you can see in public. As for the harassment, set up security cams and record as much of it as possible in order to provide the Police with evidence of any potential crimes. | Section 108(a) is the most useful for an infringer who posts an entire copy of a protected work in public. Subsections(b,c) require that the copy not be made available outside the premises, which precludes internet posting; (d) requires a user request to make a copy; (e) applies only to items that are off the market and transferred to a specific user; (h) allows more copying in the last 20 years of the period when a work is protected (not applicable here). Subsection (a) allows a library or archive to make one copy of a work, as long as there is no commercial advantage to making the copy, the library is relatively public (it might restrict access to bona fide researchers), and a copyright notice is included: this has the fewest restrictions on copying. The internet downloader is not a library or an archive, so the downloader is not granted any permission under 108 to make a copy. Under 108(a) a library can make no more than one copy available, but every uploading or downloading is "making a copy". A library would be contributorily liable for the illegal downloadings of their "customers". It is difficult to know exactly what one can get away with under 17 USC 107 a.k.a. "fair use". I am fairly sure that posting a copy of a contemporary book in the open is not "fair use" even if the intent is to make it possible for dummies to study chemistry: such copying is not at all transformative, totally unlimited, and provides a significant market substitute for the protected work. | The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing. | A public key is private data - the fact that its a public key is neither here nor there, its data owned by the user and not necessarily in the public domain (I have keypairs for which the public key is only known by myself, for example). For a subject access request, you must give the user all data you hold about them, subject to certain restrictions laid out in the GDPR - in your case, this would be the IP addresses, public keys, encrypted data and anything else involved in identifying their devices for transferring the files. You dont need to decrypt the encrypted data if that is something you cannot do or would not normally do in the course of holding it during a transfer - to you, the encrypted data is what you hold. If you hold the means to decrypt the data, that means (private key for example) would also be included in the subject access requests response, but in your case you say you dont hold that, so there you go. Remember to include information from things like logs etc in your response. |
How does the US legal system treat car accidents with pedestrian casualties? 2 years ago in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a guy was driving 105 km/h (max allowed 60) through red light and killed two teenage girls on crosswalk. He didn't even bother to stop. Instead, he called his sister and friend to get him to Serbia border where he fled to Serbia. Later he turned himself and was extradited to Bosnia where the trial began. Now the trial is over and he is accused of "causing general danger" and "not helping injured", but there is no mention of killing someone. The prosecutors want the maximum sentence for those two crimes which is, I believe, only 8 years. So, how would the crime be treated in the US? What would be the charges? What is the maximum sentence he could get? | Assuming that this wasn't a planned murder or assault, the most serious charge would be vehicular homicide. In the US, this is governed by state law, but states are not radically different in whether this is a crime. In Washington, under RCW 46.61.520, vehicular homicide is a class A felony, punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine The crimes is defined as causing death while driving (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502; or (b) In a reckless manner; or (c) With disregard for the safety of others. and such speeding is highly likely to be found to constitute the element of recklessness. There are also hit-and-run charges, which is a class B felony (10 years and $20,000). A person can be found guilty of both charges, and the judge can apply the prison sentences consecutively, meaning you add them up, rather than serve the jail time at the same time (in this case, essentially dispensing with the hit-and-run term). The law is written so that a killing is a crime, and if you kill two people that could be two charges (the question is whether there is a single act or two – most likely there was a single act in this particular case). There is no state where recklessly killing a person while driving is legal. First degree murder could be considered under 9A.32.030 if a person "Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". That kind of charge was applied to the Charlottesville driver, but it is highly unlikely to be applied to even the most extreme speeding. The actual penalty imposed depends on the sentencing laws of the state. In Washington there is a complex calculation based on the severity of the crime (16 degrees – vehicular homicide is level 11), prior criminal history, whether there are multiple convictions (vehicular homicide and hit-and-run). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances can also be considered to compute the actual sentence; I don't see any way for a non-specialist to guess what the actual penalty would be in this case. | Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means. | The person who is changing lanes has the responsibility to make sure that they have space to move into. Suppose there was a person in front of you in the destination lane who hit the brakes suddenly - if you change lanes and rear-end them, that's your fault, because you failed to leave enough distance. I don't see how it's any different in this case, where the person is behind you and accelerates suddenly. A turn signal doesn't give you the right to change lanes at will, you are responsible for making the maneuver safely. It's poor driving etiquette for the other guy to cut you off like that, but it's up to you to ensure there's space as you move over. From your description of the incident, it sounds like your actions initiated the sequence of events, and it was also your actions that prevented the accident. From that, it seems highly likely you'd be found at fault if the accident had happened - in that scenario, your actions would have created the situation, and you also would have failed to take action to avoid the accident. | Because the relevant law enforcement decided not to In the US (and indeed in all common law jurisdictions), law enforcement and prosecutors have discretion over when and if to lay charges by considering such things as the wishes of the victim, the prospects of success and whether charges would be just in the circumstances. At best, this allows a measured response to the particular situation. At worst, it enables discrimination and persecution. Either way it solves the problem of allocating limited resources to comparatively unlimited need. | As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury. | This varies from state to state. Here's a representative statute: Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop, willfully fails or refuses to obey such direction, increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer. See 625 ILCS 5/11-204. For a first offense, IL calls it a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 1 year and $2.5K. but on the third offense it becomes a felony punishable by up to 3 years and a $25K fine. If the signal was meant for you, then the divided highway is a moot point so long as you realize it was for you (which might be established by you turning off the road into some neighborhood where you have no business). united-statesillinois |
Car for rent and drugs Lets say there is a person who rents a car out to a friend. This arrangement goes well for the first few months. Then a large amount of illegal drugs are discovered in the car while the friend is driving. The friend is pulled over and then tells the officer that the drugs are not his and that they are the car owners. (in this hypothetical the drugs are actually the friends and not the car owners) In the most likely case who is held responsible for the drugs found in the car? | Both the police and the courts are likely to look at the situation as a whole, rather than adopting any policy specifically in relation to drivers or owners. For example, it's unusual for people to rent cars to their friends for months on end. That might suggest there is something untoward about the arrangement. Is there evidence of the commercial arrangement, or is the owner pretending to have rented the car out for months, when in reality they had stashed the drugs then let a friend borrow the car for a day? It would also be unlikely for a drug dealer to stash a large amount of drugs in a car then lend the car out on a long-term basis, so if the car is out of the owner's hands, that would tend to suggest the drugs belong to the person in possession of the car (and not the owner). But if the amount of drugs were small, typical of personal use, then it becomes more credible to imagine they could be forgotten by the car owner before lending the car to a friend. Police intelligence might also have a bearing. Does one party or the other have known links to the drugs trade? Also, is the lifestyle of one or the other, in particular, inconsistent with known sources of legitimate income? My point with all these questions is to highlight how sensitive the issue is to the fine details of the circumstances, and that it's impossible to give a strictly general answer. | Following the guidance of the police In summary: If the item is hazardous or dangerous you should report it to the police using the emergency number. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a private place, hand it to the owner of the premises - it's their responsibility to attempt to find the owner and the property becomes theirs if they can't. If the item is non-hazardous and found on public transport, hand it to the operator - they have their own by-laws about lost property. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a public place, if it has a serial number, hand it to the police - they may be able to trace the owner if it is a government document, hand it to the issuer if it is of low value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner "these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item." if it is of high value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner and if you can't hand it to the police. | In the UK, generally there is no duty to report crime. There are circumstances where there is a duty to report suspicious activity or 'knowledge' or 'suspicion' of a crime. These include: financing of terrorism money laundering or dealing in other proceeds of crime (criminal property) or fraud in a regulated sector (e.g. solicitors, accountants, insolvency practitioners, finance, gambling) (unless the information comes to the person in 'privileged circumstances') In respect of such circumstances, as soon as Bob 'knows' or 'suspects' Rob is engaged in such behaviour Bob must report this to the authorities and must not tell Rob about it (the offence of 'tipping off'). Bob commits an offence if he doesn't report it. In terms of failure to report money laundering that could lead to a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine. Depending on the circumstances an additional risk of failure to report is being perceived to have participated in the commission of the crime. | Assuming, pending information about the jurisdiction, that this happened in the US, the answer is it depends. As described in Justia's Vehicular Searches article and Wikipedia's Motor vehicle exception article, Under US law police can search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. This doctrine was first stated by the US Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and later modified or repeated in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court broadened the rule to evidentiary searches. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) the Court ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrant-less search at the convenience of the police. Subsequent cases have widened the scope of the exception, although the probable cause requirement has remained, and stops must have at least "articulable and reasonable suspicion". In the case of an ordinary traffic stop, the police may conduct a Terry-type search, based on "articulable suspicion". However, if the police arrest the driver, that is grounds to search the car under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) Under Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.(and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 note 9 (1982).) police may remove the car for a search elsewhere if they have probable cause to believe that there is contraband (such as alcohol, drugs, or weapons) in the car. Thus the arrest justified a search, as described in the question. It might not have justified the tow if there was not probable cause to suspect contraband. But that depends on the detailed facts, and judging those is beyond the scope of this site. In Collins vs Virginia (2018) the Court ruled that a warrant-less search of a car parked on the owner's property and within the curtilage was not justified. (The "curtilage" is the area near the house which gets additional Fourth Amendment protection, almost as if it were inside the house). However, in that case no arrest was made at the time of the search, and the search was based on an officer recalling the car having been used to elude arrest some two months previously, not just a few minutes before, so that case may not apply in the situation described above. If there was no probable cause, any evidence found might be subject to suppression, and a suit for damages under sec 1983 might be brought against the officers and the police force, but that would depend on the specific facts, and would in practice require a lawyer skilled in such matters. | In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split" | An individual has no authority or legal basis to demand a personal "fine" for a perceived offense. The actions in the two scenarios would both be blackmail. although whether they would be prosecuted is quite another question. It would be reasonable for the shopkeeper to demand compensation for the lost merchandise. The offender (or the offender's parents) might offer to pay, either because they thought it the right thing, or in hopes to induce the shopkeeper not to call in the police. But if they specifically made "no police" a condition of payment, that would be bribery or attempted bribery. The resident in scenario 2 could demand compensation for an alleged civil wrong of excessive noise, whether or not the passer-by was speeding. ote that the amount of noise made would not be directly related to the speed of any driver (although no doubt there would be some relation) and no one driver would be responsible for keeping the resident up. I doubt that a civil suit, if pressed that far, would prevail, although it would depend on the factual details. The specific law of the local jurisdiction would also matter. But the moment there is a threat to bring evidence of a possible crime to the police, and a request for money instead, that is blackmail. | The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything. | The Likely Ruling Assuming points 1 and 2 in the question, all the evidence from the trunk would be inadmissible, and if there really is no other evidence against Bob, then Bob would go free. This is highly improbable; the prosecution would find some grounds to dispute the unlawful nature of stop and search, even if ones the court would not accept. A better version might be "The judge rules that the stop and search were unlawful, and is upheld by the appellate court". That is more realistic and has the same result. Inevitable Discovery The only grounds I can see for any other result is "inevitable discovery". If other police were, say, already staking out Bob's house with a warrant to search the car, and Bob was on the way to that house at the time of the stop, then the prosecution could argue that they would inevitably have conducted a legal search of Bob's car and found the same evidence. The conditions for invoking this doctrine rarely occur, but it is possible. After the Trial There is no way that Cal's body can be Bob's property, so it would be released to Cal's next of kin or legal executor. Unless Bob was Cal's next of kin, it is hard to see any way that the body would be handed over to Bob. Cal's clothes are almost surely part of Cal's estate, although it is in theory possible that they are Bob's property. No claim of ownership can be used against Bob in a later trial, because any later trial would be barred by double jeopardy. In any case, while evidence from the trunk would all be inadmissible in a trial of Bob, it might be admissible in a possible later trial of Joe, Bob's alleged accomplice. Therefore the police might well retain all the items (except the body) as possible future evidence. Terminology This is actually about the exclusionary rule itself, not about the "fruit of the poison tree" doctrine. What is the difference? If an unlawful search finds evidence, that evidence is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. If an unlawful search merely finds a lead, evidence later found via the lead is considered as "fruit of the poisoned tree" and is therefore inadmissible. For example, if the murder weapon is found in Bob's car after an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule applies. But if a note saying "stuf at 1234 Elm" is found during the unlawful search, and the police visit 1234 Elm Street, and find the murder weapon there, that is "fruit of the poisoned tree". Why does it matter? Because if the police find a different lead to 1234 Elm, so that the investigation or search at that address is not based solely on the results of the unlawful search, then the evidence found at 1234 Elm may be admissible, while corroboration will not save the evidence actually found by the unlawful search. It is a subtle but sometimes important distinction. |
If one was groomed as a child, can they be found innocent as an adult? Dave the Dad is the father of Bob the boy. Dave groomed Bob to murder minorities from a young age. If Bob went on to murder some minority at age 12, Bob wouldn't just be given consequences like some random adult who'd committed such a heinous act. More likely, Bob would be given counseling, while Dave would be held responsible. But what if Bob was groomed by his dad Dave all the way to age 18, and went on the same murder spree? Or up until the age 21? Or whatever reasonable age have you. My main question is: can Bob be exonerated in any way because he was groomed by an adult (even into his own adulthood)? To clarify: please do not use "threatening" in your answer. Dave grooming Bob is different than someone "threatening" Bob to do something. Also, "murdering minorities" is a random example that may not be perfect. Feel free to substitute in something more appropriate so as not to distract from the heart of the question (e.g. committing shop-lifting, murdering women, selling meth, etc.) | canada No: mitigating factors short of duress or other defences like necessity or self defence do not excuse or justify a crime that is otherwise proven. Mitigating factors must be taken into account during sentencing. History of abuse is a personal circumstance that can be taken into account: e.g. R. v. Farrell, 2013 BCSC 1537 at para 9. Same for "parental introduction into the criminal lifestyle": R. v. L.T.N., 2021 SKCA 73, at para 61. | Abandonment is not the legal concept to be concerned with (though the situation might fall within the ambit of a law that uses the word "abandon"), instead the question should be about the legal obligations of a parent. California Family Code is what you want to look at. Though a look at the criminal act of "child abandonment" can be informative: section 271 and following indicate that there are some penalties for abandonment-like actions for children between 14 and 18, but the acts would have to be "willful" and "without lawful excuse" (which probably includes "inability to perform"). In the Family Code, section 7822 states when proceedings can be brought. For example, if (2) The child has been left by both parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a period of six months without any provision for the child's support, or without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to abandon the child. Section 3900-3901 says that the father and mother of a minor child have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances. The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first. Nothing in this section limits a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been made. There seems to be a formula for computing expectations of support: but the law won't require a person to pay money that they do not have. The law also will not compel a third party to take in an guest, nor will it compel the mother to become homeless (i.e. order the third party to take in the child or eject the mother). The courts could easily require the mother to take financial responsibility for the child. | Bob should certainly expect to be impeached by whichever side his testimony injures. Their attorney will confront him with the transcript of his previous testimony, and likely read it out loud for the jury to hear, and force him to acknowledge that he said something different before. This is pretty standard trial tactics. Bob would not be treated as formally admitting that he committed perjury, though I think it's fair to say that he has effectively made that admission. One side will treat him as having lied the first time; the other will treat him as lying now. It's possible that he will have some explanation for the discrepancy -- he was high, he has memory problems, he misunderstood the question -- but in your hypothetical, the explanation would have to be pretty amazing to justify such a complete reversal. | In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. | If there has been no trial establishing Bob's guilt, the bank does not know that it was Bob who did rob the bank. Even if the bank has Bob on the security video feed, claiming that, "As my name is Bob, I will shoot anyone who does not follow my instructions", and Bob left behind his driver's licence at the heist, the bank does not know that it was Bob. The bank could sue Bob in a civil action in order to get the money back. It would have to follow some procedures to notify Bob of the lawsuit and, if he did not appear, it would win by default. If Bob were to appear, he could make his case about why the bank should not be entitled to that money ("It was not me" / "I only took $1,000" / whatever). After the trial had happened, the bank still could not take the money right away. Maybe Bob would offer some other assets worth $50,000 to pay the bank. After it had become evident that Bob was unwilling or unable to comply with the payments, then the bank could ask the court to seize Bob's assets. The court would decide which assets could be seized, would order to have them seized, and then would provide them to the bank. That does not mean that Bob would be free to use his $100,000 during this time. Before the trial is over, the bank could request the judge to freeze Bob's account, as a way of ensuring that he does not withdraw the money from it. The judge would evaluate the likelihood of Bob losing the trial and refusing to honour it (and whatever Bob's lawyer's objections to this are) and decide on the issue. But that would only affect Bob's ability to use the money, not his ownership. | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | In the UK, male circumcision is legal, and only requires 2 things: That consent is obtained, if the subject is too young to give informed consent, the parent can give it. The caveat here is that you have to be able to give parental consent. Simply being the biological father is not enough, an unmarried father is not automatically given "parental responsibility" and must be obtained through courts. That the procedure is performed by a "competent person". This is not necessarily a doctor There also needs to be a consent with both parents. One case in the UK involved a Muslim father wanting to circumcise his son. The mother disagreed and the court upheld the refusal of permission to perform the procedure until the child was of age to decide for themselves. For many, this is a matter of faith, such as with Muslim and Jewish communities. In Jewish communities, the circumcision (a ceremony called a "Bris" or b'rit milah) and the circumcision is either performed by the father or his representative, but is almost always performed by somebody trained in the procedure, dictated by the "mohel" and are usually physicians... Either way, written consent is not required, there are no documents to sign, forms to mail in to the government, etc. The only things that need to happen is that parent(s) who have parental responsibility must agree and consent, and that the procedure be performed by a "competent person". |
In Germany, why are fines for fare evasion more likely to lead to jail time than other traffic-related fines? For most traffic related offences in Germany, eg: illegal parking, driving intoxicated and speeding, the punishment is a fine. But, if you enter the public transprot without ticket, then you are liable to jail time. Can someone explain what the rationale is to increase the punishment of getting on public transport without a ticket than the driving fines? | Because that's the law since 1935! StGG§ 265a (eng) declares, that it is a criminal offense to take transportation without a ticket and not wanting to pay. (1) Wer die [...] die Beförderung durch ein Verkehrsmittel [...] in der Absicht erschleicht, das Entgelt nicht zu entrichten, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft, wenn die Tat nicht in anderen Vorschriften mit schwererer Strafe bedroht ist. (1) Whoever [...] uses a means of transportation [...] with the intention of not paying the fee therefor incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine, unless the offence is subject to a more severe penalty under other provisions. But how come transportation fares are in the same paragraph as tricking a vending machine into selling you an item or phones to call without paying the full or any fee? In this case, it's history: §265a was first enacted in 1935, targeting mainly public telephones and vending machines, because those could be tricked by modifying 2 pfennig coins to have the diameter of 10 pfennig coins. The wording was quickly broadened to encompass any machinery controlling entry, but not all sorts of transportation (e.g. a taxi). But where did this come from? Well, the need for the law came from a problem the lawmakers and justice system faced: Because no human was tricked into letting people use the machine for less than the price or nothing at all, it wasn't fraud, because fraud was defined to interacting with a human in such a way. So there had to be a separate offence that targeted tricking machinery. When enacted, Tickets and ticket vending machines were in the scope of the paragraph from day one, as ticket sales or access to the train in many places was handled by automatic machines already or you could buy pre-paid ticket booklets/strips which would then be stamped and devalued in the transportation or at the station. In 1953, the scope was broadened to any use of the telecommunication infrastructure without pay, as the upcoming lack of telephone company employees creating a physical connection would mean it wouldn't be fraud anymore, so they used the same reasoning. Finally, in 1997 the telephone network was renamed communication network, also encompassing the internet and cellphones. One year or fines The punishment is one year or fine. In Germany, that is a fine of up to 365 day-values, which then are determined by the wealth and income of the convicted person. If you can't pay or want to pay, you can instead go to prison, each day serving also reducing your fine. That is called Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe. Only in exceptional cases like a massive repeat offender, the sentence would be only jailtime and no fine instead. Also note that all transport is companies and not conducted by the state (even if the DB is state-owned), and as such it is an Antragsdelikt - the damaged private party has to convince the state attorney that going to court is worth their time. However, it is much better for the transportation company to instead leverage the Terms of Transportation and gain the increased fare - usually at minimum 60 € or multiple transport price, whichever is higher. | While local law varies, most jurisdictions do not authorize citizens' arrests for traffic violations. Generally, citizens arrests are authorized only for misdemeanors and felonies outside the traffic code. Indeed, there are many traffic offenses for which law enforcement is authorized only to stop a violator and issue a ticket, but not even law enforcement is authorized to actually arrest someone. And there is no such thing as a citizen's citation or ticket. Citizens arrests also usually require that the citizen witnessed the crime in progress, but that requirement would be met in this case. If the case had been a hit and run, however, a citizens' arrest probably would have been legally authorized, although the wiser course of action would still be to call the police and to follow the offender at a safe distance. | They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. | The IRS Criminal Investigation division is typically going to be the arresting agency, assuming that (1) the offense is treated as a criminal matter; (2) a warrant is actually issued; and (3) anyone actually sets out specifically to serve the warrant. It is usually the case, though, that the violation is handled as a civil matter. When it is treated as a criminal violation, the defendant and the Service often reach an agreement that eliminates the need for an arrest. If there is a warrant, though, any police agency could theoretically make the arrest if they happened across the defendant. But if it's a time-sensitive investigation -- if the defendant is expected to flee or destroy evidence, for example -- it's a safer bet that you'll see an actual warrant execution. In that case, you would have CI taking the lead, perhaps with assistance from other agencies. | To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source. | I can’t speak for Indonesia but if you did this in Australia you would be a criminal. You either committed fraud or are an accessory to fraud. You would probably be considered an accessory at and after the fact which means you are subject to the same maximum penalty as if you had committed the fraud yourself - 10 years in jail. In addition, you are liable to repay the money taken, jointly and severally with your ‘friend’. However, if they can only find you, you cannot recover from your ‘friend’ as you were engaged in a joint criminal enterprise. Scams such as you describe are distressingly common and many people fall for them. As such, assuming the court accepted your story (because you might actually be the fraudster and have just made it up) you would be unlikely to get close to the full sentence and if you caught the judge on a good day, might even escape jail. If you are lucky, the jury might acquit, even though, on the facts, they shouldn’t - juries do what juries do. If you’re really lucky the police might decide not to prosecute. |
Best approach for a debt collectors call? We are getting debt collection calls from a cabinet contractor who didn't finish the job(we have emails of all punchlist items they have ignored). We have paid 95% of the bill and haven't been contacted to finish up the remaining items, honestly I just figured they'd drop it because it's probably at this point more money for them to come back and fix the issues that are remaining - and we don't have time to deal with it. Should I just ignore the debt collector? Is it best to answer and explain the unresolved work? Or what would the best approach be in that situation? | Don’t ignore the debt collects In most jurisdictions, your failure to pay can and will be recorded on your credit history. This may affect your ability to obtain finance or the rate you pay for it. For credit reporting, there is no need for the creditor to prove the debt before doing this. For example. In general, you are not legally allowed to default on a contractual obligation (i.e. not pay the bill) even if the other party has defaulted on theirs (i.e. failed to complete the work). It is not clear that you have explained to the contractor that you are withholding the remaining payment until they have fixed the alleged defects or if you have just not paid the money. When you have a contract dispute you need to be clear and take active steps to resolve it. Perhaps head office thinks all these items have been resolved. Perhaps you think they are defects or omissions but they are actually within normal tolerances or are exactly what you contracted for. Unless you talk to them, you can’t resolve it. When you have set out the disputed items, given them a time to fix them, told them you will pay when they are fixed, and possibly set out an alternative method of resolution (like you accepting the defects for a 5% discount) then you have a bona fide dispute. At that point you can tell the debt collector this and they must stop pressing you and remove your name from the credit reports. | No, you could not have prevented them from collecting their belongings But you could have sued for trespass Unless those boxes were part of the contract for sale, they remain the vendor’s property and just like you can’t withhold your mate’s trombone that he accidentally left after that great party, you can’t withhold the vendor’s boxes - that’s called “stealing”. What you could (should?) have done is refuse to settle until the boxes were removed. As the vendor was in breach, if you suffered any unmitigated loss as a result of the delay, you would be entitled to recover it. This is one of the reasons why you should inspect on the day of settlement. Given that you accepted the breach, even though the vendor’s boxes were technically trespassing, they could reasonably raise the defense that they had implicit permission- at least for a reasonable time. “A few days” is a reasonable time. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | They fail as a business and the debt passes to another bank. There is a massive banking catastrophe and most banks fail. Companies do not cease to exist because they are in bankruptcy. Typically a caretaker management is set in place (elected either by the borrowers or the judge overseeing the bankruptcy) to avoid the loss of value during those proceedings. Usually a company in bankruptcy has to reduce its operations because it will find it difficult to get resources to continue its usual operations. But it could continue those operations that are still expected to provide a profit. It would not be unusual for the caretaker manager to ask more funds from the borrowers in order to ensure that they do not lose even more of the value of the company. I would say that debt collection is profitable enough to keep it running, at very least to cover the minimal legal requirements so that the debt does not expire. And at the very least, the debt can be sold to a debt collection agency or another bank, outside of the bankruptcy proceedings (then the net value of this sell is what will be passed on to the borrowers). It will give a small profit for the original company, but at almost no cost or risk for them. Also, the debt holder would have no incentive to collect if it was in bankruptcy proceedings and didnt own anything. You are confusing managers with owners. The people deciding what to do are the managers, and even in bankruptcy managers still owe fiduciary duty to their business. In fact, in general there is no need for the manager of the company to "own anything" of the company they manage, yet they have to work to improve its situation. If a manager negligently caused the company to cause value, he could be sued for it. Even if he is not sued, it would look very bad for him when looking for a new job. In any case, this is not different than the shop across the street going out of business. Have you seen any of them putting a sign telling "We no longer own anything, so come here and help yourself whatever you want for free"? No? A credit card company would not do that, either. | The Company is performing wage theft I have never heard of a wage method that pays a salary according to hours but doens't pay for hours over 40. Monthly Salary, by definition, is paid regardless of hours. Your contract doesn't give hours, it just gives a monthly total. That's a contract, and you should be paid according to the contract. In terms of fairness, it certainly isn't right to dock pay for weeks you worked less than 40 but not give you credit for weeks you wored more than 40. Now, it's not clear if you moved to direct employment for the second month. If you did, the first month would be a contract violation, and the second would be a violation of wage & labor law. A company can't pay you salary as an exempt (exempt from hourly wage laws, like management) employee and also dock you pay according to hours worked. So what can you do? If you are still a contractor and actually want the job, not much more than arguing with payroll. Since you (why?) decided to be a contractor instead of a direct hire, you have exactly zero protections to getting let go. If you are a direct employee, you have protections from bringing action about being paid fairly, though your long-term prospects there would be problematic if you have to take the company to task using the government. Any HR rep should know all of the above. But never just go to HR without talking to your manager first. Remember that HR works for management, and working against your manager is generally a bad career move. | With that much potentially at stake, you might want to discuss this with a lawyer. many lawyers will do an initial consultation for free or a low charge. However, you could simply write a letter saying that you do not agree that you owe the money and that you dispute the charge. You may give any reasons why you think you are not liable. It might be a good idea to add that there may be other reasons as well, so you do not foreclose any possible legal arguments that you may learn of later. Send the letter by certified mail, return receipt, and keep a copy with a note of the date that you sent it. It is not a bad idea to get the certified mail form first and include the certified item number as part of the inside address in the letter. Keep the copy, and keep the receipt with it when you get it. It is not a bad idea to send a copy by email, noting that it is a copy of a certified letter. This will put a record of the date and time it was sent in the email service provider's records. Normally it is up to the person who claims another owes money to file suit. If your former landlord takes no action, you need do nothing. However it is a good idea to check your credit reports and see if this was reported as a bad debt. if it is, you can file a statement of dispute with the credit bureaus. If there is any further correspondence on the matter, be sure it is in writing, and that you keep a copy. If you are called on the telephone about it, send a prompt followup letter summarizing the conversation, and particularly any statements made by the other party, and any agreements reached. Keep a copy, and send a copy by email as well as by postal mail. It should probably start something like "In our telephone conversation on {date} about {topic} you stated ..." If you are sued you will need to consider whether to retain a lawyer to represent you. | is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Yes, you can sue for breach of contract. You would probably seek an order for specific performance. You could also claim damages but it is difficult to see exactly what damage you have suffered. Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract? Yes, where a contract is silent on a date for performance of an obligation they must be carried out in a reasonable time. From the circumstances 4 months is starting to seem unreasonable but they will no doubt argue that it is reasonable- this is something the court would decide. | Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job). |
What laws prohibit winning prizes in international contests? In the https://flutter.dev/create contest, the rules say this: Persons from the following countries or regions can submit but will not be considered eligible for the contest due to local rules, including exclusion from judging and prizes: Italy, Brazil, Quebec, and Mexico. What laws in these countries or regions prevent winning prizes in an international contest? Edit: there are no chance elements in the contest, but part of the judging criteria is subjective. | Quebec has more stringent sweepstakes laws than the rest of Canada: Companies don't exclude residents of Quebec from sweepstakes because they don't want to advertise in Quebec, or because they have anything against the residents of that province. The reason why so many sweepstakes are void in Quebec is that the sponsors must follow a stringent set of laws set out by Quebec's Regie des alcools, des courses et des jeux (RACJ), which governs alcohol, lotteries, contests, gambling, and more. ... For example, in order for sweepstakes with prizes worth more than a certain value to be open to residents of Quebec, the companies sponsoring the sweepstakes must take some or all of the following steps: Register the sweepstakes rules and all advertisements used to promote the contest with the Quebec government at least 30 days ahead of the sweepstakes' launch. Publish the full text of the sweepstakes' rules at least 10 days before the giveaway begins. Pay a fee of up to 10% of the sweepstakes' value, depending on who is allowed to enter. Agree to allow the government of Quebec to mediate any lawsuits arising from the contest. Follow strict guidelines about the contents of the sweepstakes rules. Allow the government of Quebec the right to approve any changes to the giveaway that need to be made once it has started, and to approve canceling the giveaway if it becomes necessary to do so. File a written report after the contest has concluded, attesting that the prizes have been delivered or attempted to be delivered. Agree to let the RACJ mediate any disagreements with the public. File security in the amount of the prize value, to ensure that the prizes are actually awarded. The full set of laws can be found in chapter L-6, r. 6 of Quebec Consolidated Statutes. Note that under Quebec law, a "publicity contest" (concours publicitaire) is a contest, a lottery scheme, a game, a plan or an operation which results in the awarding of a prize, carried on for the object of promoting the commercial interests of the person for whom it is carried on. So even though chance plays a minimal role in the contest you've described, it's still regulated by the stringent requirements of Quebec law. In contrast, in the rest of Canada, promotional contests are governed by Section 74.06 of the (federal) Competition Act. A set of enforcement guidelines can be found on the Competition Bureau's website; they basically require anyone running a contest to: give "adequate and fair disclosure... of the number and approximate value of the prizes, of the area or areas to which they relate and of any fact within the knowledge of the person that affects materially the chances of winning;" not "unduly delay" the distribution of the prizes, and select winners on the basis of skill or on the basis of random chance. [I think this basically bars giving the prize to the boss's nephew.] However, there is nothing about fees, securities, publishing the rules in advance, submitting one's advertising materials to the government, etc. Given the relative ease of running a contest in the rest of Canada compared to Quebec, one can easily see how a company might not find it worthwhile to allow Quebecers to enter and win. | Federal countries usually define the separation (and sometimes sharing) of legislative competencies in their constitutions. There will also usually be a "default" case for if the competency is not explicitly defined in the constitution. For example, in the United States, the default is to give legislative power to the individual states via the Tenth Amendment. If criminal law is left to the sub-national entities, then the nation can usually still enact a penal code with respect to its competencies (again, the U.S. is a good example). So, I decided to make this a mini-research project by checking the countries Wikipedia lists as federations. I wasn't able to find an explicit statement as to whether there were competing penal codes in most cases, but was able to find in which level of government the constitution placed criminal law. In some cases where there are "competing" penal codes, the constitution specified which level has supremacy, making for less "competition". Without further ado, here's what I've been able to find. Links are either to an appropriate Wikipedia page, or the part of the applicable constitution dividing the legislative competencies. Take these with a grain of salt. Competing penal codes Australia Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia India Iraq Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Sudan United States Single national penal code Austria Brazil Canada Comoros Germany Malaysia Nepal Russia Switzerland Venezuela Unclear Argentina Belgium Micronesia St. Kitts and Nevis Somalia South Sudan United Arab Emirates | The general answer is, no, it is not valid in the US, see this article. Exceptions to laws recognizing e-signatures abound which exclude wills from general laws recognizing electronic signatures. Nevada is the one current exception (conveniently located between Oregon and Arizona). There have been attempts to legalize electronic wills, including in Arizona (SB 1298). Although Tennessee does not recognize e-wills, a gentleman in Tennessee went ahead and did it, and in Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 the court decided that the will was properly executed and witnessed. Electronic notarization is recognized in Arizona, though apparently for things you file with the government (not things that your heirs will eventually file), whereas in Oregon it is a general-purpose way of getting a document notarized. Since the courts are loathe to completely disregard a person's last will and testament because they didn't narrowly follow requirements, you might be able to "get away with it", but it would not make things easier for the executor. | "Any perceived compliance or non-compliance of other developers’ apps does not have any bearing on the compliance of your own apps." Could this mean that Google Play's policies are applied differently for different developers or apps? No, it means that you can't break the rules even if others are breaking the rules or you think they are breaking the rules. I think it is worth noting that those apps are for the Indian market. I don't know which one you are in, but google will have different rules for different countries to comply with various regulatory requirements. | The expression "Russian person" appears in Article 11 of the original, which says No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by: (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; (c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph The "Whereas" clause first introduces the word "person" saying Those measures comprise the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain natural and legal persons, entities and bodies and restrictions on certain investments, as a response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol Article 2 then gives various prohibitions, which are broader that the March prohibitions against certain transactions "to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia". Since the regulation applies to things that are not human and cannot be citizens, it does not mean "citizen". It does include "a human", as well as artificial persons such as corporations, or government bodies. A Russian citizen who lives and works entirely in e.g. Germany is not in the prohibited set if they are not shipping prohibited goods to Russia. The Syrian Commander-in-Chief of the PLA (who is not a resident of Russia) is, however, prohibited from obtaining "dual use goods" to be taken to and used in Russia. Article 11 is different in wording from other articles stating various prohibitions, which repeat that long expression with "in Russia or for use in Russia". Art. 11 says that under certain circumstances, contract claims shall not be satisfied if the claims are made by (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; Apart from the explicit list in Annex III, (b-c) or Art. 5 is (b) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 %by an entity listed in Annex III; or (c) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (b) of this paragraph or listed in Annex III. Therefore, the expression "any other Russian person, entity or body" refers to something much more expansive. On the face of it, it has to mean that no "Russian person" in any sense can sue for non-performance arising from this regulation. | Would the American client refuse to have to potentially deal with non-American courts, in the possibility of a conflict? Some might, but probably not all. Most wouldn't bother to read it; others who do won't understand what the jurisdiction provision means. Should the contractor pick just one court (English OR Welsh)? No. England and Wales is a unified legal jurisdiction. The two countries share a single court system. Could the contract stipulates that is enforceable under exclusive jurisdiction of American, English and Welsh courts, but that the Welsh one takes precedence? If US courts have jurisdiction and English-and-Welsh courts have jurisdiction, then there is no exclusive jurisdiction. | An Estonian company can be sued under French law for violating French law in France, and so can its officers, no matter what their nationality or where they reside. So yes, you could be sued in France as an officer of the company. If you have assets in France, a French judgment against you will be easier to enforce than one against someone who has no assets in France. This is, similarly, not about nationality but about the location of your assets. A suit could also be pursued in Estonia. If the activities in Estonia are contrary to Estonian law then you could also be sued in Estonia as an officer of the company. We frequently have questions about "which law applies" for cases that span multiple jurisdictions. The general answer is that all law applies. An activity in multiple jurisdictions must comply with the law in every one of them. If you are doing something that is prohibited (or even that possibly might be prohibited) in either Estonian law or French law, you should take professional legal advice. Unless you can find a lawyer who is qualified in both countries, you will need two lawyers. | I can't answer for the Indonesian law specifically. But in general, under most international copyright schemes, a translation is considered a copyrightable work. This means that even if the original work (in this case, the Quran and Hadith) is in the public domain, derivative works based on that public domain work can still be copyrighted by their creators. This includes, for example: A song with lyrics taken from the Quran A play or movie dramatizing stories from the Quran A novel retelling a story from the Quran In all of these cases, the author has built something new, based on the public domain framework. Because they contributed something original, they are entitled to a copyright on their original contribution. They can't stop someone from copying the Quran themselves, but they can stop someone from copying their original work based on the Quran. Most copyright courts--again, I don't know about Indonesia specifically--will treat a translation the same way. A translation is an original work that requires creativity and skill--otherwise Google Translate would work a lot better than it does. Just like a movie based on the Quran, a translation based on the Quran will probably be copyrightable under most, if not all, countries' copyright laws. |
What rule governs when county court decisions result or don’t result in written statements of reasons? I recall reading that at the circuit judge appellate level, the answer is yes. But I’m more wondering specifically about the district judge or deputy district judge level of first instance. | united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more "special verdict" questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called "courts not of record", a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record. | Consider that stuff "court costs" or "court fees." They are actually often things not related to the court, like environmental fee, or emergency medical something or other, or park poop bag fee. Pretty much whatever either the legislature or administrative decision makers what to put on there. And FWIW, if you were not texting get your phone records and bring them to court to prove that you did not send any texts in or around that time. | I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand. | No, the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct permits County Judges to practice law except "in the court on which he or she serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the county court, or acting as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he or she has served as a judge or in any proceeding related thereto." This is because County Judges in Texas are not judges in the classical sense. They are more like the CEO of a given County. ( cited above is Canon 6(B)(3)) | It's basically a question about the rules of court. While I can't say for sure about this case, a scheduled court date that isn't canceled, even in a stayed proceeding, is to be held. Non-appearance of a party or their representing lawyer is a bad idea as it might incur contempt of court. Such a court date can be used to (once more) inform the court and other parties of the stay. Paperwork that might have been delayed in postal service is then given over under the eyes of the judge, pretty much ensuring that the other parties did get them and nobody may cry foul play. Possibly the meeting can be used by the attorney to reschedule other court dates or depositions if the stay has a specific time length. Also note, that not all stays are for the whole case but might only rule to stay parts of it: a divorce case that includes a case for visitation of a child might stay the visitation part till a related case about where the child will live in the future is solved, but continue on the parts that try to sort out the divorce itself. Such non-stayed proceedings do proceed even under the stay of some others. | Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. |
Can shop staff search your bag when you are selected for a random rescan? (UK based). My question refers to the situation where you are using the "scan as you go" system in which you scan items and pack them into your bag as you go around the shop, and pay at the till before you leave. When using this system you agree in the terms to random rescans, in which your items are occasionally completely rescanned by store staff to see if there is anything you didn't scan. However, this seems to imply that the shop staff have the ability to go through your personal bag, which may have your own belongings as well as your shopping. As far as I am aware here the store has no recourse to use citizens arrest powers, as there has been nothing to suggest you have broken the law, so they have no power to search your bag or detain you for a police member to search your bag. But if they have no power to search you, surely the rescan system will never catch potential shoplifters, as any unscanned items can be kept concealed in your bag. | You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives. | The pawn shop has the "use of property" of their own premises. The pawn shop has obviously the right to examine the gun to determine its value, for example, or to clean it if it needs cleaning to avoid damage, or to show it to a potential customer. And the pawn shop is allowed to let the police onto their own premises, even without a search warrant. | Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - No 10 Downing Street is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So, people with legal authority over the space can restrict or ban your access if, for example, you repeatedly flaunt the rules that they impose on the space. Their private security can request that you leave. If you refuse, you are trespassing and subject to arrest, either by security as a citizens arrest or by the police. | I'm confident that there has been no successful breach of contract lawsuit on that basis: that is not the right legal basis. Actions against a shoplifter would either be under tort law or, much more likely, criminal law. Put simply, theft is a crime, encoded in the laws of all nations, and the government will shoulder the burden of punishing a shoplifter. Since the goal of criminal law is to guarantee a well-ordered society (not to restore the victim of the crime), a victim of theft may have to pursue their own legal case against the criminal, if they want to be restored for their loss (let us say that the criminal also ate the evidence). | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing. | Ultimately yes, this can and does happen, but there are a few steps necessary before the bailiffs come to your door. In times gone by, the common law recognized a right to "distrain for rent", meaning that a landlord could come round to the tenant and seize some property as security (up to the value of the rent owed). If the rent is not then paid within a certain time, the goods could be sold. Various additional provisions of law covered the circumstances around forcing entry, breaking open locked cupboards, and searching off the premises for goods which the tenant had concealed. There were also special-case rules about what could be seized, such as a statute of the seventeenth century saying (among other things) that landlords could not harvest growing crops, but could take already-cut sheaves. Subsequent reforms for the protection of tenants have made it so that landlords cannot do this at their whim. They first have to go to the County Court for a judgement that there is an unpaid debt. (In fact, this and subsequent steps can happen with any debt.) On that basis, they can apply for a "warrant of control", under which an "enforcement officer", commonly called a bailiff, will take charge of collecting the money owed. There are quite a few steps and rules here, but the basic position is the same in terms of being able to take your stuff. And it is not the landlord walking around making those decisions, but a court-appointed officer. The previous common-law "distress" process is now totally abolished, for most tenants by the Housing Act 1988, and for everybody in 2014, because of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 section 71, which simply states The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent is abolished. Commercial property has its own legal regime since that Act, but previously functioned in the same way. So landlords can no longer seize your property on their own, but they can go through a few hoops and ask a court to do it. They also do not get to keep the specific property, but just get the money. As mentioned above, this is the general avenue for what happens when a court orders you to pay money, and you don't do it. The High Court has its own enforcement officers who are able to deal with larger amounts of money, as well as enforcing evictions. In Scotland, the same basic pattern applies but different words are used, and some of the detailed rules are different. "Attachment" is when a sheriff officer (= a bailiff) comes round to value your possessions and auction them off if you don't pay. There is also "arrestment" which is taking money out of your bank account. | In this instance, the police were almost certainly trying to get you to volunteer to be in a line-up with the victim of the crime picking out potential suspects (of which you were absolutely one, and probably remain so). Assuming the chap or chappete who got mugged, who basically only saw the barrel of the gun, picked you out of the lineup at random, you could have expected to be carted off to a holding cell pending an interview, followed by arrest and very likely conviction for armed robbery. You were wise to refuse. You should never cooperate with the police even if you think have an amazing alibi that means that you couldn't have committed the crime. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE |
Is it legally required to present ID when entering a hostel? Is there any specific law that it is necessary to present identification when checking into a hostel, because since you are living amongst others, there might be a variety of interpersonal issues, and in some ways, the private/residential sphere and the public sphere are in the same place? (Any country, but curious about the North America or Europe.) | germany Visitors in hotels must be registered and the hotel must keep the paperwork for a certain duration. According to §29 Bundesmeldegesetz, foreigners who are required to be named in their registry need to show an identity document (groups might have summary listings for some). There are some optional simplifications. Paying by credit card may count as identity verification. From context where this law is placed, it is not about interpersonal issues in the hotel. Germany requires all residents to register with their municipality of residence, and registering hotel visitors closes loopholes. §28 immediately before this is about sailors on river barges, §32 is about hospitals. | The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far. | This is weird. Within the EU, a passport is proof of identity, and it is also proof that you are allowed to take a job in the EU. There is nothing that a birth certificate would add to this. Either the bar manager is badly misinformed, or he doesn't want to give your brother a job, and will come up with something even more ridiculous if he gets the birth certificate. | This helpful video gives the answer, and it's no, you don't have to open your door unless they have a warrant. If you've committed an indictable offence (those considered most serious, such as murder, manslaughter, causing really serious harm (injury) and robbery) they have the power to enter without a warrant (see 17 b of the PACE Act). In the case I saw there was no indictable offence and so the lady didn't (shouldn't!) have opened her door. You can speak to them through a closed door or window and if they try to break in it is they that are breaking the law. | Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence. | There are various tangential ways in which this could be illegal, for example if your subjects are celebrities, you take a picture of them and commercially exploit it without permission in a product endorsement. Leaving aside such fringe cases, in the US, the legal right to privacy comes about, at the first cut, by premise trespass law. If the proprietor tells you to go away, you have to go away; if the proprietor tells you that you cannot take pictures, you cannot take pictures (your right to enter is conditional). Neither of those circumstances holds in your case. There are other tort-law bases for a right to privacy: numerous privacy laws regarding privacy and financial transactions (not relevant here), the aforementioned right of publicity (commercial exploitation of likeness), false light (like defamation, about creating a false impression – I don't see what false information is conveyed by a photo). There is also public disclosure of private fact, but that cat is out of the bag because the subject has self-disclosed the supposedly offensive fact revealed by the picture by eating in public. Intrusion of solitude and seclusion does not exist in the circumstance, since the subject is eating in public where everybody can see: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This page sums us Virginia law. The main take-away from that is that there is no common law action for privacy in Virginia, and only an action for unauthorized used of likeness or name. | As per this question & answer, in the US there is no expectation of privacy in public places (not to be confused with private places where public is allowed e.g. supermarkets). Photos taken in public belong to the photo taker and he/she is free to use them in whatever way. No privacy is violated here. The fact that the person whose photo was taken was a celebrity does not change anything. It would have been completely their fault to expect privacy in a public place and behave rashly. | The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions. |
Can a private person deceive a defendant to obtain evidence? In the 2019 movie "Badla" (spoilers ahead), Naina was accused of committing a murder in the UK, and her trial is in London. She denies the accusation. Her clever lawyer Badal arrives and they have a three hour conversation going over all the details of the past events, coming up with different theories about the real culprit - and throughout it, Badal slowly gains her trust. He eventually manages to get Naina to confess that yes, she did in fact commit the murder. Including how she did it and where she hid the body. Badal leaves the scene and five minutes later the real Badal arrives! The fake Badal was actually Nirmal, the father of the murder victim, who of course recorded the whole conversation including the confession. He calls the police, and the credits roll. It's a compelling movie but this struck me. Nirmal was deceiving Naina by impersonating a lawyer, which is a crime. But he had nothing to lose, he wanted to get justice for his dead son. And because he is not a police officer or official part of the prosecution in any way, this evidence wouldn't be inadmissible for being bad police practise, I would think (this question says that the police cannot impersonate a lawyer to gain evidence, but Nirmal is not police). But if such a confession would be admissible in court, then why don't more people pretend to be lawyers, or generally do illegal stuff like deception to obtain evidence? | england-and-wales Admission of the confession is at the discretion of the court PACE s78 gives the court the discretion to decide on the admissibility of confessions obtained if it appears to the court that "having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." There is deliberately no case law guidance on this. Superior courts in the UK have been scrupulous in saying that each case turns on its merits. The “circumstances in which the evidence was obtained” are certainly suss and would not be permitted by a police officer who is required to warn the suspect and advise them of their right to silence. However, that is not sufficient to exclude the evidence. The court also needs to consider whether it would have “such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” If the confession is the only evidence then admitting it would clearly be unfair. However, if the Crown has mountains of other evidence, then the confession may only have a small probative value. There is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in the UK Far more likely is that the Crown would not even seek to introduce the confession. It would just slow the trial and give the defence grounds for an appeal. Instead, they would use the confession to inform their investigation and get other evidence to convict. Legal privilege In England and Wales, legal advice privilege only applies where there is a lawyer present. If Badal is a lawyer, then the privilege attaches; if he isn’t then it doesn’t, irrespective of what he led Naina to believe. The same would be true even if Badal believed he was a lawyer but, for some reason, was not licenced in E&W. Litigation privilege is a broader concept and covers all advice, including from non-lawyers, where litigation (including criminal prosecution) has commenced or is reasonably likely. Based on the description, Naina has been committed to stand trial so everything she said is covered by privilege and is inadmissible. Why bother doing this? Most criminals are not sophisticated and will often implicate themselves if you give them enough space without the police or others violating any rules. Anecdotally, I have a relative who was a psychologist for a remand prison - prisoners charged but not yet tried. At the start of every meeting with a prisoner they would say “I work for the state, nothing you say is confidential and it can be used against you” - they still had prisoners confess to crimes they weren’t charged with, name accomplices, and tell where the loot was hidden. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? | Your appraisal is unjustly harsh, though not incomprehensible. A surprising number of lawyers are legally illiterate, in the same sense, even Supreme Court justices have to be told what the law is in a certain sense, and they often have to discover the law rather than recite it. Bear in mind that the typical education requirement for being a police officer is graduation from high school, and not a law degree. The educational requirements for the FBI are stiffer. They learn certain basics in a training course that lasts a few months, which covers everything. There is no law prohibiting a police officer from "harassing" a person who wants to film them. The line in the sand is that they cannot prevent a person from filming them. It would be interesting to know how many officers are actually unaware that they cannot force a person to stop filming. Also, the statement that they "can't" stop a person from filming them is a bit of an over-statement – they actually are capable of doing that, but what are the consequences? Given qualified-immunity, their own concern reduces to two issues: personal liability (getting sued) and department procedures manual (getting fired). It is invalid to infer ignorance from a particular pattern of behavior. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | I'm not familiar with the lawsuit, but generally speaking, a court's finding that a lawyer falsified evidence would not directly result in the lawyer being disbarred, as the trial court does not have authority to regulate the practice of law. Instead, a court that reached that conclusion -- either by a verdict, or because a judge was persuaded by the evidence without reaching a verdict -- would likely report that outcome to whatever organization is responsible for licensing attorneys in that jurisdiction. | It's a bit like talking to the police: anything you say might be used against you, so the conventional wisdom is to say nothing. It is a good rule of thumb. When you are paying a professional to represent you, why make things complicated by speaking on your own behalf about the same issue? As you point out, not everyone follows this rule. In some circumstances there might be benefits to discussing your case publicly, such as fundraising or deterrence. Whether the risk outweighs the benefits will depend on the details of the legal case and your role in it. Lawyers are likely to emphasise the following risks: If you are a witness whose credibility is in issue, any public statement could potentially become a prior inconsistent statement which is used against you in cross-examination. Again, one of the purposes of hiring a lawyer is to be careful about how you communicate your position on a litigious matter and reduce the risk of careless remarks having unexpected consequences. Speaking publicly undermines this goal. In Commonwealth countries, there is a significant risk that public comment on a case before the court could amount to sub judice contempt of court. Attempting to litigate the case in the media can be perceived as undermining the authority of the court. Lawyers are expected to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice and would be reluctant to condone anything that could be regarded as a contempt. This contributes to a culture where discussing active litigation is "not the done thing" and may itself cause problems with a witness's perceived credibility, aside from the risk of a contempt allegation. Speaking publicly about litigation is risky and the consequences are difficult to predict, which is why people often engage lawyers to do it. When the client continues to make their own statements without legal advice, it makes the lawyer's risk management job more difficult, so they are likely to advise against it. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). |
