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The flashing red light is treated like a stop sign Does the flashing red light eventually turn into a steady red light before it changes to green? If so, does it always happen this way? Thank you! "Drivers facing a flashing red traffic control light must stop before the stop line or crosswalk. If there is no stop line or crosswalk, drivers must stop before the intersection. Drivers should proceed only when it is safe and after yielding the right-of way. The flashing red light is treated like a stop sign." | Does the flashing red light eventually turn into a steady red light before it changes to green? Not really. Fail Mode For Regular Stoplights A flashing red light is usually a default mode of a traffic light system when the control system is broken, or the power grid is down. In these cases, it returns to its usual red-yellow-green mode when the system is back up and running. Visibility Enhancing Red Only Flashing Red Lights But, sometimes a permanently flashing red light with no other colors is deployed in addition to, or instead of, a stop sign, at intersections where stop sign visibility has been a problem. In these cases there is never a solid red light, or a light of any other color. It looks like this: or like this: (Obviously, none of these still images actually shows the flashing in action, you have to use your imagination.) | Spain also considers a group of cyclists as a single vehicle in some circumstances. This guide from the Dirección General de Tráfico shows, at page 10, about right of way: También se tiene prioridad de paso cuando el vehículo de motor vaya a girar, a la derecha o a la izquierda, para entrar en otra vía y el ciclista esté próximo o cuando circulando en grupo el primero haya iniciado el cruce o haya entrado en una glorieta. or [The cyclist] also has right of way [with respect to a motor vehicle] when the motor vehicle is going to turn, right or left, to enter another road and the cyclist is nearby, or when cycling in a group the first has started the crossing or has entered the roundabout. I can see no other differences related to travelling in group; in particular the only references to red lights and pedestrian crossings is that cyclists must stop at them, without mentioning any difference if part of the group has already passed. | It is true that in the US, valid Federal law supersedes state law or regulation when there is a conflict. Precisely because of this, state laws and regulations are normally carefully written to avoid such conflicts. It is very unusual for a federal law issue to apply in traffic court. The question does not say what Federal law issue you think will apply to your case. Most issues where Federal law might plausibly affect a state court process, such as a fourth amendment violation on a search and seizure issue, would not apply in traffic court, although they might apply in a criminal court proceeding. Federal law does not generally deal with traffic issues, nor does it preempt state traffic laws, because there is normally no conflict. There is a group of people, who often call themselves "sovereign citizens" who have a habit of making wildly invalid legal claims, and trying to claim that much of the law does not apply to them. Such people often assert elaborate theories about why certain laws do not apply, not infrequently involving the Federal Supremacy Clause. Such claims are invalid, and will not be received well by a court. A claim that one travels by "conveyance" rather than by "car" and thus state laws do not apply is such an invalid claim. The argument made in this answer is such an invalid claim. Chapter 18 of the US code does regulate commercial vehicles to some extent. Therefore in that chapter "motor vehicle" does mean "commercial vehicle" because those federal regulations do not apply to private vehicles. This does not mean that state regulations that apply to private vehicles are preempted or otherwise invalid. If you think a Federal Issue will apply during a traffic court session, it would be wise to consult a lawyer in advance. Many lawyers offer free or low-cost initial consultations. If you think a relevant legal issue is not being addressed, politely, briefly, and clearly explain the issue that you think applies. Do not yell at the judge or other court personnel. Do not try to "make up your own rules". You will be given a chance to indicate your side of the issue. Response to recent edit, and related comments Without a record of the actual court hearing you describe, there is no way to determine if the judge was acting correctly or not. Even with the record there might well be no way to determine what the judge had in mind, or why s/he acted as s/he did. I maintain that any argument that state traffic codes are in fact preempted by federal law, or apply only to commercial vehicles, or that an ordinary personal car is not a "motor vehicle" because of a definition in Blacks or any other dictionary, is legally unsound and frivolous, and could well subject a person who makes it in court to penalties for contempt. A particular judge might not want to bother with the matter, of course. I think i have answered the question as asked, in a way likely to be most helpful to people in general. Others may have other views. | Yes. There's a sentence about this in the DMV handbook: Center Left Turn Lanes A center left turn lane is located in the middle of a two-way street and is marked on both sides by two painted lines. The inner line is broken and the outer line is solid. If a street has a center left turn lane, you must use it to prepare for or make a left turn, or to prepare for or make a permitted U-turn (CVC §21460.5 (c)). You may only drive for 200 feet in the center left turn lane. This lane is not a regular traffic lane or a passing lane. To turn left from this lane, signal, look over your shoulder, and drive completely inside the center left turn lane. Do not stop with the back of your vehicle blocking traffic. Make sure the lane is clear in both directions and then turn only when it is safe. Look for vehicles coming toward you in the same lane, preparing to start their left turn. Vehicles using the center turn lane. When turning left from a side street or driveway, signal and wait until it is safe. Then you may drive into the center left turn lane. Enter traffic only when it is safe. You can stop in the center left turn lane as well while waiting to merge into the regular traffic lane. You should not stop in nor drive through a dedicated turn lane that might exist in a center left turn lane. | Stop: possibly The standard for initiating a traffic stop is named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Terry stop. The standard is rather simple: Initiating the stop only requires reasonable suspicion. If their computer claims that the driver's license of the car owner is expired or suspended, that is reasonable suspicion to at least stop the car to check if the owner is driving it and if the license really is expired. Arrest: possibly To facilitate an arrest, the next level of scrutiny is needed: probable cause. Generally, there is little requirement on when a police report is to be written, but contemporary reports (at the same time or close to) are typical. Example of rising through the ranks Alice, 16 years old, dent in the fender from a fenderbender. That is not even a warning's worth and does not rise reasonable suspicion. Bob cop's computer still reads the license plate and Bob gets a flashing light: the car owner's license is expired. That is reasonable suspicion that there is an offense if the owner and Alice are the same person. But Bob needs to verify that. The reasonable suspicion can go away if for example the car was owned by Charles, a 60-year-old gentleman, then the suspicion that Alice's license is expired goes away. But the stop in itself was reasonable! Bob starts the ticket after stopping Alice, then passes the car to get to Alice. Looking in he sees that behind Alice lies a box stamped "Top Secret - US President's Eyes Only" all over. Bob arrests Alice for the probable cause of possibly possessing those documents illegally. The documents were in plain sight, so no search was needed btw. | The exact situation depends on where you are. If you are in Washington state, what you get (but did not realize) is a notice to appear in court. By not paying the fine or showing up to court, you could be subject to RCW 46.64.025, so that the department of licensing is notified. You have 15 days to respond to the notice. We assume that you are a resident, because if you are a non-resident (and not resident of another state with a reciprocal agreement), they would have required you to pay a bond at the time of the ticket (though that isn't possible with automated infraction-detection). When the Dept. of Licensing gets the notice of the unpaid ticket, they may suspend or revoke your license. At this point, you will have received notice that your license was suspended (unless you changed your address and mail isn't forwarded, in which case you have a different problem, that you're supposed to apprise DOL of your current address, and didn't do so). At that point (after they send the letter), you have 15 days to respond. One response is to pay the ticket plus the added fines, or, you can request an administrative review (to appeal the suspension). The point of going to court to plead your case would presumably be to modify the judgment against you, for instance to reduce or eliminate the added fine. You would then need to give a good reason for not being punished: RCW 46.64.025 already has you covered, because the suspension process starts with willfully failing to appear. You would then need to show that your failure to appear was not willful. It does not legally matter whether you are a foreigner or have problems understanding the language. Speeding tickets usually say pretty clearly that you must pay the ticket within a specified time frame, or appear in court, but people don't always read tickets. It is entirely plausible that one's grasp of the language is low enough that there really was a misunderstanding. If you can provide credible evidence that your failure was not willful, by law you would only be liable for the ticket. In other states and countries, the situation could be somewhat or quite different (e.g. Norwegian traffic laws are stricter). In New Mexico, it is more serious to fail to appear. NM Statute 66-8-126 states that "It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued". Your license can/will be suspended (it is not clear whether suspension is automatic), but additionally since failure to appear is a misdemeanor, you can be arrested. Unlike Washington law, there is no willfullness requirement for such a penalty. Given the criminal nature of failure to appear, a traffic attorney would need to suggest an appropriate belated response. | Looks like these cameras are legal: If a dash cam is installed (e. g. for the purpose of collecting evidence in case of an accident), it is important to ensure that this camera is not constantly recording traffic, as well as persons who are near a road. This source, page 10. I assume, "constantly" means you cannot leave it recording round the clock on a parked bicycle, and the records must be retained no longer than is needed for the specified purpose. | I think this is a reference to Section 14-224: (a) Each operator of a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which results in the death of any other person shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any officer or witness to the death of any person, and if such operator of the motor vehicle causing the death of any person is unable to give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any witness or officer, for any reason or cause, such operator shall immediately report such death of any person to a police officer, a constable, a state police officer or an inspector of motor vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or station, and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the accident causing the death of any person and such operator’s name, address, operator’s license number and registration number. There are subsequent similar paragraphs about accidents resulting in injury or property damage. The wording is a little bit confusing and it appears that you don't strictly have to report to the police, if you instead identify yourself to a witness. |
Is it illegal to spray weeds on another person's land without permission, and thus to harm animals? I am in England. I rent a field off an elderly friend who can no longer tend it. I use it as grazing for 2 horses. A local farmer who is clearly obsessed by weeds is regularly going round the local verges and field spraying various "weeds." One of the fields he has sprayed is the field I rent. I must note I have not witnessed him in the field however nettles in the field died at the same time and in the same way as nettles on a nearby verge that I saw him spray. Several days after the nettles died I noticed both horses had weeping blisters in their mouth, however they healed soon after with the help of some ointment (hopefully no long term harm done.) Is this behaviour illegal and if so who should I report it to? Local council / DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs) / police? | You would need to be able to prove that he encroached on your land (or your tenancy to land) with his pesticide/herbicide. You should speak to him and let him know that you feel his herbicide made its way (it could've come with the wind if its just on the borders) to the land, and as a result your animals were harmed. It's always better to see if you can handle this by appealing to his sense of responsibility. Just ask him to not spray the border, or not spray on a day with any breeze if he insists on spraying the entirety of his land. If he denies spraying the border (or at all), you can try to catch him in the act and film it, or find neighboring witnesses, such that you can file a complaint for trespass. It is probably not illegal in the true sense of the word, but it may subject him to damages. You may try contacting your department of agriculture. If he is a commercial applicator there are likely regulations that dictate the necessity of following label instructions or specific regulations or laws in your community that may also subject him to liability under common law, if the pesticide drift enters the properties of others (like yours) and causes damage. While pesticide particles carried by air may cause harm to people, your type of damage or damage to another's agricultural crops is the typical claim made and the typical measure of damages. More-so when they drift to organic crops. Generally, plaintiff(s) must show that defendant(s) breached either the label instruction or a regulatory provision to succeed in recovering damages outside of common law. Typically, there are labeling instructions or regulatory provisions that limit spray drift. Is he spraying whole fields such that you think he is purchasing commercial amounts? If he is just spraying his small field or plot of land, you will have to establish a claim for trespass in order to recover damages. You also must be able to prove damages – e.g., veterinarian bills, loss of use of the animals for plowing or whatever. You have to have show the act (spraying), causation (the cause and effect) and damages (the actual effect to you that brought about specific damages) to make a claim. So far, you don't seem to have actual evidence of the act, although if you can acquire that, causation seems to be met, as well as the potential to show specific damages. Unfortunately, the pain and suffering of animals does not have the same impact or carry any of the same rights as people incurring some sort of physical harm. It must be some actual quantifiable damage to you. Only you can determine what this is. In neighborly disputes, the measure of damages is often not worth the cost of litigation. Sad but true. As a plaintiff (if it comes to that), you'll need to establish trespass or another common law cause of action as a basis for the recovery. Or you could seek equitable relief (ask the court to order he stop the practice). These claims prove challenging for plaintiffs to establish because of the common usage of pesticides. Also, strict liability is generally not available as a cause of action. You may have a claim in nuisance, but you still must show those three elements of proof. There are typically laws that preempt negligence claims concerning labeling (like in the US), and remaining negligence claims tend to be difficult to prove, for the very reason you stated (you didn't see him do it but you know he did). This means that in order to show you (or your chattel) were injured by spray drift you will probably have to file a claim in trespass. However, chemical spray drift is so intangible it is difficult for plaintiffs to meet the requirements for a trespass claim. States’ approaches to trespass for securing damages resulting from spray drift vary, and this can mean that a plaintiff must carefully plead interference with exclusive possession (your right to the land) together with injury meaning substantial property damages or damage that is physical, to establish their cause of action in trespass. | Was or is possession of screwdriver illegal in the UK? Yes, if the screwdriver's intended purpose is for a criminal act. There's not enough detail in the article, but the most likely scenarios are: Offensive Weapon, contrary to section 1 Prevention of Crime Act 1953: (1)Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence ... [...] (4)In this section “ public place ” includes any highway, or in Scotland any road within the meaning of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise; and "offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. Going Equipped to steal, contrary to section 25 Theft Act 1968: (1)A person shall be guilty of an offence if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or theft. (2)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. (3)Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing a burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use. [...] (5)For purposes of this section an offence under section 12(1) of this Act of taking a conveyance shall be treated as theft. Possession with intent to destroy or damage property, contrary to section 3 Criminal Damage Act 1971: A person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it— (a)to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person; or (b)to destroy or damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of some other person; shall be guilty of an offence. [with a maximum sentence of 10 years] NB in this jurisdiction, possession of a weapon for self-protection is not, except in some very narrow circumstances, a reasonable excuse to carrying one. | It's not THAT easy, and it's fifteen years, not ten. As you say, Virginia requires your neighbors to do more than mow your lawn to get title to your land. In Virginia, most of these requirements are laid out in judicial decisions, not statutes. However, the one requirement set by statute is that the possessor has to have "possessed" the land for 15 years. As for the rest of the requirements, they are the usual ones. Ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Virginia gave a nice, concise summary. It said that to "establish title...by adverse possession," your neighbor would have to prove that their possession was: actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous... Here is what the Court said each element requires: Use and occupation of property...constitutes proof of actual possession. One is in hostile possession if his possession is under a claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner. One's possession is exclusive when it is not in common with others. Possession is visible when it is so obvious that the true owner may be presumed to know about it. Possession is continuous only if it exists without interruption for the statutory period. Two things to notice: Because your neighbor's possession must be adverse, you can stop the 15 year possession "clock" by simply giving them your permission to mow the lawn. It does not matter that your neighbors are mowing "in secret and without letting us know it." That you are here asking about it shows the mowing so "visible" that you know what is going on. For more information Whether your neighbors can claim your land depends on how Virginia courts have interpreted the law. Luckily for you, several Virginia lawyers have gone online to explain those details. These two, (one in the Washington Post), give nice overviews, while this guy, says mowing alone probably won't do it. This guy says, "Virginia courts don’t make adverse possession easy," but he's a NYer, through and through, so who knows whether he knows what he's talking about? Of course, none of this is a substitute for talking to a Virginia lawyer with experience in adverse possession. | Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition. | My general belief is that in the United States entering structures like the ones you've pictured would be considered trespassing regardless of if there is a sign in place or not. This is based on the fact that I'm almost certain that if you become injured while on the premises you could sue the land owner. I believe the trespassing signs are just there to give legal cover to the land owner in case someone does try to sue them. Here are two sources that essentially support my beliefs: General definition: Trespass is defined by the act of knowingly entering another person’s property without permission. More detailed legal definition: § 11.411 Criminal trespass. (a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so, he or she enters or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure. An offense under this subsection is a misdemeanor if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a petty misdemeanor. As you can see these buildings are clearly owned by someone, and you clearly haven't gotten permission to enter the building. Ergo, you're trespassing. Now if you were talking about ancient Mayan ruins, or an Old West ghost town then this would be more of a gray area, I believe, since those structures have been abandoned for 150+ years. The same goes for structures in National Parks, since a National Park is public land you could make a case that you thought you were allowed to go since you weren't specifically told you can't go (assuming you didn't cross a fence line/no trespassing sign). You should definitely contact a real lawyer though. Now if you do enter then I think the probability that you will be caught and prosecuted would be fairly low. It is your decision if that risk is worth the reward of entering/exploring the structure. | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction. | There's nothing that I can find that specifically refers to any offence for allowing one's goats to roam free, but there are at least two national, and probably more at state / municipal level, laws that deal with obstructing the highway - therefore potentially making the goat owner liable for any injury or damage shown to be caused by their (in)action: Section 8B, National Highways Act: Punishment for mischief by injury to national highway.-- Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which he knows to be likely to render any national highway referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8A impassable or less safe for traveling or conveying property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with a fine, or with both. Section 283, Indian Penal Code (IPC): Whoever, by doing any act, or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge, causes danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any public way or public line of navigation, shall be punished, with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees. There are also animal-welfare related laws to consider, such as: Section 289 IPC: Negligent conduct with respect to animal. Whoever knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any animal in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life, or any probable danger of grievous hurt from such animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Section 3 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act: Duties of persons having charge of animals. It shall be the duty of every person having the care or charge of any animal to take all reasonable measures to ensure the well-being of such animal and to prevent the infliction upon such animal of unnecessary pain or suffering. |
Misleading business name What legal actions can be taken against a company that uses manipulative naming tactics, such as including the word 'All' in its name, in order to mislead or confuse customers? Are there any laws or regulations in place to prevent companies from using deceptive names or branding, and what can consumers do to protect themselves from such practices? For example: AllFood Restaurant, AllBank | Are there any laws or regulations in place to prevent companies from using deceptive names or branding? united-kingdom Yes. The applicable legislation may be found in the Companies Act 2006. Section 1198 states that: (1) A person must not carry on business in the United Kingdom under a name that gives so misleading an indication of the nature of the activities of the business as to be likely to cause harm to the public (2) A person who uses a name in contravention of this section commits an offence. [...] Also a further provision at Section 54 states that: (1) The approval of the Secretary of State is required for a company to be registered under this Act by a name that would be likely to give the impression that the company is connected with— (a) Her (sic) Majesty's Government, any part of the Scottish administration, the Welsh Assembly Government or Her Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland, (b) a local authority, or (c) any public authority specified for the purposes of this section by regulations made by the Secretary of State. [...] The Regulations referred to above are the Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business Names (Sensitive Words and Expressions) Regulations 2014 which lists, at Schedule 1, a host of words and expressions that are prohibited or require approval as the case may be. This list is far too long to reproduce in full, but by way of example it includes: Bank Charity Child support Police Royal Stock exchange University | Fairly easily. You want to use their API. They give you the conditions for using it. As long as their conditions aren't illegal or unreasonable, you need to adhere to them to use their API. Is it illegal to not include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name? Almost certainly not. Is it an unreasonable term? Almost certainly not. If you want to include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name, you can try - but you can't then use their API. | In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store. | Some people make the Kft. to LLC translation that you suggest and it would probably not be illegal to do so if other text did not imply that it was anything other than a Hungarian entity. From a practical perspective, the best solution is to spell out the company type in Hungarian, possibly in a footnote. For example, suppose that your company is called "Magyar Delponeous" (because it is easier to explain by example). You could say "Magyar Delphoneous*" or "Magyar Delphoneous, Kft.*" in the body text, with a footnote at the bottom of a page that says following an asterisks that: "The company is a Hungarian Kft. (korlátolt felelősségű társaság), a non-stock business form similar to a U.S. limited liability company or a German GmbH". It would also be proper to say "Magyar Delponeous, a Hungarian limited liability company" in unabbreviated form, because the most common translation of "korlátolt felelősségű társaság" is "limited liability company". But, I would disfavor using the form "Magyar Delphoneous, LLC" because it could implicitly suggest a non-Hungarian place of entity formation where the abbreviation LLC is used, and avoiding any implication of being misleading is best. KFC is not the common or correct abbreviation for this form of entity. | UK and EU There is is no legally binding definition of the terms "vegan" and "vegetarian" at EU or member state level. In 2019, the EU began work on legislation for those definitions. However, under the UK's Food Information to Consumers (FIC) regulations (that implemented certain provisions of the EU directive of the same name), food information must be accurate, clear and easy to understand. This is intended to protect consumers from false or misleading labelling. The UK's Trade Descriptions Act also prohibits false or misleading labelling. The UK's Consumer Rights Act 2015 says "Every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term that the goods will match the description". And in the UK deliberate mislabelling is criminal fraud. I imagine other jurisdictions have similar laws. In 2006 the UK's Food Standards Agency published vegetarian and vegan guidance for food labelling. Unfortunately I can no longer find it on the FSA's website (food.gov.uk). However, it had the following definitions: Vegetarian The term ‘vegetarian' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of products derived from animals that have died, have been slaughtered, or animals that die as a result of being eaten. 'Animals' means farmed, wild or domestic animals, including for example, livestock poultry, game, fish, shellfish, crustacea, amphibians, tunicates, echinoderms, molluscs and insects. Vegan The term 'vegan' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of animals or animal products (including products from living animals). Now, those definitions weren't/aren't legally enforceable in themselves but an enforcement agency might use them as criteria when investigating a complaint. Related: fish and molluscs are key allergens Also under the FIC: Food businesses include restaurants, cafés and takeaways, and businesses that produce, manufacture or pre-pack food. Food businesses must tell you if they use any of the 14 key allergens as ingredients in the food and drink they provide. They must supply allergen information for every item that contains any of the 14 allergens. The 14 allergens include fish and molluscs (e.g. mussels and oysters). The consequences You are free to ask the food business to list the ingredients (indeed this is the advice to people with allergies) You are free to report your concerns to the food business (they really must list their uses of those key allergens) You are free to not give your custom to the business In the UK you can report businesses that you don't believe meet the legal requirements to the National Food Crime Unit. But if there is no direct intention to deceive or deliberate dishonesty it is not a 'food crime' and should not be reported to the NFCU. These non-crime concerns should be reported to the relevant local authority if you get no satisfaction from the business. | This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer. | What kind of recourse can OP pursue to swiftly clear their name? The OP's "recourse" is to prove the truth - that he is not a convicted or accused (by a prosecutor) sex offender - to those who defamed him, who are presumably the bar owner(s), who instructed the bouncer to remove the OP because he was a sex offender; and possibly the bouncer, who may have told Anne that the OP was a sex offender; and possibly others who later on social media said the OP is a sex offender, such as Anne herself. The facts of who may be a sex offender and who may have falsely asserted someone is must be sorted out, and that's usually done by lawyers before a lawsuit (with a possible settlement from "We're going to sue" threat letter by the OP's lawyer); or in the discovery process of an actual lawsuit; or in court by a jury. It's entirely up to the OP to take legal action, hopefully under the advice of a lawyer; and it's not a good idea for the OP to confront the bouncer, Anne or others and possibly complicate his own situation. As for anything happening "swiftly", that's another point entirely. The OP could sue for damages to his reputation and/or to require the defamers to retract their statements, or for other compensations. Many personal injury lawyers give free initial consultations. See Defamation | Legal Information Institute for definitions and the laws regarding defamation, libel and slander (which can vary due to jurisdiction; in some areas, defamation is criminal as well as civil). Libel is published defamation, as in defaming someone in messages on social media; slander is spoken defamation, such as what the bar bouncer may have done. Do they have a strong case for egregious defamation? The likelihood of "a strong case" is for the OP's legal counsel to determine; they will look at the evidence of defamatory statements, the likelihood of getting monetary damages from the bar and/or the individuals involved, and other factors. | The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other. |
Could a state enforce a law that establishes a definition of "biological sex"? There appears to be no federal law establishing a definition of "biological sex", according to an earlier Law SE question: Is there a definition of "biological sex" in U.S. law? Currently, there is a bill in the Montana legislature that seeks to create a strict definition for ‘sex'. The law would "create a rigid definition of “sex,” boxing out legal recognition of intersex, nonbinary and transgender people in far-flung references across state law..." Excerpt of the bill itself https://trackbill.com/bill/montana-senate-bill-458-define-sex-in-montana-law/2377583/ SB 458... would define sex as “the organization of the body and gametes for reproduction in human beings and other organisms,” specifying that humans have “exactly two sexes, male and female, with two corresponding gametes. The sexes are determined by the biological indication of male or female, including sex chromosomes, gonads, and nonambiguous internal and external genitalia present at birth, without regard to an individual’s psychological, chosen, or subjective experience of gender.” If that bill became state law, could it be enforced - by that I mean the non-recognition of intersex, nonbinary and transgender people - by the state of Montana absent a federal law, or until a federal court struck it down? Or would this be simply a case of the Supremacy Clause? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supremacy_Clause | There are several dozen federal case precedents addressing the rights of transgender individuals under existing federal laws. The cases most squarely on point and binding on the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana are Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2000) (holding that the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA) applied to targeting of a transgender person) and Parents for Privacy v. Barr, No.18-35708 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2020) (rejecting arguments that a school policy protecting transgender students violated other students' rights). To the extent that the Montana law was used in an attempt to do an end run around existing federal law protections of transgender individuals, it would probably be struck down as applied under the supremacy clause. Various other federal courts have found that transgender individuals are protected under: The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Title VII, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, Title IX of the Affordable Care Act, The Fair Housing Act, and The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to grant certiorari to review or overturn these decisions protecting transgender rights (which isn't to say that it couldn't adopt new precedents overruling these decisions in the future). So, in almost all areas where sex discrimination is prohibited under federal law, the Montana statute would have to yield to federal law. Federal law protections against sex discrimination aren't all encompassing, but the federal courts have not hesitated to invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment when no statutory protections apply. So, there probably aren't many circumstances in which this law could have a meaningful effect. The fact that a Montana state law might say otherwise is irrelevant. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently specifically made clear to the Montana Supreme Court that it may not enforce state laws that violate federal law stating: The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by the Federal Constitution, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. “[T]his Clause creates a rule of decision” directing state courts that they “must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal law[ ].” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015). Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (June 30, 2020). Similarly, in another not too ancient case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: The question presented in this case is whether the holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does. See U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516 (2012). Another older and emphatic provision making clear that state officials must follow federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court is as follows: Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’ In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as ‘the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,’ declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60, that ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, ¶3 ‘to support this Constitution.’ Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers' ‘anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State. * * *’ Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524, 16 L.Ed. 169.1112 No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery * * *.’ United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136, 3 L.Ed. 53. A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, ‘it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases * * *.’ Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397–398, 53 S.Ct. 190, 195, 77 L.Ed. 375. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) Any Montana government official who tried to enforce that law that has been held to be overridden by federal law in sheer defiance of federal law would end up like Rowan County, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis: in jail for being in contempt of court in short order. | In the US, it stems from some statute, such as RCW Ch. 71.05 in Washington state, which starts by stating the rationale for the law, and which are to protect the health and safety of persons suffering from behavioral health disorders and to protect public safety, and prevent inappropriate commitment of persons living with behavioral disorders and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from involuntary commitment etc. The various laws in this chapter make it possible to commit a person to a mental institute or to undergo involuntary therapy. There is a separate chapter, RCW 71.34, applicable to minors. In general, this law calls for professional evaluation and treatment, without legislating science. The trigger is generally evidence of a tendency towards serious harm or grave disability, with a requirement that the action be requested by a certain kind of behavioral professional. There are not many hard-coded limits on what can be ordered: while RCW 71.05.215 "has a right to refuse antipsychotic medication", that right is overridden when "it is determined that the failure to medicate may result in a likelihood of serious harm or substantial deterioration or substantially prolong the length of involuntary commitment and there is no less intrusive course of treatment than medication in the best interest of that person". Along with the legislation cited, there are also regulations which don't require legislative action (they are "empowered" by the statutes), which could specifically forbid a treatment, but again choice of treatments are left to the professional. In some other jurisdiction, it's possible that a certain treatment would be explicitly outlawed. | The closest possible prohibition is found in s. 286.1 of the Criminal Code, which makes it an offence to pay for the "sexual services of a person." "Sexual services" is not a defined term. The Department of Justice provides its opinion about what this term might cover, but that is not determinative. In relation to a charge of the previous version of this prohibition (which also used the term "sexual services"), counsel was unable to direct the judge to a definition of the term, and the judge was unable to find one (2015 ABPC 241). The judge adopted a test that requires the service to include "some sexually suggestive physical act on the part of the person providing the sexual service". This is a test somewhat stricter than the one proposed by the Department of Justice in that in addition to merely being "sexually stimulating or gratifying," there physical act itself must be "sexually suggestive." [50] What is a “sexual service”? Counsel have not directed me to, nor have I been able to find a definition of the term “sexual services”. [51] Sexual services” would clearly include any type of sexual intercourse, or physical contact for purposes of masturbation. It would also include posing for nude photographs. A request “to touch or feel the breasts of the [female] complainant” is an attempt to obtain the sexual services of the complainant. In my view, “sexual services” would also include dancing in a sexually provocative or stimulating fashion. In terms of a general definition, I think the phrase “sexual favours rendered ...for the sexual gratification of the customer” is sufficient. [52] However, I am of the view that the “sexual services” or “sexual favours for the sexual gratification” of a person requires that there be some sexually suggestive physical act on the part of the person providing the sexual service. The sexually suggestive physical act may be many things, such as posing nude, or sexually suggestive dancing, or suggestively removing clothing. That list is not exhaustive, and, with the creativity of the human mind, I doubt one could ever create an exhaustive list. However, the common element is that some sort of sexually suggestive physical act is necessary to constitute the sexual service. [53] In the case at bar, the accused had M.C. engage in what one might call “fantasy role playing”. If the role playing involved M.C. performing a sexually suggestive physical act, then the definition of “sexual service” might well be satisfied. However, in the case at bar, M.C. took on the fantasy role of being the slave in a master/slave relationship. M.C. did not perform any acts as a slave. The “slave role” was one in the mind of the accused (and perhaps M.C.), and had its expression in the content of emails and text messages between Mr. Peterson and M.C., but M.C. did not engage in physical acts for the sexual gratification of the accused. ... [54] M.C. was cast in the role of a slave in fantasy role playing, but the playing really only occurred in the heads of Mr. Peterson and M.C. That does not constitute the act of Mr. Peterson obtaining the sexual services of M.C. [citations removed] But this was a lower trial court's reasoning that has not been adopted by others yet, and no other court has needed to develop the definition at the margins. | I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. | In the United States, the mentally disabled cannot be sentenced to capital punishment. (Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304 (2002)) Many states treat the display of female breasts differently than the display of male breasts. For example, see Minnesota Statutes 617.292 which deems the "showing of the female breast" to be nudity. | As for the ex post facto question, an ex post facto law is one that makes an act illegal when it was legal at the time of the commission. Let's now look at the clause: (b) Effective date.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and the amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply regardless of whether the conduct alleged occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, before, on, or after such date of enactment. What amendment is made in section subsection a? Section 230(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “(5) NO EFFECT ON SEX TRAFFICKING LAW.—Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit— “(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of title 18, United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title; “(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 of title 18, United States Code; or “(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 2421A of title 18, United States Code, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.”. This does not make any act illegal. It say "we don't mean by this that...", and does not make any act illegal. The basic definition of the crime is here: §2421A(a) Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or operates an interactive computer service (as such term is defined in defined in section 230(f) the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f))), or conspires or attempts to do so, with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both likewise §2421A(a). The bold part is standard language invoking the Commerce Clause, which is the source of federal authority in what would otherwise be a state matter. The italicized part, referring to intent, indicates that the website owner/operator has to have a wrongful intent, so it's not just a penalty against those who own or operate a website for content produced by the users of the site, if those users advertise prostitution or sex trafficking. The First Amendment has a number of limits, for example you are not free to threaten or defraud, or advertise murder for hire, of advertise employment, housing or lodging (etc) discriminatorily (e.g. "Women need not apply" is illegal). The question would be whether the government has a compelling interest in limiting free speech (I think the court would say yes), and is this the narrowest restriction possible that accomplishes that interest (again, yes). So it would probably pass strict scrutiny. The purpose of the act is both to tune up the Communications Decency Act and to extend the Mann Act, which makes certain forms of interstate sex a crime. So, 18 USC 2422 (a)Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both"; (b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. This expands the federal limits on prostitution in a standard way. | Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child. | The legal responsibility to support a child arises from "parentage" and not "genetic relatedness", therefore one of two identical twins will not be assigned such responsibility simply because of genetic relatedness. However, genetic facts can enter into a legal proceeding for support, and can be evidence to establish parentage. In the US, the rules for determining parentage are generally established by the Uniform Parentage Act, instantiated for instance in Washington state RCW Chapter 26.26A. RCW 26.26A.100 spells out the full set of rules: A parent-child relationship is established between an individual and a child if: (1) The individual gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.26A.700 through 26.26A.785; (2) There is a presumption under RCW 26.26A.115 of the individual's parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding or a valid denial of parentage is made under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265; (3) The individual is adjudicated a parent of the child under RCW 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (4) The individual adopts the child; (5) The individual acknowledges parentage of the child under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under RCW 26.26A.235 or successfully challenged under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265 or 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (6) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.600 through 26.26A.635; or (7) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.705 through 26.26A.730. §§300-355 govern the use of genetic tests in determining parentage, according to which genetic test results can be evidence of parentage, but §§600 ff specifically address assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements – RCW 26.26A.610 for example specifically assigns "parentage" to a person who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child, and under §605, a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction. |
Does the US Government monitor and/or revoke newly naturalized citizens? I know to some extent the US watches everyone, but what I am thinking of is whether newly naturalized citizens are watched to see if their naturalization process seems insincere in hindsight. For example: If a newly naturalized citizen immediately emigrates from the US back to their country of origin (although continues to file and pay relevant expat taxes). If a newly naturalized citizen, who became a citizen after 3 years of residency because they're married to a citizen (rather than the usual 5 years, src) immediately gets divorced. (Obviously you have to present evidence of a bona fide marriage - which mine is - to even get citizenship, this is hypothetical) If a newly naturalized citizen, who took an amended oath NOT swearing to serve in the US military, due to 'deeply held religious or moral code' (src), then joins the military, gets a concealed carry permit, gets an FFL or similarly seems to not be very pacifisty. If a newly naturalized citizen immediately joins the Communist Party, which although not illegal (src) would have disqualified them from citizenship if they'd joined the CP before applying. I know there are certain things where the US can revoke citizenship, like serving in a foreign military who's at war with the US, but none of my list are illegal activities in themselves. Does the US watch for and/or revoke the citizenship of new citizens for this kind of stuff? (1) could happen if my parents get sick or injured and I need to become their carer, for example. Also, I do intend to modify my citizenship oath/affirmation (3): I have religious conviction against bearing arms for any worldly nation, but I am willing to use force in private-individual self-defense, and I feel like the nuanced distinction between those may be lost on any watchdogs. I would also be curious whether misdemeanors or felonies shortly after citizenship can result in revocation. | If a newly naturalized citizen immediately emigrates from the US back to their country of origin (although continues to file and pay relevant expat taxes). This used to be grounds for expatriation, but in 1964, in Schneider v. Rusk, the supreme court ruled that it was impermissible. The law was subsequently amended to remove the relevant provision. | The police are mistaken because they don't understand immigration law. Usually, the first step to resolve this problem would be to explain the situation in a letter to or telephone call with the town attorney, elevating it from a police officer who has no training in citizenship and naturalization paperwork, to an attorney, who should either know better, or should be able to find out more easily. | The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in. | A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not. | When can I re-apply for the citizenship, there is no date mentioned on the letter received. You can reapply as soon as you meet the criteria. If you don't move again to another state or USCIS district, and if you don't spend so much time outside the US that you fail to meet the physical presence requirement, then you can reapply on the three-month anniversary of your move to your current place of residence. The criteria are available at USCIS's Naturalization Information page: Naturalization Eligibility Requirements Before an individual applies for naturalization, he or she must meet a few requirements. Depending on the individual’s situation, there are different requirements that may apply. General requirements for naturalization are below. Be at least 18 years old at the time of filing Form N-400, Application for Naturalization. Be a permanent resident (have a “Green Card”) for at least 5 years. Show that you have lived for at least 3 months in the state or USCIS district where you apply. Demonstrate continuous residence in the United States for at least 5 years immediately preceding the date of filing Form N-400. Show that you have been physically present in the United States for at least 30 months out of the 5 years immediately preceding the date of filing Form N-400. Be able to read, write, and speak basic English. Have a basic understanding of U.S. history and government (civics). Be a person of good moral character. Demonstrate an attachment to the principles and ideals of the U.S. Constitution. | The list is enormous. For example, if subpoenaed to appear in a legal case, you must appear pursuant to the order. If ordered to pay child support, you must pay child support. If you are an executive in a company, you may not act on the basis of non-private information regarding the company. Your comment that "If it's not detailed on this list, you'll probably never be concerned with it, eg, gun registration laws and other situations that don't apply to most residents" applies to a number of things on the list, for example most people are not called for jury duty, probably the majority of people are not subject to property tax requirements. most people do not have to register for the draft. By adding "If X...", you can make these into universal rules – everybody that meets the filing requirements must file federal income taxes. Non-citizens have a few additional requirements, but they are a drop in the bucket compared to the general case, obey the law which applies to everyone. | It depends partly on where you are. If you're in the foreign country and they have a law compelling you to answer any questions asked by their government or some company, they you have to answer the question. Whether lying has any legal repercussions depends on the laws of the country, so you'd have to narrow it down a bit. If you're in the US, the only context where you can be compelled to answer a question is when ordered to do so in court (giving testimony), and you have 5th Amendment immunity from being forced to testify against yourself. If you are granted immunity from prosecution, then they can compel you to testify (answer the question). If a foreign entity asks you whether you are a US citizen, you can decline to answer. You can also make up any answer you want, and generally not run afoul of US law (though you could run into problems in that country). There are state and federal laws about making false statements in official investigations, which would not be applicable to what you describe. There is no general law that says you must always tell the truth. However, making a false statement could be part of the crime of fraud, so it would depend on the context of your statement, i.e. are you misrepresenting your citizenship in order to get something of value. In light of the topical update, again there may be country-specific penalties in country for lying about citizenship, and tax evasion is against the law here, which is true whether or not you lie. FATCA specifies a duty to disclose (sect. 6038d), which is not tied to truthful reporting of citizenship (in other words, there is no point in lying to the bank because non-reporting is still a crime). But: this law probably brings the lie with the scope of 18 USC 1001 ("Martha's Law"), which makes it a crime to conceal a material fact "in any matter within the jurisdiction of ...the United States". This means and has been held to mean not just that you can't lie to federal officers, you can't lie to anyone who reports your information to the federal government. FATCA also says "we don't care if it's a crime to report being an American in that country", so inconveniences certainly are not a defense. | The granting of citizenship is expressly recognized in multiple places in the US Constitution. It would be incoherent if the prohibition on titles of nobility meant that the US could not confer citizenship on people. It would also be totally out of sync with any public understanding of "titles of nobility" at the time of the framing or today. The US has conferred citizenship by parentage to children born abroad since 1790, which is further indication that the nobility clause was not understood to preclude citizenship by parentage. The concern behind the nobility clauses was the creation of "super-citizens." As Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution at Vol. 3, p. 215: [the nobility clause] seems scarcely to require even a passing notice. As a perfect equality is the basis of all our institutions, state and national, the prohibition against the creation of any titles of nobility seems proper, if not indespensible, to keep perpetually alive a just sense of this important truth. Distinctions between citizens, in regard to rank, would soon lay the foundation of odious claims and privileges, and silently subvert the spirit of independence and personal dignity, which are so often proclaimed to be the best security of a republican government. He cited Federalist No. 84, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote: Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people. The worry was that titles of nobility would undermine the republican system of government. I also question your premise that citizenship is "clearly hereditary in the U.S." As you say, the 14th Amendment guarantees citizenship to those merely born in the US and subject to its jurisdiction. For the vast majority of U.S. citizens, citizenship is based on their place of birth being in the U.S. Knowing that somebody is a citizen tells you nothing about their heritage. |
In a criminal trial, what is the sequence of proceedings? Does the prosecution advance their own case first, calling their witnesses, examining them before the defense cross examines them, all before the defense then presents their case, calling each of their own witnesses to examine before they are cross examined by the prosecution? Or can it depend on circumstances whether the prosecution presents their case first or the defense does. Can a party request for a different order of proceedings in a given case? And does it matter who had coordinated and arranged for the attendance of a given witness who they may be called by? In other words, suppose the prosecution coordinated the preparation of and submitted the witness statements of witness A, B & C, the defence had arranged for the evidence statements of witnesses D & E, but all 5 of these witnesses’ statements are nonetheless admitted before the court. Now suppose the prosecution is presenting their case first, as in the suggested standard sequence above, and it wishes to call witnesses D & E, even though these are not “their” witnesses. Is that allowed, to examine them of its own initiative prior to the defence having been given the chance to present their case? And suppose the prosecution has nothing to add to its own witness’s written statement through examination. Must the prosecution necessarily “call” its own witness? If it doesn’t do so, then what impact does this have on the weight or admissibility of the written statement? | what is the sequence of proceedings? See Rule 25.9: the prosecution summarizes the case the defendant has an opportunity to concisely identify what the defendant intends to put into issue the prosecution introduces all of its evidence (including all of its witnesses) (and the defence has the opportunity to cross-examine each) the defendant has an opportunity to ask for a directed verdict of acquittal the defendant has an opportunity to summarize the defence case the defendant has an opportunity to introduce evidence, including witnesses (and the Crown has the opportunity to cross-examine each) either side may introduce additional evidence if needed in rebuttal prosecution's closing submissions defendant's closing submissions | Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581. | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area. | This is a great question because it's a useful vehicle for understanding a cross-cutting principle of law: baselines and exceptions. I find that thinking of law as a system of baseline rules and exceptions to these rules is a great way to organize and make sense of the mess that is 'the law.' A police officer testifying about what you told them, whether it helps you or hurts you, is hearsay. So, as you correctly pointed out, the baseline assumption is that that testimony can't come in. But, the hearsay rule is famous for having a ton of exceptions to it. Two relevant exceptions here are: (1) statements against interest, and (2) prior inconsistent statements. If what you told the police officer was a direct admission of liability, or a statement that contradicts the theory of the case that you're presenting to the jury, either or both of these exceptions are going to kick in and make that hearsay admissible. These exceptions are not going to kick in, however, for hearsay statements that help you. A humorous, but related, aside, is that there's some jurisdictional differences in how far the 'statements against interest' exception goes. In some jurisdictions it only applies to admissions of liability, but in other jurisdictions it also applies to simply embarrassing statements. My evidence professor illustrated this by, out of the blue, mind you, saying, in class, "I stopped wetting the bed when I got to college," and then explaining that in the latter type of jurisdiction, that statement would be admissible. He then paused after the class had finally stopped laughing and said "that's not true, by the way...I stopped in high school." | The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc. | Does failure to present a charge to a grand jury leave that charge open for future indictment? Yes. Indeed, even if the charge is presented to a grand jury and it declines to indict, exactly the same charge that one grand jury declined to indict upon can be presented to a future grand jury and produce a valid indictment. I understand that normally when a Grand Jury declines to indict for an alleged crime, prosecutors may not present it again to a future Grand Jury. (I believe this rule is statutory, not constitutional.) While I won't rule out the possibility that such a statute exists, I am aware of no state where that is the case. A charge upon which is grand jury declines to indict is often not presented to a future grand jury as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or prosecutor's office policy, but generally this is not a mandatory rule. One reason that it is not a mandatory rule is that there is no practical way that a defendant could enforce the rule if it was a mandatory rule. Grand jury proceedings are secret (at least until an indictment is produced and then only as pertinent to the defendant indicted on the charges producing an indictment). Generally, even the judges in the court calling a grand jury have no access to its proceedings until it issues an indictment, and then has only slightly more latitude to review its proceedings than a defendant in the case. | SCOTUS has at least three times found that it is necessary for a defendant to be present at the beginning of a criminal trial in order to satisfy the Constitutional mandates regarding due process. So the simple answer is that a defendant must be present during a criminal trial because without his presence no trial can begin. However, once a trial has begun FRCP Rule 43 itself (section c) allows for the absence of the defendant. Among the provisions: The defendant can waive his right to be present simply by voluntary absence. The defendant can also waive his right by disruptive behavior in the court. |
Would I be risking being guilty of destruction of evidence any time I clear data off my computer? where are the limits? I've heard it claimed everyone is guilty of a crime, whether or not they realize it. As such my computer likely possesses all kind of evidence against me, even if it's mostly trivial things. Maybe I have messages with a friend where I admitted to speeding to get somewhere when I was late, or I watched something copyrighted online when I shouldn't have (or possibly didn't even realize I was circumventing copyright when I watched it), or my hypothetical child just hit puberty and waited until I went to bed to visit some of those sites a child in the throes of puberty is likely very interested in and is not legally allowed to visit. The point is that likely there is some kind of evidence of crime on my, or anyone's, hard drive at some point in time, I may not even realize that the data was evidence or even that my actions were technically a crime. That means there is a non-trivial chance any time I choose to clean up my computer, delete unused data, clear my browser history, or otherwise remove what I consider to be unimportant data I may actually be destroying evidence. So when can I delete stuff from my computer without risking a crime? To give a few examples of increasingly questionable theoretical actions: Assuming there was some sort of potential evidence I was unaware of is there ever a point I could have deleted it without it being criminal? Do I have to be aware the data may be evidence first? If my hypothetical child clears the browser history to keep me from discovering the sort of sites the visited while I was asleep are they guilty since they knew they were destroying evidence, even though their intent was not to prevent criminal prosecution but instead to avoid revocation of internet access by me? What if I know my friend visited a website that is illegal, say one for viewing copyrighted shows illegally, and I've chosen to not report him. Am I now never allowed to delete my browser history or clear its cache ever again since that would destroy something I know is evidence of my friend's crime? What if my computer has major software issues and the only viable solution is delete everything and reinstall from scratch; am I stuck with a worthless broken computer because reinstalling things from scratch would delete evidence of a crime? I'm interested in the USA perspective. My home state is MD, but I would be willing to accept answers referencing any states' laws if answerer is more familiar with their own. I'm just trying to figure out where the USA generally draws the line between intentional destruction of evidence and every day digital activities. | The relevant Maryland statute is MD. Criminal Law Code Ann. § 9-307 (2021), subsection (a): A person may not destroy, alter, conceal, or remove physical evidence that the person believes may be used in a pending or future official proceeding with the intent to impair the verity or availability of the physical evidence in the official proceeding. Note "that the person believes" and "with the intent to." If you have no reason to think it might be necessary in an official proceeding, you aren't violating this section. If you delete the data unintentionally or for some other reason, then you also probably are not violating the section. (I say "probably" because I'm sure there's some sort of provision for negligence or willful disregard for the evidential value of something you should know has evidential value.) As a practical matter, no copyright lawsuit or criminal trial (and criminal trials over copyright infringement are very rare) is going to depend on the browser history of the defendant's friend. What if my computer has major software issues and the only viable solution is delete everything and reinstall from scratch; am I stuck with a worthless broken computer because reinstalling things from scratch would delete evidence of a crime? If you know of evidence on the hard drive that would be destroyed, you can copy it somewhere else before deleting and reinstalling. Federal law is similar: it requires knowledge and intent. 18 USC 1519: Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. | Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction. | The purpose of the button is not to put liability on you, but to shield the website from liability. The website does not want you looking up information about drugs, deciding that a particular drug is right for you, causing yourself harm and then blaming the website. You may have acted unlawfully but you would have no liability because no injury (financial or otherwise) has been caused to the website. Clicking the button is an assertion that one is a medical professional. This is a false statement, so the website could sue you for the tort of deceit, but there is no injury, which is one of the elements of deceit. The website would not even get nominal damages. The button may also constitute a contract. In exchange for access to a website, you warrant that you are a medical professional. You are not, which is a breach of the contract. However, the damages are nil. Conceivably, if you passed the information on to someone else who misused it, there may be some injury to the website, and then you would have to compensate the website for that injury under one or both of the heads of liability described above. In terms of criminal liability, it is rarely an offence to make a false statement to a private body without some other aggravating element. For example, in Australia, it is an offence to make a false statement for financial gain, or to make a false statement to a government official (regardless of whether there is financial gain etc). But simply making a false statement is not by itself a crime. You may breach a computer law. The United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is pretty broad. Obtaining information from a computer without authority is an offence: 18 USC s 1030(a)(2)(C). The only exception is if the web server is in the same state as you and somehow nobody from outside the state can access it: see definition of 'protected computer' in 18 USC s 1030(e)(2). | The courts are never in such a broad position to rule on generic wikileaks evidence. Theoretically, a court could have to rule on the admissibility of a specific document, so in that sense the matter is always dealt with on a case by case basis. There is a "document" that purports to be somehow from Amazon, reporting that a certain grey building with no architectural charm in a nearby village is an Amazon data center. Legally speaking, nobody cares, but let's say that there is some legal reason why it matters whether the claim is true (I stipulate that the document passes the relevance test). The publicly-posted document has no probative value, because anyone can create a file containing the word "Amazon". It looks like a cleaned-up OCR scan of a printout (hence the complete failure at non-English characters), and lacks any clear indicia of Amazon origin. Thus the party would have to establish that the document is authentic, and there must be a provable chain of custody from the author to the submitted document. Federal Rules of Evidence cover questions of authenticity and contents of admissible evidence in art IX, X. Nothing in rule 901 suggests that such a document would be admissible. Very theoretically, if they happened to also have the original paper document, there might be sufficient forensic evidence to prove that the document is traceably come from the purported source. The wikileaks document per se would still be inadmissible, but the (more) original document could be admissible. | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | Per your comment responses, Maryland is a two party consent state which means that the other party must consent to your recording IF there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In one's own home is generally considered a place where one has this expectation and thus these recordings are problematic. Depending what you intend to do with them, I would first contact a lawyer to get legal advice as to how to handle this before you publish them. If you are looking to file a criminal complaint (and assuming statute of limitations hasn't run out) the prosecutor may be willing to not prosecute you for violating 2 party consent law because you were trying to gather evidence of someone else's crime, but it's not a guarantee (though this will look bad on the prosecutor come election season). If you are suing your parents it might not be admissible as evidence but I can't specifically say that either. If you are using it to show other people in the same situation what to look for it's probably best to find another set of recordings as these ones carry a lot of legal issues that will come back to bite you if you release them. Finally, while not legal, your parents may not want to pursue the criminal recording side of this matter if they are aware of the "Barbra Streisand effect," wherein actions taken to ensure something isn't viewed by the public cause that something to gain wider viewership than if they never bothered trying to censor it. | No. Art. 17(1) GDPR lists conditions when erasure can be requested. None of the listed grounds would apply in this case. However, you might have to explain why you process the data (for moderation purposes as you explained above), and why that is lawfully. In particular Art. 5 and Art. 6 need to be taken into account. In your case, processing will be based on Art. 6(1)(f): (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Even if the data subject would be a 9 year old child, the legitimate interests of you and other forum users outweigh the objection of the data subject. Based on Art. 5, there will be a moment when the data has to be deleted. For example 1 year after the last login attempt. | If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on. |