What is a judicial review vs administrative review? I hired lawyers to investigate something that happened to me. One of their findings was "judicial review was unavailable". In simple terms does someone request a judicial review when they believe their rights have been violated and want a court to make an order that would help them? What exactly is an administrative review or administrative tribunal? I get the impression it can happen in the work place, school or some sort of organization with a certain level of formality and structure. I also understand that it need not be fair, or at least what counts as fair is not defined. I understand it usually doesn't happen, especially if it's a non-government organization, but when can a judicial review override an administrative review's decision? | In simple terms does someone request a judicial review when they believe their rights have been violated and want a court to make an order that would help them? No. A judicial review in Canada is when the court reviews an administrative decision, that is, a decision (including by omission) made by the executive branch of the government or another entity exercising public functions under legislative or administrative delegation, as a last resort to preserve the rule of law, as an exercise of the inherent judicial authority. If your rights were not violated by a decision of the executive branch of the government, a judicial recourse may still be available, but usually not called judicial review. For example, if your contratual rights were violated by a private party (e.g. you are owed money), you can still sue the person in court as an ordinary civil lawsuit. In certain cases however, an administrative tribunal can make a decision regarding private disputes; the decision of the administrative tribunal, a public body, is subject to judicial review. If your constitutional rights are violated by a primary legislation passed by the Parliament (or provincial legislature), you may apply to a competent court for declarative relief, but usually this is also not referred to as judicial review, despite some similarities and some intersections in practice. The scope of judicial review is limited. The courts show considerable deferrence to the elected legislature and government and only exercise the power when all other legal resorts are exhausted. The legislature often provides administrative recourses with quasi-judicial characteristics (e.g. administrative tribunals, see later), which must be exhausted before the court steps in. The legislature sometimes deliberately limits or even attempts to bar judicial review through privative clauses. Although completely barring judicial review is not possible, it can influence the court's deferrence. Usually, one must obtain a leave (permission) from the court before commencing a judicial review proceedings. Then, if the leave is granted, the judicial review proceeding is not a proceeding for the judge to substitute their own decision in place of what the original decision maker made. New evidences are generally not admissible in judicial review; the judge only considers what is involved in the attacked decision. In most cases, the judge assesses whether the decision-maker was reasonable in their interpretation of law and their exercise of legal authority; it does not matter whether the judge would have made a different decision. In most cases, if judicial review is granted, the original decision is quashed (cancelled) but it is remitted to the original administrative body for re-determination (usually with another officer or panel). Seeking judicial review does not automatically prevent the administrative decision from coming into force, unless the applicant specifically demands the stay of decision and the judge agrees. There are exceptional cases where the judicial review is conducted on a standard of correctness, notably when procedural fairness is involved or when another important constitutional or general legal question should be determined conclusively. The applicable standard of review is based on the Supreme Court judgement in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov. In such cases, the judge would make what they think should be the correct decision with respect to the part of decision that should be follow such standard. Even then, the judge usually would direct the original decision maker to make a new one consistent with their judgement, instead of making a new one. What exactly is an administrative review An administrative review, or reconsideration, is when the administrative body itself provides a way for an interested party to request a review of the original decision by the administrative body itself (although often by another officer within the same service). It is generally not a legal right, and only granted when there is a clear error (e.g. the decision maker had the wrong file) to ensure administrative certainty. The term is usually not applied if there is a formal statutory structure of reexamination by another decision maker for an administrative decision, even if the new reexamination occurs within the same body. or administrative tribunal? Administrative tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies established by law (passed by legislatures) that makes independent decisions on behalf of the executive government. They are established to avoid costly and slow-moving lawsuits in courts and to specialize in specific areas of law to better serve the interests of justice. There are several types of administrative tribunals: dedicated conflict resolution tribunals between private persons, for example: Landlord and Tenants Boards that resolve disputes arising from real estate leases human rights tribunals where many discrimination claims in services and employment are resolved labour relations boards that deal with the recognition of labour unions and conflicts (grievance) between unionized workers and employers tribunals that review particular types of government decisions, e.g. the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, who has jurisdiction to hear appeals on certain types immigration decisions (e.g. deportation of a permanent resident) tribunals that make independent decisions for the government, despite the tribunal itself being part of the executive branch, e.g. the Competition Tribunal the Copyright Board other bodies exercising public statutory functions, e.g. the professional regulatory bodies (e.g. law societies, colleges of physicians and surgeons) are administrative tribunals for the purpose of exercising functions delegated to them by law, even if often they are private societies, for example, the decision to or not to admit a lawyer by a law society is subject to judicial review as the law society is exercising its delegated public authority (to regulate who can practice law). Some tribunals may have multiple functions described above; for example, the IRB is the first decision maker on the grant of refugee status, while also having statutory jurisdictions over appeals of certain immigration decisions (including the decision itself made over refugee status). As all powers of an administrative tribunal must be based in law, only those decisions that the legislature said could be dealt by these tribunals can be to an administrative tribunals; for example, temporary visa decisions (e.g. for visit or studies) are not appealable before IRB, but judicial review of the officer's visa decision can be directly requested. I get the impression it can happen in the work place, school or some sort of organization with a certain level of formality and structure. If it concerns the government, it may involve an administrative action that may be subject to judicial review. For example, a federal government employee may have recourses with the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board, whose decisions are subject to judicial review. A public university's decision (including a student's grade) may also be an administrative decision subject to review. The internal university appeal procedures could be seen as similar to the functions of administrative tribunals, but these internal boards are usually not established by law and are appointed by internal university procedures. Otherwise, it is a private dispute where a formal structure may be desirable for legal and moral reasons. I also understand that it need not be fair, or at least what counts as fair is not defined. A public body exercising a quasi-judicial function, particular an administrative tribunal, must be fair. It is a matter of natural justice where the court is not reluctant to correct an administrative decision maker. The duty of fairness generally does not apply to political or legislative decisions. While there is no simple definition of what is fair and the application of the principles of natural justice necessarily depends on the case in question, there is a significant body of case law on what consists fairness (or rather, unfairness). For example, arbitrary or dishonest decisions are almost always unfair. Decisions made without possibility of being heard are often unfair. Undisclosed conflicts of interest can also bring fairness into question. A private body in its private capacity (i.e. not exercising a public function) has no general constitutional or natural justice requirement to be fair, but the law may impose upon private persons a positive duty (e.g. provision of goods and services without racial or sex discrimination; dismissal without notice only possible for cause). if it's a non-government organization, but when can a judicial review override an administrative review's decision? If it concerns a non-government organization that is not exercising a public function, a judicial review is not possible; other recourses may be possible, e.g. an ordinary lawsuit, or recourses to a public body (e.g. if you have problems with a landlord, you can go to the LTB). If it concerns an actual administrative decision, judicial review is granted, among other possible reasons: when the decision maker lacks the jurisdiction to make the decision, e.g., when they make a decision outside their statutory powers when the attacked decision is unreasonable; for example, when the decision is not supported by logic or evidences (that were submitted during the administrative decision making) when it is incorrect on an important constitutional question or other question of law, or the principles of natural justice had been breached during the decision making process. | "Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well). | I'd say it's more like a concurrence than a dissent. Justice Thomas isn't saying the Court should have taken the case; he's just raising question about the (implicit) reason the Court isn't taking the case. Most experienced observers will read the statement as a signal that he is open to reversing Raich and hoping that someone will bring the right case in which to do that. But in the end, t amounts to pure commentary and has no legal effect. The practice of filing these types of statements is not "normal," as the Court rejects probably more than 95 percent of the cases that come to it, and it does so without comment. But it is hardly unprecedented to see these types of statements, and I assume that every justice (except perhaps Barrett, given her recent arrival) has made similar statements. From a quick search, I can find statements from Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, from Roberts, and from Breyer. | Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | The wording is a little confusing, but I interpret it as saying the following: Normally, discovery in a court case allows either party to demand documents from the other, to be used as evidence. However, our courts have exceptions; certain documents might be 'privileged against discovery', meaning they couldn't be demanded in that way. If one of those exceptions would apply to a document under court rules, then you can't request it under Freedom of Access either. To know what those privileges are, and how broadly they apply, you'll have to consult the rules of court procedure for your state. | Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later. | In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that. |
Legality of spending public money on private enterprise I am wondering about spending public money on private enterprise. In particular, for the city of Santa Fe, NM, USA. The enterprise is an indoor soccer franchise. The city is being asked to cover the $250k to $500k renovations and rent back time to the soccer clubs. The ROI would be 40+ years (based on the numbers in the article). For reasons not entirely evident, the mayor is pushing hard for this. There are lots of outdoor, full size soccer facilities in Santa Fe. Can you describe legal ways in which this might be challenged? | The government is allowed to spend public money on private enterprise. For example, the Small Business Administration gives grants to qualified businesses. Stadium subsidies have been a feature of government operations for decades, running in the billions of dollars. Here is a list of various larger businesses that received government bailouts. There is a procedure for approving such expenditures, such as the legislature of a state or city council. The mayor cannot usually unilaterally declare that the city will spend money on such a project, unless the city council has created a discretionary fund for the mayor, to support projects that the mayor deems will "benefit the city". Unless there is some flagrantly illegal about the funding, there is probably no legal means to challenge the decision in court, it is a purely political matter. In rare circumstances (like this) a law can be passed that limits making stadium construction a taxpayer duty. | What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year. | It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders. | There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass). | "Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road. | A receipt is just a written proof that money was taken. It is hard to imagine a place on Earth where the legality of giving such a proof would be questionable at all so that you would need to talk about an "authority to issue receipts". Only if you find a place where money itself is illegal. Now, the real question here is whether such receipts (issued by private persons not registered as businesses) can be used for accounting purposes, e.g. to claim that your business, which transacted with those persons, incurred expenses. The mere fact that sole traders need to be registered to do business does not outlaw the use of receipts issued by non-registered persons. For example, your business could be buying old stuff from the public (used cars, electronics etc.) and refurbishing it. Provided that this activity itself is not illegal, receiving receipts from those one-off private sellers, and using them in your bookkeeping would be perfectly legal too. | No. Just because some building is "owned by the public" or State, doesn't mean it's public property. A state's national guard installation comes to mind immediately. State workers' offices are not public places. Airport hangars/buildings/runways. You can't just go hang out in the DPW garages. | Usually, the only reason to set up an "ownerless" corporation is to set up a non-profit. Non-profit corporations can have self-perpetuating boards and are very similar to charitable trusts. If it ends up without any board members and has a self-perpetuating board, any person affected by the corporation or a suitable government representative (in the U.S., usually a state attorney general in the place of incorporation) can apply to a court to have new board members appointed. In a "for profit" context, this generally doesn't happen because the people investing in the company want to be able to profit from it and/or obtain a return of their investment. So, the question is largely hypothetical in that case. |
What does the citation YEAR Misc NN mean? The case Bower v Brewdog bears at the top of its bailii page a citation, [2019] EW Misc. 16 (CC), which I would like to break down to. understand. I assume that CC is an abbreviation for County Court (ie denoting the levlel of the court as would be done by EWHC or EWCA or UKHL or UKSC etc). 2019 is clearly the year. Is 16 a serial number? What series does it refer to, if so? And what does Misc. indicate? | County Courts do not have official neutral citations and are placed in the Miscellaneous category by the British and Irish Legal Information Institute, who nowadays acts as the unofficial case reporter in the UK. See https://www.bailii.org/bailii/citation.html for a list of courts whose proceedings have official neutral citations. The series number appears to be decided by BAILII, probably based on the time it publishes a case. | This is not a quote, per se, rather, it is a meme. It is attributed to Gilbert Gray, and according to The Independent Saturday 7 March 1998 was originally: "I take it, Mr Gray, that your client is familiar with the maxim: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" "Indeed my lord, responded the QC drily. "In Barnsley they speak of little else." However, according to the Fortune Newsletter two years later, it was attributed to a different barrister, Charles Gray, who is reported to have recounted a story about a barrister in Reading who was asked by the judge whether his client was aware of the principle of Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself), to which the barrister replied: "In the Irish village from which my client comes, M'Lud, they speak of little else". It is also attributed in 2005 to some unnamed judge referring to sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As Tim Lymington notes, the Irish res ipsa loquitur version is attributed to Marshal Hall apparently was on the air in the BBC production The Trials of Marshall Hall originally from 1996, and is cited in a recent book review. The book review and Wiki versions of that statement differ slightly in the wording of the text, to wit Wiki: "Is your client not familiar with the maxim res ipsa loquitur?” replied, "My lord, on the remote hillside in County Donegal where my client hails from they talk of little else." vs. book review Judge: “Mr Marshall Hall, is your client familiar with the doctrine res ipsa loquitur? Marshall: “My Lord, in the remote hills of County Donegal from where my client hails they speak of little else.” Without a copy of the book, I can't say whether the reviewer mis-copied the quote, but at least we can believe that the linked quote represents the review author's wording. There is a much earlier work on the life of Marshall Hall, Marjoribanks, Edward For the Defence. The Life of Sir Edward Marshall Hall K.C. (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1929), which might contain the quote in question. At this point, I am inclined to take the Hall res ipsa loquitur quote as being original and the others as being derivative works. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. | Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill. | Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment." | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. | I don't know the specifics of this invention, but it's important to remember that the novelty and non-obviousness of an invention is made as of the date of the patent application (or earlier priority date, not applicable here). In this case, that would be September 5, 1979. So you'd have to look specifically at what art existed as of that date (actually, one year prior to that date) and show that the invention was obvious and not novel in light of that prior art. It would take more than a general claim that it's obvious, for example. The practices followed by the PTO in determining novelty and obviousness in accordance with the law is set out in the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, chapter 700 ("Examination of patents"). You might find that an interesting read. The current release (Ninth Edition, Revision 07.2015) is here; the edition in effect in 1979 would have been the Fourth Edition, here. As an aside, the term of the patent is not 20 years from publication. The term under today's law is 20 years from initial filing date, not from publication. Had that law been in effect for this patent, it would have expired in September 5, 1999 (which it actually did, as noted below). Prior to June 8, 1995, US patent term was based on the date of issue plus 17 years; in this case to January 5, 1999. But under terms of the 1995 law, any patent applied for prior to June 8, 1995 got the greater of those two terms; so we're back to September 5, 1999 again. (And just for completeness, there is also the matter of periodic maintenance fees that today need to be paid to keep a patent in force; but that didn't start until December 1980, and wouldn't have applied to this patent, which was filed prior to the institution of maintenance fees.) | I'm not sure if you are asking for each of the countries listed, but I am assuming that they are there merely for example. In the US, the are a variety of different rules for its different court systems. As a rule, each State can make its own rules for its court system, and the overarching Federal system has its own rules as well, although they run off of the same principles. As such, the answer varies on which state the court is located in and possibly the type of document. In California, for example, different documents have different retention times for different documents. For example, documents for civil cases default to 10 years of retention, while adoption paperwork is retained permanently. For a criminal matter, the judgement (the final product that says if the accused is found guilty or innocent, and for what crimes) is retained permanently, while all other documents are retained for the greater of 50 years or the maximum length of sentence imposed. When the retention period for a document is over, the document is not automatically destroyed(at least in California). Instead, the appropriate official sends an official notice to all the parties in the case that the document is to be destroyed, and if no response is received to transfer the documents, the documents can be destroyed. (Source:http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=68152) Note: I have said "document" throughout, which originally meant a piece of paper. However, recently, documents have been submitted electronically, and sometimes older documents are electronically scanned. |
If one homeowner gives consent to search a house but the other homeowner does not, do the police have consent? Suppose Alice and Bob are co-owners of a home. Police come to the door and ask to search the home. Bob says, "yes, you may search our home," but Alice says, "no, you may not search our home without a warrant." Do the police have valid consent to search the home without a warrant? In practice, I expect the police might wait for Alice and Bob to come to an agreement, but let's suppose that both Alice and Bob maintain their positions. Can the police search the home based on Bob's consent even though Alice denied consent? The jurisdiction I'm primarily interested in is the U.S. (Utah if it is state-dependent), but I'm also interested in other jurisdictions. (I found this related question which indicates that if the police reasonably believe that someone with authority gave consent, then the search is valid even if the person giving consent didn't actually have authority. I believe my question is different because the linked question doesn't address if the police have mixed messages regarding consent) | Although the question is different, the answer to the other question actually contains the answer to your question. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". One occupier's clear objection based on Fourth Amendment interests cannot be overridden by the consent of another in this case. A disputed consent should not be resolved by the police, but by a judge. | Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not "contraband" (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned. | You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives. | Silence is not cause. However, this may not prevent a search. The officer does not need to tell you that he has probable cause, he must simply have it in order to conduct a search. If he obtained the probable cause before he pulled you over (this is likely), then he will order you out of the car and search over your vociferous (and silent?) objections. If the officer does not have probable cause, searches anyway, and can't come up with a convincing one in time for the court date, then yes you have a claim. But remember, just because the officer didn't inform you of the cause doesn't mean it didn't exist. Always consult an attorney before any legal action. | The question for trespassing is whether the trespasser has been adequately notified of the possession interest that another person has in the property. Although it is legal to evangelize door-to-door without a permit, most jurisdictions will require you to leave promptly if the owner asks you to leave. In the absence of such verbal requests, you have a legally protected interest in engaging in conversation with your neighbors. Based on the law as I understand it, it is likely that your jurisdiction will recognize a right to proselytize to your neighbors door-to-door regardless of a no trespassing or private property sign. However, for the sake of certainty, here’s a little bit about trespass law. Typically, states have statutes that define what it takes to make a sign “conspicuous” enough to create grounds for prosecution. Such laws include specifications for the thickness of markings and the sign’s distance from the ground. Arkansas statutes have established that a person who enters or remains unlawfully on property has committed trespass, which means that the person must enter or remain in or upon the premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon the premises. Communication is key. Arkansas law provides that if the property is unimproved and apparently unused, and is not fenced or otherwise “enclosed in a manner designed to exclude an intruder,” the person entering the property does so with license and privilege. Generally, however, if a person unlawfully enters property that has been improved, he has trespassed regardless of a sign on the premises devoid of some religious purpose for his visit. Thus, there really is not a significant difference between the “No Trespassing” sign and the “Private Property” sign. Both would communicate to any potential intruder that the property he is about to enter is presently being possessed by another person and thus would likely be sufficient to provide grounds for claiming notice in court if a property owner should choose to bring a suit. | If the property has been transferred to HUD in a reverse mortgage foreclosure, the family has no authority to sign anything and the country records are simply not up to date (it is not unusual for county real estate records to be one to six weeks behind being up to date based upon how busy the recording office is and how many staff they have, often they are further behind in the summer and around Christmas when employees tend to take vacations). HUD can sign the easement, and so can any successor owner. Whether they will or not is another question. Even if the foreclosure were not quite complete, any action taken by the family after the foreclosure was commenced would be invalidated once the foreclosure was completed. | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | Assuming, pending information about the jurisdiction, that this happened in the US, the answer is it depends. As described in Justia's Vehicular Searches article and Wikipedia's Motor vehicle exception article, Under US law police can search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. This doctrine was first stated by the US Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and later modified or repeated in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court broadened the rule to evidentiary searches. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) the Court ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrant-less search at the convenience of the police. Subsequent cases have widened the scope of the exception, although the probable cause requirement has remained, and stops must have at least "articulable and reasonable suspicion". In the case of an ordinary traffic stop, the police may conduct a Terry-type search, based on "articulable suspicion". However, if the police arrest the driver, that is grounds to search the car under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) Under Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.(and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 note 9 (1982).) police may remove the car for a search elsewhere if they have probable cause to believe that there is contraband (such as alcohol, drugs, or weapons) in the car. Thus the arrest justified a search, as described in the question. It might not have justified the tow if there was not probable cause to suspect contraband. But that depends on the detailed facts, and judging those is beyond the scope of this site. In Collins vs Virginia (2018) the Court ruled that a warrant-less search of a car parked on the owner's property and within the curtilage was not justified. (The "curtilage" is the area near the house which gets additional Fourth Amendment protection, almost as if it were inside the house). However, in that case no arrest was made at the time of the search, and the search was based on an officer recalling the car having been used to elude arrest some two months previously, not just a few minutes before, so that case may not apply in the situation described above. If there was no probable cause, any evidence found might be subject to suppression, and a suit for damages under sec 1983 might be brought against the officers and the police force, but that would depend on the specific facts, and would in practice require a lawyer skilled in such matters. |
At what point does refusal to report a crime make one an accomplice to a crime? This is a question out of curiosity only, indirectly inspired by my last question post. I'm wondering at what point not reporting a crime is itself a crime. I know that if someone happens to witness a bar fight and doesn't immediately call the cops they are not guilty of a crime (or I assume they aren't, unless they're technically guilty and simply never prosecuted for it). This implies that the refusal to report a crime is not, by itself, a crime. However, I'm also pretty sure if, for example, a women knows her boyfriend is sexually assaulting their child and turns a blind eye to it she can be convicted as an accomplice to the crime. Likewise, I think if you're riding in the car with someone who does a hit and run you are required to report it or be an accomplice. So I'm wondering where this line is drawn. At what point does one's involvement become such that they are guilty simply for failing to report another individual, assuming they have not actively done anything to directly support the crime otherwise? Furthermore, if someone is indirectly benefiting from a crime they do not encourage or facilitate – for instance a wife getting a new fur coat after her husband robs a bank despite her not approving of the husband's actions – does this make her an accomplice? Is there a line here to draw, presumably a bar serving a drink to someone they know is a bookie doesn't make them guilty, even if the bookie presumably earned the money he is using to buy the drink via an illegal job? | TL;DR Never; unless there is a specific law in the jurisdiction that requires it, however, that is a separate crime, it doesn't make you an accomplice to the first crime. There is no general obligation to report a crime; some jurisdictions may have legislated to make reporting mandatory, either generally or for specific professions. Accomplice From the link, an accomplice is: One who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unites with the principal offender in the commission of a crime. One who is in some way concerned or associated in commission of crime; partaker of guilt; one who aids or assists, or is an Accessory. One who is guilty of complicity in crime charged, either by being present and aiding or abetting in it, or having advised and encouraged it, though absent from place when it was committed, though mere presence, Acquiescence, or silence, in the absence of a duty to act, is not enough, no matter how reprehensible it may be, to constitute one an accomplice. One is liable as an accomplice to the crime of another if he or she gave assistance or encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to prevent it with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate commission of the crime. Mandatory Reporting Many jurisdictions impose an obligation on certain professions to report suspected crimes. The most common and obvious being a police officer who generally has an obligation to report all suspected crimes. Other professions include doctors, teachers, nurses etc. in the case of suspected child abuse; sometimes this extends to elder abuse but usually doesn't include an obligation to report spousal abuse. If a person with such an obligation fails to report, they have not become an accomplice to the original crime or any future crime; they have broken a different law on their own. General consequences In general, a witness to a crime is not required to report it. They could be asked to give a statement but are not obliged to and would not be subject to arrest. If they were subpoenaed to appear in court as a witness then they would be obliged to do so and give evidence; failure to do either would be contempt of court. To be clear, a perpetrator of a crime is also not obliged to report it and is protected from contempt by rules about self-incrimination like the US Fifth Amendment. As an aside, NSW, Australia has recently passed a law that while maintaining the accused's right not to testify has allowed juries and judges to draw inference from the silence in their deliberations. Specific Laws Some jurisdictions have specific laws that make it a crime not to report. For example, in New South Wales, Australia Section 316 of the Crimes Act makes it an offence to conceal a serious indictable offence (i.e. one with a maximum penalty or 5 or more years gaol) that a person "knows or believes" has occurred without "reasonable excuse". The punishment is up to 2 years; if you solicit or accept any benefit for concealing it, the punishment is 5 years. Prosecution for people who came by the information as a result of practicing certain professions requires permission of the Attorney General. Privilege A person may become aware of a crime through disclosure as part of a professional-client relationship. Such disclosures may be subject to privilege. At common law, only the lawyer-client relationship is legally privileged meaning that a lawyer cannot disclose what their client has said to them. This does not cover advice on committing or covering up a crime - if a lawyer does this there is no privilege and the lawyer may become an accomplice. Closely related is the litigation privilege where communications prepared as part of litigation (including criminal prosecutions) are protected even if they are not between the lawyer and the client. Some jurisdictions have statutorily extended this privilege to other relationships: doctor-patient, priest-confessor, pastor-parishioner, accountant-client, psychologist-patient etc. Check your local guides. Your examples The bar fight witness has no obligation to report and is not an accomplice. In NSW, this is the crime of affray, a serious indictable offence, and must be reported. The mother of the child has no obligation to report and, unless she is assisting or encouraging the commission of the sexual assault, is not an accomplice. Further, spousal testimonial privilege does not apply; i.e. the mother could be compelled to give evidence against the boyfriend or face contempt. In NSW, this is the crime of Sexual intercourse-child under 10, a serious indictable offence, and must be reported. The passenger has no obligation to report and is not an accomplice. In NSW, this is the crime of failing to stop and assist after vehicle impact causing death or grievous bodily harm, a serious indictable offence, and must be reported. Sub-questions At what point does one's involvement become such that they are guilty simply for failing to report another individual, assuming they have not actively done anything to directly support the crime otherwise? At the point where the person moves from being a witness to a participant by assisting or encouraging the perpetrator. ... if someone is indirectly benefiting from a crime they do not encourage or facilitate, ..., does this make them an accomplice? No, however, if the person knows that the benefit are the proceeds of crime then they could be charged with receiving stolen property and would not have good title in the property even if they didn't know. presumably a bar serving a drink to someone they know is a bookie doesn't make them guilty, even if the bookie presumably earned the money he is using to buy the drink via an illegal job? It depends if they know the money is the proceeds of crime; if they do then receiving it is a crime in its own right but it doesn't make them an accomplice. | Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away. | Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her. | Your question is very broad, but yes, there innumerable ways that the actions of a victim/complainant can result in a not-guilty verdict. I'll list some. Contemporaneous consent to contact. If the victim/complainant consented to the contact, then the offence of assault or sexual assault will not have been committed. Self-defence. If the victim gave the accused reasonable grounds to believe that the victim was about to use force against the accused, then depending on the circumstances, it might not be an offence for the accused to take certain actions against the victim for the purpose of defending themself (the accused). The provocation defence that is based on conduct of the victim. See Criminal Code, s. 232, which can result in a not-guilty verdict for murder. | In the United States, many jurisdictions have criminal offenses outlawing behavior that may include what you're describing here. In Ohio, for instance, disorderly conduct (R.C. 2917.11) includes "insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response." In Indiana, there's the offense of provocation (IC 35-42-2-3), which is even broader and includes "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally [engaging] in conduct that is likely to provoke a reasonable person to commit battery." It looks like this has been interpreted to include even actions that don't directly involve the provoked person, such as kissing another man's wife. Beyond the criminal offense, there are also jurisdictions that will permit a civil suit for damages resulting from the criminal act. There are also states where this could constitute intentional interference with business relations or intentional interference with an employment contract. In any of those cases, your co-workers could be looking at damages for lost wages, loss of reputation, etc. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary. | united-states Generally, a witness cannot object to a question on the grounds that it fails to conform to a rule of evidence (e.g. hearsay). A witness can refuse to testify on a matter either due to the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or on the grounds that some other privilege (e.g. attorney-client, clergy confession, spousal) applies. A witness can also say that they don't understand the question as phrased (either because it is complicated or because it contains terminology or concepts that the witness doesn't understand), or that the witness didn't hear the question, or that the witness forgot what the question was while the lawyers and judges were discussing whether it could be asked. This often results in the question being restated or rephrased. A witness may also answer a question by stating that there is no answer to the question as it is based upon a false premise (e.g. "on which day of the week did you beat your wife?"). And, if true, a witness can properly answer that they don't know the answer, either because they never knew or because they don't currently recall the answer. |
Is the character of a “request” legally defined? In general English usage the notion of a request seems to connote that compliance with it is discretionary and not required. But in legal usage and correspondence it seems to perhaps assume a different character. For example, consider the idea of a subject access request. In fact compliance with such requests is generally compulsory. What is the basis for the divergence of usage? | To request means simply to ask politely or formally - there is no implication that an answer is optional or required Some requests will be backed by law or custom such that they require a response, others do not. The former is more likely to be the case in a legal setting than in a casual setting which might be why you are finding an implication that doesn’t exist. | At what point is unsolicited explicit material considered harassment? How do the advertisers have the right to broadcast something that I would definitely bring up to HR if I heard a coworker say? The contexts are too different. One cannot expect much similarity on how the unsolicited explicit communications are addressed. On platforms such as Youtube the unsolicited explicit material is not sent specifically to you, but to a set of users who at best have some characteristics in common. By contrast, akin communications in a work environment are much likelier to constitute harassment insofar as they usually are intended for a specific person. Your own use of the term "broadcast" reflects your acknowledgment of that difference. Another difference relates to the recipient's dependency on the environment where the unpleasant communications occur. Implicit in the anti-harassment protections in a work environment is the acknowledgment that the recipient's livelihood depends on that person's continued employment. That dependency renders such communications a form of coercion. By contrast, dependency is much lower or non-existent when it comes to entertainment platforms: the recipient can leave the platform without any consequences that might threaten that person's livelihood. Have I entered into an agreement with the service provider than I consent to receiving these advertisements by using their services? That is hard to tell. You will need to read the terms of service of these platforms and post another question if some clause(s) is(are) unclear. | "Reasonableness" is meant to be vague, because what is reasonable in one case or contract or industry is not always reasonable in another. Generally, though, you'll probably find courts interpreting it to take into account normal practices in your geographic area, in your industry, and between you and the other party. If one party looks like they're trying to unjustly enrich themselves or is asking for something that people just don't agree to in the real world, it's probably going to be unreasonable. If people are asking for the fair value of their work on terms that are normally agreed to when they're the subject of negotiations, it's probably reasonable. Dropping the reasonableness language would probably leave the assigning party in a bad position, as they're not required to make the assignment, with no qualifications as to the terms. The assignee could argue that they're free to take the IP on any terms whatsoever, though courts often read in a reasonableness requirement anyway. This answer is based on U.S. law, but there will be probably be pretty strong parallels if you're in a common law jurisdiction. | It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been. | There are no specific criteria for deciding whether a request is manifestly unfounded or excessive, because this depends very much on context. The ICO has given some clarifications, but they still won't tell you an allowed frequency of requests. We (as data subjects) should not invent particular criteria because they would be only our opinion. In any case, the data controller would have burden of proof to show that a request was indeed manifestly unfounded or excessive. That means that a data controller will generally err on the side of caution and allow repeated requests. But that doesn't mean you won't get pushback on your proposed frequency. I think your proposed approach is likely to be both unfounded and excessive. A controller has one month to respond to your request. Sending off a request while a previous request is still pending would likely demonstrate an excessive frequency of requests. Even if the data controller responds more quickly, it is doubtful whether that would entitle you to more frequent updates. Since the data controller will inform you about important events with a letter, this weakens your need to make frequent requests. Your “Bayesian model” is also flawed, both in content and application. As your prior, you expect a very high rate of events. However, a normal citizen would expect to receive a parking fine approximately never. Your model should more correctly be based around the probability of missing an event, while also accounting for letters (which generally do arrive in time). It might also be incorrect to use your circumstances as the basis for determining a reasonable frequency. The ICO suggests multiple factors (nature of the data, purposes of processing, how often the data is altered, relationship with other GDPR rights). These factor's generally relate to the controller's processing, but not to your individual circumstances. Next, your requests seem unfounded: the purpose of your requests is not aligned with the GDPR, and automated requests raise doubt about whether the request is valid. Your motivation to make the requests is “to know about claims such as parking fines […] when something goes wrong with the letters sent”. This is a fairly speculative reason since letters generally do arrive well. In contrast, the GDPR provides for the right to access “in order to be aware of, and verify, the lawfulness of the processing” (Recital 63). You are not claiming the right to access for the purpose of verification and to obtain information about the processing, instead you're abusing the GDPR rights to create a kind of API that auto-updates. So, is three months a hard and fast rule? Definitely not, but it seems like an unobjectionable, reasonable frequency. If a data controller thinks a request every three months is excessive, you'll likely be able to push back successfully. But with more frequent requests, you're entering a grey area. Here, it becomes increasingly likely that the controller is able to demonstrate that your requests are invalid. | Arbitrary doesn't mean what you think it means The term arbitrary describes a course of action or a decision that is not based on reason or judgment but on personal will or discretion without regard to rules or standards. A clear rule that a license fee is required to be paid by a certain date that is the same for everyone is pretty much the opposite of arbitrary. | It doesn't matter. When a contract is left ambiguous the interpretation that is used is the one that is the most favorable to the party that did not draft the contract, under the logic that if the party that did draft the contract chose all the wording and thus, they could have stated their interpretation in the contract just avoided this whole mess in the first place. A similar rule exists in criminal law, where if the law is ambiguous, the interpretation used is the one most favorable to the defendant, since the state could have drafted it in a way that made their interpretation clear. | Your analysis so far seems correct. You must comply with all applicable laws. The GDPR's Art 6(1)(c) legal basis clarifies that having to provide personal data is no excuse: that legal obligation is all the legal basis you need for sharing the personal data in accordance with your obligations. However, that legal basis doesn't generally excuse you from your other data controller obligations. For example, you should still inform the data subjects about the processing as per Art 13(3). |
Can Congress secretly pass a bill Supposed some Congress members thought it would be necessary to pass a bill without telling the public about national security. For example, if a war broke out and Congress wanted to allocate money to a secret cause, could they enter a closed session and pass a bill, send it to the President, and become law without telling the public? First, is this even possible/legal? Are there any instances of this happening (and later being revealed to the public)? | Congress did exactly this in the war of 1812. Normally, laws passed by Congress must be published after being made. In 1789, the First Congress instructed the Secretary of State with the duty of printing new statutes at least three newspapers, and the current law puts it in the hands of the Archivist of the United States; in between, there have been variations. On March 3, 1811, Congress passed a law saying simply: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this act, and the act passed during the present session of Congress, entitled “An act to enable the President of the United States, under certain contingencies, to take possession of the country lying east of the river Perdido, and south of the state of Georgia and the Mississippi territory, and for other purposes,” and the declaration accompanying the same, be not printed or published, until the end of the next session of Congress, unless directed by the President of the United States, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. This overrode the normal publication rules in order to hide the existence of the cited earlier law, and of its own existence. The proceedings in Congress also took place in secret session, including the signing of the bills by the President, James Madison. As the title suggests, the earlier statute authorized Madison to use military force to take possession of the disputed territory (which was also claimed by Spain), establish a provisional government there, and use $100k of newly appropriated funds to do so. A further law of 1813, with the same secrecy provision, extended the territory and gave $20k more. These statutes were not published until 1818, after the war had ended and a further law reformed the publication of statute law in general. The supposed secrecy was also compromised in practice by the fact that the annexation of West Florida was widely known once it started happening. As far as we know, Congress has not experimented any further with suspending publication of its legislative activity. It is allowed to meet in secret session, and the Constitution allows secret material to be omitted from the official journal. Nowadays, we know pretty well when secret sessions have taken place, even if we don't know what happened during them. It would be practically very hard for Congress to hide the fact that it had met and passed a law. The closest modern counterpart is not a secret act, but the use of a "classified schedule of authorizations" or "classified annex" to direct spending on things that Congress does not wish to reveal. For example, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (1068 page PDF), there are references like: "there is appropriated $125,000,000, for an additional amount for 'National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund', to remain available until September 30, 2024, which shall only be used for the acquisition and retention of certain materials, as specified in the classified annex accompanying this Act" "The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (17) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division." The second bullet point covers billions of dollars of total spending, but it is not revealed that we are spending $7.18bn on a project to explode the moon, or whatever. So in this appropriations case, your hypothetical is pretty real: Congress could pass emergency legislation authorizing spending on something, without revealing what the something was. Other kinds of laws would raise their own issues. For example, a secret criminal statute would very likely fall foul of the Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. The concept of a secret law is in many ways objectionable - natural justice, interference with democratic accountability, etc. - which makes it politically difficult as well as legally questionable. | Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water. | So it's not that SCOTUS is declining to review the matter on Constitutional Grounds but that it's declining to rule because 1.) It's a military matter 2.) It's under review by congress. SCOTUS is basically saying that, of the three branches, they are the least equipped to deal with military policy and when a better equipped branch is reviewing the matter. SCOTUS doesn't want to dictate to Congress how to change the rules when Congress is in the process of changing the rules itself... but they can say "Hey, we got our eyes on this as a constitutional matter so keep that in mind when you decide on what you're gonna do about this. When Congress makes a decision on this particular law (either change it or keep it), SCOTUS may take a look, but that doesn't mean they'll rule against it, as Congress and the Military can present an argument that it might be necessary for military defense reasons. | The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate. | "Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional). | Can an idea be a trade secret? Certainly -- most trade secrets are ideas. The thing is, unlike copyright, patents, or trademarks, trade secret isn't a very strong form of protection. Trade secret legislation only protects against certain "unfair" methods of obtaining the secret. Independent invention is perfectly fine: if I figure out on my own what the secret formula for Coca-Cola is, there's nothing the Coca-Cola company can do to stop me. Reverse engineering is also fine: if I take a bottle of Coke to a chemistry lab and analyze the ingredients, there is again nothing the Coca-Cola company can do. Additionally, a company wishing to make something a trade secret needs to take active steps to preserve that secret. Continuing the Coca-Cola example, they might require anyone reading the formula to first sign an agreement to not disclose what they read. | Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action – in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth. | Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter. |
Does the software we use to write code affect the licenses we must use? I am a junior software developer and found the licensing confusing, partly because senior devs around me have no idea either. Below I explore scenarios where a software developer uses other software. For example, I make up here three cases: Dev uses a Linux Distro, and inside Linux the code editor VSCode, and also runs other programs without ever glancing at the source code - to learn from the output. Dev distributes a program that imports other people's programs Dev only runs software and uses the result of those programs in the code. For the first case, I would assume that my duties are only with the source code, so the first item is fine. For the second one, if you distribute code that uses other people's code, then you should make sure the license is correct, and will depend on which imports you have. For the third one, I am not sure what is the solution, so any clarifications are welcome. | In general, the output of a program is not copyrighted by the author of the program. When you write a novel in Word, Microsoft doesn't own any copyright in your novel. When you prepare financial statements with Excel, Microsoft doesn't own any copyright in those either. There can be exceptions. Some programs (like GNU Bison, a parser generator) actually do output parts of their own source code, and their source code is copyright to the author. To clarify things, GNU made a statement in the license for Bison that officially says they don't have copyright to what it outputs. You should expect programs of this type to have such an exception, and if they don't, maybe ask the author or don't use them. | It does mean that you cannot reuse any parts of the source code, even small simple ones. You would have to rebuild the code from scratch. There is a significant chance that the code would be "substantially similar" to the code that you were hired to build, also that if anybody else were to write a bubble sort or 24-to-am/pm conversion routine, it would look the same, where even variable names (which should describe function) are the same or very similar. In case of an infringement lawsuit, you would have to defend yourself by showing that there are only a few ways to code a given function. Copyright protects only the "expression", not the abstract idea. A linked list is an idea, which can't be protected by copyright; same with recursion, pointers, stacks, object-oriented programming... Anything that involves copy and paste is infringement. If you re-read the copyrighted code and then try to reconstruct it, you probably crossed the infringement line. If you remember the problems and solutions and accidentally write somewhat similar code, that is probably on the safe side. From the perspective of the programmer not wanting to always reinvent the wheel, it would be most useful to make a distinction in the contract between "the essentials of the customer's program" versus "incidental utility work". The difficulty will arise in saying specifically what is essential vs. incidental. For instance, I know that if I were to hire you to develop a speech-recognition system, low-level audio-acquisition and encoding would not be essential to my purpose, whereas DSP parsing routines would be the center of my interest. The programmer would then want to retain recycling rights to all non-essential code. | Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible. | You can't patent an algorithm, but I'll assume you are talking about the case where you have patented a machine or process that uses an algorithm, but that adds significantly more, and that the software being distributed implements much of this process. Courts might find an implied licence or promissory estoppel when distributing software under an open source licence that doesn't explicitly exclude patent licencing as part of its terms. It would be prudent to state your patent rights and explicitly exclude a patent licence if you intend to enforce your patent rights. As an example, this software implicates a patent , so they allow "permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation for educational, research, and non-commercial" purposes. Users that want to use the software commercially need to contact the authors who also happen to be the patent owners, and I assume would negotiate a patent licence at that point. | You are free to sell or not to sell to whoever you like (unless it is illegal discrimination, like not selling to white Christians), but it doesn't make a difference, because anyone who buys the software from you can legally sell it on to anyone they want. So you cannot control who ends up owning the software. If I want the software and you don't sell it to me, and I still want it, I'll just ask a friend to buy it and give them the money. Other people would just get a pirated copy if you refuse to sell to them (and would have very little bad conscience since they offered you cash and you refused to take it). You can put terms into a license, and in the USA this is binding. The customer may not agree with the license, and in that case they have the right to get a refund for the software. In the EU, I don't think a license is binding, so you'd have to sign a legally binding contract with the buyer. Apart from all that, you have very little chance to find out if the software is used against your wishes and to do anything about it. | In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today. | For a large organization, software licensing compliance is a very broad and intractable problem. The licensing environment is very different for the big company than it is for little tiny you. Many large companies are subject to audits by software vendors (i.e. Adobe, Oracle, etc.) in which they have to show licenses purchased for each active seat. There's a whole new INDUSTRY around maintaining license compliance. An employee bringing in their own software and installing it on a company computer complicates this vastly. That is the environment that the question should be considered within. The large company makes the decision somewhere along the way that your individual efficiency in performing your individual tasks is less important than maintaining auditable software licensing compliance. Since they own the computer/laptop/server, it's their decision. Many times it seems that corporate policies as they apply to the individual worker are obstructive and limiting, but there's a bigger picture to the situation. | Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact. |