Is it true that at one stage a husband could not rape his wife? Is it really true that up until relatively recently in the US a man could not rape his wife, because apparently at one point in time a married couple was considered one legal entity and a person cannot rape himself? I just heard this once in passing in a YouTube video and was wondering if it was fact or fiction? | It is true that marital rape was not recognized as a legal wrong in the United States until relatively recently (the 1970s–1990s). However, the reasoning was not that spouses were the same legal person. Rather, the reasoning was the legal fiction that by marriage, a wife provided prospective and irrevocable consent. Source: Marital Rape in the United States (and the sources cited therein). | The Miranda warning only has to be given to a person being interrogated in custody, and on the premise that the wife is not in custody, the police do not need to read her the warning. Therefore, anything she says can be used against her, or somebody else, unless there is a separate reason why the statement could not be used. The wife may invoke the spousal testimony privilege, in which case she cannot be compelled to testify against the husband. The officer could theoretically testify that the wife said "I washed blood out of his clothing", but this is an assertion made by an out-of-court declarant to prove the truth of the question at hand, i.e. hearsay. There are numerous exceptions to the definition so that in some cases, the statement would not be hearsay. If the wife refuses to testify, that cuts out half of the exceptions, but maybe the wife is a co-conspirator. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). | Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH. | There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced. | The question didn't mention marital status, but since states formally recognize that relationship it's helpful to start there. tl;dr: The Supreme Court decided state laws that required a woman to notify her spouse were unconstitutional. Thus it's unlikely there'd be grounds for suit. Background The central mechanism of Roe v. Wade (U.S. 1973) was a balancing act between what it decided was a 14th amendment right to privacy and the state's interest in both the health of the woman and the potentiality of life. Because Roe explicitly recognized a state interest, Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1982 that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period. It also mandated parental consent for minors (with some exceptions) and spousal notification. This reached the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Casey (U.S. 1992). There, the court upheld most of the Pennsylvania law (reinforcing its statement in Roe that a state does have an interest) but struck down the spousal notification portion. To do that, it determined the appropriate test was whether a state was placing an undue burden---a significant obstacle---in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability. It reasoned that: state regulation impacts a female's liberty more than male's during pregnancy (by way of biology) if a man and woman disagree, only one can prevail not all women are equally impacted by a notification mandate (for reasons of domestic violence, etc.) Combining this with the notion that women do not lose any constitutionally protected liberty upon marriage, it decided spousal notification would be a significant obstacle and thus an undue burden. In other words, unmarried women don't have spouses to notify, so placing a notification requirement on married women creates an additional burden that the court found undue. To get back to the question, the father certainly has a right to file a suit against the female (...and it happens from time to time). However, it likely wouldn't go far. Since unmarried women were the baseline in Casey, it's unlikely there'd be grounds for either married or unmarried fathers to sue their female partners. This comes up frequently under the moniker of "Father's Rights," which has gained less traction in the U.S. than in other countries. That said, Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would allow fathers to proceed against abortion providers. | Article 41.3.3 of the 1937 Irish Constitution said: No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved. Until this section was changed by the 2019 amendment. I can find no source to show how "but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law" was interpreted, but it seems that a person divorced in or prior to 1940 under US law would not have been permitted to marry in Ireland after 1937 until 2019 under this provision. It should be noted that although Finnegans Wake by James Joyce was published in full in 1939, much of it had been written and published in sections by 1926. It is not at all clear just when it is set. In the 1920s, the constitutional provision quoted above was not yet in effect. | The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. |
Apostille document for from non-apostille countries I am an indonesian marrying a Mauritian. The marriage will take place in Mauritius. To obtain my residence permit, they are asking for: Full Birth Certificate of applicant duly legalized/authenticated by competent authority/ bear the seal of "Apostille" of the Hague Convention of 5th October 1961 (where applicable). Indonesia is not part of the Apostille Convention, I'm in Indonesia, What should do, is there any other legal document I can use to replace the apostille birth certificate and where should I do this ? | At the time of moving to another country for varying reasons, legalization of documents is required. It could be in different forms like apostille or attestation. Since Mauritius belongs to the Apostille Hague Convention, it requires your documents to obtain the apostille sticker from the concerned foreign affairs department of the nation. However, Indonesia is not a part of the apostille countries and hence, does not provide apostille of documents. In order to get the document legalization from a non-apostille country for an apostille country, the document needs to be attested from the respective embassy. In this case, the Birth Certificate authentication can be obtained from the Mauritius embassy based in Indonesia. The embassy won’t be able to provide the apostille sticker but will attest the document by providing a stamp and signature on it. This shall substitute the requirement for apostille birth certificate. | The issues you describe have existed with signatures from the beginning of their use. There exists a tradeoff between ease of use and reliability, both of forgery and of people falsely claiming forgery. Originally, the closest thing to a signature was the use of seals and signet rings. While relatively hard to forge, it only showed that the possessor of the object agreed. Signatures, especially in cursive font, were developed later. They were in some ways easier to forge(you didn't need to get access to a physical device), but more difficult in others(the seal symbols tended to be used on everything and various improvements in technology had been made), and harder to falsely claim forgery(because most people can't alter their handwriting well). You were affixing your name to the document, indicating that you agreed. Often, the signatures were required to backed up with the signatures of other people as witnesses. They didn't have to agree to the document, they just had to agree to testify that you signed of your own free will. Because witnesses, especially trustworthy and independent witnesses, are hard to come by, some places have dropped that requirement, such as checks and signing a aper receipt when using a credit card. But for some important documents, certain jurisdictions still require witnesses, including large transactions (a document relating to a car insurance payout I recently had required a witness to confirm my signature) and marriages. However, with electronic media, the point of a signature is more to indicate deliberate acceptance of terms, with verification of an individual being left to other processes (e.g. IP address, MAC address, linkage to a specific email account, etc.), so forgery is less of an issue. I have also seen "signatures" amount to checkboxes and "I agree" buttons. Generally, the higher the stakes and "more legal" the agreement, the more likely to these have been the "typed signatures" that you describe, but this seems to be decreasing in frequency, suggesting that its purpose was to stop gap a hole in legal acceptance by judges/courts/laws with regards to electronic communications. Addendum: It should also note that the replacement of seals by signatures is not universal; for instance in Japan, seals are still used over signatures in the majority of cases. | Based on Irish law, specifically the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, can I live abroad after naturalizing as an Irish citizen and retain my citizenship just by filling that form? Yes, subject of course to factual disputes. The statute (as amended) provides that this revocation is not possible when the citizen has "registered annually in the prescribed manner his name and a declaration of his intention to retain Irish citizenship with an Irish diplomatic mission or consular office or with the Minister": Revocation of certificates of naturalisation. 19.—(1) The Minister may revoke a certificate of naturalisation if he is satisfied— (a) that the issue of the certificate was procured by fraud, misrepresentation whether innocent or fraudulent, or concealment of material facts or circumstances, or (b) that the person to whom it was granted has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State, or (c) that (except in the case of a certificate of naturalisation which is issued to a person of Irish descent or associations) the person to whom it is granted has been ordinarily resident outside the State or, in the case of an application for a certificate of naturalisation granted under section 15A, resident outside the island of Ireland (otherwise than in the public service) for a continuous period of seven years and without reasonable excuse has not during that period registered annually in the prescribed manner his name and a declaration of his intention to retain Irish citizenship with an Irish diplomatic mission or consular office or with the Minister, or (d) that the person to whom it is granted is also, under the law of a country at war with the State, a citizen of that country, or (e) that the person to whom it is granted has by any voluntary act, other than marriage or entry into a civil partnership, acquired another citizenship. To be precise, filing this declaration does not protect the citizen from revocation of naturalization under another subsection of section 19(1). But if we assume that the annual declarations were all filed promptly (or that there is a reasonable excuse for any failure to file promptly), and that there is no dispute about this, then it is plain from the statutory text that the minister has no discretion to revoke the certificate of naturalization under 19(1)(c). If it were a country like UK or New Zealand, it would straightaway revoke citizenship by claiming misrepresentation of the intention to reside. This is not necessarily true. If there is a reason for the decision to leave, the naturalized citizen could seek to rebut any presumption that there had been misrepresentation. In the case of Ireland, filing the annual declaration does not protect the naturalized citizen from denaturalization under 19(1)(a), so even if the declarations are filed, it could be necessary to show evidence that there was a genuine intention to reside in Ireland at the time of naturalization, and that the intention changed subsequently. If that intention did not in fact exist, then the minister could assert that the certificate had been obtained by fraud, and if the naturalized citizen is unable to rebut that assertion, the minister could revoke the certificate under 19(1)(a). Also see Part IV of the statute for other ways in which Irish citizenship may be lost. In practice, I don't think it is presently very common for countries that generally tolerate (or explicitly permit) multiple nationalities, such as Ireland, the UK, and New Zealand, to seek to denaturalize their naturalized citizens who move abroad. Denaturalization seems to be largely confined to politically sensational cases such as those of terrorists. Since Ireland is a party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, one way to protect your Irish citizenship may be to renounce your other citizenship(s), if that is possible. However, I do not see any related provisions in the 1956 act linked above. | Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces. | @DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result. | Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law*. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. *Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues. | Will UKVI allow a concession for this specific situation? Only your wife's UKVI caseworker can definitely answer this with any certainty, but as you say CR2.3 (b) does seem quite compelling but (c) less so - unless the medical records support her condition was "life-threatening" ...any period spent outside the UK will not count towards the 180-day limit if the absence was for any of the following reasons: [...] (b) travel disruption due to natural disaster, military conflict or pandemic; or (c) compelling and compassionate personal circumstances, such as the life-threatening illness of the applicant, or life-threatening illness or death of a close family member; [...] | Typically in extraditions, the treaties will only allow for extraditions if both nations have a similar crime and similar punishment for that crime. In this case, there maybe some pause for Australia to grant an extradition as Australia no longer has the death penalty for any crime, so it could be that while the new crime the defendant is being sought for is Escape from Incarceration related (that's a yes in both countries), technically the punishment for an escaped Death Row Inmate is the Death Penalty. Australia can't extradite for any crime where death penalty is on the line, but the requesting nation can say they will give a more lighter sentance that is more compliant with the requested nation's own laws. However, since it is Death for another crime that Austrilia never had jurisdiction over, it complicates matters. There is precidence for procedural reasons for refusing to extradite. For example, while the U.S. and Italy have an extradition treaty and both view murder in the same light, the U.S. refused the extradition of a citizen who was wanted for a murder in Italy that she was previously aquitted of, but new evidnce was uncovered. Because it is illegal for the state to try a person twice for the same crime in the U.S., the U.S. declined the extradition treaty. Some additional notes, extradited persons can only be tried for crimes that they were extradited for, so there is an argument that Australia would refuse unless Indonesia promises to commute the Drug Trafficking sentence to Life Imprisonment |
Would it be theoretically possible to design a 100% legal ransomware where the user voluntarily chooses to encrypt their files and pay to decrypt them Would it be theoretically possible to design a 100% legal ransomware where the user voluntarily chooses to encrypt their files and pay to decrypt them? (Seriously, I always wondered if it was possible!) For example, the software would have to be voluntarily downloaded by the user, and it is clear to the user on the download website in large text that the program is ransomware. The website might say in large text on the home page, "This program locks your files and forces you to pay us with real money to get them back! Make yourself and your wallet sad, and try our ransomware today!" The terms and conditions when the program is being installed would clearly state to the user in large text that their files are about to be encrypted, and they will have to pay to get them back. The price would be set by the user before the files are encrypted. This hypothetical 100% legal program would see hypothetical users who act like Patrick from SpongeBob SquarePants. Please note that I'm not going to do this, nor do I encourage this behaviour, but I am curious as if it is legal. I know nobody in real life would be dumb enough to voluntarily install ransomware on their computer! | It is not necessary to design anything (program design is outside the scope of Law SE, anyhow). It is legal to pay a person to encrypt your drive with BitLocker. It is legal to instruct them, as part of the contract, to not reveal the key to you, until you complete your contractual obligation (paying the fee that constitutes your consideration under the contract). The contract could immunize the encryptor against liability for the drive-owner wising up moments after enter is pressed. | The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it. | The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation. | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service. | The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures. | Suppose I obtain the ability to access someone else's cryptocurrency. This sounds like fraud e.g. I overheard them saying the password to their wallet out loud or I am a custodian of their assets. Nope, STILL fraud, possibly even Computer Misuse aka hacking... and because you use internet: it's Wire Fraud I now borrow those assets, keep them for some period of time, and then return them, without the owner's consent. hmmm, let's take california... Luckjy you, it is not embezzlement because you were not entrusted with the cryptocurrency, you gave yourself access. 503. Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted. No it is plainly... theft under California law: 484. (a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Giving it back doesn't matter. The person taking the crypto for any amount of time without being entitled to them is committing theft. You see, California doesn't interest that you just want to borrow. They don't even require Mens Rea for the mere taking - only for fraudulent pretense there is an intent question. In fact, it might even be automatically Grand Theft: 484d. As used in this section and Sections 484e to 484j, inclusive:[...] (2) “Access card” means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access card, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper instrument. 484e. (a) Every person who, with intent to defraud, sells, transfers, or conveys, an access card, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, is guilty of grand theft. YIKES! and now, intent to defraud comes in, but that is actually minimal: that just means taking without being allowed to by the owner in many cases. | A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable. |
Is cross examination strictly confined to the subjects that the original examination pertained to, or can the opposing party make their own points? Pretty straightforward question, really: what are the topical constraints of cross examination with reference to examination? Suppose party A calls witness W to the stand to ask them questions about the alleged motive and means for the crime. Party B now cross examines W but would like to use the opportunity to raise points rather about W’s whereabouts and possible alibi so the questions B would ask W in CE actually have nothing to do with those asked of W by A shortly before. Are they nonetheless allowed? | On cross-examination any relevant questions can be asked. It is re-examination that is confined to clarifying whatever new questions/issues were raised during cross. | While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court. | You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on. | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. | The appellate court gets the trial transcript which includes all the testimony (and exhibits or descriptions/photos of them) and the trial court's rulings. Also, each side presents an appeal brief, which will generally include a statement of facts, pointing out ones it thinks favorable to its views. In civil cases a jury may be asked/instructed to give yes/no answers to a series of questions, but this is not normal in criminal cases. An appellate court can (and sometimes does) rule that there was not sufficient evidence to permit any reasonable jury to convict; to that extent it can rule on questions of fact. But, as the comment by ohwilleke mentions, an appellate court does not hear new evidence. It can overturn the conviction and send the case back for a new trial, and in such a new trial additional evidence may be introduce at the trial court level. | Senators, and anyone else for that matter, can ask any questions they want. The witness is required to answer the questions only if under subpoena, and only if the answer of the question would neither require disclosure of privileged information nor violate a 5th Amendment right (which is a form of privilege). Many things that are the subject of an NDA are not privileged information, and the fact that someone claims that something is a trade secret does not automatically make it privileged information. Privileges can be established by statute, court rule or at common law. | Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? No. Usually only specific kinds of evidence related to specific kinds of claims such as alibi evidence, an insanity claim, or expert testimony must be disclosed prior to trial by a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case does not have to disclose evidence harmful to the defendant's case prior to trial as a general rule. Sometimes there is a requirement to disclose witnesses anticipated to be called, or exhibits to be possibly used very shortly prior to trial, but that is more the exception than the rule. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Yes. A plaintiff in a civil case can compel disclosure prior to trial of all evidence in the custody, control, or possession of the defendant that is relevant or is reasonably calculated to be relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings (e.g. counterclaims, replies to counterclaims, third-party complaints, cross-claims, etc.). The scope of discovery is slightly different in jurisdictions that don't follow the federal model. This can include pre-trial depositions of the parties, although a defendant can claim the 5th Amendment at the risk of being exposed to an adverse inference communicated to the jury at trial if the defendant does so. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require the pre-trial disclosure of expert testimony that will be used at trial, of exhibits that will or may be used at trial, of witnesses who will or may be called a trial, of all documents that are relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings, of all insurance coverage that could cover the claim, of all persons with knowledge of the disputed facts, and of an expected damages calculation. In the federal system, however, one need pro-actively disclose only witnesses and documents that support your case without being asked. Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? The rules of procedure applicable to a case govern the scope of discovery, but judges have considerable discretion to determine that requests are excessive relative to what is at stake in the case, are irrelevant, or unduly burden some other legitimate interest of the person subject to discovery. Is there punishment for non-compliance? Yes. First of all, a failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so is a ground to exclude presentation of that evidence at trial. Secondly, in civil cases, attorney fees incurred to obtain the discovery can be awarded, facts that might have been disclosed can be declared to be true as a matter of judicial sanction where there is not disclosure, claims can be dismissed, etc. The main relevant federal rule in civil cases is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. It is an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed with only a hypothetical remedy left to the defendant as is the case in most of these united states to comply with an obviously unlawful arrest that doesn't present an immediate threat to life? I don't understand this long and convoluted sentence. The part about an unlawful arrest seems divorced from the issues in the rest of the the question. It isn't clear what kind of unlawful request is involved either. | It depends on the particular law in the particular jurisdiction in which you are charged. Most statute laws enumerate the defences that are available. In common law countries there is a general defence that (except in strict liability offences) the perpetrator must well ... perpetrate the criminal act; what you describe does not appear to meet that requirement. Other jurisdictions would not be so forgiving. |
Conflict Between Third Circuit and NJ Appellate Division Regarding Stay Pending Appeal? NJ Rule 2:9:1 states: When an appeal is taken from an order compelling or denying arbitration, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to address issues relating to claims and parties that remain in that court unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court possessing supervision and control How is this rule consistent with the ruling by the Third Circuit in Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007)? In the above case, the Third Circuit noted the existence of “a circuit split on the question of whether the filing of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 16(a) of the FAA automatically deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed until such time as the appeal is fully litigated or determined to be frivolous or forfeited,” and “expressed agreement with the majority rule of automatic divestiture where the Section 16(a) appeal is neither frivolous nor forfeited.” Isn't the the Appellate Division in NJ required to uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in such matters? | Isn't the the Appellate Division in NJ required to uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in such matters? It is not. There can be no conflict on procedural issues between the Third Circuit, which is interpreting federal rules of civil and appellate procedure, and a ruling of a New Jersey court which is interpreting state rules of civil and appellate procedure. Different court systems have different procedural rules. Federal rules of procedure are inapplicable in state courts. State rules of procedure are inapplicable in federal courts. The circuit split referred to is between different federal appellate court circuits interpreting the federal rules of civil and appellate procedure. But none of those rules are applicable to state courts. Furthermore, even if a question of substantive federal law were involved, the state courts of New Jersey are only required to follow precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court and higher appellate courts in the New Jersey state court system. Decisions of the Third Circuit on questions of federal law are not binding on the courts of New Jersey despite the fact that New Jersey is located in the Third Circuit, even though they are persuasive authority on questions of substantive federal law that are equally applicable in both court systems. | In the US, there are many possible sanctions A frivolous case, or pattern of cases, can result in a number of punishments: Paying the other side's legal fees -- Mind you, in the U.S, it is normal for each party to pay their own fees, and that will happen in "honest disagreement" type cases in which both parties have a valid perspective. "Loser pays" only happens when a) the loser has filed a ridiculous lawsuit, or greatly burdened the other side with frivolous filings; and b) the winner asks for fees. Transferring other costs to the plaintiff as the court sees fit. Again, winner must ask. Barring a plaintiff from filing future cases, without advance permission from the court. Again, winner must ask! Barring attorneys or firms from practicing in certain areas of law. Disbarment of the attorneys. That is decided by the state's Bar Association, typically a nonprofit trade association who in effect regulates lawyers in this manner. For instance, California is one of only four states allowing cash awards for ADA violations. A clever person named Mr. Molski went around to different restaurants and checked their bathrooms for ADA compliance. If a toilet paper roll was 1/2" out of position from where ADA required, Molski would take notes. Molski checked dozens of restaurants every day, and passed these notes onto a San Francisco law office. The law office filed hundreds if not thousands of these lawsuits against the various restaurants. The lawsuits all claimed that Molski was injured as a result of the ADA noncompliance. Mind you, this was in the age before easy merging of databases and MS-Word documents. Since these hundreds of cases were so similar, they simply made Xerox copies of the relevant paperwork, only leaving a few fields blank to be typed in by hand. To reduce secretarial workload, they didn't bother customizing the date of injury: so all cases claimed Molski was injured on the same day. Hundreds of defendants simply settled for amounts in the $5000 range (about half the cost of hiring a lawyer to grind through a trial). However, one defendant, a Chinese restaurant, fought. Their counsel discovered the hundreds of other same cases, and pointed out to the court that Molski was claiming to have suffered the same injury at dozens of restaurants on the same day. What an unlucky fellow! The defendant then claimed Molski and attorneys were Vexatious Litigants, and the court wholeheartedly agreed. Molski was barred for life from filing any lawsuit without advance court approval (in which Molski would need to show a body of evidence to the court that yeah, a real and valid case was there). The law firm was barred for life from filing any ADA related cases. The law firm folded up, and is no more. The lawyers involved in the case quit practicing law. Then we have Righthaven, who purchased from newspapers the "right to sue and collect damages" for copyright violations. Many bulletin boards, chatrooms, forums and Q&A sites allow/rely on "User Generated Content" (UGC), such as this here answer. They used search engines to find forums where users had copy-pasted newspaper articles. Generally, forums are protected from user behavior by the DMCA. Then, like Molski, they sued the forums, offering a settlement number below the cost of litigation itself. Again, hundreds paid; but a few fought on principle, with support from EFF. Again, Righthaven got destroyed in court - the right to sue cannot be sold. Courts ordered them to pay their victims' legal fees, bankrupting the operation. Prenda tried a similar thing against people who BitTorrent porn. I was in a case where we asked for fees. I got them, with such ease that I am kicking myself for not asking that the plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (which would have saved many others from this person). Further, the judge laid a heavy hint to the 3 other co-parties that if they asked for fees, they'd get them too. They did not ask. Amusingly, one of the lawyers who should have asked, was unable to collect from the client. Should have asked... | The original filed case would have been "Government v. Item", with the government (plaintiff) suing the item (defendant), not the other way around. But these are appellate cases, and the title convention there is "Appellant v. Respondent", regardless of who was the original plaintiff or defendant. So in each case, the item presumably lost in some lower court and is now appealing to SCOTUS. Taking 62 Cases of Jam as an example and chasing the citations, the original case in US District Court for the District of New Mexico was United States v. 62 Cases, 87 F. Supp. 735 (D.N.M. 1949). The government sought to condemn the jam on the grounds that it was only 25% fruit, where federal standards for jam required that it must contain at least 45% (or more depending on the type of fruit). The District Court dismissed the "libel" on the grounds that the product was clearly labeled "imitation". The government appealed to the Tenth Circuit (183 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1950)); here the case was still titled "US v. 62 Cases" since the United States was the appellant; appeals cases are always titled "Appellant v. Respondent". The circuit court reversed, ruling that since it looks and tastes like jam, it has to meet the standards for jam, its label notwithstanding, and ordered the jam to be condemned. The jam petitioned for certiorari to the US Supreme Court, (340 U.S. 593 (1951)), and now for the first time the title of the case is "62 Cases of Jam v. US" since the jam is now the petitioner. Again, "Petitioner v. Respondent" is the norm. As the defendant party was "62 Cases of Jam" throughout the lower courts, it wouldn't make sense to change it to "Fred Smith, Owner of 62 Cases of Jam" at this point. SCOTUS reversed, and the jam was finally exonerated, free to resume its ordinary jammy activities. | Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals. | (My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof. | Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment. | Nothing prevents firms from putting clauses like that in the disclaimer. If you're talking about goods (rather than services), much contract formation is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which 49 states have adopted (and which Louisiana has adopted part). However, the real question relates to whether that kind of language will be enforceable in court. A common way to attempt to avoid litigation is to insert a clause that requires arbitration of disputes (instead of litigation). The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), so this can be successful. Contracts that have class-action arbitration provisions are a little dicier, but in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Conception, 563 US 333 (2011) , the court held the FAA preempts state laws that disallow class arbitration. | Part XVIII of the Criminal Code addresses the power and procedure for appeals. Appeals of indictable offences are appealed to the provincial Court of Appeal. The Crown can generally appeal where there is an error in law. The Crown has a limited appeal on the basis of questions of fact. This includes appeals for unreasonable verdict.1 However, the Crown cannot appeal on issues of credibility unless it amount to an error in law. The Defence can appeal both issues of fact and law.(ss. 675 and 676) R. v. Kendall, [2005] O.J. No. 2457 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 46 from a Canadian Criminal Procedure Wiki. Unlike in U.S. law, the government can directly appeal an acquittal on certain grounds in Canada (without regard to whether it was a jury trial or a bench trial), although those grounds aren't quite as broad as those of the defense. This would also be true in modern English law. In practice, it is somewhat easier to appeal a verdict in a bench trial than in a jury trial, because in a bench trial you know why the judge says he or she came to the verdict and can determine if those reasons were incorrect, while in a jury trial, the appellate court presumes that the jury followed the law and use any even implausible basis for their opinion even if that isn't what really happened. The complete bar on appeals of acquittals of criminal charges in U.S. law due to the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, is a rare exception to the global norm. |
Are designs explained in academic publications considered to be in public domain if there isn't yet a patent application about it? In academic journals, sometimes the new approach they describe seems so promising that companies may want to use those designs or designs made/inspired from the principles mentioned in the publication. When an invention is publicly displayed, it loses its novelty and hence cannot be considered as patentable. My question is: is an academic journal publication considered a public display of information or isn't considered so depending on the publication being an open-access one or not?(Is there any difference whether the publication is accessible through a subscription based journal - which limits the audience and hence may limit the public display criteria - or a blog on the internet?) If a design isn't patented, do companies have the right to use these designs presented in journals? Thank you, | Designs in publications are prior art If a party publishes a design in any way to the public, no other party can patent it and the publishing party only has a narrow window to file for a patent if the jurisdiction even allows for that.1 However, a publication of the underlying material doesn't invalidate a previous patent. In fact, requesting a patent requires disclosure and publication. Academic publications do count as a publication of the mechanism and are grounds to void a patent filed after the publication date. 1 - In the US, there is a general timeframe for that, in other jurisdictions, such a timeframe is only given if the publication was to acquire a patent in a different country. | I want to use a couple of lines from "What is life?" by Erwin Schrödinger as quote on the front of my thesis. Would i need permission for that form publisher or would that be convered in fair use? There are close cases of fair use, but this is not one of them. This is unequivocally and clearly fair use. It is a brief excerpt of a much larger body of work, it is for non-commercial use by a student, and it is for educational and academic purposes (presumably to advance science). Also do i need to attribute the quote properly Yes. This is necessary both because of the moral rights of the author under E.U. copyright law (assuming that works by Erwin Schrödinger are still in copyright), and for reasons of academic ethical considerations. It is still in copyright, because he died on January 4, 1961, which is 58 years ago. So, in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 50 years (the minimum required by the Berne Convention) this is out of copyright, but in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 70 years (e.g. Germany), the copyright is still in force until January 4, 2031. Also, even if the work were out of copyright, as a matter of academic integrity, you would be required to attribute the quote in an academic thesis in any case. Quoting someone without attribution in academic work is considered plagiarism, and could result in your thesis being stricken and also in your degree being revoked in a serious case. Government ministers in the E.U. have been forced to resign over plagiarism in their academic work as students in recent years. This is taken much more seriously in Europe than it is in the U.S. | German perspective: In German law, there is the concept of Schöpfungshöhe (threshold of originality), which is required for authorship rights (Urheberrecht) to apply to a work. Basically, the idea is that a minimum of creativity is required for something to be protected. However, that bar is rather low. Thus, for example: Literary works are protected practically always. Maps are generally protected, even though you might argue they "slavishly copy nature", because the act of choosing what to show and what not is already creative. However, a faithful photographic reproduction of a painting is not eligible for Urheberrecht to apply (LG Berlin, AZ 15 O 428/15) So yes, a "slavish copy" of a work would not qualify for protection if there is no creativity involved. Note, however, that other types of protection apart from Urheberrecht might apply, such as Sui generis database right. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | Yes, you can do that, assuming that the pictures are really in the public domain (i.e. due to their age, and not only claimed to be). But you probably shouldn't, but you'll probably want to add a label to the images anyway (what it depicts, who the original painter is, etc). So adding a "public domain" tag to each image shouldn't be a big issue. You can do that on a separate page as well, giving the source for each. Note that while using pd images does not create a copyright violation, even if you blatantly say that you created them yourself, it could still be considered plagiarism. When writing a science book or even a thesis, this could get you into trouble. | For the US: I believe 17 U.S. Code § 120 applies here: 17 U.S. Code § 120 - Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works (a)Pictorial Representations Permitted.— The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. So long as the building is located in or visible from a public place, anyone should be allowed to distribute models of the building Edit (more information, but I believe original answer still suffices): So we know from 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8), that architectural works are copyrightable, and the extent of this copyright protection extends to copyright over the blueprint itself and/or the right to produce the building. This seems to only mean that an architect would own copyright in a model of a building if he specifically creates a sculpture of the building and then copyrights it. It doesn't appear that designing a building or having blueprints of it grants the creator rights over a sculpture of the building, the rights to such a sculpture would have to be obtained seperately. TL;DR You should be allowed to sell models of a building so long as they are not models based off the actual blueprints of the building, and that these models haven't been manually copyrighted by the architect beforehand. (i.e making the building hasn't granted a copyright over models of the building beforehand) | It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons? | Electronic designs can be patented provided they meet the criteria for a patentable idea. But patenting a design using specific ICs is probably not a good idea as all someone has to do is redesign the same function using different ICs and they have worked around your patent. The best approach is to patent your circuit function using "functional blocks" that are more generic so that the overall circuit's function, which is the novel idea, it patented and not the specific implementation. Patents can be tricky to navigate. You might do well to consult a patent attorney who can advise you how best to protect your intellectual property. |
broker cancelled life insurance policy without authorization Back in 2018 we had a life insurance policy that was set up in 2007, we were selling our house and buying another, our broker wanted to make sure we were covered as we were taking on a bigger debt. She advised to keep the old policy because it was excellent and take out what she called a top up policy. We agreed and this is what we thought was set up. 2023 comes along and we are remortgaging - was advised to take another look at our policies. In turn we have discovered she replaced the old policy for the new one and we have been covered for a lot less than we thought for 5 years. We are tying to determine what an acceptable compensation would be! | We are tying to determine what an acceptable compensation would be It mostly depends on whether the acts and representations by the broker caused you to pay in excess and/or have made it more expensive for you to restore your previous insurance plan. The gaps in your description prevent us from identifying whether your claim(s) against the broker is (are) meritorious from other standpoints. The broker's advice to buy additional insurance suggests that since 2018 you must have paid more than you used to. In that case, you would be entitled to recover from the broker the excess over the premium paid for the insurance you actually had after the old policy got replaced. In England the statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract is six years. This implies that delaying legal action for another year will reduce the amount to which you are entitle to recover. If insurance similar to the old, "excellent" policy now costs you more than it would had the broker never replaced it, you might be entitled to that difference as well. That is because the broker advised you something and she did the opposite, thereby unjustifiably worsening your position. | While the state, or a creditor, can initiate a probate if no one else does (if the state does so, the official in charge of this is called the "public administrator"), neither are required to do so. Also, sometimes a guardianship is converted to a probate, but this doesn't appear to have happened. This is a thankless job that probably doesn't make sense to bother with if estate liabilities exceed the assets of the estate, but most states have a "non-claim statute" that bars creditors claims, other than liens including property tax liens, after a certain amount of time after the death. So, even if the estate may have been insolvent at death, if enough time has elapsed, many of the potential claims may now be barred, making the estate solvent again. Siblings generally have priority for appointment over a nephew, so to be appointed yourself, you would ordinarily have to receive a renunciation of their right to serve as executor before applying to do so yourself, but some states disregard that priority if no one has taken action after a certain period of time. You would initiate probate by contacting an Alaska lawyer in the vicinity of the place he was domiciled at death. The lawyer can review the guardianship court file, determine if an executor was appointed, and determine if there are assets that could justify opening an estate relative to lien debts including Medicaid liens. If there are not, letting the assets be lost to a property tax lien may make more sense that spending money to transfer his property in an orderly fashion to his creditors with nothing in it for any of his family. | There is a reasonable chance that the amount that you are borrowing and paying interest on is through a third party, so the dealer can't just waive the interest for the period when they are fixing the car. Legal responses would include canceling the sale, and suing for damages. The problem with suing for damages is that this isn't costing you an extra $15/day (the loan gets paid off at a fixed time, regardless of how much you get to actually drive the car). It would be a considerable stretch to argue that you were deprived of a week's worth of enjoyment for the car because of the wrongful acts of the dealer, and should be compensated. Your attorney would be in a good position to tell you, based on the facts and Texas law, whether that approach would be futile. The legality of the situation primarily depends on what the contract says. It is likely that the contract has clauses that maximally disclaim responsibility to the maximum extent allowed by law. There will be some clause that says something about taking delivery of the car, so you can check whether they have breached the contract on that point: it is possible that there is some escape hatch like "as soon as possible, upon receipt of payment". It seems pretty clear that they concealed a material fact, in order to induce you to buy the car. For example, the manufacturer may have installed a defective veblitzer which had to be replaced, and a reasonable person would not buy a car with a defective veblitzer, thus the veblitzer is a material fact. Or: the veblitzer may have been damaged in a flood. The fact that the car is, by their representation, not safe to drive in its current state, the mind of fact that would push most people into the "no thanks" category. To pursue the fraud angle, you need to be more specific about the defective part in your complaint. The only way to force them to reveal the nature of the missing part is to sue them and compel disclosure of the relevant facts during discovery. Again, your attorney would deal with this. You should bear in mind that if the sale is simply cancelled, you may not be able to recover the loan application or processing fee, and the trade-in will no doubt have been sold, so you can't get the old car back. There are laws against deceptive trade practices which might be applicable, depending on whether they said anything deceptive in their disseminated advertising. Section 17.46 may be applicable, if they patched the car together temporarily with a counterfeit veblitzer. | Political risk insurance exists, but not in the format hypothesized. What the question is contemplating is more like a gambling bet, or a futures contract (which is a type of "derivative" contract), than insurance. What constitutes an insurable risk of harm to an insurable interest is mostly a matter of common law although there are some state statutes on point in the U.S. which is the level of federalism at which insurance is regulated. Basically, you can only insure against a loss to an "insurable interest" caused by an insurable risk. In practice, this means that insurance has to be linked to an individualized loss of an individual or business that is clearly and directly caused by a covered occurrence. A change in governing political party itself, doesn't give rise to such a loss. The mere fact that a party is elected or that the people elected take an oath of office, doesn't itself change any laws or regulations. It just puts in place people who might do such things in the future. Political risk insurance, when it exists, insures against the nationalization of one's business at a loss, or against the industry that one is engaged in becoming illegal, at a loss. It is the specific action taken by the newly elected regime towards the particular insured firm or individual, and not the actual new regime itself, that gives rise to a loss to an insurable interest in the case of political risk insurance. For example, you might be able to buy political risk insurance against the possibility that your marijuana business which is legal under state law but not federal law, will be seized in a civil forfeiture or shut down by a change in the practical effect of the relevant state law. If you are worried that your company's stock will decline in value due to an election result, the available financial instrument would be to short sell your company's stock, hedging against losses arising from a drop in stock price below a certain dollar value by a certain date for any reason. If your company is not publicly held, the risk of a decline in business due to an election result is not something that can be insured against. | If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice. | Your title doesn't quite match your question. "Reneging" would mean saying that a lease would be offered at the reduced rent, and then not offering the lease. Here, they offered the lease, and you accepted. So now the question is not whether they can refuse to offer you the reduced-fee lease, but whether they are owed the back rent. Verbal agreements are indeed binding, but they are rather sticky from an evidential point of view. Also, there are other possible complications. If your original lease stated that verbal agreements are not binding, or that only specific people are authorized to modify the terms and the person you talked to is not such a person, then this is not binding. If after they said you could keep the rent reduction, you signed a lease for the full amount or otherwise indicated acceptance of the full amount, then it may be considered not binding. Even if the agreement is not binding, you have further arguments. If you believed that it was binding, and did so out of good faith, then there was not a meeting of the minds, and they can't go after you for breach of contract. They may have other claims, such as damages if they can show that they could have gotten more money from another prospective client, but them accepting the rent makes that difficult to pursue. Now, again, verbal agreements do have evidentiary problems. If your case were nothing than your word claiming that they agreed, you would not have much of a case. But here, you have: -They were willing to take the lower rent for the initial period -You stated that you would leave unless given a continued discount, and you stayed -They didn't make any attempt to collect the full rent for three months -They are willing to give you the discount if you pay the back rent All of this points rather strongly towards your claim being true. You also say "this situation is not unique to me." It's not clear what they means, but if other tenants also got verbal assurances that the discount would continue, and they testify to that effect, then your case is even stronger. | Dale M is correct. Lawyers get calls all day long from people who want free advice and have no intention of entering into a paid representation. That is what your letter sounds like. I write separately just to add that you may have better results if you make explicit that you are aware of their rates and prepared to pay them. Even then, though, it may be that whatever you'd pay for the two hours to walk you through this is not as valuable as time they'd spend on other matters. If I have to prioritize between a repeat client and someone who will probably not pay for anything more than having one question answered, that's an easy choice. | The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today. |
Is a contract valid with totally wrong last name and wrong project address? Is a contract valid with the wrong last name? I had a contractor come and do some work on a barn. He said that he would do good work use different products. In the end, he did not use the products and did poor quality work. I asked him for a detailed contract. What he brought me had a sentence or two on the work. The rest was just stuff about payment and such. The contract had my first name correct, but he had gotten part of my email address and used that as my last name. Also, he had the address of the project as the address across the street as my property has no official address. I signed the contract with a carpenter's pencil quite poorly and am not sure if anyone could read it. I trusted the guy as he is part of Isiah House, a rehabilitation charity. I am unhappy with the work and he does not want to do anything about it. The contract says I have 30 days to pay. He wants the money now. I just recently received a copy of the contract after asking for it after the work was done. I never have been involved in contract litigation. Is the contract considered valid and binding with a totally wrong last name and a wrong project address? | Ah, the old "is this contract invalid (but still legally binding for the other party)"? You signed a contract with someone else. You do not dispute that it was you who signed the contract and agreed to it. You made it abundantly clear that there was a contract between you when you allowed him to do the work. This means one of the following was true: There was a mistake in the contract. What was followed was how it was intended. You signed a contract containing false information in an attempt to defraud someone. One of these will end up much worse for you. The fact that the work was not completed to the agreed upon standard could be considered a breach of contract- this is something a small claims court would decide. | Agreement You say: my landlord added a clause stating: "All moving must be done in rear of driveway or pay $250 (near basement door)" Was this addition made at the time you signed the lease or subsequently? This matters because the terms of a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, they must be agreed. If the change happened after the lease was signed then , unless you agreed to it, it has no effect whatsoever. Since that resolution is boring; I will assume that it was always there. Enforcability Is this actually enforceable, since I did park in a public space and not necessarily on his property? Yes, it is enforceable. People can agree in a contract to do (or not do) anything so long as that thing is not illegal - that is what a contract is; a legally enforceable agreement for two people to do certain things. You agreed "All moving must be done in rear of driveway ... (near basement door)" and you didn't do what you agreed to do. Therefore you broke a term of the contract. It doesn't matter that you don't know why he wanted you to do this or if it was reasonable or if it meant that you couldn't use your parent's truck - if these were issues for you they should have been raised before you agreed to do it. If the clause said "When moving out you will wear a blue double breasted suit with a yellow and purple bow tie" then that is what you must do. Consequences There are a number of options open to the wronged party when the other party breaches a term of a contract. The most relevant in these circumstances is to sue for damages. So how much are damages? Well, they are an amount to restore the wronged party to the position they would have been in if you hadn't broken the agreement. In situations where damages can be hard to calculate, contracts can make a provision for liquidated damages; a pre-agreed amount of what the damage will be: in this case "$250". However: In the United States, Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that, in contracts for the sale of goods: Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. This largely mirrors the common law rule, which applies to other types of contracts under the law of most US states. On the face of it, it would appear that $250 may be "unreasonably large" given the nature of the breach where it appears that the landlord has actually suffered no damage. | Does posting a letter create any 'legal' agreement between myself and the postal service? Is there any obligation to deliver a letter? Assuming that an agreement is formed, at what point in the process? When the letter entered a post-box, when it was picked up from the postbox, or later - perhaps when a post-mark is added by the postal service? Posting a letter in Germany does not create a contractual agreement between you and the postal service (and so your follow up question above does not apply). Instead, German postal service activities are governed by the Postal Act and regulations adopted by the postal service. The Postal Act creates a system in which independent contractors licensed by the government carry out parts of the process of delivering the mail and are given quasi-governmental status in connection with these activities. Since it is quasi-governmental it has immunity from legal liability, except as set forth expressly by statute. The postal service and its contractors and employees are required to follow the Postal Act and related regulations, and the people and entities involved in doing so may have legal liability for compensatory damages caused to someone as a result of their intentional or negligent violation of the regulations. In contrast, contactual liability is generally imposed without regard to fault and any failure to perform as expected by the parties is actionable. So, in Germany, you can't prevail in suing the postal service or a contractor or postal employee simply by showing that a letter wasn't delivered in a timely fashion, or wasn't forwarded appropriately. You also have to show a court why this happened and demonstrate that the conduct that caused this to happen was intentional or negligent compared to the standard of care for postal workers in the situation in which the alleged misconduct occurred. German law, generally speaking, interprets compensatory damages rather narrowly compared to U.S. courts, for example, generally excluding damages for inconvenience and emotional distress, and favors orders compelling someone to carry out a duty in lieu of a damages award for failure to perform a duty, when possible. Some of the obligations of contractors and employees, such as delivery deadlines, are overall performance standards which are not enforceable in individual cases because not every letter must meet those standards, only a certain percentage of a letters in the system. What commitments beyond the happy-path described above exist? Is there any commitment to attempt to deliver a letter with a less than perfect address (e.g. missing out the postal-code)? Or to offer the recipient the chance to pay the additional postage owed on a letter without enough postage? The highlighted language in subparagraph 4 of the portion of the Postal Universal Service Ordinance quoted at length below governs what should be done in this situation. (There may be additional requirements set forth in other regulations or in individual subcontractor license agreements; this answer is not comprehensive.) The pertinent provisions of the Postal Act provide that: Chapter VII Service of Documents under Public Law Regulations §33 Service of Documents Requirement (1) Any licensee providing letter post delivery services shall undertake to serve documents, irrespective of their weight, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules of procedure and legislation on the rules of service in administrative procedure. Sovereign powers commensurate with this obligation shall be vested in the licensee (entrepreneur charged with specific functions in the public interest). (2) The Regulatory Authority shall exempt from the obligation according to (1) above a licensee thus obliged, upon its request, provided the licensee does not have a dominant position in the market. Exemption is ruled out if there is reason to believe that service of documents according to (1) above would no longer be ensured across the Federal Republic of Germany as a result. Exemption may be revoked if the licensee becomes dominant in the market or if the condition set forth in sentence 2 above becomes applicable. A request for exemption may be linked to an application for licence grant. §35 Liability in the Performance of Service of Documents Liable for any damage caused by neglect of duty in the performance of service of documents shall be the licensee obliged, in accordance with the regulations governing a civil service employer’s liability for damages in the territorial area. . . . §38 Liability for Damages Whosoever intentionally or negligently violates this Act, an ordinance having the force of law issued by virtue of this Act, any obligation arising from a licence or any other Regulatory Authority order shall, to the extent that the legal provision, obligation or order aims to protect another party, be obliged to compensate that party for any damage arising from such violation. So, the postal service's obligations with regard to delivering mail are a matter of postal service regulations rather than being in the nature of contracts. And, if an employee or contractor of the postal service causes harm by intentionally or negligently disregarding the regulations, that employee or contractor is obligated to pay compensatory damages to someone harmed by that violation. The primary postal service regulation in Germany, is called the Postal Universal Service Ordinance. Some pertinent provisions of this regulation state: There shall be sufficient letter boxes that customers in urban areas will not need, as a rule, to travel more than 1,000 metres to reach one. Letter boxes shall be emptied every working day and, depending on requirements, on Sundays and bank holidays, as frequently as is needed to comply with the quality standards cited in subpara 3. Letter box clearances shall be based on the dictates of business life; clearance times are to be indicated on the letter boxes. Letter boxes within the meaning of sentences 1 and 2 above may also be other receptacles that are suitable for posting letters. Of the inland letter items mailed on a working day, at least 80 per cent on average, over the year, must be delivered on the working day following the day of mailing and 95 per cent by the second working day following mailing – with the exception of items subject to the requirement of a minimum 50 items per mailing. In respect of intra-Community cross-border mail the quality standards laid down in the Annex to Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ 1998 No. L 15/14) shall apply. If the Annex to the Directive is amended the quality standards in the amended version shall apply as from the first day of the third month following publication of the amendment. Letter items shall be delivered, unless the addressee – by establishing a PO box or in any other way – has declared that he intends to collect the items. Delivery shall be made to the residence or business premises stated in the address, by placing the items in a receptacle specifically for the addressee and large enough to be provided with the items, or by handing the items over in person. Any items that cannot be delivered in accordance with sentence 2 shall be handed over to an alternative recipient, where possible, unless there are instructions to the contrary from the sender or addressee. Where the addressee’s residential or business address can only be reached with undue difficulty or in the absence of a suitable or accessible receptacle for the letter items, the addressee may be excluded from delivery. The person so affected shall be informed of this intended exclusion. There shall be a minimum of one delivery per working day. The structure of postal service law in Germany, as a question of administrative law regarding the functioning of a government agency, rather than as a contract between the person sending a letter than the postal service, would be typical of most countries (although in many countries there would not be the added complication of providing postal services through independent contractors). | there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road. | That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached. | Contracts do not have to be written and signed on pieces of paper, except in a few cases specified by law. Writing style (ordinary style of talking vs. high-register formulaic language) does not affect the validity or a writing in contract law. You do have something in writing. What matters most is what he actually said (exact words, not your belief of what it must have meant), and how it relates to any existing contractual obligation. For example if the message says "You're fired, turn your badge in at the desk. I'll think about giving you two weeks pay", that's not an enforceable promise. But your existing contract might say "You get 2 weeks severance pay when we fire you", and that can't be walked by by saying "I'll thinking about it". And it also depends on whether there are any laws mandating severance pay (but California does not have any mandatory severance pay law). | What does your contract with your client say? What does your contract with your sub-contractor say? Typically the client contract will not specify HOW the work gets done, just the deliverable(s), the price and the liability. Unless your client contract says otherwise, it's perfectly legal for you to farm out the work. It's also perfectly fine for you to deduct the cost of the sub. As long as that's profitable the IRS will have no problem for that at all: that's a perfectly normal business practice. Things are a bit more complicated if you farm out at a loss since that could be interpreted as a tax evasion scheme. However, as long as it's reasonable, that's fine. If there are defects in the work product, the client will come after you, regardless of who did the work. It's generally your responsibility to fix the issues, cover damages etc. You, in turn, can try to recover your damages from the sub, but that depends on the nature of the contract you have with the sub. | A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company. |
What happens with seized money? Daniel the drug dealer was caught with 20.000€ of illegaly earned money while crossing the border into Switzerland. The money was covered in traces of all kinds of drugs, so the court did not believe any of his stories about where he got the money from (also, cash in excess of 10.000€ must be declared when crossing the border, as a measure against tax evasion). The court found him guilty of drug dealing, attempted money laundering and similar crimes and charged him with a fine of 1000Fr, plus court fees. But what happens with the seized money? I can think of several options: It is returned to Daniel, deduced by the fine. (Unlikely, because in this case, the crime would have been worth it, as the fine is significantly lower than the cash earned) The money is destroyed by the court (Destroying money is illegal in itself, though) The money becomes property of the state (Sounds a bit weird, as this would make the state benefit from a crime) | The money is forfeited to the state This would normally be the case even if Daniel is acquitted. The proceeds of crime may be seized using forfeiture rules which require Daniel to prove that the suspect money is legitimate. | Laundering physical money Let's say a career criminal committed a couple crimes and is now in possession of a large heap of money in form of coins and paper currency. They want to use that money to buy themselves a nice house. But showing up with a huge bag of money at a bank or real estate agency would look very suspicious. It is very likely that they will get reported and then investigated by law enforcement. What do they do? They need some explanation where that money comes from. A good way to turn that dirty money into apparently clean money is by running a legitimate cash-based business. The criminal then goes to the bank each week and deposits a chunk of their ill-gotten cash claiming it's income from their business. Common choices are restaurants, casinos or the name-giver laundromats which were famously used by crime boss Al Capone to launder his illegal income. But they can use any business for this purpose which takes payment in cash and doesn't leave easy to analyze evidence how much business they really performed. Now the criminal has all that ill-gotten money on a regular bank account and can use it to buy what they want without raising any further suspicion. Laundering electronic money Another category of money laundering which got very relevant in the age of online banking is to launder illegally obtained money which can be found on bank accounts. For example by hacking online banking accounts or running scams. If the criminal would just send that money to their personal account, then the investigators would just need to subpoena their bank and their real identity would be revealed. So they need some way to move that money which is hard to trace. Common methods are: Transfering money to accounts in foreign countries in order to tie up investigators with the bureaucracy of international investigations. Transferring money in ways which are hard to trace, like cryptocurrency, gift cards, private money transfer services or private people they recruited to forward money through their personal accounts. Buying, transfering and selling virtual assets in online games. Buying physical items from online stores using false identities and selling them again under their real identity. Fortunately none of these methods of money laundering are completely untraceable. They make the work of law enforcement more difficult, but not completely impossible. The criminals usually hope to frustrate law enforcement to the point that they give up and prioritize "larger fish". | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! | Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics | Under German law, if you are sentenced to a fine because you committed a crime, that fine is measured in Tagessätze (day fine). One day worth of fines is the 30th part of your monthly income, adjusted according to the criminal's personal and economic situation. Basis for that is Criminal Code sec 40 (§ 40 StGB). There is, however, no corresponding principle for prison sentences. The reasoning behind that is, that a wealthy person would hardly be able to "improve" their time in prison compared to a less wealthy one. In fact, they would "lose more money" in the meantime. | I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know. | It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this. | The note you have quoted does not accurately summarise the decision, which is available on BAILII. What happened was: IOC agreed to sell 5,000 tons of salt to Mumtazzudin. Atlas paid IOC for the salt on behalf of Mumtazzudin. Because Atlas paid, Atlas received the bills of lading. Thus, the salt was pledged to Atlas to secure the money owed by Mumtazzudin. Atlas endorsed the bills of lading over to Chabbra for value. In other words, Atlas sold Chabbra the right to be repaid by Mumtazzudin, and to take delivery of the salt as security for the debt. Mumtazzudin persuaded the shipowner to hand over the salt without presenting the bill of lading. Chabbra sued the shipowner for conversion (destroying the value of its security). What does “refused to redeem the pledge when the bills of lading were tendered to them by Chabbra” mean? Chabbra, as the pledgee of the bills of lading, was entitled to possession of the salt, until Mumtazzudin “redeemed the pledge” by paying Chabbra the amount originally advanced by Atlas. But Mumtazzudin managed to get the salt without the bills of lading, so it refused to pay Chabbra. Why would a savvy seller even transact with buyers who couldn’t pay for the transaction upfront? The alternative may be that the sale is not made at all. However, that is not what happened in this case – the seller got paid. |
How do lower level (county or magistrates) courts in the City of London differ in their jurisdictions from those in the surrounding boroughs? Because the City of London has certain aspects of municipal autonomy, are there restrictions on their equivalence with the rest of the county or magistrate court system? In general any county court can hear or even transfer cases between one another. Does this differ at all for City of London located courts? Similarly if the nearest magistrate’s court to the location of a crime is in the City of London, but the crime scene itself is just without, does this have any implications on the magistrate’s court in which the crime can be prosecuted? | There is currently no difference, but there have been substantial differences in the past. Since the Courts Act 1971 (specifically s.42), the City of London has had its own county court that is on the same basis as other county courts. It is called "The Mayor's and City of London Court" for historical reasons, as that was the name of the court that was the previous closest equivalent. The 1971 Act establishes that the new version of the court has the same jurisdiction as any other county court, thus taking away any special privileges which the old version had. It was already almost like a county court by virtue of the City of London (Courts) Act 1964. Moreover, since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, there are no longer separate county courts, but one enormous one that sits in several places. That includes the City of London location. In criminal matters, the Crown Court (established under the same 1971 Act) is logically also one enormous court. When it sits in the City of London, it is known as the "Central Criminal Court" (Senior Courts Act 1981, s.8(3)), but is still the same court. It does not have any special status with respect to the City, being meant to handle cases from all of Greater London as well. Formerly, it had to operate a complex system of separate juries for City cases, but nowadays that is all uniform. For magistrates' courts, the Courts Act 2003 created a single jurisdiction for all of England and Wales. That is divided into "local justice areas", one of which is the City of London - these replace the old "petty sessional divisions". There are no special rules for the City. Applying the general rules for a particular criminal case would result in it being dealt with in the place where the offence is alleged to have happened, or where the accused lives, or where the witnesses mostly live, or "where other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with" (s.30(5)(d)). Perhaps soon, powers under the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 will be exercised to abolish local justice areas (s.45), enabling even more flexibility with the assignment of cases to courts. In particular, this is meant to make it easer to shift cases around depending on local workload, or on which court location is genuinely most convenient in all the circumstances. The Act also removes (ss. 46 and 47) the current special rules about the City of London court premises being provided by the City authorities, rather than by the Ministry of Justice which handles all the other ones. Formerly, there have been plenty of law courts for the City, or its livery companies, or St Paul's Cathedral (the consistory court had criminal jurisdiction over clergy), or the "compters" (debtors' prisons). Some of these still exist in a ceremonial capacity but do not function as courts. For example, the aldermen of the City can meet as the "Court of Husting", which was formerly a functioning law court but nowadays has the sole purpose of enrolling certain deeds, and hasn't done that since 1978. There are still two Sherriffs, nominally associated with the Poultry Compter and Wood Street Compter, but their courts have not existed since 1867. Some of the City's officers have residual ceremonial connections with the Old Bailey or other institutions, but these have no practical impact on the work of the courts. | The Professional And Lay Judges In The Scene Murder trials in Japan take place in a regional court called the "high court" which is one level below the Japanese Supreme Court. Trials of very serious crimes in Japan (crimes punishable by death, life imprisonment, or very long sentences in prison, not just ordinary felonies) are tried by a mixed panel of three professional high court court judges and six lay people who are sometimes described as jurors but are probably better described as "lay judges". The law providing for this kind of trial was passed in the year 2004 and first implemented in the year 2009. Many European countries in the civil law tradition have a similar process. While proceedings would mostly be in the court room, a court view when all of the professional and lay judges go to the scene of the crime or some other key venue where important facts happened would be far more common in Japan than in the U.S. After hearing the evidence presented at the trial, which is managed by the presiding judge of the three professional judges, all three judges and the six lay judges deliberate together as a single panel regarding the guilt or innocence verdict which would be rendered in the case. This is in contrast to juries in common law countries where the jury is independent of the judge, makes the ultimate verdict decision without deliberating with the judge, and interacts with the judge only via jury instructions and reception of their verdict. Judges In Other Kinds Of Cases If this had been a serious civil case or a felony case not serious enough to give rise to a lay judge trial or an appeal of a lower court ruling, instead of a very serious criminal case, it would have been heard only by the three professional judges without the six lay judges. More serious cases are heard by more senior professional judges from the high court, and less serious cases are heard by more junior professional judges from a district court which is below the high court but above the summary courts (and marginally superior to the almost equal in status family courts which are staffed by more junior professional judges as well). If it had been a serious misdemeanor or intermediate stakes civil case, it would have been heard by a single professional district court judge acting alone. Trials of very minor criminal cases and civil lawsuits are heard by a single judge acting alone without any lay judges, who is not admitted as members of the judicial profession and might not even be legally trained, who is really closer to what we would call "justices of the peace" in the United States. This position is often translated as "summary court judge." The Judicial Occupation And The Selection Of Lay Judges In Japan Japanese judges belong to a separate occupation than lawyers and prosecutors that staffs the judicial system of Japan. Basically, they start in family court or in the intermediate level court of general jurisdiction court called district court, right out of college, hearing smaller cases alone, and more serious cases in panels with justices of the peace or family court judges in a three judge panel. These panels also hear appeals from civil judgments of summary court judges. Then, they work their way up the judicial hierarchy based upon seniority and merit. Mid-career judges are in courts called "high courts" that handle most serious matters in the first instance as trial courts, appeals from cases heard by junior judges from the level of courts below them, and appeals in criminal cases from the rulings of summary court judges. The most senior and meritorious and respected judges, of course, are the fifteen judges on the Japanese Supreme Court. For the most part, appointments and promotions are similar to those of other civil servants, rather than being political. Lay judges are selected in a manner somewhat similar to the way common law country jurors are selected, although, as far as I know, the prosecution and defense have less of a say over who serves as a lay judge on a panel and most people called to serve as lay judges will actually end up doing so (in contrast to the very high rates of disqualification and preemptory challenges in common law juries for a serious case like a murder trial). The Professional Status Of The Lawyers In This Scene Incidentally, the legal profession of the prosecutors and the legal professional of the defense attorneys would be different as well. Like judges, prosecutors are civil servants with their own separate professional qualification (although judges, lawyers, and prosecutors have essentially the same academic curriculum in college). Private sector lawyers like the defense counsel in the picture belong to the main licensed occupation for lawyers which is in some respects more similar to that of barristers in the U.K. than to U.S. lawyers, both because there are so few of them and because of their typically more trial oriented practices. Other Kinds Of Legally Trained People In Japan Japan, like many civil law countries, has legally trained notaries who handle a lot of transactional work including drafting the legal instruments involved as a third-party neutral who also has tasks that overlap with government officials who keep official records. Finally, like many civil law countries, and to a lesser extent like solicitors in the U.K. before that profession was formally regulated there, many people major in law as undergraduates in college but never take the professional examinations to become a lawyer, a prosecutor, or a judge. Instead, these people typically end up working in managerial jobs in a business with a status akin to an investment banker or finance professional or realtor in the U.S., but with no formal occupational credential other than their college diploma. The Clerk And The Nature Of The Trial Court Record In front of them is what seems to be the clerk, recording everything. The clerk is probably taking detailed notes as an aid to the judges and lay judges in their deliberations, but unlike a common law criminal trial, verbatim transcripts and records of the proceeding are not maintained (or at least, have no special evidentiary status). The clerk is not a direct analog to a U.S. style court reporter who takes dictation of everything that is said word for word. If there is a dispute regarding the facts found at trial on appeal, at the first tier direct appeal of a conviction, a five judge Japanese appellate court panel of the fifteen judge Japanese Supreme Court would hear new evidence on the matters about which there were allegedly mistaken findings of fact by the trial court of first instance with new witness testimony and the same or new exhibits, rather than simply reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court as final and complete. Sometimes an appeal initially referred to a five judge panel of the Japanese Supreme Court would be reheard by the "Grand Panel" of all fifteen Japanese Supreme Court judges, in which case, the findings of fact of the appellate panel judges are conclusive and binding on the grand panel Japanese Supreme Court which is limited to resolving legal issues. | How deterministic is the legal system? It depends. And less than we might wish. It depends on the case. How complex is the fact pattern? How strong is the evidence? How clear is the law? How compelling are the legal precedents? Questions of that nature. The only generalization I might make would be that "lower level" cases seem more deterministic than "higher level" cases. By higher level, I mean those heard by a supreme court making constitutional decisions. Here is a web site that has created a prediction market out of supreme court cases. Many have written on this topic. Read this answer. It is an excellent treatise on the subjectivity of the legal system. Written by a real attorney. Read this answer too. My advice: If you seek a deterministic system, don't look to the legal one. | You should contact your local London borough if you wish to lodge a complaint (and you never know, you might get a different result this time). Depending on the nature of work being carried out, and the level of noise, this may fall within either s.60 of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 or possibly under Part 3 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 if it is deemed a Statutory Nuisance Taking the Royal Borough of Greenwich as an example, they say here: General construction work should be restricted to the following hours: Monday to Friday 8am to 6pm Saturdays 8am to 1pm Noisy work is prohibited on Sundays and bank holidays Therefore it seems the 8am start is allowed. As for the noise levels, independent readings will be required to see if your figure of 80db is accurate but if it is, and continuing with Greenwich as an example, it may be over the permitted levels stated at 6.3 of Greenwich's Code of Practice - assuming that the builders fall within the definition of conducting "major construction and civil engineering works". I have not checked many other boroughs, but the above is consistent with those that I have. | Why do you expect different courts to determine different laws in the same way? The Czech and UK laws that implement the GDPR are necessary different because they are the products of different legislative and legal traditions and are written in different languages. The differences may be minor but they will exist. Particular cases will have different factual and legal nuances and be interpreted by different courts with very different judicial traditions. Czech courts set no precedents in UK courts and vice-versa. It’s no surprise that there will be different outcomes. Even jurisdictions with much closer legal traditions like US Federal Circuit Courts and Australian states often have divergent precedents on similar (or the same) legislation. | Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-). | The answer depends on the jurisdiction, the court, and how the public defender system is set up. This answer addresses state court indigent defense at the trial level. In many jurisdictions, state courts are organized by counties. In many of these counties, particularly larger and urban counties, public defenders are a department of county government (like the district attorneys who prosecute, or public works, or the tax assessor). These defenders are county employees, and paid a wage. They are not compensated "by the case." In other jurisdictions, there may be no county-level public defenders. Courts there will appoint private attorneys to defend indigent defendants, and will compensate the defenders pursuant to a fee schedule promulgated by the court, or the judge's whim. The fee schedule may be time-based or flat fee, and usually provides differentials for type of case, amount of time required, investigative and witness fees, and often allows the lawyer to seek additional compensation if the lawyer thinks it's warranted. The court may decline the lawyer's motion, of course, at the risk that the lawyer won't take future appointments, a serious difficulty for the court which must, under the law, provide counsel for indigent defendants who face incarceration. More than this, it's tough to generalize. The setup in Los Angeles County, California, for instance, will be different than the experience in Alliance, NE, or a small county in another state. The same challenges face the federal courts. I'm only familiar with the California federal courts at the trial level, where a parallel system applies, with defenders on salary and employed by the federal government. While some states provide representation on appeal using defenders employed by the state government, other states rely on individual lawyers being appointed, rather like the trial-level system. Source: I'm a prior county public defender and private attorney in California. | The U.S. has no such website, at least at either the federal or the state level. It is possible that some local courts allow their records to be searched on that basis although I am not aware of any that do so. Probably the closest database to that in the U.S. accessible to the public is the non-governmental non-profit organization operated Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse for federal criminal justice records (and other federal government records). It has lots of data on federal government matters from a variety of sources but isn't quite as comprehensive or as easy to use as the website described in the question. The problem with that is that the federal courts handle only a small percentage of the criminal cases in the United States, and it is a highly skewed mix of cases (e.g. with lots of immigration cases but few ordinary "blue collar crime" cases outside Indian Reservations and federal parks). The information necessary to build such a website is largely a matter of public record, but no one has taken on the task of making such a website. In part, this is because the task is so daunting. While the federal courts have a comprehensive electronic database called PACER, each state has at least one separate court case data base system, and many states have trial court case databases only at the county level and not at the state level, or have different databases for different kinds of courts. Even in states that do have statewide databases, there are often some courts that aren't included. For example, Colorado's state courts are part of a single statewide database, but its municipal courts each have their own separate court by court databases. Some rural areas in the U.S. still keep trial court records in paper form only. The data has been gathered from time to time of important subsets of this kind of data, but it isn't publicly available. For example, a media consortia in Florida gathered information to examine the consistency of sentencing and the extent of racial discrimination in sentencing in Florida, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the United States gathers such information selectively to make sentencing decisions. Neither of those compilations, however, including making the raw data available to the public. Similarly, there is a separate private academic database that tracks case level state general jurisdiction trial court data in 75 of the largest urban counties in the United States (including state law felony cases). But, that database is only available to members of the academic consortium that maintains it (basically, professors at affiliated universities and other professors granted privileges to use it from consortium member professors). The Westlaw division of its parent company, and Lexis-Nexus collect some trial court level data on U.S. courts, state and federal, on a non-comprehensive, basically opportunistic basis, but don't have complete data from any jurisdiction (although Westlaw's federal data basis has a pretty significant share of reasoned federal trial court orders). Both of these services require paid subscriptions. In contrast, comprehensive databases of precedent making appellate court decisions at the state and federal level are widely available on both a commercial basis (with better search tools, headnote analysis, and correlations of the data like records of cases citing other cases and statutes), and on a non-commercial basis (with just the bare bones text of the cases). This is because this information is necessary to almost every lawyer and judge to practice law on a day to day basis. |
Under what circumstance is it a crime if a car owner allows someone other than themself to drive their car? In a New Hampshire "driving law test" that I have, there is a question "Under what circumstance is it a crime if a car owner allows someone other than themself to drive their car?" What is the relevant statute if any? | TITLE XXI Section 263:1-a 263:1-a Allowing an Improper Person. – No person shall knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven by a person who is not properly licensed or otherwise entitled to drive. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a violation, and if the license or driving privilege of the person allowed to drive is under suspension or revocation, the owner or person in control of the vehicle, notwithstanding title LXII, shall be fined not less than $100. I would also hazard that allowing someone to use your vehicle knowing they intend to commit a crime would make you an accessory but I don’t think that’s the answer they’re looking for here. | The judgement actually gives reasons: The criminal law insists that every person driving a car must attain an objective standard measured by a skilled, experienced and careful driver. That is shown by McCrone v Riding ... the standard is an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the driver. And the judgement goes on to quote R v Evans [1962] 3 All ER 1088: if a man in fact adopts a manner of driving which the jury think was dangerous to other road users in all the circumstances, then on the issue of guilt it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, momentarily inattentive or even doing his incompetent best. [Such considerations are] highly relevant if it ever comes to sentence. Primarily, it is to protect other road users. It is only on the matter of guilt that skill and experience are irrelevant. When it comes to sentencing, it may be a factor. And, if I might add my own interpretation, part of the reason that the skill of the driver is irrelevant is that the other users of the road cannot know whether a driver is skilled and experienced - they must therefore be able to expect this, and the law reflects this expectation. As much as we complain about other road users, we only complain because we expect them to meet a certain standard - we most likely would not complain if we truly expected them to be incompetent. | As far as I know in the United States, no DMV provides test vehicles. You need a vehicle to take the driving test. Since you are not currently licensed, you can not legally drive yourself to the test alone... So logically, you must bring someone... anyone... willing to drive you to the test and provide a vehicle for you to test in. As others have stated in the comments above, worse case scenario is the hiring of a driving instructor. If you read the written instructions (and I remember correctly), it does state something along the lines of "must be accompanied by a licensed driver and provide an insured, registered, vehicle". Which is a bit more formal than the "bring a friend". Most people just naturally use more casual terms when speaking. I don't know your age, but it's probably more common to hear "bring a parent" than "bring a friend" when speaking face to face with the DMV staff. Also, not all insurance policies are driver limited. Some policies are on the vehicle regardless of driver. Typically Liability-only insurance is vehicle specific, not driver specific. [*1] You'd have to review the policies or call the insurance agents to confirm this. You may even do something as simple as add you to the current insurance for a month or two while you're practicing and testing. Just reimburse your friend for any increase in premiums during this time. Contact the insurance company/agent. The cost may be minimal. In addition, there are non-owner insurance policies which cover you even if you do not own a vehicle. This would provide insurance if none of your friends has a policy which would work. Realize that most people taking the test for the first time have probably already been added to a policy owned by their parents. So, your situation is a bit more unique. It's not meant to be inherently confusing but if you're "outside the norm" you have to do some deductive reasoning on your own. And finally, if an accident or damage were to happen during your practicing or testing, it would still be your responsibility. If you are in control of the vehicle, you are responsible for any damage to it or damage caused by the vehicle due to any negligence on your part, regardless of any insurance policy. You'd be a pretty bad "friend" if you caused damage and didn't financially make restitution leaving your "friend" holding the bag, so to speak. Restitution could be something as simple as paying the deductible on your friend's policy. Of course, if you are not covered by insurance any claim may be denied -- leaving you responsible for everything. The mindset that just because your friend owns the car they are totally responsible for anything that happens while your driving seem very, very self-serving and, well, I'd be apprehensive about loaning you my vehicle as well. In fact, I absolutely would not. | New Hampshire law makes it illegal to resist arrest, "regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest." RSA 642:2. You can likely defend yourself against excessive force used in or after the arrest, but you may not resist the arrest itself. | They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both. | An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all? | Generally yes, but it depends on both context and jurisdiction. For example, if you arrived from a different street segment at 4-way stop at the same time as another car, and give a flash to indicate "go ahead," that by itself is not likely to be sustained as sufficient to justify a stop. If you come up close behind another car and flash your high beams as part of aggressive driving (e.g. message "get out of my way") then that may form a key contribution to a justification for pulling you over for aggressive driving. Many states also prohibit use of high beams when other cars are around because they have a tendency to blind other drivers (and blinded drivers are more likely to be in an accident), so if the officer observes you committing that offense it would be probable cause to pull you over for that. Here's an example from NY State where flashing high beams, alone, did not provide probable cause for an officer to pull over a vehicle. NY's law about high beams blinding other drivers specifies that the high-beams have to interfere with the other driver's operation of the vehicle for it to be an offense. See also citations near the end of this decision, which says: The Court of Appeals has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v. Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v. Hines, 155 AD2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76 NY2d 736 [1990]; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc 2d 19, 20 [1994]). Also, if you are flashing the police car, the officer may think you are trying to get his/her attention for some reason and that you are initiating a traffic stop. However, do be careful. This driver in Texas flashed his high beams at another car (which turned out to be a police car) because he thought the other car had its high beams on (the officer says it was just a new car; at least two other drivers had apparently flashed the officer for the same reason). The officer then applied the same law that driver was concerned about, forbidding the use of high beams that blind others. The driver was tased, shot, and killed as the officer applied the instant death penalty for his offenses, and the penalty was ruled justified. A dead driver cannot practically contest that stop later on, even though the family might try. See also Headlight Flashing: Legality on Wikipedia. | In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving. |
In a civil trial, can a party “call” its opponent’s witnesses in making its case? I mean, as opposed to merely cross-examining them in the course of the opposing side’s presentation of their case. A closely related question asks of calling the defendant itself, though not its witnesses. | ontario Any party may call a witness that has relevant evidence (Rules 53.01 & 53.04). There is "no property in a witness" (see also Unifirst Canada Ltd. c. 9766065 Canada inc., 2021 QCCQ 7946 at para. 10). The adverse party may be called as a witness unless they've already testified or counsel has undertaken to have them appear as a witness in their case (Rule 53.07). | If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific). | I understand that by "civil law systems" the OP means to refer to civil (vs criminal) cases, not to the civil law (vs common law) systems. The standard for proof of "guilt" (which is not actually called "guilt") is indeed "much lower" in civil cases, but the reason for that is not that it has to be so, but that the standard of proof in criminal cases has to be much higher. In civil cases none of the parties face criminal conviction. One party will just lose some money or property, will have to perform some work, will lose some opportunities etc. So, initially, both parties play the same game and each of them is in to lose it down to a similar level of peril. What follows is that, at the baseline, neither of the two parties should be in more advantageous position to prove their rightness than the other. In other words, if any of them proves that they are more than 50% likely to be right than the other, they should win. Indeed, why would one party have to prove their rightness beyond reasonable doubt? If it was so, it would mean that the other party would effectively have to prove their rightness to only a small degree, which would be utterly unjust. lot of guarentees like right avainst self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. what is the reason behind this ? False. If saying something from a witness stand would risk you being prosecuted, you can refuse to say it regardless of whether you are giving evidence in a civil or a criminal case. | Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful. | There is no "different legal procedure" for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling. | Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956. | I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation). | Almost none of this is written down anywhere in official court rules but there are some widely adopted standards for this practice. Most courts require that only one lawyer be in charge of speaking at any given stage of the trial. But, it wouldn't be unusual, for example, for one lawyer to question most of the witnesses and for a different lawyer who is more familiar with the specialized subject matter in question (e.g. electrical specifications), usually a junior lawyer, to question the expert witnesses in a case. Also, if the usually designated lawyer is absent for some reason (stuck in traffic, sick, etc.), the "second chair" lawyer can (and is often required to) take over the case for the client until the "first chair" lawyer is available again. Mostly, second chair lawyers (I've spent plenty of time over the years in this role) do the following (a non-exclusive list): take notes, pay attention to how the judge and jury are reacting to testimony, provide input into jury selection decisions, reminds the primary lawyer of points that still need to be covered in the examination of a witness, reminds the primary lawyer of exhibits that still need to be formally offered into evidence, scrambles to find rebuttal or impeachment evidence for unanticipated testimony, prompts the primary lawyer to make objections if the primary lawyer was paying attention to something else, identifies and has at the ready exhibits needs to present (or to follow the other side's examination), looks up points of law that are relevant or will need to be referenced that come up during trial, handles logistics for witnesses who are not on the stand (keeping them in the hallway if the witness is sequestered, trying to obtain the appearance of no show witnesses or reshuffling their order, saying thank you to witnesses who are no longer on the stand, etc.), carries some of the litigation team's stuff into and out of the court room, provides informed commentary and suggestions during breaks and working lunches, etc. Also, in addition to the usual "first chair" and "second chair" roles, often supplemented by a paralegal or legal assistant, there is a different kind of arrangement in which different lawyers for the same person can fully participate. This far less common arrangement happens when the person showing up in court is wearing "more than one hat" and has a different lawyer in different capacities. For example, suppose that someone is the President of a corporation and both the corporation and the President individually are both sued. There might be one primary lawyer for the corporation and one for the President personally, and both lawyers might participate fully. |
Why is the Declaration of Independence not held as legally binding, under Art VI, cl I, of the U.S. Constitution? The Declaration of Independence was used as an instrument to approach foreign countries and interact on the world stage, prior to winning the Revolutionary War. Therefore, it was the ground on which the Confederation established loans, which were used to fund the war. As such, should it not be as valid, as the debts, for which it was used establish? | The declaration contains only one passage that purports to have legal effect: We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name, and by authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and Independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connexion between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as Free and Independent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent States may of right do. There are no credible challenges to any of this, so the question of whether it formally has legal force is not particularly consequential. The passage at the beginning concerning rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, among other concepts, is prefatory material serving to justify the colonies' claimed right to independence. In other words, it establishes the colonies' authority to make the declaration quoted above. It has no legal force in part because it does not purport to have legal force. | Does this theory have any basis in current or historical fact? Not really. The sovereign citizen movement uses legal terms, but not correctly, and often confounded with Biblical doctrine, and hones in on stylistic matters that are not legally material now and weren't legally material at any time historically, like capitalization rules (which, actually, were historically wildly inconsistent, see, e.g., an image of the original U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence). There was an era from roughly the mid-1800s to the early 1900s when the law was very hung up on the precise wording of deeds (e.g., a deed to "John" rather than to "John and his heirs, successors and assigns" created a life estate rather than transferring full ownership of land), or stating precisely the right things in a legal complaint to have a right to legal relief (when what was required to be stated was discernible only from legal authorities like decades of case law reports or legal treatises). But, while that was an era when technicalities and legal fictions that would seem to a layman to be similar to those of the sovereign citizen movement were important legally, none of the actual technicalities and legal fictions that were historically important in the law are actually utilized by the sovereign citizen movement. Instead, it makes up technicalities and legal fictions that never existed historically, in the service of a defiant, anti-government agenda in which it is easy to impose liability on others but hard to impose liability on adherents of the movement, while the historical technicalities and legal fictions served the opposite role - with a pro-government agenda in which it was hard for non-professionals utilizing red tape filled bureaucracies to impose liability on others but was easiest to do with regard to people who defied authority, like sovereign citizens. Likewise, there has never been any means by which individuals can evade liability for taxes, for criminal conduct, or for civil liability committed by them personally, then or now. The question restates the common misconception that: For example, a plumber may operate in the capacity of an LLC to avoid personal civil (though probably not criminal) liability for any mishaps that may happen while on the job. But, in fact, even with all of the modern limited liability entity formalities complied with, this isn't actually true. One can never have limited liability for work that one personally carries out. Limited liability only protects you from contractual liabilities and from vicarious liability for the acts of your agents and employees. And, doing so still does not insulate you from criminal liability for acts of your agents and employees for the most part due to RICO and solicitation and conspiracy offenses. One can never evade liability in the manner that the sovereign citizen movement suggests, even if one complies with actual legally recognized formalities. | Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws. | No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates. | The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it. | There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state. | According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case). | There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account". |
ASKED: Why do many "No Trespassing" signs say "POSTED"? Many "no trespassing" signs say "POSTED" in large letters at the top. Why? Obviously, the sign is posted; that's the whole purpose of a sign. To me, it makes as much sense as putting "ASKED" at the start of a Stack Exchange question or "TEXTED" at the start of a text. Does it serve any legal purpose? Or is it just designed to scare potential trespassers with legal-looking text? | "Posted" is a Term of Art "Posted" is a term of art in trespass law, specifically meaning that signs forbidding entry have been placed at the borders of a parcel. The page "Properly posted definition" from Law Insider reads: Properly posted means that signs prohibiting trespass—or bright yellow, bright orange or fluorescent paint—are clearly displayed at all corners, on fishing streams crossing property lines, and on roads, gates and rights-of-way entering the land. Or, they are displayed in a manner that is visible to a person in the area. The entry "Posting" in the "Legal" section of The Free Dictionary reads: Posting In connection with Trespass statutes, the act of placing or affixing signs on private property in a manner to give notice of the trespass. The page "The Importance of Posting Property Signs" reads in relevant part: Why should you use posted signs on property? Posting property is a great way to let someone know they have entered private land and they might not be welcome. Using posted signs not only indicates trespassing but also can specify restricted activities. Signs are good for both rural and urban settings as a way to protect owners and their property. ... Most states have specific rules for property signs that must be followed. Some rules may include: Words used: POSTED or NOTICE Sign size: 11" x 11" or 144 square inches Lettering size: minimum of 2" Sign color: purple, bright orange, yellow Sign distance: every 100 feet Some states allow the use of spray paint to mark trees and fences in lieu of a sign. Purple paint is frequently used because it stands out against common natural colors. However, if a trespasser is unaware of this marking method, it would be more effective to use a sign. Check local and state laws to confirm what is needed to properly post legally in your area. Several US states use the term "Posted" in their laws on trespass, and provide that the presence of the word "posted" on a sign has special significance. Maryland maryland Maryland Criminal Law Code § 6-402 (2017) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not enter or trespass on property that is posted conspicuously against trespass by: (a) (1) signs placed where they reasonably may be seen; or (a) (2) paint marks that: (a) (2) (i) conform with regulations that the Department of Natural Resources adopts under § 5-209 of the Natural Resources Article; and (a) (2) (ii) are made on trees or posts that are located: (a) (2) (ii) 1. at each road entrance to the property; and (a) (2) (ii) 2. adjacent to public roadways, public waterways, and other land adjoining the property. The law firm page "Trespassing Laws in Maryland" reads in relevant part: Posted Property Trespass A person is not allowed to enter onto property that is posted conspicuously against trespassing. That posting can come in the form of signs that are placed where they can be reasonably seen or by paint marks on trees or posts at the entrances and land adjacent to the property. New York new-york-state The page "Posting Your Land" from the NY Dept of Environmental Conservation reads in relevant part: Trespassing Trespassing is illegal even on unposted property. Instead of posting, a landowner or other authorized person may issue written notice to another individual informing them that they are prohibited from entering the property. The notice must contain a description of the property, what restrictions apply (hunting, fishing, trapping) and the person or persons prohibited from entry. It should be delivered by certified mail or other processes (ex: legal notice in newspaper) to prove that the person was served. At any time, anyone by the landowner, occupant, or other authorized person to leave the premises (posted or not), must do so immediately. Trespassing on areas posted against trespass pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law is punishable by a fine up to $250 and/or up to 15 days in jail. It is a defense to this type of trespass that there are not signs posted instructing people to stay off the property. It may also be a defense that any signs posted in the area are not in the proper place to be easily seen by visitors to the property. Signage Details Hardware and farm supply stores frequently carry signs for posting. Customized signs may also be obtained from local printers. DEC doesn't provide signs to private landowners unless the landowner is a cooperator under the Fish and Wildlife Management Act. In this case, they will be provided with "Safety Zone" signs. Cooperators provide free public access to most of their property in a large cooperative hunting/fishing area. Signs must be a minimum of 11 inches by 11 inches. They also must bear the name and address of the owner, lawful occupant or other person or organization authorized to post the area. The sign must bear a conspicuous statement which shall either consist of the word "POSTED" or warn against entry for specified purposes or all purposes without the consent of the person whose name appears on the sign. These words must cover a minimum space of 80 square inches (about 9 by 9 inches) of the sign. Image from the NYS DEC page linked above (There is a very similar image included in the Wikipedia article "Trespass".) California california In California "Posted property" is the legal term for property where suitable signs have been placed along the boundary or near it, to informa people tht trespassing is forbidden. But it appears that in CA the word "Posted" need not appear on such signs, the words "No Trespassing" being sufficient. California also makes it a misdemeanor (Under section 602) to enter into or remain on property of another, without any legal right to be there, if one is instructed not to enter, or to leave, but such proeprty is not considered "posted". California Penal Code section 553 provides that: he following definitions apply to this article only: (a) “Sign” means a sign not less than one (1) square foot in area and upon which in letters not less than two inches in height appear the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” (b) “Posted property” means any property specified in Section 554 which is posted in a manner provided in Section 554.1 . (c) “Posted boundary” means a line running from sign to sign and such line need not conform to the legal boundary or legal description of any lot, parcel, or acreage of land, but only the area within the posted boundary shall constitute posted property, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (e) of Section 554.1 . California Penal Code section 554 provides in relevant part that: Any property, except that portion of such property to which the general public is accorded access, may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the manner provided in Section 554.1 , and thereby become posted property subject to the provisions of this article applicable to posted property, if such property consists of, or is used, or is designed to be used, for any one or more of the following: ... California Penal Code section 554.1 provides that: Any property described in Section 554 may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the following manner: (a) If it is not enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of the area and at each entrance. (b) If it is not enclosed within a fence, and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or contains any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs along or near the exterior boundaries of the area at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner, and, if such property has a definite entrance or entrances, at each such entrance. (c) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre, and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of such fence and at each entrance. (d) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or has any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs on, or along the line of, such fence at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner and at each entrance. (e) If it consists of poles or towers or appurtenant structures for the suspension of wires or other conductors for conveying electricity or telegraphic or telephonic messages or of towers or derricks for the production of oil or gas, by affixing a sign upon one or more sides of such poles, towers, or derricks, but such posting shall render only the pole, tower, derrick, or appurtenant structure posted property. California Penal Code section 555 provides that: It is unlawful to enter or remain upon any posted property without the written permission of the owner, tenant, or occupant in legal possession or control thereof. Every person who enters or remains upon posted property without such written permission is guilty of a separate offense for each day during any portion of which he enters or remains upon such posted property. | Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law. | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't. | Your question goes to a person's state of mind, which gets tricky; the intention of the law is that to be guilty of trespassing a reasonable person would need to know they had entered into or were remaining in a place they are not supposed to be. Specific requirements for what that means is going to vary by jurisdiction (closed-off area, posted signs, verbal notice, etc). Trespass is knowingly entering another owners’ property or land without permission, which encroaches on the owners’ privacy or property interests (Cornell Law). In your example, John would not be trespassing unless and until Joe asked him to leave and John refused to do so. | An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction. | As the answer by Greendrake says, if you have a a legal reason, to enter property, you re not a trespasser. Trespassing is generally defined as entering on property against the expressed will of the owner or lawful occupant, without lawful authority. A firefighter is not trespassing when responding to a fire, even if the owner orders the firefighter to leave. A building inspector is not tresspassing while making an inspection (if local law grants an inspector access). Neither is a police officer with a warrant for entry, or a person with a court order to recover property. In some cases such lawful authority must be communicated to the owner, in others it need not be, this depends on the nature of the authority and the exact provisions of the governing law. Whether such a person entering with authority may be armed depends very much on the local law, and the nature of the authority. In some cases and some places such a person is free to be armed, in others this would be illegal. If one is lawfully present somewhere and is attacked, one is entitled to defend oneself (or another), although there may be a duty to avoid a confrontation by retreating if this is reasonably possible when not in one's own home in some jurisdictions (such as California). But the use of deadly force (such as a gun) is generally not lawful unless there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. None of this is legally different when one is lawfully on another's property than when one is in a public place. California Law California Penal Code section 693 provides that: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. It should be read together with sections 692 and 694. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction #505 reads: The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if: The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] ) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being (raped/maimed/robbed/ )]; The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; AND The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified According to "California Self-Defense Laws" (a page posted by a CA law firm: California law allows use of force in self-defense or defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or they are in imminent danger of physical harm, and that force is necessary to stop the danger. However, you may only use the degree of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The page "California Self Defense Laws" from Findlaw reads: The right to use force -- even deadly force if necessary -- to defend oneself is a broadly accepted principle of the criminal justice system. But while all states allow defendants to claim self defense if they can back up such claims, states differ on the scope of what may be considered appropriate use of force and when it may be applied. ... As a general rule of thumb, any force used against an intruder must be proportionate to the harm reasonably feared. In People v. King {Crim. No. 20380. Supreme Court of California. August 29, 1978.} The California Supreme Court held that self-defense was a possible defense to a charge of possession of a handgun by a felon, and wrote about the right of self-defense in CA law. The opinion reads: [I]t is apparent that the conviction cannot stand if the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the right of self-defense as it related to the section 12021 charge. ... When enacting section 12021 and its predecessor statute, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the several existing statutes giving any person the right to use force, including deadly force in appropriate circumstances, in defense of self or others. This right has been included in provisions of the Penal Code since its enactment in 1872. Section 692 provides: Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made: By the party about to be injured; By other parties." Section 693 provides: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. Section 694 extends the right to defend others, providing: Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense. Although the extent of these rights has been defined and circumscribed by judicial decision (see, e.g., People v. Ceballos, supra, 12 Cal.3d 470) none of these sections has been amended to restrict the rights affirmed therein since its adoption over a century ago. Civil Code section 50, affirms the same rights, providing: Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest. It, too, was adopted in 1872, and it was amended in 1874 to expand the right of defense first declared to encompass guests. Similarly the provisions of sections 197 and 198 governing the circumstances in which homicide is justifiable were included in the Penal Code of 1872, and are traceable to the Statutes of 1850. ... Use of a concealable firearm in self-defense is neither a crime nor an unlawful purpose. ... We conclude, therefore, that the prohibition of section 12021 was not intended to affect a felon's right to use a concealable firearm in self-defense, but was intended only to prohibit members of the affected classes from arming themselves with concealable firearms or having such weapons in their custody or control in circumstances other than those in which the right to use deadly force in self-defense exists or reasonably appears to exist. Thus, when a member of one of the affected classes is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate section 12021. As in all cases in which deadly force is used or threatened in self-defense, however, the use of the firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances and may be resorted to only if no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available. In the case of a felon defending himself alone, such alternatives may include retreat where other persons would not be required to do so. | What a statute means can be difficult to determine. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation that could be helpful: Textual: The plain meaning doesn't confine "use" to a few particular types of uses. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. Legislative history/legislative intent: The previous version of the subsection did limit prohibited uses to only composing, sending, or reading electronic messages. Given the amendment, it seems that the legislature no longer desired that limitation. When the bill was introduced, Rep. D'Amico stated the purpose of the bill was to "[expand] the prohibition on driving while using an electronic communication device to include uses beyond composing, sending, or reading an electronic message." During debate, when asked what a person should do that doesn't have Bluetooth, Rep. D'Amico suggested "You put it on speaker phone". When asked, "Where would you place the phone?", Rep D'Amico replied, "Wherever you feel like; just not next to your ear." During the same debate, D'Amico described the bill: "What House Bill 1247 does is ban handheld cell phones while driving a vehicle." In my opinion, the declaration of the bill's sponsor, and the debate surrounding the bill treated it as expanding the prohibition from including only texting and email to also include voice conversations. As far as I can tell, the full scope of "using" under this statute hasn't been tested in court, but I could see this going either way. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. However, a court might also be convinced by the legislative intent that only aims to add handheld voice communications to the previous list of prohibited activities (or it least it could be argued that this is the case). Further, under a purposive construction, a court could even look beyond the explicit legislative intent and find that the core purpose was to prevent distraction, in which case "using" could include any activity on your electronic device that distracts you as if you were texting, or making a phone call (eg. selecting the next song to play in your music app). |
*Buecking* holding finds that cooling-off days for decrees of transitory legal separation do not count for in rem decrees of divorce The Buecking holding unambiguously finds that cooling off days for transitory decrees of legal separation do not count for cooling off days in rem decrees of divorce. The Dissolution Act of 1973 regarding RCW §26.09.030 supports the conclusion that the 90 day waiting period applies to legal separations: [WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW Volume 49 Number 2 Symposium: Recent Washington Legislation 2-1-1974 The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract? Luvern v. Rieke University of Washington School of Law page 390] “It should be noted that legal separation cannot be decreed until the end of the 90 day cooling-off period required by the Act. Immediate needs may of course, be met by temporary orders pursuant to § 26.09.060. There is no more reason for a hasty entry of a coerced decree of legal separation than there is for a decree of dissolution." https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2028&context=wlr There was never any finding that the original legislative intent was unconstitutional. The decision in Buecking was for a case where there was both a petition for legal separation and petition for dissolution. Legal separation is in personam/transitory, Dissolution however is in rem; basically legal separation cooling-off days don’t add up for divorce decree cooling off days, and that’s why the day counts are separate. Buecking never says there is no wait period for a decree of legal separation, it’s just that wait days for DLS do not count for the tolling to a divorce decree. “Decrees of legal separation are in personam and may be thought of as transitory actions. When more than a persona order is sought – when status is to be changed – the action acquires an in rem quality and different jurisdictional requisites are involved.15 https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2028&context=wlr THE PROBLEM IS that this particular case (Buecking) is important because it [[[wrongfully]]] up-ended (in some WA counties, not all) SPECIFIC written legislative intent for a 90 day cooling-off period to be applied to legal separations as well as divorces (Washington 1973 Dissolution Act). A first-glance reading of the holding without reading the full the context of the two types of actions misrepresents the decision. RCW 26.09.030(a) refers to "the decree" when it is a dissolution, and (d) refers to "the decree" when it is a legal separation; the other parameters remain the same. Amy Buecking's "cooling off" post petition for legal separation did not sum into the entirely different "cooling off" post petition for her divorce. Further, after Amy properly filed for legal separation day 1 (12/12/08), she should have, if the court has SMJ, long before day 476 (4/2/10) have been granted a decree of legal separation (DLS). Why wasn't the petition signed? The appellate brief says that on day 476 (4/2/10) Amy filed "an amended petition for dissolution, replacing the petition for legal separation she filed more than a year earlier." [[[Amy would have long ago had a DECREE for legal separation by day 90 or April 2, 2010, then per RCW 26.09.150 because it had been far more than 6 months (180 days) since filing for said legal separation. By 6 months plus 90 days or 270 days since, on 9/8/09, Amy could have easily gotten an immediate conversion of the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution: "RCW 26.09.150(2)(a) No earlier than six months after entry of a decree of legal separation, on motion of either party, the court shall convert the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution..."]]] The case goes on to say that on day 558 a judge entered a decree of divorce "on the amended petition." [[[The judge should have been abe to enter a decree of divorce on the decree of legal separation per RCW 26.09.150(2)(a) immediately after motion to convert on 4/2/10.]]] Then on day 707 Tim's motion to vacate the DD because it was issued before the end of a 90 day wait period (day 82) was denied so Tim filed an appeal. [[[But per RCW 26.09.150 there would have been no wait at all on top of the 6 months had the petition for legal separation been signed.]]] Then in September of 2011 the Appellate Court ruled that there is NO applicability of the wait period for legal separation petitions to the wait period for divorce petitions. The appellate briefs do not ever call out the missing the decree of legal separation, in fact the term "decree of legal separation" is totally missing. The fact that the divorce decree was signed on day 82 did not impinge on the subject matter jurisdiction, so Tim lost on this point. It's obvious that a 90 day cooling-off period for legal separations alone, is irrelevant to this case. It makes no sense to remove it against the will of the legislature's Dissolution Act of 1973. If you have any thoughts I'd appreciate them, thank you. | The matter was unambiguously resolved for the whole state by the Washington Supreme Court in Buecking v. Buecking, 179 Wn. 2d 438. The trial court erroneously granted the divorce 82 days after the petition for dissolution was files, contrary to state law. Mr. Buecking did not object, and only later argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction before 90 days had passed. The Court of Appeals held that if the trial court erred by entering a decree of dissolution before 90 days had passed, it was a legal error that did not involve the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reaffirms the interpretation of the law – 90 days since the filing of the petition for dissolution, not 90 days since the filing of some petition (separation) that ultimately leads to dissolution. Buecking claims that the 90 day period is intended to limit the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court instead finds that "if a court can hear a particular class of case, then it has subject matter jurisdiction". So the lower court error was a legal error, and not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bruening lost because he failed to make the correct legal objection to the trial court, and the 90 day rule is valid state-wide. | @Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional. | B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do. | is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct & statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all. | That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant. | Once I figured out the term I was looking for was "cooling off period" a google search led to this SFGate article which seems to say, no, there is no cooling off period in California. breaking a lease, even before moving into a new home, can be a legal challenge. If you must cancel a lease before moving in, be prepared for a financial loss and possible legal difficulties. And this article There is no "cooling off" period for residential releases. In some states, a cooling off period is required for certain contracts, which give signers a window of time, typically one to three days, during which they can void the contract if they change their mind. Unless such a condition is explicitly stated in the lease or there is a rare jurisdictional law that requires a cooling period, your lease is binding the second you sign your name. So, the answer to my question is "No, there is no grace period" and that my current apartment, with the 3 day exception was just a kind offer on their part. I'd just guess because they're a large firm (they run ~80k apartments) they've learned it's better to let people go if they change their mind in 3 days than go through the trouble of forcing them to honor the lease. Interestingly, and related IMO, there is also no cooling off period for car purchases. I thought there was which is why I thought there might also be one for apartments since, at least in California, many apartments yearly rent is more than the entire cost of a car. (avg in SF is $40k a year) But, at least in California, if it's a used car and if the car costs less than $40k, the dealer is required to offer you the option to purchase a 2-day cancellation clause for around 1% of the car's price. | It appears you would need to contact the Calgary courts directly to discover more about the case(s) as any case files will likely be held with them. It's possible that the case was dropped, or that they were found "not guilty" which would explain the lack of further news on them. I searched the Canadian Legal Information Institute's website for you but wasn't able to find any criminal cases involving them — only some civil cases around bankruptcy and creditor claims. | You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with. |
If one is tried+convicted of a crime at a certain time, can one be tried+convicted of another crime that happened at the same time? [Yakuza Series] 100% inspired by Yakuza Lost Judgement. Bob is accused of assaulting Alice at X o'clock, with video evidence. It goes to trial, and Bob is successfully convicted. Later on, strong evidence comes up of Bob committing the murder of Mark at X o'clock. (e.g. security camera footage + DNA evidence). How can this be handled? Will Bob's original sentence (for assaulting Alice) have to be overturned before he can be tried for the murdering of Mark? Can someone in jail even be tried for something else while they're already in jail? P.S.: For the original context: Alice was in cahoots with Bob. Alice said Bob did the crime, and Bob admitted to it. Furthermore, Bob was trying to make a mockery of the justice system by showing how, even though he obviously committed the murder of Mark, he would just stay in for short sentence over the fake assault of Alice. | Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe. | Police continue to investigate Following an acquittal, there are two possible positions for the police: they are certain the acquitted person performed the act but they were not guilty (for all sorts of reasons). The investigation is closed because although the police know who did it, there was no criminality due to the not guilty verdict. The evidence in the court shows that the accused did not commit the act. Ergo, someone else did. The police will keep looking for that someone else. Note that the proposed scenario is highly dangerous for you. First, the exculpatory evidence may be inadmissible, particularly if it is an alibi (see Can I surprise the prosecution with an alibi defense at trial?). To rely on an an alibi defence, it must be raised with the prosecution before the trial. You would have to have said that you were where the phone footage was shot before the trial starts and the police may have therefore discounted you as a suspect from the get go. Second, you are now committing a crime, usually called an attempt to pervert the course of justice and this action may also make you an accomplice to the murder after the fact. You beat the rap on the murder and then spend a lot of time in prison for those two. | Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence. | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. | Yes The Prosecutor for the local jurisdiction could formally file charges. No complaint by Rock is legally required, and given the video evidence available, Rock's testimony might not be as essential as a victim's testimony often is. But if Rock were to testify that the fight was staged, and no real assault occurred, the case would probably fall apart. That would not be good for the prosecutor's reputation, and might well be a reason not to proceed without a clear statement from Rock. See also: "Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge? | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example). | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. |