How does the Uniform Plumbing Code apply to me, for the purposes of home renovation? According to my state, Texas, Occupations code, Chapter 1301. PLUMBERS, it says in SEC. 1301.255. Adoption of Plumbing codes, Section 1301.255 adopts the Uniform Plumbing Code and the International Code Council's International Plumbing Code as they existed on May 31, 2001. The statute notes that the Texas State Board of Plumbing Examiners may adopt later versions of this code. As of June 2021, the 2018 edition of the Uniform Plumbing Code and the 2018 edition of the International Code Council's International Plumbing Code have been adopted by the State Board's Rule 367.2 in Title 22 of the Texas Administrative Code. Rule 367.2 also adopts codes incorporated by reference within the 2018 International Plumbing Code, which include the International Code Council's 2018 International Fuel Gas Code and the 2018 International Residential Code. See the text of Rule 367.2 for details. Does this bind me as a homeowner doing personal home renovations, or just plumbers for hire? | You can purchase your own copy of the UPC at just about any outlet that sells books including Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/2018-Uniform-Plumbing-Code-Tabs/dp/1944366075 Yes, your local AHJ (agency having jurisdiction) almost certainly has adopted this code or something very similar to it and you need to pull a permit, have the required inspections, and follow the code with any modifications or changes. | For the first question, assuming EU legislation being applicable here, EU regulation No 1896/2006 of 12 December 2006 on creating a European order for payment procedure may be relevant, foreseeing a unified procedure for payment claims. On the second one, the answer is likely to be found in EU regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. This regulation has in its Article 4 a general rule (persons domiciled in a Member State shall [..] be sued in the courts of that Member State) but of course also several exceptions to this rule. A relevant exception here is contained in Article 7: In matters relating to a contract, the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question are competent. | The new decree of November 14, 2022 contains an amendment (bottom of p2) to the Federal Law 53-FZ originally enacted on March 28, 1998, concerning military service. The former version of the text contained separate provisions in Article 2 about different kinds of military service that could be performed depending on nationality. This allowed Russian citizens who also held another nationality, or foreign citizens, to serve in the Russian armed forces under contract, and only in non-officer ranks. Russian citizens without other allegiances were able to serve voluntarily, or be conscripted, and were additionally eligible to serve in the state intelligence apparatus and other bodies, as well as in the main armed forces. The amendment is slightly differently organised, but the key part is the text which extends service "по призыву" (on demand) to "гражданами в том чсиле имеющими гражданства (подданства) иностранного государства" (citizens, including those who have citizenship (nationality) of a foreign state). Draftees under this section are again only for the non-officer ranks of the regular armed forces. The option is retained for Russian citizens without other allegiances to volunteer, in which case they might become officers or serve in the broader military/intelligence establishment, or for non-Russians to volunteer for the regular forces. Russia's original law was fairly generous in exempting holders of other nationalities, as most countries with mandatory military service or registration do not make the distinction. For example, Israel and the USA are two countries where holding additional nationality is not a barrier. (Though in both of those cases, there are other exemptions which might be in play. The USA is also not currently operating actual conscription, just a registration system.) And there are plenty of countries without a draft at all. In the context of the overall pipeline from "you are a regular person minding your own business" to "you are in uniform pointing your weapon at your country's designated enemy", militaries also have several opportunities to discard draftees or volunteers who they genuinely don't want, for whatever reason. It may be that even a country which obliges dual citizens to register and attend an assessment, would then choose not to make them train and fight. Or they may be channeled into different roles. It might depend on the conflict in question (e.g. you are a citizen of A and B, and A is at war with C, so you have to fight; if A were at war with B then your fate would be different). Regarding Why should they care whether someone also has citizenship of some other country? they may be anxious about you having divided loyalties, or about angering the other country. These concerns would be more acute if the country is engaged in an actual conflict. There are several treaties that allow multiple citizens to avoid having to serve multiple terms of military service in each country. The details depend on the countries involved, but the general idea is that if you are (for example) both Austrian and Danish, and live in Denmark, then you do your military service there and Austria does not mind. In that case, it's helpful that neither of those countries is at war, and certainly not with one another. What you cannot generally do is use both of your nationalities to cancel each other out, and avoid military service altogether. Equally, if you are Austrian and British (the UK has no conscription) then the government of Austria still wants you to do military service on their terms. | Clean your tub. Scratch that off the list. Typo - forget about it, there is nothing here, clerical errors are curable if not outright reasonable. In CA your landlord can enter under certain circumstances. All but emergency require notice, agreement, or your presence. But what is your remedy? A civil suit for damages or call the cops and try to get the landlord charged with criminal trespass under CAL. PEN. CODE § 602. | Your framing of the issue is basically wrong. There is an exemption, which varies from state to state, from unsecured creditors (but not creditors that take the goods as collateral) in bankruptcy and in debt collection outside of bankruptcy (not always the same exemption), for tangible personal property owned by the debtor which constitutes the debtor's tools of the trade, but that varies from state to state, is a creature of state statute (and the bankruptcy code), is not universal, and is usually limited in dollar amount. Moreover, the exemption only applies when the tradesman actually owns the tools of his trade which is customary in some professions, but not automatic. It is only the case when the tradesman buys his own tools. There is no generic v. non-generic distinction. In the software field, education and the public domain can always be accessed. But, intellectual property, that can be protected, that is developed for the employer, is usually work for hire and belong to the employer. This default rule is subject to the terms of the agreements between the parties entered into contractually. | The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant. | You are responsible The “public mains” are the infrastructure owned by the utility (and are the utility’s maintenance problem). From those, to the point where it enters the building (or your unit for a multi-unit building), they are the landlord’s problem. Within your leasehold they are your problem. Notwithstanding, a leaky tap is probably a worn washer which is caught by the “fair wear and tear” clause anyway. | usa No. U.S. Federal Regulations An employer having only unisex, multi-person restrooms is a violation of OSHA regulations. Sex-specific restrooms are required, at least for the employees, unless the restrooms are only single-occupancy. While, as another answer mentions, California has a law authorizing cities in California to require restrooms to be gender-neutral, such laws would be unenforceable as preempted by federal law unless/until the OSHA regulation is changed. (For those not familiar with U.S. regulations, OSHA is the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which regulates workplace safety. Its regulations apply to the entire United States.) 29 CFR 1910.141(c)(1)(i) is the relevant regulation here (emphasis mine): Except as otherwise indicated in this paragraph (c)(1)(i), toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex, shall be provided in all places of employment in accordance with table J-1 of this section. The number of facilities to be provided for each sex shall be based on the number of employees of that sex for whom the facilities are furnished. Where toilet rooms will be occupied by no more than one person at a time, can be locked from the inside, and contain at least one water closet, separate toilet rooms for each sex need not be provided. Where such single-occupancy rooms have more than one toilet facility, only one such facility in each toilet room shall be counted for the purpose of table J-1. There is an explicit exception to the requirement for the restrooms to be sex-specific for single-occupancy restrooms, but there is no exception for restrooms designed to be occupied by multiple people as you've described. This particular regulation applies only to restrooms that are available to employees (as opposed to those exclusively for use of patrons.) Requirements for those exclusively for use of patrons are set by state-level plumbing codes. maryland Maryland Plumbing Codes While the OSHA regulation above does not apply to restrooms for use only by patrons, Maryland's plumbing codes require separate facilities for each sex for those, too, with a few exceptions. Section 403.2 of Maryland's plumbing code (emphasis mine): 403.2 Separate Facilities Where plumbing fixtures are required, separate facilities shall be provided for each sex. Exceptions: Separate facilities shall not be required for dwelling units and sleeping units. Separate facilities shall not be required in structures or tenant spaces with a total occupant load, including both employees and customers, of 15 or fewer. Separate facilities shall not be required in mercantile occupancies in which the maximum occupant load is 100 or fewer. Separate facilities shall not be required in business occupancies in which the maximum occupant load is 25 or fewer. 403.2.1 Family or Assisted-Use Toilet Facilities Serving as Separate Facilities Where a building or tenant space requires a separate toilet facility for each sex and each toilet facility is required to have only one water closet, two family or assisted-use toilet facilities shall be permitted to serve as the required separate facilities. Family or assisted-use toilet facilities shall not be required to be identified for exclusive use by either sex as required by Section 403.4. |
Property law: title vs possession In property law what is the difference between Title and Possession? They basically sound like the same thing to me. | Title is legal ownership. Possession is immediate control, often but not always physical control. For example, if I buy a book and lend it to my friend A, I have title to it, but A has possession. Or if I rent a house, the landlord has title (or possibly the landlord's bank does) but I have possession. If a thief steals something, the thief has possession, but not title. Some kinds of property have a registered or written title. For example, land and houses usually do, and in many jurisdictions automobiles also do. Those will show the legal owner, and may well also show outstanding loans for which the property is collateral. The law may require that the written title be signed over, and/or that the transaction be recorded with a governmental authority and a new written title issued, when ownership of such property is transferred. "Lawful possession" includes a lent or rented item of property, but not a stolen one — a thief does not have lawful possession. | You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right. | Depends where you are At common law, theft (or more generally, larceny) requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. However, many jurisdictions have removed this element from the crime. For example, s118 of the new-south-wales Crimes Act 1900 says: 118 Intent to return property no defence Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused's own use, or for the accused's own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. | Joint tenancy (as opposed to tenancy in common) would accomplish all of these goals. Joint tenancy gives each individual the absolute right to occupy the property (each person owns the whole property). If one dies the property automatically passes to the other joint tenant(s), which is known legally as the right of survivorship. The child(ren) could never force the parent(s) (other joint tenants) to vacate the property; on the inverse, however, the parent(s) could not deny the child(ren) the ability to also possess the property during their lives, if they so chose to do this. I am assuming if the children ran into hard times and needed to live there, it wouldn't be a problem, but this should be specifically addressed with the client. For a valid joint tenancy to be created, you would simply need to have: a. Unity of title: whereby the joint tenants must hold title to the property under one document (i.e., the title deeds); b. Unity of time: the joint tenancy must start and end on the same date for all the joint tenants (end date being the death of the final joint tenant, who will/should have passed through will/trust to an heir the title interest; c. Unity of possession: all joint tenants have equal rights to possess the whole property (as mentioned above, the children could occupy); d. and finally, Unity of interest: joint tenants must have equal interests in the whole of the property. This is the simplest way to do this while meeting all objectives. | They are both “documents” under most rules of evidence Basically, there are only two sorts of evidence: Testimony. What a witness says to the court. Although, in practice a lot of testimony is said out of court and given in writing but it’s still testimony. Documentary. Everything else. | There is no significant difference between the two and it is simply a matter of (modern) legal writing style. Traditionally, contracts were always written in the third person, but starting sometime in the late 20th century (if I had to hazard a guess, I'd say sometime in the 1980s), the innovation of writing in the first and/or second person was developed and found to be more readable for most people, especially in contracts of adhesion. | Ownership is different from sovereignty Sovereignty means the right and power to make and enforce laws. Ownership means having property rights over something. Put simply, the United States (Federal and States considered collectively) has sovereignty over everything in the US (and some things outside) but everything in the US is not owned by the US. It’s owned by a bunch of different entities: individuals (US and non-US citizens), corporations (foreign and domestic), local, state and Federal governments etc. Ownership rights are subservient to sovereignty - the government may pass a law restricting what you can do with your property because they have sovereignty over it. Can you exert your rights to that airspace? Of course, however, the invention of aircraft required modification to the right of exclusive ownership. From United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946): (a) The common law doctrine that ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261. (b) The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part of the public domain, as declared by Congress in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261, 328 U. S. 266. (c) Flights below that altitude are not within the navigable air space which Congress placed within the public domain, even though they are within the path of glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Pp. 328 U.S. 263-264. (d) Flights of aircraft over private land which are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land are as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. Pp. 328 U. S. 261-262, 328 U. S. 264-267. This is a perfect example of the difference between ownership and sovereignty. People used to own the airspace “up to heaven” then the sovereign in the shape of the US Government changed the rules so now they don’t. Whether you can sell the airspace above your property depends on whether the sovereign (the US) has a law that allows or prohibits the splitting of airspace rights from the underlying land. I know such a split is usually possible with water and mineral rights. Exclusive sovereignty in the case of a Federal nation like the US means that only the Federal government has power. When only the states have power it’s called residual power and when power is shared it’s called concurrent. | One option is to bring a civil lawsuit to obtain a court order for the return of your property, something that usually proceeds on an expedited schedule (often one to three weeks from filing to an order). The traditional name of such a lawsuit is "replevin" although the modern and minority terminology for this kind of lawsuit is civil action for "claim and delivery." You could ask the police to intervene, and they might do so, but are not required to do so without a court order. This can take the form of a criminal theft charge, or could take the form of what is called a "civil assist" when the individual comes to the place where the property is held in the presence of law enforcement which assures a peaceful transfer. Sometimes a court in another matter such as a divorce, or domestic violence criminal case, will enter an order authorizing or directing that a civil assist take place. The appropriate remedy depends to some extent upon the reason given for not returning the property. One valid defense to not returning property is that a lease created a lien in the personal property left at the premises for unpaid rent, or a lien for moving and/or storage charges. The availability of such liens varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and based upon the precise details of the situation. Another valid defense would be that the person in possession of the property was not satisfied that they knew who owned it. |
Admitting to a different crime as one's alibi? Mark is accused of a Murder committed between 1pm-2pm on March 10th. However, at that time, Mark 100% has an alibi for something else he was doing (which isn't exactly legal). For example Mark was doing meth in front of his buddy Bob Mark was beating his wife Wendy What is Mark supposed to do? Admit to his other crime as an alibi to get him off the hook for what he's accused of? If one admits to other crimes during a trial, will that get added on to the crimes he's being tried for? Or will Mark get acquitted for murder, but immediately be put on trial for the other crime he admitted to? Or what? My gut tells me that Mark's best course of action is to weigh the consequences for what he's convicted of against what he would be admitting to. Is that right? | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case. | There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | (assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions). | Offering up evidence that another person committed a crime is a standard and accepted, although rare, criminal defense strategy. It is mostly not used very much because most crimes for which defendants are charged were not committed by somebody else, and because most innocent defendants lack the investigative and economic resources to identify enough information about another potential suspect to present such a case credibly. The defense would have to articulate to the judge that the reason for offering up evidence about Z is to support Y's theory of the case that Z and not Y committed the crime, in order to overcome a relevance objection. But, the defendant had wide latitude to do so in order to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. In most circumstances, it would be a reversible abuse of discretion to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence to support a theory of this kind. A similar strategy, for example, was recently used in a preliminary hearing in a case involving a high profile murder in Colorado where a man stands accused to murdering his wife (the man is Barry Morphew) has developed a theory that his wife was murdered by someone else based in part, for example, on the evidence of unidentified DNA near the murder scene allegedly associated with previous crimes in DNA databases. | I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it. |
What does it mean for a trial, or other hearing, that has been listed to be “vacated”? What does it mean, and what are the implications of having a trial (or other hearing) vacated? Does it more strongly suggest that it will have been dispensed with finally, or that it will be rescheduled/relisted for another date? Importantly, I would like to know whether this means that the current case is ditched and the prosecution has to lay down charges to the court again from scratch? | What does it mean to have a case vacated? Two US Lawyers Say: The term "vacated" means that the Court on appeal reviewed the lower court's decision, found error, and overturned it. It means a reviewing court, usually a court of appeal, has determined that a trial court judgement should be vacated, or in other words, eliminated. Legal Dictionary Says: The term vacate has two common usages in the law. With respect to real property, to vacate the premises means to give up possession of the property and leave the area totally devoid of contents. To vacate a court order or judgment means to cancel it or render it null and void. Wikipedia Says: A vacated judgment makes a previous legal judgment legally void. A vacated judgment is usually the result of the judgment of an appellate court, which overturns, reverses, or sets aside the judgment of a lower court. An appellate court may also vacate its own decisions. A trial court may have the power under certain circumstances, usually involving fraud or lack of jurisdiction over the parties to a case, to vacate its own judgments. A vacated judgment may free the parties to civil litigation to re-litigate the issues subject to the vacated judgment. Here's What Dale M. Says: Therefore, pick your poison, do more research to determine the common definition in the context which it's applicable in your particular case, or ask your lawyer. | I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand. | Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc. | Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh. | At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case. | If you win a family court appeal in MS can you request another judge? You can always file a motion to recuse, perhaps with a rehearing with the chief judge afterwards. Without knowing the details of the reversal on appeal, though, it is impossible to identify whether the appellate opinion or the record of the case endorses/supports a finding of bias or other grounds for disqualification. These motions are hardly ever granted. See Pearl River Co. Board v. Mississippi, 289 So.3d 301, 308-309 (2020): In the absence of a judge expressing a bias or prejudice toward a party or proof in the record of such bias or prejudice, a judge should not recuse himself. [...] The burden [...] is a heavy one The bar for granting these motions is overly high not just on paper, but in reality there is also an element of judicial arrogance insofar as these motions are a form of firing a judge. Recusal can be meritorious in your case, yet be denied even by the chief judge and the appellate panel. | There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term. | An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction. |
Can I be convicted of conspiring without an overt action? Under US law, as far as I understand, a conviction of conspiracy requires at least one overt action. If I was in on the conspiracy but didn't do anything - will I be convicted? Here's an example: me and two buddies meet in a dark room and discuss the best way to murder the president, and how that's what needs to be done (i.e. we agreed to cooperate and coordinate). Then we each go our separate way. One of my buddies goes to a gun shop and buys a rifle, than gets arrested by the FBI that were recording our conversation. But I went home and then to work and didn't do anything. Can the FBI convict me of conspiracy? | It is hard to tell if this constitute criminal conspiracy. The insight and input you contribute to the planning of the crime (and acts you may have taken to acquire the knowledge used in those plans such as a Google search and research to assist in the planning) could itself arguably be an overt act. But facts in the question regarding your participation in the planning meeting isn't specific enough to know. You've also, probably accidentally, backed into another issue because of the way that this question is framed. If you and anyone else in the group are U.S. citizens, planning to assassinate the President, at least while the President is in office for reasons in any way related to his official duties while in office as President, very likely also constitutes the crime of treason. This matters because there are quite serious criminal penalties under federal law for a failure of anyone to report an attempt to engage in sedition, when you are aware of it, even though there isn't general duty to report most crimes of which you are aware under federal law. The crime of failing to report a treasonous plot is called "misprison of treason". See 18 U.S..C. § 2382. This statute states: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both. So, even if you haven't engaged in conspiracy to assassinate the President, you are probably still guilty of a serious federal felony. | This is a super complex question and no one really knows the answer yet. Orin Kerr is probably the leading scholar on this question, and he generally argues that forced decryption of one's own device is not a Fifth Amendment violation. As I understand it (and oversimplifying by a lot), one key piece of his position is that requiring you to put in your password is a statement about your knowledge of the password itself, not about the contents of the machine into which you are entering it. And because your knowledge of the password for your own devices is presumed, an exception for "foregone conclusions" would leave this compulsion unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. You can read one of his explanations here. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that approach, but a California judge recently reached a conclusion similar to Kerr's. This will probably by a question for SCOTUS before too long. | No That is nothing but fiction. Assuming that this is in the US, the police would (probably, there are some exceptions) have had to deliver the well-known "Miranda" warnings, that the suspect has the right to silence, the right to consult a lawyer, and the right to have a free lawyer if unable to afford one, and that statements may be used against the subject. If, after those warnings, the suspect chooses to confess, or to make a statement, that confession or statement would be fully admissible, even if the suspect did not have a lawyer present, unless there was some other reason for the statement to be excluded. No such reason is mentioned in the question. It is simply not the case in the US that a confession is excluded just because no lawyer was present, nor is that the law anywhere that I know of. If the police failed to give the warnings when they were required, then any statements or confessions would be excluded. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) says: law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Footnote 4] As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. That tells you exactly what the police are forbidden to do. Nowhere does it say that a lawyer must be present. Indeed it says the opposite: The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That means that s/he can confess after being warned, and such confession would be admissible, provided that s/he knew and understood those rights. | Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. | The standard is different for some of the kinds of surveillance described than others. 24x7, door-step, snitching-neighbors doesn't require any justification at all, except to convince someone that the time and money is worth it. It is not, in a constitutional sense a "search". Cell phone monitoring (meaning wiretapping) requires a sworn statement demonstrating probable cause to believe that is a crime has been, or is in the process of being, committed. In the alternative, if the surveillance involves a non-U.S. person, and the motive for doing so is espionage, pretty much all that an intelligence agency has to do is say that it is interested. | In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense. | Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments. | Intent is an element of the offense of murder. If the prosecution can't prove the required level of intent for murder, the defendant may still be convicted of a "lesser included offense" like Manslaughter or perhaps Criminally Negligent Homicide, or even an offense that doesn't require an actual death like Aggravated Assault or an offense that doesn't require proof of an injury like Deadly Conduct. If the defendant is claiming that the intent was not voluntary because of some hypnotic effect then that is basically an insanity plea. Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity face an indefinite commitment to a mental hospital, which can amount to decades of involuntary hospitalization. To learn more about this situation, read about the case of John Hinckley Jr. I personally doubt any jury would actually believe a hypnosis defense, especially without a woo-woo jury foreman, some outstanding work by the defense attorney, and a team of expert witnesses that includes an unrelated hypnotist and a psychologist who didn't believe in hypnosis until examining the defendant in this case... so a Mulder and a Scully. |
What are the differences between petitions, complaints, and indictments? These seem to be ways of bringing actions to a court. How do they differ and compare? | These are different terms for initiating documents. What one court or jurisdiction calls a petition, another might call an application. "Complaint" may not have a technical meaning in some contexts or jurisdictions, but often it is used to refer to the initiating document at a specialist tribunal. There are other names for initiating documents: notice of civil claim, notice of action, etc. There is no way to know which terms have a technical meaning and what those meanings are without looking to the rules and practice in a particular jurisdiction. "Indictment" is an initiating document in a criminal prosecution. But there are also "informations" (generally implying lesser charges). | The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence". | Law enforcement officers can obtain information with a search warrant, which is a document issued by a judge or magistrate that authorizes them to search for specific information or evidence based on "probable cause" to believe that it will inform the investigation or prosecution of a crime. A court can also issue a subpoena at the request of a party to a proceeding before it. Since in most cases only the state can bring criminal charges before a court, an individual would have to bring a civil complaint before a court in order to even request a subpoena related to his complaint. Also, it is up to the court to enforce its subpoenas: It's not like a warrant where you can then pursue the items subpoenaed through force. If the subject of a subpoena doesn't respond you have to ask the court to compel the party, which means you have to bring your complaint before a court that has jurisdiction over the party you wish to subpoena. This can be difficult when it involves a third party – especially a third party that would rather ignore or object to the subpoena than hand over the information. I.e., if you can't convince law enforcement to investigate the crime, and you can't convince the company in possession of the data that it's in its interest to help you, then you would most likely be facing a steep legal bill to get an attorney to successfully obtain the information through civil process. | Judges don't have timesheet entries (and are often expressly excluded from FOIA obligations). They get paid salaries and are expected to work hard enough to clear their dockets in reasonable periods of time, however long that takes. If you wanted a more direct evidentiary estimate, you could estimate that a judge and his clerk together probably work 90-120 hours a week, figure out how many trials and hearings of what length were conducted and deduct that time spent on that from the total, and then divide the remaining hours by the number of opinions one can estimate that the judge wrote (or better yet, a reasonable estimate of the number of pages of opinions that one can estimate that the judge wrote). Typically, a lot of the legal research grunt work and more boilerplate parts of an opinion are written by the law clerk under some general instructions from the judge, with the judge writing the more substantive sections personally and heavily (or lightly, depending upon the quality of the law clerk) revising the draft opinion as a whole. The longer the opinion, the more likely it is that a substantial portion of it was written by the law clerk. For similar kinds of legal writing (e.g. appellate briefs and motions for summary judgment and proposed orders or written closing arguments) one to six hours per page from all professionals working on the document would be in the right ballpark. Judicial opinions come with some efficiencies, because once a judge decides a point of law or reaches a factual conclusion it doesn't have to be belabored in the same way that a litigant who isn't sure if their reasoning will be persuasive or not must. But, judicial opinions also typically have to spell out a greater proportion of legal and factual foundation for the end analysis that isn't hotly contested, will summarize all of the material points from the evidence presented in the case, and will frequently also recap in some detail the arguments made by the advocates for both sides of the case before actually engaging with those arguments in an analysis section. On balance, those factors probably pretty much balance out. If the judicial opinion is shorter, elegantly written, contains pithy turns of phrase, and/or contains lots of legal citations or factual analysis not raised by either party, it is probably closer to five or six hours per page or more. If the opinion is longer, has a rote and mechanical feel to it, and has very little factual analysis or references to law not mentioned by the parties, it is probably closer to one hour per page or even less. When some of these factors go one way, and other of these factors go the other way, it is probably in between in terms of hours per page. This said, sometimes it takes a judge a long time to write an opinion, but the end product is very short and elegant. In these situations, often what happened is that the judge and the judge's clerk spent lots and lots of hours writing a long and detailed first draft, then got an insight that provided a much more efficient and succinct way to reach a resolution to the case. In those circumstances, there would be dozens or scores of hours of work that went into the discarded first draft, only to be superseded by a half a dozen or dozen hours devoted to a much shorter final draft. In those cases, the final draft of the opinion might be ten or twenty hours per page or more once you include the time spent on the discarded draft. Of course, another factor is that some judges are just more efficient legal writers than others, and some judges have more familiarity with some areas of law than others. A opinion that might take one judge twenty hours to write might take another judge presiding over the very same case and producing an opinion of the same length and quality a hundred hours to write. The opinion in Meads v. Meads was 176 pages. If I had to make a best guess, I'd estimate that it probably took about 600 hours to write, probably about two-thirds of which was law clerk hours and probably about one-third of which was judge time. | An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.) | The emails both are and are not hearsay If the landlord seeks to use them as evidence that you did the things stated in the emails, that’s hearsay. However, if he seeks to use them as evidence that he received complaints about you, that’s not hearsay. Notwithstanding, this is no doubt a hearing in a tenancy tribunal or small-claims court - strict rules of evidence generally don’t apply in those. The emails are therefore likely something that will be admissible even if they are hearsay. | Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A. | I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed. |
If one is threatened, are they allowed to stay silent with no legal consequences? Andy the abuser is doing unspeakable things to his child. His wife Wendy witnesses and is aware of this. Normally, Wendy would also be held liable for not reporting this horrible crime (at least I assume so @.@). But what if Andy threatens Wendy? Is Wendy's silence allowed with no repercussions in that case? As a simple example, Andy could say that he'll beat Wendy badly if she ever goes to the police. As a more elaborate example, Andy could be a mafioso, and say that he has "his boys" tailing Wendy at all times, so she "better not try anything funny". | Following RCW 26.44.080, Every person who is required to make, or to cause to be made, a report pursuant to RCW 26.44.030 and 26.44.040, and who knowingly fails to make, or fails to cause to be made, such report, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Mandatory reporting applies to many people such as doctors, teachers, coaches, also (d) The reporting requirement shall also apply to any adult who has reasonable cause to believe that a child who resides with them, has suffered severe abuse, and is able or capable of making a report. There is a defense to criminal charges in RCW 9a.16.060 which says (1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that: (a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or she or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and (b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and (c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved. There are limits to the duress defense: (2) The defense of duress is not available if the crime charged is murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse. (3) The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself or herself in a situation in which it is probable that he or she will be subject to duress. (4) The defense of duress is not established solely by a showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her spouse. What you describe sounds like duress. Technically, Wendy could report the abuse to all sorts of other government entities besides the police and not run afoul of the threat, but it is quite reasonable to assume that Andy intended the beating regardless of who receives the report. | “I’m going to kill you” is not a threat Or at least, not necessarily. A criminal threat is more than words - it must encompass the intent to carry out the threat. Except in wholly exceptional circumstances, this type of language between parent and child is not a threat. | One path would be to get compliance, by demonstrating that it is legally required. The best evidence that he is legally required to wear a mask is this recent mandate from the Department of Public Health. However, I cannot find a corresponding executive order, which may be in a generic form empowering CDPH to issue orders. Any imposition of penalties for violation must be publicly announced and rest on legislative authority. The mandate is not generally enforced, except in a few cases regarding bars and restaurants. There are various persuasive avenues that you could pursue, such as asking CDPH to come talk to him (unlikely, but you could try), complaining to the property owner, appealing to local social media to apply pressure (possibly putting yourself at legal risk for defamation, if you make a false statement). There are two more involved legal actions to contemplate. One is to terminate the lease and move elsewhere. This would likely result in an action to collect the remainder of the rent, but the strategy would be to argue that the manager has interfered with your private enjoyment of the premise. A second, highly improbable, is to sue the manager and get an enforceable court order requiring him to wear a mask. Courts have a prejudice against ordering people to take actions when other options exist (terminating the lease, monetary compensation). It could be an interesting but expensive test case to see if you could get a judge to order the manager to wear a mask. So yes they are obligated to wear masks, but legal enforcement is going to be difficult at best. | There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office. | This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey. | None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story. | “Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen. | She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely. |
How would one comply with a court order to unpublish unlimitable information? (If this has been asked, please deduplicate; I searched but couldn't find anything similar. Thanks!) This is wholly hypothetical, I hope. Let's have two people, "Alice" and "Bob". Alice publishes some data that, for whatever legal reason, they ought not to publish. Bob gets some sort of court order which directly instructs Alice to stop publishing the content. From what I've heard, the court may deputize Alice somewhat, instructing them to not just cease publication, but also to actively inform other publishers that they must cease & desist. If those other publishers continue, then Bob may complain to the court again, and the court may order those other publishers to cease as well. We are now in the 21st century, though, and the content may be available via e.g. Bittorrent, a key-value data store which can make data internationally available as long as one person, somewhere in the world, is reachable and has a copy of the data. This can create a problem for Alice; let's imagine a third person, "Mallory", who sits beyond the court's jurisdiction. Mallory openly flouts the court order by publishing a Bittorrent key (a torrent file or magnet link) which allows anybody to obtain a copy of the data. (Also note that tools like Magnetico can be used to let anybody become an eavesdropper, passively learning Bittorrent keys as they transit the network. Mallory may "openly flout" the court without the equivalent of a conspicuous notice in a public place.) Given that Alice has been instructed by the court to stop publishing the data, and given that Mallory refuses to stop publishing the data, what might Alice be obliged to do to comply with the court? Since this is an international question, answers can pertain to any jurisdiction! | united-states This answer analyzes the question under U.S. law, although it is really generally applicable in all countries with a common law legal system. I'm not familiar with how non-common law countries address this issue at this level of granularity. Given that Alice has been instructed by the court to stop publishing the data, and given that Mallory refuses to stop publishing the data, what might Alice be obliged to do to comply with the court? Very little. This is why courts very rarely issue orders like this one. Disobedience to a court order is enforced with a contempt of court proceeding against a party that allegedly knowingly and willfully failed to comply with the court order. But an inability to comply with the court order (at least if this is not due to sabotage by the party subject to the order after that party learns of the order's existence) is a complete defense to contempt of court sanctions. Contractually, this is why most non-disclosure agreements have liquidated damages and actual money damages remedies as well as the remedy of injunctive relief. If harm that can't be unwound results from conduct taken before an injunction is in place, or as a result of a breach of an injunction that the person who was ordered to do something can't remedy, then a court imposes money damages and/or punitively imposes a criminal fine or incarceration on a party who defied a court order. | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. | A more general version of the question, as far as I can see, is "Is Google Drive legal?". I can create an account and upload files to Google Drive, and I can open them from the cloud using various interfaces. I can directly open only certain files types, others I have to download to the device that I'm using in order to open the file. There are various file storage systems that allow this, most or all of which seem to use some sort of system of password access, file-access permissions and encryption to block access by unauthorized individuals. All systems seems to allow "sharing" of a specified file. Google and colleague escape liability by complying with 17 USC 512 aka the DMCA safe harbor provisions. Basically, they don't know, they don't select uploads, they have a removal procedure, they don't know that the material is infringing, and they "are not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". There is a chance that you would be sued for inducing copyright infringement, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, specifically We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties You describe a situation that is unlikely to be found to constitute inducement to infringing, instead it is "enabling possible infringing", and mere possibilty of doing something bad with a tool does not make you liable for selling a tool, under current US law. An eyebrow would be raised, though, as to why this service only allows ebooks to be deposited. | As a designer and programmer you virtually have nothing to worry about apart from your wasted time. Such a network would likely never evolve (unless in Darknet) just because the would-be blockchain node owners would not have the balls to keep the nodes up. If a court in country A orders information deleted, the node owners residing in A would have to comply. Technically impossible? Well, then take the node down. Information will be available from nodes in other countries anyway? Does not matter — nodes in A will be taken down regardless. Note that the right-to-be-forgotten is only a small part of the obstacle. Defamation, hate speech, child pornography etc. published in a system that does not allow to delete information will cause the whole system to be deleted. | They'd have a big hurdle to clear. According to 17 U.S. Code § 512(c): (d)Information Location Tools.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link, if the service provider— (1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; (B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of this paragraph, the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that reference or link. So long as these conditions are met, Google is immune. So, what is ESPN going to argue? Are they going to argue that Google had actual knowledge of infringement? Are they going to argue that Google received a financial benefit directly attributable to the streaming? Are they going to argue that they sent a DMCA notice to Google and the links were not then expeditiously removed? Or are they going to argue something else entirely? | As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis. | If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public. | One big hole in any scheme that relies on copyright is that it could not preclude people talking about the previous content or talking about you. This is well established First Amendment law. For example, see Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which holds that except in rare judicially established exceptions (relating to military information, obscenity, and inciting acts of violence), government censorship is unconstitutional. Thus, no statutory scheme could be used to prevent third parties who happened to have seen the material while it was freely available from re-iterating what they had seen, or talking about it, or talking about the author (you). People could even reproduce portions of the published content. Some types of reproduction would be protected as fair use in the US, especially if the reproduction is for the purpose of criticism. (17 USC 107, and this previous Law.SE answer) The closest approach would be to protect your work as trade secret, making sure that anyone that you share it with agrees to non-disclosure. But, if you "publish unique content under this pseudonym" there is no way to "arbitrarily or wholly revoke discussion about that content". If the cat gets out of the bag, while you may have remedies against the person who violated the non-disclosure agreement, you would not be able to prevent third-party discussion or reproduction. |
do Judges have the power to interpret a law contrary to the drafters intent? From what I see, a judiciary has the power to interpret laws and they don't need to interpret it with regard to the intent of the legislature neccesarily and they can apply standards of fairness in interpretation decided by themselves rather than a drafters interpretation. but I am assuming that this requires a constitution to create underlying principles? | The power definitely exists, and it is also said by some (respectable persons) that they have a duty to do so. There are many schools of legal interpretation. One trend is to attempt to discern legislative intent, based on whatever facts there might be such as newspaper articles or legislative committee reports. A contrary trend is to look exclusively at the text enacted by the legislature – this school is known as the Textualist school, and is currently dominant in the US Supreme Court. There are also non-textualist "progressive" trends that seek justice according to some social principle, rather than the text of the law or the definitive intent of the original legislators, which may address the situation that you have in mind. In civil cases, statutory law tends to be rather unclear, allowing a judge to decide on the basis of their beliefs of what is fair, equitable or just. That is because in the common law, close to a millenium old, judgments were supposed to be "just". In the US, much of the common law has been re-coded as statutory law, and in that case, the intent of the legislature is really to "encode the sense of justice implicit in the common law". This does not mean that trial judges have unlimited power to set aside the words of existing laws. Their primary obligation is to apply the law literally, as interpreted by their superiors (appellate courts). When the higher courts are silent and when the legislature is not clear, the trial judge has some leeway to follow whichever jurisprudential philosophy they adhere to. | If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position. | It is purely ceremonial. The tendency in modern jurisprudence is towards the practical and away from legalisms and technicalities. Even if a judge used a gavel in some way inappropriately, it would be unlikely to have any legal significance for anyone but the judge. An argument based on gavel misuse would fall into the "fringe-on-the-flag" category of legal arguments (yes, there are people who think that the court's powers are determined entirely by the fringe on the courhouse flag). The gavel is a traditional trapping of a common law courtroom, but has no legal significance. | Testing the law means running a case under that law and having a court rule on it. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary does not give opinions on whether a bill proposed or an act passed by the legislature is legal or not - they decide controversies that arise under those acts. The executive is obliged to follow the law so if they do something the law prohibits or don’t do something the law requires then someone with standing (usually someone affected by that act or omission) can take them to court and seek an order for them to stop (an injunction) or to do what they are required to do (a writ of mandamus). In the present situation, it’s my understanding (and I may be wrong) that Parliament has enacted a law that requires the Executive (in the person of the relevant Minister of the Crown) to request an extension from the EU if Parliament has not approved a Brexit deal. Testing the law would mean the Minister not doing that or stating an intention not to do it. A person with standing can then petition the court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to do it. If the Minister still refuses they would be in contempt and subject to being gaoled until they did. | Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment. | Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum. |
In US courts has a strong alibi ever been excluded based only on untimely notice? There is a question Can I surprise the prosecution with an alibi defense at trial? which asks a similar thing and the answer there seems to be yes, but the evidence presented seems to me to be inconclusive at best. Since it only implies that the notice of alibi requirement is constitutional, but the notice only says the court MAY exclude the alibi if it has not been disclosed. The goal of the statue as read seems to be more expediency and efficiency of proceedings though and the argument being that alibis can be easily falsified, here assuming that witnesses can be coerced/bought/or just sympathetic (mom in one case where this was raised) but there is evidence that is quiet hard to falsify such as public video recordings or witness testimony from large amounts of unrelated people. Is it realistic that a court would exclude such testimony due to it not being disclosed timely? | Yes, this happens with some regularity. In the absence of timely notice, courts should generally permit the alibi testimony, assuming that prosecution will not be surprised or prejudiced by the late notice and that the lack of notice was not the result of bad faith. But when that's not the case, courts can and definitely do exclude alibi testimony: State v. Reed, 155 Ohio App.3d 435 (2003) ("The record demonstrates that the prosecution was unaware of Reed’s alibi, and it had no opportunity to investigate the claim. Thus, the state would have been prejudiced by Reed’s unanticipated alibi testimony, and Reed has made no showing of excusable neglect or good cause for his delay in providing notice. In light of Manns’s failure to appear at trial and Reed’s last-minute change in trial strategy, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the alibi evidence." United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1076 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The better practice is generally to hear an alibi witness. However, the district court maintains discretion in such matters, and it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the testimony in this case.") People v. Grant, C050172, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3356 (Apr. 25, 2006) Assuming the government is subject to reciprocal discovery obligations, a defendant's due-process rights do not preclude the exclusion of alibi witnesses as a sanction for failing to give timely notice. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants."). | They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction. | National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-"content") user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges. | In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible. | Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later. | A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer. | A judge has the authority to determine what law applies to a case and to instruct the jury accordingly, and also has the authority to determine which evidence is admissible. Presentation of a defense, in practice, involves presentation of evidence supporting a legal theory. In order to be admissible in evidence in an evidentiary hearing or trial, the evidence must be relevant to a legal theory that is in some way connected to the evidence. If no reasonable juror could make a ruling establishing that a legally recognized defense was established based upon the proposed evidence (especially if the proposed evidence is prejudicial to the prosecution case on the basis of reasoning that is not a legally valid defense) it can be excluded. For example, evidence in support of the theory that the defendant murdered the victim because the murder victim raped the defendant's sister six years ago, might very well sway a jury to acquit the defendant. So a defense attorney might want to make this argument. But, this is not a legally recognized justification for murder, so evidence in support of this defense would be excluded as irrelevant by the judge. In federal court, and in states with rules of evidence based upon the federal rules of evidence, the primary legal authority behind this is Rule of Evidence 402: Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Some states also have procedural notice requirements for certain kinds of affirmative defenses. For example, if someone is arguing an alibi, a notice of an intent to present this defense must be provided by the defense a certain number of days before trial, so that the prosecution can develop the very different in kind type of evidence needed to rebut that defense, rather than having someone acquitted due to surprise when rebuttal evidence exists but the prosecution doesn't know in advance to locate the necessary witnesses and evidence to rebut this kind of defense. | First, if the police officer had reasonable cause to believe that a crime was in progress then the search would not be illegal in the first place. However, let's assume the search was illegal. Normally the evidence would be excluded under the exclusionary rule. However, there are two exceptions known as the independent source and attenuation doctrines. The evidence of the police officer as to the imprisonment would be excluded. However, the evidence of the victims is independent of that illegal search and their testimony would be admissible. Further, that testimony would allow independent discovery and admissibility of any physical evidence in the property. However, if the victims were dead, then there would be no independent discovery and none of the evidence would be admissible. |
Can I surprise the prosecution with an alibi defense at trial? Let's say I've been accused of a murder. Throughout the investigation I've plead the Fifth as to where I was when the crime happened. Eventually I'm put on trial, still pleading the fifth as to my whereabouts during the crime. Then, when put on the stand during the trial, I finally tell the court, and jurors, that I had an airtight alibi the entire time and have just refused to share it until now. Let's say the alibi could result in some trivial criminal charges being filed, like loitering, so I do have the right to claim I had reason to fear bearing witness to myself. I'm wondering what would happen at this point. The prosecution wouldn't have had a chance to prepare for this revelation, but they can't say that I or my lawyer acted wrongly if I only now decided to testify. Would this be cause for a mistrial? Would it matter if this was a legal strategy? For instance what if I tell my lawyer "I don't want to reveal my alibi unless you think there is a greater then 50% chance the jury will find me guilty." Can my lawyer continue as normal, knowing I may surprise the defense if I deem the odds of going to jail too high, or is he in a position where he has to say something once he knows I'm intentionally withholding information to surprise the prosecution? As to why anyone would do this, I can think of two reasons. 1) I know who did it and was willing to take the chances at court to protect the real person until it became clear I'll likely lose, 2) I did the crime, but the prosecution has the theory of the crime all wrong, and so I'm intentionally looking to undermine the prosecution by surprising them with an alibi in hopes of convincing the jury that the prosecution didn't do their 'homework' and thus I'm innocent. | No Federal law and most states have an notice of alibi rule that requires a defendant to identify witnesses who will testify as to their alibi and where the defendant claims to have been. The validity of these rules was upheld by the Supreme Court in Williams v Florida: The Fifth Amendment would not be violated if, after the alibi witness had given evidence, the court granted a continuance to allow the prosecution to seek rebuttal evidence (this point was conceded by Williams's lawyers). Consequently, all the notice-of-alibi law did was allow the prosecution to do so before the trial, instead of having to interrupt the trial. It did not provide the prosecution with more information to use against a defendant than they would eventually get in any event. | This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations. | The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks). | An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.) | In the U.S., one trial can be held for multiple co-defendants, though prosecutors and defense attorneys will have reasons for seeking separate trials (If only to avoid having a scene similar to the on in Dark Knight where Harvey Dent has about 50 mobsters caught in one RICO violation plus their lawyers and the judge's simple question of "How do you plea?" is met with a din of responses.). The Defense's reason for this is that an individual may not have been a part of every step of the collective guilt and thus some charges might not be appropriate if it's an individual's guilt compared to a groups guilt. For example, the six police officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray at trial were all tried separately. The first trial was declared a mistrial over the hung jury, and two subsequent trial's resulted in findings of not guilty by a judge during a bench trial. The remaining individuals had charges dropped (The three officers who had yet to have trials plus the one officer whose trial resulted in a mistrial). One of the findings a running theme of the officers as individuals did nothing wrong, though had they been tried collectively, the results may have been different, since the individual trials meant certain facts couldn't be brought up as they didn't apply to the individual but did if they were tried as a group. From a prosecutor's standpoint, separate trials mean that you can use one suspect against the other and make a deal for lighter charges in exchange for testimony against a partner in crime. The U.S. legal system does allow for plea deals between the defense and prosecution (and while it's not the only nation that allows this, it's one of the few where plea bargaining is not viewed as a "dirty" tactic and is openly embraced (U.S. attorneys tend to hate going to trial and will try to avoid it.). Prosecutors are not above offering immunity or granting lighter sentences in exchange for help in other cases, often in the form of testimony against the big fish. For a criminal who believes "snitches get stitches", an offer of flipping on your co-defendant for a sentence of 10 years, with parole in 5 is nothing to sneeze at when you're looking at 25 to life without parole for what you did. It's not immunity for testimony (typically, witnesses in plea bargains are not allowed to take the 5th with respect to questions on the stand because they will typically plea before the trial, and thus can't be prosecuted for the same crime.). | Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court. | Although there have long been requirements to disclose certain types of defenses -- alibi, insanity, etc. -- common law jurisdictions have more recently moved in the direction of greater disclosure obligations for the criminal defendant. Virtually every jurisdiction now requires the defendant to disclose his witnesses and his evidence to the prosecution at some point before the trial, at least if the defendant has made discovery demands of the prosecution. For more information on common-law discovery rules, see here. | No That is nothing but fiction. Assuming that this is in the US, the police would (probably, there are some exceptions) have had to deliver the well-known "Miranda" warnings, that the suspect has the right to silence, the right to consult a lawyer, and the right to have a free lawyer if unable to afford one, and that statements may be used against the subject. If, after those warnings, the suspect chooses to confess, or to make a statement, that confession or statement would be fully admissible, even if the suspect did not have a lawyer present, unless there was some other reason for the statement to be excluded. No such reason is mentioned in the question. It is simply not the case in the US that a confession is excluded just because no lawyer was present, nor is that the law anywhere that I know of. If the police failed to give the warnings when they were required, then any statements or confessions would be excluded. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) says: law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Footnote 4] As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. That tells you exactly what the police are forbidden to do. Nowhere does it say that a lawyer must be present. Indeed it says the opposite: The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That means that s/he can confess after being warned, and such confession would be admissible, provided that s/he knew and understood those rights. |
Can previous crimes that one was found "not guilty" of be used against them? Carl the criminal robs a store as his first crime. Somehow, he is found not guilty of this (the 12 jurors do not unanimously agree on his guilt). After walking free, he immediately goes back to the same store, and is caught again as a suspect from committing the same exact crime. Double Jeopardy says you can't simply be tried over the same exact instance of a crime. Still, my 2 main questions are Even though Carl was found "not guilty" the first time, can that first case be used as evidence against him for the current second case? If Carl is found guilty for this second case, can the sentence be extended to include consequences from the first case (which it is probably obvious now he should've been found guilty for). Or does Double Jeopardy protect Carl from having that first case used against him in any way? This is just one simple example. In a more extreme case, consider a murder. Carl was found "not guilty" of murdering Mary, but was found trying to murder the rest of Mary's family the next day. P.S.: the impetus for this question is inspired by Yakuza Judgement. In it, a character refuses to defend themselves from a crime they're accused of, because they don't want to admit to another crime they committed. | What you are describing is closely related to "acquitted conduct sentencing". On the first point, "Carl's" previous acquittal cannot be considered evidence that he committed a later crime; the subsequent crime must be tried on its own merits, in isolation. However, for your second question, once convicted of that crime, his previous acquittal (rather surprisingly) can be taken into account during his sentencing. Many legal minds have found the practice of "acquitted conduct sentencing" extremely troubling, and there are hopes the US Supreme Court could prohibit the practice in the near future. But for the moment, it is still an allowed practice. Summary article here "This practice allows judges to use conduct a defendant was acquitted of by a jury to increase a defendant’s sentence or punishment for a separate crime. This tool essentially allows judges to veto a jury’s decision when they merely disagreed with their conclusion." Another good article on the topic Of the seven charges, [he] was convicted on two. Under federal advisory sentencing guidelines, the two convictions generally warranted a sentence of 24 to 30 months in prison. The district court, however, calculated a range of 87 to 108 months, based on the charges on which [he] had been acquitted. [he] was then sentenced to 84 months (seven years) in prison. [He] was indicted on seven charges, convicted of two, and acquitted of five. But his sentence was exactly the same as it would have been had he been convicted by the jury of all seven charges — and three times as high as it would have been had the judge considered only the two charges of which the jury convicted [him].” | Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy. | Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question. | You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal. | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial. | The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.) | Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect. |