Does "OK" imply "Yes", in the eyes of the law in general? Is "OK" legally binding as a "Yes"? In some situations, I have been asked questions, and I said "ok", but they just repeat their question one more time. So I think "OK" means "whatever, I don't care". What do you think? | Language is contextual. When the meaning of a communication is at issue in litigation, that meaning is gleaned from the totality of the evidence, not from any presumption of what a word means in isolation. "Okay" can mean "yes", it might mean only that you understand, it might communicate coerced acquiesence falling short of actual consent. See the discussion in R. c. Byers, 2018 QCCQ 4673: [81] Regarding the petitioner’s pretention claiming that she “clearly express her wish to consult an attorney”, the Court considers that the answer “OK” does not show a clear intention to consult a lawyer. [82] At the most “OK” could mean that she understood, that she heard them and also could [have] signified “Yes, I would like to consult an attorney”. [83] In the decision Ellis, the Court of appeal had to analyze the meaning of the words “OK” as part of evidence of purchasing a firearm, the Court considered that this had an equivocal meaning. [84] Moreover, the Court wrote: “[40] (…) Viewed in the context of the whole of the evidence, we consider it a reasonable inference that the two responses “Ok ok” signified nothing more than an acknowledgement of the prices quoted.” [85] For analysis purpose, the Court will consider that the answer “OK” means “yes”. See also R. v. Potvin, 2012 ONCA 113: The pertinent facts known to the appellant were straightforward. The complainant repeatedly said “no” to sex and then appeared to say “yes” by uttering the word “okay”. Viewed in the context of all that preceded it, we agree with the trial judge that the complainant’s use of the word “okay” was ambiguous. In the absence of further inquiry by the appellant, a single “okay” after five refusals over a sustained period of time was simply insufficient to ground a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent. | A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act. | The holding of the Miranda decision says: (d) In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: the person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him The body of the opinion also says The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. although also He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law When SCOTUS says do this, that is the law. Since SCOTUS say can, will, and can and will, the only safe course of action is to say can and will. This page has some interesting discussion about the problem of the meaning of modals in a legal context. The Miranda warning does not constitute a contractual promise between the arresting officer and the arrestee, so "will" cannot be construed as a binding promise to prosecute and use the evidence in court. "Will" can only be construed as a prediction, as do "may" and "might". If the warning said "can, and mightmay be used against you", that choice or wording would suggest that the probability of statements being used against you is low – that would be totally misleading. The strongest modal should be used, because the probability is high that some statement will indeed be used against the person. Simply saying "can" suggests that it's a mere possibility, as opposed to a probability. "Can and will" is thus the appropriate construction for conveying the probability that your confession will be used against you. "Shall" shall not be used (it is confusing since it doesn't mean what the legal profession sometimes thinks it means); "must" is just plain wrong (it's legally meaningless to say "anything you say must be used against you", when many things that a person says would be inadmissible). | A text message is just as legally binding as a letter, and the lion's share of the cases have held that a text message from a known sending phone number is equivalent to a signed letter. One would have to carefully parse the exchange of communications to see if they amounted to a binding offer and acceptance, but the fact that it was in a text message, rather than on a piece of paper is irrelevant. Indeed, generally speaking, such an offer and acceptance, if the words exchange show that, could be binding even if made orally, if it could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedurally, however, once a judgment has been entered, as is the case here, the process of proving that you have complied with a stipulation regarding what is to constitute payment in full may be challenging. I'll leave the question of civil procedure in Connecticut small claims court to someone more knowledgable about it than I am as that could vary a lot from state to state, or even from court to court based upon local practice within the state. | Don't consent. Say so (ideally in a well documented way, like on video). Challenge the fruits of any unlawful search after the fact in a suppression hearing, or in a civil rights lawsuit. There is a decent chance that a court will find that the warrantless search is lawful – even if it isn't – but there isn't much that you can do about it that would be wise or legal. Also, recognize that in many circumstances, warrantless searches are legal. | As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid. | Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions. | Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons – e.g. admissions made – if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention – although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court – hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter! |
What is "probable cause"? I know what probable cause is and how it is used in law/law enforcement. But what does the actual term "probable cause" mean? In a sentence where it is used like "The drug dog's alert gave me probable cause to search your vehicle" in this case the officer has "definite cause" why is probable used? In the wikipedia definition it says: "Probable" in this case may relate to statistical probability or to a general standard of common behavior and customs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probable_cause But that is also very vague, "statistical probability" or "general standard" of what? Statistical probability of, in the given example, having drugs? How does that relate to giving cause? It just seems like any way you try to interpret the word "probable" it doesn't make sense, you either have cause to search/arrest/etc. or you don't where is the probability? | ...in this case the officer has "definite cause." Why is probable used? "Probable cause" is a standard for when a property search can be conducted or a warrant issued. According to the Wikipedia article you linked to, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines probable cause as a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts are probably true We do not talk about "definite cause" because there is no such legal standard. Having "definite cause" as you suggest here simply means you have a very strong case to satisfy the legal standard of probable cause. Referring to the above definition, the officer whose drug-sniffing dog alerts at a traffic stop certainly has a "reasonable amount of suspicion." The officer may actually have an incredibly high amount of suspicion, but that's irrelevant to the probable cause standard. It is merely sufficient that the officer's level of suspicion is "reasonable" and backed by suitable evidentiary circumstances. It just seems like any way you try to interpret the word "probable" it doesn't make sense, you either have cause to search/arrest/etc. or you don't where is the probability? The probable cause standard is "probable" because it does not impose exacting requirements on law enforcement. (Note that the U.S. Constitution uses "probable" slightly differently from its modern meaning; see another answer.) It need not be blatantly obvious that a crime is being committed but likely that a crime is being committed. Of course, the exact standard of how likely is likely enough to satisfy the standard of probable cause (and what evidence constitutes a particular threshold of likelihood) is a test for the court to determine. | Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy. | If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal. | Nothing is typical Investigators have wide discretion on how (and if) they pursue an investigation of an alleged crime. When they make an arrest is part of that discretion. Making an arrest starts all sorts of clocks running on the legal process and investigators may not want to do that for all sorts of legitimate reasons. | Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant. | This is going to depend on what you think or know is on the phone, why you want to keep it undisclosed, and why the officer says s/he wants it. If one knows or has good reason to think that there is evidence of a crime on the phone, then destroying or hiding that evidence may be criminal. If one gets a court order, such as a warrant or subpoena, to turn over evidence, destroying the evidence or otherwise failing to comply may well be criminal contempt of court, or another criminal offense. In most circumstances an officer must have probable cause, and usually a warrant, to conduct a lawful search. But border searches are different. That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of incoming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs inspector of locked container shipped from abroad). The Congressional Research Service wrote: in the March 2021 report "Searches and Seizures at the Border and the Fourth Amendment" (pdf): The Supreme Court has recognized that searches at the border are “qualitatively different” from those occurring in the interior of the United States, because persons entering the country have less robust expectations of privacy, given the federal government’s broad power to safeguard the nation by examining persons seeking to enter its territory. While law enforcement searches and seizures within the interior of the United States typically require a judicial warrant supported by probable cause, federal officers may conduct routine inspections and searches of persons attempting to cross the international border without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of unlawful activity. But a border search that extends beyond a routine search and inspection may require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Recent years have seen legal challenges to border searches of electronic devices such as cell phones and computers, which often contain more personal and sensitive information than other items frequently searched at the border, such as a wallet or briefcase. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Lower courts have generally held that government officers may conduct relatively limited, manual searches of such devices without a warrant or any particularized suspicion. The courts, however, are split over whether more intrusive, forensic searches require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Federal statutes and implementing regulations confer designated law enforcement officers with broad authority to conduct searches and seizures at the border and surrounding areas without a warrant. These searches commonly occur at designated ports of entry along the border, such as border crossing points.[1] But searches may also occur in other places along or near the border.[2] To enforce U.S. customs laws, federal law enforcement officers may inspect and search individuals, merchandise, vehicles, and vessels arriving at the border, as well as further into the interior of the United States and within U.S. waters. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1496, a customs officer may examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein” and whether those items are subject to taxes or otherwise prohibited. Similarly, 19 U.S.C. §1467 allows customs officers to inspect and search the persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving by vessel from a foreign port (including U.S. territories). If there is nothing that could be evidence on a phone, erasing it should not be criminal destruction of evidence, but this will be hard to prove after the fact, and border officials have authority to insist on a search with no warrant or particular suspicion. Notes [1]: See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a “border search” as one that occurs at ports of entry where there is an actual or attempted border crossing);see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Border Security: At Ports of Entry (last modified Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry (describing U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s functions at ports of entry). [2]: See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (recognizing the government’s interest in patrolling inland or coastal waters “where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (noting that the Border Patrol conducts inland surveillance activities “all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens.”); See also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., "Border Security: Along U.S. Borders" (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (describing the Border Patrol’s responsibilities along the border | There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf | The officer is saying that he believes the information to be correct, but a clerical error or typo isn't a question of saying something that you don't believe to be correct, it is a question of incorrectly putting what the officer believes to paper, often in a context where the mistake is obvious, without an intent to mislead. You would not prevail in court. Courts have broad authority to correct clerical errors even years after the fact. In civil actions in federal court this is authorized by Rule 60. But, almost all courts have this authority with respect to court process which includes traffic tickets. Since it is clearly a typo, it would not cast doubt on the integrity or accuracy of other statements in the ticket. A typo reflects fat fingers, not dishonesty. |
What crime has someone committed if they "kill" someone who is already dead? Was watching a police drama (a classic "Taggart" episode) where this was a plotline. A wife shot her husband while he was "sleeping", and subsequently confessed to his murder. Yet (this being Taggart) it turned out that the husband had actually been dead at the time she shot him, having previously been stabbed by another party. If this situation were to occur in real life (exceptionally unlikely as this might be), what, if any, crime would the wife have committed? And what punishment would she face? Presumably, she presents as much danger to society as someone who had actually killed their husband would do (since she has proven that she is prepared to kill someone, even if she actually didn't), so if part of the purpose of sending criminals to prison is to remove dangerous people from society, logically there is no more or less of a reason to lock her up than there would be if the husband had been alive when she "killed" him. On the other hand, the other purpose of sending criminals to prison is to get justice for the victims of crime, and in this case, she has not actually committed the crime. Taggart is set in Scotland, where Scots Law applies, but answers from different legal jurisdictions would be welcome. | united-states In the U.S., this would be attempted murder. While Scotland and the U.S. have laws that differ in many respects, this is not an issue upon which I would anticipate that there would be difference between Scottish law and U.S. law. And what punishment would she face? According to Wikipedia: Attempted murder is a crime at common law in Scotland. Attempted murder is the same as the offence of murder in Scottish law with the only difference being that the victim has not died. The offence of murder was defined in Drury v HM Advocate: “[M]urder is constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, by which the perpetrator either wickedly intends to kill or displays wicked recklessness as to whether the victim lives or dies.” Intention can be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Wicked recklessness is determined objectively and is "recklessness so gross that it indicates a state of mind which falls to be treated as wicked and depraved as the state of mind of a deliberate killer." As with all common law offences in Scotland, the maximum punishment available is life imprisonment. Despite the maximum punishment available, I suspect that the Scottish courts would be more lenient than U.S. Courts in similar circumstances, on average. Sentencing judges have broad discretion and that would be informed by the circumstances and reasoning involved. Under U.S. law, in most states, crimes are typically graded into various classes of felonies and lesser crimes (Colorado, for example, has five grades of felonies, and three grades of lesser offenses, with a variety of special enhancements and reductions for particular crimes.) And, attempts are typically one grade lower than the crime attempted, although some U.S. states follow the Scottish rule and treat attempts and the crimes themselves as of the same grade. | Yes Now, murder needs a definition because they are all subtly different. Let’s use the one in the new-south-wales Crimes Act 1900: Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. The only real difficulty is in the phrase “causing the death charged”. So a sensible prosecutor would charge both defendants with both deaths. A jury would find them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one of the “death[s] charged”. The case is similar to Rogerson and McNamara who took a live Jamie Gao into a storeroom and came out with a body. Each accused the other of the murder - the jury didn’t believe either of them. | As you describe it, the survivor knows that the action will result in death, and premeditatedly undertakes the action. So we turn to the murder statute in that (unspecified) jurisdiction, which will be like this: A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: (a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person So the charge is first degree homicide. Because the murder statute might leave a person wondering if "it counts" when the conduct follows somebody's rules, the jury is given instructions clarifying what words mean: for first degree homicide in general see these pages. Most relevant here are the elements of "extreme indifference", also the definition and elements of premeditation. In general, if I say "It's okay if you kill him", that does not make it legal to kill a person, so organizationally sanctioning the move does not legalize it. | Laws that add special penalties to killing a police officer require that the accused knows that the victim is a police officer, for example DC 22-2106 (emphasis mine) (a) Whoever, with deliberate and premeditated malice, and with knowledge or reason to know that the victim is a law enforcement officer or public safety employee, kills any law enforcement officer... A prosecution would need to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the victim was an undercover police officer to convict them under this statute. In the case presented, it seems unlikely that the bartender could be convicted under such a statute, even without consideration of a possible self-defense argument. | Why should they? If a person is accused of a crime, say murder, why should more evidence be needed to convict them if they are a high ranking government official than if they are just an ordinary person? Why should their trial be conducted differently? If convicted, why should their punishment be different? Yes, you can run societies that way and people have and do but it isn’t very fair is it? Equality before the law does not imply any other sort of equality People high up in the government have more power and authority than others but if they are alleged to have broken the law they are treated the same as anybody else. | I interpret the sentence "intruder enters your home using the internet" in the question as not as physically entering the home but as virtually entering the home, in other words hacking into the victim's home network remotely. When that interpretation is incorrect, please comment. Note that an action can only be considered self-defense when the self-defense prevents a crime currently in progress from being completed. When A hacked into B's computer and then B punches A in the face later, that's not self-defense, that's illegal vigilante justice. The self-defense argument would only work if it actually prevents the completion of the crime. For example, if A and B were in the same room, A sees B hacking into A's computer right now and uses physical force to prevent B from completing the hack (like yanking the keyboard out of B's hands). Also keep in mind that the intensity of self-defense must be appropriate for the severity of the crime. What is and is not appropriate is for a court to decide in each individual case, and the guidelines that are to be applied vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But causing bodily harm to people when the crime they are committing does not cause bodily harm is often not considered within the limits of self-defense. For further information about what is and is not allowed in self-defense, I recommend the series about self-defense by Law Comic. | Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law. | No, if, as you say we put aside the human rights questions surrounding the death penalty itself and assuming that the prisoners had been legitimately charged, convicted and had exhausted their appeals process. Once a person has been convicted, sentenced to death and has exhausted their appeals then the timing of the execution passes from the judicial branch to the executive branch of government. This is why governments can implement and remove moratoriums on executions at their discretion. Doubtless there are administrative rules and logistical issues involved in the actual timing of the execution but if these have all been correctly dealt with then they are essentially held at the pleasure of the person in the government charged with the decision. Was it legal? Probably. Was it ethical? ... |
Is one allowed to operate a live-feed drone on the streets in Japan? (Yakuza Judgement) In Yakuza Judgement, a detective agency often uses a quad-copter drone with a camera providing a live feed in the bustling city in Japan. One use they have for it (which is obviously problematic) is to snoop in buildings through windows. But that usage aside, another way it's used is to remotely monitor one of their agents and provide back-up, without having to actually be there on the scene. Is using a drone like this legal? So long as you're not disturbing the peace and being dangerous, of course. Since the game takes place in Japan (mainly Tokyo/Yokohama), my question is mainly directed there, but I'm also curious about what the law says about it in the United States, or other countries. I am in particular reminded of the stories I've heard of disabled students using robots with cameras in order to attend school, which leads me to believe that this must be legal to a certain extent. | in japan operation of an unmanned airborne vehicle, aka UAV, aka Drone, inside a city might be legal, if a special license is obtained: Drones may not be flown in the following manners without special permission from the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism: 150 meters (492 feet) above ground level; near airports; above densely inhabited areas, as defined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. This means in reverse, that you could have such a special license, but that license needs to be obtained for each operation 10 days prior, may only be done in daytime and within line of sight between drone and operator. However, city centers are densily inhabited areas, so the default is banned. However, in the countryside, flying a UAV does not require a special license, as long as the general other rules are followed (150 m above ground, 30 meters of any obstacle, daytime only, line of sight, etc). Among the requirements is also a total ban on alcohol at the control. As a result, the operation as depicted is not lawful under the ordinary laws as they operate in our world, unless the drone operator has special permit. | An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to. | For the USA, the FCC has a few words to say on the subject: “Generally, “jammers” — which are also commonly called signal blockers, GPS jammers, cell phone jammers, text blockers, etc. — are illegal radio frequency transmitters that are designed to block, jam, or otherwise interfere with authorized radio communications.” (https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf) In addition, the FCC specifically calls out WiFi blocking devices using deauth attacks as you described, calling them “Willful or malicious interference” in a warning they issued in 2015 This is the closest thing to precedent I could find, related specifically to WiFi . That pretty much sums it up. If the device’s primary purpose involves disabling radio communication, it is illegal. It does not matter to the FCC how targeted or filtered the attack may be, it is still unauthorized. At the core of the issue, you (a private citizen) are not allowed to maliciously or willfully interfere with someone operating their radio, no ifs, ands, or buts. Drone IPS system using such an attack would most likely be illegal. The FCC may change this interpretation in the future, but for now it is illegal. | By "buying the song" on Gumroad you don't actually buy the song, you buy the right to do specific things with that song. I couldn't find the exact license terms, but for 800 Yen (about $6) for a whole album I highly doubt that this will include much more than the right to listen to the song on a private device. The rights to publicly perform, reproduce, redistribute, use commercially etc. usually cost a lot more. So if you want the rights to use the song in your own video, you will have to negotiate the purchase of a license which allows you to do that with the creator. Or if they reassigned their copyrights to a music label or copyright collective (which some music artists do), with that organization. There are some exceptions in the copyright laws of some countries where you can use parts of a song without a license. For example, the "fair use" exception in US copyright law if you review, discuss or analyze a song. But such exceptions usually don't apply if you use the song as background music, adapt the song into an own work or even just reupload the song on your own channel. | Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest. | "Civic obligations" are based on one's personal moral philosophy, best discussed on Philosophy SE. On the legal front, in the US, there is no (existing) legal basis for simply declaring some random thing to be "top secret", even if it has great potential to be used for evil purposes. If this is research conducted under the umbrella of the Dept. of Defense, it might be classified, but a garage inventor is not subject to the laws regarding classified documents. Congress could pass a law prohibiting promulgating research on time travel, but even if such a law were found to be constitutional (unlikely, on First Amendment grounds, see this), one cannot be penalized for breaking the law before it becomes a law. | That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism. | ORS 166.220 suggests this would be illegal - specifically its "unlawful use of a weapon" if a person (emphasis mine): Intentionally discharges a firearm, blowgun, bow and arrow, crossbow or explosive device within the city limits of any city or within residential areas within urban growth boundaries at or in the direction of any person, building, structure or vehicle within the range of the weapon without having legal authority for such discharge. So what's "within range"? With a homemade bow of unknown construction, draw weight, and unknown arrows I'd say it's pretty much going to be something you find out when an arrow goes that far. I wouldn't expect it to match the range of high-end bows and arrows (I've seen 40lb recurves cover ~250 yards) but 100 yards plus doesn't sound ridiculous - more if it's got some elevation to it. The point is you really don't want to find out the hard way when a shot goes astray giving your neighbours the old King Harold treatment. |
Are encryption apps (iOS) exempt from US Export Regulations if released to the US App Store only? Note: The original question in iTunes Connect regarding exemptions has since been changed to reflect recent changes made to their FAQ as follows: Does your app meet any of the following: (a) Qualifies for one or more exemptions provided under category 5 part 2, (b) Use of encryption is limited to encryption within the operating system (iOS or macOS), (c) Only makes call(s) over HTTPS, (d) App is made available only in the U.S. and/or Canada. TL;DR - In short, the answer to my original question per Apple Export Compliance is yes, "(under option d), encryption apps are now exempt from Export Regulations if sold in the U.S. and Canada app stores exclusively." I have an iOS app built and ready to ship which allows the user to perform symmetric encryption using arbitrary length keys (i.e. > 56 bits). I've been reading up on US export regulations and am looking to extend my research here as well. Question: If I have an iOS app that performs "strong" encryption but I only make it available to select territories (i.e. US), can I answer "Yes" to the following question? Does your app qualify for any of the exemptions provided in Category 5, Part 2 of the U.S. Export Administration Regulations? Make sure that your app meets the criteria of the exemption listed here. You are responsible for the proper classification of your product. Incorrectly classifying your app may lead to you being in violation of U.S. export laws and could make you subject to penalties, including your app being removed from the App Store. Read the FAQ thoroughly before answering the questions. You can select Yes for question #2 if the encryption of your app is: (a) Specially designed for medical end-use (b) Limited to intellectual property and copyright protection (c) Limited to authentication, digital signature, or the decryption of data or files (d) Specially designed and limited for banking use or "money transactions"; or (e) Limited to "fixed" data compression or coding techniques You can also select Yes if your app meets the descriptions provided in Note 4 for Category 5, Part 2 of the U.S. Export Administration Regulations. I should also point out that it's quite possible (and perhaps easy) to VPN into the US to download an app only being sold within the US and I guess this is where my main question lies - is this considered "exporting" and thus subject to US Export regulations as well? | Update (12/2/16) - Just received the following confirmation from Apple Export Compliance: The [redacted] app presently uploaded into your account CAN BE legally released to US and Canada only, it will not be necessary to go through Export Regulations. They have also rephrased the question "Does your app qualify for any of the exemptions...?" to the following: Does your app meet any of the following: (a) Qualifies for one or more exemptions provided under category 5 part 2, (b) Use of encryption is limited to encryption within the operating system (iOS or macOS), (c) Only makes call(s) over HTTPS, (d) App is made available only in the U.S. and/or Canada. Update (12/1/16) - In addition to the research below, a list of "Sample Scenarios" are given in iTunes Connect Resources and Help, one of which states: A developer chooses to release his app in the U.S. and Canada only. -- No U.S. CCATS or ERN is required. No France Import Declaration is required. The following statement (mentioned earlier in the same page) should also be taken into consideration regarding exemptions: All liabilities associated with misinterpretation of the export regulations or claiming exemption inaccurately are borne by owners and developers of the apps. So it appears the correct answer is likely not: N.B. to Note 3 (Cryptography Note): You must submit a classification request or self classification report to BIS for mass market encryption commodities and software eligible for the Cryptography Note employing a key length greater than 64 bits for the symmetric algorithm ... in accordance with the requirements of § 740.17(b) of the EAR in order to be released from the “EI” and “NS” controls of ECCN 5A002 or 5D002. Furthermore, under Note 4: Category 5 - Part 2 does not apply to items incorporating or using "cryptography" and meeting all of the following: a. The primary function or set of functions is not any of the following: “Information security”; A computer, including operating systems, parts and components therefor; Sending, receiving or storing information (except in support of entertainment, mass commercial broadcasts, digital rights management or medical records management); or Networking (includes operation, administration, management and provisioning); b. The cryptographic functionality is limited to supporting their primary function or set of functions; and c. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs a. and b. above. I suppose there could be clarification under this note, but if I understand it correctly, an iOS app having the sole purpose of performing symmetric encryption with keys greater than 56 bits would have the primary function of: "Information security" Being "a computer" Barring clarification on these points that would qualify for exemption, NLR, etc. self-classification would likely be [any of the following]: 5D002.a.1.a (software) - Designed or modified to use "cryptography" employing digital techniques performing any cryptographic function other than authentication, digital signature, or execution of copy-protected "software," and having ... A "symmetric algorithm" employing a key length in excess of 56-bits Encryption registration may have also been required prior to September 20, 2016 (see linked reference). "Companies no longer are required to submit an encryption registration to BIS before self-classifying and exporting certain encryption items..." (Wiley Rein LLP) References: Commerce Control List: Category 5 Part 2 (Cryptographic "Information Security") - BIS Export Compliance - f5 License Exception ENC (740.17) - BIS Information Security Updates (September 20, 2016) BIS Publishes New Encryption Rule - Wiley Rein LLP | I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel). | The US CFAA is by no means limited to "the US government and its financial interests ". It currently applies to any computer which is "protected". 18 USC § 1030(e)(2) defines a "protected computer" as (in part): a computer ... (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States This covers any computer connected to the internet. 18 USC § 1030 (a)(2) (C) applies to anyone who obtains without authorization : information from any protected computer; Of course, nothing requires federal prosecutors to bring charges for all acts which technically violate this sub-section. If someone hacks another person's holiday card address list, I doubt if a CFAA prosecution would be brought, but it could be if the US Attorney thought fit. | Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them. | Are there such restriction for F-1 students who have been in the US for less than 5 years, who are non-resident aliens for tax purposes and are actually not citizens of the US but are citizens of another country? Short Answer For the most part, citizenship and immigration status are legally irrelevant to your eligibility to participate in an ICO (there are isolated exceptions related to international trade sanctions, and there are certain "sensitive" industries that usually wouldn't apply to an ICO). This said, no issuer of coins is required to make the offering available to everyone who is not prohibited by the applicable laws from participating. For example, if someone wants to make an ICO available to anyone but Canadians, that is their prerogative. But, in practice, most private ICOs require investors to be accredited investors, and few students on F-1 visas have the wealth, income or professional qualifications necessary to be accredited investors. Long Answer In an ICO made in the United States, the issuer (i.e. the person creating the coins) and the underwriter (i.e. the professionals retained to handle the ICO for the issuer, which will sometimes be the same person as the issuer) are electing to treat the coins as "securities" for the purposes of U.S. law which means that they can be issued only as a "public offering" upon registration with the SEC under the '33 Act or the '34 Act, or under an exception to those acts. While the statutes enumerate exceptions to the Acts, almost everyone sticks to trying to comply with one of the safe harbor exceptions created by SEC Regulation D. This protects the issuer and underwriter from legal liability for making an unregistered offering of a security that does not fall within an exception to the registration requirement, even though it is not unambiguously clear that cyptocurrency coins are "securities." They do this because the consequence for being wrong on this legal question of first impression are very severe and could lead to civil liability for all losses that coin holders experience, large civil penalties that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, and criminal convictions. Eligibility to participate in a private offering made pursuant to the Regulation D exceptions to U.S. Securities laws (mostly the '33 Act and '34 Act) governing public offerings of securities that often require someone to be an "accredited investor" does not depend upon the immigration status or citizenship of the investor. A private ICO would ordinarily be made under a Regulation D exception. There are two Regulation D exceptions (one for offerings of less than $1,000,000 in the aggregate by an issuer, and another for intrastate offerings) which do not require you to be an accredited investor and there are other exceptions with allow a small number of non-accredited investors to participate if they are provided a professional advisor to counsel them in evaluating the offer. The most popular Regulation D exceptions for private offerings, however, are limited to accredited investors, which are available without regard to citizenship. A non-citizen could probably not participate in an offering made pursuant to the intrastate exemption, but this exception is quite unpopular for issuers and underwriters because very few offerings qualify under it and the boundaries for qualification are not well defined. I could imagine an ICO being made under this exception but I am not aware of any that actually are be made in that manner. Generally, to be an accredited investor you must be a certain kind of business entity (e.g. a bank), or a member of a certain set of professions (e.g. lawyers and brokers), or have a certain net worth and/or income. To be an accredited investor, a person must demonstrate an annual income of $200,000, or $300,000 for joint income, for the last two years with expectation of earning the same or higher income. An individual must have earned income above the thresholds either alone or with a spouse over the last three years. The income test cannot be satisfied by showing one year of an individual's income and the next two years of joint income with a spouse. The exception to this rule is when a person is married within the period of conducting a test. A person is also considered an accredited investor if he has a net worth exceeding $1 million, either individually or jointly with his spouse. The SEC also considers a person to be an accredited investor if he is a general partner, executive officer, director or a related combination thereof for the issuer of unregistered securities. An entity is an accredited investor if it is a private business development company or an organization with assets exceeding $5 million. An organization cannot be formed with a sole purpose of purchasing specific securities. Also, if an entity consists of equity owners who are accredited investors, the entity itself is an accredited investor. In 2016, the U.S. Congress modified the definition of an accredited investor to include registered brokers and investment advisors. Also, if a person can demonstrate sufficient education or job experience showing his professional knowledge of unregistered securities, he is also considered an accredited investor. In contrast, in the case of a public offering, which must be registered with the SEC under the '33 Act or '34 Act, any adult of any nationality (except as noted below) can participate without being an accredited investor. Still, in general, a U.S. securities law perspective, an investor from the U.K. or France or South Africa is the same as a U.S. citizen, even though the tax treatment of the investment for a non-citizen is very different from the tax treatment of the investment for a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. The primary exception to this general rule is that there are some people in some countries who are prohibited from investing in U.S. securities as a consequence of international trade sanctions. These would include members of the families of certain government officials in Russia, Syria and Venezuela, for example. Usually, a private offering packet provided to potential investors (such as one I wrote a couple of months ago involving international investors as well as U.S. investors) will include a separate form in which potential investors certify to the issuer and underwriter of the offering that they are not prohibited from investing under these laws which are enumerated in the form. Non-citizens who are not resident aliens (i.e. who are not green card holders), are also usually required to make a disclosure related to income tax compliance that is different than the Form W-9 that has to be provided by U.S. citizens and green card holders. There are also certain industries (e.g. equity investments in Colorado legal marijuana dispensaries, or farms in some Great Plains states) in which non-resident non-citizens are simply prohibited from making investments entirely although there are no ICOs of which I am aware that would fit in that category. | GDPR does not cease to apply because of the location of data storage. It applies based on the location of the data processor, data controller, and data subject. If you are in the EU, you are a data subject covered by GDPR. It does not matter where the data are stored. Note that you are asked to confirm that you're aware that US laws may be less protective, but you're not asked to acknowledge that anything about the arrangement causes the "laws of your country/region" not to apply. The company also does not seem to be claiming that they don't apply, although it seems that they want you to think so, and it's not clear whether they think so. You are correct that GDPR doesn't allow its protections to be waived. A data subject may always consent to certain processing, and some processing may be performed without consent, but it's not possible to waive the right to withhold consent for processing that does require it. | I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on! | GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland. |
The arrow shown on the bicycle lane sign There is an arrow on the following bicycle lane sign. What does it mean? Thank you! | This simply indicates that the lane the arrow is pointing to is reserved for the use of bicycles. Typically such a sign would be mounted on a pole near the curb, so that the arrow would point to the rightmost lane of the road. Another version of the sign exists with an arrow pointing straight down. This one is designed to be mounted on a cantilevered pole, so that it is directly above the bike lane in question. Where the bicycle lane is immediately adjacent to the curb, the ground-mounted version of the Reserved Bicycle Lane sign (Rb-84A OTM) should be installed. In cases where the bicycle lane is not adjacent to the curb, such as when a parking lane is present, the overhead mounted version of the Reserved Bicycle Lane sign (Rb-84 OTM) may be considered. If used, the overhead sign should be installed on a cantilever and centred above the designated lane, every 200 m or where visibility obstructions warrant. The cantilevered signs are not required after every intersection. (All images and quotes taken from the Ontario Traffic Manual.) | No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket. | It's highly unlikely that A would even recognise this as similar. It's really bog standard. A coloured patterned background (in a different colour and with a different pattern). Two buttons. A picture and a testimonial. All things that have been done thousands of times. In the end, it is _copy_right. What exactly is B supposed to have copied? | First off, I wouldn't assume that this is always a prank. This is a rather infamous tactic used by bike thieves. These thieves add a second lock to "discourage" the owner from taking their bicycle, wait a few days, and then remove both locks, thus stealing your bike. Don't wait, get your bike out right away. As long as this is your own bike, you don't have much to worry about. It would generally be helpful to call the police, so that they might make a note of it. They might not be able to help you cut the lock, but they will make a note of the incident. It might also be a good idea to register your bike. Getting into the law part... If you were to ever be charged with a property-related offence (which I doubt would happen), you probably wouldn't be able to be found guilty. In Canada, the relevant section would be §35 of the Criminal Code. To summarize that, it basically means that you can't be guilty of an offence if you believe that another person is about to render your bike inoperative (through addition of the second lock), and that your act that constituted the offence would be preventing or stopping that. Don't forget, the bike has to be yours as well. | S88 Closing roads and public places: ...totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or without vehicles, to any road or public place... S91(1)(a) Power to give directions: direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency That is what "this Act otherwise provides"; S6 that you cited only works "unless": Unless this Act otherwise provides, this Act does not limit, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the functions, duties, or powers of any person under the provisions of any enactment or any rule of law. Also, from another angle, "functions, duties, or powers" are not the same thing as "rights": the Act does not limit the former (unless provides otherwise), but nowhere does it say it does not limit the latter. | I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed. | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. | You should file a complaint with the police. If you complain to the police then they might do something. If you don't complain then they certainly won't. Are food trucks licensed? You might try complaining to the license authority. However go to the police first because the licence authority are unlikely to do anything without a police complaint. Even being just another statistic helps increase the pressure for action on the wider issue of racism in society. If all else fails you can just post the incident on YouTube and see what happens. Its an unreliable method of enforcement and can backfire, but it has been known for international embarrassment to kick reluctant authorities into action. |
Is copying from How to Draw books copyright infringement? Suppose I want to draw a horse. I don't know how to draw a horse so I buy a How to Draw Animals book and follow the instructions of the book to draw a horse. Now can I use my drawing for commercial purposes? | The book teaches you how to draw horses. Once you learned how to do it, and you draw a really nice horse, you have drawn it yourself. You have the copyright. You use it any way you like. Of course it's different if instead of drawing the horse yourself you just make a copy of an image in the book. That would be the author's copyrighted drawing. Added since the question reappeared: One way to learn drawing horses is to start by making copies by hand of others' good drawings, practicing, practicing more, until eventually you can draw your own horses, which was the purpose of the book. So these copies made as part of the learning process might be treated differently. And the might not actually be copies, just your best attempt at making a copy. On the other hand, taking this book, making ten copies using a scanner, framing and selling them, is obvious copyright infringement. | Getting permission from the game owner would be a sensible approach. If you get it, great. Then you could do it with the owner's blessing. It's possible to do your write up without the owner's permission, but then you have to be much more careful. For instance, the names of games cannot be copyrighted. No one can prevent you from writing "A Guide to Bridge," or "A Guide to Chess," etc. On the other hand, some games are trademarked, in which case you will need to attach a TM (trademark) symbol when referring to them. In this case, see a lawyer. You are also allowed to discuss the game itself "in your own words," but you must be careful not to "plagiarize" anything from the rules, or the official game description. That is, while you can refer to specific aspects of a game, such as building houses and hotels, the leash on copying is fairly short, as little as five words. This does not refer to five words in a common sequence referring to a single thought like "The United States of America," but it could refer to five words in an original or unusual sequence such as "I think therefore I am," by Rene Descartes, or "X houses and Y hotels," where the numbers X and Y define the number of houses and hotels in a certain board game trademarked (I believe) by Parker Brothers. | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) | If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA? | You need permission from the copyright holder(s) to make the prints at all unless it falls under some fair use doctrine or is a work in Public Domain. If permission is granted, it would presumably involve you paying money on some negotiated basis. An artist might flatly refuse to give permission to your plan to use their art as a component of your art. | What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea. | A car, or other useful object, is not generally a copyrighted work. There can, in come cases, be a copyright on the aesthetic aspects of the design, which might prohibit a different car maker from making a different car with a very similar appearance, But taking a picture of a car is not an infringement of copyright, and the photographer does not need permission from the car maker to take the picture. Such a picture would itself be protected by copyright, and the book author would need permission from the photographer or other copyright holder to use the image, unless that use came under fair use or fair dealing. (If the book author took the picture, this would not be an issue, of course.) This would be true whether this was a "commercial use" or not. Such permission is often granted freely if proper credit is given, but that is the choice of the copyright holder, and in some cases a fee would be charged, or permission might be denied on any terms. | Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter. |
What does it mean that the RPT tribunal member in this case was “also sitting as a district judge of the county court”? In this case one of the tribunal judges is indicated as having been sitting as a judge of the county court, even though the claim had been brought in the first tier tribunal of residential property. How did this come about, what exactly does it mean, and what enabled them to sit as a judge of the county court? | This is explained at paragraphs 2-4 of the decision you link. There were two proceedings: a claim in the county court and an application to the Tribunal. The county court claim was transferred to the Tribunal to be consolidated with the application, and they were to be heard together. (Although, technically there should be no literal "transfer" or "consolidation"; the claim is always a county court claim, separate from the tribunal application. It is just that the matters are heard at the same occasion by inviting a tribunal judge to sit in their capacity as a county court judge. See commentary on City, University of London v. Vodafone Limited (2020).) In that circumstance, Judge Nicol was sitting as both a tribunal judge and as a county court judge. This is possible because: On 22 April 2014, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 Sch.9(1) para. 4 was brought into force, providing that judges of the First-tier Tribunal are judges of the county court and therefore able to exercise the jurisdiction of the county court, providing that a claim form has been issued and the matter has been listed for hearing by them. Stephen Jourdan, K.C., "FTT Judges sitting as judges of the county court" (January 2019) See also this previous Q&A where this was explained. | As these are "on the road" restrictions, I assume they fall within Nottingham City Council's Parking Permit scheme which states: Anyone who can prove they are a resident within a scheme area and are in an eligible property can apply for a Residents Permit. ... The maximum allocation of permits per household is 3 and this is made up of any combination of residents or visitors permits. ... Vehicle specific Resident Permits require: A copy of the Motor Insurance Certificate (not required for visitor permits) Residents living in a flat (i.e. a house converted into separate properties) will also be required to provide a water rates bill. So, in answer to "Can tradespeople park in a "permit holders only" residential area?": Yes, the solution is to have one or two visitors permits ready for use by tradespeople so they can park nearby (and not forgetting to get them back once the work is done as they cost £25 to replace). Edit to add the following: Nottingham also run a Business Parking Permit scheme, and one would assume that Nottingham-based tradespeople would be aware of this and apply for their own permits. Also, following @richardb's comment observing that the landlord may not be resident in the scheme's area so they won't be eligible for a Residents Permit, and assuming that the buy-to-let is run as a business (most are) then the Business Permit should be a viable option if they pay the fees and provide the following: A copy of recent business rates or utility bill dated within the last 3 months containing the business name and address printed on them Vehicle specific permits will also require a copy of the motor insurance certificate | Technically anyone can sit on a jury. Lawyers are not automatically excluded from juries anymore, as being called for jury duty is a right and a duty that the law abhors automatically excluding people from. That is the official line on this. However, in reality, lawyers will always be stricken from serving by one of the lawyers trying the case. Each lawyer has a certain number of preemptory strikes (the ability to get rid of a juror for any reason, aside from those protected by law, such as race, religion, etc). They also have unlimited "for cause strikes," which are when a juror is biased in some way. Lawyers trying the case almost always try to use a cause strike to get a lawyer off, saying that they are biased toward either Defense or Plaintiffs based on the type of law they practice. The judge will usually not let them use a cause strike, saying that an attorney is ethical enough to apply the facts to the law and not sway the jury based on their personal biases that everyone has; plus, we're officers of the court so we have a duty to be ethical. Hence, they are typically forced to use a preemptory strike to get a lawyer off, but they will, every time. (If the lawyer just tried a similar case, then they'd get to use for cause.) The real reason that the lawyer from one side or the other definitely wants a lawyer off is that the jury instructions presented by each side to the judge are crafted in a way that each word carries specific meaning and, with that, is designed to lead to a certain way of thinking. Once the lawyers have fought over the instructions and the judge decides what will be presented, the jury only gets them in writing...in some states not even in writing, they only get them read to them without a copy to take back to the room. If a lawyer is in the jury, that person will undoubtedly be able to explain exactly what the law requires for a finding, or exactly why a certain finding should be had. They will advocate one way or another; this is undeniable. The instructions are purposefully confusing. The reason is this: when we fight over jury instruction, inherently, one of us will want an instruction that is hard to understand, for a lay person. This is because we want them to apply the law as it is commonly (mis)understood, not as it truly is, because that's not good for our case. To have a lawyer on the jury would defeat the finely crafted instruction and its potential to confuse. They would undoubtedly explain the instruction to the jury. One may think this would be helpful, however, juries are told that any special knowledge they have about anything pertaining to the case shall not be shared as it could sway the jury. This is most true when it comes to a lawyer sitting. When a jury doesn't understand a jury instruction, their only recourse is to send a question to the judge. In states where they have the instruction in writing, all he can say is "read carefully;" he cannot give his interpretation of what the instruction means. If a judge did give his own interpretation that is grounds for a mistrial or an appeal at least. A lawyer on the jury would be able to explain, "Oh, what this really means is X," and this is bad from one side's perspective, almost always. We all have biases, and even finely determined rules of law can be subtly pushed toward one direction or another with the use of a certain word over another, or the placement of one element before another. Generally, unless the side who would most want the attorney off had exhausted their preemptory strikes, and lost the argument to remove for cause, there is very little chance a lawyer will serve. The fact of the matter is that both sides are very likely to want a lawyer stricken from the jury pool, (even from the side who may believe the lawyer to have leanings in their favor). It is essential to control as many factors as possible in a jury trial, and an attorney on the panel is just a wild card. The potential always exists that if a lawyer ends up on the jury, they could explain the elements of the case to their fellow jurors, who may then not rely as fully upon the carefully crafted language in the instruction(s). This could backfire on either side when certain portions of the language used may be intentionally vague or difficult to parse though for someone who doesn't practice law. Anyone interested in the process of choosing and striking jurors (in the U.S.), through the process of voir dire, this is a fairly comprehensive article on the topic. | Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause. | To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority. | I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired. |
Who can ask the judge to interpret a paragraph of his court judgement, in uk? The appeal judge states: The county court judge decided based on arguments that are plainly available to her. The county court judge fell into error in concluding that the non-delegable nature of the Defendant’s duty to the Claimant was somehow relevant to the Part 20 claim. Had the Defendant considered that the county court judge reasons were inadequate then the proper course would have been to ask the county court judgment to provide further reasons in accordance with the guidance set out in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] W.L.R. 2409. The defendant advisors would have had plenty of time in which to do this because the county court judgment was circulated in draft form to all the parties more ten weeks before it was eventually handed down. The trial barrister failed to present arguments to the county court judge, that the appeal barrister presented in the appleallate hearing. The county court judge may have been persuaded to have reached a different conclusion had she had the advantage of the arguments presented before me on this appeal but that is not to the point. The Defendant cannot now be heard to complain that if the case had been differently presented below then he may have won. So long as the Judge’s conclusion was consistent with the evidence then her decision must stand. It was and it does. This appeal is dismissed. Who can ask the judge to interpret this judgement: who is responsible? The first barrister or the defendant? If the first barrister, can the defendant claim for barrister professional negligence? | The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc. | Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence. | The difficult part is deciding when two cases are similar. Precedents from higher courts govern what the law is in a case. But, a lot of what trial court judges do is to boil down a mountain of evidence to determine authoritatively what facts actually transpired before applying the law to those facts. This involves immense amounts of discretion and judgment. Also, while in some cases the law provides very clear guidance to a judge about what to do, in other cases, the law is vague enough that two different judges can reach two different verdicts, both of which are legally correct, on the same set of facts. For example, in a divorce case (involving made up facts and law to illustrate the idea), suppose that the two main assets of the family are a house and retirement account of equal value and that the facts as applied to the relevant law say that the value of the assets must be divided equally between the husband and wife. One judge could award the house to the husband and the retirement account to the wife, while another judge could award the retirement account to the husband and the house to the wife. But both judges would have complied perfectly with the law. Similarly, in a divorce there are a variety of different custody plans for children that could all conform to the law and different judges could choose different plans and each be correct. As another example, suppose that a bulldozer destroys a house and the person whose house is destroyed sues for money damages. The judge is presented with two different appraisals from equally qualified appraisers for the value of the house, both of whom superficially at least, are using proper appraisal methods. But one appraiser says the house was worth 1,000,000 and another says that the house was worth 1,500,000. Realistically, any verdict the judge renders between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 could be upheld as legally correct. Because the process of turning evidence into legal verdicts involves so much discretion and so many judgment calls, and because it is rare that two cases are factually identical, the goal of giving similar verdicts for similar cases, is difficult to achieve and difficult even to evaluate in real life. It is almost certain that similar cases often result in dissimilar verdicts, and not infrequently the reasons for this (like using personal ideologies as opposed to what the law demands to resolve close cases) are not good ones. But deciding how common that is, or in what kinds of cases it is most troubling that this happens, is very hard to determine. | While I am a U.S. attorney, the U.K. and U.S. are essentially the same on these issue in practice: "reasonable wear and tear" is a classic issue of fact to be decided by the judge (unlike the U.S. there are never juries in U.K. landlord-tenant disputes) based upon the evidence presented to him and his or her good judgment if the case goes to court. There won't be a lot of case law that is specific enough to provide guidance in your particular case (if any) because cases like these aren't worth appealing and creating case law on and because the law intentionally vests judges with great discretion on these issues and only intervenes in appellate decisions when a judge is deeply out of line. The legal definition of "reasonable wear and tear" is basically vacuous and don't provide much meaningful guidance. I know you are joking, but no, do not set it on fire. You will find yourself incarcerated for arson, with a felony criminal record and a restitution judgment in the amount of the damages and a fine and court costs as well, and your credit record will be screwed and no one will rent to you ever again if they find out by doing a cursory background check. Your mum probably won't even invite you to Christmas dinner this year. If they charge your security deposit and you don't think you owe it, you would have to sue them for a return of the part of your security deposit you don't owe, knowing that you face a risk of paying their legal fees if you lose, but will get your fees if you hire a lawyer and win (caveat: there are more nuances to fee shifting in the U.K. courts than I spell out here which are rather technical). If they say you owe more than your security deposit and you don't pay, they can sue you for the balance, knowing that they face a risk of paying your legal fees if they lose, but will get their fees if they win. In practice, it doesn't really make economic sense for either party to hire an attorney because the amount of the fees is so high relative to the amount of money at stake. The security deposit is 2-4 hours of legal time, and the amount claimed is maybe 7-14 hours of legal time, neither of which is sufficient to address the respective issues economically in a fully litigated hearing. Short of going to court, you can provide them documentation and your video to show that you are right and to discourage them from docking your security deposit (in full, anyway) or suing you, ideally A.S.A.P. before they are too committed to taking legal action. You could also propose a compromise and see if you can get them to agree to it with neither party facing the risk of going to court. | Can the judge flat out tell the jury that they cannot vote to nullify the verdict? He can but this kind of "jury nullification" makes little sense and is obvious that is not possible. A verdict is rendered by the jury. Once the verdict is rendered, there is no further vote. It would also make little sense for a jury to render a guilty verdict and later have another vote to nullify the previous verdict. From now one I will refer to jury nullification as we usually refer to it: the jury returns a not guilty verdict, although the jury believes the accused is guilty of the crime (rather than returning a guilty verdict and later nullify it, which is what you are implying here) A different question would be "can the judge ask the jury to not engage in jury nullification"? Yes he/she can. A judge can respond that jury nullification is not possible. If the jury convicts, this false information by the judge is generally deemed a harmless error on appeal, and the conviction is upheld If the judge did so and the jury chooses to nullify the verdict anyways would the fact that the judge forbade them to do so have any impact on what happens from that point forward? No. Jury nullification is part and parcel of common law, and it could well be part of the "jury trial" granted by the Constitution. Would the jury risk repercussions for nullifying a verdict against the judges orders? Only for jury nullification no. They can face repercussions if they lie in voir dire and say that they will follow the law as given to them no matter what, for example. Finally is there any situation where jury trying to nullify a verdict could phrase their objection incorrectly such that the judge could rule it as a guilty verdict (ie if they say "we think you proved the plaintiff did this thing, but we don't believe he should be punished" can the judge rule that they said he was guilty and just ignore the second half?) Juries return a guilty/not guilty verdict. They don't return their thoughts to the court ("we think that...."). They simply say "guilty" or "not guilty". If for some unknown reason they should choose to tell the judge more than what is required from them, jury nullification is still an option of the jury and something that the jury can do, have the right to do, so the judge will not be able to override the jury. But this is something that should not happen. If the jury wants to engage in jury nullification, they have to tell the judge "not guilty" and nothing more. The jury doesn't have to explain its decision to acquit. | The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time. | This is a great question because it's a useful vehicle for understanding a cross-cutting principle of law: baselines and exceptions. I find that thinking of law as a system of baseline rules and exceptions to these rules is a great way to organize and make sense of the mess that is 'the law.' A police officer testifying about what you told them, whether it helps you or hurts you, is hearsay. So, as you correctly pointed out, the baseline assumption is that that testimony can't come in. But, the hearsay rule is famous for having a ton of exceptions to it. Two relevant exceptions here are: (1) statements against interest, and (2) prior inconsistent statements. If what you told the police officer was a direct admission of liability, or a statement that contradicts the theory of the case that you're presenting to the jury, either or both of these exceptions are going to kick in and make that hearsay admissible. These exceptions are not going to kick in, however, for hearsay statements that help you. A humorous, but related, aside, is that there's some jurisdictional differences in how far the 'statements against interest' exception goes. In some jurisdictions it only applies to admissions of liability, but in other jurisdictions it also applies to simply embarrassing statements. My evidence professor illustrated this by, out of the blue, mind you, saying, in class, "I stopped wetting the bed when I got to college," and then explaining that in the latter type of jurisdiction, that statement would be admissible. He then paused after the class had finally stopped laughing and said "that's not true, by the way...I stopped in high school." | The judiciary is an arm of the state There is no “power grab” by the judiciary: they are simply exercising the Constitutional power they have to act as a court of record (given to them in the Supreme Court Act) and resolve disputes. In the UK (among many others), judges get paid to interpret the law - both statute and customary law - weigh the evidence and make decisions. You seem to think this isn’t their job but it is precisely their job. In general, judges try to leave their personal and political opinions outside the court, however, they are human and mistakes are sometimes made, from bias or otherwise. That’s why there is an appeals system - one judge has made a decision, 3 or more others review it. The Grainger test is as much a part of the law of the UK as the Equality Act is. It can be changed by an act of Parliament or it can be changed by a future appellate court at the same level or higher in the hierarchy. Parliament’s role is to write laws of general applicability, the administrations role is to administer those laws, including making decisions about individuals, the judiciaries role is to decide specific controversies by interpreting the law and providing guidelines for consistent decision making by future judges and officials. |
Can two people be tried together? Bob and Carl are both accused of the same murder of Alice. Are they supposed to be tried together as one party in a single trial? be separately tried in two simultaneous trials? be tried one after another? or what? (2.) seems the most correct, as Bob and Carl are separate parties that may want different lawyers, etc.. But that also seems the most hairy path, since the crimes are obviously extremely related, and each case would rely heavily upon the other. As a separate but related question: if an entire family/group are accused of crimes, are they all tried separately, simultaneously, or what? | In the U.S., one trial can be held for multiple co-defendants, though prosecutors and defense attorneys will have reasons for seeking separate trials (If only to avoid having a scene similar to the on in Dark Knight where Harvey Dent has about 50 mobsters caught in one RICO violation plus their lawyers and the judge's simple question of "How do you plea?" is met with a din of responses.). The Defense's reason for this is that an individual may not have been a part of every step of the collective guilt and thus some charges might not be appropriate if it's an individual's guilt compared to a groups guilt. For example, the six police officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray at trial were all tried separately. The first trial was declared a mistrial over the hung jury, and two subsequent trial's resulted in findings of not guilty by a judge during a bench trial. The remaining individuals had charges dropped (The three officers who had yet to have trials plus the one officer whose trial resulted in a mistrial). One of the findings a running theme of the officers as individuals did nothing wrong, though had they been tried collectively, the results may have been different, since the individual trials meant certain facts couldn't be brought up as they didn't apply to the individual but did if they were tried as a group. From a prosecutor's standpoint, separate trials mean that you can use one suspect against the other and make a deal for lighter charges in exchange for testimony against a partner in crime. The U.S. legal system does allow for plea deals between the defense and prosecution (and while it's not the only nation that allows this, it's one of the few where plea bargaining is not viewed as a "dirty" tactic and is openly embraced (U.S. attorneys tend to hate going to trial and will try to avoid it.). Prosecutors are not above offering immunity or granting lighter sentences in exchange for help in other cases, often in the form of testimony against the big fish. For a criminal who believes "snitches get stitches", an offer of flipping on your co-defendant for a sentence of 10 years, with parole in 5 is nothing to sneeze at when you're looking at 25 to life without parole for what you did. It's not immunity for testimony (typically, witnesses in plea bargains are not allowed to take the 5th with respect to questions on the stand because they will typically plea before the trial, and thus can't be prosecuted for the same crime.). | My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge. | united-states Bob could do any number of things to try to convince someone to prosecute Alice: call the prosecutor's boss, or the district attorney (or their equivalents in DOJ if it's a federal crime), or his elected representatives; he could also go to the media, or post on social networks... But if none of that works, the article is right: Prosecutors can't be legally compelled to prosecute someone Crime victims don't have any rights to control whether a prosecution happens—the government is the plaintiff. A prosecutor can even file charges over a victim's objections. Federal law and some states have Crime Victims' Rights Acts, which do grant some rights. But note the particularly relevant exception in that law: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction. This is also a separation of powers issue: the executive branch has the exclusive right to determine how the laws are executed. Neither the legislature nor the judicial branches can compel the executive to prosecute someone. Note that none of this affects Bob's civil remedies: he can still sue Alice for damages. But that won't result in her ending up in prison. | You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine. |
Are banks committing the crime of deceptive marketing? As depositors of Silicon Valley Bank are painfully finding out, money in a checking account is not exactly the same as dollar bills in your wallet. Money in a checking account are effectively overnight loans to the bank, which are automatically renewed daily, until withdrawn. The bank borrows money from you, on an overnight basis, and then invests these money in long-duration assets such as 10 year government bonds. A bank failure happens when the bank's assets have declined in real-time market value such that those assets can no longer be sold to fulfill all overnight withdrawal requests. However, the entire global economy functions on the implicit assumption that checking accounts are in fact the same thing as dollar bills in your wallet. When I login to my bank account online, I see a certain number of dollars. These dollars are presented to me as readily available "cash under the mattress". Unbeknowst to me, these dollars are not readily available. They have been invested into illiquid long duration assets, such as 30 year mortgages at 3.5% rate of interest, far below the current overnight interest rate of 4.5%. Throughout the process of setting up the checking account, signing the paperworks, it was not made clear to me that my "readily available" cash deposit was actually a loan to the bank. And that, in the event of a bankruptcy, no pun intended, amounts above 0.25 million would be considered as a loan to the bank, payable only up to the amount realized from the fire sale of the bank's remaining paltry assets, minus lawyer fees. Many highly influential figures in the financial space are right now calling for a taxpayer funded bailout of SVB overnight deposits. Failing which, they claim, would result in a loss of confidence in thousands of small banks. Question: Is the practice described above, to wit: representing overnight loans that are backed by duration mismatched assets as a form of "bailment", and marketing a bank's services as such, a form of deceptive advertising? | No The bank is not pretending in any way that the money received from depositors is guaranteed. If they had done, then that would be deceptive marketing. The bank held itself out to be a bank and to provide the services that a bank provides. They are allowed to assume that their customers know how banking works. It is clear that you do not because both explanations you have provided are wrong. | It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures). | Are there any federal or state laws in the US regulating which models can banks and money lenders use to decide for/against lending money to an individual? There aren't really safe harbors regarding what lenders can use. There are only laws that prohibit certain practices like discrimination in lending. Everything else is permitted. ow do you ensure that your AI model doesn't have a variable that indirectly or directly takes into account ethnicity when making a decision). Using a "black box" machine learning or AI model is inherently risky legally because it isn't transparent and there is no good way to demonstrate that discriminatory effects aren't due to to discriminatory factors as opposed to neutral factors. AI models tend to pick up on impermissible factors by attaching weight to factors that aren't substantively important, but are correlated strongly with impermissible factors, for example, assigning different weights to different surnames. On the other hand, if you can spell out the precise formula by which your model is constructed (in a closed court proceeding if necessary to preserve trade secrets) and can demonstrate that no impermissible factors are considered, directly or indirectly, then your mathematical model is very likely to be upheld as legal and permissible. | You’ve presented a number of different scenarios, without a lot of specifics, so I’ll start from the top, and from a US perspective. A very generic term that would come up in this situation is material misstatement. one might say that an account or line item is overstated or understated, or a misstatement could arise from the omission of a necessary note, because notes are an integral part of the financial statements. Financial statements are said to be materially misstated if the misstatement would affect the choice of a typical decisionmaker. There’s no explicit standard for what is or isn’t material, but in practice, auditors often choose some small fraction of net income as the threshold. Materiality can also be caused by positive vs. negative earnings, or other thresholds, like financing agreements which might oblige the company to keep its current ratio above a certain level, for example. In the US, the rules to which the statements have to be materially correct are known as GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and they are codified in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Accounting Standards Codification (FASB ASC). Depending on how the scheme is arranged, issues in the realm of “buying stuff as a “customer” to make the business look good” include: Substance over form: it may not be appropriate to recognize as a sale at all. If the net effect is a transfer of cash from the owner or manager to the business, while the goods find their way back into the company warehouse, that could be considered as paid-in-capital, or even a liability, rather than a sale. Owner bought some product to inject cash, and put the goods back in the inventory? That’s cash from the stockholder, not a customer sale. Somebody in management moved a truckload of product to his storage unit, only to return it after year end? That might be more accurately characterized as a loan, not a sale. I don’t know of any specific terms for this exclusively, but there have certainly been cases where companies moved inventory to undisclosed warehouses in an effort to hide fictitious sales from their independent auditors. Edit: Another term for certain sales without commercial substance is a “roundtrip transaction” or “roundtripping.” Disclosure notes: even if there is commercial substance to the transaction, it may require disclosure notes, such as those for related party transactions, as required by ASC 850. Transactions with related parties must be disclosed even if they are not given accounting recognition (ASC 850-05-5). Examples of related parties are given in ASC 850-05-3, including “an entity and its principal owners, management, or members of their immediate families,” among others. Under the relevant definition, a person does not need a formal title to be considered a member of management (ASC 850-10-20). The related party disclosure is not required in consolidated financial statements, for transactions that are eliminated in the consolidation process (ASC 850-10-50-1). For sales from a public company to a bona-fide external customer, there’s also the major customers disclosure, but the threshold for that is 10% of revenue, which is much more than enough to materially impact the bottom line. Generally, transactions between a parent company and a subsidiary will be eliminated in the preparation of the parent’s (consolidated) financial statements (ASC 810). This means if the parent company A sells goods with a carrying value of $30 to its subsidiary, B, at a price of $50, A doesn’t recognize that $20 gross profit until B sells the goods to an outside party. Internally, B might carry the goods at $50 on B’s books, but A would have to cancel it out so that only $30 of that appears on A’s consolidated balance sheet. The consolidation method is applied when one business has a controlling interest in another, and in summary it means that the parent company reports A+B’s financials as if it was all a single entity. That means B’s assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses, are all reported as part of A. It also means any transactions between B and A are transactions within the entity; you wouldn’t recognize a gain or loss (nor revenue and GP) if your marketing department sold office equipment to your engineering department, and you don’t get to with subsidiaries either. Consolidation requires not only eliminating revenues, cost of goods sold, and excess carrying value of inventories on intra-entity transactions; it's also gains and losses on things like equipment, meaning the same transaction could require a consolidation adjustment twenty years later to eliminate excess depreciation expense. Long story short, ASC 810 deals with consolidation, and those rules apply when you create or purchase a subsidiary to buy your stuff, or use a subsidiary to pass the same $200,000 back and forth. When the parent entity does not have a controlling interest in the investee (the basic threshold is 50% of voting shares, or by some other agreement) but does have significant influence (representation on the board or other factors in ASC 323-10-15-6), then it will be treated as an equity method investment. Instead of adding the line items together, it's a single asset and A's portion of B's earnings are a single line item on the income statement, but the adjustments are similar to those in a consolidation. Another kind of revenue recognition game which companies used to play involved bill-and-hold arrangements, wherein the customer (or the “customer,” or a salesperson without any real input from the supposed customer) would place an order, and the company would send (or at least, prepare and book) an invoice (revenue), but not ship the goods until the customer actually asked for them. These days, the rules on revenue recognition are fairly guarded against these kinds of things, but some other examples of “sales” that aren’t really sales include consignment arrangements, repurchase agreements (could be a sale with right of return, or depending on terms could be effectively a lease or a financing arrangement), and the gross vs net revenue issue for principle/agent situations (airline and hotel booking sites are a popular example. If they’re an agent they’re required to report their commission on a net basis but would likely prefer to look bigger by calling it a $110 sale and $100 cost of goods sold, instead of just $10 revenue). If you’re interested in management schemes to mislead the users of financial statements, check out the SEC’s online archive of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) here. Some of them just deal with individual professionals who should know better, but they can be pretty interesting, whether they involve poor ICFR, or intentional deception on the part of upper management (it's on management either way). | First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea. | I see that this would put me under heavy US regulation, and I'd like to avoid that, since it would require huge funding to hire lawyers to do something like that. There are many reasons for financial and banking industry regulations; namely, fraud protection, corruption and money laundering preventions, use of crypto to avoid taxes and records, etc. If you're serious about a startup that involves financial transaction, one of the first things you do is find a law firm to advise you on the legal plausibility of an idea. And be prepared to spend thousands and thousands of dollars in legal fees for regulatory approval. Would doing something like this solve my problem? You're really going to trust randos on the web for legal advice? | Gifts that are sincerely given away are generally not part of the assets to be split up in a divorce. However, if you transfer assets to a parent, only to start receiving that value back from them after the divorce, this is considered hiding assets and is illegal Whatever the reason, hiding assets, income and debt is not only unethical; it’s also illegal and subject to severe penalties IF discovered. You’ll likely be deposed, which means you’ll have to provide live testimony, under oath, about assets and property. If you lie during discovery or your deposition in order to hide assets, you’ve committed perjury (a punishable crime). If your lies are discovered by your spouse, your spouse’s attorney, or a judge, you may face severe sanctions (monetary fines) or a perjury charge. in some states, you can even be arrested for very serious incidences of hiding assets | united-states They thought of that. See IRS Pub 550, page 36: You are treated as having made a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position if you: • Enter into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property, So when you short-sell 1 BTC while still holding 1 BTC, it's taxed as if you simply sold your 1 BTC. This makes sense as the transactions are essentially identical in effect. I don't think it matters that the 1 BTC you held was used as the collateral for the 1 BTC you borrowed. In particular, although short sales are usually reported and taxed as of the date when they close, constructive sales are an exception and are taxed on the date of the constructive sale itself: You must recognize gain as if the position were disposed of at its fair market value on the date of the constructive sale. This gives you a new holding period for the position that begins on the date of the constructive sale. Then, when you close the transaction, you reduce your gain (or increase your loss) by the gain recognized on the constructive sale. So this doesn't help in deferring your taxes. |
How does the USA allow so many legally illiterate police officers? I sometimes get these random youtube shorts of police people in the US harassing people who try to film them while on duty. Then you have these videos where these people have to try and convince these people whos job it is to enforce the law that they do actually have the right to film police while on duty. Apparently in the US you have to educate police on your rights because you cannot expect law enforcement to have any specific knowledge of the laws they are tasked with enforcing. I watch these random American people's dash cams and see police people doing things I know to be unconstitutional which is really bad when you consider the fact that my legal education does not comprise anything more than being a regular active member of this SE and that I live halfway around the world and have never set foot on US soil. I'm just left wondering how exactly it is possible for the average bobby-on-the-beat in the US to have such a fundamental lack of knowledge on US laws? I do not think that there are no good police in the US. All Im saying is the google bot shows me with alarming regularity US police people that this site has taught me are indeed trampling on peoples rights. I just cannot really understand how that could be the case? Im not trying to generalise or stereotype anyone but I dont believe the opinion that American police could do with a couple of courses in constitutional law at a local community college is being unfair to them. What legal requirements and standards are there for the legal training that US Officers of the Law receive before receiving their qualification and office. Are there no legal minimums as to understanding levels by law enforcement agents of people's constitutional rights? | Your appraisal is unjustly harsh, though not incomprehensible. A surprising number of lawyers are legally illiterate, in the same sense, even Supreme Court justices have to be told what the law is in a certain sense, and they often have to discover the law rather than recite it. Bear in mind that the typical education requirement for being a police officer is graduation from high school, and not a law degree. The educational requirements for the FBI are stiffer. They learn certain basics in a training course that lasts a few months, which covers everything. There is no law prohibiting a police officer from "harassing" a person who wants to film them. The line in the sand is that they cannot prevent a person from filming them. It would be interesting to know how many officers are actually unaware that they cannot force a person to stop filming. Also, the statement that they "can't" stop a person from filming them is a bit of an over-statement – they actually are capable of doing that, but what are the consequences? Given qualified-immunity, their own concern reduces to two issues: personal liability (getting sued) and department procedures manual (getting fired). It is invalid to infer ignorance from a particular pattern of behavior. | can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected. | As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury. | Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents. | Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect. | You can be under arrest before you are handcuffed and the police officially read you your rights. The problem from the citizen perspective is that there is no bright line test that tells you whether you are under arrest, and the courts can find that there was no arrest at a point where the suspect was handcuffed and confined to the back of a police car (United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004) – you can be merely "detained" for an investigatory stop while in cuffs. One test that might be used is asking if you are free to go about your business. A reasonable person could decide whether they were under arrest by the nature of what the officer says. For example, if he says "It would help us if you could stand over there" or "...if you could sit down", it is reasonable to conclude that this is an urging but not a command. On the other hand, if he says "Sit down, now!", it is unreasonable to think that that is a mere suggestion or plea, it is an order. There is no specific Arizona law that says when police can order you to do something, nor is there a specific law saying that force may only be used in such-and-such circumstance. There generally are guidelines for police conduct, and the guidelines tend to grant much leeway to officers (until it gets to be a recurring problem and the guidelines are changed). An example is Seattle, whose police manual reduces the question to the statement that "An officer shall use only the force reasonable, necessary, and proportionate to effectively bring an incident or person under control, while protecting the lives of the officer or others". But this does not say whether one must obey police orders. In Oregon v. Ruggles the court sympathetically notes that Whether a particular police order is “lawful” is frequently a complex question involving some of the most vexing and intractable issues in constitutional law. For example, a police order such as “Stop!” can be an unlawful seizure of a person under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, depending on whether the order is accompanied by a sufficient show of authority and the officer who issues the order is subsequently found to have lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. But Oregon has a statute, ORS 162.247(1)(b), requiring you to obey a lawful order by police. The court found that you don't have to know whether the order is lawful. Arizona has a related statute, ARS 13-2508 where resisting is defined as intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent a person reasonably known to him to be a peace officer, acting under color of such peace officer's official authority, from effecting an arrest including the means of "Engaging in passive resistance" (which is "a nonviolent physical act or failure to act that is intended to impede, hinder or delay the effecting of an arrest"). Arizona law frames the resisting crime in terms of "effecting arrest", which is different from what Oregon law says: (a) Intentionally acts in a manner that prevents, or attempts to prevent, a peace officer or parole and probation officer from performing the lawful duties of the officer with regards to another person; or (b) Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. But even if an individual in Arizona is not chargeable with resisting arrest for failing to sit (because the officers were not effecting an arrest), that does not mean that police cannot order you to sit – it just means that it's not a separate crime to fail to comply. | In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense. | The General Rule In practice, the only time when self-defense against a police officer is legal is when you do not know and have no reasonable way that you could have known that the person attacking you is a police officer. (And arguably, a police officer acting in an official capacity in furtherance of his or her duties, rather than in a personal capacity as an individual.) For example, if the police do a no knock raid in the dark of night, and don't announce themselves, and you shoot police officers reasonably believing them to be home invasion burglars, you would not have criminal or civil liability for doing so. A similar valid self-defense claim might arise when someone has an objectively reasonable reason to think that someone claiming to be a police officer is really just a criminal impersonating a police officer, even if that belief is, in fact, mistaken. In almost all other circumstances, you need to submit to the officers, and you are pretty much required by law to bear the risk that excessive force by the officer will harm you. If you don't, you will probably be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest and will not be entitled to a self-defense defense. The fact that you are not actually guilty of a crime is irrelevant. This is often the case and police officers are not omniscient. If the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest (which there is often no way that the person being arrested or attacked can know at the time), the remedy is a civil rights suit after the fact, not self-defense. In theory, there might be other isolated circumstances where self-defense against a police officer is legal, but they involve fact patterns so quirky that they would almost never happen in real life, or would almost never be possible to prove in a manner that the courts would believe. Officer Liability For Harming Someone Legitimately Acting In Self Defense Whether the officers had civil liability to you if you were harmed by the officers while exercising your right to self-defense would depend upon their state of mind, even if you were rightfully using self-defense. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in January of 2017 (White v. Pauly) involved this fact pattern. In White v. Pauly an officer arrived late on the scene and had no reason to believe that the officers who arrived there before him and were being shot at by citizens in a house that they were approaching, lacked probable cause, or had not announced themselves. The court held that as a result, he had no civil liability to a citizen he shot, even if the person who the late arriving officer shot while that citizen was shooting back at the police officers on the scene was actually engaging in good faith self-defense. The citizen's self-defense in the case had a valid defense to criminal or civil liability for firing on the officers, because the citizen shooting back didn't actually know that the people approaching his house were police officers. But, because the late arriving officer reasonably believed under the circumstances that the citizen had no right to engage in self-defense, because he thought that the early arriving officers had probable cause and had announced themselves, the late arriving officer had no civil liability to the citizens he shot. |
Can a customer sue an Internet Cafe for being BULLied (kicked out+ threatening to call the SECURITY) This internet cafe (computer gaming, charging us for every hour) literally kicked me out on the 3rd time (meaning I've only been there twice before) for "having too many complaints" and "we can do that because we're a small business" Here’s the most possible reason that they hate me: helping me adjust the settings and then switch stations took a long time (about 10 minutes, which is long for an anxious game player when he’s reluctantly AFK…you guys know how that feels) to try changing the game setting (but FAILED), and then I have to be brave enough to ask them if they can let me switch seats. Relaunching the game also takes time, which is counted into the $5/ hour. I stayed for about 71 minutes, which is a little longer than the standard time. When I was about to leave and pay, I asked them if they could charge me for just an hour because of the time wasted. They agreed, but became upset when I carelessly dropped 2 drop of hand sanitizer on the table. And now the main story happens: on this 3rd time, that woman straightforwardly said “I’m asking you nicely, to leave” and I was shocked. Anyway that woman refused to provide any reason for kicking me She never let me complete the sentence and kept saying that she would call the SECURITY if I don’t leave So I got kicked out because I had “too many complaints” and they’re “small business who can refuse to Service”. That’s the whole story. I searched for a while and saw that “a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination”. Does that mean I can’t sue them with a reasonable chance to win? | There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | When dealing with recalcitrant agencies, governments, businesses or otherwise who move very slowly or refuse to deal with genuine consumer issues - like refunds they have agreed to - one thing to do is carefully up the ante. You need to get them to take you seriously, and one way is to potentially get some third party help. Call the hospital billing department and say if they don't resolve this issue - which they admit exists - you're going to file a complaint with a consumer advocate, like Nevada Consumer Affairs .gov and/or get legal help from a non-profit or pro-bono legal aid firm, like Pro Bono Legal Services - State Bar of Nevada. I say carefully because you don't want to say I'm going to sue! or get angry and threaten anything. Just tell them you're looking at all your options. And that may resolve the matter right there; they don't want to deal with the extra work of a complaint from the state government or a letter from an attorney, and you may have your refund quickly. If it doesn't, look at filing a complaint with the online form at Nevada Consumer Affairs, or call a free or pro bono legal clinic and see about getting help. Sometimes a formal complaint or a letter from a lawyer will quickly resolve things. | You are mistaken: they deny you on your act When you use Tor, your browser is not sending a lot of information. That makes Tor browsers hilariously easy to detect: nobody knows where the real browser is, but it is hilariously easy to block all Tor users for using Tor, or at least those that the server knows are Tor IPs. Using Tor is an action, not how you look. The closest Brick and mortar equivalent would be "Show me your ID please" and you show them a paper cutout of something that has Sample stamped over it. "No shirt, no shoes, no service" in the united-states Yes, most places can deny service based on how you dress or your state of hygine. These two would in most cases not extend to the protections under the Civil Rights Act, which protects some characteristics like race and sex, but not visual factors like "being dressed" or "smelling of cow". There can be a fine line where religious dress code is concerned, but in general and broad strokes, the restaurant can deny you for wearing the wrong clothes. Actually, the slogan is much broader than it appears: as long as an establishment's dress code is not violating discrimination law (like the CRA), they can enforce it under their freedom to contract. | You can sue anyone for anything. I will answer these on the assumption that the real question is whether there is a legal basis for such a suit. 1) Could someone open a civil action against the city of Las Vegas for failure to provide security? Or are city/county municipalities immune? And is the state of Nevada immune? This would not prevail. There is governmental immunity and there is no duty of care. And there is also no plausible argument, factually, that somebody in the government did something wrong. Note also that a comment accurately notes that the incident took place in the City of Paradise rather than the City of Las Vegas, and the question has been revised accordingly. Some states have a general victim's compensation fund that helps partially cover losses of crime victims, but I am not aware that Nevada has one. 2) Could someone sue the concert promoters for failures to provide safety? And/or was that safety limited to the actual physical area of the concert? No. The risks were unprecedented, unforeseeable, and there would have been no cost effective way to prevent them. 3) Could someone sue the hotel/casino for failure to provide general safety? What about failure to prevent the gunman from bringing weapons into the hotel/casino? The hotel/casino is not a guarantor of general safety. The trouble with "failure to prevent" is that the weapons were legally obtained and owned. While it could have raised suspicions, there was no crime or illegal activity to report due to the lax guns laws of the U.S. and Nevada. Notably, in a similar suit arising out of the Aurora, Colorado theater mass shooting at a showing of The Dark Knight Returns, a court dismissed claims of those injured against the theater because the crime was not foreseeable at the time and because the crime was an intervening and superseding cause of the harm. The precedent is not directly applicable, since Nevada is in the 9th Circuit and is a different state, while Colorado is in the 10th Circuit. But, the principles of law that apply would be very similar and persuasive to a court in Nevada. 4) What about the store that sold the firearms to the shooter? Even though those sales appear to have been legal in Nevada? No. As you note, the sales appear to have been legal. If someone could show that the sales were made illegally, or worse, were made illegally with knowledge that this was intended, that would be a different story. 5) Or one or more of the firearm companies themselves? No. The guns were not defective and were in compliance with federal regulations. Specifically, this is governed by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act which would also apply to the conversion kits that he purchased to make some of the firearms more like automatic weapons. 6) What about the shooter, his estate, and/or his family? I assume it can be alleged that they might have known of the shooter's plans and/or failed to intercede. Claims Against The Shooter The shooter is dead, so he would be hard to serve with process (i.e. you can't sue dead people, you can only sue their estates). Another way that crime victims often receive compensation is from restitution awards in a criminal case. But, in U.S. jurisprudence, criminal charges cannot be brought against dead people and are automatically dismissed if a defendant dies before he is convicted or after he is convicted but before the conviction is final. Claims Against The Family Family is not legally responsible for other family member's torts and crimes simply by virtue of being family members (although claims against a decedent's estate may impact them by reducing the inheritance that they might otherwise have received) and there is no plausible reason to believe that anyone, other than possibly his girlfriend, would have had any knowledge of his plans. He appears to have had a distant relationship with his brother who knew nothing, his parents are dead, he was not currently married, he divorced each of his two successive wives long ago, and he has no descendants. Claims Against The Girlfriend His girlfriend might have knowledge and involvement (her ID was used, but apparently without her consent while she was out of the country, and the $100,000 sent to the Philippines, probably for her, could be construed as a unilateral dying gift) and the FBI is investigating that, but there is no terribly good reason to think that she could foresee what was going to happen or acted negligently in some respect. She has denied having any knowledge in public statements made by her lawyer - she says she thought he was just breaking up with her when he asked her to take a trip to see family in the Philippines and there is no immediate reason to doubt her statement. There is also not a general duty to report crimes which one suspects that someone you know will commit in the future. One could argue that the shooter had an arsenal of guns that could have clued in the girlfriend, but so does about 3% of the total population, and a much larger proportion of the population that is wealthy and has a hunting hobby. So even if she'd told authorities about the arsenal, this concern probably would have been dismissed, and without causation there is no cause of action. The $100,000 sent to the girlfriend could probably be recovered for the creditors of his estate as a fraudulent transfer action against the recipient. This has nothing to do with the fault of the girlfriend. But, any gift made while someone has liabilities or anticipated liabilities in excess of his assets are voidable, and the tort liability anticipated in this case would have been far in excess of the shooter's assets. Claims Against His Estate Claims for wrongful death absolutely can and should be filed in his estate. He was a wealthy man and there should be enough to at least make some payment to every victim. It may be necessary for a public administrator or a creditor to step forward to open the estate as it is unlikely that the shooter's family wants that job. They would not want the job because the heirs will almost surely get nothing from his probate estate because his tort liabilities almost certainly exceed his net worth. But, it is important that someone step up to serve as the executor of his estate, because otherwise his assets could be depleted by failures to pay debts resulting in penalties and seizures of collateral, and by failure to collect property to which his estate is entitled such as rent and mortgage payments owed to him or to companies he owns. There is a strict time limit for asserting claims against an estate that can often be a short as three months after the date of death. The relevant statute is as follows: 147.040. Claims: Limit on time for filing A person having a claim, due or to become due, against the decedent must file the claim with the clerk within 90 days after the mailing for those required to be mailed, or 90 days after the first publication of the notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020. A creditor who receives a notice to creditors by mail pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 155.020 must file a claim with the clerk within 30 days after the mailing or 90 days after the first publication of notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020, whichever is later. If a claim is not filed with the clerk within the time allowed by subsection 1 or 2, the claim is forever barred, but if it is made to appear, by the affidavit of the claimant or by other proof to the satisfaction of the court, that the claimant did not have notice as provided in NRS 155.020 or actual notice of the administration of the estate, the claim may be filed at any time before the filing of the final account. The period of 90 days prescribed by this section is reduced to 60 days if summary administration is granted under chapter 145 of NRS. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.040. It is possible, and even likely, that filing new lawsuits against the shooter or his estate after his death, other than by filing a claim against his estate in a Nevada state probate case, would be barred by Nevada probate law, so that claims are concentrated in the claims process. Also, while federal courts would usually have jurisdiction over a diversity lawsuit brought by an out of state plaintiff against an in state defendant, there is a probate exclusion from diversity jurisdiction that requires claims to be filed in the probate estate rather than in federal court. The hardest question for the estate once it is liquidated will be how to allocate the estate's limited assets among unrelated debts of the decedent, claims of the deceased victims and claims of those victims who were injured or suffered property damage only. There are, of course, rules to govern that in the Nevada probate code and in case law. The primary rule that applies is as follows: The debts and charges of the estate must be paid in the following order: Expenses of administration. Funeral expenses. The expenses of the last illness. Family allowance. Debts having preference by laws of the United States. Money owed to the Department of Health and Human Services as a result of the payment of benefits for Medicaid. Wages to the extent of $600, of each employee of the decedent, for work done or personal services rendered within 3 months before the death of the employer. If there is not sufficient money with which to pay all such labor claims in full, the money available must be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the amounts of their respective claims. Judgments rendered against the decedent in his or her lifetime, and mortgages in order of their date. The preference given to a mortgage extends only to the proceeds of the property mortgaged. If the proceeds of that property are insufficient to pay the mortgage, the part remaining unsatisfied must be classed with other demands against the estate. All other demands against the estate. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.195. Of course, often people end their lives and go on killing sprees when their situation is much worse than it appears and it could be that he has debts that left him on the verge of bankruptcy with nothing left for others to recover out of his estate. Claims Against The Shooter's Liability Policies The shooter almost certainly had comprehensive general liability insurance policies in his businesses and homeowner's insurance that cover him for liability for negligence. But, these policies are required as a matter of public policy, and do as a matter of commercial practice, have an intentional acts exclusion. So, there is no reasonable argument that he or his estate were covered by insurance for his acts. Claims Against The Shooter's Life Insurance Policies and Retirement Plans As a wealthy accountant, the shooter probably have life insurance and probably had retirement plans. If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was his estate, the analysis is unchanged (but the IRS has a priority claim for taxes due upon the distribution of the retirement plan assets). Also, the fact that he killed himself does not invalidate his life insurance policy if it is incontestable (which is usually defined in the policy to mean at least two years old). If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was someone other than his estate (particularly if the beneficiary designation is more than four years old, removing the fraudulent transfer act as a challenge to the designation), the default rule is that these assets are not available to his creditors including the shooting victims. Some states allow an insolvent estate to invade certain non-probate transfers. I would need to do further research to determine how this applies in Nevada, but his probate estate might have a basis to recover some of the life insurance and retirement asset proceeds with third-party beneficiaries for the benefit of the insolvent estate. (There is also a choice of law issue presented. Many life insurance policies and retirement plans state that they are governed by the law of a particular state. It isn't always clear if that choice of law provision, or Nevada law, would control the question of whether an insolvent probate estate may access funds otherwise payable in a non-probate transfer to another beneficiary.) The main statute in Nevada governing invalid non-probate transfers is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 155.093, et seq., and it does not allow an insolvent estate to secure those funds, but I am not an expert on Nevada probate law and there may be another exception that allows an insolvent estate to reach these amounts. A Nevada statute which could be applicable to override these beneficiary designations says: SB 454, § 51. Creditor claim: General power created by powerholder Appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or of the powerholder's estate to the extent provided in chapter 112 of NRS. Subject to subsection 1, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is not subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or the powerholder's estate to the extent the powerholder irrevocably appointed the property in favor of a person other than the powerholder or the powerholder's estate. Subject to subsections 1 and 2, and notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision or whether the claim arose before or after the creation of the power of appointment, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of: (a) The powerholder, to the same extent as if the powerholder owned the appointive property, if the power is presently exercisable; and (b) The powerholder's estate, to the extent the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claim and subject to the right of a decedent to direct the source from which liabilities are paid, if the power is exercisable at the powerholder's death. As used in this section, “power of appointment created by the powerholder” includes a power of appointment created in a transfer by another person to the extent the powerholder contributed value to the transfer. Nev. Rev. Stat. § SB 454, § 51. The beneficiary designation could be reviewed as a power of appointment. Chapter 112 of the Nevada Revised Statutes is Nevada's Fraudulent Transfer Act. 7) And more of an opinion: could a group of victims attain class action status against any of those entities? Against the shooter's estate, yes. Against anyone else, there is not a valid cause of action unless new facts are revealed. On the other hand, since the probate claims process consolidates claims into a single case at a single forum before a single judge, it would usually be unnecessary to file a class action in this situation. Other Possible Plaintiffs and Defendants The Hotel The shooter damages the hotel's windows and his room, and he may not have paid his bill. These would be claims of the hotel in his estate. Criminal Enterprise Victims Josh Marshall at the Talking Points Memo is among those who have suggested that his spending was far in excess of his apparent source of income, and that he may have been engaged in some form of illegal activity which could conceivably even have caused him to decide to end his life. The shooter reported his source of income in real estate transactions as $1,000,000 per year from "gambling", which as Josh Marshall accurately points out, is pretty much impossible given the type of gambling that he engaged in which is overwhelmingly biased in favor of the House in the long run. Professional gamblers play games like poker where it is possible, at least in principle, to win in the long run without cheating. But, he didn't play those kinds of games with any frequency. One of the more plausible explanations for why he would gamble so much is that it is a form of money laundering that allows him to turn ill gotten gains that he would use to purchase chips at casinos into gambling winnings, in exchange for the house's inevitable net gains from his bets in the long run (which can be a pretty small percentage transaction cost, on average, compared to other forms of money laundering). If so, others may have claims against his estate, that compete with the claims of the shooting victims, under statutes such as RICO, based upon this conduct if there was any. Criminal Conspiracies Of course, if evidence came out that this was actually done at the direction of some criminal syndicate (perhaps to raise the price of gun company stocks?), that would be another thing entirely and one could sue the other conspirators (as well as prosecuting them criminally), but there is nothing strong enough to file a case in court that would survive an attorneys' Rule 11 obligations to file claims with a genuine factual basis at this point. It would be an avenue to investigate on the long shot possibility that this conspiracy theory was true. Such conspiracies are not entirely unprecedented. One mass shooting incident in Germany recently that was originally believed to be a terrorist attack turned out to have been motivated by a desire to influence the financial markets. Life Insurance Policies Everyone who has a life insurance policy that was killed could make a claim against that policy. The harder legal question is whether people who had only "accidental death" life insurance policies could make claims in this case. Worker's Compensation Claims Everyone who was killed or injured while on the job at the scene (e.g. roadies for the concert, security guards, police, photographers working the show) could make a worker's compensation claim against their employer's worker's compensation policy. This would include medical costs, lost wages and funeral expenses. Health Insurance Everyone with health insurance who was injured who was not on the job could make a health insurance claim for their medical costs. CGL, Auto and Homeowner's Insurance Claims Most comprehensive general liability insurance (CGL) policies of businesses would cover property damage in this incident. Most automobile insurance policies (but certainly not all) would cover damage to a car in this incident. Most homeowner's and renters insurance policies would cover property damage to property other than a vehicle in this incident. It wouldn't be unusual for a CGL policy for the concert organizers or the venue would have a provision that covers medical expenses up to a small dollar limit for injuries sustained by invitees (i.e. concert goers) at the concert or venue as the case might be. But, it wouldn't be unusual for there to be no such coverage. Travel Insurance Claims From the comments: Many tourists from the UK would have travel insurance. Other European countries probably as well. I checked the online terms of a random UK company, they would pay for the cost of hospital treatment or funeral in case of "unexpected injury", and I seriously hope they wouldn't claim that if someone fires a gun at you, an injury would be "expected". Plus travel related expenses, like transport home, just losing your flight etc. The one I checked wouldn't pay for disability except for "personal injury", that is something you caused yourself. And no compensation, just the actual financial loss. Tort Claims Of People Not Personally Injured The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress tort, which is recognized by Nevada, while by its terms applicable only to "negligence" cases not at issue here, allows recovery by someone who had a near miss with physical harm and suffers emotional distress as a result. There is a reasonable chance that Nevada courts would allow this tort to be applied to "near miss" cases of intentional physical injury. Pretty much anyone on the scene (roughly 22,000 people) could arguably make such a claim against the shooter's estate. Spouses of people who are injured can often make a claim for "loss of consortium" in Nevada for physical harm to their spouse, even if they are nowhere near the scene of the incident. These claims could be made against the shooter's estate. This would allow claims by several hundred people in this situation. Many of the wrongful death claims would be statutory claims of next of kin, rather than claims brought by their estates. these would be brought against the shooter's estate. Trivia Point If this had happened on certain Indian Reservations, there probably would have been federal liability to all Indians harmed in the attack, as the federal government has liability for all criminal harm caused by "bad men" on the Indian Reservations in question to Indians under the treaties creating those reservations. But, obviously, the Las Vegas strip is not in Indian Country, even though many casinos in the U.S. are in Indian Country. | This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | Probably Not In general, the law gives a school significant discretion on how to run its courses and grade its exams. And it is unlikely that getting into a lawsuit over a grade will be a good way to proceed. You could explain more fully to your instructor why you feel unfairly treated, and if not satisfied by the response, go to the department chair or other higher authority as the structure of the school may provide. I would suppose that the instructor had permission to require the 3rd party software, or that school policy gives an instructor that option. It might be worth confirming that, however. For future tests you might be able to shutdown or suspend all popups to avoid the problem happening again. A "game mode" sometimes will do that. |
I owe money to SVB and I have deposits with SVB. What happens now? I have 10 million USD deposited with Silicon Valley Bank. Now that they are liquidated, let's say I get to recover FDIC insured 0.25 million plus 5.75 million, total 6 million. At the same time, I owe Silicon Valley Bank 4 million dollars. What happens? Do the unrecovered deposits and loan cancel each other out? Or do I have to pay them back 4 million? | Your liabilities are not canceled out with your claims automatically. If this is a real story, it's best to talk to a lawyer familiar with bankruptcy proceedings. You still owe money to whoever owns the bankrupt bank now - that is, to the State of California. This debt stands to be collected. During the bankruptcy, your claim will be resolved in order of priority. After FDIC payout, the rest of your deposit will be priority unsecured debt. It is prioritized after priority payments and secured debts, but before non-priority unsecured debt. It is theoretically possible to lose the full deposit and still be liable for the debt. | In general, you still need to pay for the drink. If you had purchased the drink (on credit, ie a tab or similar as you appear to have done), and you had offered the vendor CASH, and he had refused, [if you can prove you offered him cash] he would be unable to pursue you for the debt (technically you would still owe it to him, but as he had declined government issued tender the government won't act on his claim, so he has no remedy available to him to extract payment - although he can refuse to serve you in future etc). Paying through a debit card is not the same as paying cash - although the money goes out of your account and into his, its not "legal tender" in the same way cash is. | They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information | United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water. | united-states They thought of that. See IRS Pub 550, page 36: You are treated as having made a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position if you: • Enter into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property, So when you short-sell 1 BTC while still holding 1 BTC, it's taxed as if you simply sold your 1 BTC. This makes sense as the transactions are essentially identical in effect. I don't think it matters that the 1 BTC you held was used as the collateral for the 1 BTC you borrowed. In particular, although short sales are usually reported and taxed as of the date when they close, constructive sales are an exception and are taxed on the date of the constructive sale itself: You must recognize gain as if the position were disposed of at its fair market value on the date of the constructive sale. This gives you a new holding period for the position that begins on the date of the constructive sale. Then, when you close the transaction, you reduce your gain (or increase your loss) by the gain recognized on the constructive sale. So this doesn't help in deferring your taxes. | there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road. | You're not directly asking this, but I'm assuming what you're getting at is when do I owe the taxes upon receiving that pre-payment. This depends on your corporate structure as to how you can realize taxes. If you are DBA, LLC, or S-Corp you pay taxes based on your personal income at the end of the year as all earnings go to the owners because the business can't hold onto those. So if you receive those funds in Dec (assuming Dec is the end of your fiscal year), and you haven't delivered your service it doesn't matter you pay on the pre-payment funds which will really hurt you if you have to spend some of that pre-payment to deliver the service. If you are a C-Corp you can defer those taxes until you deliver the service as you can mark that revenue for the next year and several years as you deliver the service. What matters is how you declare your C-Corp's accounting practices for reporting your revenue to the IRS. What you want to do is be an accrual model. That will let you pay for things like salaries, COGS, etc before you know how much you made, and only pay taxes on the earnings at the tax rate of the corporation. Of course if you do this you would do this only if you want to keep that money in the corp to conduct business. You wouldn't want to pay corporate tax then pay personal income tax if you're the owner. So you'd want to pay out any earnings to yourself as a distribution (ie to all owners) or bonus (to individuals) to avoid the double taxation. Keep in mind I'm not an accountant, tax lawyer, but a guy who has been through exactly what you're asking. Consult professionals as needed because you'll be up your eye balls in contracts to build such a business and you'll need their help anyway. | Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed. | They recently took me to court (I am now 20) to have me start paying for the bill, under distress I signed paperwork stating that I'd start paying them, however I find this entire situation very aggravating. Short Answer You are almost surely screwed at this point and can't do anything but abide by the settlement that you agreed to when you signed the paperwork. Preface Regarding The Applicable Jurisdiction I am answering based upon the majority rules of law in U.S. states, because there is almost no other country in the world where you could end up in this financial situation due to universal healthcare systems that exist in most countries other than the United States. Also, this isn't an area of law with a great deal of state to state variation, although the law isn't exactly the same in every single U.S. state. The Minority Defense You quite possibly had a minority defense before you signed the paperwork. The minority defense is based upon an inability to give adequate consent to a contract. Whether the minority defense would have worked in this case, however, is a close call, because there are exceptions to the rule that would probably apply in this case. Settlement, Ratification and Duress The legal standard for "duress" in contract law usually means situations where there is literally a gun to your head or they're going to kill your dog or something like that, not the kind of economic pressure or persistent harassing collection efforts that I suspect you are referring to in this case. Of course, if they did steal your dog and threaten to kill it if you didn't sign the paperwork, then you really would have signed it under duress and you should probably both take legal action to repudiate that paperwork (because agreements entered into under duress are generally voidable, rather than void), and you should probably report the incident to the police as a crime. So, anyway, the paperwork you signed is probably enforceable, despite the pressure that they put on you to sign it. Once you sign a settlement agreement as an adult (which is almost surely what you did) you have ratified the agreement made when you were a minor and forfeit any way to fight it. You are stuck with what you agreed to at this point and there is nothing you can do about it short of going bankrupt. I would not recommend going bankrupt over a debts owed to a single medical provider unless that debt is so huge that ruining your credit for seven years and paying a bankruptcy lawyer is worth it to get out of this debt. For most twenty-year-olds facing debts for a few chiropractor treatments this would not make sense. Lesson learned: Talk to a lawyer before you sign paperwork, not afterwards, because once you've signed on the dotted line, there is usually little or nothing that a lawyer can do to help you at that point. Guarantors As a guarantor of the obligation to pay for your care, your mother would no doubt be on the hook in any case, whether or not you settled, and whether or not you went bankrupt. Unless the settlement agreement that you signed says otherwise, they can still attempt to collect the bill from her as well as from you. Of course, as you make payments towards the total balance due, the total balance due goes down. Your mother, as a guarantor, is only obligated to pay the portion of the bills that remain unpaid when they try to collect the debt from her. The Necessaries Exception To The Minority Defense Even though the minority defense might apply in this situation, most states recognize an exception to the minority defense when a purchase of "necessaries" is made by a minor. Bills for medical care would usually count as "necessaries", because you would have had no choice but to buy if you had been an adult anyway, so your lack of consent to pay isn't something that caused you material harm. Honestly, in the medical industry, an agreement in advance to pay a negotiated price is the exception rather than the norm. Often the providers themselves have no real clear idea what their patients are billed for their services, although chiropractors tend to be more informed about the financial arrangements than medical doctors in most cases. Void Contracts v. Voidable Contracts In any case, minority is a defense to a contractual obligation that would ordinarily only make the contract voidable, rather than void. In other words, a minor can repudiate a contract that is voidable on account of minority and successfully get out of it within a reasonable time of becoming an adult (or sooner while you are still a minor through a parent or guardian or next friend), but it is not automatically invalid. There is a good chance that a court would consider a two year delay in trying to repudiate the contractual obligation too long, even if it concluded that the necessaries doctrine did not apply because, for example, the court considered this to be elective, luxury care rather than medically necessary services. Unjust Enrichment Claims Also, in addition to suing for breach of contract, the chiropractor might be able to sue for quantum meruit. This legal theory is not based upon mutual consent the way a contract claim is, although this is sometimes called a "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" claim (it is also sometimes called a "restitution" or "unjust enrichment" claim). As a result, minority is not usually a defense to a quantum meruit claim. Instead, a quantum meruit claim is based upon preventing you from being unjustly enriched, (1) from benefits that you received, (2) that were not unwelcome, (3) from the efforts of someone else who did that work, (4) with a reasonable expectation of being compensated for the work, (5) in situations where there is no binding contract between the parties. (Different lawyers and different courts might break up these elements into more or fewer components, but the gist of the claim would be the same in pretty much any state.) In a quantum meruit case, damages are based upon the fair market value of the services rendered, rather than an agreement of the parties, since there was no mutually agreed price under a contract that they are seeking to enforce. Quantum meruit claims are frequently brought as a backup claim to a claim for breach of contract by failing to pay for services, in cases where the contract claim may be infirm for reasons such as minority. |
Most people treat bank deposits as bailment. Why is this the case? Is this a problem? Explanation: 99.999% of people treat bank deposits as bailment. But under FDIC rules, only the first 0.25 million is bailment. Amounts above that are loans to the bank. If the bank goes bankrupt, that amount is subject to loss. But the problem is, 99.999% of people do not operate that way. This includes multi-millionaire tech founders who deposited large sums with Silicon Valley Bank. An analogy: Imagine if 99.999% of people thought that they could petition their grievances to the government. But when they actually try to do so, government agents arrest them by the thousands and throw the book at them. This scenario is absolutely 100% hypothetical. Questions: (1) So what is the reason for the massive discrepancy between expectations and reality, regarding the nature of bank deposits? (2) Is this discrepancy a problem? From what I see, it results in continuous bail-outs of failed banks, because people deposit critical funds and life savings in loan instruments that they perceived to be bailments. (3) Are banks guilty of not properly informing customers about the non-bailment nature of deposits above 0.25 million? (4) What can be done from a legal point of view to reduce this discrepancy between expectations and reality? | 99.999% of people treat bank deposits as bailment. This is not borne out by the evidence. The evidence is that most people do not conceptualize their daily interactions and relationships in legal categories like "contract," "bailment," etc. Most people do not turn their minds to the web of risks and rights that they operate in day to day. But under FDIC rules, only the first 0.25 million is bailment. This is also not true. No monetary deposit is a bailment. The concept of bailment is limited to tangible property (e.g. the contents of a safe-deposit box). This is well-established common-law principle, but see generally Dickerson, "Bailor Beware" (1988). The remainder of your question asks for multiple opinions, each of which appears off-topic here, so I have tried to correct misunderstandings in your premise. | If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked. | I'm assuming you are talking about "warrants in debt" and not arrest warrants. A warrant in debt is that the creditor has filed with a court for the repayment of a debt. The court will then issue a judgement (in default if you do not appear) either for the creditor or the debtor. After that, the creditor can then (if they win) seek things such as garnishment to repay the debt. Now in the UK, they have accepted the "Electronic Communications Act of 2000" which means that a Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) is as legally binding as a "wet ink" signature. Non-QES signatures may also be binding, but that requires additional evidence. Let's take an example of a small personal loan. Let's say you apply electronically for a loan of X amount. The loan is approved and the money is transferred into your bank account electronically. You spend the money but make no attempt to repay the loan. First the bank will make attempts to collect the debt via normal means, then they may sell the debt to a debt collector. The debt collector will apply for a "warrant in debt" to take you to court for the amount (possibly with fees). If you do not appear, a default judgement will be applied to you. If you signed the loan application with a QES compliant system, that signature is all the debt collector will need to show that you accepted the debt and the repayment terms. If you did not sign with a QES system, they can still submit the application but they may have to prove other things, like: Your intent to obtain money for some purpose Your action in keeping/spending the money No action on your part to return or rectify the transfer Any payments you may have made towards the loan (shows that you acknowledge the loan and terms) So no, as of at least 2000 most countries accept some type of electronic signature to be legally binding. An entirely different topic would be if the debt is legal without the paperwork. Many debt collection agencies buy debt in bulk that may not be much more than an Excel sheet with the amounts and names/addresses and other personal information. A lot of times the entire debt "paper trail" is not transferred with these debt purchases so a debt collector may have purchased $10 million worth of debt for $50,000 that is nothing more than an Excel sheet. I believe in the US this has held up, but I'm not sure about the UK/rest of the world. What the YouTube people may be saying is that they don't have anything regarding the debt as far as binding paperwork goes. That may be something completely different. | You can file a complaint with the CFPB regarding 12 CFR §1005.10(e)(2)-1. Your individual state Department of Labor may enforce similar state level regulations too. And, yes, this technically falls under the FDIC as well. You can also file a complaint with them, although it's very unlikely they would pursue any action against a non-bank employer. The FTC has also pursued cases in violation to this statute, however those have only targeted lenders forcing the use of certain banks, and were not aimed at employers. | In contract law in the United States, this is a "liquidated damages" clause. It provides that when one side breaches the contract, it has to pay a certain amount of money to make up for it. Normally this is done where it is difficult to calculate the actual damages in the event of a breach, or where the parties would rather avoid calculating the actual damages--a common example is where you put in an earnest money deposit on a house and then forfeit the earnest money if you do not buy. However, there are restrictions on what kind of damages are permitted. Notably, a "penalty" usually refers to an unreasonable amount that is unenforceable as against public policy. It would ordinarily be unreasonable to make someone pay a hundred million dollar penalty for breaking a ten thousand dollar contract, for example. Liquidated damages clauses frequently say "this is not a penalty" and "the parties agree this is reasonable" to make it harder to invalidate them on public policy grounds. Instead, if the liquidated damage payment is a payment meant to reflect actual damages that are just hard to calculate, it is much more likely to be enforceable. You would need to research liquidated damages and penalties in the state whose law governs the contract to determine whether the particular clause is permissible under state law. See https://www.google.com/search?q=restatement+of+contracts+penalty&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8 | I assume that the loan was legal, in light of rule changes pertaining to non-borrowing spouses. If so, there is really no recourse other than to repay the loan. This article explains the current options / restrictions in an understandable manner, but of course it is too late to do anything about it. If there was actually fraud or coercion in the loan, or if the elder party was mentally incompetent, there might be some legal recourse, but we don't have any evidence of fraud, coercion or incompetence here. | You would likely have to show actual damages. And for example if you had a chance to buy a car worth $11,000 for $10,000 and couldn't because of the bank freezing your account, you'd have to convince a judge that the $1,000 possible profit was actual damage. Next you need to show that the bank explicitly guaranteed that your money would be accessible at any time. And assuming that blocking your account to prevent fraud against you was reasonable, how negligent were they when they couldn't unfreeze your account as quick as you would have liked? | I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million. |