Why did Christopher Tran warn Judge Kelly about the Minister for Immigration's power to cancel Djokovic's visa? I find this detail in the recent Novak Djokovic's Australian visa saga quite interesting. On Monday, 10 January 2022, when Judge Kelly delivered his decision to reinstate Djokovic's visa, Christopher Tran (the lawyer acting for the government) told the judge that the Minister for Immigration is now contemplating using his "personal power of cancellation" (which is exactly what happened days later and was sustained by the Federal Court on 16 January 2022). So, when Mr Tran said that to Judge Kelly, the judge thanked him for the warning, adding: "I could have been something approaching incandescent if I had discovered that for the first time... this evening or the early hours of tomorrow." Why did Mr Tran warn the judge? Was that an attempt to make the judge change his mind and think again, like "look man, why bother reinstating the visa if it will [possibly/probably/likely/definitely] be cancelled anyway"? Is that what should be read between the lines? If so, how does it sit with lawyer/courtroom ethics and the expectation of judicial independence? Mr Tran would have known that Judge Kelly was supposed to make decisions independently on the merits of the case — not taking into account what the exec branch of the government might then do. Does what Mr Tran said to the judge demonstrate that he in fact did not necessarily expect the judge to be entirely independent, but expected him to possibly be prone to make decisions taking into account the politics and what the government might do? Was that the exec branch attempt to bully the judicial branch? | Video of that portion of the hearing can be found on the court's YouTube channel. It doesn't seem like anything nefarious. My interpretation is that Mr. Tran is just giving Judge Kelly this information because, if the Minister for Immigration does cancel the visa, Djokovic will probably challenge that decision as well, meaning more court proceedings and more work for Judge Kelly. So Judge Kelly appreciates knowing about this in advance, so that he and the court staff can immediately start getting ready to handle that case, and plan their schedules accordingly. This is based on some further context in the video, around 12:00. Judge Kelly says (with some editing on my part): It would be extraordinarily difficult for anyone else to get up to speed if there is to be another Tait v. Queen [[1962] HCA 57] type application. So I expect to be fully informed in advance if I am required to continue to be available for any further [unclear] proceeding that is to be sought. [...] Now if I am to be called on short notice to deal with another interim injunction [...] this court is fully entitled to be informed, in the way that you have quite properly done this afternoon and for which I am grateful. Is that clear, Mr. Tran? Also note that Mr. Tran prefaced his remark (around 6:15) with "to avoid any unintended discourtesy to Your Honor and court staff -- I wouldn't want Your Honor and court staff to hear this through any other means." This fits more with the idea that he's informing the judge just so that he knows what's coming. Mr. Tran knows that this will be an inconvenience for Judge Kelly and he wants to minimize it by making sure he has as much advance notice as possible. Finally, note that Mr. Tran's statement about the probable visa cancellation comes immediately after Judge Kelly had just pronounced his order (2:10-6:10), ordering that the visa revocation be quashed and that Djokovic be released, and ending the proceedings in the case currently at hand. I'm not even sure whether the judge could unilaterally change his mind at that point. But if Mr. Tran had wanted to influence Judge Kelly's decision, you'd think he would have said something much earlier. Waiting until after the decision was announced seems much more like he is trying to avoid even any appearance of trying to influence the decision. | Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual. | So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts. | The Star Vancouver has a good article outlining the actual charges. Meng is not charged with "violating an embargo" but with defrauding U.S. financial institutions. It may be easier to report that the "crime" is violating sanctions but it's a little more nuanced. Meng is charged with defrauding U.S. financial institutions in order to avoid sanctions. From the article: The U.S. authorities allege Meng committed fraud by telling an HSBC executive her company was in compliance with U.S. sanctions against Iran limiting communication technology. The meeting took place in 2013, but the location was not revealed. HSBC is based in London with operations in the United States. Joanna Chiu, the Star reporter who followed the bail hearing, tweeted: US banks became concerned about the relationship between Huawei and subsidiary SkyCom. Meng told banks the two were separate when in fact "Huawei is SkyCom. This is the alleged fraud". Supposedly, the claims were in a PowerPoint presentation made to a financial institution in 2013. As a result of those claims, banks in the U.S. cleared financial transactions for Huawei. The nexus between Meng, Huawei, SkyCom and U.S. law is Meng making claims to HSBC that Huawei is not related to SkyCom inducing U.S. based financial institutions to unknowingly engage in transactions that violated sanctions with Iran. Thus, the fraud charge against Meng. | You cannot stop the claim. But the good news is that claims of jurisdiction by many countries are routinely ignored by many other countries. So enforcement attempts might fall short. I've written things here that might get me into real trouble with the authorities of North Korea if I ever traveled there and if they were able to match my real-world identity with this account. But I don't plan to travel there. Likewise, before I went to Turkey I should probably review what I've written about their government, and then wonder if it is worth the risk. Probably yes, it wasn't very incendiary. But my home country and those I tend to visit (if there is no pandemic ongoing) would not extradite me for what I wrote. | It's not regulated by international law. Depending on the laws of the intended destination country, it may be the case that none of the members of the family are permitted to enter, or that they can enter, but only two can enter as a "couple", while the others are legally completely separate (or even excluded from the country). According to one blog, at present in the United States, a foreign national must actually intend to practice polygamy in the United States to be ineligible for an immigrant visa. The current law does not prevent a polygamist or someone who practiced polygamy in the past or expresses a belief in polygamy from being eligible for an immigrant visa. But aliens coming to the United States to practice polygamy are barred. Before 1990, there was a law on the books by which someone who merely "advocated the practice of polygamy" could have been barred. This question has been answered on Quora for the U.S., again for the U.S. (where the question asked about "US and EU"), and for Canada. Basically, the whole family can't legally immigrate as a unit. However, determining who is the "real" wife, if any of them, would depend on the facts of the case, the specific laws of the target jurisdiction, and the purpose of the determination. It could very well be that every one of the other marriages would void a new marriage in the destination country and entitle the children to child support, but none of them would entitle the wife to a spouse's visa or the father to visitation rights after a purported divorce. See also this answer about whether it's possible for a married immigrant to commit bigamy by entering the United States pretending to be unmarried. Sure there are people who try, and it's more likely to succeed with the cooperation of the foreign spouse(s), but it's against the law and can be grounds for deportation, imprisonment, annulment of the second marriage, or exclusion of any polyspouse who is outside the country. | Your main misunderstanding is that opposing counsel cannot testify. He can ask a question, such as "Did you say ...?", which provides Einstein an opportunity to answer in a way that maintains the credibility of his testimony, but consel cannot just enter his own testimony into the record. In addition, counsel on "his side" has the opportunity to pose appropriate clarifying questions, e.g. could ask "Did you repudiate that idea 88 years ago?", though there is a problem that the attorney may not have the technical expertise to recognize the subject-matter question that they should ask. Expert testimony does not attempt to determine the state of scholarship in an area, it attempts to resolve a specific factual matter. The two are not the same thing. Einstein would not testify as to what his general and special theories of relativity say, except in a bizarre universe where some person is accused of the crime of denying the theory of relativity. Instead, he might be testifying for the defense, where the defendant is accused of an act that (it turns out) is physically impossible in light of the theory of relativity. If Einstein had been in the habit of posing random mutually-contradictory conjectures on a weekly basis, opposing counsel's question could be relevant to establishing that the witness's testimony is not reliable. Theoretically, counsel could "hint" that the witness is scientifically flighty, so Einstein would have to have a credible explanation for changing his position. It is easy to demonstrate that scientists in general do change their positions as knowledge expands, so Einstein's burden would not be very substantial. | In general the act must be a crime in both countries for an extradition to proceed, but the extradition treaty between countries A and B likely has more specific provisions as well. C's involvement is generally limited to consular assistance, but there have been instances where countries have offered to incarcerate their citizens for convictions in other countries. The country of citizenship certainly does not have priority to extradite or try its citizens, and it is unlikely that the country seeking to prosecute would have much interest in another country taking over the case. |
Why do courts reserve the verdicts for later? The courts of law (including the Supreme Court) in India often "reserve" the verdicts after hearing is completed. What's the purpose behind this practice? | Good decision-making may take some time. During the hearing the judges will hear/see what the parties say, and may: Come up with a decision and voice it right away; or Tentatively come up with a decision, but wish to deliberate/research it further to be sure; or Find it difficult to figure a decision. Extensive deliberations/research will be required. Those are the official reasons. In practice, if the court is not so independent or is corrupt, the judges may secretly consult whoever they see fit before reaching a decision (politicians, parties to the case who bribe them, and so on). | Can a jury render a verdict that contravenes with binding precedent? Yes, but (if it is a guilty verdict) it will be overturned on appeal. The appeal court will say that the jury's verdict was not one which any reasonable jury could have made on the basis of the evidence and the instructions in the case. As explained in Dave D's answer, the trial judge will have explained the law, including the binding precedent, to the jury. So if we get to this stage then the jury is disregarding instructions. The above process is the remedy. You may notice a 'gap' where the jury can unlawfully acquit a person and there's nothing anyone can do about it, because of the rule against double jeopardy (that is, you can't appeal against an acquittal). This is called jury nullification, because the jury has nullified the relevant criminal law by acquitting an offender. | First, while most US court systems do have rules against frivolous lawsuits, most judges are loathed to employ them because the punishment is that the vexatious litigant would be denied the use of courts for when they do actually have a case of merit. Declaring someone a vexatious litigant also does not 100% block someone from filing suits. Normally they can file if a judge or officer of the court (i.e. a lawyer) signs off on the case. Since most lawyers won't touch the kind of cases that vexatious litigants tend to file, the litigant tends to be representing themselves pro se (Lawyers taking these types of cases tend to get disbarred quite quickly as they are effectively taking money from clients who they ought to know don't have a snowball's chance in hell... with global warming in full effect... in an El Nino year). Furthermore, being declared a vexatious litigant in one state does not ban you from filing in another state and most election cases at the time of writing have yet to reach the Federal Level (and even then, such a declaration is not a nationwide ban. It only bans the litigant in federal courts. All 50 states have to separately ban the litigant in their own legal system). Secondly, while there are a number of cases over the past election that were dismissed, only a handful were filed by Trump's legal team. Many were filed by down-ballot Republicans or even voting citizens in many cases who's desired outcome just happens to align with Trump's desired outcomes. While most have been dismissed, it's wrong to say they were filed by Trump or his legal team. The right to litigate election results is quite broad as to who has the standing to file these cases and it varies from state to state. Finally, not all cases dismissed are dismissed "with prejudice" which means that while the case in it's current state is not acceptable for a court to hear, it's not without merit to be heard once the deficiencies are amended. As an example, one early case filed and dismissed was seeking an injunction to stop the vote-counting until the court could rule on the matter of how well ballot observers could actually "observe" the ballots being counted. However, between the time the case was filed and the judge heard the case, the ballots were all counted, which meant that the relief sought by the plaintiff (i.e. Trump) was physically impossible to grant BUT the legal question of whether ballot observers were allowed to properly observe the counting is still valid, so it was dismissed "Without Prejudice" which means the plaintiff could amend the case and refile as the relief needed to be changed. Essentially the judge is willing to at least hear the arguments but cannot grant the relief for damages sought. In the U.S., Judges cannot hear cases that are moot, even if there is a valid argument to be made (to give a criminal angle to this, yes, a judge should hear the evidence that a man committed mass murder... but only if that accused mass murderer is still alive to be punished... if he's dead there's really nothing the Judge can do.). | Courts do prioritise cases that need urgent resolution, regardless of the parties' nobility or net worth. The process of prioritising is not open to the public though: it is hard to prove that nobility/net worth do not play a role. In any event, the Djokovic's cases did need urgent resolution for obvious reasons: he had his visa cancelled and was liable for immediate detention and expedited deportation. As to whether anyone else needed justice more urgent than he got it — go figure. | Yes Ideally a case will be conducted by the same judge throughout, however, there are a multitude of personal, professional and administrative reasons why this might not happen - litigation can take years and like every other workplace people come and go, have changing family circumstances, sickness, vacations etc. A litigant should not be alarmed and trust that the new judge has got themselves up to speed. For most people, litigation is a rare and confusing experience, for judges it’s just another day at the office. | People are routinely and almost universally defended by lawyers in serious criminal cases in both civil law country and common law country legal systems. The availability of counsel for the indigent in cases involving petty crimes varies, but not in a way systemically related to the common law v. civil law distinction. It has more to do with the available supply of lawyers. The lawyer's job isn't very different, despite the fact that the lawyer has an audience of a panel of judges rather than a judge presiding over a decision making jury, although obviously lots of fine details (e.g. concerning the procedures for presenting evidence) are different. In both cases, defense lawyers call the attention to the facts favorable to the defendant's case, offer up evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant if the lawyer can obtain it, argues to the court regarding how the evidence should be interpreted and what inferences should be drawn from it, and argues regarding any ambiguities in how the law should be applied to these particular facts. Furthermore, in most criminal cases, in both civil law countries and in common law countries, guilt or innocence is not the primary issue. The primary issue for criminal defense counsel in most cases is assisting the judges in determining the right sentencing option on the right charges for a defendant who pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial of some crime, based upon the character of the crime and offender that is presented to the court by the lawyer. This part of the process is very similar indeed in the two systems. Typical issues might include an assault case where the issue is whether there was serious bodily injury, justifying a more serious sentence, or mere ordinary bodily injury, justifying only a less serious sentence, in a case where it isn't clear cut at the guilt and innocence phase, or arguing whether probation and a fine, or incarceration is a better fit to a minor offense, in the sentencing phase. It isn't entirely or primarily about "legal loopholes" in any system, although "legal loopholes" tend to be more important in U.S. criminal law than in many legal systems. There are some places in which civil law courts are more open to consider a defendant's arguments than others (and many civil law countries decide serious criminal cases with a panel that is a mix of legally trained judges and lay jurors), but that can vary wildly from country to country and within a country as well. | "Precedent" refers to a finding of what the law is. A jury only finds facts, and operates (supposedly) within the meaning of the law as already established. All the jury reports is "yes" and "no" to questions of fact (with some reference to existing law): they do not report, at least in any official way "we interpret the law as saying X". So it would be impossible for a jury to "set precedent" in the case law sense. In a notorious case, they might "set precedent" in inspiring other jurors to act similarly, but this is not enforceable precedent in the way that case law precedent is. In the US, if the jury acquits the defendant, that is the end of the matter and there is no re-trial. As for the UK, I am not sure but I think that the prosecution being unhappy with the jury's decision does not create an exception to the double jeopardy rule. | This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe. |
Are attorneys discouraged/disallowed from having therapists? Lawyers defend many genuine criminals who, after being freed, would go on to continue to commit terrible criminal acts. I would imagine that it is a profession that is extremely taxing on one's mental health. That being said, I assume that Larry the lawyer, after successfully defending someone, can't just go to his therapist Theodore and blab "I feel like I just let a murderer go", no matter how important it is for Larry's mental health. Mental health is important for all people in any profession. But are lawyers, who deal with some of the darkest parts of society, discouraged/dis-allowed from interacting with therapists? Even if Larry the lawyer tries to obfuscate the details (e.g. "I have a friend who just defended a murderer"), it's pretty clearly something that's bound to break attorney-client privilege. So I'm not sure what the answer might be. Edit: upon further reflection, this question may be generalized to "borderline breaking NDA by opening up to your therapist". The therapist is obliged to keep things confidential, and their therapy can be considered a medical necessity just like a neurosurgeon's (depending on whom you ask). So I suppose the crux of the problem is whether opening up to a therapist (which can be a medical need) constitutes a breach of secrecy. | I would imagine that it is a profession that is extremely taxing on ones mental health. True. Lawyers defend many genuine criminals who, after being freed, would go on to continue to commit terrible criminal acts. This is not a significant reason that the profession is taxing on mental health. Indeed, the pretty much complete consensus of the criminal defense bar is that providing a defense to people who are factually innocent of any crime is much more taxing on mental health than providing a defense to people who are factually guilty of some crime. You deeply misunderstand the nature of criminal defense work (which isn't uncommon), and in particular, the things about being a lawyer that make it stressful and that can cause mental distress. Day to day work as a criminal defense lawyer is psychologically, for the most part, more like being a car salesman who is constantly haggling over prices and making deals, day in and day out, than it is a major moral dilemma. That being said, I assume that Larry the lawyer, after successfully defending someone, can't just go to his therapist Theodore and blab "I feel like I just let a murderer go", no matter how important it is for Larry's mental health. Without addressing the issue of whether privileges material can be revealed to someone who is subject to another privilege (which is a tricky legal issue to analyze),it is entirely possible to engage in fruitful psychotherapy without revealing attorney-client privileged material. In part, this is because the things that you think that lawyers find to be the source of their mental health worries aren't what actually is the source of those worries. One thing that is desirable, however, about practicing in a law firm rather than as a sole practitioner without associate attorneys or staff, is that it does provide someone with whom you can readily and on a daily basis discuss attorney-client privileged matters related to your work. This isn't mostly a mental health thing per se. It isn't that you provide psychotherapy to your colleagues. But, some people process the details of their work life better when they can talk through it with a fellow professional and the process of reaffirming and challenging your own professional judgments. This can bring you a general mental clarity about your work that helps to overcome a "lack of bandwidth" feeling that can lead to mental stress. More generally, practicing law outside of a law firm without professional colleagues is simply lonely, which is a mental health stressor in its own way. | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions. | The most important consideration is whether you're giving advice "as" something special. An example would be claiming to be a medical doctor and advising people to do something clearly harmful such as "take 10 Tylenol and call me next week". In such an extreme case, there could be criminal charges. Less severe would be an accountant giving grossly wrong and incompetent tax advice to a client, in which case the accountant could be civilly liable. (For instance, telling a client "you don't have to declare royalties for textbook sales"). In such cases, a client depends on the professional to give competent advice, and you rely on him to work according to a certain professional standard of care. There is a difference between the standard of care that an ordinary "reasonable person" owes to any other person, and the standard of care owed by a professional in an area. What would be excusable bad advice that I might give on how to build a wall would be inexcusable if given by an engineer. The basic idea is that if you interact with a person (even indirectly, manufacturing something that a 3rd party buys), you have a certain duty to be cautious. If this is just an ordinary-person on ordinary-person interaction, then the parties (both parties) are expected to exhibit the degree of caution that a "reasonable person" would exhibit (attempts to pin down what a "reasonable person" would do have proven impossible, though juries always know subjectively what a reasonable person would do). However, your duty to not give bad advice is offset by the advice-taker's duty to not take bad advice – that is, if a reasonable person would know that taking 10 Tylenol is a bad idea (thus I, as a non-physician might have some duty to not give such stupid advice), then the person who stupidly took 10 Tylenol was contributorily negligent in taking the 10 Tylenol. As far as I can tell, if you do not represent yourself as a member of a technical guild (lawyer, doctor, accountant, many others) giving technical advice in that capacity, and you are not directly contracting with a person (i.e. they hire you to give them advice on how to keep your yard from falling over the cliff), then you can say stuff like "If X, then you should Y", and not have to pay if someone does that Y and they suffer a loss. | The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well. | Based solely on what you've described, what the lawyer did is inappropriate if, in fact, it occurred without any prior permissions. However, since you are not the actual client, it may be that you lack pertinent info, because this would be exceedingly rare behavior. Lawyers are allowed to make procedural and "expert"/professional decisions about your case without your consent, and do so all the time. As a general rule: we decide who to depose, what expert(s) are necessary to prove your claim, what questions to ask in discovery, what to say and when to say it when attempting to settle, and what witnesses to call vs. not to call at panel or trial. All of that is in the purview of the attorney's general discretion and work product. However, attorneys cannot diminish, amend, or settle your claim without your permission, unless you've signed a limited representation agreement and/or a prior authorization to do these things with a waiver of consultation on issues relating to settlement. (It is not uncommon for a client to say, "My bottom line is X; hence, you have my permission to settle the case for anything over that amount.") A client may also, subsequently, give verbal consent, saying things like "just do your best and get what you can". Contingency and Total Award Strategies Since you aren't the one having entered into the contract, you may not be privy to the existence of these types of contingencies. Agreements like this are very common when an attorney takes a weaker med mal claim. It may be that the lawyer will only take the case to the extent that they will try to settle, and may even file the case, with the understanding that they will never try the case. It is a way to try to get you as much as possible when all facts come to light, without agreeing to the expense of a trial. This happens a lot. In these situations, when you are trying to settle a claim that ends up being much less valuable than the attorney thought when he took the case, the insurance carrier will often say, "We will pay X on the claim if Doctor Doe is dismissed out," or something like that. Often lawyers intentionally over-file, in hopes there are two carriers (the more insurance the more money to make you go away) that they can try to settle with. When it turns out both docs are covered under one insurance carrier, then the weaker claim will often get dismissed out. It is a strategic decision to add them, and to dismiss them – and this is very common. Proving malpractice against one doctor is hard enough; trying to prove that you are the victim of double malpractice, back to back, is nearly impossible. All of that said, even if a client has entered into these types of limited or decisional authority-granting agreements, the lawyer still has a duty to keep the client apprised of what's going on. The client may decide later they don't like how little the attorney is stating the claim is worth (despite being forewarned this may happen, it happens all the time that when it actually occurs the client is not happy). In that case, they have the right to find a new lawyer, but that will be very difficult to do for a few reasons: (1) the original attorney is entitled to get paid for the work done under a theory known as “quantum meruit,” so other attorneys will be hesitant to get involved; (2) they will put a lien on any recovery for the amount of time and expenses, to be paid from any settlements or awards (and they get paid first, before the client or the new lawyer); (3) if a client gets angry and says they want to just drop the case rather than have the lawyer make more than the client, even after a year or more of work, all of the costs will still be owed by the client; (4) the potential new attorney will call the one who has the case and ask about whether the client has unreasonable expectations, if their case has any value, etc. Keep mind, if an attorney is doing the things you've described, they probably would suffer no love loss if the case went away. Malpractice in Context It very often happens, especially in medical malpractice cases, that a client will come in and describe the case one way, and then when the medical records arrive and the attorney and/or the paralegal/nurse-para review them, and all the facts get flushed out, it turns out things occurred a bit (or a lot) differently than the client described or recalled in the first place. This is typically not a matter, 99% of the time, of the client lying to the attorney, but rather it is merely the phenomenon of memories being based on their perception of the events/their care, rather than verifiable fact and established medical standards. (This is why eye-witness testimony is so notably unreliable: 10 people can witness the same event and there will inevitably be 10 different descriptions.) One thing all clients should be told by their lawyer (and you should only hire an experienced medical malpractice lawyer for these cases) is that bad outcomes do not equal negligence. Lay people often think that if something bad occurred while under the care of a doctor, this is the case, but it is not the measure of malpractice. Sometimes, even when the doctor does everything according to their specialty/industry standard, bad outcomes happen. Malpractice/negligence only occurs when they have deviated from this standard of care - outcome notwithstanding. The inverse is also true, when it comes to a bad outcome. The doctor may have breached the standard of care, but this cannot be determined by the patient - the law requires expert testimony to establish this. Sometimes bad outcomes are just the risk of the procedure. This is why patients sign (but rarely read) the informed consent forms, that describe in detail, and state the patient is aware, of all the potential bad outcomes that may occur during the procedure. Negligence, or a "breach of the standard of care" occurs when the typical physician (not the best expert in the world, just the normal, typical doctor in that field) would have found the actions to be unreasonable and never acceptable given the totality of the circumstances. Once you prove that, you then still need to prove that is what caused your damages (not the disease, or the ailment itself). Unfortunately, even with the best physicians, bad outcomes happen all the time. It is very common, to the point of being almost predictable, that a medical malpractice claim's value will depart from the original ballpark estimate of value that an attorney tries to "best guess" at the outset. When your attorney tries to value a case, they roughly estimate your "special damages", which consists of medical bills, lost income, lost earning capacity, and other quantifiable sums. Then, they must try to assess the market rate award for pain and suffering for the type injury you've sustained. This is only guesswork, based on jury verdict reports, reported settlements, and the jurisdictional leanings toward large or small verdicts (comparatively). As the case evolves, as facts come to lights, as experts are consulted - this is when these estimates can largely deviate from the original guesstimate based on very limited information. Risks of Contingency Representation At any rate, when a lawyer takes a case on contingency (when they agreed to get paid only if they recover, and not until they recover, aside from out of pocket expenses), they do this because they've relied on the client's account of what happened, as well as their initial assessment of the records, usually prior to hiring an expert (if they even intended to hire one because they agreed to take the case all the way through trial). You must understand that attorneys don't like when a case loses value any more than the client; in fact, probably less as they are the ones who've invested often hundreds of hours in the case at that point. This is how they make their money. Thirty-three percent of a small amount is not the same as that of a large amount. And many, many hours go into these cases. An attorney can make far more than their hourly rate on a great case, but this is balanced by making far, far less on cases whose values plummet as facts come to light. When a case appears to lost much of it's initially estimated value, the attorney will still try to maximize recovery; however, it may not seem that way to the client because after they take their third, and then recoup their expenses (which is on top of the third and is the responsibility of the client win-or-lose), clients can end up with almost nothing. This is because the expense of these cases is enormous and it is the problem with that area of law and the system in general. It is not uncommon for a medical malpractice case to cost, out of pocket, $200,000 or more! This is why so few people are able to get a lawyer to take these cases, and often when they do, it's on the very limited basis I described. Med Malpractice Primer Med Mal cases are some of the hardest cases to win and they are by far some of the most expensive cases to try. This in not accidental. Depending on the state you live in, tort reform (a legislative effort to limit the amount of medical malpractice claims filed and tried overall, as well as limiting their total recovery) can range from limits on damages, to very short windows for statute of limitations, to the requirements (like where I practice) where you must literally try the case twice – once before a med mal screening panel, who hears all your witnesses just as a jury does, and then decides whether the case should (and in some cases can) go forward. In some states (I happen to practice in one) the findings are admissible in court (not the evidence but the finding). So, if the MMPT screening panel finds the doctor was not negligent, or was, but the damages were within the standard disclosed potential outcomes, so there was no causation, or myriad other things, if you decide (or in some states, if you even still get to go to court) the defense gets to say to the jury that the legislatively enacted Med Mal Pre-trial screening panel found X (no negligence, causation, or damages – or all three). These panels are usually comprised of a lawyer (75% defense lawyers) or a judge, and two doctors who are biased against these types of cases in the first place). Also, if your expert gets torn apart on an issue during panel phase, anything they admit can be used against them in the trial. I say all this to help you understand that these cases are made, by the legislature, to be very hard to even find a lawyer to take, very hard to win, and exceedingly expensive to litigate. This is based on the (fallacious) theory that medical malpractice claims should be limited to the most serious claims because this litigation is so costly, and so impactful on the rates all citizens pay for insurance, that the legislature has seen fit to make them very difficult to prosecute, thereby weeding out weak claims. Bottom Line If the client truly feels their lawyer did something they did not have permission (either explicitly in writing, or verbally) to do, they need to talk to the attorney, explain their discomfort with the situation, and figure out why it occurred and if it was truly in the best interest of the case and the client. If the lawyer cannot adequately answer those questions, they should get a second opinion. The client can demand that anything the attorney did be undone, if it was the type of thing that is in the client's control. One would need to see the engagement letter and retention agreement, and also be privy to the conversations. It is, unfortunately, not uncommon for a client to say they understand what the lawyer is proposing when they don't. If you find that's the case, you may have them ask that all determinations be put in writing, with an explanation as to why. | Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court. | This is a valid question that comes up from time to time. The answer can be a bit fuzzy and the law on questions 1 and 2 is often not well spelled out. This answer refers only to U.S. legal history without much customization for Maryland in particular, so I may omit references to some relevant Maryland specific statutes or cases of which I am not aware. Often there is no statutory guidance or there is only inconclusive or vague statutory guidance. There is often also little appellate case law precedent to provide guidance. The issue comes up far more often than it is litigated, in part, because these issues tend to become moot before they can be resolved by a precedent creating appellate court, and because statutes addressing the issue tend to be recent and not yet litigated, or non-existent. These issues are often highly time sensitive and don't have an economic prize to spend money litigating over are often not litigate to the maximum extent. Court rulings when cases are presented to them often depend a lot on the procedural context of the way the issue comes up, how the issue is framed by the litigants, and upon the court's gut feelings and upon unwritten social norms. For example, one recent case involving the ability of a priest to visit a man who was sick with COVID-19 in a Maryland hospital notwithstanding hospital visitation policies was resolved in the context of a complaint to the Maryland Office of Civil Rights and would not be generally applicable to an intrafamily dispute as opposed to an allegation of religion based discrimination. The hospital's opinion is often given outsized weight, since it is a "neutral" party in a family dispute, has a vested interesting in having litigation resolved that is more economic than that of the family members, and is likely to have counsel that is most familiar with the issues presented. this is true even though often, a hospital has a religious affiliation or is for some other reason specific to the facts of a case is not truly a "neutral" party in a visitation dispute and takes a position for a non-medical reason. As a young lawyer at a law firm that represented a hospital, I handled cases like these for a hospital when they came up for a couple of years, because nobody more experienced wanted to deal with these emotionally draining and time consuming conflicts with few monetary rewards for the hospital, and because the stakes from the hospital's perspective were low, so junior associate attorneys could be trusted with this cases. Appellate courts also often frame these decisions as fact bound case by case questions decided under general considerations applicable to all forms of injunctive relief in civil cases, rather than questions presenting more general questions of law to which general policy rules apply. Furthermore, the conceptual foundation in which we think about the authority of different family members over an incapacitated person at common law has shifted materially since the 19th century when these issues started to arise, and mostly hasn't been formally discussed by the courts as applied to these particular situations in the meantime. So, even when there are old precedents governing these situations, there is doubt regarding whether they are still good law, because the old precedents are based upon assumptions about spousal and parental and family member rights that no longer hold in other areas of the law. See also an analysis of issues of visitation and medical decision making for disabled persons, primarily under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and related regulations, with footnotes particular to Maryland's state laws on the subject. Can E block B, C and D from visiting A in the hospital? What legal authorization form(s) can person A fill out and provide to B, C and D to prevent that from happening if this is a serious concern? The right of a private individual to visit someone in a hospital is usually not codified into law and is usually a matter of hospital policy within reason, acting in the best interests of its patients from a medical perspective. Usually E could only block B, C and D from visiting A in the hospital (1) with the cooperation of the hospital based upon its own policies (since as a practical matter, the hospital is generally in control of the situation and has broad authority to restrict access to its patients for health reasons), or (2) with a restraining order or protective order obtained from a court, or (3) as a legal guardian appointed by a court of person A (who generally has the authority to decide who their ward can interact with). In old common law cases (usually mid-19th century or earlier, but sometime in the early 20th century), the spouse of a married person (sometimes only the husband of a wife, but not vice versa), or the parents of an unmarried minor or unmarried person more generally, had the rights of a legal guardian with respect to an incapacitated person, and a family member had authority to make decisions for an incapacitated person as next of kin, in the absence of a parent or spouse. But, for the most part, this is no longer legally enforceable law. The Married Women's Property Acts of the late 19th century and early 20th century generally eliminated the authority of a spouse to act as legal guardian of an incapacitated spouse without a court order, sometimes subject to cases of "necessities", and control of personal family property like a marital residence, household goods, or vehicle titled in a spouse's name alone that the competent spouse used in the ordinary course prior to the incapacity. The authority of a parent or next of kin person to take action for an incapacitated person without a court order was largely abrogated by state probate codes establishing court procedures for guardianship and conservatorship appointments for incapacitated people giving spouses, parents and next of kin priority, but not authority in the absence of a court order, except in the case of minor, unmarried, unemancipated minor children. And, even then, it is rare for statutes for expressly grant parents that authority over the children by statute and the authority is merely assumed as background common law to other statutes limiting that authority in cases of child abuse or child neglect, and some kinds of decisions still need court approval even in the case of parents of unemancipated, unmarried minor children. Documents specifically authorizing visitation are rare (I've never seen one in real life outside a civil union of a same sex couple), although states with "civil union" laws enacted before same sex marriage was legalized, often expressly afford a civil union partner visitation rates with priority over other family in hospitals, despite the fact that the status quo law is often ill defined. Hospital policies that denied visitation to de facto civil union partners were an important driving force in causing civil union legislation to be adopted with the support of legislators who didn't have a strong feeling about gay rights as an overall matter and who were otherwise indifferent to the economic rights of civil union matters but adopted the rights of married couples because it was the mindless default way to adopt a body of pre-existing law with little serious thought or fact rich informed deliberation. This is, in part, because visitation is not a matter over which a patient at a hospital has unilateral decision making power. Hospitals generally have their own policies regarding visits to patients. See, e.g.,, discussing the University of Maryland's hospital visitation policy. Usually, a hospital will honor a patient's reasonable request to not allow someone to visit them (out of general respect for patient autonomy). But, a hospital will often decline to allow a patient to have visitors out of concern for the best interests of the health of the patient even when a patient would like to have a visitor (e.g. a hospital would often refuse to allow someone with a recent positive COVID-19 test to enter an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) even if the patient would like to visit that person). Even here, however, the conceptual foundation behind traditional hospital practices related to visitation have shifted. The modern view is to more strongly respect the personal autonomy interests of a hospital patient than hospitals did in the past (the trend started to shift more strongly to a patient autonomy mindset in the late 1950s and gradually shifted toward greater patient autonomy in that time frame, particularly, following the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill). Hospitals are loathe to create a situation where their express statutory, contractual, and/or common law authority to regulate visitation could be overridden by a patient, and laws related to hospital visitation are rarely adopted by a legislature over the objection of the hospital lobby. What legal authorization form(s) can person A fill out and provide to B and C so that they get precedence in medical decision-making authority over E? Many hospitals would give E priority over B and C and D in making medical decisions for A, if A is incapacitated and there are no court orders or legal documents that provide otherwise, as a matter of policy. And, these policies are often traceable to the mindset associated with the old common law rules that no legal have binding legal effect. But some states have a scheme in which the hospital makes unilateral decisions in the best interests of the patient as they see it, unless B, C, D and E (and possibly other people designated by mutual agreement) jointly agree on who should make those decisions. See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-18.5-103 (Proxy decision-makers for medical treatment authorized--definitions). On paper, Colorado is such a state, although in practice, a hospital would offer listen to a spouse over other family anyway. I don't know if Maryland is such a state. I could not easily locate any statute in Maryland governing medical decision-making authority for an incompetent patient in the absence of a health care power of attorney or the equivalent or a guardianship proceeding, although my search was not exhaustive. A document commonly known either as a medical power of attorney, or a health care power of attorney, or a health care proxy designation made by a competent person who does not have a legal guardian appointed for them at the time, can designate someone such as B and C to have priority over E in making medical decisions for them. This document would be controlling absent a court order to the contrary, and usually a court would give authority to the person named in that document (although a court is almost never required to do so without regard to the suitability of the person seeking court ordered decision making power). |
Can someone use good deeds to "bribe" their way to innocence? Question inspired by Yakuza Judgement. Carl, the huge rich criminal, is on trial for a murder he obviously committed. But during the trial, he looks at the 12 jurors and says "if you let me go, I will donate 100 million dollars to the Red Cross. What's more important: me being in jail, or 100 million dollars to charity?" Clearly, at least one of the jurors might resonate with this point, and refuse to say Carl is guilty. So what is supposed to happen in this case? Btw, please don't focus on the "letter" of my question, but instead, focus on the "intent" of my question. Maybe Carl's money gets impounded, I don't know. The point is, Carl's arrest does more harm to the world than actually letting him be free. P.S.: For those curious, in the actual game: Carl is on the brink of curing Alzheimer's, but commits a crime. But what if Carl brings up the fact that putting him in jail means millions of people suffer/die from Alzheimer's? Edit: to be clear, no actual bribery is going on. Carl isn't saying "I'll give you $100 if you let me free". What's happening is Carl has so much good he can do for humanity (e.g. donate millions to charity, take care of children, cure important diseases, etc.), which he can't do if he were in jail. At which point, many jurors might consider that the world would be better off with Carl out of jail (so he could do good for the world) than in jail (solely so that Carl could suffer). | Carl may not do this, as he would be prohibited from making this argument at trial. At trial, evidence must be relevant, meaning that it makes a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Because the trial is meant to determine whether Carl is or is not guilty, his promises of future philanthropy have no bearing on the matter. And even if they somehow did, Carl still would not be able to tell the jury about them because they would be blocked under Rule 403, which excludes evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by its risk of biasing or confusing the jury. If Carl attempts to make these statements anyway, he risks a mistrial, which means he has to start over with with a new jury. In some jurisdictions, Carl may, however, be permitted to make this argument during the sentencing phase, where the court can properly consider the societal effects of whatever punishment it imposes. At this point, though, it's obviously a little late for Carl, as it presumes he has been convicted. | The purposes of criminal justice include (this list is based on the Sentencing Act 1991 in Victoria): Deterrence Rehabilitation of offenders Denunciation ('this behaviour is wrong') (Retribution can also be a purpose.) What the question is talking about is rehabilitation. As discussed in the book 'Starship Troopers', you can't expect a person to improve their behaviour if they are not shown how. Some simple examples in practice include violent offenders being sent to anger management classes, or bad drivers being sentenced to remedial training. Why aren't all offenders put into rehabilitation programs? Some reasons include: Cost. It would be very expensive to offer all the rehabilitation which would help all offenders. Often this kind of thing is court-ordered, so if the judge does not know about relevant programs or does not assess the offender's needs correctly, then the offender will not be sent to them. The offender is unwilling to participate in programs that are available, and there are limits to how much coercion a given society is comfortable applying. There is no 'one size fits all' rehabilitation. Some people need to talk about what makes them use drugs, others need to talk through their childhood issues, others need training so they can get a job and not fall back into bad habits when they are released from prison. Perhaps North Korea has a great curriculum for putting lots of people in a camp and they come out model citizens, but I'm not aware of the details. Can a person really be forced to do anything? Even the army can't do that. The army might put you in prison, but that's redundant for a person who is already a prisoner. You can always threaten to kill them, I suppose, whip them, or brainwash them with electrodes perhaps, but that depends on your principles as a society. I think it's fair to say that, these days, the trend is towards what the question suggests, which is putting as many offenders as possible into rehabilitation. In 2014 it was reported that Texas took the money it would have spent on building a new prison and used it on rehabilitation instead, and there were suggestions that that worked well. | Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case. | How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent. | Bribery always involves a public official or person with a legal duty (such as a witness in a legal proceeding). It is illegal for such a person to accept a bribe. See 18 USC 201. We speak metaphorically about "bribing" when we aren't actually talking about the same thing as the legal concept. Seen as a contractual matter outside the legal concept of bribery, a contract requiring a person to cover up a violation of the law would be unenforceable. However, it would be the crime of extortion to threaten to expose the criminal, so to rule that out, we would have to assume that the criminal knew that Jones could rat him out, and he offers Jones money to keep quiet. If the agreement were to "not testify", then that would be bribery. In other words, we have an almost perfectly innocent person, who acted entirely legally (did not extort, is not a public official, did not accept money in connection with testifying in court), and accepted money given for an unenforceable purpose which was breached. Their only fault was accepting payment to not turn a criminal in (and even then, they did turn him in). I can't find relevant US case law that definitely rules one way or the other. I believe though that the court would not order the money returned to the criminal – the court would do nothing to validate such a contract. | If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this. | would this be illegal in the U.S.A.? This would almost certainly fail under the US Constitutions 8th Amendment as being a "cruel and unusual punishment": Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted While the inmate has been sentenced to execution, they are still afforded a lot of protection and are entitled to a stay of execution at any point (which is why there is typically an open telephone line to the state governor etc right up to the point at which the execution starts). Being deliberately put in harms way to catch a killer just because they have been sentenced to execution would be both a cruel and an unusual punishment. | Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president. |
Is an attorney allowed to turn on their client? Inspired by Yakuza Judgement. Say that Andy the Attorney is potentially representing Dave the defendant. But while they talk, Andy finds Dave to be a repulsive human being who's obviously guilty of the crime. As a good human being, Andy quits being Dave's attorney, and instead airs out all the dirty laundry to the prosecution, to get Dave locked behind bars for good. Are there any consequences for this? Can Andy be charged with anything? Can Dave declare a mistrial? Etc. Edit: I didn't want to give explicit examples, but what if Dave was openly admitting to having committed the crime, and was boasting about committing more crimes as soon as Andy gets him off the hook. At some point, isn't Andy allowed to, as a good Samaritan, turn on Dave? What if Dave was openly boasting about acts of terrorism he was about to commit, etc.. Is Andy forced to be a tool/bystander to Dave's villainy? Is Andy ever allowed to take action against Dave without consequence? Similar to how even therapists are allowed to speak up if their client is dangerous. | Andy would be almost immediately disbarred and might also be held in contempt of court. Andy would be disbarred for reasons including his violations of the duty of confidentiality owed by Andy to his client Dave under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in a context like this one. This would be considered an open and shut blatant violation of one of the highest and most serious ethical obligations that an attorney has, and is neck and neck with the rule against stealing money from your clients as a ground for near automatic disbarment. The clarity and severity of the breach of professional ethics by Andy in this regard (and other aspects such as his fiduciary duties to his clients and duty of zealous and diligent advocacy for his client) leaves no ambiguity regarding the appropriate level of discipline. Andy might be held in contempt of court for reasons including knowingly disrupting a court proceeding in which he was or is an attorney of record. He can't quit representing Dave until the court grants his permission to do so. Dave's trial would probably not go forward or his conviction would be set aside. In all likelihood, a trial with a new prosecutor not exposed to the information would be arranged to avoid the taint of the breach of privilege. This would be because providing the prosecutor with inadmissible evidence taints the ability of the prosecutor to proceed untainted by inadmissible evidence and would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel which is one of the grounds for setting aside a conviction for a violation of the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution, which grants the right to effective counsel. what if Dave was openly admitting to having committed the crime, This is utterly irrelevant. Criminal defense lawyers aren't only or mostly for innocent people, and their main job isn't really to get people acquitted of crimes they committed. Instead, a criminal defense lawyer's job is to hold the prosecution to their duties to prove their case, to force the criminal justice system to comply with civil liberties protections, to prevent convictions of excessive charges for the conduct committed, and finally to secure appropriate sentences for their clients (which usually means negotiating a plea bargain). Criminal defense lawyers prevent defendants from being convicted and sentenced in circumstances where they wouldn't have been convicted or sentenced if they weren't ignorant of the legal system (which most criminal defendants are). what if Dave was . . . was boasting about committing more crimes as soon as Andy gets him off the hook. A vague statement like this does not trigger any right of Dave to take any action differently. It's basically bravado or a statement about his own character in general. What if Dave was openly boasting about acts of terrorism he was about to commit, etc. If he was about to commit an act of terrorism but was thwarted, Andy needs to keep his mouth shut. If Andy knows that Dave is about to imminently commit a specific terrorist act then this very distinct fact pattern raised different issues and belongs in a separate question. The crime-fraud exception to the duty of confidentiality, and the way that an ethical lawyer can take appropriate action in a way that minimizes harm to the client, all involve considerations very different from those in the main question. Is Andy forced to be a tool/bystander to Dave's villainy? Is Andy ever allowed to take action against Dave without consequence? The duty of a lawyer not to use his services to further a crime is also a very distinct fact pattern. But, failing to report imminent unilateral acts by a client in furtherance of a crime or fraud is very different from not using information about a client's past actions or vague future intentions against the client, and is also different from using a lawyer as a tool to commit a crime or fraud. These are three distinct situations. A different analysis applies to each one. | The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client. | If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | Charlie may or may not be guilty of murder or of attempted murder. It depends upon his intent and knowledge, which the question doesn't flesh out sufficiently to evaluate. Why did Charlie bodyslam Bob? The reason matters a lot. Did Charlie know that the building was on fire? Was Charlie trying to kill Bob? Was the thing that Bob knocked his head upon an intended result of the bodyslam, or an intervening cause? Did Charlie's initially less culpable act and his knowledge combine to create a duty to rescue and what offense (probably not murder) would it be if a death resulted from a failure to rescue? Alice is likely to be guilty of murder, but on a felony-murder theory, rather than on a transferred intent theory. In most, but not all, states if you are in the process of committing one of an enumerated list of specific felonies that pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as arson, you are guilty of murder in the event that anyone (even a co-conspirator) dies as a result of your felonious course of conduct, whether or not you intended that a death result. Alice might have been able to purge her felony-murder liability if she had tried to put out the fire and save Bob once she realized that he was in danger, under the exception to felony-murder for renunciation of a course of felonious conduct, but she didn't even try. The doctrine of transferred intent in a murder case usually applies when you intent to kill one person and instead end up killing someone else. But, Alice didn't intend to kill anyway, so this doctrine does not apply. Alice's best defense would be that the death was a result of the attack by Charlie, rather than by the fire, which she would merely have to establish a reasonable doubt regarding. But, ultimately that would be a weak defense for her. | The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge. | This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud. | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. |
Implications of lots of non-permitted work in a house purchase/sale Looking at houses, we have found one that has been completely redone (footings to rafters in many places) but without permits for the most part. The original house was from 1908, it was redone and added onto in the 1970s, and the current owner redid nearly everything in the 2000s-2010s. I know the owner so I'm not personally worried about the work (he also had plumbers/electricians out for work outside his expertise). We like the house, but I'm worried about the future implications of trying to sell a house of entirely un-permitted work. Has anyone had experience with this type of situation? Here are some sub-questions related to things I'm most concerned about, but any related experience is welcome. Are there any legal implications with a lot of un-permitted work on a home? i.e. would I be responsible for permits/fines if any? Will not having permits be a "non-starter" for any processes? I.e. mortgage, insurance, valuation, etc.? Will not having permits reduce the value of my home? Will having lots of unpermitted work make it harder for me to sell the home at a later date? If I want to ger a permit for work I want to do on the home, will there be complications? | Consult a lawyer These issues are quite common and their impact depends on your jurisdiction (usually local governments handle this) and the attitude of your potential lenders/buyers. In most cases, local governments have the power, in extremis, of ordering the demolition of unpermitted work. However, this is normally done only when the work is irredeemably unsafe or adversely affects the amenity of neighbours. More common might be an order to make good any defective work, possibly to current rather than historical codes after which they will retroactively grant the permissions. Some lenders will refuse to lend if there are unpermitted works. Others will only lend against the unimproved land value less the cost of demolition. The same is true of insurers. As for buyers, well, its making you stop and think, isn't it? Common solutions are to make your offer contingent on the current owner cleaning all this up before you close or offering less to cover the risks you are assuming. This may cause you to miss the property but that's the risk you run. | Every lot on the subdivision is and always will be acquired “through the Developer” Unless the developer still owns it. Somebody is the heir or assignee of the Developer - that’s who you need to seek approval from. Even if the Developer was at some point a company that got liquidated, the right of being the Developer would transfer to the creditors of that company. | You can read about Magnuson Moss here, but it only applies to warranties on goods, not services. As you note, the warranty on the unit is still valid. As for agreeing, it is not unusual that a consumer is not aware what all they are agreeing to when they buy a house. One of those myriad signatures that you put on myriad documents was your agreement to contract terms in the pile of papers that you were handed. If you trace through the entire pile of pieces of paper, you should find something saying that you agree to "all of the attached conditions", which is where you are supposed to say "Wait, what conditions?". | The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion). | While this question was initially posed as a request for legal advice, I've stated some general principles of this kind of situation generically. You are deemed to have "constructive notice" for legal purposes of all documents filed in the public record pertaining to your property whether you know it or not. You are also on notice of anything that a reasonably informed person could assume to exist from observable facts (like that existence of municipal water and sewer service) upon an inspection of the property. In terms of reasonable expectations, almost every urban home is subject to multiple utility easements. If your home has (or most homes in your neighborhood have) municipal water service, municipal sewer service, electrical service, and cable or telephone lines, there are almost certainly easement in place for all of these things. Typically, in a contract for the purchase of real estate, there is a fixed deadline for you (or a title company on your behalf) to review the public record to find what is there. If you don't object by that deadline to any title issues, you can't get out of the real estate contract or undo it. Typically, the deed from the seller will contain an exclusion from the warranty of title for "all easement of record." If the title insurance policy contains an exclusion for easements, you can't make a claim against that title insurance policy. Even if there weren't an easement in the public real property records, anything that has been there since 1911 would benefit from a "prescriptive easement" which is the equivalent of adverse possession a.k.a. squatter's rights, for easements. In New Jersey, for example, the prescriptive easement time period is usually twenty years and never more than sixty years. Furthermore, utilities usually have the power, delegated to them by the government that grants them permission to operate or by the state, to create new easements at the very modest price associated with a reduction in fair market value caused by the easement. This is often estimated to be half of the fair market value of the unimproved land per square foot times the actual square footage occupied by the utility when it isn't working on its infrastructure. Easements, once established, run with the land, and generally can't be removed without the permission of the party for whose benefit the easement is granted a.k.a. the owner of the dominant estate (in legal terminology, the utility's rights in the easement are called the "dominant estate" and the home owner's rights in the property subject to the easement are called the "servient estate"). There may be implied in law duties of someone using an easement to restore damage caused after using it, but it wouldn't be worth suing over that for a bit of displaced grass and a rose bush. | I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious. | I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with. | Since the contingency is in the contract and has not been removed, if the purchase falls through due to not selling the existing property, they will get their earnest money back. That was the whole point of putting the contingency in the contract in the first place. |
Can the prosecution fight for the defendent's innocence? Bob is accused of a crime (let's say murder). Bob is a self-hating man who wants to be punished. He admits to the crime, and hires a lawyer to push forth his guilty plea. The prosecution, however, doesn't want to convict him of the crime, because they believe that the true culprit is still out there, and that Bob is just being ridiculous. In this case, is it possible to have a trial where the prosecution is trying to prove Bob's innocence, while the defense is trying to prove Bob's guilt? Edit: if it's so hard to believe that "the state" would prosecute for a case like this, then assume that the case is between two private parties. E.g. Bob admits to murdering Penny's pet cat. Penny trusts Bob, and wants to prove that he didn't murder her cat. | He cannot enter a Guilty Plea until he has been charged with a crime. He would only be charged with a crime if the Prosecution believes they have enough evidence for a conviction. If they believe "the true culprit is still out there", they would not arrest or charge or attempt to prosecute "Bob". He can hire an attorney, and go on TV and say he is guilty, and beg to be prosecuted. The District Attorney (or similar Office) can simply respond, "We are aware of the claims by Bob. At this time, we do not have enough evidence to support charging Bob with a crime. The investigation continues." Somewhat ironically, if they have substantial evidence that Bob is not the murderer, he can then be charged with Making a False Report. | There is no cognizable grounds for a criminal prosecution in those circumstances. There are also no cognizable grounds for Bob to deny paternity, or to bring a civil action against Alice. Bob will be obligated to pay child support and to have all of the responsibilities of an unmarried co-parent with Alice. | It is not as simple as the witness just making the assertion that they are the killer. They will be subject to grueling cross examination to break their story. If the victim was killed at a specific time, perhaps the prosecution can prove the witness was somewhere else at that time, and therefore lying. (No Opportunity) If the victim was killed with a specific weapon, perhaps the prosecution can prove that only the accused had the weapon, and the witness had no access to it, and therefore lying. (No Means) If the victim was killed in a specific way, perhaps the witness doesn't know any of the details of how the crime happened, and therefore is not credible. (No Knowledge) If the accused's DNA is found at the scene, and their shirt is covered in blood, and the witness has no corroborating evidence against them, then the witness is likely lying. (No Evidence) If the witness claims he is the murderer, the prosecution can inquire as to why he killed the victim. The real murderer had a reason: Perhaps money, power, hatred, passion, etc, that the witness may not be able to provide. (No Motive) Planting doubt in the mind of a jury is an effective defense. But lying about who did what, when, how, and why it is not as easy as you suggest. | No. The true accuser is the state and the state always has standing to enforce its laws. This is an injury in fact. The judge would laugh at you and probably then double the fine for your insolence. This defense would be considered frivolous. | was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity & import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly "Carol's sake" entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's "good legal reason" does not necessarily have to protect or advance "Carol's sake". | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness. | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? |
Can a U.S. President's doctor refuse to answer medical-related questions asked by a Congressional committee? Say that in the event that the 25th Amendment was to be invoked due to the suspicion that the U.S. President was no longer physically and/or mentally capable of performing his/her Presidential duties, can the doctor(s) of the U.S. President be ordered to appear before a Congressional committee to answer questions about the mental and/or physical state of the U.S. President, and if so, can he/she refuse to answer any or all questions perhaps due to HIPAA laws? Or, would the doctor(s) be allowed to plead the 5th Amendment in order not to answer any medical-related questions about the U.S. President? | The Fifth Amendment would not apply, because nothing in the testimony would incriminate the doctor. Indeed nothing would be at all likely to incriminate the President either, it is not a crime to be unable to carry out Presidential duties. It is likely in such a case that the President would waive confidentiality. In that case the doctor could testify freely. If the President insisted on confidentiality, and attempted to prevent the doctor from testifying to Congress, there would be a conflict between the power of Congress to compel testimony, in this case on what is clearly a vital national issue within the scope of the needs of Congress, and traditional doctor-patient confidentiality, let alone the requirements of HIPAA. I am not sure how this conflict would be resolved. There might be an emergency application to the Supreme Court, but the SC does not usually do very well with truly urgent issues. The Pentagon Papers case and Bush V. Gore indicate some of the problems that can arise. If the doctor was prevented from testifying, that might incline members of congress to think the testimony would not be favorable to the President, and thus tend to suggest that they should not approve the President resuming or continuing his or her powers and duties. But that is rather speculative. The 25th has never been invoked, and the detailed procedure that would be followed if it were is not very clear. I am not aware of any similar situation in which medical testimony has been demanded to deal with an urgent issue, but the patient has attempted to block it. I think this case must be considered to be undecided until it actually arises and a court rules. | Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president. | While there is an act that President Trump and his supporters are citing, titled the Presidential Records Act (PRA), to accuse House Speaker Pelosi of breaking federal law, it is important to understand what actions the law accounts for. The act mandates that the President of the United States preserve records and other laws governing the federal government. This serves as a form of checks and balances to prevent the president and his advisers from shielding documentary information from public view. The act is fairly new, as it was passed in 1981. It is important to realize that this law does not apply to print outs or widely circulated documents. Moreover, the copy of the State of the Union that she was given is not a governmental record. Therefore, House Speaker Pelosi did not violate the Presidential Records Act, nor any other federal law. However, it is open to debate whether Pelosi's action was appropriate, though I will not supply my opinion on that matter. | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | Art II, Sec 2, Cl 1 of The Constitution says of the president "and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment". The Constitution does not state any further restrictions on the presidential power, and there are no statutory limits, because, as observed in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control. Accordingly, presidents have written pardons on and with numerous different writing instruments. Insofar as there are no constitutional restrictions beyond the aforementioned, it is not required that a pardon be signed, or that it be on a tangible semi-permanent medium. It is impossible to know what such a pardon tweet would look like, beyond the limit on length. The one place where a presidential signature is required is under the Presentment Clause, that when presented with a bill that passed the two houses of Congress, "If he approve he shall sign it". Such a signature need not be actually written by the president, it may and often is written by an autopen. The question of the legality of autopen signatures for bills has not been presented to SCOTUS, but the Department of Justice has issued an opinion (July 7, 2005) that it is legal. I have failed to locate a repository of presidential pardons (the actual documents), so I do not know if, so far, all presidential pardons were written down and signed, though I would expect it to be so. The Arpaio pardon was signed (or auto-signed), likewise Obama's final mass-pardon on Jan 17, and previous Obama pardons were, but pre-Obama, DOJ does not provide any document. | No, That Would not be treated as a Conflict of Interest There is precedent. The four Justices appointed by President Nixon did not recuse themselves on cases involving Nixon, including subpoenas to turn over White House tapes recording conversations involving Nixon and his close advisors. Indeed it was a decision against him in such a case that apparently was the final thing that caused Nixon to resign. It is worth noting that there is no binding law or rule of practice specifying when a Justice must recuse, which is different than the rule for all other Federal judges. Congress could pass a law imposing a mandatory code of ethics on the Justices, but has not done so. | In the US, it depends on why you are doing this, and how you go about performing the operation. There are approved devices and procedures, and there is the other stuff. In an emergency that is life-threatening or threatens severe debilitation, it is permitted for a physician to try an extreme measure – if the state has a "Right to Try" law. Otherwise, a review and official approval by the relevant IRB is required. The devices are regulated by the FDA, but the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so the feds don't have a say in whether a procedure is allowed. Nevertheless, use of unapproved devices can be taken to be evidence of failing to meet the required standard of care, in the case of a malpractice suit or punitive action by the state regulatory board. There is no specific law prohibiting removing lots of organs and replacing them with prostheses, though arguable what happened was that the brain was removed (it's not that a replacement shell was built around the person). Ordinarily, intentionally "killing" a person is illegal (except in case of sanctioned execution or self-defense). There is zero case law that would tell us whether removing a brain from a body "kills" the person. Most likely, there would be a prosecution for unlawfully causing a death, and either the legislature would tune up the law w.r.t. the definition of "causing death", or the courts would do so. | Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation. |
Is it legal to publish a cease and desist letter that I have received? I've received a cease and desist letter for defamation from a local businessperson that I believe to be without legal basis - the actionable statements listed are clearly statements of my opinion. Would it be legal to publish this letter publicly, or send it to a newspaper, to let people know that this businessperson is throwing their legal weight around and bullying community members to try to protect their reputation? To clarify this is a completely separate question from "is it legal to perform the actions listed in the letter" - I'm asking if sharing the letter itself is legal or illegal. | Is it legal to publish a cease and desist letter that I have received? Generally speaking, yes. My interpretation of your post is that you published your opinion about a business or businessperson, and the businessperson now is trying to intimidate you or deter you from sharing with others your opinion. The phrase "the actionable statements listed are clearly statements of my opinion" is otherwise unclear. Under defamation law, only false statements of fact are actionable whereas statements of opinion are not. The businessperson is not entitled to your silence. If your criticism is about the business, the cease and desist letter sounds in unfair and misleading practices to the extent that the business is trying to conceal from the public some inconvenient information that you as actual or potential customer possess. Even if you published as a competitor, your statements would have to be untrue and misleading for these to constitute disparagement. See the Black's Law Dictionary definition of disparagement [of Goods]. For the reasons stated in the other answer, copyright issues are not a matter of concern. It is preferable to publish the letter as is. Transparency preempts confusion as to "I said, he said". By contrast, paraphrasing the letter for the purpose of avoiding an imaginary violation of copyright creates a risk of you inadvertently giving him grounds for a claim of defamation. | Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement. | No one can give you a meaningful answer unless you specify what jurisdiction you're in. Assuming you're in the United States: There's no liability for defamation. The company using your picture isn't saying anything about you. Whatever you might feel the implications are, the reasonable reader would not view the ads and conclude that you are actually sick or struggling financially. Even if they would, it is not defamatory to say that someone got sick or that they are struggling financially. As you indicated, those implications would merely be unflattering, and there is no liability for saying something unflattering about someone. There's potential liability for "misappropriation of likeness." One of the four commonly recognized privacy torts covers the misappropriation of a plaintiff's likeness. The classic case would involve the use of a celebrity's name or picture to sell a product that she has not endorsed. Some states allow lawsuits for misappropriation; others do not. Even among the ones that do allow it, there is some variation as to the facts you must prove to win the case. As I recall, some states require that the defendant use the name or likeness for commercial purposes and some require that the plaintiff's likeness already had some meaningful value outside the context of the misappropriation in question. If you're interested in pursuing the case, contact a lawyer with experience in privacy torts in your jurisdiction. | You need permission to copy unless fair use applies Does this mean that when someone sends you their resume, it is unlawful to pass it on to others unless the author gives permission? First note that copyright law only applies to copying. If someone were to give you a physical copy of their resume (assuming such a thing would happen in this day and age) then giving this to someone else without copying it is not copyright violation. There may be privacy issues involved but that’s another issue. Further, in the United States, there is a fair use doctrine which allows limited copying without permission in certain circumstances. This is likely to apply in a lot of situations around copying resumes. Finally, permission does not have to be explicit. For example, if you receive a resume in the course of a job application then permission to make copies for that purpose can be assumed to have been implicitly given. Can you get sued if the resume finds its way to someone the author did not intend to see it, and the author suffers some harm as a result? Under privacy law, possibly. Under copyright law, no. What you can be sued for is making a copy. It doesn’t matter where this ends up. Is distributing a resume in the context of professional networking considered as implicit consent to allow sharing with anyone under the US legal system? No. It’s explicit consent because those networking sites have Terms and Conditions that explicitly deal with copyright. For example, if you post your resume on LinkedIn, you agree to this. | BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others. | I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario. | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. | Pretty much everything you need to know about the ownership and licensing of your material on Medium is in the Medium TOS you contractually agreed to when you signed up with the service. Basically, you granted Medium a license to use the work, but you did not agree to an exclusive license nor turn over copyright to them. Part of that Terms of Service – Medium Policy reads: Content rights & responsibilities You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. You’re responsible for the content you post. This means you assume all risks related to it, including someone else’s reliance on its accuracy, or claims relating to intellectual property or other legal rights. You’re welcome to post content on Medium that you’ve published elsewhere, as long as you have the rights you need to do so. By posting content to Medium, you represent that doing so doesn’t conflict with any other agreement you’ve made. By posting content you didn’t create to Medium, you are representing that you have the right to do so. For example, you are posting a work that’s in the public domain, used under license (including a free license, such as Creative Commons), or a fair use. We can remove any content you post for any reason. You can delete any of your posts, or your account, anytime. Processing the deletion may take a little time, but we’ll do it as quickly as possible. We may keep backup copies of your deleted post or account on our servers for up to 14 days after you delete it. Pertaining to presenting Medium content in an iFrame on another site, this is reasonably close to not allowing that: You may not do, or try to do, the following: ... (2) access or search the Services by any means other than the currently available, published interfaces (e.g., APIs) that we provide;... You can use Embed Code Generator | Embedly to embed an iFrame of a Medium page on another site. But contacting Medium via the email at the bottom of the TOS would tell you for sure if it is OK. Comments on your pieces on Medium do belong to the owner. And You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. appears to cover the idea of copying your material from Medium to your own site. If in doubt, ask them. |
Can bills (the documents of laws/legislation) have pictures? Or text only? Can images become part of the legal code? Asking out of plain curiosity. I tried googling, but just couldn't find a combination of keywords that didn't bring up irrelevant results. Laws become law when the congress approves of a "bill" - a document that dictates and explains the terms of the law. I've only heard of laws being represented as text only. But that seems limiting in the modern era and all the things we have to make laws about now. I'm curious if any of these documents used pictures or images in their explanation of the law, and thus if there are any images now part of the legal code. I'm not interested in seals or letterhead or other decoration. Only an image that is part of the content of the law. Such that when a judge interprets the law they'd need to consider the image. For example if they passed legislation protecting an endangered species and the bill contained a picture of the animal that would count. I'm hoping someone can answer this about the US because that's where I'm from. But I'd also be happy to hear of examples from around the world if they exist. I know it might seem like a silly question, but it's interesting to me. Thanks in advance if you can answer. | Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to. | This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist. | Each directives page on eur-lex has a "national transposition" page. For example, directive 2009/65/EC, concerning UCITS, is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32009L0065. There is a navigation box at the top left with several relevant pages: Text Document information Procedure National transposition Summary of legislation (Before the recent site redesign, these were shown as tabs across the top of the page, so for the lack of a better term, I will call these "tabs.") The Document information tab shows, among other metadata, relationships with other EU acts. One useful section on this page is the All consolidated versions section, which is a set of links to consolidated versions of the document, indicated by date. The answer to your question is the National transposition tab, which shows "National transposition measures communicated by the Member States." It is worth noting the disclaimer: The member states bear sole responsibility for all information on this site provided by them on the transposition of EU law into national law. This does not, however, prejudice the results of the verification by the Commission of the completeness and correctness of the transposition of EU law into national law as formally notified to it by the member states. The collection National transposition measures is updated weekly. The list of national acts is in the form of links, which lead to pages that seem designed to present the text of the national legislation, but in the examples I have checked say nothing more than "Text is not available." Perhaps there are some instances, or will be in the future, where these contain links to national legal information sites. As it is, there is enough information to enable one to search the national sites to find the relevant legislation. | Here is a list of language-regulating bodies. There is none for English, but they exist for Spanish (Real Academia Española), French (Académie française) and Swahil (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa for Tanzania, Chama cha Kiswahili cha Taifa for Kenya). No language regulator addresses the issues which arise in the interaction between natural language and the needs of legal interpretation. Instead, these bodies generally strive to maintain the historical "purity" of the language. Rather than "define" a word like "sandwich", they decide whether to outlaw (or disparage) the word because it comes from English. The vast majority of language-related problems in law which arise in common-law countries pertains to characteristics of common law and the practice of establishing precedent. There are philosophical conflicts, for example between those to adhere to the text versus those who try to discern original intent. If we had an official agency that precisely defined what a "weapon" is, we would still have the struggle over interpretive philosophies which renders moot any rulings from the national language regulator. In the US, part of the problem of word-definition is the widespread practice of localized redefinition in statutes – the laws that say "In this subsection, 'weapon' has the meaning defined in 18 U.S. Code §920" (fictitious: §921 defines "firearm" undefined "weapon"). Tracking the scope of definition and range of variation of a word within a body of codified law is very difficult. The rule in common law is that words that are not statutorily defined are given their "ordinary" meaning. There is no authoritative resource for "ordinary meaning" in English (there is no such thing as "the" dictionary). In the US, it would require a constitutional amendment to immutably impose a particular dictionary standard for deriving word meaning (e.g. Webster's Fourth New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, forthcoming) and there would be ensuing political protests. A legally precise definition of "repair" would be very difficult to understand, and would require hiring a lawyer in order to engage in the activity of "repairing broken windows", from a legally-safe perspective. And that is just word meaning. Ambiguity in sentence-meaning cannot be resolved by listing the sentences. | Congress cannot be sued for enacting a law. Period. The courts do not have the power to punish Congress for passing a law, they cannot forbid Congress from passing a law, they have no say over what the wording of a law can be. Only Congress has the power to determine what laws they pass. The courts do, of course, have the power to interpret and even strike down a law that they deem to be unconstitutional. This is the essence of constitutional separation of powers. | Posting such a pic and statement may give grounds for a lawsuit, but probably not Overview That is going to depend very much on the the jurisdiction, and on the specific facts. If the statement that the pictured person owes a debt is false, this may be a case of defamation, but that was explored thoroughly in Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? and its answers. See FindLaw's page "What Is Invasion of Privacy?" for an overview of the classic privacy torts. See also this page quoting the Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 652 See further the Wikipedia article "Privacy laws of the United States" which gives a history of the four torts. Note that not all US states recognize all, or indeed any, of the privacy torts. Nor do all non-US jurisdictions. In some places these torts have been recognized, or blocked, by legislation, in others by court decision. And in the US they are limited by the federal First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Right of Publicity,aka Appropriation There is, in general, no right to privacy in one's physical appearance under any of the standard privacy torts, except that if one's likeness is being used to advertise something, or imply sponsorship or approval of a commercial product, many jurisdictions protect a right of publicity (sometimes called the tort of Appropriation of Name or Likeness). But here it does not appear that the image is being used to advertise or promote or sponsor anything, so that would not apply. Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion The tort of Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion would only apply if the picture were taken on someone's private premises or somewhere else there the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Otherwise it would not apply, there is no general right to privacy for a picture taken in public. Private Facts The tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts could possibly apply if the fact of the unpaid debt had been carefully kept secret, and if its disclosure would be highly offensie to a reasonable person. But nothing that is a matter of public record can be the subject of such a suit anywhere in the US, because under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) publication of facts derived from public records is protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, even against a specific state law granting protection. This will obviously not apply outside the US. False Light If the statement of the debt were true, but in some significant way misleading, the tort of False Light might apply. This is described by the Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 652E as: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Note that the standard of (b) above is the same as the "Actual Malice" standard for defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public figure. False light cases are in many ways similer to defamation cases, and some jurisdictions have treated themn as identical tro defamation, while otrhrs do not recognize them at all. Nothing in the facts stated in the question would imply a false light claim, but more context might possibly support such a claim,. Conclusion Nothing in the question clearly indicates that any privacy-based tort would apply, but the facts are stated it a very brief way in the question. Further context and detail might clarify the answer one way or the other. This answer is largely based onunited-states law, althoguh some of it will apply elsewhere. | Yes, maybe australia In Australia, child abuse material is classified as the sexualised depiction of persons under 16 (or in some cases 18). This applies under both State and Commonwealth laws. Common charges in NSW will be possessing, disseminating or producing child abuse material under s 91(H) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Further Commonwealth offences can be found in circumstances where a communications carrier has been used for the purposes of delivering child abuse material. Within this field, there are subtle variations in circumstances. The court would need to decide if the pictures were a “sexualised depiction”. Context matters. I don’t know of any cases on point but convictions have been secured for sexualised cartoons of children and pictures of fully-clothed children in sexual poses. | If the photos are exact or "slavish" reproductions of flat (2D) art, then under Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) the photos are not original, and have no copyrights of their own. If the art was not under copyright (for example published before 1924) then neither are the photos. If the art is still under copyright, the photos are "copies" and the permission of the copyright holder (of the original art) is required unless they fall under the fair use exception, which photos taken for and used in classroom instruction, and for no other purpose, might well fall under. However, if the photos are so taken that angle, lighting, filters, and other aspects under the control of the photographer make a difference to the photo, then they will generally constitute new works, and if the art is under copyright protection, will be derivative works of the originals, and both the copyright holder on the original art, and the photographer will hold rights. One rule of thumb is if the photo shows the frame of the painting, it probably has original elements of lighting and viewing angle. The more the photo approximates a scan of a flat work of art, the less original it is. Photos of sculpture, architecture, and other non-flat (3D) art works (and objects) inherently involve artistic decisions about viewing angle, lighting, etc, and will pretty much automatically be original enough for copyright protection. If the original art is out of copyright but the photo is an original work the photographer will hold rights, but no one else will (unless the photographer sells or transfers the rights). In that case it does not make much sense to call the photos "derivative works" as that term is intended to indicate that the works are subject to another's copyright, which these are not, because there is no copyright on the original. Or one could call them derivatives of a public domain work -- the effect is the same. Under the case of Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), a work must have a certian minimum degree of originality to be protected by copyright under US law. Both Bridgeman and Feist are US cases, but many other countries have followed their logic and apply similar rules to copyright issues. It is not uncommon for those who have taken photos of art to assert copyright protection which a court would not uphold, but this will not be judged unless someone copies these photos, and the photographer (or someone claiming through the photographer) sues, and then defense challenges the validity of the asserted copyright. The statements in the text quoted by the OP may be based (in part) on such untested assertions of copyright. |
Legal defense against paying taxes for supporting terrorist? The United States has undoubtedly supported many questionable groups over the years including groups now designated as terrorist organizations. If someone decided they did not want their tax dollars to fund terrorist, nazis, mercenary groups, etc., would this be a viable defense in court regarding the non-payment of taxes? | The first point that is already well-established in law is that there really is a legal requirement to pay taxes, not just federal income taxes, but taxes in general. On rare occasion, there is a legal dispute as to whether something is a tax (Obamacare) or whether a particular authority is allowed to levy such a tax. Let us assume that the tax in question is legally levied. Some taxes are independent of any specific intended purpose (e.g. federal income tax, state sales tax). Some are for a specific purpose (Medicare tax, the taxes that are local school levies). Even when a taxing authority corruptly but legally misdirects the funds designated for a specific purpose, you are still required to pay the tax. It's not that a tax law could not be written which allows a person to refuse to pay a tax if they judge that the revenues are being misdirected, it's that the law-makers did no cripple the tax law with such a provision. As far as I know, no taxing authority anywhere allows a person to refuse to pay a tax is they disagree with the use of the taxes, which is to say, taxation is mandatory, not voluntary. If it is voluntary, it is known as a "contribution". You are allowed to contribute to some governmental purpose, you are required to pay taxes. You can't overcome the requirement to pay taxes on First Amendment grounds (being forced to support something that you don't like). The IRS has a FAQ that addresses the First Amendment argument, with a mass of supporting court cases (US v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252; Jenkins v. Commissioner, 483 F.3d 90; US v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627; Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173; US v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 831; and so on). | Unless there is a law or regulation against it, it is legal. However in a big government it can be practically impossible to determine whether something is legal. For example, nobody even knows how many criminal statutes have been promulgated by the U.S. federal government. And that's nothing compared to the volume of executive regulation and judicial case-law that determines whether something is illegal. I.e., in practice determining that something is legal is a bit like proving a negative. Furthermore, if you look long enough some argue that you can probably find some law under which almost any action could be considered illegal. Note also that even if it is not against the law, it could be proscribed by contract (read your Terms and Conditions!), and breach of contract is in general – but with an astonishing number of exceptions! – illegal. | Article 8 is pretty clear. The fact that it is recommended to extend the draft to women indicates that there is a conflict needing resolution. A relevant case before the European Court of Human Rights ruled on this and found the law to violate articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. They identify an exoneration from the tax under the Military-Service Exemption Tax Act sect. 4. Reading the judgment could be helpful (maybe you know the case). What I get from it is that there are a bunch of situation-specific details that could be applied (e.g. you have to first complain formally in-country before going to ECHR), and issues of disability level and the distinction between disability and illness. This gives a model for anyone to attempt to resist the tax, but only a change in the law will get rid of it. | The Code defines "Source of income" as: lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. There's nothing to suggest that the occupation is a relevant consideration otherwise. What it would mean is that if the occupation of a person is relevant to their source of income, it would be illegal to discriminate on that basis. I would consider occupation distinct from source of income - I could (but don't) have a family trust that is my source of income, and my occupation is volunteer work. My occupation is very clearly not my source of income. | Yes, and this is very common - Cuba, North Korea and Iran are often excluded. Mind you, this is from a US perspective. The banned country may have other ideas about the legality of the ban under its laws. But if you weren't planning to do business with that country anyway, that's not exactly going to hurt you. | The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | NAL, but I used to work for the IRS. GS-0592-08, AUSC W/I CSCI (for non-feds, that means General Sector, series 0592 grade 8, Tax Examiner, Austin Service Center, Division -> Wage & Investment, Section -> Collections Services and Compliance Operations. Yeah, no joke.) And I wanted to add some insider insight to help clarify some of the thoughts already shared here. First off, I feel like clarification is needed because lay people get especially confused about this very, very easily: the IRS is an agency exactly like the FBI, except the IRS falls under the US Dept of Treasury and the FBI falls under the US Department of Justice. Like all federal agencies, both the FBI and the IRS exist to enforce federal law. They're both law enforcement agencies. And again, the difference is the kind of law they enforce: the FBI enforces federal criminal law. The IRS enforces federal tax law. The IRS does not need (and wouldn't accept, not that the FBI would try - completely different jurisdictions) any help whatsoever from the FBI in enforcing tax law, including criminal tax law. The IRS does not disclose tax information; the confidentiality of taxpayer information is more intense than HIPAA. Literally nothing short of an act of Congress or a certain breed of court order can compel the IRS to disclose federal income tax information. (Not going to get into charitable orgs in this answer, but even then, the IRS doesn't make those filings public - the orgs themselves do, public self-reporting is a requirement of maintaining their tax-exempt status.) The FBI didn't get Al Capone; the IRS did. For tax evasion. Anyway, in answer to the OP's question: THE IRS IS NOT ACTUALLY CONCERNED WITH THE ORIGIN OF THE INCOME AS LONG AS YOU PAY TAXES ON IT. Anything and everything beyond federal tax law falls outside the IRS's scope. Which is why uou can write quite literally anything you want on line 80 (or whatever it is these days) of your 1040A (occupation) (technically, as long as you don’t perjure yourself, not that anybody's counting.) It's pretty much just a footnote anyway. As a tax preparer, you can skip it, and even if that line weren’t specifically, explicitly protected by the 5th Amendment, it wouldn't matter if it weren’t, because the IRS does not disclose federal income tax information with any other agencies or organizations under any circumstances. As long as whatever you put there is factually accurate - if you fill it out at all. You can answer in Klingon; nobody cares (unless you write something funny, which we actually appreciate btw ;) ), because it's not necessary to process your return. Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and accurately list all amounts and sources of income I received during the tax year. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge. "Sources of income" means "all the money you got paid, as best as you could record it" - if you got paid cash waiting tables (tips) or slinging heroin, the IRS doesn't care as long as you report the income. You can write "slinging heroin" (it's the IRS, not the DEA) but tax preparer would probably pick the code for "inside sales." When the IRS participates in joint task forces, it is because the IRS's ability to track money is second to none (and even then, IRS involvement in task forces are usually related to terrorism.) The IRS occasionally assists other agencies with criminal law enforcement efforts, but the IRS doesn’t prosecute them and doesn’t involve confidential tax information in them. For example, as far as the IRS is concerned, if you embezzle a hundred grand and then launder it, the IRS’s criminal jurisdiction they’d be pursuing you for would be underreporting (and probably tax evasion.) If you embezzle a hundred grand, but file and pay your quarterly withholding (I never worked in Underreporter but I'm pretty sure fraud would be considered self-employment since by definition it's off the books) you’re in compliance with the IRS’s criminal jurisdiction. And yes, you have the right to itemize deductions, but not every expense is necessarily allowable - for example, some expenses have limits on how much can be deducted. So even if an expense was related to earning income, it doesn't mean you can necessarily claim it, or all of it; gas mileage driving to places you rob at gunpoint, sure - bullets? I guess if hunters or game tourism or shooting ranges / instructors can deduct bullets, a hitman could too, but I’d expect to get flagged for audit to see how much of what is actually permissible. But even if some or all of those deductions ended up being disallowed and you wound up with a balance due, as long as the IRS determines that you were not intentionally seeking to avoid or circumvent tax law, it wouldn’t be a criminal [tax] matter. I'd have to look, but if parking tickets aren't allowable, I strongly doubt bail, fines, restitution, etc. in conjunction with being criminal convictions associated with earned income would also not be allowable. The only way other agencies would gain visibility into this would be if someone were dumb enough to go to court at the conclusion of an audit, at which point the tax situation would become a matter of public record. To illustrate the lengths to which the IRS seeks to facilitate voluntary taxpayer compliance in meeting their obligations, when I was at the IRS in the mid-2000s, there was a program for drug dealers to file quarterly withholding as self-employed using a sort of special sticker book provided by the IRS to use in lieu of receipts. If a professional tax preparer or tax planner were assisting someone who discloses, or starts to disclose that this is actually illegal source income - the tax preparer just puts in a code for whatever comes closest to describing the occupation that earned the most income and the taxpayer doesn't have to be specific as long as they are not untruthful. (Honestly, you really can write whatever you want. Nobody cares. People put stuff down like "pirate" and "bridge troll" as well as stuff like "slinging heroin", "bookie," "racket," "al qaeda", etc.) |
Does the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (or equivalent) cover UK NHS prescriptions? In the UK the NHS provides free-of-charge health care, with a few exceptions e.g. a patient has to pay about £8 per drug on prescription. An NHS doctor prescribes a drug that is unsuitable for a particular patient (tablet form, for a patient that cannot swallow tablets), and the doctor knows this in advance. The patent discovers this when at home, but cannot return drug (for safety reasons). The issue is rectified by a new drug being prescribed. However the patient is expected to pay a 2nd time. If the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applied, then the patient could return the drug as not suitable for the particular purpose. Does the Sale of Goods Act 1979 or some other statute, apply? Or is the NHS exempt? | There is, as far as I can see, no Crown exemption from the sale of goods acts (including the International Sale of Goods Conventions), but unfortunately for this patient the NHS has no liability either in logic or in law. The doctor provided a written prescription, for which there is no charge, and which allows patients to buy certain drugs. The patient took the prescription to a chemist's, which (for money) provided the drug specified in it. Even if the patient had noticed that the prescription was for the wrong form of medicine, the pharmacist has no discretion to alter it; if the prescription specifies tablets, the patient can either buy the tablets or not buy them and take the prescription back to the doctor. In neither case has either the doctor or the chemist committed any conceivable offence regarding sale of goods. (There might theoretically be a case for negligence, but it would never be worth either suing a doctor for an £8 prescription fee or reporting him to the authorities for writing a prescription for the right drug in the wrong form). | Yes. There is both a duty to disclose and permit inspection of certain records (e.g. those that adversely affect either party's case or support another party's case) and a right for the court to demand access to other specific records. In england-and-wales the applicable rules are found in Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example: Standard disclosure 31.6 Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only– (a) the documents on which he relies; and (b) the documents which – (i) adversely affect his own case; (ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or (iii) support another party’s case; and (c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction. Specific disclosure (1) The court may make an order for specific disclosure or specific inspection. (2) An order for specific disclosure is an order that a party must do one or more of the following things – (a) disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; (b) carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; (c) disclose any documents located as a result of that search. Party's control 31.8 (1) A party’s duty to disclose documents is limited to documents which are or have been in his control. (2) For this purpose a party has or has had a document in his control if – (a) it is or was in his physical possession; (b) he has or has had a right to possession of it; or (c) he has or has had a right to inspect or take copies of it. Right of inspection 31.3 (1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except where – (a) the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; (b) the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it, or (c) paragraph (2) applies. (2) Where a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of document disclosed under rule 31.6(b) – (a) he is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but (b) he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. Inspection and copying 31.15 Where a party has a right to inspect a document– (a) that party must give the party who disclosed the document written notice of his wish to inspect it; (b) the party who disclosed the document must permit inspection not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the notice; and (c) that party may request a copy of the document and, if he also undertakes to pay reasonable copying costs, the party who disclosed the document must supply him with a copy not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the request. And, in case there's any doubt that this applies to electronic records: Meaning of document 31.4 In this Part – ‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded; | Informed consent is required for a surgical procedure. "Informed" includes having knowledge of the risks. The relevant legal question would be whether the doctor in question did adequately apprise the patient of the risks. On an individual basis, patient A could sue doctor X for the resulting harm. It is possible that 5 patients might sue the same doctor on this basis, which gets expensive and inefficient. If there is a well-defined and large-enough class, it may be possible for the action to be certified as a class action. 20 people might be a large-enough class. The defendant would be "whoever is responsible for the wrong". That might be a single practitioner, or a hospital that the practitioner(s) work for. The hospital is an obvious plaintiff, if they failed in their duty to assure that their employees adequately informed patients of the risk. | As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine. | There is no "normal" or "standard situation". The parties are free to negotiate whatever terms they like within any limitations imposed by law. If you're unhappy with the proposed terms then you should either negotiate to include a liability limitation clause, refuse to agree the NDA, or consider whether the benefits of signing it outweigh your concerns. If you are entering into the NDA as a consumer and with a trader, then in england-and-wales, you might have some protection from Section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which provides: (1) An unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer. (4) A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer. For example, a contract which imposes unlimited liability on a consumer, while capping the liability of the trader, could be unfair. This will very much depend on all the circumstances and what the contract as a whole says: (5) Whether a term is fair is to be determined — (a) taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and (b) by reference to all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it depends. A term also can't be assessed for fairness if it specifies the main subject matter of the contract (which arguably a liability clause in a NDA does) and the term is transparent and prominent (see Section 64). "I also don't understand the following wording: ...breach of this Agreement may cause irreparable harm to XXXXXX. Therefore, in addition to any other remedies available to XXXXXX, XXXXXX may obtain injunctive relief in the event of any breach or alleged breach of this Agreement without proving actual damages." What this is saying is that, in addition to all the usual actions that the other party could take against you for breaching the NDA (e.g. suing you for damages in the event that they suffer a loss from your breach), they can also apply to a court for an injunction without needing to prove that your breach caused them any loss. An injunction in this case would be a court order requiring you to stop breaching the NDA (e.g. to stop divulging information subject to the NDA). | Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here. | In England and Wales and Scotland, 'licensed premises', i.e. premises authorised to serve alcohol, are obliged to provide free drinking water to customers on request. Unlicensed premises are not obliged to provide drinking water. In England and Wales, all licensed premises "must ensure that free potable water is provided on request to customers where it is reasonably available". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111116906/schedule?view=plain In Scotland, all licensed premises are obliged to provide "tap water fit for drinking" free to customers on request. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/16/schedule/4/paragraph/8/2005-12-21?view=plain In Northern Ireland there is no law providing for giving customers free water on request. Schools in Great Britain (i.e. not Northern Ireland) are obliged to supply free drinking water. England https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1943/made Scotland https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2020/153/regulation/7/made Wales https://www.legislation.gov.uk/mwa/2009/3/section/5 All UK workplaces must provide workers an "adequate supply of wholesome drinking water". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/3004/regulation/22/made | I don't know of any law, state or federal, that would prohibit the disclosure of these facts. Such a law would almost certainly be unconstitutional under Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, (1976). In that case, consumer groups sued to invalidate a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from disclosing the prices of their products to the general public. The state argued that "purely commercial" speech did not enjoy First Amendment protection, but the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that unless it is deceptive or misleading, commercial speech enjoys normal First Amendment protections: Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other ways. ... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering. In this sense, the justifications Virginia has offered for suppressing the flow of prescription drug price information, far from persuading us that the flow is not protected by the First Amendment, have reinforced our view that it is. Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). I'd therefore assume this is just a matter of store policy. From the pharmacy's perspective, advertising its inventory of controlled substances probably makes as much sense as putting up a sign advertising how much money is currently in the cash registers. |
Is one allowed to ask for compensation for their witness testimony? Bob witnesses a murder, so reports the crime to the police. Later, lawyers representing the state/jurisdiction come to Bob, asking him to provide witness testimony. But Bob values his time, and doesn't want to spend hours at the court out of the goodness of his heart. Is Bob allowed to ask for monetary compensation to serve as a witness for the crime? Or does that create a conflict of interest ("I paid this witness $1000, now listen to them support my argument")? | A witness who is under a subpoena cannot condition their appearance or testimony upon being compensated. Usually, a "lay witness" who is not offering expert testimony and instead just testifying about their personal knowledge of the facts of the case, is entitled to a statutory witness fee when appearing pursuant to a subpoena to be paid by the lawyer or law firm or government agency issuing the subpoena. But, this minimal amount is basically only enough to pay for mileage to get to the court house, parking, and perhaps lunch. It is even more minimal than the tiny compensation paid to jurors. It is not unethical for an attorney to pay reasonable actual expenses of testifying to a lay witness to encourage them to cooperate with the process and as a courtesy to avoid inconveniencing them beyond the statutory witness fee. For example, paying the cost of a hotel and dinner the night before if it is a long trip to court so that the witness doesn't have to leave home to go to court at 3 a.m. would not be unethical, even if it exceeds the statutory witness fee. But, it generally isn't proper to pay a lay witness simply to testify. As an example, the statutory witness fees for federal court witnesses in Denver, Colorado, which is one of the most generous sets of witness fees, in part, due to the high cost of living there (state courts are usually less) is as follows: Witness fee per day $40.00 Witness mileage, round-trip (per mile) $0.655 Witness subsistence reimbursement (Denver) (seasonal, Nov. 1 - Dec. 31, 2022 = $232; Jan. 1, 2023 - March 31, 2023 = $241.00;) for an overnight stay $278.00 Witness subsistence reimbursement (Denver) for last day of travel (See General Services Administration per diem website page for seasonal changes [also lists of per diem rates for other Colorado locations], and GSA mileage website page.) $79.00 An "expert witness" testifying on matters of opinion arising from their expertise unrelated to the facts of a particular court case, is entitled to reasonable compensation and normally would testify voluntarily when not under subpoena, pursuant to a retention agreement upon which the expert may be cross-examined at trial to show a potential source of bias. Sometimes a "non-retained" expert witness will testify under subpoena rather than voluntarily (e.g. someone who performed an autopsy on a body in a murder case) because they have knowledge of facts from their personal knowledge that are relevant in addition to having that knowledge enhanced by their professional expertise. Such witnesses generally are compensated at a reasonable rate for their services, but the analysis is different and is governed by the applicable civil procedure statutes and rules in the place where the trial is conducted. | Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much. | As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury. | The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks). | There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later. | The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully. | What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied. | In the united-states, attorneys are almost never placed under oath. Their statements -- whether they are assertions of fact or legal arguments -- are not evidence, and they are not subject to cross examination. There are limited circumstances in which an attorney would be competent to present actual evidence. In such cases, the attorney would be sworn in as a witness and subject to cross examination, but the attorney would likely also be disqualified from acting as an attorney in such a situation under Model Rule 3.7. |
Is there a difference between seizing and impounding items? You hear both terms used to refer to broadly the same action. | Seizing is the taking. Impounding is a possible action after the seizure. Goods may be impounded, or forfeited, or destroyed, or turned over to the legal owner, or something else. If you're hearing both terms referring to broadly the same action, it's because the cases you're hearing about are broadly the same: something is seized and impounded. | No, you could not have prevented them from collecting their belongings But you could have sued for trespass Unless those boxes were part of the contract for sale, they remain the vendor’s property and just like you can’t withhold your mate’s trombone that he accidentally left after that great party, you can’t withhold the vendor’s boxes - that’s called “stealing”. What you could (should?) have done is refuse to settle until the boxes were removed. As the vendor was in breach, if you suffered any unmitigated loss as a result of the delay, you would be entitled to recover it. This is one of the reasons why you should inspect on the day of settlement. Given that you accepted the breach, even though the vendor’s boxes were technically trespassing, they could reasonably raise the defense that they had implicit permission- at least for a reasonable time. “A few days” is a reasonable time. | First, I need to correct a misconception you seem to have. The length of time you spend in jail does not normally determine if something is a felony or a misdemeanor. Whether something is a felony or a misdemeanor is based on how you're charged. And it's not like you happen to be charged with something with a maximum sentence of 365 or 366 days; if you are being charged with a felony, it's because the decision was made that your alleged crime was serious and should be treated as a felony. If you're being charged with a misdemeanor, ditto. Prosecutors charge knowing the difference between the two. The distinction was not originally "punishable by more than a year in prison" vs. "punishable by at most a year." In fact, it originated well before the idea that the default punishment for most crimes is confinement for a term, where the term is dependent on the severity of the crime. The original distinction was about forfeiture. A felony was a violation of a feudal relationship between a lord and a vassal; if a vassal violates their duty of loyalty to their lord, their relationship ends and their property is forfeit to that lord. Not all serious crimes were felonies. Murder was normally not a felony, because it didn't violate that duty of loyalty. Later on (post-Normans), murder and other serious crimes did result in forfeiture. The term broadened to include these crimes; at this point, "felony" meant "this crime results in your property being forfeit." These were also the most severe crimes. This is the point where "felony" meaning "exceptionally severe crime" really became established. However, the technical distinction based on forfeiture became muddied, because of another punishment that almost always went along with it: execution. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, complained that people are mixing these two up. The meaning generally shifted to "crimes which were punished by death," but scholars did know that the proper meaning should really be "crimes punished with forfeiture." The distinction mattered. Because felonies were so serious, the procedure involved differed in several respects. I happen to know you're in the US and my main source is also about the US, so let's hop across the Atlantic Ocean to the colonies. Here, forfeiture was pretty much unknown around the time of independence. The popular understanding of "felony" was still "capital crime;" the legal understanding tended to be "the common-law felonies plus things the legislature designated as a felony." Nearer the end of the 18th century, the number of crimes punishable by death dropped substantially in the US. The default punishment for most serious crimes shifted from execution to confinement in a prison (this is when prison became the default sentence for even very serious crimes in the US). These new prisons were very different from the older jails: they were designed to reform their inmates, and turn them into productive members of society. But not all crimes need that; with less serious crimes, you don't have to go about fixing a character flaw, you just have to show to the criminal that doing this bad thing results in this punishment. The lack of a firm definition of felony became a serious problem shortly after this change. Originally in the US, things worked basically like in England. Legislatures passed laws, which might refer to older laws by name, but there was no organizing principle. Lots of the criminal law was bound up in precedent. It was extremely difficult to find out for sure what the law even was. Instead, there was a major push to codify the law. That means you would have a code, which contained, in organized form, all the laws relating to crime. One of the earliest and most influential American penal codes was actually never adopted. It was written by Edward Livingstone for Louisiana, and was intended to wholly supplant the common law (Louisiana would be the perfect state for this, because it still has a civil law tradition). Livingston didn't use the term "felony," but did distinguish between "crimes" and "misdemeanors." The main systematic difference was not in the penal code itself (the punishments were set out on a crime-by-crime basis), but in the corrections code. Crimes were punished in a penitentiary designed to reform the prisoner; misdemeanors were punished by simple imprisonment. Crimes were all punished by more than a year, while misdemeanors could be punished by anywhere from a few days to two years. The important thing was where and how you were punished, not for how long. While this code was never adopted, it had a major influence on the New York code of 1829. The New York code was designed to rationalize the law, but not do too much in the way of substantive changes. In particular, the old idea of a "felony" was not abolished; it was preserved, with real significance (part of the point of keeping the term was that they didn't want to lose all its baggage), and so it needed a definition. They basically adopted Livingstone's definition. Felonies were always the more serious crimes; since serious crimes were now evidence of character flaws to be reformed in a penitentiary, the crimes where you got sent for reform were the felonies (plus, of course, those punished by death). All others were misdemeanors. They also decided that punishment for more than a year, in a jail that's not designed to reform you, was bad; no jail sentence could be more than a year. Since confinement continues to be the main form of punishment, this definition has managed to stick without issue. The forfeiture and capital punishment definitions became obsolete as those punishments became completely obsolete or very, very limited in use. That's pretty much how things got where they are now. It makes some amount of sense to distinguish between bad crimes and not-so-bad crimes, without needing to list out the bad crimes. This is not actually unique to English law; the French penal code also makes this distinction. The term survived the feudal context in which it originated because it was useful. As confinement became the main type of punishment, and as (at the same time) confinement for serious crimes was paired with efforts to reform and rehabilitate criminals, the old distinction shifted to distinguishing between things where you needed that reform and things where you just needed punishment. Then, it shifted in some places to being about the length of said punishment, as an alternative way of expressing the same basic idea but which could be more easily applied to varying systems. Main source: Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 461 (2009) | There is not a single legal term that encompasses all of these offenses in most jurisdictions. Instead, there are a number of different offenses that could apply based upon whether or not there is sexual contact, the nature of the coercion involved, and certain other details of the offense. To use a concrete and precise example, I provide the exact language of the most relevant offenses in Colorado's criminal statutes, since they are easily available to me and I am familiar with them, and they are typical, for the most part. I omit the language used to determine offense category within offenses when there are more and less aggravated versions of an offense that have different criminal penalties (e.g. kidnapping has a higher grade of offense if it is not possible to verify that the kidnapped victim has been subsequently released and is alive). But, the terminology used for the kinds of offenses that you describe in not nearly so uniform as the terminology used for sexual assault or rape (and some jurisdictions would include some or all of the conduct you describe as a subtype of sexual assault). In Colorado, there is an offense called "Unlawful sexual contact". Section 18-3-404, Colorado Revised Statutes, which basically means a rape that does not involve penetration. Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits unlawful sexual contact if: (a) The actor knows that the victim does not consent; or (b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct; or (c) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows that the victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented; or (d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or (e) Repealed. (f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority, unless incident to a lawful search, to coerce the victim to submit; or (g) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices. There is also an offense called "Invasion of privacy for sexual gratification". Section 18-3-405.6, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link). A person who knowingly observes or takes a photograph of another person's intimate parts without that person's consent, in a situation where the person observed or photographed has a reasonable expectation of privacy, for the purpose of the observer's own sexual gratification, commits unlawful invasion of privacy for sexual gratification. It is generally used for peeping tom type offenses, but could conceivable involve forcing someone to expose themselves sexually without their consent but without physical contact with the offender. Similarly, "Internet sexual exploitation of a child", might apply to some cases, and is defined at Section 18-3-405.4, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link), although "importunes" and "entices" isn't really the same as coercion, and is instead more in the nature of deception than than coercion. An actor commits internet sexual exploitation of a child if the actor knowingly importunes, invites, or entices through communication via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message, a person whom the actor knows or believes to be under fifteen years of age and at least four years younger than the actor, to: (a) Expose or touch the person's own or another person's intimate parts while communicating with the actor via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message; or (b) Observe the actor's intimate parts via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message. In contrast, "Sexual assault" (a.k.a. "rape") is defined at Section 18-3-402, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link) as: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: (a) The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will; or (b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct; or (c) The actor knows that the victim submits erroneously, believing the actor to be the victim's spouse; or (d) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; or (e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of age and the actor is at least ten years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; or (f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to coerce the victim to submit, unless the act is incident to a lawful search; or (g) The actor, while purporting to offer a medical service, engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than a bona fide medical purpose or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices; or (h) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows the victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented. Colorado does not have a provision parallel to statutory rape for unlawful sexual contact, nor does it have a deception to make someone think that a partner is a spouse provision for unlawful sexual contact, even though that is a recognized form of sexual assault. These are clarified with definitions in Section 18-3-401, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link; definitions inapplicable to the offenses cited omitted): (1) "Actor" means the person accused of a sexual offense pursuant to this part 4. (1.5) "Consent" means cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will and with knowledge of the nature of the act. A current or previous relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent under the provisions of this part 4. Submission under the influence of fear shall not constitute consent. Nothing in this definition shall be construed to affect the admissibility of evidence or the burden of proof in regard to the issue of consent under this part 4. . . . (2) "Intimate parts" means the external genitalia or the perineum or the anus or the buttocks or the pubes or the breast of any person. . . . (3) "Physically helpless" means unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unable to indicate willingness to act. . . (4) "Sexual contact" means the knowing touching of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. (5) "Sexual intrusion" means any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue, or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. (6) "Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse. Emission need not be proved as an element of any sexual penetration. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. (7) "Victim" means the person alleging to have been subjected to a criminal sexual assault. Also closely related is "criminal invasion of privacy", Section 18-7-801, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link), which is primarily targeted at "up skirt" photos, but could be used for the kind of offense described in the question. (1) A person who knowingly observes or takes a photograph of another person's intimate parts, as defined in section 18-3-401 (2), without that person's consent, in a situation where the person observed or photographed has a reasonable expectation of privacy, commits criminal invasion of privacy. . . . (3) For the purposes of this section, "photograph" includes a photograph, motion picture, videotape, live feed, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, electronically, digitally, or chemically reproduced visual material. There is also offenses called "Human trafficking for sexual servitude" and "human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude". Section 18-3-504, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link), which could sometimes apply (human trafficking without sexual servitude is also a crime but not within the scope of the question). A person who knowingly sells, recruits, harbors, transports, transfers, isolates, entices, provides, receives, or obtains by any means another person for the purpose of coercing the person to engage in commercial sexual activity commits human trafficking for sexual servitude. This is clarified with many definitions at Section 18-3-503, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link): (1) "Adult" means a person eighteen years of age or older. (2) "Coercing" means inducing a person to act or to refrain from acting, if the inducement is accomplished by any one or more of the following means: (a) The use or threat of the use of force against, abduction of, causing of serious harm to, or physical restraint of a person; (b) The use of a plan, pattern, or statement for the purpose of causing the person to believe that failure to perform the act or failure to refrain from performing the act will result in the use of force against, abduction of, causing of serious harm to, or physical restraint of that person or another person; (c) Using or threatening to use the law or the legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed; (d) Threatening to notify law enforcement officials that a person is present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws; (e) The destruction or taking, or a threat to destroy or take, a person's identification document or other property; (f) Controlling or threatening to control a person's access to a controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5); (g) The use of debt bondage; or (h) The exploitation of a person's physical or mental impairment, where such impairment has a substantial adverse effect on the person's cognitive or volitional functions. (3) "Commercial sexual activity" means sexual activity for which anything of value is given to, promised to, or received by a person. (4) "Debt bondage" means: (a) Demanding commercial sexual activity as payment toward or satisfaction of a real or purported debt; or (b) Demanding labor or services as payment toward or satisfaction of a real or purported debt and failing to apply the reasonable value of the labor or services toward the liquidation of the debt; or (c) Demanding labor or services where the length of the labor or services is not limited and the nature of the labor or services is not defined. (5) "Identification document" means a real or purported passport, driver's license, immigration document, travel document, or other government-issued identification document, including a document issued by a foreign government. (6) "Maintain" means to provide sustenance or care for a minor and includes but is not limited to providing shelter, food, clothing, drugs, medical care, or communication services. (7) "Makes available" means to facilitate contact between a minor and another person. (8) "Minor" means a person less than eighteen years of age. (9) "Person" has the same meaning as set forth in section 2-4-401 (8), C.R.S. (10) "Serious harm" means bodily injury or another harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, which is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person to perform or continue to perform labor or services or sexual activity to avoid incurring the harm. (11) "Sexual activity" means: (a) Sexual contact, as defined in section 18-3-401 (4); (b) Sexual intrusion, as defined in section 18-3-401 (5); (c) Sexual penetration, as defined in section 18-3-401 (6); (d) Sexual exploitation of a child, pursuant to section 18-6-403 (3) (a) and (3) (d); or (e) An obscene performance, as defined in section 18-7-101. (12) "Victim" means a person who is alleged to have been, or who has been, subjected to human trafficking, as described in section 18-3-503 or section 18-3-504. An obscene performance, referenced above is defined at Section 18-7-101, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link) in the pertinent parts, to mean: (2) "Obscene" means material or a performance that: (a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b) Depicts or describes: (I) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including sexual intercourse, sodomy, and sexual bestiality; or (II) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, sadism, masochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals, the male or female genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state; and (c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. . . . (4) "Patently offensive" means so offensive on its face as to affront current community standards of tolerance. (5) "Performance" means a play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition performed before an audience. . . . (6.5) "Prurient interest" means a shameful or morbid interest. A person, as defined in the referenced language is defined as follows: "Person" means any individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, limited liability company, partnership, association, or other legal entity. Sometimes false imprisonment or kidnapping would be relevant charges: "First degree kidnapping" is Section 18-3-301, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link) would apply when someone else is kidnapped for purposes of coercing the person made to conduct the sexual act: Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. Sometimes the victim would also be a victim of "second degree kidnapping" per Section 18-3-302, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link): (1) Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. (2) Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. One can also imagine this offense including "false imprisonment", Section 18-3-303, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link): Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. This section shall not apply to a peace officer acting in good faith within the scope of his or her duties. "Criminal extortion" (a.k.a. "blackmail") defined at Section 18-3-207, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link) is likewise a plausible offense depending upon the nature of the coercion: (1) A person commits criminal extortion if: (a) The person, without legal authority and with the intent to induce another person against that other person's will to perform an act or to refrain from performing a lawful act, makes a substantial threat to confine or restrain, cause economic hardship or bodily injury to, or damage the property or reputation of, the threatened person or another person; and (b) The person threatens to cause the results described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) by: (I) Performing or causing an unlawful act to be performed; or (II) Invoking action by a third party, including but not limited to, the state or any of its political subdivisions, whose interests are not substantially related to the interests pursued by the person making the threat. (1.5) A person commits criminal extortion if the person, with the intent to induce another person against that other person's will to give the person money or another item of value, threatens to report to law enforcement officials the immigration status of the threatened person or another person. If drugs are used to induce the sexual conduct, assault charges could apply. The relevant offense in Colorado is "second degree assault", Section 18-3-203(1)(e), Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link): A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: . . . (e) For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance, or preparation capable of producing the intended harm; Notably, in Colorado, unlike many states and countries, intentionally causing bodily injury that is not serious bodily injury and does not involve a deadly weapon or a first responder injury, is a tort or municipal ordinance violation, but not a state law crime, except for some subtypes of disorderly conduct, harassment and hazing. "Disorderly conduct" includes assault in the context of fighting in public, in Colorado, but wouldn't be applicable in the circumstances of the question. Section 18-9-106, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link). A person commits disorderly conduct if he or she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: . . . (d) Fights with another in a public place except in an amateur or professional contest of athletic skill "Harassment" is closest to bare physical assault in Colorado, and could apply in some of these cases. Section 18-9-111, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link). A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical contact "Hazing" is defined in Section 18-9-124, Colorado Revised Statutes, and could be implicated if the means of coercion are related to this kind of activity. (2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Hazing" means any activity by which a person recklessly endangers the health or safety of or causes a risk of bodily injury to an individual for purposes of initiation or admission into or affiliation with any student organization; except that "hazing" does not include customary athletic events or other similar contests or competitions, or authorized training activities conducted by members of the armed forces of the state of Colorado or the United States. (b) "Hazing" includes but is not limited to: (I) Forced and prolonged physical activity; (II) Forced consumption of any food, beverage, medication or controlled substance, whether or not prescribed, in excess of the usual amounts for human consumption or forced consumption of any substance not generally intended for human consumption; (III) Prolonged deprivation of sleep, food, or drink. (3) It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in hazing. If the conduct causes serious bodily injury or the loss of a pregnancy, there are other charges that could apply. There are also offenses that might apply in certain situations that apply only to certain kinds of victims or certain kinds of relationships. For example offenses limited to minors like child abuse, domestic violence offenses, offenses related to abuse of "at risk" persons, offenses related to sexual offenses involving psychotherapists, sexual offenses involving abuse of a position of trust, solicitation of prostitution, child prostitution offenses, criminal conspiracy charges, criminal solicitation charges, criminal attempt charges, organized crime charges when there is a pattern of such conduct for profit by an organization or group of people, etc. | While software is often the subject of pirating, the term is also used generally for unauthorized use of any copyrighted material. It turns out that this terminology is very old. Wikipedia notes that this sense of the word piracy is attested as far back as 1603 CE and was used as part of the language of a copyright treaty as early as 1886 CE. In particular, people who use or distribute unauthorized copies of movies, television shows, videos of live concerts, and music are also frequently said to be engaged in pirating of the material. The term is used in this context in testimony before Congress by the chief U.S. Copyright official in 2005. Critics of the term argue that "piracy," which originally meant armed robbery of tangible property on the high seas (a form of theft), is an inapt way to describe copyright infringement which is really different in kind than theft because copyright infringement does not deprive anyone of use of the materials, it merely impairs the legally granted monopoly of someone regarding how it shall be used. As Matthew Yglesias explains at Slate: If I steal your car then you don't have a car anymore, whereas if I duplicate a digital media file we both end up with it. The harm in the duplicating is supposed to be that by duplicating content that Fox Filmed Entertainment owns the copyright to, I'm depriving Tom Rothman of some revenue that he might have gotten had I instead gone out and bought a copy of the content for myself. That's fair enough for Rothman to feel sad about, but it's a totally different kind of thing. I didn't buy DC's animated film of Batman: Year One, and I didn't pirate a copy either; I watched it at a friend's house. The difference between watching a movie with your friend and copying your friend's Blu-ray is that one is legal and one is illegal. But in both cases you watch the movie without paying the copyright owner, and in neither case have you stolen anything from anyone. | It means: if I give you permission to occupy my property then you are not occupying it with "hostility" and adverse possession will not come into effect providing that we both remain within the terms of our agreement for your occupation. | It is capitalized because the word NEXIUM has a conspicuous definition. In other words, they're using it in the specific way they have defined it to mean. This is to differentiate it from any other meaning it may have in some other context. Obviously with NEXIUM, it's a word they just made up and it's very unlikely that it could ever be confused with anything other than their particular drug. But what if the drug were called PRAXIA? The word praxia might be confused with the medical term. It's also the name of a city in Romania (I just learned that while looking that word up). But PRAXIA in all caps refers specifically to their drug, and there can be no ambiguity between that and other uses of the term. This is especially important for drugs, since they are legally required to disclose the side effects in their advertising, and you wouldn't want someone potentially confusing the name of the drug with the condition it treats. You see this in contracts as well. When a contract provision is written in ALL CAPS, it is done to conspicuously call attention to the text, either because it is redefining an established legal term or is modifying rights you may have under the law (e.g. LIMITED WARRANTY, SEVERABILITY, BINDING ARBITRATION, etc.) There is no established rule for this, by the way. It's mostly a matter of style. Some laws require conspicuous disclosure of certain provisions in contracts, so ALL CAPS has traditionally been used to meet that requirement. NOTE: The term "Nexium" (not in caps) is simply the registered trademark for the drug. It simply protects their intellectual property (i.e. the name), and isn't intended to describe or define anything in a legal way. Fun fact: Subway got sued for making "Footlong" sandwiches that were not actually 12 inches in length. They tried to argue that "Footlong" was a trademark and not intended to convey the length of their sandwiches. They settled the lawsuit, because really, that's a jackass move right there. I wonder, though... If they'd called it a FOOTLONG, would that have made a difference? ;-) | Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated. |