What makes a car not a “negotiable” chattel? Another answer contrasts negotiable instruments like currency with the example of a car where a thief of the car doesn’t “own” the car and cannot transfer ownership. What is it about a car that makes it different from the currency? | The question makes more sense if you ask it in the other direction. Everything that is not currency, pretty much, is like the car. Currency is the pretty much singular exception to this rule, by sheer force of laws designed to facilitate free transferability of currency without friction. Currency is special property because it is defined as such. See also this answer. | It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this. | Is the agreement made by the seller binding? Yes. You "secured" reimbursement of 90% of what you paid and de facto waived your entitlement to the remaining 10%. Prior to that signing the agreement, you were entitled to be fully reimbursed regardless of how long it takes for the counterparty to sell the car to someone else. Depending on the exact terms of the agreement, the counterparty might have the meritorious argument that your waiver is in exchange for a "timely" (i.e., two week) reimbursement of at least 90% of your payment. | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. | You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment. | Can you have valid Terms and Condictions when there is no entity mentioned? No, but the example you post is inapplicable because the terms clearly state in the beginning that the agreement is between "you" and "Binance operators". The latter is defined shortly thereafter. Thus, it certainly identifies the entity. A contract does not need to exhaustively list all information such as parties' registration(s) or domicile. As long as a reasonable person is able to grasp who are the entities entering a contract, that contract is binding and enforceable. If it cannot be ascertained from the contract who the counterparty(-ies) is(are), then neither party can prove that he and other entity(-ies) knowingly and willfully agreed to an exchange of considerations or promises thereof. Accordingly, nobody would have standing to sue others for breach of contract. | Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar. | Each of the 50 states plus non-states has their own laws, but there is nothing general about contract or other law in the US that forces a rental facility to accept customers who don't have / won't get the insurance that they require. It is a reasonable requirement, because it protects their interest insofar as angry customers might sue the facility because their car was broken into, and many of them would mistakenly believe that their car insurance covers theft or destruction of contents (thus leading to a desire to sue, to cover the property loss). It may be just too much hassle and too risky for them to assume the correctness of a customer's claim that they already have adequate coverage and will maintain said coverage, with no practical means to verify the claim. |
What laws would Jesus be breaking if he were to turn water into wine today? In the Bible is Jesus’ first miracle: of turning water into wine: “On the third day a wedding took place at Cana in Galilee. [...] Nearby stood six stone water jars, the kind used by the Jews for ceremonial washing, each holding from eighty to a hundred and twenty litres. Jesus said to the servants, ‘Fill the jars with water’; so they filled them to the brim. Then he told them, ‘Now draw some out and take it to the master of the banquet.’ They did so, and the master of the banquet tasted the water that had been turned into wine. [...]” John 2:1-9 NIVUK Hand-waving the mechanism of transformation, what laws would be violated? I’m assuming alcohol licensing, potentially food certifications + labelling, etc. Assume the same scenario: a guest at a wedding who does not receive compensation for the wine. Interested in any jurisdiction. | North Carolina, united-states The problem is Jesus didn't make wine, he made liquor, which is more heavily regulated. NCGS § 18B-306 (a) Authority. - An individual may make, possess, and transport wines and malt beverages for the individual's own use, the use of the individual's family and guests... That would appear to make the transformation ok. However, the issue is if you look at the definition for wine, NCGS § 18B-101 (9) "Unfortified wine" means any wine or alcohol consumable containing sixteen percent (16%) or less alcohol by volume made by fermentation from grapes, fruits, berries, rice, or honey; or by the addition of pure cane, beet, or dextrose sugar; or by the addition of pure brandy from the same type of grape, fruit, berry, rice, or honey that is contained in the base wine and produced in accordance with the regulations of the United States. Miracle wine isn't wine because the alcohol didn't arise from fermentation, it came from a miracle. Similarly, NCGS § 18B-101 (15) says "Malt beverage" means beer, lager, malt liquor, ale, porter, and any other brewed or fermented beverage or alcohol consumable except unfortified or fortified wine as defined by this Chapter, containing at least one-half of one percent (0.5%), and not more than fifteen percent (15%), alcohol by volume. and since it wasn't brewed or fermented, it's not a malt beverage either. Therefore, it would be a liquor, as it's an alcohol consumable containing ethyl alcohol. NCGS § 18B-101 (14) "Spirituous liquor" or "liquor" means distilled spirits or ethyl alcohol, and any alcohol consumable containing distilled spirits or ethyl alcohol, including spirits of wine, whiskey, rum, brandy, gin and all other distilled spirits and mixtures of cordials, liqueur, and premixed cocktails, in closed containers regardless of their dilution. Thus, Jesus would violate § 18B-307(b) Unlawful Manufacturing. - Except as provided in G.S. 18B-306, it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture any alcoholic beverage, except at an establishment with a Brew on Premises permit or a Winemaking on Premises permit, without first obtaining the applicable ABC permit and revenue licenses. | As you say, the roommate who was there "did not equate the sound of a running toilet with wasting water". That, I am afraid to say, is negligent: normally, when you hear constantly flowing water, you do something about it. Somebody has to pay for the water, and assuming the water is in your name, that is you. You could yell at the roommate, but legal negligence is irrelevant to the water bill. However, if there were any resulting damage (for example to wiring or walls), that is where the question of negligence would come up: you probably would be found liable for damage to the building that resulting from letting the condition persist. But unless the fill valve broke at the tank and leaked water onto the floor (which would be clearly obvious) there won't be any damage that you are liable for. I assume that the leak developed from an old part giving out. This would be normal wear and tear, for which you would not be responsible (assuming you didn't cause the problem, for example by putting concentrated bleach in the tank). You you are saying that the landlord is trying to charge you for the repairs, and on this point, the landlord is on thin ice. A landlord cannot just make up rules about assigning liability for damage: that is a matter to be determined by the courts. A tenant can do things to a fill valve that can cause a leak; and the seal has to be replaced every few years. The tenant is not liable especially for routine replacement of the fill value seal, and does not become liable because they failed to inform the landlord in a prescribed manner. Not reporting a leak within 24 hours does not contribute to the underlying failed part. You could probably contest the legality of that bit of maintenance clause 24, in that the landlord cannot unilaterally declare who is responsible for damage. At the trial, both sides will present relevant evidence, and the judge / jury will decide whether the tenant's negligence caused the seal to fail. | See Holt v. Hobbs 574 U.S. ____ (2015) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U.S. ____ (2014): Under RLUIPA, the challenging party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious exercise is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief The test is ignorant as to whether the person's belief happens to match an "expected" profile of a particular religion, although if it did, that would go some way to establishing that the belief is a sincerely held religious belief. In Holt v. Hobbs, Gregory Holt requested that he be allowed to grow a 1/2 inch beard in prison. In oral argument, Justice Scalia noted that the religious requirement is to grow a full beard [...] I mean, you're still violating your religion Counsel for Holt responded: Well, the religious teaching is a full beard. He testified that religiously half an inch is better than nothing. [...] A partial beard is better than none. And that's not just in secular terms. That's also in religious terms. The court ruled in favour of Holt. That his belief differed from the strictest interpretation of the religious text was not relevant. | It depends in part why you think he owes you money: is it about real estate in the US, it is about his role as executor or heir in an estate, does it relate to professional or commercial activity outside his official function? This is covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Article 31. If so, you can sue him the regular way. Enforcement of a judgment can be a challenge, since he can't he held in contempt for ignoring the order, and the police can't enter the embassy to take property. A theoretical alternative would be to take the case to the local Archdiocese, but Canon 366 precludes that "the seat of a pontifical legation is exempt from the power of governance of the local ordinary unless it is a question of celebrating marriages", so taking your case to the Archdiocese of Washington is pointless. Consequently, I think the case would have to be presented to the Roman Rota. But from what I can tell, unless this situation is a violation of church law, you will fail to state a cognizable claim. | Nope. Even if we were to accept this definition of law as some written decree, and I'm unsure that's the case1, there are civilisations with written law that predate the Ten Commandments. Babylonian Law (c.1800 BC) predates the Ten Commandments. Also, the Code of Ur-Nammu predates even that (c.2050 BC). 1. Most definitions of law don't require that it be written, but rather that it is some system of rules that govern the behaviour of some group of people. | Thus being a fundamental question of constitutional law, this translates into asking how SCOTUS would likely rule given a certain situation where e.g. there was no confession and the two-witness requirement is not satisfied. In the case of Cramer v. US, 325 U.S. 1, the direct testimony of two or more witnesses established that "Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged; that they drank together, and that they engaged long and earnestly in conversation", but "There was no proof by two witnesses of what they said, or in what language they conversed; no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to their mission, or that he had any to give; no showing of any effort at secrecy, they having met in public places, and no evidence that Cramer furnished them shelter, sustenance, or supplies, or that he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks". The ruling (in favor of the defendant) focused on the fact that what was suffiently witnessed was not treasonous (drinks and conversation are not overt acts of treason). The court assigns some significance to the testimony of a single witness Kopp, stating that To the extent that his conviction rests upon such evidence, and it does to an unknown but considerable extent, it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness not without strong emotional interest in the drama of which Cramer's trial was a part. The fact that the evidence was uncorroborated is dispositive in this case. There has not been a case where a conviction was supported only by circumstantial evidence, and the language of the Constitution plus the meaning of "testimony of a witness" is clear enough that it would be a major break with legal tradition to say that circumstantial evidence can substitute for direct evidence (testimony). A video recording cannot testify, only a person can testify. A person can testify that they watched a video, but they cannot testify that they directly witnessed defendant making a certain statement. Rather they can testify that they inferred from watching the video that defendant made a statement. This is not to say that some SCOTUS could not find a path for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, but that would be a significant break from existing tradition. | I am guessing that you are asking this because you are interested in being an officiant at a marriage ceremony. There are many options, including the Church of Universal Life, for example. The legal question is what ordination is acceptable for the purpose for which you intend to use it. Different states have different laws about who may officiate a wedding ceremony. It is important that you be certain you are permitted to do so with whatever ordination you are seeking. Although I believe there will be more litigation about this in years to come, not all states allow "internet ministers" to perform wedding ceremonies. You may need to contact an attorney in the state to be sure, and this is advisable because marriages have very significant legal and property implications. You do not want a couple to have their marriage deemed void because you were the officiant in a state that does not allow that. This could affect everything from taxes to property ownership to the right to make medical decisions for each other. As a general rule, tourist destinations and states with more secular populations are more likely to allow these marriages. I believe Pennsylvania also allows the couple to self-solemnize the ceremony, growing out of the customs of the Society of Friends. The bottom line is that the answer is state-specific. | A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth. |
If a crime happens between two parties in different countries over the internet, what laws apply? Lets say, for the sake of example, it's a severe crime (punishable by jail time) in the United States to say that someone stinks. Person A is from Brazil where no such law exists Person B is from the United States Person A says "You stink" publicly to Person B on Twitter. What would happen? Would Person A get away with it or would they be extradited and judged under US law? | The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with. | Countries can prosecute people for their actions in any part of the world, but generally only do so for certain crimes. In other words, whether the country is likely to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction depends a lot on what "action A" is. For example, many countries reserve the right to prosecute crimes against humanity and similar violations of international law in their national courts. The accused need not be a citizen of that country. The US can prosecute its citizens for having sex with children anywhere in the world. On the other hand, a US citizen doesn't need to worry about being prosecuted in the US for a relatively minor crime if the action occurs in a foreign jurisdiction, such as for possessing a controlled substance. | The general answer is "yes." Who ever said that only one set of laws applied? Jurisdiction isn't a matter of "one country's laws matter here, let's find out which one it is." All jurisdiction means is that your laws apply to the conduct, not that no one else's can as well. Broadly, there are a few sources of jurisdiction that are generally considered legitimate (to at least some degree) in international law: Territoriality: You have jurisdiction over actions performed in your territory. You also have jurisdiction over crimes where just one part of the crime happens in your jurisdiction (e.g. standing in country A and shooting someone in country B), or even if it just has a significant effect in your territory. Nationality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed by your citizens anywhere in the world, regardless of whether or not they were breaking the law of wherever they were. Passive personality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed against your citizens anywhere in the world. Protective: You have jurisdiction over crimes directly harming core state interests, like counterfeiting your passports or sabotaging your warship. Universal: A handful of crimes (like piracy or genocide) are so serious that every country in the world can exercise jurisdiction. If you catch a pirate, you can punish them. These are accepted to different degrees. Passive personality and protective jurisdiction tend to be iffier; territorial jurisdiction is unquestioned (although if it's just based on effects in your territory, it becomes a bit iffier as well). But any of them can be a basis for jurisdiction. If multiple countries have jurisdiction, whoever actually has the offender decides who will try them (jurisdiction to make an arrest is limited to the country in which the arrest is made). So: If you're located in a country, you have to comply with their laws, and they can regulate just about whatever they want, including what you're doing to foreign computers. The foreign country can also generally regulate what you're doing, because part of what you're doing is happening on their territory. Even if both you and the computer are in a foreign country, you may have to answer to the courts of your country of citizenship. Depending on what exactly you're doing, the protective principle may come into play. For instance, if you hack into a computer on a foreign military base, the foreign country could prosecute you for endangering their security. If you're coordinating a genocide, universality applies and anyone can prosecute you. If you hack the computer of a foreigner, passive personality may apply, although this tends to be controversial. | Caveats Obviously, I can't know the law of every jurisdiction and based my answer below on U.S. law. I have seen cases over the last few years on all of these points, but don't have all of the relevant references immediately at hand and I am instead working from memory. It is also a new and rapidly developing area of the law. People are always coming up with new kinds of conduct that were never thought of before which when analyzed appear to violate some kind of legal duty. A good rule of thumb is that if something novel seems intuitively wrongful it is usually possible to come up with a legal theory to impose liability for doing it by framing the situation in a way that analogizes it to more old school wrongful conduct. Overview All of these forms of liability require proof of more than the link alone, even though the link establishes one necessary part of the liability claim. There must also be some sort of contract or implied-in-fact agreement of people affected by the link, rather than arising purely from posting the link alone under a statute or tort law (tort law is the law of legal liability enforceable in lawsuits by a person harmed by wrongful conduct on grounds other than a contract or statute). Generally, that agreement is either an abuse of an otherwise legitimate contractual relationship by one of the parties to the contract (or an affiliate of one of the parties to the contract), or is agreement to work together to further someone else's tortious or criminal conduct. (Tortious conduct is wrongful conduct that gives rise to civil liability that can be enforced in a lawsuit, whether or not it is a crime). Generally speaking a link that was legitimate at the time and became illegitimate after the fact wouldn't sufficient for third-party beneficiary liability in this way. This is because most kinds of liability require intent to do something, knowledge that you are doing something, recklessness, willful and wanton conduct, negligence or some other threshold of liability greater than mere strict liability after the fact. Put another way, I have never seen a case where there is a legal duty to police links that have gone bad after they are posted in circumstances where the person who let the link go bad did expressly undertake an obligation to keep the links valid and to regularly monitor them, which almost no one does. An example that would be the exception to the rule would be a third-party website provider to a business that has a contract to regularly update and monitor the firm's website, for a firm like a grocery store or retail vendor that doesn't want stale coupons or discounts to be advertised, where this might be a breach of contract by the active third-party firm website operator. For most purposes, there is no liability Linking to a website does not, under U.S. law, constitute a copyright violation or a basis, in and of itself, for a defamation claim or trademark violation, related to the content of the destination site. I am not comfortable that this would be true in all jurisdictions. For example, I wouldn't be surprised if a country that adopted Islamic law as its supreme law would impose criminal or quasi-criminal liability upon someone linking to a website that violated that country's blasphemy laws, even the the linked site is legitimate in the place where it is made. TOS Violations Some links that exist for SEO (search engine optimization) purposes to a legitimate website can violate a terms of service (TOS) agreement at the website where the link is placed or of the Internet service provider (ISP) involved, with the usual consequence being that the website or Internet service provider can drop you and cease to provide service to you, even if you paid a subscription fee for that website or ISP that is not refundable in the case of a TOS violation. Strictly speaking, this isn't really "legal liability" but it would provide a justification for a self-help remedy that causes economic harm to the person engaged in violating the TOS with SEO conduct. Conceivably, a TOS violation could establish a duty that could provide a basis for someone other than the firm with whom the TOS violator agreed to the TOS, if the TOS violation caused harm to a third-party beneficiary of the TOS, but I've never actually seen a case brought successfully on that theory. And, generally speaking, a link to a legitimate website wouldn't cause legally recognized harm to a third-party who clicked on it. One situation where a TOS violation might give rise to liability to a third-party, however, would be a link designed to facilitate a denial of service attack that causes economic harm to the victim by preventing it from doing economically beneficial business with actual customers. Conspiracy liability Conceivably, if someone is directly to a website that is being used to conduct securities fraud or some other kind of fraud, or child pornography, there could be liability on a civil conspiracy or a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime at the linked site, but the link in and of itself wouldn't suffice to prove that case. Instead, one would have to show that there was an overt coordination with the primary violators at the destination website by the person linking to them, as part of an intentional effort to further the conspiracy and that the link was one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (generally also including other overt acts and generally in a case where the plaintiff or criminal prosecutor can show some motive to advance the conspiracy such as a sharing of profits from the conspiracy, or a family relationship to the primary offender, or reason to want to seek revenge against the victim(s) of the primary offense). The last sentence of the question, however, seems to not apply to this particular situation when it says: The hyperlink is to legitimate websites atleast at time of hyperlinking ok. Click Fraud SEO type links can also give rise to liability if you have a contract with a service that compensates you based upon the number of times that a web address is viewed (a.k.a. per "click"), for example, a Spotify song or a Webtoon comic or a streaming video service or an online marketing contract where you are being paid for sending traffic to a site that is marketing to third-parties. These cases are often called "click fraud" cases even when the theory of liability is not common law fraud. The theory of liability in these case is that you have (1) breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, or (2) breached a specific contractual term to that effect, or (3) engaged in fraud (both civil and potentially criminal wire and mail fraud), or (4) engaged in the deceptive trade practice of false advertising (potentially a third-party or attorney-general could do this too, but the damages cases would be very weak). This is because either (1) you are being paid for third-party clicks intended to reach the destination in question, but are artificially inflating that count with links that you or (2) your confederates generate, or by links that mislead third-parties into going to a site that they will react negatively too, tarnishing the reputation of the person paying for the clicks pursuant to the contract. Usually lawsuits of this type a brought by the party paying for the clicks against a person who was overpaid until a click based compensation contract to recover an overpayment under that contract arising due to this misconduct. But Wikipedia identifies some circumstances in which there can be suits involving non-contracting party: A secondary source of click fraud is non-contracting parties, who are not part of any pay-per-click agreement. This type of fraud is even harder to police, because perpetrators generally cannot be sued for breach of contract or charged criminally with fraud. Examples of non-contracting parties are: Competitors of advertisers: These parties may wish to harm a competitor who advertises in the same market by clicking on their ads. The perpetrators do not profit directly but force the advertiser to pay for irrelevant clicks, thus weakening or eliminating a source of competition. Competitors of publishers: These persons may wish to frame a publisher. It is made to look as if the publisher is clicking on its own ads. The advertising network may then terminate the relationship. Many publishers rely exclusively on revenue from advertising and could be put out of business by such an attack. Other malicious intent: As with vandalism, there are many motives for wishing to cause harm to either an advertiser or a publisher, even by people who have nothing to gain financially. Motives include political and personal vendettas. These cases are often the hardest to deal with, since it is difficult to track down the culprit, and if found, there is little legal action that can be taken against them. Friends of the publisher: Sometimes upon learning a publisher profits from ads being clicked, a supporter of the publisher (like a fan, family member, political party supporter, charity patron or personal friend) will click on the ads to help. This can be considered patronage. However, this can backfire when the publisher (not the friend) is accused of click fraud. This link identifies and describes in some detail five leading click fraud cases: Motogolf.com vs Top Shelf (2020) – sporting goods, ongoing case TriMax Media vs Wickfire (2017) - digital advertising, $2.3 million Satmodo vs Whenever Communications (2017) - satellite phones, dismissed RootZoo vs Facebook (2012) - ruling denying motion for class certification Lane’s Gifts and Collectibles vs Google (2006) - $96 million settlement | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. | Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution. | Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal). | Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A. |
Is standing on a sidewalk with a sign that says "Slow down, Speed trap ahead" illegal? Police set up a speed trap on a busy intersection. Bob decides to create a sign that says "Slow down, Speed trap ahead" and get way ahead of the speed trap to slow people down. He is slowly walking up the sidewalk. Is Bob breaking the law? | I believe there are courts that have affirmed convictions for obstructing official business or something along those lines, but the general consensus seems to be that conduct like this is not a crime, or that it cannot be criminalized without violating the First Amendment. The most recent decision on point came just a few weeks ago. In Friend v. Gasparino, No. 20-3644 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023), a man sued police for arresting him because he had set up a sign saying "Cops Ahead" two blocks away from where they were running an operation to enforce distracted-driving laws. The trial court dismissed the case, holding (1) that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment because it was "of little, if any, public concern"; and (2) that even if it was protected, the officer's conduct in arresting him satisfied strict scrutiny because if police wanted to prevent distracted driving, there was no less restrictive alternative to arresting the plaintiff. But the Second Circuit reversed, holding (1) that speech remains protected even if it is not a matter of public concern; and (2) that there was no evidence that limiting the plaintiff's speech was necessary to permit the state to write citations and enforce the law, even if it would have been helpful. | Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either. | From Rule 170 of the Highway Code: watch out for pedestrians crossing a road into which you are turning. If they have started to cross they have priority, so give way If this was indeed the case, then it suggests that the OP had right of way, and the driver was at fault. In any case, the driver should have indicated before turning. | You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes? | I'll assume a real question here and not one about a fan film on YouTube. Take the trash from a trash deposit container outside my neighbor's house, without asking permission? All depends on the locality; and sometimes the law is not settled, either. Some cities have passed laws that deem trash to be city's property as soon as it is placed in a city-supplied trash bin, because the city (or a private contractor) hauls to and owns the landfill. Other cities claim legal ownership of recyclables when placed on the curb, for the obvious reason that they are worth money. The law can be not settled if objects are in alleys and not in trash bins, or simply placed on the curb. For the sake of discussion, there are numerous examples of cities looking the other way with scavengers and pickers; it all depends on the location and the enforcement. (And, there are examples of the police being able to legally pull evidence from trash; but that's not the question here.) Go to the landfill, load some trash into my truck, then drive away? Think about it: you're obviously not going to be able to do this in a location with a managed landfill with employees that check you in and take your tipping fee. If it's a private trash contractor, it's private property; for a city, it's probably against the contract you signed when you paid to dump and probably against city law to salvage from the landfill, for liability reasons. (That doesn't mean the employees at the landfill can't salvage themselves; that's up to them.) But like anything, at an unmanaged landfill in a rural area, you could probably get away with it. | California Vehicle Code chapter 11, division 7, article 1, section 22350: No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. Section 22358.5: It is the intent of the Legislature that physical conditions such as width, curvature, grade and surface conditions, or any other condition readily apparent to a driver, in the absence of other factors, would not require special downward speed zoning, as the basic rule of section 22350 is sufficient regulation as to such conditions. Without knowing exactly what questions the officer was asked, it's impossible to know why you were ticketed and why you were found guilty, but "reasonable or prudent" and "endangers the safety of [others]" covers a great deal of ground. | (Converting comment into an answer) You could sue for criminal damage, if any actual damage is caused during the removal of those notices - however, that will cost you an initial outlay in solicitors fees and court costs and isn't guaranteed to have a successful outcome. You could also just take this as a learnable event and not park in other peoples spots? The owner of the parking spot may have the legal right to have your car removed at your expense, and/or issue you with a penalty charge if suitable notices have been posted, so you might consider yourself to have got off lightly here perhaps? | Interesting question! I believe all of the examples can be addressed by the following rules: A vehicle on a roadway has the right-of-way over a vehicle not on a roadway. Therefore, the vehicle leaving a parking lot always yields to a vehicle in a parallel road. Absent another rule, the vehicle on the right always has the right-of-way. So if two vehicles are leaving adjacent parking lots, the left one waits for the right one to go if there is any potential conflict. Of course, not enough people know these rules, so in practice if you can't get the vehicle with the legal right-of-way to take it I teach drivers to be as decisive and cautious as possible: I.e., take the right-of-way, but not so fast that you can't avoid the other vehicle if it decides to go after all, because legally you will be at fault in a collision. (Though it's anyone's guess how police and insurers would settle the tricky scenarios you illustrate.) |
What is denoted by “operation of law”? I had only previously encountered the phrase as in “surrender by operation of law” until just now I read the latter portion of the phrase used independently by user @ohwilleke in another answer. What does the component phrase “operation of law” denote? | "by operation of law" means that something happens automatically even if nobody does something about it. For example, if property is owned in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, it becomes the sole property of the surviving owner automatically and instantaneously when the other co-owner of the property dies, even if documenting that in the public record takes time. Similarly, you get the right to buy beer in Colorado immediately after midnight on your twenty-first birthday, without having to apply to any agency to active this right. And, if you have a claim with a two year statute of limitations and two years and a day pass after the event triggering the statute passes, your claim is extinguished by operation of law even though no court has said so. | You will note that the quoted definition says that person includes a corporation sole, a body corporate, and an unincorporated body What it doesn't say, but almost certainty intends, is that "person" also includes a natural person, that is an ordinary human being with a single body. What is happening here (I think) is that the law is specifying all the other things that will be treated in some way like a natural person, while it also assumes the "ordinary" or "plain English" meaning of person. Also, the law is assuming all the ordinary standard legal terminology, such as "corporation sole" and only giving definitions where the usage is in some way different from the standard meaning, or where there are multiple meanings in common use and it wants tom specify one. This makes the law shorter, but harder to understand for anyone not well-versed in that specific legal tradition (a non-lawyer, or say a lawyer from a civil-law country). So I am reasonably confident that you are, in fact, a person under this law. (Unless perhaps you are actually a robot or a space alien, after all on the net who knows. LOL) | The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem. | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | S88 Closing roads and public places: ...totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or without vehicles, to any road or public place... S91(1)(a) Power to give directions: direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency That is what "this Act otherwise provides"; S6 that you cited only works "unless": Unless this Act otherwise provides, this Act does not limit, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the functions, duties, or powers of any person under the provisions of any enactment or any rule of law. Also, from another angle, "functions, duties, or powers" are not the same thing as "rights": the Act does not limit the former (unless provides otherwise), but nowhere does it say it does not limit the latter. | "Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. | Is a country an institution or an entity? Neither. It's a sovereign state (a "political entity", not an entity in the sense of a legal persona). |
Who owns money (EUR) as a thing in the EU? The European Central Bank prints money (EUR) and puts it into circulation. It is therefore the first owner. Are persons who take possession of the money also owners at the same time? I am talking here about possession and ownership. Or does the ECB remain the owner? | A possessor in good faith owns currency Currency is owned by the person who has it provided they came into possession legitimately. Currency is a small category of goods, known as negotiable instruments, where the person who has it, owns it. Unless, they came into possession in an illegitimate way, such as by stealing it or finding it (and not handing it in to the authorities). If they received it in the course of a legitimate transaction - wages, payment for goods or services, etc. - then they own it even if the currency was previously tainted. Contrast this with, say, a car, where the legitimate owner remains the legitimate owner no matter who is in possession. Now, there are usually laws that prohibit the destruction of currency even if you own it, but that doesn’t change the fact that you own it. For comparison, there are laws against dumping your car in the river but it’s still your car. | Yes, you can borrow tax-free Bitcoin (or really, any currency not your home currency) is a security like a stock or bond. Whenever you take a loan using a security as collateral, that is not a taxable event, and so you do not owe taxes on the money you borrowed. Perfect world, you pay it back and this is not taxable either: the loan/repayment is a non-event to the tax authorities. (Although interest might be tax deductible). When this goes wrong: you default If you default and keep your collateral, at some point, the lender decides you'll never pay, and forgives aka "writes off" the loan. This forgiveness is considered ordinary income and it is taxable in the year forgiven. In the US this is waived if you can show that you were insolvent at the time of default. When this goes wrong: forced sale of collateral The collateral is still your property. The bank just has a lien on it or other form of control, like it's in your brokerage account in their bank such that they can flag it, force sale, and intercept funds. When the bank forces sale of your collateral to pay your debt, that is a sale of the security for tax purposes. The proceeds go to you (as far as the tax person is concerned), even though the bank certainly will intercept the proceeds. So the tax liability goes to you. Note that standard capital gains rules apply, so if you owned it less than 1 year when you signed up for the loan, yet the bank forced the sale after 1 year of ownership, then it counts as holding the security longer than 1 year for tax purposes. (e.g. qualifying for the lower "long term capital gains" rate in the US). | In the Netherlands, this qualifies as a deceptive trade practice (misleidende handelspraktijk) and is therefore directly illegal. It's likely also an unfair trade practice, (oneerlijke handelspraktijk) as the claim appears intended for end consumers. This means that the seller cannot count on the consumer knowing anythong about stuffase. It is a dutch implementation of EU directive 2005/29/EG, so similar laws apply in other EU countries. But the illegal per se part might vary. | In the US, a house Title determines ownership, the name on the mortgage determines who owes the bank money. But a new mortgage will need the title holder to be on the document, because you cannot use someone else's real property as collateral. As to who can evict someone, it's the property owner, not the mortgage holder. | If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries. | This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution. | The document involves the bank cancelling the deed of trust (i.e. basically the mortgage) that you gave to the bank for the loan, because it was paid in full. In a deed of trust, the legal fiction is that you transfer the property to a trustee for the benefit of the bank. The bank was a grantee of an equitable interest in the property and a beneficiary of the trustee of the deed of trust. You were the grantor in the original transaction, giving the property to the trustee of the deed of trust, in which the bank and the trustee were grantees. Now, the bank is the grantor giving back to you what you gave up when the deed of trust was created, and you are the grantee of the rights that the bank acquired under the deed of trust. This is a routine document with nothing that seems to be amiss or needs to be clarified. It just means that the deed of trust is gone and that the property is now free and clear again. Depending upon local real estate practice, it may need to be recorded to establish that fact in the public record. | No GDPR applies to people (not just citizens) who are in the EU. It has no applicability if both parties are not in the EU. |
If a witness asks for their lawyer during a trial, how is it handled? A criminal trial is going on. Andy the Attorney asks Walter the Witness some questions. After a while, Walter realizes he's been an idiot, and says he wants his Lawyer Larry. How does the court proceed? Do they set up a second trial with Walter and Larry before they can proceed with the first trial? Or what? Two examples: Walter said one thing (which wasn't exactly true), and Andy brought up evidence that Walter was lying. Walter would rightly like to consult his lawyer Larry at this point before saying anything else. Walter idiotically admits to a crime while serving as a witness. Walter would obviously want to consult with his lawyer Larry at this point, to amend his original statements. I am not a lawyer, so sorry if I'm completely ignorant of witness/court proceedings. | Generally speaking, witnesses are not legally represented at trial, unless they are also parties. While a witness may choose to seek legal advice about a request or order they have received to give evidence, they would generally be expected to take this opportunity before they actually show up at trial. A witness examination would not normally be adjourned because a witness said something damaging to their own credibility or to one party’s case, and would like to pause and obtain legal advice. One goal of cross-examination is to expose unreliable evidence by obtaining this kind of tactical advantage over a witness. It is up to the party whose case was damaged to try to fix the problem in re-examination or reply evidence. That party may not be particularly interested in protecting the witness’s personal interests. There may be exceptions in specific factual situations, when it becomes clear that a witness does not understand their right to object to giving evidence on the grounds of self-incrimination or some other privilege. A judge may choose to halt further questioning of the witness if there is a real risk of a mistrial or some other procedural unfairness, which can be addressed without unfairly depriving the cross-examiner of their opportunity to challenge the evidence. | Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case. | The judge would reject the defendant's guilty plea and proceed to trial. This is a common part of a plea colloquy, which is a standard (often scripted) conversation that occurs between the judge and a defendant who is pleading guilty to ensure that the plea is voluntary and made with knowledge of its possible consequences. It seeks to ensure that the defendant is aware of what they're charged with and the consequences of their plea, and that they were not improperly pressured into pleading guilty—for example, because they felt that their lawyer wasn't doing a good enough job. This is required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11, which requires that: Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement) Many (possibly most/all) US states have similar rules. For example, Pennsylvania law states that "The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and shall not accept it unless the judge determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered." Examples of scripted questions to establish this include: Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this case by your attorney, Mr./Ms. __________? Are you satisfied with the services of your lawyer? [ Mr./Ms. defendant ], are you satisfied with the representation you have received from [ Mr./Ms. defense counsel]? If the defendant answered that they were not satisfied (and continued to give that answer when informed of the consequences of doing so, as occurred in the below example), the judge would reject the guilty plea and proceed to trial. It's remarkably difficult to find a case in which anyone has actually done this. The only one I could find was this New Jersey case in which the "defendant would not agree on the form that he was satisfied with defense counsel's work." The judge informed the defendant in various ways that this would lead to the plea being rejected and proceeding to trial: Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. ... The only other thing I can do is schedule you for trial, Mr. Cuevas, which you are entitled to. Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. I can't take your plea after you're telling me that you're dissatisfied with your lawyer. If I can't take your plea because it's not appropriate and it's not legal, the only other thing I can do is schedule the case for trial. | Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints. | The old saying: Being your own lawyer means you have a fool as the lawyer and a fool as the client. If one fool calls the other fool as a witness, that's even more foolish. And the worst crime is annoying the judge with your antics. Opposing council will just take note of every question you ask and your replies, and then call you as witness themself. And assuming they are a proper lawyer, everything they ask will be hurting you. No need to accuse you as "leading" or "badgering" the witness. | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. |
Is it illegal to download data from a misconfigured server that is open to the public? Bob has a website that he hosts online and is open to the public. A portion of the site has "members only" data. However, Bob implemented his security protection of this sensitive data incorrectly. So when Alice clicks the link to view the protected data, instead of being prompted to login or sign up. She just gets access to the data. Has Alice broken the law if she unintentionally views/downloads the members only data? | The most apparent potential offences would be under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, but these require the mens rea of "knowingly" or "intentionally" doing things without authorization, or doing so "with intent to defraud", etc. See also the Department of Justice's manual entry on this family of offences. Particularly relevant is this quote: As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Given your stipulation that the person has unintentionally viewed or downloaded the material without authorization, this would not be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. | You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR. | Yes such a username would be personal data. It is information that relates to an identifiable person. In this context,a person isn't identifiable only if you can infer their real-world identity, but already if you can single out one person's records. Thus, your random IDs and any linked information would be personal data as well. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean that processing it is illegal. It just means you need a legal basis. That could be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject (like saving game progress), a legitimate interest, or consent. Taking into account GDPR principles like "data protection by design and by default", it could be sensible to hide a players stats from the leaderboard until they give consent. On the other hand, you may have a legitimate interest to provide leaderboard data for ranking/comparison, especially if the leaderboard entries are pseudonymized. In any case, it should be clear to the users which information is visible to others. | If you aren’t the intended recipient of the password-protected file: StGB § 202a makes it illegal to access this file StGB § 202c makes it illegal to obtain (e.g., by brute forcing) the password for this file, if you intend to access the file that way (in the sense of § 202a) (this is the so-called hacker paragraph) If you are the intended recipient, this law doesn’t seem to apply, and it shouldn’t be illegal to brute-force the password. | Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged. | There is no general prohibition against taking down material, even non-infringing material, which is posted by some person, but there is a risk to the service provider. Abstracting away from the specifics of github, a Provider has some agreement with the User whereby User rightfully makes Stuff available on Provider's site. Arbitrarily removing Stuff (in violation of the usage agreement) may cause damage to User, who may sue Provider, and Provider will avoid that if possible. DMCA protects Provider from copyright infringement suits by Victim, providing the proper DMCA procedure is followed, and it allows Provider to remove Stuff without fear of getting sued by User (17 USC 512(g)). This protection is not available if the takedown notice is not proper. (As a case in point, the entire series of Harry Potter books is still out there freely on the internet, because only the rights holder can demand a takedown, and the rights holder seems to not be concerned). | I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions. | Your code is considered free speech (Bernstein v. United States) and you have allowed the use of the code via the MIT license. Since the application of your code is very generic and is not specifically targeting anyone. You probably are not criminally liable. This is simply writing a "Proof of Concept" for security testing purposes. That same way Metasploit, Nessus, and Nmap have actual exploit code but are considered tools of the trade. Now if you go around using your spyware on non consenting victims. You might get a visit from some people with guns and badges that have 3 letters on them. |
What is the purpose of a Corporation Sole? Why must an organisation represent the idea of an individual, rather than the organisation acting in its own capacity while the individual simply sits as its head? In other words, why do case workers of the ICO form the Information Commissioner's Office, rather than the Information Commissioner simply serving as the head of the Information Commission or Information Rights Office or something like that? What function does this notion of a corporation sole serve? | The Information Commissioner is the successor of the Data Protection Registrar, created by the Data Protection Act 1984. The office was renamed in 1998 and again in 2000, and the functions have changed along the way. The current governing legislation is the Data Protection Act 2018, schedule 12. There have been many suggestions of changing the structure - such as the ICO's Triennal Review of 2015, and the Leveson Inquiry Report (see sections 4.8 and 4.9, p1109 of volume 3) of 2012 - but that has not happened. So your sense that the "corporation sole" model is a bit unusual is shared by many distinguished minds, and even in 1984 it was probably anomalous, judging by a quick scan of contemporaneous legislation. For example, the "Cable Authority" established in the same year was created as a statutory corporate body, to regulate cable television. Ultimately, the Data Protection Registrar and the Cable Authority could do the same sorts of things, as far as employing people, acquiring property, entering into contracts, and so forth. There were special rules for how the Registrar and the Authority members would be appointed - these are different rules from one another, but they are both set up by primary legislation. The differences therefore fall to be explained as a matter of policy preference, since they are both legally viable ways to establish a body performing public functions "at arm's length" from ministers. The main difference is at the leadership level, since as far as doing the job, people employed in the ICO are in the same position regardless of whether they work for a corporation sole or aggregate. If there is one person in charge, then you have a single "head" salary to pay, a single selection process to run to find them, and a single point of accountability to government and to Parliament. If there is a board of directors then they all have to get chosen somehow, and responsibility can be more diffuse. But having several people can lead to better decision-making, and could make the organization appear less biased by having balanced representation. In fact, prior to the Act of 1984, the creation of a Data Protection Authority (rather than a sole registrar) had been proposed many times, most notably by the Lindop Committee which reported on the matter in 1978. The idea of a registrar was developed in the Government's 1982 paper, Data Protection: The Government's Proposals for Legislation (Cmnd 8539), which led up to the Act. That recommended that there be a single independent official who would be accountable for the work, but that he would be assisted by an expert committee. Additionally, a Data Protection Tribunal would take care of the resulting legal disputes. In the actual legislation, the expert committee was not made statutory, because the government felt that it would be too difficult to define what it ought to do in a way that would stand the test of time (see HL Deb 19 July 1983, vol 443 col 1084 for a Lords committee debate on this topic). The "corporation sole" legal structure gives maximal flexibility to how the Registrar would organize the office over time, while still doing the legal mechanics to give it independent personality. | Short answer: There is no difference. Long answer: Come, ride with me through the veins of history. I'll show you a god who falls asleep on the job. (And how can we win, when fools can be kings? Don't waste your time or time will waste you.) The word 'company' (as in a corporation) is derived from the word 'company' (as in a group of people, like the Company of the Ring). The word 'corporation' reflects the fact that the organisation has an independent existence for legal purposes, that is, it metaphorically has a 'body' ('corpus') or has been 'incorporated'. (If you have ever wondered why corporate culture is so boring then consider the common etymology of the words 'corporation' and 'corpse'.) Before there were incorporated companies, there were 'joint stock companies'. The term 'joint stock' referred to the fact that members of the company (analogous to what we would today call shareholders) jointly held the 'stock' (as in 'inventory') of the company. This use of the term 'stock' to describe a type of company makes no sense in today's language, but originally the term was used to distinguish a 'joint stock company' from a guild (also known as a company) where the members each maintained their own inventory. For example, in the Worshipful Company of Stationers and Newspaper Makers (the printers' guild in London, which managed censorship on behalf of the government in exchange for the right to suppress piracy), each printer had their own stock of paper and finished products; in contrast the Muscovy Company had a single stock of wool that it took over to Russia and a single stock of furs that it brought back to sell in London (the 'joint stock'). (The early joint stock companies were of course technically partnerships, which is why, in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, the definition of 'partnership' excludes a company and the definition of 'company' excludes a partnership, forming a neat circle which everybody ignores in practice because they want money. Incidentally, as you would imagine, a limited partnership, which may be incorporated, is a partnership rather than a company for tax purposes, unless it is a 'corporate limited partnership' in which case it is a company. But that is tax law, you must never go there Simba.) So anyway, back in the day, if you had put 10% of the capital into a joint stock company then you could be said to have a right to 10% of the 'stock' of the company. Over time, as the trade in interests in companies evolved, the term 'stock' came to refer to a member's rights in respect to the company, e.g. 'I own stock in the XYZ Company.' Since what you hold is a share in the stock of the company, it was said that the member held a 'share'. Subject to company law and the company's constitution, etc, a company could split or merge shares. So, if you had 100 shares in the company, the company might split each share into 10 shares, giving you 1,000 shares. Back before we had electronic computers and the Internet, keeping track of shares was a lot of work. If a person had 1,000 shares then you might have to move around 1,000 printed share certificates. Therefore the practice developed of converting a person's shares in a company into stock. Stock representing 1,000 shares could be documented as a single item instead of 1,000 items. (Of course, you could still sell one 1,000th of that stock if you wanted to.) Of course a shareholder could never convert their shares into stock. That would make no sense. Shares (or stock for that matter) do not exist outside of the records of the company. Therefore the company, or more precisely the directors on behalf of the company, must be the ones to convert shares into stock or vice versa. The terminology that developed, and which persists to this day outside of strict legal contexts, is: a 'share' is a single unit of ownership in the company; 'stock' is the whole of a person's ownership in the company. In Morrice v Aylmer (1875) LR 7 HL 717, the House of Lords confirmed that a bequest (in a will) of the deceased's 'shares' would imply a bequest of their 'stock'. So, even in a legal context, there's not much of a distinction. The one distinction of note is this: you cannot have partly-paid 'stock'. If shares are only partly-paid, then you have to keep track of them individually. You can't have the company converting a bunch of shares to stock, not distinguishing between which are paid up and by how much, and then converting them back into shares, with who-knows-what consequences (probably none to be frank, but we're talking about 19th-century information processing systems here). Therefore there was the rule that you can only convert shares to stock if they are fully paid-up. In Australia, in the 1995 draft of the Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill (written by the Attorney General's Department's 'Simplification Task Force') it was proposed to abolish 'stock' and force all Australian companies to convert stock into shares. This proposal became law in the Company Law Review Act 1998, and today is reflected in section 254F of the Corporations Act 2001, which says that a company cannot issue stock or convert shares into stock. | That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small. | The same page at the ICO website also lists what an organisation should do if they refuse to comply with a request: What should we do if we refuse to comply with a request? You must inform the individual without undue delay and within one month of receipt of the request. You should inform the individual about: the reasons you are not taking action; their right to make a complaint to the ICO or another supervisory authority; and their ability to seek to enforce this right through a judicial remedy. You should also provide this information if you request a reasonable fee or need additional information to identify the individual. Even if they did not inform you about this, the last two bullet points basically list your options. You can make a complaint (Art. 77 GDPR), or go to court (Art. 79 GDPR) requesting the online retailer to comply with your request. (Or do both). You can request a compensation for damages, but it is often difficult to prove if you have suffered (non-material) damages. | From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info. | The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose. | What does it accomplish? It guarantees that all corporations doing business in New York can be served. (A company's having an agent for the service of process does not prohibit people from serving the corporation directly. The secretary may be "the agent upon which process may be served" but is not "the sole agent upon which process must be served." And besides, process need not be served on an agent; it can be served on the company itself, at its office or on one of its officers.) With this requirement, New York makes it impossible for a company to avoid service of process by closing or moving its offices, by sending its officers and employees out of state, or by making itself unavailable by any means. No matter what steps a company might take to avoid service of process, the process server can always resort to serving the company's agent: the Secretary of State. | As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation. |