Are there no limits to damage waivers or would this go too far? I am going to make vacation on Hawaii next week. For one day we booked a Ziplining tour. Just after the free cancelation date passed, I was sent a waiver which is required to be signed to participate. And this waiver is something, even without knowing much about the legal system of the USA, I can't imagine to be justified. It asks me to hold the event host and their employees free from any damage or claim due to risks of i.e. servere injury, disabilitys or even death. OK, that's fair. Then it says that I also waive any such action for cases where anything like this happens negligent. This made me already feel somewhat uncomfortable. But not knowing the laws in the USA, this might be a thing one can ask me to waive. But then it also mentioned any of the risks or harm caused by them deliberately. And causing the risk of murder (what deliberately causing an accident that leads to death) makes me not want to sign that waiver. It feels just not right. Now leaving aside if you can waive and agree to indemnify in the USA for a deliberately caused death... Given that I got the waiver handed over just after the free cancellation period had ended and being unwilling to sign that waiver, are they entitled to keep my payment, because I missed the free cancellation period? (It was said before that there will be such a waiver, but it was not linked or anything and I was just told that the waiver will be sent out a few days prior to the event.) | This waiver is unenforceable in Hawaii Persons who “owns or operates a business providing recreational activities to the public” cannot disclaim liability for negligence. However, they are not liable for inherent risks providing those risks are disclosed. (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-1.54) While a business might be tempted to include an unenforceable waiver to discourage someone suing, it’s a bad idea. Hawaii, like most other jurisdictions, have consumer protection laws against misleading and deceptive conduct - saying you cant sue when you can has been held to be such conduct. | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. | You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause. | AA "requests" that you remove batteries from checked laptops and put them in carry-on luggage. You must, per their contract of carriage, "comply with airline safety rules", and they say that they can deny you boarding if you do not comply, which includes "Are uncooperative, abusive, harassing, or show the potential to be while on board". You might then hope to sue them because you didn't violate any safety policy of theirs but they denied you your seat, but there's nothing in the contract that states "The following is a complete list of policies". You should discuss this in more detail with your lawyer, but on the face of it there is no legal recourse, except of course a refund. | This is just saying that if they can’t host your event then the only remedy you get is your money back that your paid them (your deposit, advance payments, and of course your don’t owe final payments). It is there to make it clear that they are not responsible of any other money. What else might the client want them to refund? Other lost expenses. Non refundable deposits to the band, the florist, the caterer if this is just for the space. The non refundable airline tickets your relatives bought. Prepaid hotel rooms. They will not pay for any of that. The pandemic is a bit of a red herring because although that is of course the big thing now, it says any occurance whether or not the business caused it. The answers to your specific questions though are pretty trivial. -The business did not cause the pandemic or control the state health office (Irrelevant as noted) -There is nothing they can do about it. The state or county will allow the events when the situation improves. But even if say there was no state order but the venue for their own reasons or because they could not get enough staff cancelled, the answer would be the same. | How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to "ensure the return" or something that will "trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule." So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: "He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application." 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 ("Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information."); 2010 ABPC 410 ("I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father."); 2021 ONCJ 440 ("Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly."); 2020 ABQB 434 ("either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party"); 2017 BCSC 1463 ("The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.") | I like easy questions: you can’t. You can limit but not eliminate liability with people you have a contract with. You can’t limit liability with third parties. You need to consult a lawyer and buy insurance. | They need only take " reasonable measures", which is fairly subjective sounding... I know... But it just means that it's a fact dependent analysis taking into consideration all of the facts that are readily available. So, for example, it would be a different burden if you had 10,000 people coming, vs 10. If you post a sign saying no alcohol allowed on premises and you keep an eye out for blatant violations and deal w/ them accordingly you're fine. You're not duty bound to ensure that not a drop makes it in. It's basically meant to just keep you from serving it while not paying the higher licensing fee. |
What is the motivation for legally forcing sellers to determine the minimum price of food by multiplying it by 1.1? A radio advertisement for a food distributor said that they sell their food to fight the current crisis at "prix coutant" (cost price). However, it was followed by a very speedy text saying that, according to the law, the actual cost price was actually 1.1 times the real cost price. This seems confirmed by this governmental source, saying: À compter du 1er février 2019 et jusqu’au 15 avril 2023, le prix d’achat effectif est affecté d’un coefficient de 1,10 pour les denrées alimentaires et les produits destinés à l’alimentation des animaux. From February 1 2019 until April 15 2023, the effective purchase price is multiplied by a coefficient of 1.10 for foodstuffs and animal feed. I think I am misunderstanding something here, but what I understand is: I am a food seller, I buy some food at 1€ I want to make an advertisement and want to sell the food at cost price I cannot do so; I am actually forced by law to sell it at 1.1€ (so I am still making a profit) Is that correct? What is the motivation behind this? | The law against revente à perte (resale at a loss) is an anti-dumping law intended to prevent predatory pricing. As explained in the Wikipedia article for the case of Keck and Mithouard: The aim of this law was to prevent retailers engaging in 'cut-throat competition' by dumping excess produce onto the market, and forcing competitors out of business. | The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed. | You are not bound by any contract. You bought a physical good that the seller was barred from selling outside of the listed countries by his supplier. You did not enter a contract with the seller's supplier. Let's look the stream of commerce: Supplier of the item (Printing press) offers it. Sale with a sales limiting contract to resellers. Sale by reseller to customer without limiting contract. The first sale doctrine says, that without a form of contract, the rights of the supplier are exhausted in step 2. Even with a contract limiting the reseller's rights, step 3 exhausts any right the supplier has in the item, unless he too explicitly signs a contract. Selling an item in normal commerce is not satisfying this requirement. There already were no rights in the physical copy of the book when whoever bought the book first sold it to the second-hand seller you bought it from, and there can't be any more rights in the selling of this book gained by the original supplier unless he bought the book back from you. | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. | Caveat about the "Grainger test" as applied to veganism Grainger plc v Nicholson is a 2010 employment discrimination case. It established a five-point test for whether a philosophical belief triggers the protection of the Equality Act 2010. See the judgment here, §24. A 2020 preliminary hearing in Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports found that the claimant (= plaintiff, for US readers) held a belief in ethical veganism that did meet the five-point test. I would note that Casamitjana’s beliefs are much stronger than "simple" veganism. The judgment at §17-§22 enumerates a list of Casamitjana’s behaviour, much of which goes well beyond what the average vegan undertakes, such as avoiding the use of bank notes (manufactured from animal products) or public transportation (buses kill insects). I would assume that "simple" vegan beliefs could still meet the "philosophical belief" test, but I can see obvious differences with the Casamitjana case and would not advise anyone to rely solely on it. The restaurant case I refer to this excellent answer regarding a different hypothetical. The key question is whether the restaurant’s choice of menu is "a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim". In that case, the restaurant might argue that they chose what dishes to offer based on the cook’s ability, on a commercial strategy of selling only high-end dishes, or other similar considerations. (Note that I have not practiced law in E&W, and any real-world respondent would do well to consult a qualified sollicitor before relying on that argument.) As a non-legal answer, I would also argue that such an application of the Equality Act 2010 would be extremely burdening. For instance, ethical vegans could sue any restaurant offering any non-vegan options at all (regardless of whether there are vegan options on the menu, they would not want to patronize such a restaurant), or transportation company using leather seats in their vehicles; Orthodox Jews might sue any business open on Saturdays; and so on. However, I do not know how that objection could be worked into a legal argument. | Under U.S. law, this is only actionable is you make this statement knowing that it would not "support the continued creation of X" and that instead, you had already completely abandoned that product and you were, for example, planning to change lines of work and become a lumberjack instead. Even in that case, common law fraud is hard to show, because you would need to show how that statement which related to how the profits will be used, rather than what you are actually receiving, could cause you damages in that narrow transaction. But, many states have deceptive trade practices acts that protect consumers by allowing the attorney general, local prosecutor, or a private individual or class of plaintiffs to sue if representations such as these are made when they are known to be false. Typically, these lawsuits provide for minimum statutory damages, attorneys' fees award, and when cases are brought by a public official, injunctive relief (ordering the advertising with that pitch to cease) are authorized. For example, saying this when it is false would be actionable in California and Colorado. A fairly common fact pattern is that someone will sell stuff at an above market price saying that "profits will help me pay for my cancer treatments" when in fact the person doesn't have cancer. This could even constitute criminal wire and mail fraud, for example. Sometimes, competitors can also sue you under the Lanham Act (which primarily governs federal trademarks), for false advertising about something that could unfairly undermine their sales if what you are saying isn't true and is causing their sales to drop. On the other hand, if you sincerely believe that what you are saying is true when you say it, and your belief is not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could believe that under the circumstances, then what you are saying is legal. Usually this is true, and if it is, ultimately, you will be fine. Although nothing can prevent you from being sued on a non-meritorious basis. In between are cases where this is true (you will be supported, but perhaps only get 5% of the profits while the rest are garnished for a lawsuit), but your statements were still misleading at the time you made them and you knew it. Those cases get resolved on a case by case basis. Outside U.S. law, your mileage may vary. Legal regulation of commercial speech varies significantly from one country to another. These statements might not be O.K. for example in a Communist regime on the Chinese or Korean model. | OK, the prohibition on commercial use stems from either: The tort of passing off; this is a private civil matter between the model and the publisher, or Breach of s18 of the Australian Consumer Law which involve misleading or deceptive conduct; this is a public civil matter with strict liability (i.e. intention or negligence is irrelevant) between the ACCC and the publisher with fines of up to $1,100,000 for a body corporate and $220,000 for an individual. In both cases the cause of action arises from the possible presumption by a person who views the photograph that the model in it is endorsing the goods or services that you are selling. The standard is: Would a reasonable person, viewing the photograph in context, come to the conclusion that the model is endorsing the goods or services (either because they really like it or they were paid to show they really liked it). Context is everything here. Some examples: If you a photo studio selling the actual photograph then there is no endorsement. If you are using the photograph to promote the studio there is. If you are showing a crowd scene (e.g. at a football match) there is no endorsement. If you are showing a building and the people are incidental there is no endorsement. If you are showing individuals or small groups in a way that promotes your goods or services there is endorsement. So, look at the photograph and the purpose you are using it for: could a reasonable person draw the conclusion that the people in it are endorsing your application? | I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you. |
Are there any legal systems where "guilty until proven innocent" is actually a thing? Related: What different legal-systems are there? The idea of "innocent until proven guilty" is sometimes thrown around as an example of American exceptionalism, but it turns out that this is in fact the standard used in most of the world. There seem to be quite a few countries where there are fewer protections for criminal defendants, but I can't find any where "guilty until proven innocent" is literally the case. What I mean by this is that there are non-US jurisdictions that allow defendants to be convicted on evidence that would be thrown out of a US court as unconstitutionally obtained, but the prosecution still has to present this evidence and use it to convince the court of the defendant's guilt. The court does not simply assume, "The prosecutor said it so it must be true, GUILTY!". I would define a "guilty until proven innocent" legal regime as incorporating most, if not all, of the following criteria: The contents of an indictment or other formal accusation are presumed true unless specifically rebutted in a court of law. Defendants in court who plead Not Guilty are required to prove their innocence in order to obtain an acquittal. Simply disproving the prosecution's evidence is insufficient for an acquittal unless the defendant also affirmatively proves their innocence. Are there any jurisdictions anywhere in the world where "guilty until proven innocent" is the rule for criminal cases? Just to be clear, I'm not asking for examples of jurisdictions that are not as friendly to defendants (e.g. hearsay is admissible, no doctor-patient privilege, trial by jury not guaranteed, expanded authority of judges to issue search warrants, no right to a "speedy" trial, etc.), but something more approaching, "Oh no, John accused me of breaking into his garage. If I can't affirmatively prove to a jury that I was in America all of last month and couldn't have broken into his garage here in Ruritania, I'm going to prison!" | English defamation law is considered to put the burden of proof on the defendant, and until 2010 English law supported a criminal charge of libel- so called "criminal libel" or "defamatory libel." It should be noted that criminal libel was never affirmatively enshrined in English law, but it came about as an outgrowth of English common law. It was never heavily prosecuted, but was a crime and did carry a potential sentence of one to two years in jail. A comprehensive review of criminal libel in English law was published as "Working Paper No. 84 Criminal Libel". You can read it here. In England, when actions for libel are brought, the defamatory statements are assumed to be false. This assumes the defendant/publisher to be in the wrong, and they must demonstrate their actions to be reasonable. At the time, the defenses available (see paragraph 3.17 in linked reference) to the defendant/publisher were either: Assert that the statements are not actually defamatory, or do not constitute libel on other technical grounds (e.g. were not actually published in a fixed medium) Make an affirmative defense of "justification"- proving both that the defamatory statements were actually true AND that that there is a public interest in publishing the statements. Make an affirmative defense of "fair comment"- similar to justification but for statements that are a matter of opinion rather than a matter of objective fact. This satisfies your first condition- the statements named by the plaintiff/prosecutor are assumed to be false and defamatory (note another peculiarity of English common law was that actions of libel could be brought by a prosecutor but could also be brought by private citizens... even if they weren't the ones being libeled). This means the prosecutor was assumed to be in the right, and the defendant was assumed to be in the wrong. Paragraph 3.19 in the linked document lays it out for us: The onus of proving the truth of the statement lies on the defendant who must also prove the facts by reason of which it was for the public benefit for the statement to be published. Accordingly, the person defamed need give no evidence to rebut the allegations made in the plea of justification, leaving the defendant to prove that the libel was true and that the publication was for the public benefit. Note that this is a departure from most other western legal systems in two ways. In the US we say that "Truth is an absolute defense against libel claims." If the statement is true, then you can say it under US law, no matter how badly it damages someone's reputation. Note that this is not true for common law criminal libel- merely being true is not sufficient defense, the statements must both be true AND there must be a public interest in publishing the statements. Thus a newspaper or gossip rag that published lovers' intimate details could be prosecuted for criminal libel even if those details are true. Truth is not an absolute defense. At this point we have also satisfied your second condition. Once an action of libel has successfully been brought, the defendant must assert some defense or else they automatically lose. Either they must contend that the alleged defamatory statements don't technically rise to the level of libel under the law, or they must prove the truth of their statements and provide a compelling public interest in making those statements. Other legal systems handle libel very differently. In the USA, libel laws vary on a state-by-state basis. In general however, a plaintiff wanting to bring suit for libel must provide evidence that the libelous statements are in fact false. If they cannot provide some evidence to that effect, there is no prima facie case of libel and the defense could move for a summary judgement. As has already been said, truth is an absolute defense in the USA. While the crime of libel no longer exists in England, all of this carries over into modern-day civil libel actions. The onus is still on the defendant to prove their innocence. Modern observers have coined the terms "libel tourism" and "libel terrorism" to refer to the practice of attacking critics in English courts rather than more appropriate venues specifically because of the fewer protections afforded to defendants there. The US in particular passed the SPEECH Act in 2010, saying that findings of libel from foreign courts are unenforceable in the US, largely due English libel tourism. | Here are the jury instructions. These describe how to evaluate witness testimony, burdens of proof, and the four-factor fair use test, among other things. The jury had to answer yes or no to the following question: Has Google shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its use in Android of the declaring lines of code and their structure, sequence, and organization from Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4 and Java 2 Standard Edition Version 5.0 constitutes a "fair use" under the Copyright Act? They answered yes. Juries do not explain their reasoning (different jurors might even have different reasonings), but the assumption is that they followed the jury instructions to arrive at this conclusion. To be clear, the issue wasn't reimplementation of 37 Java APIs, but a more limited taking, including "the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization". | The eighth amendment, by prohibiting excessive bail, implies that pretrial detention is constitutional in at least some circumstances: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Some may be surprised to learn that this was not at all innovative. There is a virtually identical clause in the English Bill of Rights, a century earlier: That excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted. From this it should be clear that pretrial detention was already widely accepted as necessary in some cases (in fact, it was the norm for centuries), so it is unlikely that anyone thought that the constitution or bill of rights had sought to abolish it. The assertion that pretrial detention is illegal as a means of punishment follows directly from two principles, namely: That the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is not appropriate to punish someone whose guilt has not been proven. That the purpose of pretrial detention, in keeping with the presumption of innocence, is not to punish. Rather, it is primarily intended to secure the presence of the accused at trial and to prevent the person from committing more crimes. Wikipedia has more information at its articles on bail and the eighth amendment's excessive bail clause. Consequently, there is unlikely to be any case in which the constitutionality of pretrial detention, generally, is at issue. Rather, you will find cases in which particular elements of an individual's pretrial detention are alleged to violate some constitutional right, which, in addition to the protections already mentioned, includes the right to a speedy trial. | First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone. | There may be two questions sort of embedded in here: How long does the government have before it violates Speedy Trial; and How long does the government have to turn over its evidence? Unfortunately, they're probably both impossible to answer at this point. Question 1 Under the Speedy Trial Act (18 USC 3161): In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. If a defendant consents in writing to be tried before a magistrate judge on a complaint, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date of such consent. IRA was indicted on February 16, 2018, so 70 days later would be April 27, 2018, which has obviously already come and gone. But their initial appearance wasn't until May 9, 2018, which pushes the time back to July 18, 2018. That would be the default latest date for a trial to begin, but the Act also allows delays for a variety of factors. Among them are delays "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant," which includes time the court spends considering the defendants' motions. So if IRA moves to dismiss the case, all the time spent fighting over that motion would "toll" speedy-trial time, meaning that it would stop the clock until the motion was decided. Another provision of potential relevance is 18 USC 3161(h)(8): Any period of delay, not to exceed one year ... [if] an official request .. has been made for evidence of any such offense and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country. So if there's evidence somewhere in Russia linking these guys to the crimes they're accused of, that might push speedy trial back by a year just to deal with that issue alone. So the short answer to Question 1 is that Speedy Trial requires the trial to begin on July 18, but that practically speaking, that probably won't happen. Question 2 The timing of discovery, the process of each side turning over its evidence to the other side, varies based on the kind of evidence involved, so there are usually multiple disclosures of evidence between the time of indictment and the actual trial. Under current DOJ guidelines, prosecutors are encouraged to provide "broad and early discovery." More specifically: Exculpatory evidence available under Brady v. Maryland should be turned over "reasonably promptly"; Impeachment evidence available under Giglio v. United States should be turned over "at a reasonable time before trial to allow the trial to proceed efficiently"; and Material available under Rule 16 should be disclosed "as soon as is reasonably practical." As you can see, these aren't really hard deadlines. The defense will ask for the documents, the government will turn over documents, and then they'll probably both fight about turning over some other documents, and then they'll wait for the court to decide what to do. So when does Mueller have to turn over his evidence? Probably the best answer we have right now is: "When a judge tells him to." | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). | Yes, such a scenario is plausible, and there are some cases where it has probably happened. But since juries do not normally give reasons for their votes, it is hard to establish when it has and when it has not happened, and I have seen no statistics on such occurrences. By the way, "Jury Nullification" is simply when one or more jury members vote in a particular way because of something other than the law and evidence as presented in the trial. Most often the term is used when a jury votes to acquit because they dislike or disapprove of the law involved. For example, in the 1850s a number of people accused of violating the US Fugitive Slave Law by harboring runaway slaves were acquitted, reputedly because juries who disliked the law (quite unpopular in many northern states) no matter what the evidence. Later, during Prohibition, some people charged with possessing or selling alcohol were acquitted, reputedly by juries who disapproved of Prohibition. In both cases, it is hard to get authoritative sources that specific cases were actual instances of jury nullification. Anyway, a juror need not "ask" for jury nullification, that juror just votes to acquit. A jury that votes to acquit (or convict) because of political or personal views about the accused might be said to be "biased" but I am not sure if that would be described as "jury nullification". | The title question is overly-ambitious: it is not guaranteed, and nobody thinks that it is. The law does what is practical to achieve the desired result. Actual failure one way or the other is mostly irrelevant until a clear pattern to the failure is found, then there might be a legal resolution, but it might also require a political resolution. One consideration is whether it is possible for a defendant to receive a fair trial in a certain jurisdiction. Generally, you are tried in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred, sometimes (rarely) the venue can be changed to a more neutral location. This consideration is significant in high-profile cases. For example, the trials of Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad took place relatively far away from the scene of the crime. The trial judge must weigh the arguments for an inconvenient trial location, and in this trial the judge refused a petition for a change of venue. The judge stated that "As far as change of venue, I do not think that that would give the defendant any kind of a fair trial beyond what we are doing here today. I don’t think there’s any place in the state of Minnesota that has not been subjected to extreme amounts of publicity on this case" A second layer of protection is that prospective jurors may be excused. If a juror declares in advance (during voir dire or elsewhere) that the defendant is guilty, they will be excused for cause. The defense (or prosecution) also has some number of peremptory challenges – in this case, the defense has 5 and the prosecution has 3. In this category, a seated juror can be excused for cause (this happened), when a juror admits that some news e.g. about the city's settlement had prejudiced the juror. Also related to juror selection is that juror must swear to follow the law in reaching a decision. The third layer of protection is limiting testimony, for instance if the prosecution were to ask a witness something like "Won't there be major riots if Chauvin isn't convicted?", the defense would presumably object and prevent such testimony from getting uttered in the first place, or getting officially stricken if it somehow gets out. The fourth layer of protection is that jurors are meticulously instructed as to the logic of decision-making. If you can find a copy, there are here (MN does not make the instructions freely publicly available). Here are the California instructions. Additionally, a judge might attempt to limit what can be said by the media, or might sequester the jury so that they cannot hear any such publicity during the trial (but that's impossible for pre-trial publicity). Another layer is that a mistrial can be declared. However, what goes on in the jury room is in a black box that the legal system cannot generally touch. If a juror was paid off, that could be touched by the legal system, but there is nothing that can be done if it turns out that a juror has a bias in favor of the prosecution, despite the premise of neutrality. Finally, if the facts are so clear, a judge might overturn a conviction on the grounds that a reasonable jury could not reach that conclusion, based on the facts and the law. By "final" I ignore the possibility of an appeal. |
Under the US Constitution, can Congress require the President to use military force? Suppose that a new Congress gets elected, and they unanimously really, really really hate the government of country X, so much so that they want the US military to basically destroy it. So the government passes a law that not only declares, but also bestows upon the President a legal obligation to see that country X's government is completely upended. It leaves no room for the President to cease hostilities for more than, say, 30 days every 3 years, except as provided for by treaty. Would this be legal? | The Constitution says "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States". As supreme military commander, the president alone gets to say whether or not to commit troops for such an expedition. Congress does have the power to control the purse. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that Congress cannot command the president. | Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws. | Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions. | There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest. | The source of the power of the United States government to do the things that it does are the people themselves. (United States Constitution) The people have decided on three branches of government (judicial, executive, and legislative). The expression of the will of the people through these three branches of government results in the government having authority to enforce laws within the borders of the United States. It is not through any contract, agreement, certificate, registration, or other that you come under the jurisdiction of the United States, but simply by your presence. (There are some limited exceptions for foreign diplomats and tribal sovereignty.) | The constitution has the "Treaty Clause" (article II, section 2) which states that the president "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur". There is no legal concept of "signing" a treaty in the US, and only ratification counts. It is unclear what limits there are to enforcement of treaties in lieu of statutory enactment. Medellín v. Texas held that While a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on that basis This was a reversal of prior trends going back to Ware v. Hylton based on the Supremacy Clause, that all Treaties … which shall be made … under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby But Medellín doesn't mean "never": you have to "parse a treaty's text to determine if it is self-executing", which is a different ball of wax. | First, the practical answer is no: even if they ordered the President to go to war, the President can just refuse. The military is generally in the habit of listening to orders from the President, particularly if the question is "do we or do we not go to war;" the courts do not have the power to command the armed forces. They could try issuing an injunction instructing the military to go to war, but the injunction would be ignored. They could try holding people in contempt, but the President is in charge of almost all federal law enforcement (and can pardon criminal contempt), so that's not going to work. And even if the President could be punished for contempt, if he thinks intervening will result in the annihilation of the human race in a thermonuclear war, he will not issue the orders. But that's assuming the courts would even try to intervene. They wouldn't. Courts don't generally want to issue orders that they know will be ignored. In this case, the relief being sought (i.e. an order to do something) is a kind of relief that is up to the discretion of the court. So even if a court would be legally justified in issuing that order, they have an easy out. (For damages claims, Congress can just refuse to appropriate any money to satisfy them; no federal money can be spent unless Congress appropriates it). There's an even earlier out, though. Courts are not political branches of government; one of the basic rules of jurisprudence is that courts should not get involved in deciding something that's really up to the elected branches. Baker v. Carr had a list of factors to consider: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Foreign relations in general is very often grounds for deference, as is military strategy. Courts are utterly unqualified to determine proper diplomatic or military actions to take, or to evaluate whether the President's actions were enough to meet the requirement of "do what's necessary to restore security;" foreign policy is a case where a country needs a unified face (because other countries aren't particularly willing to deal with US internal politics), and where the courts could easily screw up what the government is doing; and whether to send Americans to war is a question that is clearly a matter for those accountable to the people. So, federal courts cannot analyze this question to decide whether or not the government has done anything wrong; it's for the other two branches to decide. | Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts. |
What kind of legal trouble would have a law firm that called its defeated opponents assholes? Say a new law firm wants to come up with a fresh and juicy marketing strategy to win a share of local law market. They adopt a moral code which, although could be seen arguable, is nevertheless coherent and is consistently adhered to. In a nut shell, they only take clients that they think are good people and refuse to represent cheats, crooks and similar people that they call "assholes". When they win yet another case, they put the defeated party (proved in court to be in breach or even convicted) on a page on their website called "The Assholes" where they summarise cases for each of them. They avoid labelling opponents not yet defeated in order to minimise claims of slander. What kind of legal trouble would such a law firm face? Would it still be slander/defamation? Would they rather quickly lose their bar accreditation, or would they only become controversial but otherwise stand well? (Any English-centric common law jurisdiction) | Calling someone an "asshole" is, at least in the US, an expression of opinion and so is not defamation. Saying that someone has committed a crime may be defamation, but not if that person has in fact already been convicted of that crime. In general if a statement is provably true, it is not defamation. If all that this hypothetical firm does is to post facts as found in court decisions, along with their unfavorable opinions of losing parties who they did not represent, it is hard to see any defamation case being valid. And I don't see any other obvious legal problem with doing this. It would probably anger other lawyers, and might make it harder to negotiate settlements or do other deals. If this firm announce that they refuse to accept as clients "cheats, crooks and similar people" and then make it public that they refused to represent some specific person, A, then A might claim that this portrayed him or her as a "cheat or crook" and was defamatory. The exact wording of their publicly announced policy, and of any announcements that they decline to represent A, would matter a good deal, as would the jurisdiction's exact law of defamation. In some places, codes of ethics promulgated by a Bar Association might be violated by such a policy, but such codes are usually not enforceable in the general case. I don't see any obvious grounds for disbarment proceedings. | The purpose is to avoid the possibility that the solicitor will inadvertently end up providing advice to more than one side of the same dispute or transaction, putting the solicitor in a conflict of interest situation. In the simplest case, the solicitor might already represent the landlord that the tenant is seeking to discuss legal rights vis-a-vis. Even if the advice is merely hypothetical, this is not O.K. A solicitor has a very high duty of loyalty to the solicitor's clients. Providing aid of any kind to someone adverse to the solicitor's clients that benefits that person, even if another solicitor would probably say the same thing, is a serious breach of that duty and is forbidden and sanctionable. It could get the solicitor kicked out of the profession in a worst case scenario. The duty of loyalty includes a duty to take reasonable care not to inadvertently or negligently act disloyally. There is also a risk of a more subtle sort of conflict that has to be evaluated since many disputes and transactions are not just two sided. For example, perhaps a solicitor a big commercial tenant client on the brink of a settlement with a particular landlord after lengthy and extensive negotiations (perhaps in a business lease renewal deal), and another prospective tenant client might, for example, have an interest in leasing the same property as your existing client at a higher rate. Representing both tenants/prospective tenants could creating a conflict between your two tenant clients. Screening clients based upon their landlord relationships helps solicitors to identify these conflicts and to prevent them from arising. More generally, the best practice is for a solicitor to make sufficient inquiry prior to providing any legal advice to a prospective new client, to avoid having clients that have a conflict of interest with each other. This regulation (to the extent that it is really as specific as suggested) is simply a codification of this general rule in a specific, commonly recurring situation. In large law firms, every single legal professional in the firm typically spends the first half hour or so of every day reviewing lists of new prospective clients and parties related to them in order to screen for potential conflicts of interest. (I used to have to do that when I worked in a large, international law firm for a while.) There would typically be one or more paralegals or administrators in the firm who do nothing but manage that conflicts of interest screening process. Obviously, however, this requirement is a lot less burdensome if you are solo practicing solicitor who almost entirely represents individual human being and family tenants with isolated residential leases, and works in a large city where few clients have any connections to each other. | The old saying: Being your own lawyer means you have a fool as the lawyer and a fool as the client. If one fool calls the other fool as a witness, that's even more foolish. And the worst crime is annoying the judge with your antics. Opposing council will just take note of every question you ask and your replies, and then call you as witness themself. And assuming they are a proper lawyer, everything they ask will be hurting you. No need to accuse you as "leading" or "badgering" the witness. | There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use. | Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side. | This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification. | So as per recent Supreme Court decision in Matal v. Tam, the phohibitation of the registration of trademarks that may "disparage" persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols was ruled Unconstititutional. At issue, Tam, the bassist and founder of an all Asian-American band that was named after a slur for Asians (the linked article contains the Band Name, but to avoid a possible rule violation, I will not use the actual term). Tam was unable to register the trademark for his band due to the term being a slur, despite the bands intention to use the term in a re-appropriated manner. SCOTUS held that the act was unconstitutional and that Trademark protection did not constitute government speech beyond that the specific mark was registered with the government and thus protected. The decision found 9-0 in favor of Tam. (The case gained some fame as it immediately ended litigation on the name of Washington D.C. NFL football team as well). The other famous case is that of Jacobellis v. Ohio which held obsecenity is not protected speech, but that obscenity is to be determined by the most local levels of government. After all, what is Not Obscene to Los Angeles could be highly obscene to the Amish in Pennsylvania (Basically, no opinion was agreed too, but this was concurred with and every Justice held a concurring opinion). This case is famous for Justice Potter Stewart's concurring opinion, in which he stated obscenity should be limited to only Hard Core Porn, but famously did not offer a legal definition of that term beyond "I know it when I see it [and the motion picture involved in this case is not that]." Basically, check your local limits for guidance, as there is no federal or state law to help discuss this. Finally, as a small aside, the specific name of the establishment in the OP may be on it's face a little naughty, but "Dick" is a diminutive name for "Richard" and this gets all sorts of playful puns on it's other vernacular uses. For example, in one comic featuring Batman's young ward Robin (Dick Grayson), who was admonishing other heroes for not protecting their secret identity, one character comments to another that "Robin is being such a -" only for the second character to interrupt and remind the first "No real names." Another example is the stage name of a famous parody artist who sepcializes in singing modern pop songs in the style of a Vegas Crooner or Lounge Singer, Richard Cheese. The pun relies on knowing this nickname. For one that is not punning on the body part, The Red Green Show once had a sketch where Red Green (the character's name) was talking with the town's notorious liar, Hap, who in this particular sketch dropped the time he went whaling and chased after the "Great White Whale Moby Richard." Red asks if he meant the titular whale from the novel Moby Dick, to which Hap responds, "I didn't know him that well, Red." | If the patent lawyer "hears about" such failed patents from clients, and then uses the client's work and modifies them into successful patent filings, that would seem to be a clear conflict of interest, just as a business lawyer cannot use info learned from a client to make his own business deals, unless the client grants an OK. But if the patent lawyer just hears through shoptalk, or through communication by, perhaps, patent examiners that the lawyer works with, I don't see any conflict of interest, although as the comment by Eugene Styer suggests, there is likely to be enough prior art to make the patent invalid. |
Is there a law against destroying works of art of historic importance when you are the owner? At work we recently had a bit of a debate about whether or not it would be legal to destroy a work of art if you are the owner of said work. A few years ago, Banksy destroyed his own painting by shredding it, and recently there have been several instances where people have vandalized paintings by throwing paint, or by gluing themselves to a work of art. Suppose I was the legal owner of (for example) a Van Gogh, or Michelangelo's David, would it be legal for me (for whatever reason) to destroy it, even though it is a work of art which is of both great financial and historical value? For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that the work of art is not insured, so there's no insurance fraud to deal with. Basically I'm just curious to learn if it would be legal or not. Obviously laws differ from country to country, but I'd still like to know if there's some sort of worldwide consensus, and if there are countries who have very different laws on this subject. | In general, ownership of a thing includes the property right to dispose of or destroy the thing. However, there may be statutory prohibitions for special categories of property. Many countries have entered into treaties that obligate them to identify, protect, and conserve for future generations the cultural heritage in its territory. This includes "architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting." See e.g. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. How this protection is realized is dependent on the nation's domestic implementation. For one example of a protection regime, see british-columbia. When a work has been designated as a "Provincial heritage object" on the Provincial heritage register (Heritage Conservation Act, s. 3(1)), the owner is prohibited from damaging, desecrating, or altering that work without a permit (s. 12.1(2)(a)). There is also a complex web of import and export restrictions relating to objects that a country has identified as cultural heritage. Many countries make it an offence to import an item from another country that has identified the object as cultural heritage without an export permit from that other country. That export permit will often not be provided to an entity without demonstrated capacity to preserve the cultural property. The permit can also subject to conditions (presumably, at least to not destroy the thing). See generally "Guide to Exporting Cultural Property from Canada," "Cultural property export permits." I am not familiar with the United States' implementation, but it is a party to the World Heritage Convention and has passed various statutes dealing relating to the protection of cultural moveable property. | State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. ("Late fees" are in the class of "liquidated damages", where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). Ga. Code § 44-3-223 does require you to "comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument", but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply. | I'm just going through high-level concepts with this answer, it's possible I miss a detail. Architectural works are indeed copyrightable works in accordance with Berne Convention Article 2(1). Both Big Ben and Eiffel Tower are no longer under copyright due to their architects dying more than 70 years ago. French moral rights do not expire (UK moral rights expire with the economic rights). Most relevant to this question are the rights to attribution and against derogatory/damaging/prejudicial treatment defined by Berne Convention Article 6bis(1). Copyright law is on a per-country basis and under Berne Convention Articles 3 & 4, foreign works are accorded equal rights to domestic works. French moral rights apply within France. Taken together, in the UK these architectural works are in the public domain. In France, economic rights (copyright) have expired, but moral rights still exist. Miniature replicas should be fine, but be sure to include attribution. | You misunderstand the nature of copyright. Holding copyright allows you to decide how the work can be copied: there is no obligation on you to publish it if you don't want to. After your copyright expires you don't have to publish it either: the only thing that has changed is you can no longer prevent anyone making a copy. The lost works of Aristotle are in the public domain - if you can find them you can make as many copes as you like. | The tenant is responsible for damage beyond “fair wear and tear” which this obviously is. If it is as bad as you suggest then it may require professional forensic cleaning which can run to thousands of pounds. At some point, things like carpets etc. can be cheaper to replace than to repair. There is no upper limit (beyond, at the extreme, the cost of demolition and rebuilding the dwelling), however, there may be a practical limit being the amount the tenant can pay before going bankrupt. | Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this. | A Probably. Exceptions include: A didn’t own the materials from which the flute was made; the flute belongs to the material’s owner. A made the flute under a contract of employment; the flute belongs to A’s employer. A has sold the flute before making it; the flute belongs to the buyer. This is not only the law in india but pretty much everywhere in the world. If you want to ask about redistributive justice or taxation/welfare; please post the question on our sister sites philosophy or politics. | Don't get hung up on unauthorized resale. That only prohibits unauthorized resale. Authorized resale is ok. From http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1854-copyright-infringement-first-sale-doctrine: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). Since the first sale doctrine never protects a defendant who makes unauthorized reproductions of a copyrighted work, the first sale doctrine cannot be a successful defense in cases that allege infringing reproduction. |
Are there any contract/law-based incentives for someone on their death-bed to obey the law? Walter is told that he has 1 week to live. So he goes on his twitter profile, and posts the KFC secret formula, airs all the dirty laundry of his boss, etc.. Basically, he breaks every last NDA he was a part of. In the most extreme case, perhaps he even goes on a violent crime spree. What is discouraging Walter from doing this? I know that, in Japan, penalties can be forced onto family/loved ones. But I don't think that's the case in America. So, in terms of the law and its enforcement, what is there to discourage Walter from causing millions of dollars in damages, etc.? | Bob’s estate can be sued Bob the human is dead but Bob the legal person continues, at least for a while. People who were damaged by Bob the human can sue Bob’s estate for restitution. Assuming that Bob would like his assets Togo to his heirs instead of these people, that acts as a disincentive. This does not apply to criminal sanctions. | In California (as in all states) there is a justifiable homicide defense which might be used in such a situation. For the force to be justified, you have to reasonably believe you are in danger of being harmed, that you need to use force to avoid the harm, and you may only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat. It then is a matter for the jury to decide whether those principles were followed in your particular instance. The reason why it's hard to predict the outcome is that it depends on a subjective evaluation by the jury, as to whether the shooter had a reasonable fear and whether lesser force was a viable option. The jury's decision is guided by instructions to the jury (#506, #506) which focus on relevant distinctions. The jury will be told that "Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be", and that you have to reasonably believe there is "imminent danger of great bodily injury". My evaluation is that that does not describe the scenario in the question. There is some possibility of future harm... but not imminent harm. People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470" states that "the rule developed at common law that killing or use of deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense was a forcible and atrocious crime" and "Examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem, rape and robbery", and that could support application of a justifiable homicide defense in a bank robbery. But in the present instance, the bank is being robbed and the shooter is a by-stander. Despite all of the bank robberies in California, there is no relevant case from which one could draw an analogy. | DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law. | Short Answer Based on the facts you supplied, it seems the author's request for removal might be unenforceable. Explanation Section 2.a.1. of the license declares the license is irrevocable. [Emphasis added]: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. Irrevocable means: "Unable to cancel or recall; that which is unalterable or irreversible." Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. So don't rely on my answer for anything. Hire a real attorney if you need help with a legal matter. Never take legal advice from strangers on the internet. Treat all answers on this site the same way you would as if they came from a bunch of strangers at a party who got all their legal information by watching episodes of Boston Legal, The Practice and Ally McBeal. But have lots of opinions they are willing to share on legal questions nevertheless. | Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy). | It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted. | That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism. | This is contract law. There is nothing in legal codes that stipulated that this is valid, but rather that by signing a document that allowed for a signatory to void the contract if one of the terms was broken (don't do drugs... don't do criminal acts) is a valid agreement and the contract documented it was signed, thus the clean roommate was allowed to void his agreement without penalty for the exit because of the terms within. You can call it a loophole or a clause but it's perfectly valid as the contract was entered without any duress by both parties and the terms were violated. It should also be pointed out most shows in the vein of "Judge Judy" are not actually being handled in a real courtroom setting or real civil trial, but a set that is designed to look like a court room. What is actually going on is a legal process called "Binding Arbitration" where both parties in a disagreement sign a separate contract stating that they will agree to the decision of a neutral arbiter, who need not be a judge (though having a legal background is very helpful). With rare exception, the outcome cannot be appealed or elevated to a real civil court (unless the losing party is not cooperating with the arbiter's judgement, or the case is dismissed without prejudice, which is judge speak for allowing a civil case to be refiled or filed with another court. Typically this happens when the plaintiff is the victim of something that requires a little more legal authority in the judgement.). They also don't typically do this in a real court room but in a conference room. The court room trappings in these tv shows are for the audience. Arbitration does not create a legal precedence and typically the requested settlement must be small claims ($5,000 or less) though Judge Judy type shows will pay for travel and lodging for both parties and their witnesses regardless of outcome. |
I found a stick pin in my mouth after a bite of peanut butter. Can I sue the company and win? I took a bite of peanut butter and found a stickpin in my mouth and I almost swallowed it. It was a brand new jar and still had the seal on it. I don't know why a stickpin would be in peanut butter, but do i have valid grounds to sue? | As a lawsuit, it doesn't make sense in U.S. law unless you have suffered significant injuries. Your damages are likely to be, at most, nominal ($1) if you discovered it before you were hurt, so you'd only lose the money spent replacing the jar of peanut butter with a non-defective one and the nominal $1 damages. You would not generally have a right to any of your attorneys' fees and personal time spent on a lawsuit like that which would likely cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars on an hourly basis (no attorney would take a case like that on a contingency basis), and would take hundreds of hours of your own personal time. | While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation. | There is commonly a law like RCW 69.50.309 which says that A person to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner, and the owner of any animal for which such controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was delivered to him or her by the person selling or dispensing the same. A controlled substance is "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state laws, or federal or commission rules". Schedule V includes some opiates with low potential for abuse and dependency. It does not include prescription antibiotics, and does not include Ibuprofen and other OTC NSAIDs. The cop may be right about keeping your narcotics in the original container, but wrong about anything less. I can't presently locate the Oklahoma analog of this law. After diligent searching, I even suspect that Oklahoma does not have such an "original container" law. It would count as a "counterfeit substance" if it is a controlled substance and is in a container with labeling that is not that of the original distributor, but if the contain is completely blank, it is not legally a "counterfeit substance". And again, that only applies to controlled substances. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. | I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B). | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes. |
What should a lawyer do if they are confident their client is committing perjury? Let's say a client confesses one thing to their lawyer, but at trial makes a radically different claim when asked while under oath. The difference is substantial and likely to affect the result of the trial and the lawyer reasonable believes the defendant has committed perjury. He can't come out and accuse his client of lying based off of confidential information covered by attorney client privilege. However, he also can't support perjury, putting him in an awkward position. Does the lawyer just move on and say nothing? Can they continue their planned defense as it was because the perjury doesn't change the argument, even if it could affect the odds of the client being found guilty? Then again what if the perjury does change the argument the defense was planning to make and he has to either alter his plan for defense or likely reveal the perjury? If the lawyer adjusts his defense in deference to the lie is he not supporting perjury? Does the lawyer simply say he can't continue to defend his client and ask for a mistrial without saying why? | If somehow the lawyer knows that evidence provided by their client to the court is false, the lawyer has an obligation to direct the client to cease the perjury and to persuade the client to disclose to the court that the evidence was false. If the client does not stop, the lawyer must withdraw. There are tactful ways to express the reason for withdrawal to the court without prejudicing the client. Ethics opinions and guidance are available online from various bar associations explaining how to handle this situation, as well as academic scholarship on the topic: https://www.alabar.org/office-of-general-counsel/formal-opinions/2009-01/ https://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/resource-centre/key-resources/client-relationship-management/untying-the-knot/ https://firearmslaw.ca/2013/10/25/right-to-know-the-ethical-dilemma-of-a-lying-client/ https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/ethics-articles/dealing-with-client-perjury/ https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss4/10/ Every bar association should be able to provide advice to a lawyer faced with this situation that is tailored to the specific circumstances and the local rules. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | (US Answer) Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm..." Most states have incorporated the MRPC into their own state legal ethics codes. Therefore, as to whether a lawyer may tell the police, it comes down to whether death is reasonably certain, and whether the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary to prevent the death. In the case of a person buried alive, death is reasonably certain, and whether the disclosure is reasonable will be based on what the lawyer knows and doesn't know - was it a month ago? ten minutes ago? etc. If the lawyer believes it is too late, he is obligated to stay quiet. If he believes there is a chance of saving the life, and that belief is later judged reasonable if he is investigated, there will be no penalty for him if he discloses. There is no duty for a lawyer to report a crime committed by a non-lawyer/non-judge, so non-disclosure should have no negative ramifications legally. Disclosure found to be unreasonable could be punished by private censure, public censure, suspension of license, or even disbarment, depending on the view of the bar association's ethics investigators. | The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error. | The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all. | The Plan For A Clearly Guilty Client Without Bargaining Power This question underestimates how much of a criminal defense lawyer's work involves sentencing rather than a determination of guilt or innocence. Suppose as the OP does that the prosecution can easily prove beyond a reasonable doubt that your client is guilty, you client has no plausible defenses, and the prosecutor won't budge on a plea. As a criminal defense lawyer, you may well advise your client that there is no percentage in fighting guilt on the charges, and have your client plea guilty. This prevents the prosecutor from spelling out for many hours in excruciating detail exactly why your client is guilty and the harm the resulted from the crime, which could harden the judge in the sentencing phase. It also frees up a client's often scarce resources for legal work that is likely to be more fruitful and for things like paying fees associated with alternative sentencing programs and paying restitution. It is an empirical fact that judges sentence criminal defendants who plea guilty, even in the absence of a plea bargain, less harshly on average, than criminal defendants who insist on going to trial. (When there is a plea bargain "sentences following convictions at trial are five times larger than sentences received by those who plead guilty".) Often the sentencing premium for going to trial is stunningly large to the point where it has been argued that it amounts to an unconstitutional burden imposed upon the right to a jury trial. Then, you focus entirely on the sentencing phase of the case. There's More Discretion In Sentencing Than Guilt Verdicts Short of first degree murder and a handful of other crimes, there is almost always some discretion on the part of the judge regarding the sentence to be imposed, no matter how clearly guilt is established. Often a judge has the power to sentence someone guilty of a minor felony to probation or a "boot camp" or "community corrections" or even a fine without incarceration, rather than a prison term. Often a judge has a wide range of possible lengths of incarceration (especially in misdemeanor cases and for very serious felonies). Often the corrections department has considerable discretion over which facility to commit a client to and some are better than others. So paying attention to the facility assignment process also matters. Where a defendant is facing both state and federal criminal charges, it sometimes makes sense when conviction on all charges is likely, to plea guilty immediately to the federal charges so that the defendant is already in federal prison before pleading guilty to or going to trial on the state charges, so that if the defendant is sentenced to serve time for the state and federal charges concurrently because they arose from the same incident, the time is spent in the more pleasant federal prison rather than the less pleasant state prison. (This is the case because violent crimes are overwhelmingly prosecuted under state law, while a large share of federal crimes are white collar or are for immigration and non-violent drug offenses. So, your fellow inmates tend to be less vicious in federal prison.) Not infrequently, state prosecutors will even drop state charges to conserve their scarce resources, if they know that the defendant is already facing a significant term of incarceration following a conviction on federal charges. A criminal defense lawyer thus almost has something to argue at sentencing because there is almost never only one possible result of a sentencing hearing even if all of the facts are not in any dispute whatsoever. The judge's interpretation of what those facts should imply in terms of a sentence is always up for debate and argument. What Do Lawyers Do In The Sentencing Phase? As a criminal defense attorney in a case like this, your job is: to present your client in the best light possible, to locate witnesses who will testify that he has support in the community and that he is basically a good guy despite this particular lapse, to marshal testimony that extended incarceration will be a hardship to someone dependent on him, to have him sincerely apologize to the victim and try to do something immediately to make it up to the victim and to show regret and contrition, to support him in not violating terms of pre-sentencing release if any, and perhaps even to see if charges that might otherwise bring him into a recidivist sentencing regime can be sealed or vacated for any reason. You present mitigating evidence regarding IQ or mental health conditions or prior military service or poverty or provocation that explain your client's conduct even if it doesn't excuse it. You try to get the prosecutor to agree that a harsh sentence isn't necessary here, or even to support an alternative sentencing option. Prosecutors are frequently more sensitive to their win-loss record of securing convictions than to precisely how the people they convict are punished. You scrutinize the pre-sentencing report for any inaccuracies and prepare to prove that they are inaccurate. You litigate which category your client belongs in under the sentencing guidelines that apply, if any, which are often the subject of much less case law and hence for more room for interpretation. For example, in a recent case handled by another lawyer in my office (I don't do criminal work myself, but have colleagues who do), the client's sentence was reduced by more than 95% from what the prosecution requested because they had meant to charge 300 counts of a municipal ordinance violation for which each day counted as a violation, but actually charged our client with only 2 counts of the municipal ordinance violation and the judge held the prosecution at sentencing to only a sentence based upon the offense actually charged in the relevant documents. You prepare to explain to the appropriate people how maintaining community ties through visitation will reduce his odds of recidivism if he is located at a more favored correctional facility rather than a less favorable one. You prepare to explain to the appropriate people that your client's survival would be a risk based upon the gangs present at a less favored correctional facility, or that he would be more likely to join a gang and thus commit more crimes upon release at a less favored correctional facility. You get your client to be cooperative in paying any restitution he can afford to pay even before the court orders him to do so. You find decent clothes for him to wear to his sentencing so he doesn't look like a thug and teach him what not to say at sentencing that would piss of the judge. Do his hair in a way that makes him look as vulnerable and inoffensive as possible. Cover his tattoos and remove his piercings as much as possible. If your client is black, find a white or Asian-American relative or mentor or girlfriend or supporter to stand at his side and support him in court. This shouldn't matter but it almost always does. If your client doesn't speak English well, find a relative or mentor or girlfriend or supporter to testify in fluent English in support of leniency and make sure that there is an interpreter lined up for his sentencing hearing. You remind the judge of other more serious cases involving the same offense to which your client's can be compared, or of the sentences imposed on more culpable co-defendants to suggest that your client's sentence should be less severe. You downplay the harm caused and emphasize your client's future prospects. You help the judge relate to your client anyway that you can. You may need to research the judge's background and history of sentencing decisions to find out what this particular judge does or does not find persuasive in sentencing hearings. Sentencing Is As Important As The Charge Of Conviction A criminal defense attorney who presents a solid sentencing case may leave the client who receives a near minimal sentence on that charge with a lighter sentence than one who plea bargains to a lesser charge but then botches the sentencing phase resulting in the client getting near maximal sentence on the lesser charge. Consider, for example, the attorney who represented Brock Turner, a Stanford student convicted of raping an unconscious woman in public in the face of overwhelming evidence against him who none the less, was sentenced to just six months of incarceration (reduced further for good behavior in jail). Another attorney could have plea bargained down to simple assault and still left his client with a more harsh sentence. Turner's attorney was so effective in securing a lenient sentence that the sentencing judge was recalled for the first time in 87 years in California for his leniency. Conclusion So, the notion that a good criminal defense attorney's job is over when the client has no chance of establishing his innocence is just fundamentally wrong. Roughly 90% of criminal defendants will plead guilty and half of the rest will be convicted. The vast majority of these criminal defendants are guilty of something, even if not the exact offense of conviction. The criminal defense attorneys' job isn't mostly about getting acquittals for clients who are the vast majority of the time guilty of something, it is about securing a non-excessive sentence for the conduct committed. Even in the majority of cases that don't conclude with a plea bargain, most of the job is about the sentencing phase, where there is almost always more judicial discretion, and not about the guilt-innocence phase of the case. | Documents are not protected under the 5th Amendment, so a person can be compelled to produce documents that may incriminate them. The person cannot be forced to testify against themselves, however – they can invoke their right to not testify against themselves. The attorney-client privilege canon has some exceptions, for example (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules or (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services (bearing in mind that POTUS is required by law to turn all documents over to the national Archives, so turning the records over is "compliance with the law" and a think that an attorney would do for their client, though this event is quite belated). No subpoena was issued and no testimony was given, so the Fifth Amendment is irrelevant. | When it can be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference.” Which is the standard the New York appeals court endorsed in 2014 for “defamation by implication”. So, on the face of the statements, they have to imply fraud and they have to show that the speaker intended to imply fraud. Whether they did that is up to the jury. |
Is character assassination of witnesses allowed? Say that one side of a trial brings a witness Walter onto the stand. If the other side doesn't like Walter's testimony (and wants the jury to not take it seriously), are they allowed to engage in character assassination of Walter? For example, airing his past crimes, his controversial social media posts, etc.. To be clear, there is nothing material against the content of Walter's testimony. All they're doing is "factually" berating his character. As a follow-up, when cross-examining the witness Walter, is the attorney allowed to proceed down a line of questioning designed solely to twist the knife on the character assassination angle (as opposed to questioning about the actual testimony that was made)? For example, directly asking Walter about controversial tweets they made supporting Nazism, as opposed to anything relevant to the case. I'm not sure what the correct answer might be. On one hand, knowing that the witness has been untrustworthy in the past is pertinent information to be considered by the jury. On the other hand, focusing on a witness's unsavory beliefs is a massive and immaterial distraction that puts personal bias over actual facts. | It is allowed to introduce evidence that impeaches the credibility or reliability of a witness, which could include his previous 5 convictions for perjury. This does not constitute "character assassination", so I'm not sure what you mean by that. A felony conviction can be admissible (assuming he was not exonerated). There are limits; for example, evidence of religious belief would be inadmissible, likewise holding an unpopular political belief. The evidence has to be connected to the witness's honesty. | Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal. | It has been along-standing principle in the US that names of jurors are publicly known, although there can be exceptions (US v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (1979) is the first case of a fully anonymous jury. Now, except in the 10th Circuit, they are allowed and not extremely rare (I don't know what the percentage is). So it would depend on whether the particular jury list is public. Apart from the situation where a juror is harassed by the press and gets a court order to restrain approaches by a specific member of the press, if you can contact them, you can ask them questions. There cannot be a blanket "do not contact a juror" law / order in the US, which would be contrary to the 1st Amendment. | The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible. | Your question is essentially this: consider a defamation lawsuit in which A alleges that B falsely stated that A did X (and it is not contested that B made the statement) also consider that B has done X in the past is it of any relevance to A's defamation suit that B has done X in the past canada Evidence must be relevant to a live, material issue In order for evidence to be admissible it must be "relevant to a live, material issue in the case" (this is from a dissent, but there is no disagreement about this point). Stage 1: Did B make a defamatory statement about A that was published - no relevance to this issue Defamation is prima facie proven if B's statement was published and if it tended to lower the reputation of A. The fact that B has done X in the past is irrelevant to this aspect of the analysis, especially when the defendant is not alleging that they did not say "A did X." Stage 2: Defences - there is a very narrow path for relevance on this issue Once defamation is prima facie proven, the burden flips to the defendant to establish a defence. Of all the possible defences, the only one in which I could see B having done X in the past being relevant is the defence of fair comment: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. The fact the B has done X in the past could be relevant to this defence if B were to use that familiarity with the activity X as part of the commentary on why they believe that A has done X. It could also be relevant (not on its own, but along with much more context) for an allegation of malice on B's part. Conclusion: Evidence that B did X in the past would likely not be relevant I see it very unlikely that B having done X in the past would be relevant. It would likely be treated as a collateral issue, unless B's credibility somehow became absolutely central to the litigation and if the judge was convinced that such acts relate to credibility. On the facts as described, and even for a fair comment defence, I don't see that being the case. | Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established. | I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety). | The word argumentative can mean a number of things. However, when defined as in the passage quoted from Wikipedia, it is not the opposite of 'conciliatory.' It has nothing to do with whether the witness is cooperating with the lawyer examining them. In this context, an argumentative witness is one who gives evidence about a legal conclusion (that is, the answer to a legal 'argument'). This is not allowed, because witnesses must give evidence of fact and not opinion. Sometimes, the distinction is murky. The example given is 'was the driver negligent?' The answer could well be seen as 'conciliatory' if it is consistent with the case being advanced by the advocate. It is still an impermissible argumentative question, because it is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. Suppose the lawyer wants to prove that a driver was negligent. An eyewitness could give evidence about what he or she saw and heard. A qualified professional could give expert evidence about what can be inferred from the physical evidence or agreed facts (eg. whether anybody was speeding). In the unlikely event that the driver admitted fault but a trial was still necessary, the driver could give evidence that they were drunk or not paying attention. None of these witnesses can express an opinion as to whether or not the driver was negligent, because that is the argument that the court has to decide by drawing inferences from the witnesses' factual evidence. In this context, the opposite of argumentative could be admissible, factual, direct or non-opinion. |
LGPL open source project - condition on invoking license (no right to use the software) on certain modifications. Is it possible? Released a software under LGPL license. Now added also a paid license check to it, so users can also upgrade to commercial license. However, I think some users can remove the check and re-release it under LGPL Can I somehow prohibit it? If license check code parts are modified, users rights, license (LGPL) are completely removed and there is not right to use this modified software. How can I protect against this modification of code? With close source it can be cracked, but with Open Source it would be very easy to remove it and release in the Internet as a new project. What are your suggestions? Was thinking to add a extra clause in "commons clause" in LGPL that would say: "modification to license check code, removes and rights to use this software" "Unauthorized further distribution may result in severe civil and criminal penalties, and will be prosecuted to the maximum extent possible under the law." | If you have released software under the LGPL license, you have given all recipients the right to modify this software for any purpose, including removing or adding features in a manner that you don't like. If you don't want that, you should not release your commercial features under the LGPL. Things you could consider doing: Publish the software under a different license. This is what you're thinking about. But note that you can't just add such license terms. Either, the license is still the LGPL with some extra terms. But then, the terms of the LGPLv3 allow recipients to remove the additional restrictions. Or, this is an entirely separate license. But then it would no longer be the LGPL, and no longer be an Open Source license. Whether such additional terms create a separate license or can be removed from the license is currently being litigated in the US in the context of the Neo4J database, which added the "Commons Clause" restrictions to the AGPLv3. See a discussion of the case from the Software Freedom Conservancy here: https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/mar/30/neo4j-v-purethink-open-source-affero-gpl/ Remove the restricted features from the LGPL version and maintain a separate commercial version, or implement the commercial features as a plugin. This is sometimes known as an “open core” business model. Due to the limited copyleft effect of the LGPL, you can still combine the proprietary parts and the LGPL-covered parts into a single program, but doing so may be confusing for users. It should be absolutely clear which parts are LGPL-covered, and which are your proprietary parts that cannot be modified. However, you would not be able to prevent recipients from using the LGPL-covered parts without your proprietary components, i.e. they would always be able to remove any licensing checks etc. More generally, it could make sense to think about why you want to publish any part of the software as Open Source. Sometimes, Open Source licensing is a good business decision, sometimes it isn't. If you want to control what users can do with the software, Open Source licensing is not a good fit for your goals. | Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose? | The creative commons licenses explicitly include a paragraph that they cannot be revoked once granted. That is an important concept of all free licenses (CC, but also MIT, Apache etc) Now it's a fact that Flickr (and maybe other sites) do allow changing the license to something less permissive. If you use one of their images, it's really best to keep a proof that it once was available under the CC license you originally got it with. This can be e.g., a screenshot or a link to the wayback machine. Wikimedia commons is often affected by this problem, as people regularly upload files from Flickr (which is absolutely ok, if they have a CC-by-sa or similar license at the time of the upload). Commons has installed a review process for such uploads. Trusted users check that the uploaded files really have the license on Flickr that the uploader declared. If later the license on Flickr is changed by the original owner, the history on Commons is considered to be enough evidence that the license was, in fact, permissive earlier. More about this can be read here. | Your understanding of the GPL is a bit off. GPLed code doesn't generally force you to GPL the output of the program, but that's just because the output of the program is normally not a derivative work of the program. For instance, if you write a novel in Emacs, your novel is an entirely original work. The fact that you used Emacs as a tool doesn't mean that your novel is somehow based on Emacs. This generator is different. It generates sprites by putting together art assets made by the program's creator. That means that the output contains a substantial amount of content made by the program creator, which means that it would likely be covered by the program creator's copyright. If the content was licensed to you under the GPL, you normally have to abide by GPL restrictions when you redistribute the content or incorporate it into your own program. Copyright holders can, if they want, grant additional permissions to their content and allow you to incorporate that content into nonfree software. For instance, the GCC compilers have an additional permission for their runtime libraries to let you use them in any GCC-compiled code; without that permission, GCC could only be used to compile GPL-compatible code. But unless the copyright holder has granted those permissions, when program output contains large amounts of their copyrighted content you're bound by the GPL when using it. In this case, the program specifically says that the art is dual-licensed under GPLv3 and CC-BY-SA-3.0. Since the generator's output is a combination of premade art assets (the buttons just let you tell the program which art assets to combine), the output is a derivative work of those assets. You can't use it unless your use is compatible with the GPL v3 or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (either works, since dual licensing lets you pick either license). | Being or not being open source makes fairly little difference in trademark law. If a commercial firm (Yoyodyne, say) had used the name "Portable Network Graphics" and the abbreviation "PNG" in trade, and taken such further steps as would be needed to protect it in the relevant countries, that firm would have a protectable trademark. Note that in some countries, a trademark must be registered to have any protection at all (much of the EU follows this rule). In others, use in commerce can offer some protection even without registration (the US follows this rule). Had this happened (in an alternate reality) Yoyodyne could have sent a cease and desist letter when open source developers started using the mark. If the devs did not cease, Yoyodyne might have obtained an injunction, or damages for trademark infringement, or both. They could also have issued a takedown notie to the site hosting the project. But had Yoyodyne failed to defend the mark effectively and allowed it to become generic, Yoyodyne might have lost all rights to it. Also, had Yoyodyne ceased to use it in trade for a significant period, they might have lost rights. This is a place where the different laws in different countries might lead to different results. Note that "Portable Network Graphics" is rather descriptive, and not particularly distinctive. Descriptive marks, like "Tasty Pizza" generally get weaker protection, while more distinctive marks, such as "LuAnn's Tastee Pizza" are more strongly protected, in general. Again this depends on the country, and the specific facts. In general the first to use, or to register a mark, gets the rights. When one entity is the first to use, but a different one is first to register, things can get confusing, and results will be different in different countries. Note that a Cease and Desist letter is not a legal requirement. It is a threat of possible future legal action, and often an offer to avoid such action if the recipient does as the sender requests. The recipient can comply with the letter, wait for court action, or try to make some sort of compromise deal. Open source projects, as other answers suggest, often choose to comply. | No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though. | If Client was foolish enough to pay Bad Contractor (BC) without obtaining a proper assignment of copyright in the source, or at least a sufficient license to allow Client to use the code and create modified versions, then BC owns the copyright to the source, and anyone who creates a modified version without permission from BC is a copyright infringer. The contract under which BC was hired should spell out what rights Client is to acquire, and when they will pass to client's ownership, but it might be that Client didn't get such terms into the contract. Or perhaps BC disputes that Client has fulfilled all its obligations. Yes, an infringement claim could be brought against an individual employee, although it is more likely that it would be brought against the employer, or against Client. It could be brought jointly against all three: programmer, new contractor (NC), and Client. Of course, BC's IP rights only matter if BC files an infringement suit. And it might be that a court would find an implied contract, in line with industry practice and the fees that BC was paid, and toss out such a suit. But courts are often reluctant to create contracts that the parties never agreed to. It would be risky for NC to depend on such an outcome of a possible suit. If you or NC are to work on this, you might want to have a contract in which Client explicitly indemnifies you for any copyright claims by BC, saying that they will take on and pay for the defense of any copyright suit BC may bring, and pay any damages that may be awarded to BC. That would largely remove the risk for NC and for NC's employees. | No, you can't The last paragraph of the MIT License explicitly says the author is not responsible for damages (emphasis mine): THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. A software license is not a contract. You didn't enter a contract with the developer or team. You found software online and decided to use the software. When you install paid software you are almost always presented with the EULA and check-box saying you agree to it. You took an action and agreed to the EULA. You didn’t have to agree to anything before getting access to the code under the MIT license. The software is offered "as-is" which is further protects the author. You'd have to show the author convinced you to use the software fraudulently. You're unlikely to talk to the author at all, and since the entire source code is available for review, it would be very difficult if not impossible to claim fraud. Finally, in the U.S. people have been sued using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. None of the notable cases involve embedding a virus in an open-source project. Of interest is how the CFAA defines a virus (emphasis mine) (A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; Simply writing bad code wouldn't be enough. You'd have to prove the developer acted maliciously. Hobbyists working for free don't usually have much money. The other major contributors to open source are large companies like IBM and Google, which have lawyers on retainer and deal with frivolous lawsuits frequently. |
Why do some decisions reference case law that references other case law? Why not just reference the original case law? I have seen this loads of times as I read through court decisions and case law. I am reading a Decision issued by an appeals court, and the judges cite a case that in turn cites a case. Here is the passage: Our first task “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). My question is, why bother citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co at all, if ultimately, the thing we are interested in is really Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.? | Lots of reasons The citing case may be in a higher court than the cited case but might not actually add anything. You always go for the highest authority on record. From time to time, a case makes a big review and consolidation of all the case law on a particular point. It is then easier to cite that case rather than half a dozen cases that it summarised. More recent cases are worth more, all else being equal. A case from 2002 shows the law hasn’t changed since the decision in 1997. Repeated precedents are worth more, all else being equal. By using the citing case you get the weight of two judges (or more for multi-judge appeals) for the price of one. Some judges write better than others. Citing their cases may better clarify the point. | You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right. | Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this! | Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions. | In appellate cases, the party appealing is called the "petitioner", and the other party is called the "respondent". These cases are listed Petitioner v. Respondent. In your example, Twombly was the original plaintiff, and Bell was the defendant in a class-action. This initial action would have been referred to as Twombly v. Bell. The case was dismissed by the trial court. Twombly appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This action would have been still been called Twombly v. Bell, since Twombly was the party petitioning for the appeal. The 2nd Circuit agreed with Twombly, and reversed the district court's decision. Bell, then on the losing side, decided to appeal to the US Supreme Court. Because Bell was the petitioner in this action, Bell gets listed first. | If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft. | I haven't reviewed the filings, but I can tell you that it's perfectly routine for lawyers to describe the other side's position as "plainly without merit," with no regard for the actual merits. The lawyer's job is to make his client look good, in court and in public; the existence of this question shows that he's doing a good job at least on the latter half of that equation. But in truth, it's such a generic thing to say that no lawyer who hears it will actually think it means anything. In all likelihood, the filing is like most others, in that it makes a good case on some points and a bad case on others, and the opposing lawyer's job is to argue that all of them are bad. In the rarer case that a filing is actually "plainly without merit," courts can and sometimes do impose penalties under Rule 11, which allows for sanctions against parties and attorneys who make factual assertions that are not supported by reality or arguments that are not supported by the law. | Your question is essentially this: consider a defamation lawsuit in which A alleges that B falsely stated that A did X (and it is not contested that B made the statement) also consider that B has done X in the past is it of any relevance to A's defamation suit that B has done X in the past canada Evidence must be relevant to a live, material issue In order for evidence to be admissible it must be "relevant to a live, material issue in the case" (this is from a dissent, but there is no disagreement about this point). Stage 1: Did B make a defamatory statement about A that was published - no relevance to this issue Defamation is prima facie proven if B's statement was published and if it tended to lower the reputation of A. The fact that B has done X in the past is irrelevant to this aspect of the analysis, especially when the defendant is not alleging that they did not say "A did X." Stage 2: Defences - there is a very narrow path for relevance on this issue Once defamation is prima facie proven, the burden flips to the defendant to establish a defence. Of all the possible defences, the only one in which I could see B having done X in the past being relevant is the defence of fair comment: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. The fact the B has done X in the past could be relevant to this defence if B were to use that familiarity with the activity X as part of the commentary on why they believe that A has done X. It could also be relevant (not on its own, but along with much more context) for an allegation of malice on B's part. Conclusion: Evidence that B did X in the past would likely not be relevant I see it very unlikely that B having done X in the past would be relevant. It would likely be treated as a collateral issue, unless B's credibility somehow became absolutely central to the litigation and if the judge was convinced that such acts relate to credibility. On the facts as described, and even for a fair comment defence, I don't see that being the case. |
Does filling U.S. postal service business reply envelopes with junk incur any legal peril? Some companies that send junk mail include a "business reply" envelope. This allows the junk mail recipient to send a "reply" through U.S. mail at the originator's expense. In fact these business reply envelopes can be filled with heavy junk and given to the U.S. Postal Service in order to impose additional postage costs on the junk mailer (perhaps discouraging them from further junk mailing). If a person did that could he be found liable for damages in a civil action? Or does it run afoul of any criminal statute? Are there any examples of either? | Two questions. Since the answer to the second answers the first I will go out of order If a person did that could he be found liable for damages in a civil action? Or does it run afoul of any criminal statute? As far as the post office is concerned, per Domestic Mail Manual 505 1.3.1 your heavy boxes shipped Business Reply Mail (BRM) are considered waste. Mailing the box with BRM as a label would not be a crime as long as you did not improperly ship prohibited items, like ammunition, or were trying to commit another crime such as sending a bomb or drugs through the mail, but it would be thrown out or returned to you. See: customer support ruling If a person did that could he be found liable for damages in a civil action? Or does it run afoul of any criminal statute? Unless you wasted the post offices time with excessive bulk mailings of junk or any of the reasons given before, not likely. | This question sounds to me like there is an inferred intent of the person giving the invoice to manipulate their value added tax rate due to the misclassification, and then an unrelated issue related to an overly high charge for the services which are basically independent. Is the classification of the job material in some way to either of those issues in a non-obvious way that you haven't clarified in your question? I will answer on the assumption that it is not, because at first glance, it is hard to see why this would matter with respect to either issue. A CVR listing is sort of half way between a U.S. Secretary of State company listing and a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission company listing with more than just bare bones contact information but less than a full fledged public company's disclosure statement. The fact that the company's business type classification is not a precise match for the kind of work that they did for you on this job is not obviously material to either what VAT taxes would be due (which usually depends upon the particular kinds of goods and services involved in the transaction) or the rate that a company can charge for a particular kind of work done. The fact that a company is classified in one category that describes the overall enterprise doesn't mean that every last thing done by the company must precisely fit that description. The mismatch could also conceivably be nothing more than a clerical error made by somebody preparing the CVR listing, in which case, again, the answer is "so what?" Therefore, as far as I can tell from the limited information in the question, this is just an immaterial error with no relevance to any of the likely disputes that you might have in this case. Usually, an immaterial error in a public record or invoice would not be a ground to object the amount that a company charged for the work, nor would it be something that would be appropriate to complain about in any way that would bring you an advantage that I can see in this transaction. This doesn't mean that you don't potentially have grounds to object to the invoice and dispute the higher than expected charges. But, bringing up the issue of the CVR code doesn't appear to add anything to your rights in this dispute. This said, I can certainly imagine circumstance where the wrong CVR code could be a hint that something else really is amiss. For example, suppose that you need a license to do a cleaning job since it involves environmental hazards and waste disposal, but you don't need a license to do management consulting, because who cares if someone is stupid enough to take your bad management advice. In that situation, the company might be misclassified because it doesn't have and perhaps cannot get for some reason, the business license that it needs to do the cleaning job. Charging for services while not having the proper business license might very well be illegal and a ground not to pay, and the error in the CVR filing might actually be an attempt to circumvent this problem. But, that kind of possibility relies upon pure speculation and without more facts there is no good reason to assume that something nefarious is going on here. | england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the "regulated sector" which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (& Ors)) | The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law | I assume based on your reference to .edu and your can-spam-act-of-2003 tag that you are interested in United States law. The scheme you describe is illegal under the CAN-SPAM Act. 15 USC 7704 (b) (1) (a) (ii) (b) Aggravated violations relating to commercial electronic mail (1) Address harvesting and dictionary attacks (A) In general It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail message that is unlawful under subsection (a), or to assist in the origination of such message through the provision or selection of addresses to which the message will be transmitted, if such person had actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that— (i) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means from an Internet website or proprietary online service operated by another person, and such website or online service included, at the time the address was obtained, a notice stating that the operator of such website or online service will not give, sell, or otherwise transfer addresses maintained by such website or online service to any other party for the purposes of initiating, or enabling others to initiate, electronic mail messages; or (ii) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means that generates possible electronic mail addresses by combining names, letters, or numbers into numerous permutations. The last part (ii) specifically forbids what you propose ("combining names... into various permutations). Under 15 USC 7706 you may be liable for statutory damages of up to $250 per email. In addition to being illegal, I suspect your plan will also be ineffective: this sort of spam attack would be really easy for the university to detect and block. | In case a company is flooded by such "asymmetric" requests, how should a company react? Although article 12.5 refers to singular "a data subject", it can be inferred that exposing the controller to significant expenses is not part of the legislative intent. Accordingly, the company may have requesters choose between paying a reasonable fee for the ensuing administrative costs or withdrawing the requirement that delivery be by postal mail. The bad faith scenario you outline seems to be a non-sequitur, since generally a pattern (or a high number) of requests for postal mail delivery should prompt the controller to suspect that some or many might not be legitimate. A requester with bad intentions would be unable to prove the identity of the various data subjects he impersonates or alleges to represent. | Main Question: Most likely not under Magnuson-Moss or U.C.C.. Question 1: If a charge payable before hand was not set forth in any written warranty, it is most likely not legal to deny remedy to the consumer. However, even if it was, it is possible that it would not meet the federal minimum standards for warranties as, per paragraph (d) a warranty has to provide for remedy without a charge. If there is absolutely no way for you to obtain the information to prove that a remedy is due — for e.g. no third party has legal or technical capacity to diagnose the vehicle — that is likely also a term to be found unconscionable and void, and may be found fraudulent, malicious and/or oppressive which may entitle one to collect punitive damages. (It is worth obtaining written confirmation of whether this decision is made in accord with their policies or on a line that they announce to be recorded) Question 2: Most likely same as Question 1. Question 3: Most likely same as Question 2. According to 15 U.S.C., subsection (a) of Section 2302 entitled "Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements for contents: "In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of time." (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear. (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. (12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty. (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. It may, in addition to any or all of the above, be a violation of paragraph (8), (9), (10) and/or (11) based on specific fact patterns. To the 2nd point added: If the manufacturer stated that the vehicle would run at least a certain number of miles on a full charge for a certain number of miles driven or number of years, and did not stipulate it otherwise, they would have to remedy this. It is highly likely that they tried to evade making such written statement (if not written, it's not a warranty under Magnuson-Moss). If they did, and they did not define the scope of what they would have to do in the case of a defect or malfunction, they would have to remedy it by repairs within a reasonable time; if they fail, they would have to refund or replace. This does not mean that it is likely worth pursuing the matter in court other than maybe in small claims (See: ohwilleke's reply to this question for a general explanation). Moreover, most auto manufacturers put arbitration provisions in their sale contracts and/or their warranties and generally it may be required of one to opt out of it within 30 days of entering into the agreement. If that took place, first the dispute would likely need to be disputed through a qualified dispute resolution mechanism of the manufacturer, dealer, distributor and/or sellers choice depending on who gave the warranty. The specific State's lemon laws may provide for civil penalties for willful violations which may or may not be a very high bar to meet depending on the State's case law, and which is more likely to make it worth for "lemon" lawyers to take the case, but generally they are not a great deal more like hyenas of this segment of the law. It may still be worth considering for one depending on the specific facts, including State jurisdiction and the impeding nature of the nonconformity. (Please specify a State for the State's lemon laws applicable in this hypo) | Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party. |
Has it been Legally Confirmed that A Website is not Liable if passwords stolen from it are used on other sites? Security Experts the world around all agree that you should not reuse passwords across sites. This is simply a matter of best practice, and it protects you such that if your StackExchange password is stolen, they can't use that to access your bank account. The general feeling I get from my security friends is that this "advice" is legally bulletproof, and that if their website is hacked, and plaintext passwords are stolen, they don't have to worry about someone suing them because the password that was stolen from their website was also used on that person's banking page. After all, "It's the user's fault for reusing a password!" Has this belief actually been upheld in court yet? Or is this a firestorm waiting to happen when Amazon turns out to be the victim and they sue some smaller organization for every penny it has? | united-states The argument you are making, restated in legal terms, is roughly as follows: Users have a duty to not reuse passwords. When a user reuses a password, and their password is subsequently stolen and used to fraudulently access the plaintiff's system, that password reuse becomes the proximate cause of the plaintiff's business injury. Therefore, our storage of plaintext passwords cannot be the proximate cause, and so we cannot be liable. This argument is mostly wrong. Leaving aside the fact that you're going to have a tough time convincing a jury of #1, a tort may have more than one proximate cause. Both the password reuse and the plaintext storage were but-for causes of the injury (i.e. if either had not happened, then the injury would not have happened). The injury was foreseeable, because it is well known in the security industry that many users in fact do reuse their passwords, professional advice notwithstanding. In most US states, that's enough to establish proximate cause. In the minority of states using the "direct causation" test, you might be able to characterize the user's password reuse as an intervening cause, and thereby avoid liability. However, there are other elements of tort law which must be established aside from proximate cause, and so by itself this does not resolve the question of liability. Other defenses might be applicable; for example, the terms of service might contain an indemnification agreement, which (if upheld) would make the user(s) responsible. The defendant might also argue that there is no duty of care, that it was not breached, or that the injury was or should have been de minimis (i.e. that the plaintiff should have taken greater care to prevent damages arising from account hijacking). | There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use. | Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here. | The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work. | Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line). | A simple EULA does not absolve you from legal responsibility. The law that you need to be acquainted with, if you are dealing with the US (i.e. might be sued in the US), is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in particular Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act which states the "safe harbor" provisions. Aspects of DMCA safe harbor are covered in many Law SE questions. In essence, you have to provide a way for rights holders to complain that someone has infringed their copyright on there site, and you have to take down allegedly infringing material: and there are a number of legal formalities to attend to in doing this. The main point is that you can't just ignore the problem and hope it goes away, and you can't just say it is not your responsibility, which is what a simple EULA does. To be protected, you need a "designated agent" where complainers can contact you. You provide the information online (as well as stating the DMCA policy, which can be in the EULA), and also register that information with the Copyright office (online). The complaint has to be in writing, and most of the burden is on the author of the complaint, but you still have to be sure that the complaint is legally conforming. The complaint has to say what was infringed (e.g. the URL), the identity of the protected content (title of the book, for instance), and provide the complainer's signature and contact information. It also requires the complainer to say that they have a good faith belief that the material is illegally copied (no permission, and not otherwise allowed by law), and a perjury statement that the foregoing is accurate and authorized by the copyright holder. When you have a conforming notice, you must "expeditiously" remove / disable the infringing material (there is no definition of "expeditious"), notify the user, then wait for a proper counter-claim (same general form as the take-down claim but where the user denies the posting the material was illegal. If you get a counter-claim, you notify the alleged copyright owner and wait for them to file suit in 10 days. If they don't do that, you restore the material. Here is a sample complaint, and a sample counter notice. Also, this document (look for the download tab) reorganizes the legal language so that requirements are put in logical order and not randomly scattered throughout the US Code. | Let’s say I go to a cash machine, ask for £100, and the machine gives me £10,000. I use my banking app and see that £100 left my account, not £10,000. At this point I haven’t done anything illegal. If I asked for another £100 and got £10,000 again, that might be illegal. But the extra £9,900 are not mine. They are the bank’s money. If I try to keep it, that is simply theft. | There are two processes that go on all the time, and are generally considered legal: Encryption algorithms are attacked by cryptographers and weaknesses identified. In most cases this results in a gradual reduction of the work required to break the algorithm by a few orders of magnitude at a time. The history of SHA-1 is a good example of this. People identify security holes in software and follow responsible disclosure rules. This means that they notify the vendor and give them an opportunity to fix the bug before going public. Note that this is merely considered good practice; immediate publication would be legal too. Your scenario sits at the intersection of these two processes: an attack (process 1) which completely destroys the security of many systems (process 2). Responsible disclosure occupies a legal grey area: someone who finds a bug might have had to exploit it to at least some degree to demonstrate it, and there have been cases where vendors have used police or courts to retaliate. However this wouldn't apply to your scenario. In America the First Amendment makes it unconstitutional to use the legal system to stop people saying true things (copyright excepted, and untrue things are often legal too). If your Wunderkind lives in America then a widely published factual description of their solution would therefore be legal. Legal problems only start if they provide the details in secret to people they should reasonably suspect of intending to use them for crime. |
Why is Julian Assange in jail? Further to another question asked on these boards: Julian Assange was sentenced to 50 weeks for jumping bail on 1 May 2019 Presumably, his jail term began immediately upon sentencing, in which case he finished serving his sentence 68+ weeks ago. He was held for several months pending extradition hearings, which itself does not make complete sense: presumably, the extradition hearings should have been conducted while he was serving the actual sentence. Why is he still being held in Belmarsh? I understand that after a very pro-extradition1 judge, overseen by one with serious conflicts2, struck down the American request for extradition, the Americans are appealing. Larger question However, my understanding is that if a judge finds someone guilty then they go to jail right away. And they have to file appeals while serving their sentence. Is the converse not true, i.e. if the judge finds someone not guilty and the government appeals, then doesn't the person contest the appeal as a free person? 1 Of her 24 previous extradition hearings, Vanessa Baraitser ordered extradition in 23. 2 Vanessa Baraitser is overseen by Emma Arbuthnot who has refused to formally recuse herself despite family connections to people cited for criminal activities in documents published by WikiLeaks. | There are two reasons for jail: Applying the sentence Denying the accused the opportunity of fleeing, destroying evidence or doing the same felonies again. The last part is always a difficult one, as the accused has still not received a veredict but has his rights severely curtailed. In general it is intended as a last ditch measure, and the circumstances of the case must be considered. In this case, after Assange spent several years holed in at Ecuador's embassy in the UK, and given that he did not surrender himself voluntarily, it is not that unreasonable to believe that he would try again to flee, as the matter is not still settled and he is still at risk of being extradited. I do not know about England, but in some countries (e.g. Spain) if you are kept in preventive custody but later found to be innocent you are automatically entitled to an indemnity. Also, for the larger question, that is not true either at least in some countries. After a guilty veredict a judge may postpone incarceration while appeals are reviewed (again considering things like flight risks). Of course, if you have condemned someone who has not been given bail due to being considered too risky, they remain in jail during the process. Also Presumably, his jail term began immediately upon sentencing. In many jurisdictions, the time served before the sentence is counted towards the sentence. If you spent 4 weeks in jail before the sentence, you have already passed 4 weeks of your sentence. If the time already spent is close to the time you would have been sentenced, the sentence specifies that you are condemned "to time served" and released immediately. | It's exactly the opposite. All arrests are public record under California Government Code 6254(f): Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation: (1) The full name and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location where the individual is currently being held, and all charges the individual is being held upon, including any outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole or probation holds. Other than the "endanger the safety" exception, which could be applied case-by-case, there is no general exemption for refugees or asylum seekers. Trials are also public, see What does it mean that a trial in a US court is "Public"?. Members of the public cannot be excluded from a trial, and the defendant can't "opt out" of this. This is considered to be a central feature of US justice systems and an important check on possible abuses of the criminal judicial process. | At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances). | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | The time spent on death row is largely due to appeals, habeas proceedings, and a growing backlog. The time between an actual final appeal and execution is not astonishingly long. (However, "final" appeal is hard to pinpoint because a death row inmate can file successive habeas petitions at the federal level). To highlight the relatively quick turnaround between a "final" appeal and execution, Richard Glossip lost an appeal to the US Supreme Court (Glossip v. Gross) on June 29, 2015 and was scheduled for execution in Oklahoma on September 30, 2015, a delay of 93 days (Mary Fallin Executive Order 2015-42). Due to unavailability of a particular drug, the execution has been further delayed until November 6, 2015 (ibid). The rest of this answer explains the long delay between initial conviction/sentencing and eventual execution, using California as an example. In California, since 1978, approximately 20-40 people have been added to death row per year, while fewer than 10 per year are executed. (California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice Final Report, p. 121) There are generally three different appeals available to the defendant: a direct appeal to the state Supreme Court, a writ of habeas corpus to the state Supreme Court, and a writ of habeas corpus to the federal district court. (ibid) The federal district court ruling regarding the habeas petition can be appealed to the 9th Circuit. That Circuit's ruling can be appealed to the US Supreme Court. (ibid) The Commission identified several points that are responsible for the long delays in California (ibid): delay in appointing counsel for direct appeal (3-5 year delay) delay in scheduling a case to the California Supreme Court (2.25 years between application and oral argument) delay in appointing counsel for the state habeas petition (8-10 year delay) delay in deciding the state habeas petition (22 months) delay in deciding federal habeas petition (6.2 years) delay in appealing the federal habeas petition to the 9th District (2.2 years) The US Supreme Court also publishes a primer on the death penalty appeals and the habeas process (see especially pp. 8-10). | england-and-wales Can the case be reopened when the defendant becomes well again? Yes See the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, and the related Crown Prosecution Service guidance: Section 5(1)(b) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 provides that where a person has a finding made that they are under a disability and that they did the act or omission charged, the court shall make: a hospital order (with or without a restriction order); a supervision order; or an order for his absolute discharge. Section 5A(4) of the same provides for an express power for the Secretary of State for Justice to remit for trial a person who becomes fit for trial while detained in hospital under a hospital order and a restriction order made under section 5(2)(a) Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. [...] Section 4A(2) Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 provides that a finding of unfitness will have the effect that the trial "shall not proceed or proceed further". Although the fitness to plead procedure can result in an acquittal, a finding that the offender did the act or made the omission charged is not a conviction and does not amount to the determination of a criminal charge. It does not preclude a full trial of the accused if s/he becomes fit to be tried: R v H [2003] UKHL 1. | 1: What's the correct process to get a restraining order? The police aren't involved in the formal process, although sometimes people go to the police and are told that they have to go to a judge instead. The aggrieved plaintiff presents an ex parte affidavit or makes statement in person under oath to a duty judge (who often asks clarifying questions). If this statements states a basis for a protection order one issues with a prompt return date (a week or two). At the return date the order either becomes final if the defendant doesn't show up, is vacated if the plaintiff doesn't show up, or is tried in an evidentiary hearing if both show up. Of course, a court order is ultimately just a piece of paper and there is no legal recourse against the government if they don't successfully stop the person restrained from doing something. Also enforcement of restraining orders was a lot more lax in 1987 than it is today, and men asking for restraining orders were taken less seriously then, than they are now, by most judges. 2: Can Dan keep his adultery secret during that process? Not really. In the initial ex parte hearing, Dan can probably tell the story artfully in a way that hides the adultery, but in the adversarial hearing, if there is one, the other side (or their lawyer) can ask him under oath about the affair and he has to answer truthfully in a public court hearing setting. 3: Is it plausible that Dan's family and friends don't learn about that process? Yes. Unless he's famous enough to make the newspapers (which in a decent sized city is pretty famous), and if he initiates the process, the only person who gets formal notice before the order issues is the court, and if the court issues the initial order, the only person who gets notice is the defendant. If Dan doesn't call family or friends as witnesses and don't tell his workplace why he's at court, nobody is told. It isn't a secret. It's a matter of public record that could be subsequently discovered at any time. But there is no active means of notification of friends and family in the short term. Realistically, Dan might ask a cop or a lawyer what to do, get accurate or inaccurate information, and decide not to pursue it for fear of creating sworn proof of his affair at a hearing. Cops love to provide legal advice that they aren't qualified to dispense. Dan's concern is particularly relevant because this happened in New York State in 1987 when New York State didn't have no fault divorce at the time, and the outcome of divorce proceedings on the merits for property division and alimony and custody would have been heavily influenced by marital fault in the divorce case. Revealing an affair under oath as he might have been required to do at a hearing would have crushed him in a subsequent divorce outcome if his wife found out and decided to divorce him. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare |
What was the original idea behind the practice of courtroom wigs? English judges and barristers have for a long time had to wear wigs. What was the intended implied message by the object aesthetic? What was the look of a judge or advocate wearing that type of courtroom wig intended to evoke about the character, authority, or other aspects of the court and legal process at the time when the practice was introduced? And what are its origins? Was it a French thing, imported by the Normans? | The courtroom wig actually dates from an era centuries ago when it was common for the upper classes to shave their heads and wear wigs - a practice that arose for hygiene reasons. That is, at the time when this practice first arose in courtrooms, such wig-wearing simply reflected an ordinary style of dress. The practice dates from the 16th and 17th centuries. What happened since is that styles of appearance in wider society have moved on, but not amongst lawyers in the courtroom, and in the modern day such wigs have become characteristic of courtroom dress. Until the mid-Victorian era, such sartorial traditions were the least of the anachronisms carried forward from earlier centuries. There have been some reforms in recent decades that limit the archaic appearance of judges, but one of the argument for courtroom dress has always been to make the proceedings seem solemn and formal, and to depersonalise the appearance of those who participate as officers of the court. | See Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, para. 272 OPCA litigants who advance these schemes will often focus on certain aspects of court formalities. Like Mr. Meads, they may scrutinize the court for some hidden indication of its true nature. A strange but common belief is that a flag with yellow or gold thread ‘fringes’ “denotes a military jurisdiction, not common law”. In R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 2, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199, Chief Justice Drapeau of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected a motion by Lindsay “... removing the gold‑fringed Canadian flag that has adorned the Court of Appeal’s hearing room for years ...”. This motion, and the argument that “[t]here is no lawful reason for a Canadian flag to be present other than the regular statutory authorized flag” was frivolous and vexatious: para. 9. | I'd say it's more like a concurrence than a dissent. Justice Thomas isn't saying the Court should have taken the case; he's just raising question about the (implicit) reason the Court isn't taking the case. Most experienced observers will read the statement as a signal that he is open to reversing Raich and hoping that someone will bring the right case in which to do that. But in the end, t amounts to pure commentary and has no legal effect. The practice of filing these types of statements is not "normal," as the Court rejects probably more than 95 percent of the cases that come to it, and it does so without comment. But it is hardly unprecedented to see these types of statements, and I assume that every justice (except perhaps Barrett, given her recent arrival) has made similar statements. From a quick search, I can find statements from Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, from Roberts, and from Breyer. | The concept of prima facie is common also in civil proceedings (and, impliedly, administrative ones). See the results from this query, most of which are civil cases. For instance, this memorandum opinion begins by acknowledging that the plaintiff-appellees "have met their burden of establishing a prima facie case for defamation". In theory, the purpose of prima facie elements is to establish "high-level" uniformity as to what items a plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be, will need to prove in order to prevail in a case. That uniformity is necessary for --and consistent with-- the so-called "equal protection of the laws". From a standpoint of equal protection, there is no reason why a case being criminal vs. civil should make a difference regarding the applicability of the concept of prima facie elements. | This is a purely linguistic question, despite the hope to discover a special legal process. Somebody uses a word or phrase in order to communicate an specific idea. Somebody else thinks "That's a good way to put it" and uses the same or very similar expression to convey that idea. Enough people do this and it becomes "conventional". The word itself is not made up, it already existed, and was simply applied in a specialized way (e.g. "tort" is an ordinary French word meaning "wrong, mistake" taken into English in a more specialized manner). If you want to know the history of a legal term, you have to read relevant historical rulings to see when the word was first used. That is how we know that current technical term "consideration" derives, from around the time of Henry VIII, that it derives from rulings referring to "assumpsits" which were made "in consideration of" an obligation. "Trover" is a sufficiently old term in law that you will have a hard time pinning down first use and the pattern of expansion. | Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition. | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. | There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney. |