How does Australia split its legal profession? I just got an interesting edit suggestion to my recent question by someone who just registered (perhaps for the purpose of this edit suggestion). It proposes that "lawyer" is replaced with "junior barrister" because: australia splits its legal profession, so "lawyer" is wrong It also injects a link to the professional profile of the person cited in the question. What is the deal with the splitting of the legal profession in Australia? Is that just barristers and solicitors, pretty much like in New Zealand? Or something else? Is it actually wrong to call members of the legal profession in Australia lawyers? I would guess that "lawyer" is just a general term, and the lack of specificity does not make it wrong. Am I wrong? (I presume the actual purpose of the suggested edit is to inject the link and could speculate on who the user is, but that is irrelevant to this question.) | In many Common Law nations, the distinction between solicitor and barrister is that the solicitors traditionally have direct access to clients and do much of the paperwork and discuss the planning with the clients. In some jurisdictions it was/is common practice that the barrister is not hired by the client but appointed by the judge. The barrister in turn works with the solicitor and presents the case in the court and has little to no access to the client. Historically, the division was much more stark, with solicitors working in the Court of Equity and barristers working in the Court of Common Law. Around the mid-1800s, the Court of Equity became defunct in the Common Law Legal system with the Court of Common Law fulfilling its duties and many Common Law nations changing how the split among lawyers now functions (often requiring separate tests to be a solicitor and a barrister). The split remains in England, Wales, Scotland, three states in Australia (New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria), Ireland (both the Republic and Northern Ireland), and Hong Kong. In these jurisdictions, a lawyer will hold only one title. In jurisdictions where lawyers may, or even are expected to, hold both titles, the system is called a “fused system”. Here, lawyers start their careers as one of the two and pick up the license to act in the other capacity later if they choose. This covers the jurisdictions of Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and the remaining Australian states. (Because Australia has a mix of fused and separated systems and state reciprocation, the three states with a separated system will reciprocate for states that allow for fusion. The reverse is not necessary, as fused states would only allow them for the license they already have.) The United States is fully fused and all lawyers are solicitor-barristers, for comparison’s sake. This is why the U.S. uses “attorney” and “lawyer” interchangeably despite the former being another term for barrister in certain jurisdictions (namely Scotland) while the latter term refers to solicitors and barristers collectively. The U.S. did previously have a separate system, but completely fused when Courts of Equity disappeared in the 1850s and, therefore, the term “solicitor” is still used in the legal profession, though these days it tends to be an artefact title for an office or position that predated the fusion (e.g., The Solicitor General of the United States a.k.a. the lawyer whose office represents the federal government in the Supreme Court). Modern usage of “solicitor” tends to refer to a government lawyer, and most of the states with Solicitor offices are one of the Original 13 States (not all of them, though). Only three states that were not part of the original 13 use the term (Ohio, West Virginia (likely a hold over from when it was part of Virginia, which no longer uses the term), and Oklahoma). It should be noted the average U.S. Citizens associate the word solicitor with traveling salesman or door-to-door evangelizers, and generally use the term in signage forbidding the practice on private property. | In a Bar exam hypothetical you are expected to discuss the merits of each party's cases. There are potentially many breaches here, you need to discuss them all. | In California, UPL has a flexible definition and is analyzed situationally, as is the formation of an attorney-client relationship. The shorthand definition for UPL is usually given as something like "doing what lawyers do." When your "help" goes beyond "studying law" and begins to deal with applying that law to a particular legal matter, you're definitely in the neighborhood. If you're encouraging people to compensate you monetarily, even on the sly (or perhaps especially on the sly) that's just going to make it shadier. There's no clear line that divides "assistance" from "advice" or "information" from "counsel." You're not going to find a statute or professional rule that helpfully explains just how close you can get to UPL through wink-wink-nudge-nudge "unofficial-but-maybe-you-should-still-pay-me" legal "information-but-not-advice" before liability attaches, which seems to be the drift of the question (although I understand it was edited). People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 209 P.363, 365 (1922) 'As the term is generally understood, the practice of the law is the doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity to the adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although such matter may or may not be depending in a court.' Quoting In the case of Eley v.Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836. Baron v. Los Angeles, 2 C.3d 535, 86 C.R. 673, 469 P.2d 353 (1970). "(T)he Legislature adopted the state bar act in 1927 and used the term 'practice law' without defining it. [FN7] The conclusion is obvious and inescapable that in so doing it accepted both the definition already judicially supplied for the term and the declaration of the Supreme Court (in 'Merchants') that it had a sufficiently definite meaning to need no further definition. The definition above quoted from People v. Merchants' Protective Corp. has been approved and accepted in the subsequent California decisions (citations), and must be regarded as definitely establishing, for the jurisprudence of this state, the meaning of the term 'practice law." (People v. Ring (1937) supra. 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 772, 70 P.2d 281, 283.) For comparison, the Texas Bar's UPL Committee has a digest of the applicable statutes and rules here (they also provide a few appellate decisions that might interest you). In terms of legitimately paid non-attorney help with preparing documents and the like, here's a long discussion on avoiding UPL from a Legal Document Assistant trade association site. Realistically, UPL is investigated in retrospect, mostly in response to complaints. The proper context to analyze this hypothetical is to envision the non-client furious at the non-lawyer after the case has been lost. If everything goes well the non-lawyer probably gets his "gift" and the State Bar is none the wiser. (Although I suppose there's the further wrinkle that if the non-client wins and doesn't provide the "gift" then the non-lawyer likely has no good remedy). | Yes lawyers do this. quite often in fact. There are professional and publicity reasons of course, that should suffice to not give bad advice and harm your career. But there is also a legal reason. Lawyers are responsible for the advice they give (as most professionals). If they give bad advice, they may be liable for damages! | Why is it against the law to practice law without a license? Most, if not all, jurisdictions have decided to implement a law that requires such a licence (or similar) to ensure that practitioners are properly authorised, regulated and competent in the best interests of the administration of justice and to maintain a high standard of professionalism. Any shortcomings can then be addressed either by law or the relevant regulating body. | Most advice that a lawyer gives is subjective; facts are objective but opinions are always subjective. What a lawyer does when they advise a client is typically called a "legal opinion". The reason it is subjective is that, as Dale M said, there are numerous variants that go into an opinion, and reasonably trained professionals (attorneys) can disagree as to the outcome of a specific factual predicate. Often times, case outcomes will differ based on the application of the facts to the law, so much so that the case outcome can differ based on the choice of words a witness uses, or even the way a judge interprets the law. This is why unlike truly objective discipline such as mathematics, where there is a right and wrong answer, no lawyer can ever say a case will definitely go one way or another. It will always be dependent on perception, which is the very definition of subjective. So, whoever indicated that lawyers don't give subjective advice was simply misinformed. They do. What they try not to do is make value-judgments, saying that things are good or bad; rather, they are trained to indicate whether something is illegal or not, or likely to get you sued or not. However, these are all legal opinions. | Passing the bar exam allows one to get a license to practice law. It is to some extent like a certification exam. It is in all US states a crime to practice law without a license. Exactly how "practice law" is defined varies a bit, but holding yourself out as a lawyer, opening a law office, or taking money for representing people in court is petty much always included. Other related things are often included also. Even if one has passed law school and thus earned a law degree, it is a crime to practice law without a license, and one cannot obtain a license without passing the bar exam. In some states it is possible, but hard, to pass the bar without a law degree, in some a degree is required. so the main thing a law student cannot (legally) do that one who has passed the bar exam can is practice law. Legal Sources I found this definition of the practice of law on an official Maryland web page: The “practice of law” is defined in the Maryland Code as follows: (1) “Practice law” means to engage in any of the following activities: (1) (i) giving legal advice; (1) (ii) representing another person before a unit of the state > (1) > > > (1) (iii) performing any other service that the Court of Appeals defines as practicing law. (2) “Practice law” includes: (2) (i) advising in the administration of probate of estates of decedents in an orphans court of the state; (2) (ii) preparing an instrument that affects title to real estate; (2) (iii) preparing or helping in the preparation of any form or document that is filed in a court or affects a case that is or may be filed in a court; or (2) (iv) giving advice about a case that is or may be filed in a court Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-101(h). The Court of Appeals has interpreted the practice of law to include “utilizing legal education, training, and experience [to apply] the special analysis of the profession to a client’s problem.” Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n of Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 662 (1989). In addition, meeting with potential clients may constitute the practice of law. Id. at 666. The practice of law is “ ‘a term of art connoting much more than merely working with legally related matters.’” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 649 (1999) (citations omitted). “ ‘Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer.” Id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals ruled that a bar applicant who had served as a hearing examiner for the Maryland Department of Employment & Training was not engaged in the practice of law, and therefore not eligible to take the attorney’s examination. In re Application of Mark W., 303 Md. 1, 4-6 (1985). “The hallmark of the practicing lawyer is responsibility to clients regarding their affairs, whether as advisor, advocate, negotiator, as intermediary between clients, or as evaluator by examining a client’s legal affairs.” In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 632 (1988). Also relevant is RULE 19-305.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; Law Students Under Supervision Some comment mentioned assistance in pro bono work by law students. I found Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 19-220 - Legal Assistance by Law Students which provides in pertinant part, omitting the definitions of terms: (b) Eligibility. A law student enrolled in a clinical program or externship is eligible to engage in the practice of law as provided in this Rule if the student: (b) (1) is enrolled in a law school; (b) (2) has read and is familiar with the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct and the relevant Maryland Rules of Procedure; and (b) (3) has been certified in accordance with section (c) of this Rule. (c) ... The certification shall state that the student is in good academic standing and has successfully completed legal studies in the law school amounting to the equivalent of at least one-third of the total credit hours required to complete the law school program. ... (d) Practice. In connection with a clinical program or externship, a law student for whom a certification is in effect may appear in any trial court or the Court of Special Appeals, or before any administrative agency, and may otherwise engage in the practice of law in Maryland, provided that the supervising attorney (1) is satisfied that the student is competent to perform the duties assigned, (2) assumes responsibility for the quality of the student's work, (3) directs and assists the student to the extent necessary, in the supervising attorney's professional judgment, to ensure that the student's participation is effective on behalf of the client the student represents, and (4) accompanies the student when the student appears in court or before an administrative agency. The law student shall neither ask for nor receive personal compensation of any kind for service rendered under this Rule, but may receive academic credit pursuant to the clinical program or externship. This page about the Univeristy of Maryland School of Law's public Servie program describes the program as: "one of the region’s largest public interest law firms" and states: Working alongside faculty, students provide 75,000 hours of free legal service annually to Maryland citizens in need[.] This is obviously a widely recognized and approved activity. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. |
Are underage people allowed to defend themselves in court? Bob is underage, yet commits a severe criminal act that's worthy of going to trial. Normally, one is allowed to represent themselves in court, however ill-advised that may be. But is Bob, underage as he is, allowed that same right? Feel free to set the age/crime to be whatever such that Bob would appear in court underage. | united-states The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional right to self-representation in Faretta v California, but in Godinez v. Moran, the court injected the logically prior question of competence, rejecting a mixed-bag approach to competence. The court held that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. While States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose them. The specific issue in this case is competence to plead guilty. In Indiana v. Edwards, the court stated that there is no absolute right to self-representation if one is competent to stand trial. It is held that The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that states may but are not required to insist on a specific competence to self-represent, so there can be multiple standards of competence. Second, the Edwards court put the issue more in the realm of questions of insanity, where the limit imposed on a technical minor would have to be a substantial finding of incompetence, and not just a statutory declaration that anyone below the age of 18 is ipso facto incompetent to legally defend themselves but they can be competent to stand trial. In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the court further held that nothing "requires a State to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction". This study indicates that individual states have not eagerly cleared the path to minor self-representation, noting that "Many states permit waiver by a juvenile after cursory inquiry by the court", but "Others require that the juvenile consult with a parent, lawyer or other adult". Nevertheless, "waiver of counsel is, almost without exception, connected to an 'admission,' or guilty plea", simply asserting that "Juveniles do not represent themselves at trial", and what minors waive is the right to trial. There is a lack of relevant case law citations in this study, in that no ruling is cited where the court affirms that minors are automatically incompetent to represent themselves in a criminal trial. The specifics of the qualifier "almost without exception" would be very relevant to this question. | In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). | So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent. | british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date. | The Testimony Of Children Under Oath Do Children As Young As Seven Years Old Testify In U.S. Courts? Could it actually happen in American courts? Yes. It can and does happen on a regular basis, although a seven year old is at the very lower end of the range at which children are called to testify as witnesses with any regularity. Any witness which a court determines is competent to testify, which includes many, but not all, minors, testifies under oath. Some jurisdictions have a hard and fast minimum age at which someone can be competent to testify (often age seven is the minimum), while other states make it a rule of reason for the court to evaluate on a case by case basis. Child testimony can be used in any kind of case, not just sex offenses against children or child abuse and neglect cases, although those cases are the kind of cases where child testimony is most common. Special Arrangements Sometimes Made For Child Testimony While special arrangements for the form and circumstances of that testimony can sometimes be ordered by a court (sometimes raising constitutional issues regarding whether the "confrontation clause" right of a criminal defendant is violated in a criminal case under U.S. Constitutional law), the default rule is that a minor testifies in the same manner as anyone else. Often the exact wording of the oath is changed when a child can't reasonable be expected to understand the normal wording. Perjury In Cases Of Child Testimony Under Oath If the person testifying under oath is a minor, a perjury offense would be presumptively tried in juvenile court rather than an adult criminal court. Also, it is possible that even if a child is sworn and testifying under oath, that a child will not be old enough to prosecute for the crime of perjury, even in juvenile court, if the child intentionally commits perjury. An oath has symbolic value and is believed by many people to have an effect, even when there is no credible threat of a perjury prosecution for lying under oath. In practice, perjury prosecutions, even for adults, for court testimony, are vanishingly rare even in pretty clear cases, even though the crime is committed basically every day that courts are open for business. For example, there are dozens of such prosecutions a year in Colorado including both in court and out of court sworn statements, and there are tens of thousands of evidentiary hearings and evidentiary trials each year in Colorado, or which perjury is actually committed in perhaps 5%-10% of such hearings and trials. Alternatives To Child Testimony Under Oath Evidence Of Unsworn Out Of Court Statements Made By Children It is also possible for things that a minor says to be recounted by someone who heard them said or a transcript of a conversation with someone that was not under oath (in which case it is hearsay, but may come within an exception to the hearsay rule), or via a videotape of a child saying something (which is a record to be authenticated prior to its admission). But, in both of those cases, what the child says that the court considers as evidence is not testimony. Interviews In Chambers Of Children Another process by which courts obtain information from children, often in child custody cases, is for the judge to personally interview the children, not under oath and not with testimony taken down by a court reporter, either in or outside the presence of counsel for the parties (and almost always not in the presence of parents or any audience present at a hearing) in the judges chambers. This is primarily done not to elicit evidence of facts, per se, so much as to discern the preferences, desires and concerns of the children themselves as expressed directly. Statements of preferences, desires and opinions of children, because they are not statements of fact and are instead statements of opinion, are by definition not capable of being prosecuted for perjury, since their truth or falsity is not objectively determinable. These interviews are given more weight in the case of older children than in the case of younger children and this process would not be used at all for infants or pre-schoolers. | A POA (power of attorney) does not allow one to represent someone in court. The name is confusing, it dates from a period when "attorney" meant one who acted for another, not just in court. That hasn't been a current meaning for hundreds of years except in this one expression. A POA might now be better called a "power of agency" but the inertia of terminology applies. According to Section Section 2C:21-22 of the NJ code: a. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person knowingly engages in the unauthorized practice of law. b. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if the person knowingly engages in the unauthorized practice of law and: (1) Creates or reinforces, by any means, a false impression that the person is licensed to engage in the practice of law. As used in this paragraph, "by any means" includes but is not limited to using or advertising the title of lawyer or attorney-at-law, or equivalent terms, in the English language or any other language, which mean or imply that the person is licensed as an attorney-at-law in the State of New Jersey or in any other jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) Derives a benefit; or (3) In fact causes injury to another. c. For the purposes of this section, the phrase "in fact" indicates strict liability. Accoding to the NJ courts: A person is considered to be practicing law when that person's conduct whenever and wherever it takes place is of such a nature that legal knowledge, training, skill and ability are required. This definition of the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Source: www.njcourts.gov › assets › criminalcharges › unprlaw) This rule is, if anything, more strictly enforced in criminal cases than in civil cases. In some states non-lawyers may assist a party in small-claims courts, I believe, but not in NJ. | Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice. | The General Rule In practice, the only time when self-defense against a police officer is legal is when you do not know and have no reasonable way that you could have known that the person attacking you is a police officer. (And arguably, a police officer acting in an official capacity in furtherance of his or her duties, rather than in a personal capacity as an individual.) For example, if the police do a no knock raid in the dark of night, and don't announce themselves, and you shoot police officers reasonably believing them to be home invasion burglars, you would not have criminal or civil liability for doing so. A similar valid self-defense claim might arise when someone has an objectively reasonable reason to think that someone claiming to be a police officer is really just a criminal impersonating a police officer, even if that belief is, in fact, mistaken. In almost all other circumstances, you need to submit to the officers, and you are pretty much required by law to bear the risk that excessive force by the officer will harm you. If you don't, you will probably be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest and will not be entitled to a self-defense defense. The fact that you are not actually guilty of a crime is irrelevant. This is often the case and police officers are not omniscient. If the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest (which there is often no way that the person being arrested or attacked can know at the time), the remedy is a civil rights suit after the fact, not self-defense. In theory, there might be other isolated circumstances where self-defense against a police officer is legal, but they involve fact patterns so quirky that they would almost never happen in real life, or would almost never be possible to prove in a manner that the courts would believe. Officer Liability For Harming Someone Legitimately Acting In Self Defense Whether the officers had civil liability to you if you were harmed by the officers while exercising your right to self-defense would depend upon their state of mind, even if you were rightfully using self-defense. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in January of 2017 (White v. Pauly) involved this fact pattern. In White v. Pauly an officer arrived late on the scene and had no reason to believe that the officers who arrived there before him and were being shot at by citizens in a house that they were approaching, lacked probable cause, or had not announced themselves. The court held that as a result, he had no civil liability to a citizen he shot, even if the person who the late arriving officer shot while that citizen was shooting back at the police officers on the scene was actually engaging in good faith self-defense. The citizen's self-defense in the case had a valid defense to criminal or civil liability for firing on the officers, because the citizen shooting back didn't actually know that the people approaching his house were police officers. But, because the late arriving officer reasonably believed under the circumstances that the citizen had no right to engage in self-defense, because he thought that the early arriving officers had probable cause and had announced themselves, the late arriving officer had no civil liability to the citizens he shot. |
How was the court in Abingdon RDC v O'Gorman (1968 EWCA Civ) aware of Thornton v Cruther & ors (1769)? At s23, the court cites Chief Justice Wilmot's decision in the 1769 case Thornton v Cruther & others, which it mentions is "unreported." So how did the court become familiar with the case, much less the content of its reasoning? | The Law Reports at Abingdon Rural District Council v. O'Gorman [1968] 2 QB 811, 820 read as follows: [T]he judges held that in order to "impound or otherwise secure" the distress on the premises the landlord had to move the goods into a fit and convenient place on the premises … If there was no fit and convenient place on the premises, the landlord had to remove the goods out of the house. It was so held in 1769 by Wilmot C.J. in Thornton v. Cruther¹ and in 1774 by Lord Mansfield in Washborn v. Black,² and accepted in 1846 by Parke C.B. in Woods v. Durrant,³ and by Pollock C.B. in Smith v. Ashforth.⁴ ¹ (1769) Unreported (mentioned by Lord Mansfield in Washborn v. Black (1774) 11 East 405, n. (a)). The reference to East is available at the Internet Archive at Reports of cases argued and determined in the Court of King's Bench, vol. xi (1805-18), 405: Sittings at Westminster after Michaelmas, 1774. Buller J.'s MS. … Mr. Dunning insisted that he was a trespasser; for he ought either to have put the goods all into one room, and kept possession of that only, or to have removed the goods out of the house. And he cited a case of Thornton v. Cruther and Others, C.B. Mich. 9 G. 3. before Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, where it was so holden.—Lord Mansfield C.J. said that the strict law was so … The report draws on a manuscript of Buller J, who became a judge of the Court of King's Bench in 1778, describing a hearing before Mansfield CJ in 1774. Perhaps Buller was present as counsel in that or another case, and making notes for his own future reference. Counsel in the hearing before Mansfield CJ cited an unreported decision of Wilmot CJ on the Common Bench, Michaelmas term, in the ninth year of the reign of George III (1769). Mansfield CJ accepted it as an accurate statement of the law. It is probably unknown whether Buller or East checked the citation against the records of the Court of Common Pleas available to them in the late 18th and early 19th century, such as the plea rolls. However, in this era, historical court records typically did not include judge's reasons for decision, which were announced orally in court. These reasons could be noted down by barristers, referred to in subsequent cases if the barrister was considered trustworthy, and published by the authors of the nominate reports for wider legal education. | This is an appeal from the decision in A Local Authority v JB [2020] EWCA Civ 735. In the part of the hearing to which you refer, Lord Stephens is asking the appellant’s counsel about the following principle, quoted at [31] of the judgment under appeal: When considering capacity to marry, the question is whether X has capacity to marry, not whether she has capacity to marry Y rather than Z. The question of capacity to marry has never been considered by reference to a person's ability to understand or evaluate the characteristics of some particular spouse or intended spouse: Re E (and Alleged Patient); Sheffield City Council v E and S [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam). In Re E, Munby J said at [91]: The point is suggested by Miss Waddicor's very pertinent rhetorical question: Can it seriously be suggested that the court has the right to vet E's suitors, to decide that X is suitable but that Y is unsuitable, to select who E is to marry? The answer to that question, in my judgment, is that the court quite clearly has no such role. The ‘father of the bride test’ is the proposition rejected here: that the Court of Protection could play the traditional role of the father of the bride, by granting permission to marry a particular person, rather than determining the person’s capacity to marry in a more general sense. | I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation). | I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake. | First off, let me confirm that this text accurately describes the reality. Second, this is less far afield from the common law than you would think. If you are in a jurisdiction without any binding case law on a particular point, a so called "question of first impression", you then turn to persuasive authority. Persuasive authority includes case law that is binding in some other jurisdiction and legal scholarship, often in the form of a treatise or commentary. And, it is much easier to find an answer in a treatise which is carefully arranged on a subject matter basis, than to do case law research from other jurisdictions. This is particularly true when you have not devoted a lot of time to learning how to find the needle of the law you want in the haystack of the mountain of decided cases on all available subject. The very difficult task of case law research was only possible on more than an isolated hit or miss basis at all in common law systems where case law matters in the years before the 1980s when computerized case law word searching started to become possible at an affordable to lawyers price, because a lot of full time institutional actors devote a great deal of time and money to developing and maintaining tools like digests, citation indexes, and annotations to statutes to allow practitioners to locate that case law. If court decisions don't serve as binding precedents, those institutions aren't developed. For example, in common law countries, until very recently, there were no good resources for locating trial court decisions and rulings in state courts which handle the bulk of litigation, but whose rulings are not binding precedents. (Electronic record keeping in trial courts has changed the economics of this practice and made it much more common to publish trial court decisions and to index them appropriately.) So, if persuasive authority in your legal system in the form of non-binding case law is hard to find because it wasn't worth the money for the legal system to collectively develop the resources to publish and index it on a systematic basis for an audience of pretty much the entire legal profession, the other form of persuasive authority, legal treatises, becomes much more influential by default. You see something similar in very early legal opinion writing by American judges before the institutions necessary to systemically utilize case law precedents was developed. Judges were constantly citing treatises like Blackstone, which is something they rarely do now, because that was what was on their bookshelf. Further, there are feedback effects. Smart people who wish to influence the law for society without going the legislative route in common law countries will often seek careers as judges. But, absent the psychic perk of influencing the law and making a difference in society, a lot of the most ambitious people in the judiciary in a common law system will choose instead to go the route of academia and seek to become law professors where they can have a similar influence, while earning similar pay and having more time off and freedom to pursue your own personal and professional interests. So, in systems where legal precedents aren't binding, people who might otherwise be inclined to write probing legal opinions that develop legal concepts are less inclined to become judges, and the people who do become judges care more about getting the right result and less about explaining their decisions in a way that will influence future judges in the same circumstances. Finally, consider that many civil law legal systems involve countries with a lot less appellate litigation than the United States (currently 330 million people with more than 200 years of case law), or the UK (currently 60 million people with about 1000 years of case law), or India (more than 1 billion people with a couple of centuries of case law, since colonial precedents have relevance). Suppose that you live in Denmark or Belgium or Portugal or Costa Rica or South Korea, where your population is much lower and your time frame during which your legal system has been in place is not as long. In a situation like that, half a dozen or a dozen leading legal scholars can publish treatises over ten or twenty years that are going to cover, somewhere, the lion's share of the pressing issues in the legal system, and there is probably only one law school in the entire country, so it is quite likely that most of the lawyers in the entire country took contracts or property or family law from the the same people in law school, which makes them predisposed to consider a treatise written by that professor a credible one in that area of law. And, all other sources are a comparative vacuum. If you are a judge, why cite non-binding precedents from your fellow non-specialist judge in a country that simply has no precedents in many areas of law and has fewer carefully reasoned ones, when you could instead look for guidance from the person who taught you this area of law in the first place and literally "wrote the book" and who was probably consulted by the government in any recent amendments to relevant civil code or statute of broad general applicability. And, once you start out using those methods, it becomes habitual and legal treatises become very influential. | australia Although the alleged victim has not been found, this case from the upi.com archives dated 25/09/1986 is worthy of note (emphasis mine): A woman jailed for murdering her husband had her conviction reversed when a witness testified she saw the man on television -- in a crowd at a cricket match -- three years after he allegedly was killed. The New South Wales Court of Appeal Wednesday overturned the murder conviction of Margaret Burton, saying the case against her relied on a web of circumstantial evidence and that the new evidence provided reasonable doubt of her guilt. Burton, however, still must complete an 8-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. She was sentenced to life in prison on Nov. 8, 1984, for the May 1983 murder of her husband. She and Ronald Burke, a close friend, also were sentenced to eight years in jail for conspiracy to murder her husband, Peter Burton. Peter Burton's body never was found. At the appeals court hearing, Judy Edmonds testified she is sure she saw Peter Burton in the crowd at a televised cricket match in January. Edmonds was shown a videotape of part of the cricket match and identified a man in sunglasses as Peter Burton. She said she was a close friend of his. Another witness, Jan Dyson, told the court the man in the videotape bore a remarkable resemblance to Peter Burton. Lawyers for Margaret Burton argued before the appeals court her conviction should be overturned because the prosecution failed to prove Peter Burton was dead. Appeals Court Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street agreed, saying it is not for the court to decide whether or not the person on the videotape is Peter Burton, but it is the court's responsibility to determine how a reasonable jury would have regarded the new evidence. | This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer. | The Limitations Act of 1980 and its predecessors apply to civil actions brought by private individuals. It is not a criminal statute of limitations. I will answer with regard to civil cases, rather than criminal ones. Section 40 of the Limitations Act of 1980 incorporates by reference a schedule of transition provisions that govern this question, and when a cause of action is not governed by the 1980 Act it usually defaults to the predecessor 1939 Act. The problem is both bigger than just the fraudulent breach of trust unlimited statute of limitations under Section 21 of the Act, since the deadline only runs from when an action accrues that can be long after the act giving rise to the claim actually happened, and smaller, because the act (and also its predecessor 1939 act) allow statutes of limitations to be extended for equitable reasons under certain circumstances. The 1881 Limitations Act, Section 27 had an exception to the general rule for concealed fraud tolling the statute so long as it was concealed, which probably carried over into the 1939 Act. Section 9 of the transition provisions states in the relevant part that: (1)Nothing in any provision of this Act shall— (a)enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; The 1939 Act limitations ran from when the act was committed, not when it was discovered, until the 1963 Act changes that. A full analysis of the breach of trust issue is found in this law review article. |
Cancellation vs Avoidance of a contract Hey I was reading a International Commercial Sale of Goods Contract and I saw this provision: Effects of avoidance in general 12.1 Avoidance of this contract releases both parties from their obligation to effect and to receive future performance, subject to any damages that may be due. 12.2 Avoidance of this contract does not preclude a claim for damages for non-performance. 12.3 Avoidance of this contract does not affect any provision in this contract for the settlement of disputes or any other term of this contract that is to operate even after avoidance." Why did the contract writer use avoidance here instead of an easier term "Cancellation" ? | The term avoidance, as opposed to cancellation, is an implicit reference to Articles 81-84 of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which uses the term "avoidance" rather than "cancellation." This multilateral treaty language is referenced because the CISG is the governing law for most International Commercial Sale of Goods Contracts. Why does the CISG itself use of the term "avoidance" rather than the term "cancellation", which is more familiar and idiomatic in American legal English? Probably because the term "avoidance" produced the most understandable and consistent translations into the multiple languages in which equally authoritative version of the CISG are drafted. | The advertisement is simply an invitation to treat. The lease was the contract offer, and your signature and payment were acceptance of that offer. The advertisement doesn't bind either party (other than as prohibited by deceptive advertising statutes), and you are allowed to negotiate an offer that differs from the invitation to treat. | But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies. You are mistaken. A contract settling a bona fide dispute regarding people's legal rights can mutually (or unilaterally for that matter) release or waive their legal rights. In fact, a waiver or release of rights is routinely a part of a settlement agreement. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of such agreements are entered into every year and they are almost always enforced. Sometimes, but not always, a settlement agreement will also call for a dismissal of a case with prejudice, which (roughly) means a dismissal that prohibits refiling a case involving the same subject matter. | In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.) | Written Contract If there was a written contract, the fact that it wasn't signed is not relevant. While a signature is evidence of agreement with the terms there are other ways that acceptance can be indicated: like you paying them $600. Wrong Information Where the error is fundamental to the performance - e.g. you needed shipment to Alaska and they were offering shipment to Alabama, the contract would be void ab initio. That is, it never happened and everyone needs to be returned to their original positions as far as possible. However, in general, an error by one or the other party in their understanding of what was agreed does not invalidate the contract. For example, if you told them it was a "small" dog because it was small for a Great Dane but under an objective classification, it is, in fact, a "large" dog the contract must be completed and either you or they wear the additional cost of doing so. Whether they are entitled to ask for additional payment "due to some wrong information" depends on who took the risk under the contract for its correctness? Barring a specific term, the risk usually lies with the party that provided the "wrong information" but some contract will assign the risk for one party's errors to the other party - subject to a requirement to act in good faith. If they are not entitled to additional payment, they have to perform the contract for the original fee. If they are entitled, then you have to pay a reasonable price increase - you are not generally entitled to cancel. All of this turns on the specific terms of the contract and the exact nature of the "wrong information". Consumer Protection Law CPL in your state or their state or both will almost certainly have something to say about this beyond common law rules of contract. | Because your legal fees and contract damages are not "in addition to" your risk; they are your risk. If you pay the retainer and lose, you don't lose anything more than the retainer and damages. If you pay the retainer and win, you don't win anything more than the retainer and damages. The only kind of argument I can see here is that you're incurring some kind of psychic cost by enduring the uncertainty surrounding the litigation, but I can't remember ever seeing a case -- in Florida or elsewhere -- in which the court recognized taking on risk as a compensable harm, especially in a contract case, where damages are much more limited than in other kinds of cases. Risk is just a necessary feature of an adversarial legal system. | Depending on the circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether or not the the terms of service contain an express clause dealing with inaccurate information. For example, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, under section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, if you dishonestly make a representation which is untrue or misleading with the intention to make a gain or cause someone a loss you will commit the offence of fraud. This could arise for example if you give a false name intending to obstruct the other party from being able to pursue you for any breach of your contractual obligations (e.g. non-payment for services). As for whether or not you would breach any clause in the contract requiring you to provide accurate information, it's very hard to say without seeing the exact wording and context of the clause. | Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract. |
Who do I contact regarding DA not charging sexual assault offender I was sexually assaulted which injured hip and psoas muscle, told DHHS bc im and was disabled & offender was DHHS CWS , filed police report 5-29-21 a year later Salem crime survivors a lady named Shawna called to inform "DAnot enough evidence " Shocked I began calling, tweeting & podcasts DA Mckintok speaks to me & informed me deputy ritz did the "investigation " I spoke to ritz 'why didn't you " all he said is "ok " 5x I ask why he said I want to argue, no I want justice, he then said "I recorded our interview " I said'push play' to no avail so again public appeal via calls tweets podcast so then ritz "redo" then another year no words so call DA again no charge | A district attorney has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. A district attorney may be appointed by e.g. a county board of commissioners, or they may be elected. The electorate has the exclusive power to chastise DA, but voting him out of office, so there is little to be done other than write letters to the editor. An appointed DA has some superior, so you can complain to that superior. There is no way to legally force a DA to prosecute if they do not believe that there is enough evidence to get a conviction. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible. | Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what. | The "public interest" from a charging perspective is not the same as public popularity. From the charging guide, prosecutors: should consider each of the questions set out in paragraphs 4.14 (a) to (g) of the Code to determine the relevant public interest factors for and against prosecution. These factors, together with any public interest factors set out in any further relevant guidance or policy issued by the DPP, should enable prosecutors and police decision makers to form an overall assessment of the public interest. Those public-interest factors are listed here (and each is further elaborated): How serious is the offence committed? What is the level of culpability of the suspect? What are the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim? What was the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence? What is the impact on the community? Is prosecution a proportionate response? Do sources of information require protecting? | For Mr. Petersen, the questions in general should have been elementary. The fact he did not know them is actually quite deplorable. To your questions specifically: Should Mr. Petersen, as a Juris Doctor, know of those things in his sleep? This is the wrong question. The question is: should an individual who has accepted a nomination to serve as a federal judge on the U.S. District Court know of those things in his/her sleep? The answer is unequivocally yes. One could almost argue - one would likely be scoffed at, but one could - that an appointment to a higher court, the U.S. Circuit, could get away not knowing those things 'in his/her sleep,' because appeals courts would not deal with, e.g., abstention doctrines or whether to admit expert scientific testimony, as often as a trial court does. Simply put, lawyers should at least have heard of those things (he looked/sounded absolutely dumbfounded at the words that were being said to him), litigators should know them, and federal trial court judges absolutely need to know those things to do the job. Is his excuse valid when he says that he has no background in the field(s) (he mentioned litigation once) the terms are corresponding to? If he was just some lawyer talking to some guy at a bar, sure, totally valid. If someone is a corporate M&A or project finance attorney, sure, don't expect him to win any trial court vocabulary contests. However, when sitting before a panel of U.S. Senators carrying out their Constitutional duties of "advice and consent" on presidential appointments, not knowing those things can, should, and indeed did end in complete humiliation for the person ignorant enough to try and go through with that. I'm sure his hearing was scheduled some time in advance. The fact he obviously made zero attempt to know anything is actually insulting to everyone involved. For context, I wrote a motion in limine at my first internship. If I live to be 1,000 and never step foot in a court room, I'll still be able to say more about a motion in limine than "I would probably not be able to give you a good definition right here at the table." | Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later. |
Do all legal persons have human rights? For example, a corporate legal person can be proceeded against with criminal charges. Instinctively, one would be inclined to apply such "human" rights as that to a fair trial in protecting any defendant being proceeded against in a criminal context. But must the bar be quite as high for artificial legal persons as it is for natural ones? And can non-human persons enjoy, and must they be afforded, "human rights"? | canada It depends on the right. See Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147-0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32: To claim protection under the Charter, a corporation ⸺ indeed, any claimant ⸺ must establish that "it has an interest falling within the scope of the guarantee, and one which accords with the purpose of that provision." Regarding section 12 (right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment): the text “cruel and unusual” denotes protection that “only human beings can enjoy” Regarding section 7 (right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or security of the person other than in accordance with principles of fundamental justice): A plain, common sense reading of the phrase “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person” serves to underline the human element involved; only human beings can enjoy these rights. But, regarding section 8 (right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure): the Court accepted, without discussion or explanation, that the s. 8 right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure could apply to corporations. And section 11(b): the Court extended the s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time to corporations on the basis that any accused, corporate or human, has, as Stevenson J. said, “a legitimate interest in being tried within a reasonable time” | First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone? | Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface. | Canadian lawyers who handle this kind of matter usually describe themselves as "human rights" and/or "discrimination" lawyers. No formal regulatory specialty is recognized or required, however. Any licensed lawyer in good standing is legally permitted to take on such a case. | As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury. | Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..." | From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm. | The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far. |
Why was US v. Miller not dismissed? In US v. Miller, the court found that the National Firearms Act of 1934 was Constitutional. The question I have is, why wasn't it dismissed considering that Miller died before the case was heard? Wouldn't that make the case moot? | Miller was only one of the defendants Two people were charged with the crime, Miller and Laycock. Miller was dead, Laycock was still alive. Following the Supreme Court decision: On January 8, 1940, Layton pleaded guilty to the reinstated NFA charge and Ragon sentenced him to five years probation. So the case was not at all moot. | If six justices decided that the case were sufficiently important, they could refrain from recusing themselves so as to be able to hear it. If that didn't happen, the lower court's ruling would stand, as you suggest. If I understand this rule correctly, if four justices had conflicts of interest, the court would lack a quorum. That's more likely, though admittedly very unlikely. However unlikely it may be, it has actually happened (for example, Shao v. Roberts). | You asked, "could that guy as defendant claim self defense and win?" First let's try to make it clear what is meant by "win". In the Rittenhouse trial, the defendant was charged of the following crimes: First-degree reckless homicide First-degree recklessly endangering safety (x2) First-degree intentional homicide Attempted first-degree intentional homicide Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 (dismissed) Failure to comply with an emergency order from state or local government (dismissed) Rather than thinking of the defendant as a "winner", it might be more appropriate to say that he was "acquitted" of these charges. If someone that was involved in the conflict fired first, as you described here: "They encounter each other when each is leaning or reaching or tripping, or whatever it would take for them to unintentionally point their gun at your head. You react and you raise your gun in defense, he spots your move and points his at you. You both fire. You shoot each other and you both are gravely injured. Like, paralyzed", then would they also be acquitted of all of the non-dismissed charges listed above? If everything was as you described ("unintentional", "reactionary", and "in defense"), then likely they would also not be found guilty of those crimes. It's not like they would "win", it's more like they will not be found guilty of committing one of those crimes. The precise outcome will depend on all the facts involved in the case, and the jury's decision based on those facts. So there is no single answer that always applies to every situation, but it sounds like you're wondering about some hypothetical situation that appears to be paradoxical because in this case only one person was charged with crimes: if someone else was the first shooter, the sequence of following events would first of all depend on whether or not they got charged with a crime, and I wouldn't characterize the outcome as a "win" or "lose" but as an "acquittal" or "conviction", and yes it is possible to be acquitted if everything is "accidental" as you described, and presumably not "reckless" (often meaning that a reasonable person in the same situation would have done the same thing). About your more broad question: "Is mutual self defense a thing?" It depends on what crime is being charged against the defendant. In the Rittenhouse case there was only one person that was charged. If you're asking about a hypothetical situation in which two people involved in a 1-on-1 conflict both claim self-defense, I hope I can assume that they were both charged with a crime against which to defend themselves in court in the first place. It is indeed possible for a State to prosecute both parties of a 1-on-1 physical conflict, and for both of them to successfully claim self-defense in order to eventually be both acquitted. It wouldn't be called "mutual self-defense", but each defendant would make their own self-defense case individually. | Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so. | The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court. | If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed. | Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts, without elevating the charges to felonies? Yes. if Trump's defense team argues that the law that elevates the misdemeanor charges to felony charges does not apply in this case, because the elevation option does not include federal laws, then since this is a matter of law and not a matter of fact, Judge Mercan (rather than the jury) will decide whether or not to dismiss the felony charges? Yes. Does Judge Mercan have the option of dismissing the felony enhancement but allowing the misdemeanor charges to proceed, or would Mercan have to dismiss all charges against Trump? Judge Mercan could probably choose either option if he found that the original charges were not supported by the law. There is law regarding how this decision is made but I personally don't know that area of law well. One of the reason that I am unfamiliar with it is that it is exceedingly rare for a judge to conclude that the prosecutor's charges are not supported by the law. I would be very surprised if that judge reached that conclusion in this case, in particular, because both federal election law violations and state and federal tax law violations are implicated by the indictment. The DA no doubt legally researched this issue exhaustively before presenting the charges to the grand jury and has made out a prima facie case for a felony under the applicable New York State law. If Trump is brought to trial, then would it be possible for a jury to return a verdict that Trump was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of falsifying business records but innocent of doing so with an intent to commit another crime? If so, then could Trump still be found guilty of the misdemeanors, or would he be fully acquitted, since the jury ruled that he was not guilty of the exact charges that DA Bragg filed? Whether a jury is presented with a lesser included offense charge at the request of the defense, is partially a matter of the prosecution's election to make that option available or not, and partially a matter of the judge's decision on how to handle it. The body of law involved in how this decision is handled on a case by case basis is quite involved. Most of the case law involves homicide cases, assault cases, and property crime cases where there are charges with are identical except for aggravating factors for the most serious charges. But, lesser charges generally aren't presented if based upon the evidence presented at trial, either the more serious charge is established or no charge is proven. For example, if the defendant presents an alibi defense, and a witness whose credibility is disputed places the defendant at the scene intentionally committing a crime, a lesser included offense charge would not be appropriate. But, if the defendant admits hitting a pedestrian and causing the pedestrian's death, but claims that the pedestrian was at fault in the accident for jay walking, while the prosecution alleges that the pedestrian was intentionally struck as part of a mafia hit, multiple lesser included offenses would probably be charged involving different levels of intent of premeditated intent/aggravated circumstances killing (first degree murder), to a knowing killing (second degree murder), to a reckless killing (manslaughter), to a criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide charge. Typically, the decision on this point would not be made until all evidence was received and the judge in a hearing away from the jury but in the presence of the prosecutors and defense counsel crafted jury instructions based upon the evidence presented at trial and the arguments raised by counsel at trial. | The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.). |
Do the UK TV licensing rules disregard innocent until proven guilty? I don't have a TV license, I use Netflix and Amazon Prime. In the UK you have to state that you don't have a TV license and sign a declaration to that effect every 2 years (unless you then get a license). When signing my declaration there was a note stating that they may come round and check if I need a license, I would assume by coming into my house and looking at the back of my TV. If they did this they would find no antenna plugged in and then be on there way. However do they have the legal right to perform this check? Do I have to let them in, and if I don't, what is the consequence? It feels like the check is assuming I'm guilty and that I would have to prove my innocence - but that goes against one of the fundamental principles of our legal system. My question is: does the TV licensing system operate under the innocent until proven guilty modus operandi and if not why not? | The system operates on "innocent until proven guilty" If you watch or record live television or you download or watch programmes on BBC iPlayer (live, catch up, or on demand), you must have a TV licence. You do not have to let TV Licensing officers into your home unless they have a warrant, per Section 366 of the Communications Act 2003. They will check the TV and any other devices (such as a laptop, phone, etc.) that are capable of watching or recording live television as well as downloading or watching programmes on BBC iPlayer, and that will form part of the evidence in deciding whether to charge you with a criminal offence (Section 363 of the Act) or not. If charged with an offence, you would go before a magistrate court and plead your case like any other criminal matter. Therefore, the system still operates on "innocent until proven guilty" because you will not acquire a criminal record unless the court is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that you committed the relevant offence. | You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine. | Most countries have compulsory or statutory licences for exactly these situations. You enter a licence agreement with a collecting society, pay them licencing fees, and give them a record of the music you perform. They in turn then distribute royalties to the rights holders. The exact details of which licence you'll need depends on your country, the types of events you will perform at, the frequency of the events, the size of the audience etc. It may be the venue's responsibility to obtain the licence instead of the performer, or both the venue and the performer may need to. I don't have any experience of this, and if I did my experience would be useless to yours in the UK ;). But luckily the UK has an easy to find website which tells you just where you need to go. You will need to get a licence from an organisation called PRS for Music. | It is not possible for someone to forfeit their rights because the GDPR is compulsory law. In the EU, laws can be regulatory or compulsory. In case of an agreement, regulatory laws can be set aside, if both parties agree on that. But compulsory laws cannot be set aside. Of course laws can also be partly compulsory. For example provisions which cannot be changed in disadvantage of a consumer. So there is freedom of contract, but it's freedom is reduced by law for the common good or for example to avoid misuse of bargaining power. In particular consumer related laws are often compulsory because it has little power against the other parties. Companies can have their negotiations done by lawyers, so they can make a well informed an well negotiated decision. As an extreme example, you cannot kill someone, even if that person has given you written permission. See also "Peremptory norm" on wikipedia for international law examples. | You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished. | Generally speaking, in U.S. law, a provider of a service via the Internet, such as a VPN, is immune from liability for user generated content pursuant to Section 230, so long as a copyright take-down notice is in place is complaints are lodged. So, you do not default to liability or have liability merely as a result of running a VPN. But, there is a second problem. If the VPN is very small and you can't be distinguished from other users, you could conceivably face risk not as a VPN operator, but as a user of the VPN who is confused for someone engaging in illegal activity. For example, suppose that there were five users, and that two could be ruled out due to being in places with no Internet access or being sick in the hospital, etc., leaving three possible suspects, and some weak circumstantial evidence pointed to you. You could easily become a prime suspect and maybe even end up on a terrorism watch list, even if it might be difficult or impossible to actually prove any wrongdoing on your part. | am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed. | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. |
If a restaurant is booked and upon arrival it is communicated that the kitchen is closed, are potential damages entitled to be claimed? It's a hypothetical question: Let's say you booked a table via an online reservation system (from the restaurant's website) for a romantic dinner with your partner from 7:30-9 PM. The online reservation form has fields for "time", "name", "phone number", and "message/special requests". You leave a message under the messages section that you are going to arrive around 8-8:15 PM. The reservation is getting confirmed a few minutes after the reservation. You are arriving at the restaurant at exactly 8 PM and the cashier says: "Oh, sorry, we closed the kitchen! We can't serve you today! Only take away!". Do you have any right here to complain? BTW, even though the case was in Sweden, I believe my question was a bit more general. | In general, "making a reservation" does not create a contract, except when it is obvious that you have a contractual agreement. That would be the case with an airline reservation, and one clear sign is that you have to pay for the ticket when you make the reservation; or, it you don't, then there is no contract, and they can cancel or change the price. You would look for clear signs of an agreement, such as a "agree to terms" button that you have to click. Paying a deposit is another clear sign. Then you would simply look at the terms of the contract to see what their obligation is, and what yours is. They may have strongly committed to providing service in which case you might have a cause for legal action if they break that commitment, or they might have made no specific promises about service in case of intervening events (such as if the chef has a heart attack, or the power goes out). If we do think of this as a contractual matter, you breached your duty as a customer, to be there by 7:30, so even if there is a contract, they didn't break it. The note that you added renegotiating the arrival time was insufficient – it is outside of the contract, and possibly something that they didn't see (they only look at the names and official time blocks reported by the web page). In lieu of a contract, there could be some statutory obligation, i.e. a specific regulation in Sweden saying "if a restaurant accepts a reservation, they absolutely must hold the space available for the entire reserved time", which is an unreasonably onerous business practice that no nation requires. | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | As far as I know, no jurisdiction in the US relieves a person of their contractual lease obligations when they are required by law to leave the country. However, many (perhaps most) states require the landlord to make an effort to re-rent an abandoned unit, which reduces the size of the tenant's liability. Unless the landlord just gives up on the claim for $8K, you would have that liability, which could be collected through legal process. The landlord might do this in her jurisdiction, which would no doubt result in a default judgment (because you won't show up). Theoretically, she could also pursue you in your home country, but that is much more complicated, expensive, and subject to whatever discretionary dim view the local courts have of US immigration law, or other tenant-related laws (the courts would have to conclude that there was a wrong by the standards of that country). A variant of suing you in your home country is suing you in the US and having the judgment enforced in the foreign country, but that against depends on the legal system of that country and treaties between the country and the US. Since visitor visas are a highly discretionary legal entitlement, it's impossible to say "won't" w.r.t. the question of whether a visa application will be denied because of an unpaid monetary judgment. It's also impossible to say "won't" because the law can change at any time. With those caveats, there does not appear to be any concrete reason to believe that a visitor visa will be denied because you skipped out on a lease. A visa can be denied and one can be perma-banned for lying on interview questions, so the hope is that there isn't a question "do you have any money judgments against you in the US". | No If you breach the contract that may allow the rental company to terminate it (among other things), however, termination would need to be communicated to the customer. Only if they kept it after that, with the intention of permanently depriving the company of it, are they stealing it. | Don't trivialize this because it appears to be minor and inexpensive. If something goes wrong, you could be liable for damage. You should have an idea of what a reasonable cost should be based on the rent and condition of the property. Discuss it with the landlord. If the landlord chooses to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, acknowledging that you aren't responsible for reimbursing the landlord for the cost or acknowledging receipt by the landlord of any contribution from you and a statement that the contribution fulfills your lease requirement. If you're going to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, agreeing to the choice of replacement parts and the choice of anyone you hire to do the work. It might be nice to think you can save money by doing it yourself. But if anything happens and there's damage, you could be liable. You should have renter's insurance. You should check your renter's insurance policy to see what, if anything, it says about tenant responsibility for repairs. Your insurance might pay for it. More importantly, will your insurance protect you if something goes wrong and there's damage? I recommend you copy this and modify it as you see fit or, if you don't this is correct, make up something that you think is correct. Keep an electronic copy on your computer. But also have a notebook in which you keep how-to papers, so you don't have to figure it out all over again at some time in the future and to use the how-tos you accumulate to help you make new how-tos as necessary. Also keep documentation, especially warranties. Scan receipts (receipt ink is notorious for fading over time) and warranties, keep them the electronic copies on your computer and print the receipts and put the printed receipts and original receipts with the warranty papers in the notebook. Keep a manilla envelope with receipts, warranties, instructions, and any papers you receive from anyone you hire to do the work. When you move out, you should give the envelope to the landlord so the landlord will be able to maintain what was installed and obtain warranty service if necessary. | If you have no contract to provide the service then you have no obligation under contract law to do so. However, if you are aware that withdrawing the service could or would cause damage to their business then doing so may leave you open to a suit on the basis of negligence; particularly if you do so precipitously and without warning. You should write to them in the following terms: Despite our agreement that the contract would not be renewed you have not made any arrangements to stop using my service. Consequently I consider that by your actions, you have continued to treat the contract as ongoing. I am happy for this arrangement to continue on a month-by-month basis and will be invoicing accordingly. If this is acceptable, please respond by 4pm on x/y/z; if you do not do so I will switch the service off at 4pm on x/y+2/z | While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation. | Let's analyse the landlord's claims: You have an assured shorthold tenancy agreement. The fact that there isn't a written contract doesn't change this as a verbal agreement is legally binding. That's true. A tenancy exists even if this was never written down, and it's an AST by default if the requirements for being one are met. Payment of rent constitutes acceptance of these terms. Payment of rent by the tenant, and its acceptance by the landlord, is sufficient for a tenancy to be regarded as existing. The tenancy can only be terminated early from the permission of the landlord. That's rubbish. A tenant can always end a tenancy, but there may be restrictions. In particular, a tenant cannot end a tenancy before the end of a fixed term without the agreement of the landlord, but the landlord has an obligation to find new tenants if this happens. However, I've been unable to find any information as to whether a fixed term exists if there's no written agreement. Assuming there is no fixed term, then for a month-to-month tenancy, the tenant must provide one month's notice to end the tenancy, with that month ending at the end of a rental period (i.e. the day before the next payment would be due). If you leave early this is legally abandonment and you are still responsible for paying rent for the duration of the tenancy That's true. ... if you do leave next month I'll consider you in rent arrears and pursue payment through legal means That is possible - but if you give notice as described above, then the tenancy will end, and (assuming you're up to date with the rent) you'll no longer be liable. |
Can a landlord ask me to see my luggage when moving in? I am moving into a new home where landlord is living close by. I paid the rent and when I was about to move in, I came to get the key and the landlord told me that I cannot get it because I did not bring the luggage with me. The landlord told me that he cannot give me the key because he has to see my luggage. first. To me that sounded like a very weird request, but I had no choice but to accept it. I would not get the keys otherwise. I do not want to move in the exact day when the rent starts, but a bit later though. What should I do in this case? This sounds very weird to me. I do want to have good relations with my landlord, but when I experienced this I can't help but get suspicious that I will always have troubles with this landlord. Also is it even legal that my landlord is withholding the keys from me? All this is happening in Germany, so German laws apply here. | Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble? | A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months). | In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved. | Here is what the Austrian law says in this case (Google translation): Bag control in the supermarket: There is no obligation to have your bag checked by supermarket staff or security guards. If there is a reasonable suspicion, the supermarket staff can ask a suspect to wait for the police to arrive. The police can then check the bag. In this Austrian newspaper article (in German) they say about this topic If a person is injured during the arrest because of a low value item or if an expensive item is damaged, the detective might be liable for it. As long as they don't start searching your bags, they are allowed to hold on to you till police arrives. I would complain to the shop owner about the detectives and their behavior via mail, this is probably the most efficient thing what one can do. | Your contract is between you and your landlord. Separately, the landlord has a contract between himself and the agency. Your obligation to pay rent is owed to your landlord, not to his agent. Ask your landlord to send you an email (if you don't already have one) which requests you to pay rent from X date onwards to him directly. Then pay him the rent in the way he has requested. Barring some unusual terms of the contract (which you haven't provided a copy of), the agent will not have any grounds to sue you. | I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant. | Generally, you would have to bring an eviction action just as you would for an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship. This means given written notice served as required by MA law of a deadline to leave, and then if the child did not leave, filing an eviction lawsuit and serving the papers on the child, and then attending an eviction hearing, and then, if you prevailed in that hearing as you probably would (probably with horrible TV and newspaper publicity that might go viral in social media), and then, arrangements would be made to remove him and his stuff from the house on an appointed day with law enforcement and movers and you would change the locks. It would probably take a few weeks start to finish. It is not something that a non-lawyer should try to do themselves. A lawyer would probably charge you a few thousand dollars for this proceeding. The main exception would be that generally a parent has a duty to support an adult disabled child who cannot provide for himself. You probably do not have the legal right to simply kick out your child without an eviction action, although few adult children would choose to push their legal rights not to be removed in that manner if they were. The fact that a child would likely end up homeless in some circumstances if you did this is something that most parents would not be at peace with and would regret later even if they felt good about the decision at the time, but that is a parenting decision and not a legal one. | While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit. |