Board of 9 judges in Japan? This is from a fictional trial from Yakuza Judgement, set in Tokyo Japan. The context is a trial where someone is accused of murder. On the left is the defendant (in white) and his attorney team. On the right is the prosecution team. In the middle, seated, is a witness. Standing next to the witness is the head prosecutor cross-examining. In front of them is what seems to be the clerk, recording everything. But who are the 9 people at the back? At least in America, I think there's only ever 1 judge presiding over the court. So I'm not sure who these 9 people are supposed to correspond to. Or is it customary to have a board of 9 "judges" deliberate over a case in Japan? | The Professional And Lay Judges In The Scene Murder trials in Japan take place in a regional court called the "high court" which is one level below the Japanese Supreme Court. Trials of very serious crimes in Japan (crimes punishable by death, life imprisonment, or very long sentences in prison, not just ordinary felonies) are tried by a mixed panel of three professional high court court judges and six lay people who are sometimes described as jurors but are probably better described as "lay judges". The law providing for this kind of trial was passed in the year 2004 and first implemented in the year 2009. Many European countries in the civil law tradition have a similar process. While proceedings would mostly be in the court room, a court view when all of the professional and lay judges go to the scene of the crime or some other key venue where important facts happened would be far more common in Japan than in the U.S. After hearing the evidence presented at the trial, which is managed by the presiding judge of the three professional judges, all three judges and the six lay judges deliberate together as a single panel regarding the guilt or innocence verdict which would be rendered in the case. This is in contrast to juries in common law countries where the jury is independent of the judge, makes the ultimate verdict decision without deliberating with the judge, and interacts with the judge only via jury instructions and reception of their verdict. Judges In Other Kinds Of Cases If this had been a serious civil case or a felony case not serious enough to give rise to a lay judge trial or an appeal of a lower court ruling, instead of a very serious criminal case, it would have been heard only by the three professional judges without the six lay judges. More serious cases are heard by more senior professional judges from the high court, and less serious cases are heard by more junior professional judges from a district court which is below the high court but above the summary courts (and marginally superior to the almost equal in status family courts which are staffed by more junior professional judges as well). If it had been a serious misdemeanor or intermediate stakes civil case, it would have been heard by a single professional district court judge acting alone. Trials of very minor criminal cases and civil lawsuits are heard by a single judge acting alone without any lay judges, who is not admitted as members of the judicial profession and might not even be legally trained, who is really closer to what we would call "justices of the peace" in the United States. This position is often translated as "summary court judge." The Judicial Occupation And The Selection Of Lay Judges In Japan Japanese judges belong to a separate occupation than lawyers and prosecutors that staffs the judicial system of Japan. Basically, they start in family court or in the intermediate level court of general jurisdiction court called district court, right out of college, hearing smaller cases alone, and more serious cases in panels with justices of the peace or family court judges in a three judge panel. These panels also hear appeals from civil judgments of summary court judges. Then, they work their way up the judicial hierarchy based upon seniority and merit. Mid-career judges are in courts called "high courts" that handle most serious matters in the first instance as trial courts, appeals from cases heard by junior judges from the level of courts below them, and appeals in criminal cases from the rulings of summary court judges. The most senior and meritorious and respected judges, of course, are the fifteen judges on the Japanese Supreme Court. For the most part, appointments and promotions are similar to those of other civil servants, rather than being political. Lay judges are selected in a manner somewhat similar to the way common law country jurors are selected, although, as far as I know, the prosecution and defense have less of a say over who serves as a lay judge on a panel and most people called to serve as lay judges will actually end up doing so (in contrast to the very high rates of disqualification and preemptory challenges in common law juries for a serious case like a murder trial). The Professional Status Of The Lawyers In This Scene Incidentally, the legal profession of the prosecutors and the legal professional of the defense attorneys would be different as well. Like judges, prosecutors are civil servants with their own separate professional qualification (although judges, lawyers, and prosecutors have essentially the same academic curriculum in college). Private sector lawyers like the defense counsel in the picture belong to the main licensed occupation for lawyers which is in some respects more similar to that of barristers in the U.K. than to U.S. lawyers, both because there are so few of them and because of their typically more trial oriented practices. Other Kinds Of Legally Trained People In Japan Japan, like many civil law countries, has legally trained notaries who handle a lot of transactional work including drafting the legal instruments involved as a third-party neutral who also has tasks that overlap with government officials who keep official records. Finally, like many civil law countries, and to a lesser extent like solicitors in the U.K. before that profession was formally regulated there, many people major in law as undergraduates in college but never take the professional examinations to become a lawyer, a prosecutor, or a judge. Instead, these people typically end up working in managerial jobs in a business with a status akin to an investment banker or finance professional or realtor in the U.S., but with no formal occupational credential other than their college diploma. The Clerk And The Nature Of The Trial Court Record In front of them is what seems to be the clerk, recording everything. The clerk is probably taking detailed notes as an aid to the judges and lay judges in their deliberations, but unlike a common law criminal trial, verbatim transcripts and records of the proceeding are not maintained (or at least, have no special evidentiary status). The clerk is not a direct analog to a U.S. style court reporter who takes dictation of everything that is said word for word. If there is a dispute regarding the facts found at trial on appeal, at the first tier direct appeal of a conviction, a five judge Japanese appellate court panel of the fifteen judge Japanese Supreme Court would hear new evidence on the matters about which there were allegedly mistaken findings of fact by the trial court of first instance with new witness testimony and the same or new exhibits, rather than simply reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court as final and complete. Sometimes an appeal initially referred to a five judge panel of the Japanese Supreme Court would be reheard by the "Grand Panel" of all fifteen Japanese Supreme Court judges, in which case, the findings of fact of the appellate panel judges are conclusive and binding on the grand panel Japanese Supreme Court which is limited to resolving legal issues. | As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury. | There is one context where this does happen. Common law judges have direct contempt power. This means that while a judge is in the courtroom presiding over a case, the judge can summarily punish someone with incarceration and/or a fine without a trial for "contempt of court" because the judge has personally observed what has happened. Contempt of court encompasses types of disorderly conduct that wouldn't otherwise be criminal conduct. In other contexts, the judge is just one more witness and would not be assigned to handle the case. so you can only get "non-witness judges" from out-of-state or another region. The lawsuit hasn't begun yet, and all of the possible, local judges saw it happen. As a practical matter, this is basically impossible. But there are procedures in cases where large numbers of judges a conflicted out of a case, for example, to get a judge from the next county over or another part of the same state. | At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case. | Generally, No Contempt powers are rather broad, but not that broad. A judge has power to find anyone in the courtroom in contempt, if that person acts in violation of he rules or of the judge's instructions. A judge has the power to find any party to the case in contempt if that person violates orders from the judge, unless there is some overriding circumstance, for example if the person's action was an exercise of a constitutional right, or if the judge's order is held (by a higher court) to be unreasonable. A judge will have the power to issue orders to people not otherwise parties if this is needed to preserve the judicial process, such as "gag orders" to prevent bias from contaminating a trial. These often have conflicts with first amendment rights or other rights, and there have been various cases on exactly how far a judge can go in such matters. But if the Judge is within those rules, violations of the judge's orders may be punishable as contempt. But an ordinary individual who is simply expressing disapproval of the judge, even in a highly disrespectful fashion, neither in nor near the courtroom, should not be subject to a contempt citation, and few judges would try to invoke such a power. Note that a judge can always issue a contempt decree or citation, and may be able to have the person jailed, if the person is within the court's jurisdiction. But if the citation was an abuse of discretion, it can be overturned and the judge may be subject to a damage suit, in an egregious case. Charles Rembar in The Law of the Land wrote of one case where the judge had had a bailiff purchase coffee during a recess, and found it not at all to his liking. He had the coffee-shop owner arrested, and brought into his presence, and proceeded to scream at him over the poor coffee. The owner later sued the judge, and received a 6-figure damage award. as Rembar put it "The price of coffee is going up all the time, and it seems that the jury felt that Coffee with scream was extra." | The witness can go outside and ask questions of the witness’ lawyers So if, for example, Mr Trump chooses to testify to the grand jury he goes in alone - no lawyers. If he wants to consult his lawyers he needs to ask to do, leave the room and consult them. If I were Mr Trump’s lawyer I would be worried that he wouldn’t know when he should do that. | If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement. | Alternate explanation: Richard is saying that the witness has no "testimony that would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence", and therefore should not be allowed to testify. |
Legality of legacy Delta advertisement Would the following advert be illegal currently? What specific laws would it disobey and why? Or would it be totally legal? It's hardly controversial compared to i.e. Tinder adverts, or Sex in the City shows,or Hooters so my intuition would be that this advert is totally fine by law. | Would the following advert be illegal currently? The advertisement is lawful everywhere except maybe in jurisdictions with a heavy theological/religious component. In all likelihood, an advertisement that only lists flights within the US and is directed "[t]o the guy who's got a girl in every city" is meant for the US market rather than the Haredim (in Israel) or their Islamic counterparts, let alone the Taliban. What specific laws would it disobey and why? In some trends of Judaism women have an obligation to cover their natural hair when in public. Likewise, women in Iran must wear a hijab. This implies that, already from the "hair" standpoint, all women in the advertisement except maybe "Your Dallas darling" would be in violation of the law. This might soon stop being the case in Iran, given the recent or ongoing protests after the morality police's killing of a woman who defied the hijab law. Hair matter aside, models' outfit in most or all photos in the advertisement would be in violation related laws in those jurisdictions. The violations are in the sense of "indecent exposure". Someone knowledgeable in the laws of Iran, of other orthodox Islamic countries, or of Israel's legal framework would be able to identify the specific statutes or religious-legal principles at issue. Ultimately, those prohibitions are premised on the Talmud (in the case of Judaism) and the Sharia (Islam). | You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part) | I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies. | In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today. | Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK. | No. This would not be illegal. There is considerable case law holding that a mere link to a website is not itself actionable, either civilly or criminally, for wrongdoing by the operator of the destination site. This said, even though it would not be a breach of copyright, per se, in some circumstances one could imagine the link, together with other actions to give the link more context and substance (e.g. a revenue sharing agreement with the illegal website operator based upon clicks referred from your site) to support a claim of civil conspiracy to violate copyright laws, or even a criminal conspiracy to do so. But, it would be very hard to make out a civil or criminal conspiracy claim against someone who maintained a "warning" site. Similarly, it would not be actionable to have a webpage that linked to a website that used to be legitimate when the webpage was set up, if the link then rotted and the site at that address was replaced by a website that streamed videos illegally or promoted child pornography, without your knowledge. | That post is probably illegal. Because she is making false assertions about you (that are presumably damaging your reputation), she is likely liable for defamation. Because she has copied a picture of you without authorization, she is likely liable for violating the copyright of whomever owns that picture. Commenters have suggested she might invoke a fair-use defense, but I would expect it to fail. The four fair-use factors are: The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes: Both Plaintiff and Defendant are using using the photograph to identify the holder of an account -- a Facebook account in P's case, a business account in D's. D is using the photograph in connection with a profit-making enterprise, not for educational purposes, and her use is not transformative. The nature of the copyrighted work: Photography is a creative art at the core of copyright's purposes, generally entitled to thick protection. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[P]hotography entails creative expression warranting copyright protection.") The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: There is no indication that D took anything less than the entire photograph. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: The question is not only whether the defendant's use affected the actual market for the protected work, but whether many people doing the same thing would depress the potential market for the work. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (Courts must consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market.") The potential market for the image is probably very small, but widespread unauthorized copies, publicly displayed, would undoubtedly depress whatever market exists. So all four factors cut against the defendant. Fair use is a loser defense here. | What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea. |
Why does Japanese entertainment make such backhanded references to brands (e.g. WcDonalds instead of McDonalds)? There's tons of examples. To name a few: MgRonald's and Sentucky Fried Chicken (instead of McDonald's and KFC) in Hataraku Maou-sama Attack Family (instead of Smash Brothers) in Jaku Kyara Tomozaki-kun Bepsi (instead of Pepsi) in Yowamushi Pedal Chatter a.k.a Yuttaa (instead of Twitter) in Yakuza What law in Japan forces entertainment to make such thinly veiled attempts to pretend to not be directly referencing IRL brands? It's not like someone sees "WcDonald" and doesn't 100% immediately associate it with McDonald. Is it just supposed to be a joke, or is there a legal basis for why it's done this way? I have a feeling this is a Japan-only thing, as American media seems to happily portray brands. E.g. playing Mario Kart in the Sopranos, or playing the Wii in Big Bang theory, or a Nintendo Switch in She-Hulk, etc.. | This practice isn't just restricted to Japanese entertainment, although it is indeed particularly common there. Still, the practice, which I call using "fakemarks" (the term is not in wide usage and if there is a widely accepted word for it I don't know what it is) is widespread in popular culture fiction both in and outside Japan. It is especially common among smaller scale producers of fiction worldwide. I actually keep a portfolio of screen shots of them for use in teaching materials about trademarks and about popular culture. Here are a few examples of typical "fakemarks" from "the wild": It is intended to and does successfully serve the purpose of discouraging trademark infringement lawsuits by showing non-affiliation with the trademark owner which makes it non-infringing. You also see it more in a lot of non-U.S. and non-Japanese popular culture (e.g. in works made in Indonesia and Turkey), and in U.S. works made by small independent creative producers (like webcomic artists and people writing graphic novels or online fiction who aren't affiliated with D.C. or Marvel or a major publishing firm). People use fakemarks to the extent that they do, mostly because they believe that the scope of trademark infringement is broader than it really is (a concern that regularly comes up in Law.SE questions), combined with an aversion to the risk associated with being in a gray area and incurring legal fees even if you win. This aversion has sparked industry norms and tropes such as the ones you describe. The greater aversion to risk of trademark infringement in Japan than in the U.S., that gave rise to these industry conventions and norms, has a lot to do with the way the respective popular culture industries are organized economically. The Economic Organization Of Anime and Manga In Japan Japanese anime films (where you see fakemarks used a lot) are a very intimately related direct outgrowth of the Japanese manga industry (i.e. Japanese graphic novels), with the core creative decisions like those that give rise to fakemark use made at the stage of the production of the source manga. A very large share of TV series anime are adaptations of manga that have been adapted for animated format, although there are a few exceptions producing original work, like Studio Ghibli that notably are less prone to use fakemarks. In the early days of anime, often lengthy shots of the animation were created by just a camera creating the illusion of movement by panning around a still manga illustration to save time and money. The manga industry in Japan is very highly decentralized, despite being highly profitable for the top manga writers (who are called "mangaka"). Many of the people with the highest annual personal incomes in Japan according to public tax collection agency statistics, are mangaka, in part, because mangaka are self-employed and often paid a percentage royalty, and in part, because corporate executives in Japan are paid much lower salaries directly than comparable executives in the U.S. and accumulate a lot of their wealth in the form of highly indirectly held ownership interests in business conglomerates, often acquired as founders or inheritors, that they hold for long periods of time without generating taxable income. But, while the top mangaka make huge bank when their works are selling well, the names at the top shift frequently and there is a long tail of mangaka who currently squeeze buy with just barely enough money from one or two serializations or commissioned works (like illustrated safety manuals and handbooks) to pay their bills hoping to get lucky and make it big someday. A typical manga is produced by one or two main authors (sometimes the drawing and the story/dialog are split between two people and sometimes one person does both), supplemented by one to a few assistants artists who often work either in the home of the artist or remotely from their own homes, who do finishing work like reinforcing line work, backgrounds, shading, and coloring. Sometimes there would be a copy editor and/or an assistant who writes in the dialog and text. Mangaka are generally independent contractors, often operating as sole proprietors. They typically submit their works to magazines as freelancers with only a light editorial role. The magazine editor working with a freelance mangaka's work usually consists mostly of working with prospective freelance mangaka to approve a new series, hounding their contracted mangaka to get work in by the magazine's rigid publication process driven deadlines, and deciding when a series has lost popularity and needs to be shut down. Often, the mangaka will retain the right to republish the originally serialized manga in multi-volume book form with another publisher (although, of course, contract terms vary). So, mangaka typically don't have access to lawyers, and the main kind of lawyer that they would refer to for intellectual property advice in Japan are scarce, more similar to English barristers than to U.S. attorneys, and very expensive to hire for a consult. There are only about 14,000 lawyers in private practice in all of Japan (which on a per capita basis would be comparable to the U.S. having about 36,000 lawyers), only a minority of whom would handle matters like advising someone on the impact of trademark law on their creative manga writing decisions. The U.S., in contrast, has about 1,300,000 lawyers, which is about 36 times as many per capita. As noted before, once a manga is green lit to become an anime, the key creative decisions that might benefit from legal consults have already been made, so the anime production company that can afford to hire them doesn't provide input on those issues. Also, while manga artists often do go to art school, the typical art school curricula in Japan includes much less instruction on the business and legal side of working as a creative professional than comparable courses of instruction in the U.S. would. The Economic Organization Of Popular Culture In The U.S. In contrast, in the U.S., lots of popular culture for the mass market, like television shows are much larger operations and even when they are adapted from books, are much less direct and faithful adaptation (often only "inspired by" the source material). U.S. productions, in part, because they are more likely to be live action and filmed on location, are often initiated by corporate executive type people called producers rather than by screenwriters or book authors, and a typical production as you know if you have ever watched the credits of a TV show, may have hundreds of employees and contracting companies, separate companies formed for the purpose of the show. The credits of a U.S. TV series or movie invariably has a general counsel lawyer and frequently an associate attorney or two on the payroll, as part of the group of people producing the work. Even comics and books in the U.S. are published by firms that are much more "corporate" at the creative design phase of the work, than a mangaka's home office and band of assistants and apprentices. And, as expensive as they are, it is much more economically feasible for the producers of a U.S. popular culture production or the publishers of a comic or book in the U.S. to make legal counsel available to the people doing the creative work to advise on issues like trademark infringement. Trademark lawyers in the U.S. aren't cheap, but they are less expensive than comparable Japanese lawyers and the economics of U.S. popular culture production make these lawyers more available to people who need to utilize their services while engaged in the creative production process for popular culture works in the U.S. As a result, U.S. popular culture producers at the high end of that the industry in terms of economic scale (which is where much more of it is located at the creative design stage), being better informed about trademark law. As a result the U.S. industry has not had to be as cautious and is in a better position to get closer to the line of what constitutes permissible nominative use of trademarks than the people who make Japanese manga and anime. Another issue is that business minded producers of U.S. popular culture works often use product placement as a separate revenue stream or as a way to finance set, costume and prop elements for their works, by agreement with the trademark holder, something that is typically not a viable option for a lonely mangaka who has not yet made it big. Counterexamples To Intellectual Property Conservatism In Japan This said, industry norms do not always work in the direction of caution in Japan, and those norms do influence what is considered to be fair use in copyright in Japan. For example, Japanese mangaka are more comfortable with using highly referenced illustrations that sometimes even depict copyrighted works when they are not trademarks or trade names, than U.S. popular culture producers. This is, in part, because when you are drawing everything, rather than filming, in the original story source material, at least historically, the time savings for a small shop operation using highly referenced illustrations are immense, and because it helps mangaka meet the externally imposed and strict deadlines imposed by the magazines that serialize them. Footnote On Sourcing I read quite a bit of manga, watch quite a bit of anime, and in general consume quite a bit of non-U.S. popular culture. As a lawyer, I'm naturally also interested in learning about the economics and law behind these forms of entertainment. And, it is customary in manga to periodically break the fourth wall and have the author discuss their personal lives and work process after every few chapters of their fictional works. Between this, and a few mini-features on the subject, and a reading a few law review articles on copyright enforcement for fan fiction, I've developed some familiarity with the organization of the entertainment industry in Japan, in the U.S., and in some other countries. But, I'd be hard pressed to reference those sources with hyperlinks or citations, because this is knowledge that I've accumulated on a fragmentary basis over decades and didn't anticipate at the time I was encountering most of it that I'd ever need to be able to refer back to and cite to it. | If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes. | Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book. | For works released after 1989, Copyright notices don't have any legal consequences in the United States. They are just a friendly reminder of who created the work and that they take their copyrights seriously. But those notices are not required anymore to enforce your copyrights on the works you created. If you have proof that you own the copyright on something and when it was created, and if it's still within the term limits, then you can take legal actions against people who violate your copyright. Disney has a history of repeated worldwide lobbying for extending the expiration durations in copyright laws in order to avoid any of their classic cartoons from falling out of copyright protection. So it could be that they try to intentionally muddy the waters and make it harder to find out which of their works expire when. That way people are less sure about what Disney works are and are not in the public domain, making it more risky to use them. But that's just my theory. | "Lightsaber" is a trademarked term, so it's gotta be called something else. The idea behind a lightsaber is older than Star Wars, anyhow idea are not protected by copyright. The actual design of such a weapon would be protected, but it would be a matter for the jury to decide if the supposedly-infringing design was a copy of a Lucasfilms-protected object, or that of the cover of Analog, Jan. 1969. The "setting" of the movie is completely irrelevant, all that counts is whether the object "copies" the plaintiff's design. In light of the earlier Wolfling design, it's not a foregone conclusion that all lightsaber-resembling objects are infringing. Available evidence indicates that you will be sued if you do it, so consult a really good IP attorney. | A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap. | Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition. | The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes. |
Is it a valid attorney strategy to make statements, even if they will be striken from the record? Similar to how, in football/soccer, players strategically go for fouls because they're effective. Is it common practice for an attorney to bring up inadmissable evidence/points that, even though they might be stricken from the record, will inevitably have an effect on the jury? As a simple example, if there was illegally obtained evidence on the defendant, then it couldn't be officially admitted and discussed in the court. But if the prosecution brought it up, it would "poison" the minds of the jury, even if it was ordered to be stricken from the records. | canada When faced with improper statements made in front of a jury, the judge has three options: provide a correcting instruction to the jury, to strike the jury and continue alone (in civil matters), or to declare a mistrial. Mistrial would be the appropriate remedy if the effect of the statements is so improper and prejudicial that it cannot be corrected by the judge's instructions to the jury to ignore them. See e.g. R. v. Armstrong (1969), [1970] 1 C.C.C. 136 (N.S.C.A.). A witness made an improper reference to an accused's confession. The only effective remedy was a mistrial. Whether this is the case is a matter of discretion left to the trial judge. | united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be "plain error" (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say "I object" that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was "harmless", which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings. | Laws criminalizing perjury are not about being mistaken or less believable in your testimony. The crime is, very narrowly, stating something which you do not believe to be true, while under oath. If you make a statement that happens to be untrue but you believe it is true (you are mistaken), that is not perjury. In the US, moreover, you have to assert something literally untrue, not simply say something that could be interpreted as being untrue. Rental arbitration hearings are nothing special, except that witnesses may or may not be sworn under the particular state's laws. If a witness is sworn and unambiguously asserts "Jones gave Smith $1,000 at that time", and another sworn witness asserts "Jones did not give Smith any money at that time", that might suggest that one witness testified as to something that they did not believe to be true. It might also show that they were standing in different places. Even if the circumstances show that the two witnesses observed the same facts, you would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one party knew at the time that their statement was false. It is also possible that one witness made mis-remembered or misinterpreted what they saw. They might say or write something else (under oath, or elsewhere) that establishes that they knew better. An example is US v. DeZarn, which clearly established that the defendant could not have believed the statement that he testified to. With no official record of what a party testified to, it may not possible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a party committed perjury, since it can be reasonable to doubt claims of what he actually testified to. The defendant's attorney may, however, have to create such a doubt. Some answers could be perjurous if the question and answer are short enough, for example "Did you cash the check?" "No", if witnesses to the hearing testify convincingly that this exchange took place. | The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides. | Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it. | Can a jury render a verdict that contravenes with binding precedent? Yes, but (if it is a guilty verdict) it will be overturned on appeal. The appeal court will say that the jury's verdict was not one which any reasonable jury could have made on the basis of the evidence and the instructions in the case. As explained in Dave D's answer, the trial judge will have explained the law, including the binding precedent, to the jury. So if we get to this stage then the jury is disregarding instructions. The above process is the remedy. You may notice a 'gap' where the jury can unlawfully acquit a person and there's nothing anyone can do about it, because of the rule against double jeopardy (that is, you can't appeal against an acquittal). This is called jury nullification, because the jury has nullified the relevant criminal law by acquitting an offender. | Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that. | "I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true. |
How does a prosecutor determine intent? When prosecutors look at a statute, how do they determine the requirements to prove intent? For example, look at this statute: “Whoever knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;” (U.S. Code Sec. 1030, par. 4) How does one determine what is necessary to prove a defendant acted “knowingly and with intent to defraud”? For example, do they need to prove the defendant knew he didn’t have authorization? What about intent to defraud — do they need to prove he knew it was against the law, too? (tl;dr) My specific question: How do prosecutors determine the elements necessary to satisfy the mens rea requirements attached to certain laws? | This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud. | This is an example of an affirmative defense In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the law provides an exception that amounts to if you do X you commit a crime unless Y, the defense has to prove (to a lower burden) that Y happened. An affirmative defense only kicks in if the prosecution has proved their case; which is usually because the defense concedes it if they are relying on an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense also must be introduced as soon as possible; preferably before charges are laid but, if not, at the commital/arraignment - courts take a dim view (up to excluding them entirely) if they are introduced late. As to whether a case like this goes to trial that depends on the evidence available to support Y and the weight that the prosecutor and then the committal/arraignment judge/grand jury gives to that evidence. If they believe that a jury would believe it, they will not take it trial; if they don't, they will. | 18 USC §1344: Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representation, or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. Here are some example prosecutions: United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443 (1994) United States v. Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853 (1993) United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300 (1992) | A prosecutor cannot make a change to a plea agreement after it is signed. That's why it has to be signed. If there is an error in it then it needs to be re-written and re-signed. No, your friend cannot get their conviction vacated over this. They can have it reversed and put back into pre-trial for a new determination (plea, trial, etc.). They need to speak to an attorney to understand if this is worthwhile or not. There really are very very few instances where a mistake in the legal system means you can get away with a crime. | I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it. | There's nothing he can really write that any court would have to listen to - after all, from the court's perspective, he could have been lying when he wrote it down. And following orders is generally not a defense (although if he was under actual duress, like they were threatening to kill him if he didn't do it, that could be a defense.) But being a pawn rather than a mastermind can impact the sentence. If the crime is a federal one, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines adjust the offense level according to the role in the crime: §3B1.1. Aggravating Role Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. (c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. §3B1.2. Mitigating Role Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. The lawyer would probably not qualify as a "minimal participant" if he's writing reports detailing the activity, as this shows he's aware of the extent of the illegality. He would, however, probably qualify as a "minor participant". If the crime was a state crime, then according to Oregon rules: (1) Subject to the provisions of sections (2) and (3) of this rule, the following nonexclusive list of mitigating and aggravating factors may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist: (a) Mitigating factors: (D) The offense was principally accomplished by another and the defendant exhibited extreme caution or concern for the victim. (E) The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime. | What Crimes Were Committed? The acts would constitute solicitation to manufacturer a controlled substance by Alice, attempted manufacture of a controlled substance by Bob, and conspiracy to commit a controlled substance by both of them. All of these are serious felony offenses. The payment of money by Alice and acceptance of money by Bob to carry out the production of a controlled substance would be a sufficient overt act to support the charges of solicitation, conspiracy and attempt, even though the crime was not carried out. All of these offenses are what are known in the criminal law as "inchoate offenses". Affirmative Defenses Would Bob or Alice have any affirmative defenses if prosecuted for these crimes? The two main offenses are impossibility and abandonment. We can assume, given Bob's good faith, that it was not impossible for him to manufacture the controlled substances, but he simply decided not to do it. A defendant may plead and prove, as an affirmative defense, of abandonment (typically under typical U.S. criminal statutes) by showing that he: Stopped all actions in furtherance of the crime or conspiracy Tried to stop the crime as it was ongoing Tried to convince the co-conspirators to halt such actions, or reported the crime to the police or other authorities. Bob did shop all actions in furtherance of the crime and tried (successfully) to stop the crime as it was ongoing. But, by not returning the funds and not making clear to Alice that he wanted nothing to do with the plan, Bob may not have met the third prong of an abandonment defense. Alice certainly does not have an abandonment defense. She took no overt acts abandoning the plan. Civil And Criminal Liability For Non-Drug Offenses Also, Bob might have criminal liability for theft, and civil liability to Alice on charges of civil theft or on a claim for restitution. First, a small technicality. Bob did breach a verbal contract. He has an affirmative defense of illegality to civil liability for breaching the verbal contract, but that doesn't change the fact that he did breach the contract. Anyway, while a contract to carry out an illegal act is unenforceable, and Bob would have no right to sue Alice in court if he performed the contract and then Alice failed to pay, it is less clear in this fact pattern where the illegality that bars the contract doesn't actually happen. Retaining property obtained on the basis of a contract that is disavowed that is not carried out, or when the funds are obtained on the basis of a criminal act, might constitute theft for which there might be criminal and civil penalties available, even though it was not fraud. Restitution to put the parties back where they would have been had a contract not be entered into might be available as a remedy. Restitution is often available even when the underlying contract itself fails when people have taken affirmative acts based upon a contract that cannot be legally performed. This wouldn't be a strong case for restitution, and state case law would answer the question, but it wouldn't be a frivolous one either. Of course, since Alice would be admitting to committing a crime is she brought suit (waiving her 5th Amendment right to be silent by doing so) she might be well advised not to sue. And, Bob would still have a strong "unclean hands" defense in an restitution or civil theft lawsuit. The Low Chance Of Charges Being Brought Considered It is true that if no one told anyone that the likelihood of criminal charges being brought is small. But, one can easily imagine hypothetically, that a third party saw what went down in person, or via surveillance video and audio, or that one of the parties told someone what happened and was reported (ex-lovers and mistreated trusted professional aids are notorious for doing things like this), or that someone confessed (often people do things like this when joining a twelve step program or a converting to a new religion), or one of them might testify truthfully at trial despite having a 5th Amendment right not to do so. What If The Jury Doesn't Believe Bob? If the criminal jury thinks that Bob was lying in the first place about good faith, he would have criminal liability for theft and Alice would have liability for solicitation of and conspiracy to commit the manufacture of controlled substances. Alice would be on the hook for the same felonies. Bob would be guilty of a crime the severity of which would depend upon how much money he took from Alice. If Bob doesn't think he can show the facts necessary to establish an abandonment defense, he might be smart to lie and say he was just stealing from Alice if the dollar amount was reasonably small, since the consequences would probably be less severe if he was convicted. It would be very hard to prove that he was truly agreeing to the verbal contract in good faith when he never performed it, but did take the money and not try to return it. | On the contrary, it is unethical for a prosecutor to bring a case where there is no reasonable prospect of conviction. The prosecutor is an officer of the court and as a representative of the state, their primary concern is the guilty are convicted and the not guilty are not. |
How far does legal gymnastics go to remove liability? Suppose a self storage company has a terms of service contract that goes to great lengths with its legalese to nullify any possibility of being held liable for anything, in other words reserve all rights but disclaim all liabilities toward the customer. This includes a convoluted digital security system on the lift requiring a code that is supposed to stop working at certain hours to restrict access but often malfunctions at other hours and the contract explicitly disclaims liability for the lifts malfunctioning. But when one books a space online it is promoted when selecting a space that either it is on a ground floor or the customer is assured that there is lift access. Some of these spaces are big enough to only make sense for storing large furniture and thus couldn't be useful without functioning lift access. When the lifts break down as they frequently do, it invariably wastes hours upon hours of numerous customers' time. is it possible/valid for a company to disclaim liability for not providing a service properly which they've contracted for consideration to do? Corollary: sometimes things happen that are beyond the customer's control and they are slightly late vacating the premises at the agreed time. On these occasions they may be locked inside possibly creating a fire hazard, but that's another issue, but in any case, the duty manager or contracted overnight security company is supposed to come and resolve the situation. Recently after calling the out of hours assistance number someone had to wait 2 hours for the security to arrive as their keyring was on the first floor, with their storage, bike, and house key so they could'nt get home. When finally the security arrived he tried 5-6 different security pass codes but due to mismanagement by the storage company none of them had worked and the customer was left homeless that night unable to retrieve their house keys to get into their home. The security man tried to consult the duty manager liaising from the storage company itself but they also could'nt produce a code that actually functioned to give access to the premises. The customer's sleep and life were massively disrupted by this incompetent out of hours response. No doubt the company's lawyers have painstakingly crafted their corporate service contract to eliminate any conceivable liabilities and give the corporation all the power possible in every conceivable circumstance. But are there immutable limits to the ability of corporate legal gymnastics' ability to dissolve liability while taking people's money for a service? | england-and-wales "A term in a consumer contract is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer." s62 Consumer Rights Act 2015 Some suppliers put terms in contracts that seek to limit or exclude liability. Some of these are fair and others are unfair, depending. Unfair terms are automatically 'void' and therefore of no legal effect. The Competition & Markets Authority produced some guidance titled Unfair contract terms explained, which may be of interest. A term that undermines the value of the supplier's obligations by hindering or preventing the consumer from seeking a legal remedy "falls under suspicion of unfairness". A term that has the effect of giving impunity to the supplier to act unreasonably or negligently to the consumer is very likely to be considered unfair. A term may simply not be allowed under legislation and therefore it won't be legally valid (see for example s62(8)). But the consumer may not be aware of this legal fact so the term could be misleading - in which case it is actionable as an unfair commercial practice. Schedule 2 Consumer Rights Act 2015 lists consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair. | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. | canada Not merely because of the length or legalese, and not the entire contract. But there is a line of authority in Canadian law that can lead to exclusion-of-liability clauses being unenforceable, and length is a factor. When there are unusual exclusion clauses, inconsistent with the main purpose of the contract, executed in hasty circumstances, where the contract is long and/or small and the signer's attention is not drawn to the exclusion clauses, courts have been wary to enforce them. Karroll v. Silver Star Mountain Resorts Ltd., 1988 CanLII 3294 (BC SC): [18] ... to allow someone to sign a document where one has reason to believe he is mistaken as to its contents, is not far distant from active misrepresentation. [19] In the usual commercial situation, there is no need for the party presenting the document to bring exclusions of liability or onerous terms to the attention of the signing party, nor need he advise him to read the document. In such situations, it is safe to assume that the party signing the contract intends to be bound by its terms. [20] But situations may arise which suggest that the party does not intend to be bound by a term. In Tilden the hasty, informal way in which the contract was signed, the fact that the clause excluding liability was inconsistent with the overall purpose of the contract, and the absence of any real opportunity to read and understand the document given its length and the amount of small print on its reverse side, led the Court to conclude that the defendant should have known that the plaintiff had no intention of consenting to the onerous exclusion in question. In these special circumstances, there was a duty on Tilden to take reasonable measures to bring the exclusion clause to the attention of Mr. Clendenning. Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning, 1978 CanLII 1446 (Ont. C.A.) said: In modern commercial practice, many standard form printed documents are signed without being read or understood. In many cases the parties seeking to rely on the terms of the contract know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract does not represent the true intention of the signer, and that the party signing is unaware of the stringent and onerous provisions which the standard form contains. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such terms should not be able to do so in the absence of first having taken reasonable measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and, in the absence of such reasonable measures, it is not necessary for the party denying knowledge of such terms to prove either fraud, misrepresentation or non est factum. In the case at bar, Tilden Rent-A-Car took no steps to alert Mr. Clendenning to the onerous provisions in the standard form of contract presented by it. The clerk could not help but have known that Mr. Clendenning had not in fact read the contract before signing it. Indeed the form of the contract itself with the important provisions on the reverse side and in very small type would discourage even the most cautious customer from endeavouring to read and understand it. Mr. Clendenning was in fact unaware of the exempting provisions. Under such circumstances, it was not open to Tilden Rent-A-Car to rely on those clauses, and it was not incumbent on Mr. Clendenning to establish fraud, misrepresentation or non est factum. Having paid the premium, he was not liable for any damage to the vehicle while being driven by him. As Lord Denning stated in Neuchatel Asphalte Co. Ltd. v. Barnett, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 356 at p. 360: "We do not allow printed forms to be made a trap for the unwary." | It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money. | You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". | Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit. | It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told). |
As a US citizen, what law requires me to pay income tax? I've found content (especially from Irwin Schiff) that says there's no law requiring US citizens to pay income tax. Other sources claim that income tax is mandatory. If there really is no law requiring me to pay, I'd like to know (for obvious reasons). What law or laws do require me to pay? Or are there currently no such laws? | The Internal Revenue Code found at Title 26 of the United States Code. Title 26 is the full compilation of all the laws passed by Congress relating to tax liability and every other legal obligation, definition, exemption, exception, etc. The Internal Revenue Code is the law that requires people to pay taxes and if you believe the folks who say it's only a legal requirement as assessed, they're wrong. | No, it is not debt and you are not owed any money beyond what Congress decides to give you. Section 1104 of the act says the benefits are what Congress decides to give out. This was challenged in 1960 and upheld. To quote Wikipedia: Ephram Nestor challenged Section 1104 after he was denied Social Security payments as a deported member of the Communist Party. He argued that a contract existed between himself and the United States government, since he had paid into the system for 19 years. ... The Court ruled that no such contract exists, and that there is no contractual right to receive Social Security payments. Payments due under Social Security are not “property” rights and are not protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The interest of a beneficiary of Social Security is protected only by the Due Process Clause. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties. | Can individuals spend money acquired in settlements that include an NDA? is the party that receives the payment allowed to actually use it? Yes. Payment of a substantial sum is oftentimes the main or only incentive for the injured party to bind himself in an NDA. A prohibition to spend that money would de facto nullify the benefit without which the party would have declined the NDA. Sandman isn't otherwise wealthy, if he suddenly buys a Lamborghini or a private jet, that money must have come from CNN. So doesn't this violate his NDA? No, typically it does not. Depending on (1) who the parties are, and (2) the hitherto divulged details of the controversy, the public might infer anyway --and with reasonable certainty-- who must have paid a substantial sum to settle the dispute. Thus, plaintiff Sandmann's [hypothetical] purchase of luxurious items would not really provide the public with new information. Similarly, if instead of buying luxurious items the indemnified person spends that money on rather necessary expenses (be it medical, property & casualty, etc.) ensuing from the injury, a prohibition to spend the money would lead to another absurdity: That of perpetuating or worsening the harm inflicted to the plaintiff who couldn't otherwise afford medical treatment, new living arrangements, or repairs/replacement of property, accordingly. If the payer thinks it is important enough, perhaps the NDA could include terms requiring the payee to use some extent of discretion as to the pace of spending the money. However, such need on the payer's part seems rare, and the injured person is likelier to decline the NDA altogether if the clauses for management of the compensation are unreasonable. What counts as disclosure with regards to Non-Disclosure Agreements? Any revelation, by the parties, that contravenes the terms and purpose of the NDA in that it would give non-parties information which cannot be ascertained from prior and/or independent publications and filings. That is otherwise hard to answer because it totally depends on the terms --and boilerplate-- of each NDA. | According to the information I was able to find, every zone, country, or even states, have their own taxation rules for sales made there. Correct. Well, in no way it's possible that small companies or individuals that sell products internationally deal with tax rules for each buyer, that would be a non-sense, and paying such taxes worldwide would be a nightmare not worth having a small business at all. You are required to comply with the law. If it is complicated, or difficult or expensive to do so then, it's complicated, difficult and expensive and you still have to do it. The answer is obvious: if it's not worth having a small business, don't have a small business. The main question, if someone buys a license from my web-site, is it considered a sale in the buyer's country/state which requires me to collect and pay some remote tax, or it's a purchase in my country/state which requires me to collect HST from that buyer? It depends on the law in both Canada and the destination country. In most cases, the sale will be an export sale from Canada (GST/HST exempt) and an import sale in the destination country - requiring you to comply with GST/HST obligations there. Another question is regarding invoices, I know that Canada requires certain information to be included into an invoice for sales in Canada. If my sales will be considered sales in a buyer's Country with some other rules, does it mean I have to manage tons of invoice templates? Yes. Let's say if my sales in UE exceed 30K EUR it looks like I need to register and pay VAT there. But what if I have less? Then you don't need to register and remit tax. Nor are you allowed to collect it from your customers. By the way, I have no idea what country in the Eurozone goes by the initials UE. In most jurisdictions, you need to register either when you reach the threshold in fact or reasonably expect to reach the threshold. Also in most, you can usually register even if you are below the threshold. For example, these are the rules for Australia. Anyone, please advice. Hire an accountant versed in international digital services. They will be able to give you the advice you need. They will also be able to recommend sales/payment platforms that can handle most of this for you (for a fee, of course). | Is this actually true? Not really although there may be figments of truth woven in. First, the GDPR does not prevent tax authorities from determining layers of corporate ownership or investigating tax fraud. Second, your substantive tax liability depends upon the tax laws of the countries in question. If you owe taxes under a country's tax laws but the country can't find it, that makes you a tax criminal, and doesn't mean you don't owe the tax. Third, the exact rules on what triggers tax liability in mixed country fact patterns are highly technical and not fully uniform. If you actually do business abroad within the meaning of a country's tax laws in a way that is not subject to its taxes, then it is legal. But this scheme probably doesn't meet that standard under most country's tax laws. So you hire two local directors, as contractors, from country B. On the contract signed, they oversee the day to day operations and work for you as advisor since you're the only shareholder. So their existence, the contract and the structure show that the company is managed in country B, run in country B and has economic substance in country B. This way the offshore company isn't taxed in country A. This allows you to get dividends from the company tax free (after paying corporate taxes in country B) to your account in country A. A few thoughts on this specific example. If you truly are nothing but a passive source of funding for a company, then owning shares in this company is no different from owning shares in a public held company (e.g. BMW). The notion that dividends from the company are tax free in county A in that situation is very likely incorrect. Usually, dividends and other intangible income is taxable income in the country where they are received. Most likely, the dividends are income subject to taxation in country A. There is a concept in tax law which U.S. tax lawyers call the "Economic Substance Rule" which is also true, but with different names (most of these countries don't have English language tax terminology anyway) which means that when someone is going through the motions of conducting a transaction in a tax favored form when in substance, something different is really going on, the tax authorities can choose to tax the substance rather than the form of the transaction. So, if the really valuable work is being done by the shareholder without visible compensation, rather than by the local directors and managers, you the shareholder might be taxed on "imputed income" representing the fair market value of the services rendered, or treated as the true manager of the company in country B. Similar issues can arise when valuable intellectual property is transferred to the company without being duly reflected in a fair market value purchase of equity interests, a sale at fair market value, or a licensing agreement for royalty payments. Tax officials aren't limited to looking at paperwork. They can and do interview the human beings involved in interviews that those human beings are legally obligated to attend and cooperate with and to provide truthful information in with legal consequences for lying in those interviews. Even if no official documentation or public statements would tip off tax officials, a significant share of tax evasion cases are driven by whistleblowing by disgruntled former employees, ex-spouses, jilted significant others, mistreated business partners, and revengeful angry children who feel that they have been mistreated by their parents. Nothing in the GDPR prevents whistleblowing to tax authorities. Background In E.U. countries, closely held company ownership must be declared and recorded in a notary public's "public records" or a corporate register (unlike, for example, the United States, where, this information was only contained in the internal records of the company in most cases, although a new law called the Corporate Transparency Act effective January 1, 2022, or later if initial regulations aren't adopted, changes this status quo). E.U. directives expressly requires much more public disclosure by private companies than the U.S. more generally. For example, a recent Dutch overhaul of its rules for disclosing beneficial ownership of companies is a model of contemporary modern European legislation on the subject. This affords access to this information as follows (UBO is the Universal Beneficial Ownership registry and FIO is the Fiscal Intelligence Agency, an anti-money laundering agency): The public can only access the publicly accessible UBO-information with a valid registration and in exchange for a fixed fee. The identity of those persons that access the UBO-register will be registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and UBOs may inquire as to how often their information has been consulted. The Chamber of Commerce may register the Citizen Service Number (Burgerservicenummer) of persons who access the register. The FIU and other competent authorities will, upon request, have access to that information. The FIU and other competent authorities may perform a search in the UBO-register based on the name of an individual, thus listing all connections of that individual, while the public will only be able to search the UBO-register for the UBO(s) of a specific entity (and not for the name of an individual). Even though this limitation to search options was presented as a measure to protect the privacy of UBOs, it is generally expected that commercial platforms that register company information will enable searches based on the name of individuals. The FIU and competent authorities have access to both the publicly and not publicly accessible UBO-information. In the Netherlands, the following institutions are, amongst others, qualified as competent authorities with unlimited access to the UBO-information: the Dutch Central Bank; the Authority for the Financial Markets; the Financial Supervision Office; the Dutch Gaming Authority; the Tax & Customs Authorities; the National Police; the Public Prosecutor’s Office; the Dutch intelligence agencies; and the Tax Intelligence Agency. As this example illustrates, taxing authorities are given express statutory authority to gather information pertinent to tax collection. The Dutch situation, prior to the recent reform, collected essentially similar information, but at a decentralized basis in the offices of the notary handling the incorporation of the entity in question, with similar parties having access to the information. The E.U.'s General Data Protection Regulation generally, affirmatively extends to the provision of a good or service to an E.U. person subject to the regulation, something that would not include tax collection. See Article 3(2). Also, mutual assistance treaty obligations between E.U. countries to share information, which would include many tax treaties between E.U. countries, and criminal investigations (which would include criminal tax fraud cases) are expressly exempted from its scope. | For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue). |
Can a witness lodge an objection in response to a question? Suppose that a lawyer asks a question that may breach some court protocol. Is it acceptable for a witness to turn to the judge and say "Objection!" and possibly go on to explain the nature of the objection, whereupon the judge makes a ruling? | united-states Generally, a witness cannot object to a question on the grounds that it fails to conform to a rule of evidence (e.g. hearsay). A witness can refuse to testify on a matter either due to the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or on the grounds that some other privilege (e.g. attorney-client, clergy confession, spousal) applies. A witness can also say that they don't understand the question as phrased (either because it is complicated or because it contains terminology or concepts that the witness doesn't understand), or that the witness didn't hear the question, or that the witness forgot what the question was while the lawyers and judges were discussing whether it could be asked. This often results in the question being restated or rephrased. A witness may also answer a question by stating that there is no answer to the question as it is based upon a false premise (e.g. "on which day of the week did you beat your wife?"). And, if true, a witness can properly answer that they don't know the answer, either because they never knew or because they don't currently recall the answer. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | A warrant for the arrest of the person on contempt charges could be issued although this probably wouldn't be a valid basis for extradition and instead would only be enforced if that person came to a place where the court has territorial jurisdiction. The person held in contempt could be fined, with the fine reduced to a money judgment, and the judgment could be enforced against any assets or income of the person held in contempt that are, or are in the future, within the jurisdiction of the court. The money judgment could also be domesticated to a jurisdiction where the witness has assets to enforce the judgment through the local courts there. If the witness is a party to the case, or is in some close relationship with a party to the case such that the party ought to be able to exert some control or influence of the witness, sanctions related to the case itself could be imposed. The testimony of the witness could be disregarded as a sanction if appropriate. If the witness were testifying involuntarily pursuant to letters rogatory (which is basically a subpoena from a jurisdiction where the witness is not located that is domesticated in the jurisdiction where the witness is located by a local court in accordance with local law), the court issuing the letter rogatory could sanction the witness according to domestic law for contempt of court for violating the commands issued in connection with the letters rogatory. A simple declaration that a person was in contempt of court could sometimes have collateral consequences for that person, for example, in loan applications or background checks or violating the term of some contract that was the basis of the obligation of the witness to testify, or in connection with a plea agreement that called for that person's testimony (possibly in anther jurisdiction). Courts have some discretion to fashion custom remedies in unique situations in response to someone's contempt of court. | Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law." | Unless you received an order from the court prohibiting contact, it might be legal; but it's probably not the best idea. Let the lawyers handle it Attorneys have far better, more effective means of dealing with this situation than the course of action you describe. Lawyers have productive tools to accomplish the job and they know how to use them. For example, assume the best-case-scenario results from your idea and you get the other side to admit their affidavit is fallacious in some way. "Aha!" you shout. "Success! Daylight!" But then what? It's not on record. You can't testify to the admission because that's hearsay. Now imagine they next share this information about your little conversation with the counterparty that had them sign the affidavit in the first place. After first being alerted of your concerns, they both now act in concert to shore up their stories and you never see that "daylight" again. Contrast that outcome with one where your guy or gal's attorney deposes the witness under oath, gets them to concede to your version of the facts then introduces the deposition as favorable evidence at trial. That's a much better outcome for "your side." Wouldn't you agree? Be wary of unintended consequences Generally speaking, such direct contact between the parties is often problematic and rarely helpful. (Except, in some cases, when direct contact between the parties leads to a negotiated settlement. Which happens far less often than the direct contact going sideways making the situation even more intractable.) Before you launch off on your own and do something that might be counterproductive. First, identify the areas of the affidavit that you think are inaccurate. Give that information to the party you support, then have them run it by their attorney to figure out the best way to handle the situation. | Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it. |
Subsets and Splits