Can a six year old be charged? CONTEXT: https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/13/us/newport-news-virginia-shooting-friday/index.html Assume that the six year old does not understand the concepts of life / death / murder / assault. Can the child be charged with assault or murder? Where are the contours that would preclude charging a child with such a serious crime? UDPATE: https://abcnews.go.com/US/prosecutor-charge-6-year-accused-shooting-teacher/story?id=97722288 | We cannot stipulate that a 6 year old does not understand the concepts of life / death / murder / assault, but that stipulation might be baked into the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, a child under age 8 is statutorily incapable of committing a crime. Between 8 and 12, there is a statutory presumption that a child is incapable of committing a crime, but that is rebuttable. The statute says "Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime", and it say nothing about understanding concepts. Florida law used to allow that a 6 year old can commit a crime, then when they arrested a 6 year old, they changed the law. But, the law says A child younger than 7 years of age may not be taken into custody, arrested, charged, or adjudicated delinquent for a delinquent act or violation of law based on an act occurring before he or she reaches 7 years of age, unless the violation of law is a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08 so a 6 year old can be arrested (charged, tried, convicted) for murder. Virginia does not appear to have any statute declaring 6 year olds to be categorially incapable of committing a crime. The question of capacity is of course a real consideration – insanity remains a defense against criminal charges. | Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement. | I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers | There is no requirement to interview the victim and/or the suspect prior to filing charges. Often statements are taken from the parties involved/witnesses by police and presented to the District Attorney's office as evidence. However charges can be filed without either party being interviewed, especially by the DA. This can often be the case in things like domestic violence cases, where the victim refuses to cooperate and the perpetrator refuses to talk ("lawyer up" or invoke 5th amendment rights). Charges can be filed based on circumstantial evidence of the crime (in the example, marks on the fist of the perpetrator and injuries to the victim, along with proximity). The police will try to interview the suspect and/or victim, but usually the prosecutor does not get involved at this point until charges are filed and the defendant has retained a lawyer (or declined one). | They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both. | The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable. | We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. |
Can the supreme court enforce its rulings on the executive branch? I've just read this article on Slate. In it, they describe how Trump's administration has ignored deadlines imposed by the U.S. District Court after losing a case to SCOTUS (I bolded the most relevant specific example). The Trump administration announced on Tuesday that it will continue to defy a federal court order compelling the full restoration of DACA, the Obama-era program that allows 700,000 immigrants to live and work in the United States legally. By doing so, the administration has chosen to flout a decision by the Supreme Court, effectively rejecting the judiciary’s authority to say what the law is. Donald Trump first attempted to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program in September 2017, a move that would’ve stripped its beneficiaries of work permits and subjected them to deportation. But his administration continually cut corners, failing to explain the basis for its decision and refusing to consider the impact of DACA repeal on immigrants, their communities, and their employers (including the U.S. Army). This June, the Supreme Court ruled that the administration’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” under federal law and therefore “set aside” DACA repeal. To implement that decision, U.S. District Judge Paul Grimm compelled the administration to restore DACA to its pre-repeal condition on July 17. Grimm’s order required the Department of Homeland Security to let DACA beneficiaries renew their status for two years, accept new applicants, and restore “advance parole,” which permits travel outside the country. But DHS did not do that. Instead, the agency maintained that it would reject new DACA applicants. It also declined to accept DACA renewals or reinstate advance parole. Does SCOTUS and the judicial branch have any way to actually enforce laws on the executive branch? It's one thing to enforce laws on some random citizen, but it seems there is no way for SCOTUS to enforce laws against the branch of government that's responsible for enforcing laws. | The US courts (including the US Supreme Court) do not have an army or even a police force under their direct control, except for a few court bailiffs. Ultimately, if the executive simply defies the courts, the only remedy is a political one. A court can order a person held unlawfully to be released from detention, but the jail/prison authorizes might ignore such an order. A court might order DACA applications to be accepted, and if they are not, might rule that deportations or other negative actions are unlawful. A court might hold persons who defy its orders in contempt, and send marshals to jail such persons. But if the executive branch in an organized way defies such orders, there is no judicial power to compel obedience to court orders. This is why the judiciary has famously been called the "least dangerous branch" of the government: it cannot actually do anything without at least the tacit cooperation of the executive. Cherokee Case (Worcester v. Georgia) There was a reference in the comments above to the the Cherokee Indians case, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In that case the US Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall held that the Georgia laws purporting to seize Cherokee lands were invalid as violations of Federal treaties. President Jackson was strongly displeased by this ruling. He was supposed to have said: John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. It appears that President Jackson probably did not say that, at least not publicly. But in fact Jackson did not take any steps to enforce the decision, and the decision was in fact not enforced. The lands were seized, and the Cherokee were forcibly relocated across the infamous trail of tears. This event shows that a court ruling (proper or improper) may have no effect if the executive branch refuses to obey or enforce it. | No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations. | There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News. | Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact. | Yes. This is legal, even though it is highly unlikely. There were very few, if any, instances of the federal pardon power being used this way historically, but it could happen, and President Trump, while he was in office, intimated that he might use the pardon power in this fashion. Realistically, it would be easier for the President to prevent someone from being prosecuted in the first place if the crime took place during his term, but he might pardon someone who committed the crime under a previous administration. The fact pattern in the question: “don’t be surprised if I pardon anyone that puts to death repeat heroin and fentanyl dealers dealing in amounts larger than 50 pounds” doesn't sound very morally palatable. But consider a slight variant of it which is much more plausible. Suppose that while running for office a Presidential candidate says: don't be surprised if I pardon someone who was convicted of homicide in a previous administration for killing someone who had been using them as a sex slave in a human trafficking network, or killing someone who was in the process of raping them shortly before their divorce became final but was not allowed to assert a self-defense argument at trial because marital rape was legal at the time. Now arguably that's different, because it doesn't induce someone to commit a future crime. But the President has broad discretion to make policy to de-emphasize certain kinds of criminal prosecutions in any case while in office even without the pardon power, and generally, this is not a basis for having a special prosecutor appointed at the federal level since there is no individualized conflict of interest. Of course, the U.S. President can only pardon someone from a federal crime and can't pardon state crimes or criminal convictions from other countries. So, even if the President pardoned someone of a federal crime in this situation, the state in which the murders took place could prosecute the individual for murder unimpeded (constitutional double jeopardy considerations would also not bar a state prosecution following the federal prosecution). Indeed, the vast majority of murder prosecutions are made under state law, and there are very few murders that take place which are beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and any foreign country, that are in the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and covered by a federal homicide statute, in any year. As noted by @hszmv in a comment to another answer: Federal Murder charges are a thing and can be prosecuted, but are normally reserved for murders that either involve federal government employees (especially if they are murdered because of the duties the performed in the course of their duty or the status as a federal employee) OR murders that occur on Federally Owned Property OR the Murder involved crossing state lines OR is in U.S. Jurisdiction but not in a territory or state jurisdiction (usually applies to some uninhabited territorial islands or U.S./International Waters). Further, a pardon would not prohibit the victim's family for suing the murderer for wrongful death, and indeed, probably wouldn't prohibit them from using the murder conviction that was pardoned to conclusively establish liability in a civil case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (I haven't researched that highly specific and technical civil procedure issue, however, but even if that wasn't possible, the murder trial transcript would be admissible in the civil case). A civil judgement for wrongful death was famously obtained against O.J. Simpson by the victim's family after O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal murder trial. This tactic would really only be helpful to a prospective defendant with respect to cases where there is not a parallel criminal offense under state law. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | This came in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). At the last moments of his term, President Adams and Congress appointed a bunch of new judges to the courts. One of those was Marbury, but his new commission was not delivered by the outgoing Secretary of State John Marshall. The incoming President Jefferson had the undelivered commissions thrown out and ignored by his own Secretary of State (Madison). So Marbury sued to have his commission instated. There were some peculiar subtleties to the case. One is that Marbury sued directly in the Supreme Court, rather than an inferior court. A law passed by Congress had granted SCOTUS authority to be the trier of certain cases; said law was repealed before the case went before the court. Another oddity is that the Chief Justice was the very same John Marshall that had originally failed to deliver the commission; he did not recuse himself. The case was very contentious. Congress and the President were both very combative and eager to claim control of "constitutionality" for themselves. Congress would not much appreciate its laws being thrown out, and Jefferson was of the (combative) mind that it was in fact the President who decided the constitutionality of laws (the constitution can be said to explicitly charge him with enforcement of the laws and protection of the constitution), etc. The court risked getting neutered by both sides with just the slightest misstep. The President was sure to ignore any attempt to make him do anything, and Congress would retaliate if anyone but them threw out their laws. And simply declaring themselves impotent was the same set of problems. That the ruling effectively avoided all such problems makes it one of the great examples in SCOTUS opinions to this day, though not all hold it up in a positive way (it arguably intentionally handled the case backwards, so as to yield a ruling rather than a dismissal; some even argue the case may have been manufactured as a way to formally let SCOTUS claim this power). The ruling basically said the following: (1) Does Marbury have a right to this commission? Yes, the commission was validly created and the deliverance of it is just a non-discretionary formality, failure of which is an injury that can be fixed (give him the commission). (2) Do we have the power to force the Executive branch to do something like this? Yes, for non-discretionary duties that are non-political and owed to a particular person, the courts may order the lower ranks of the Executive branch to do things. (3) Do we even have the authority to hear this case? No. It is held that the law in question would grant us original jurisdiction over this issue, but that is unconstitutional: our original jurisdiction is completely enumerated by the Constitution, and cannot be expanded by legislation. (4) So what do we do? Nothing, we just dismiss it. Madison can be ordered to do this thing, but won't actually be so ordered since the law required to let us do so is invalid. And we can invalidate that law, but don't actually do so since Congress has already repealed it. In this way both Congress and the President were left with no real angles to hold a beef over the court, as neither one of them had effectively had their authority directly neutered or compelled. The ruling did nothing but what was already done, and simply asserted the Judiciary had certain powers it could flex later: it could rule on the constitutionality of laws, and it could order the Executive branch to do things. For what it's worth, the Marshall court never really invoked these powers again, seemingly still mindful of a contentious battle for power between the branches of government that could render the courts impotent, but one way or another the ruling successfully claimed the power to decide the constitutionality of things for the courts. | In the comic timeline (seen in Uncanny X-Men #141, Jan 1981), as mainly narrated by Kitty Pryde, In 1984, "a rabidly anti-mutant candidate was elected President", and "within a year" had arranged to pass "the first Mutant Control Act". This is struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Then (let's say this is 1985-1986ish), "the Administration responded by activating the Sentinels", who promptly proceed to take over the country. Whoops! There is a further Mutant Control Act in 1988, which makes mutants "pariahs and outcasts" to be hunted down and for the most part killed. Presumably this is under the Sentinel-controlled version of the U.S. government. By 2013, society is split between baseline humans (H), "anomalous" carriers of the mutant gene (A), and full-blown mutants (M). The A-class people are forbidden from reproducing. All this is said to derive from, and be in accordance with, the law of 1988. While we don't know what the 1985 law did, it's presumably not too different from the 1988 version. The newer one is only constitutional insofar as the Sentinels have taken over. Their orders, made in response to the Supreme Court's action, were to "eliminate the mutant menace once and for all", and deposing the government is their chosen path to that end. Although the robot coup was not what the President was hoping for, we can still interpret that the intent behind using the Sentinels was to (1) achieve similar effects to the rejected law of 1985, and (2) do so in a way that the Supreme Court could not block. The idea is that the use of the Sentinels probably is just as unconstitutional as the original law, but is something the government could get away with. In the movie, Trask says that Congress refused to fund the program, and so he is appealing to the executive branch for clandestine financing: this is a similar dynamic of trying to evade the lawful process. It is plausible that the grounds for striking down the 1985 law would include equal protection, as well as protection against search and seizure, and requirements of due process. It would have been a broad enough ruling that the administration felt justified in taking an entirely different approach, rather than attempting to tweak the law. For example, if the Supreme Court held that mutants were not a protected class, and not even human anyway, but that the proposed law infringed the rights of humans in some minor way, then the creation of the Sentinels seems less obvious as a response. They must have concluded something broad enough to cover anti-mutant laws in general. I'd estimate that whether or not mutation was deemed within scope of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the other obvious civil rights violations are more likely to be biting. Certainly in the case of the giant murderbots, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are clearly engaged, and the Supreme Court might be more comfortable applying them straightforwardly, compared to reading a novel class into the Fourteenth. Politically - and the use of Nixon in the film makes this apt - the problem was not to stay within the bounds of the law, but to evade its power. Secretly funding a private-sector program doesn't make the outcome any more or less constitutional, but it does make it harder for plaintiffs to challenge. They have to find out about it. They have to demonstrate standing, which is difficult - see for example U.S. v Richardson 418 U.S. 166 (1974) holding that a taxpayer did not have standing to challenge Congressional funding of the CIA. And if the Sentinels haven't been turned on yet, then nobody has been actually harmed; all we have is a robot that might hurt mutants. Once they are activated, the secret is out, but at that point if all goes "well" then there are no mutants left to object. In the event, a legal challenge was impossible for different reasons (robot tyranny). |
How did Dominion justify the 1.6 billion value they're suing Fox News for? Dominion is suing for 1.6 billion in their defamation case against Fox News. Google tells me they make an annual income of less then 100 million and their entire company is only valued at 80 million. To be frank, regardless of whether or not Fox is found liable of defamation it seems hard to believe that the alleged defamation from Fox News alone resulted in losses equal to twenty times Dominion's current net worth. So I'm wondering if the filing specifies how Dominion came up with such a high number, and what their legal justification for it is. Do these sorts of lawsuit just always toss out some value known to be exaggerated expecting it to be lowered by the court even if they win, or - presuming they did win their lawsuit - would Dominion have reasonable expectation of being awarded the full 1.6 billion claim? | The complaint is available online. In fact, it asks for more than 1.6 billion, because it doesn't suggest any amounts for certain categories. The amounts that are specified include things such as the cost of providing security in the wake of death threats they received. Starting on page 136, they ask for General compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Damages of not less than $600,000,000 for lost profits, not less than $1,000,000,000 for lost enterprise value, not less than $600,000 for security expenses, and not less than $700,000 for expenses to fight the disinformation campaign waged against them, Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Pre- and post-judgment interest, and Expenses and attorneys' fees. Justification for the amounts in the second item is found in the complaint. | This very much depends in BigCorp and the whole situation. BigCorp has three sums of money: what they pay you, the cost of turning it into a product, and the profits of the product. Usually the first amount is much smaller than the second, and that is much less than the third. Ripping you off won’t save them much. Having a contract that rips you off but can be challenged later successfully would be the worst case for them. So the best case for BigCorp is lawyers that set up a contract that is fair, bullet proof, and is created by lawyers that cooperate to keep the cost down. BigCorps lawyers probably know someone who will work in your interest just fine. Their worst bet would be lawyers that don’t work for your benefit, and then you manage to throw the contract out when it turn out to be not in your interest. | The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S. | It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia). | This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know. | There's an interesting philosophical debate you can have. By the plain text of the First Amendment, it protects libel. Aside: Yes, the First Amendment does apply to libel cases. A libel case, like all lawsuits, involves the government's judicial branch using its coercive power to make you pay money as a result of your speech, based on a law requiring you to pay money for certain kinds of speech. Tort law is not optional; a libel case isn't "you promised not to say bad things and then said bad things," it's the government saying "what you did is bad, now pay the person you hurt because of your speech." The idea that "you can say it, you just have to face the consequences" isn't enough and hasn't been for quite a while now. Traditionally, the main point of freedom of speech was that a court couldn't stop you from saying something, but could only seek to punish you after the fact (and for that you get a jury, a public hearing, etc.) But more recently, courts realized that subsequent punishment had similar effects to prior restraint. If you're going to be punished for some kind of speech, you're going to steer clear of saying anything a jury might think is that kind of speech. Libel law is heavily influenced by the First Amendment, and has been for over 40 years. The First Amendment looks like it protects libel, but it also looks like it should protect your right to reprint any book you want. It also looks like it should protect your right to tell someone "go and murder this person." It also looks like it should protect your right to say whatever you want in court, whether or not it's true. It also looks like it should protect your right to falsely shout "fire" in a crowded hall, with the intent to cause a stampede (this isn't just a turn of phrase, there was an actual incident in which 73 people were killed which is believed to have started when someone falsely shouted that there was a fire). It also looks like it should protect your right to post a sign saying "There is a bomb at this elementary school." Yet the Constitution explicitly sanctions copyright, and no one would seriously conclude that Congress may not protect the integrity of the judicial process by punishing perjury. Ordering a hit, making bomb threats, intentionally causing panics -- the fact that speech is a key part of these can't mean that the government isn't allowed to criminalize them. You cannot run a civilized society in which death threats are legal. So, the courts interpret. Language in the Constitution that appears absolute is understood to have implied exceptions. The people writing the document were well aware that perjury was generally a crime. The same Congress that proposed the First Amendment passed a law criminalizing perjury. Sure, you're punishing someone based on their speech, but it's clearly not meant to be protected. You can't run a court system without perjury laws, and its absence from the First Amendment doesn't mean that the First Amendment thereby upended this basic principle. The courts have identified a number of kinds of speech that, by longstanding practice, are not protected. Intellectual property violations are one. Obscenity is another. So are threats. So is "speech integral to criminal conduct" (e.g. "what'll it be, your money or your life?") And so is defamation. The text of the First Amendment may not exclude it, but courts have uniformly held that it's not something the amendment was ever meant to protect. The First Amendment does still pose constraints, which are some of the most defendant-friendly in the world (interestingly enough, US law is descended from English law, and English libel law used to be among the most plaintiff-friendly in the world). It's not libel if it's true. It's not libel if it's an opinion (unless it's a statement of fact dressed up as opinion). It's not libel unless you were at least negligent; if it was about a public figure, you have to have known it was false or seriously doubted its truth. But these restrictions leave a core of speech that is and always has been punishable. | Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful. | This feels like a political hit job carried out by the courts rather than the wheels of justice doing their thing. The wheels of justice are doing their thing; the answer and legal reasoning is in the court transcript, as quoted and commented on by a news source: see Michael Cohen raid and first day in court. Transcript: 04/16/2018. The Rachel Maddow Show | MSNBC. The overall argument made by the press lawyer - which convinced the judge and the court - is that if the third client's name is given to the court as sealed information, it should be public, according to the 1st Amendment and in the public interest. (Transcript edited and condensed by me) Mr. Balin: Your Honor, I apologize for interrupting. I`m a lawyer representing the press. ABC, “The New York Times”, “Associated Press”, CNN, and “Newsday”. The judge says, quote: I think you'd better come to the podium. Mr. Balin says, quote: I think I'd better too, your honor. I've sat and listened until we got to the point where I realized there's a public access issue here. Your honor, I'm Robert Balin from Davis Wright Tremaine. Thank you very much. ...There is no credible claim that this client`s mere identity is attorney-client privileged information. Michael Cohen makes the argument that it would be embarrassing to be associated with what he terms a raid at a house, in a home. Your Honor, I hardly need to remind the court of the intense public interest in the issues that are currently before this court. I look around and I see that every other seat is occupied by a member of the press. ...That's the very nature of the First Amendment access right, so that we the people and the press can monitor our institutions and have a rational basis for agreeing or disagreeing... ...It was Justice Burger who I think put it well. People in our open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. That was in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia many years ago. ...Your honor, I see no basis for denying public access. If your honor is going to order disclosure of this name, I see no basis for denying public access to that name. Maddow's comments: This is the lawyer for news organizations coming in and pressing this point. The judge at this point has basically agreed that she's going to take the name in a sealed envelope. The lawyer for the press comes in and says, if you're going to take that name, there's no good argument, there's no good legal precedent for keeping that name from the public. The secret name of Michael Cohen`s secret third client in his legal business, if that's going to be disclosed to the court, it should be disclosed to the people. And here is an interview with Balin where he explains the how and why of his arguments: Q&A: Lawyer behind Hannity revelation at Cohen hearing speaks - Columbia Journalism Review. Other points: Help me understand the public/private nature of courtroom findings, requests as it pertains to this case. Court proceedings are public; nearly everything that happens in a court is public information (aside from issues of national security as decided by panels of judges and/or grand juries; or issues of safety for individuals and/or witnesses who are party to the proceedings). So far it seems like none little of the evidence has actually been reviewed. The nature and content of the evidence or its review has nothing to do with the identity of the clients. The issue is the secrecy of the client list, not the content of the relationship between the client and Cohen. |
How can I prove I do not own real-estate property in New Jersey? For purposes of tax exemption in another country, I need to prove that I do not own a house or an apartment in my current state of residence, which is New Jersey. How can I do that? For example, is there a way to search my identity (SSN) in property records and get an official document verifying there are no matching results? | For example, is there a way to search my identity (SSN) in property records and get an official document verifying there are no matching results? No. You can search by name on a county by county basis, however. A certified search result from your county of residence to corroborate you affidavit or declaration and attached as an exhibit to the affidavit or declaration might be worth including (even if it is something of a matter of form over substance). You might also considering attaching a copy of your lease to the place where you reside in New Jersey if you have one. Both of these documents would only corroborate that you don't own what you claim to be your residential address, rather than proving by themselves that you own no real estate in New Jersey. But the authorities you are seeking to prove something to will inevitably have to take you at your word regarding what your residential address is anyway. For purposes of tax exemption in another country, I need to prove that I do not own a house or an apartment in my current state of residence, which is New Jersey. How can I do that? Usually, you would do this by executing an affidavit or declaration under the penalty of perjury to that effect. | Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction. | The government cannot seize property because a person residing at that property has a tax debt: the debtor has to have a legal interest in the property, which you say you don't have. The government can seize property under the practice of civil forfeiture, which is a legal dispute between law enforcement and property – the simplest way to put it is that the property itself has "done wrong" (is involved in illegal activity). That's not what tax debt is. It is possible for the state to seize property in error, so just because the state makes a mistake somehow does not mean that the state cannot file the paperwork and seize the property if the owners ignore the summons. | All new residents with out-of-state non-commercial driver's licenses must obtain a PA Driver's License within 60 days of establishing Pennsylvania residency. All new residents are required to make application for Pennsylvania title and registration of their vehicle(s) within 20 days of establishing residency in Pennsylvania. When you get pulled over, the cop is going to look at your license and ask, "Is this your current address?" If you are working in PA during the day, and sleep in PA at night, you do not live in NJ with your parents. EDIT TO ADD: To be clear on this "new resident" status 61 PA Code § 101.1 "defines resident individual as An individual who is domiciled in this Commonwealth..." plus some exceptions that do not matter in this instance because OP is going to rent an apartment in PA. Domicile is defined in the same section as "The place which an individual intends to be his permanent home and to which he intends to return whenever he may be absent." Title 61 is the Revenue Title. So for tax purposes, you must have an abode and you must have intentions. The Education Title (22) defines Domicile : Domicile is the place where one intends to and does, in fact, permanently reside. So for education purposes you must have intentions and your abode must be permanent. Having a drivers license is one form of proof of residency so presumably the driver's license residency requirement follows the Revenue definition! Title 22 requires you to prove permanence, and 12 months residence prior to registration as a student is one factor. Oh, and Title 61 explicit tells us that you can be a resident for tax purposes but not for residency purposes. | Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony. | In the vast majority of jurisdictions, unpaid property taxes give rise to a lien that runs with the land. So, the new owners have an "in rem" responsibility to pay those taxes that can be collected against them solely by foreclosing on the tax lien and seizing the property if the tax isn't paid. Whether the previous owners also have any responsibility for the unpaid property taxes depends on state law which varies and on the terms of the real estate purchase and sale contract and deed in the transaction. Where I live, the real estate buyer is protected against a surprise tax bill once the sale is done in two main ways. First, the title company provides insurance against unpaid real estate taxes and will deduct any potential unpaid real estate taxes from the funds provided to the seller at closing unless the country treasurer has verified in writing to them that there are no real estate tax arrears for that parcel of property. Second, if the property is conveyed by a warranty deed that does not exclude a warranty that there are no property tax liens in existence for the relevant years, then the buyer has a right to sue the seller for the unpaid back taxes if that warranty turns out not to be true. Almost all sales of real property for full consideration between unrelated parties are carried out by a general warranty deed of this type that doesn't exclude property tax liens except for the current calendar year. If there is no title company involved in the transaction and/or the property is not conveyed by a warranty deed (e.g. it is conveyed by a quitclaim deed), then you could still avoid this risk by checking with the county treasurer to see if any back property taxes are owed on the parcel being sold and getting a certification in writing from the county treasurer of that fact, before agreeing to close on the sale. The title insurance company, or you, if there is no title insurance company, should also check the county real estate records normally maintained by a county clerk or recorder, to confirm that the seller really owns the property sold and that it has not been sold in a tax sale which would eliminate the back tax obligation but which would also mean that the seller no longer owns the property. | Yes. A multi-nation citizen who has US citizenship has equal US citizenship with every other citizen; therefore the answer to this binary question is "Yes". The citizenship(s) of anyone who does not have US citizenship is irrelevant to this question; thus, the answer to this binary question is "No". Yes. The main point here is to determine if you have the relevant documents and permissions to be legally present in the US. If you are a US citizen, a) this makes the process easier for you and b) avoids any possible issues if evidence is found of citizenship from another country, which will make immigration think that A) you are not a US citizen and b) you lied to them. Most people have only a single citizenship. That is the default mindset of immigration. There's no downside for you to inform them; there may be additional difficulties, delays, and scrutiny if you do not. If you are not a US citizen, most of the same applies. Additionally, lying (even by omission) can be grounds to have your legal status revoked. In summary, if you have the legal right to be in the US (e.g. US citizen, legal resident) being fully honest cannot hurt you, and can make the process smoother. If you have legal permission to be in the US, being fully honest will help prevent that permission from being revoked. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. |
If someone is appointed to a committee, is that member allowed to vote in the same meeting? If a committee appoints a member to itself, is that newly appointed member allowed to vote in the same meeting he/she is elected or must the meeting be adjourned before that right is granted? | First, there are many versions of Robert's Rules of Order: here is an early free version. §26(c) suggests a procedure for creation of a committee to draft resolutions, and §53 contemplates other (standing) committees. Nothing therein suggests that there are restrictions on the right of a member to vote, in terms of a mandatory adjournment. However, RRO is not a Universal Organizational Bylaws, so in order to have any force, it must be adopted as part of the bylaws (in whole or part). It especially cannot dictate who is eligible to vote – that is a detail that has to be in the organization's bylaws. | These clauses are called recitals. Taken together, they are a form of preamble. The tradition of preambles is quite ancient. The Code of Hammurabi, for example, has a preamble. This preamble serves to establish the authority of the one enacting the laws, however, rather than his motivation. United Nations instruments typically use a series of participial phrases as preambular paragraphs (pdf) rather than subordinate clauses, but they have the same function of establishing context and motivation. I have not been able to locate the origin of this particular form of preamble, however. It seems to have evolved gradually from freely constructed preambles. I could not identify when this form became fixed. | In an instant run-off, there are multiple rounds of voting (two, in this case). In the first round, everyone voted for their preferred candidate. In the second round, Jane's voters still vote for Jane, Joe's voters still vote for Joe, and John's voters vote for either Jane or Joe depending on their preferences. So everyone gets a vote in every round. To make an argument against this, you'd have to explain why this "instant system" is unconstitutional while conventional run-off elections, in which everyone votes again on a later day, are constitutional. (Some states use this system if no candidate meets a 50% threshold; for example, the special Senate election in Mississippi recently ended with a run-off.) The only real distinction between these two systems is that Jane's and Joe's voters can't change their minds between the two rounds of voting. So-called "jungle primaries" used in California and Washington effectively work on the same two-round structure, and have been found to be constitutional. If you want some legal precedent, in 2009 the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically refuted this argument in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis (bolding mine): The central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument is that in the second round, first-choice votes cast for continuing candidates were exhausted in the first round and have no further opportunity to affect the election. Appellants claim that, in contrast, voters who cast their first-choice vote for the eliminated candidate get a second chance to influence the election by having their second-choice votes, for a different candidate, counted in the second round. Appellants assert that the same is true in subsequent rounds—voters for continuing candidates have exhausted their ability to affect the election, while voters who had selected the next eliminated candidate get yet another opportunity, as their next choice is counted. Like the district court, we reject the central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument: that the vote for a continuing candidate is exhausted in the first round in which it is exercised and then is not counted and is of no effect in subsequent rounds. On the contrary, the vote for a continuing candidate is carried forward and counted again in the next round. Just because the vote is not counted for a different candidate in the new round (as is the vote originally cast for an eliminated candidate), does not mean that the ballot was exhausted, that the vote for the continuing candidate is not counted in the subsequent rounds, or that the voter has lost the ability to affect the outcome of the election. See Stephenson v. Ann Arbor Bd. of Canvassers, No. 75-10166 AW (Mich.Cir.Ct. Nov. 1975) (rejecting a claim that an IRV system for election of mayor gave more weight to votes of some voters than others because those who voted for an eliminated candidate had their second choice counted while the second choice of voters whose candidate remained in the race were not counted). Indeed, it is only because votes for continuing candidates are carried forward and combined with subsequent-choice votes of voters for eliminated candidates that any candidate can eventually win. Moreover, this aspect of the IRV methodology is directly analogous to the pattern of voting in a primary/general election system. In a nonpartisan primary election, each voter's vote counts in determining which two candidates survive to reach the general election. In essence, those primary votes are the voters' first-choice ranking of the candidates. As a result of the primary, all but the top two candidates are eliminated. Then, in the general election, voters who voted for candidates eliminated in the primary are allowed to cast another ballot, which necessarily will be for a different candidate-presumably, their second choice. This is no different than the counting of the second-choice votes of voters for eliminated candidates in instant runoff voting. At the same time, in the general election, voters who voted in the primary for either of the two surviving candidates are allowed to vote again, and they are most likely to vote again for their choice in the primary (unless, perhaps, they were voting strategically in the primary and did not vote for their actual first choice in an effort to advance a weaker opponent for their first choice to the general election). This is the equivalent of the continuing effect of the first-choice votes for continuing candidates in instant runoff. A vote in the general election still counts and affects the election, even though it is for the same candidate selected in the primary. Appellants attempt to distinguish the primary/general election system on the basis that those elections are separate, independent events, but the effect in terms of the counting of votes is the same. | Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.) | Yes, so long as you are still a US citizen, it does not matter if you no longer maintain residence in the United States. If you no longer have any sort of residence that can be claimed as a current residence, you simply register at whatever the last residence you used was when you lived in the United States (even if someone else lives there now). You would then have an absentee ballot mailed to you overseas. However, if you don't maintain any sort of residence in the United States, you will only be eligible to vote for federal offices (president, senate, house). You won't be allowed to vote in state or local elections. The keywords you'll need for voting are: UOCAVA, which is a program that allows for easier voting overseas (in some cases the ballot can actually be emailed to you and you are only responsible for printing it out, filling it out, and mailing it back). FPCA, which is the form you fill out. It actually doubles as a registration and an absentee ballot request, so you only have to fill out one form. The absentee request is good for all elections in the calendar year it is submitted, so you only have to fill it out once for both the primary and the general. | If 20 percent of the voting interests petition the board to address an item of business, the board, within 60 days after receipt of the petition, shall place the item on the agenda at its next regular board meeting or at a special meeting called for that purpose. Assume that the Association fails to follow the rule and fails to hear the agenda item and the business item is under Arbitration / Litigation. What is the appropriate monetary and non-monetary remedy to request? A Petition for a Writ of Mandamus or affirmative injunction ordering the board to consider the matter, depending upon the customs of Florida courts would be the usual remedy. But, one can imagine a fact pattern where some other relief such as also allowing money damages would be appropriate where, for example, delay impacts the cost of doing work. | It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment. | In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress). 2 United States Code § 2c. What is "PL 2 USC 2c?" First of all, it is 2 U.S.C. § 2c, not "PL 2 USC 2c" which mixes two ways of citing to statutes PL for "Public Law" is used with a public law number to identify the Act of Congress by which a provision was enacted (and sometimes additional Public laws amend a statute). 2 U.S.C. § 2c means "Section "2c" of the Second Title of the United States Code" which is a codification of all public acts passed by Congress and still in force of general applicability. What does it mean? What does it legally mandate? 2 U.S.C. § 2c mandates that for years after the effective date, when a state with two or more members of Congress draws Congressional Districts after a U.S. Census that it must do so into single member districts. It does not mandate a "first past the post" voting system (also called a plurality vote system) and indeed, some states (e.g. Louisiana) have a system in which a winner in a Congressional district must receive a majority to win in the first round, and if that does not happen there will be a runoff between the top two finishers in the first round, and one state (Maine) has ranked choice voting in single member district Congressional races. There is some dispute over whether systems like ranked choice voting count as proportional representation. They do not cause political parties to receive seats in proportion to the number of votes cast for them. But they do eliminate spoiler effects which strongly discourage the formation of third-parties in the U.S. What is the legislative process for overturning or editing an article of public code like "PL 2 USC 2c?" It can be changed by an ordinary law passed by majorities in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate in identical form and not vetoed, or vetoed and then overridden by a two-thirds majority in each house of Congress within the time allowed by the U.S. Constitution. Can it be edited to let states choose how to elect their representatives, so that proportional representation can be implemented on a state-by-state basis? Yes. Generally one says that one "amends" a statute, however, rather than "editing" it. Are there Constitutional obstacles to proportional representation and specifically to editing "PL 2 USC 2c" in this way? No. As long as proportional representative is only within the Congressional seats allocated to a particular state, there is no Constitutional obstacle. But, a national scale proportional representation system would pose constitutional issues. 2 U.S.C. 2c was enacted in order to end the previously common practice of having multi-member districts in which you could vote for as many candidates as there were seats available at large, with the highest X vote getters in the X member district winning. When people vote on party lines, that causes the party with majority support to get all of the seats in the multi-member district much as the plurality winner in a state in all but two U.S. states in Presidential elections gets 100% of the electoral college votes in a state. But, the drafters of 2 U.S.C. 2c underestimated the potential for gerrymandering to circumvent the benefits of having single member districts. |
Do you need to give the source when making a "Privatkopie" (Germany)? In Germany, when making a Privatkopie, for example by taking notes in digital form, do you need to include from which book the notes were taken, the author's name, ... if you are only going to privately use your digital notes? | No, § 63 (1) 1 UrhG, the obligation to attribute the source, concerns only exceptions listed there. The applicable exception of § 53 UrhG, copies for private use, is not listed in § 63. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. | In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization. | Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46". | Although the exact answer should depend on the country you are, in general private copies of copyrighted works are allowed. General rules are: You need to have got the work in a legitimate way. That is, that you have purchased a copy of the work with permission from copyright owners or you have got the work from an act of public distribution authorised by copyright owners - if you got it from a website that is not making a copyright infringement itself, you are in the second case. That you don't make a collective or commercial use of the work. (I took these rules from Spanish Intellectual Property law (article 31), but most countries have similar rules, specially in the European Union. Anyway, the exact limits of private copying exception may differ). Since private copying might have an economic effect, some countries collect private copying levies to compensate copyright owners - probably you have already paid for those when purchasing the printer. Therefore, you can print a book downloaded from a website (unless the site is hosting the work without authorization of the copyright owners, as pirate sites do) for your own use. You can't sell the copies or made a collective use of them. Although reach of collective use might be hard to assess, I would suggest that if you want all the people in your class have the book, send them the link so that any one could print their own copy. Update about the USA As the OP has now specified now their country I update the answer with a comment, although an additional answer by anybody more knowledgeable on US law would be great. I'm quite sure that for practical purposes the result is that you can print such a book anywhere in the world. However, I don't know which laws regulates that in the US. Google doesn't return meaningful results for "private copy usa", so I suppose it is know there by another name. Furthermore, statutes in common law countries tend to be less explicit and there might be no case law applicable. For example, I nobody printing a copy of a pdf for himself to read at home has ever been challenged in court in the USA, there might be no explicit rule about the subject. | Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough. |
How did the right for peers to be tried by peers end in 1948? In another question's comments is claimed that the right for aristocratic peers to be tried by their own kind had ended in 1948. How and why did it end then? | The privilege of peerage in criminal proceedings was abolished by s. 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948. As for why, see Colin Rhys Lovell, "The Trial of Peers in Great Britain", The American Historical Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Oct., 1949). There were "grave disadvantages in the procedure to the accused peer, who could not waive it." The accused could not challenge the jurors or appeal their decisions. It was ultimately decided that the procedure had "outlived its usefulness." See also some justification from Hansard: [...a peer] cannot say, "Waive all this, and treat me like anybody else." The existing law is that he must be tried by this grotesque and antiquated arrangement. It is a Court, but it is a very ancient Court, and it is high time that provisions were made that a Peer who is charged with a felony should be treated in the same way as anybody else. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | The earliest I know of is Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (N.C. Super. 1787), which dealt with a North Carolina statute that confiscated land held by British subjects and required the courts to dismiss any lawsuits attempting to reclaim confiscated property. The North Carolina Superior Court held that because the state constitution conferred a right to a jury on questions of property ownership, the legislature could not require the courts to dismiss lawsuits requesting such a resolution to property disputes: By the Constitution every citizen has a right to a decision in regard to his property by a trial by jury. The act of Assembly, therefore, of 1785, requiring the Court to dismiss on motion the suits brought by persons whose property had been confiscated against the purchasers, on affidavit of the defendants that they were purchasers from the commissioners of confiscated property, is unconstitutional and void. So the British subject was entitled to a trial, but the admission that he was a British subject meant that he was an alien and enemy of the government, and therefore not permitted to hold property. | You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right. | No, all text of the Canadian constitution is of equal force. The 1993 Supreme Court case New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) makes this clear: It is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution: Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. So if the privilege to expel strangers from the legislative assembly is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by the Charter, even if the Charter otherwise applies to the body making the ruling. This raises the critical question: is the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers from its chamber a constitutional power? The opinion went on to determine that the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers was an unwritten constitutional principle which could not be abrogated by the written constitutional Charter (though they did not specifically call it an unwritten constitutional principle at the time, this is retroactively so through Reference Re Secession of Quebec para. 52). Edit: Following Toronto (City) v. Ontario (AG) 2021 SCC 34, it's not entirely clear New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. is still good law as the majority relegated unwritten principles to interpretive aids and filling structural gaps of the written Constitution, without referencing this case. The rule that the (written) Constitution cannot contradict itself seems logical though, and the cited Reference re Bill 30 does indeed state at para. 62 that the written Charter cannot override other parts of the Constitution (presumably we should read that as specifically written parts, since that's what was at issue in the reference). | It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example). | You're thinking of legalism. It can have different meanings -- especially in Chinese legal/philosophical history -- but is the best match to the concept you're describing. | Parliament in the UK is sovereign: Parliament [is] the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. If parliament passed a law saying that it was a crime for "a black American woman sat at the front of the bus" and provided that it repealed all existing laws that would invalidate that law (e.g. the European Charter of Human Rights); then there is no defence to that crime if the prosecution proves the elements beyond reasonable doubt i.e. that you are a) black, b) American, c) a woman and d) sat at the front of the bus. In the UK there is no higher law that can be appealed to like a constitution. Over the years, UK parliaments have passed laws limiting their sovereignty, however, any current or future parliament could (in theory) repeal those limits. Just like the USA could (also in theory) repeal the Bill of Rights amendments to their constitution (or even replace the Constitution as a whole); albeit the process is different and less likely to succeed. The limitations on this are political, not legal. |
What is "probity"? I have found a number of definitions but none are satisfyingly congruent with the usages that I have seen in legal contexts including several times on here, which generally use it to describe a quality of evidence, even the definitions which I have found through search engines in specifically legal dictionaries. | The definitions you found online and in legal dictionaries are likely correct. I suspect you found something such as: The quality or condition of having strong moral principles; integrity, good character; honesty, decency. (Oxford English Dictionary) This is the definition corresponding to the most typical (what many would call the "correct") use of the word. It is often used in phrases like "probity and fair dealing." If you have seen other uses, in relation to the quality of evidence, this is an occasional misuse. See Footnote 54 in Matthew Gourlay, et al., Modern Criminal Evidence, Chapter 1: There is an unfortunate trend in some recent judicial decisions of using the term "probity" as a synonym for probative value: see e.g. R v Durham Regional Crime Stoppers Inc, 2017 SCC 45, [2017] 2 SCR 157 at paras 43-47. "Probity" refers to moral uprightness and is not the noun form of the adjective "probative." If a new coinage is required, "probativity" would be preferable. | I found an example of "is illegal" in RCW 78.52.467: "If the department believes that any oil, gas, or product is illegal...". There are some examples of "shall be illegal", e.g. RCW 39.84.050 "It shall be illegal for a director, officer, agent", where "illegal" is used predicatively. I tenatively conclude than the latter kind of use is less frequent that the adjectival use. Black's Law Dictionary 2nd Pocket ed does not include "illegal" except in some "illegal"+noun constructions, but it does list "unlawful" alone. "Unlawful" has been used since 1387 (J. Trevisa translation of Ranulf Higden Polychronicon), whereas "illegal" only goes back to 1626. Legal language tends to be very conservative, so the fact that "unlawful" got there first (aided no doubt by the fact that it is an Anglo-Saxon construction, not a medieval Latin borrowing) gives the term priority in legal usage. It sounds more legal to say "(un)lawful" that "(il)legal". | what does the phrase "in this act unless context requires otherwise" mean? It means that the provision or statutory definition is not to be imposed where its application would make no sense or would lead to an absurd outcome. Using the example point out, statutory or judicial references to "laws of physics", "law of supply and demand", and so forth are not to be construed as enactments or rulings issued by some authority. Accordingly, such laws are not susceptible to violation, enforcement, or repeal. | Is there a bright line / contours as to what constitutes practicing law? For the most part, no. There are some activities that clearly constitute the practice of law almost everywhere (e.g. representing someone in a court proceeding), and there are some activities that clearly do not constitute the practice of law almost anywhere (e.g. preparing your own tax return based upon your interpretation of the tax laws). There are many activities that are in gray areas and the definition varies from state to state. For example, analyzing deeds to determine who is in title to real estate on a commercial basis is considered the practice of law in New York State, but not in Colorado. What are the elements ('litmus tests') to recognize practicing law As applicable to the example in the question (there are an infinite number of possible situations so a full treatment is too broad), evaluating the law for purposes of guiding your own actions is generally not considered the practice of law. An individual can represent themselves in any court proceeding to which they are a party (although usually they can't represent entities that they own) without practicing law. Similarly, the Community Association Manager has to make one decision or another, and the law (outside of court proceedings) rarely requires that one hire a lawyer simply to make a decision that you are required to make in the course of your job. Consulting a lawyer increases the odds that the CAM will make the right decision, but interpreting the law as it applies to what you personally are required to do in carrying out your job responsibilities will very rarely constitute the practice of law. On the other hand, if someone who was a former Community Association Manager held himself out as a "consultant" for current Community Association Managers, and in the course of that consultant work told Community Association Managers what the law required them to do, this would very likely be the practice of law, because it applies legal knowledge to particular facts for someone other than yourself. The term "attorney" in its broadest definition means someone who takes action on behalf of another, and if someone is doing something on behalf of another, and it involves legal knowledge or a legal dispute, usually this will be found to constitute the practice of law. | SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand. | It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia). | Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so. | A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth. |
Can Oracle sue JSON users? As we know, Oracle owns the Java and JavaScript trademarks from its purchase of Sun. Java and JavaScript are 2 completely unrelated programming languages. JSON is the abbreviation of "JavaScript Object Notation", and is a popular format for encoding structured data. Can Oracle sue JSON users? user of parsing softwares, and developers of parsers and encoders, and ECMA, who publishes the JSON specification What can Oracle possibly win (and JSON users possibly lose) in such litigation? | I don't think so. While JSON stands for "JavaScript Object Notation", it doesn't say that. So the term "JSON" isn't infringing on a trademark for "JavaScript". To sue somebody because of an alleged trademark infringement, one needs to prove that the offender abused a trade name of the suing company in a way to make the public believe the offending company was related to the suing company. Nobody is even trying that by just using a file format. The file structure itself was developed as an open standard, so they can't claim any rights on that. I have not heard about a company claiming rights in file structures recently, because the data is considered the property of the user, not of the company that wrote the program it was created with. And users are often no longer accepting file formats that can only be read by a specific (expensive) application from a particular company. They want to be flexible to change their vendor and keep the data. | Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*] | Wikipedia and you likely have no contract. If you don't have to click "I agree" to access the data, its likely there is no contract. Therefore this is a pure IP law question. The ONLY IP law issue that I see is copyright. The DATA is not subject to copyright. Only the expression of that data. So copying the html and selling that IS potential copyright infringement. Copying the data in some other format and using that is not. Finally, even if you do copy the full html (i.e. full expression), this MAY be licensed by their terms of use (as you suggested they have licensed some content). That is a more particularized legal question that I can't answer here. | Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation. | The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction. | If you change a single character, that's clearly a partial copy. Copyright protection has a limited extent, however. The protected work must be original and not obvious. For example, there are only so many ways to write a function that computes the average of two numbers, so the copyright owner of one body of code cannot claim infringement by the author of a second body of code simply because they both have a function float Average(float a, float b) { return (a + b) / 2; } A surefire way to avoid infringing copyright is to specify the function of the code and then have someone who has never seen the code write it from scratch. This is sometimes called clean-room engineering. Otherwise, there is no way to answer your question definitively. If you create a modified copy of the code (a "derived work" in copyright terminology), there is no strict formula available to evaluate the extent of the infringement. It comes down to a case-specific analysis of the facts by a judge. Depending on the jurisdiction, which you have not specified, there may be specific laws or judicial precedent that guide the judge, but the determination will still require a specific analysis of the facts. For example, if the alleged infringer raises these arguments, the judge would have to determine how obvious the code is, or whether the copyright claimant even owns the copyright to the code. | Person A has to have created the data to hold copyright; for most kinds of data this has no legal effect because facts are not protected by copyright. A mineable database probably does not have the necessary creative elements for copyright. An algorithm is not protected by copyright (it might be patented). Person C's program is copyrighted. The product created by D is probably copyrighted, depending on what degree of creativity is involved in their transformation. If the transformation is automatic then no, but if creative judgments are applied to the output of the program then maybe. Though the resulting product is another database of facts, and the facts cannot be protected. In terms of "using the model", only C and possibly B have any control. If it is necessary to validate the software using A's data and A has kept the data secret, C might negotiate with A to use the data, in order to complete his program, and that could give A some interest in the program. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. |
Who is supposed to teach the law to the citizens? As I understand, in general, not knowing the law does not excuse violating it. That should apply to most if not all jurisdictions in most cases with very few exceptions. From personal experience, never in my life has school, family or anyone ever actually taught me any laws or showed me where I could consult them myself, and I have already reached legal age a couple of years ago. So my question is, who, by law or morality, is supposed to teach citizens the law so that they can be aware and abide by it? Answers can be generalized to include most jurisdictions or be specific. | The answer from @user6726 is a good one. But, I'd like to add to it by pointing out that the body of law applicable to an individual is usually much, much smaller than the entire body of law. I'm a lawyer who has been in private practice for almost 25 years with an extremely diverse practice compared to the average lawyer, and I've never even looked at perhaps 80% of the laws on the books in the states where I practice, and even less elsewhere. By statutory and regulatory volume, the vast majority of statutory and regulatory law is applicable to either the internal operations of government, or to the way in which regulated industries and business transactions are conducted. And, it is customary for people in situations in all of those situations to have professional intermediaries such as lawyers, realtors, brokers, architects, general contractors, accountants, tax preparers, and consultants to assist them in complying. Some of the more technical areas encountered by average people (e.g. traffic laws) are areas in which training is mandated before you can get a driver's license. Many other areas of occupational and industry regulations are similarly distinguished by having a licensing requirement to make sure that everyone involved knows that a new body of law applies to them. You only need to know about nuclear power plant regulations, for example, if you build a nuclear power plant and will soon learn if you try to do so that you need a license to do that. Even within areas of law that have broad applicability like tax law and criminal law, a lot of the law has only narrow application. For example, most people don't need to know the rules for determining the taxable income of a life insurance company, or the criminal laws pertaining to people who have security clearances to review top secret national security information. The body of "private law" governing the rights of individuals vis-a-vis other private individuals, and of criminal law that an ordinary person is in a position to violate, is very modest. And much of the law in this area is devoted to determining how serious an offense is and what the penalty should be, and what law enforcement is allowed to do in order to investigate these violations, and not to what is legal and illegal in some regard. For example, intentionally, recklessly or negligently offensively touching or causing injury to someone else's property or person, is almost always either a crime and/or a civil wrong called a tort for which you can be sued. Some versions of this conduct are more serious (e.g. rape or murder), some are less serious (e.g. pinching someone on Saint Patrick's Day for not wearing green). But the overriding concept, once you strip away the details, is pretty simple. Likewise, damaging or taking property that isn't yours, intentionally, recklessly or negligently, is almost always either a crime and/or a civil wrong called a tort for which you can be sued. Add the notion that you have to honor your promises in most circumstances and shouldn't lie or deceive in most circumstances, you have to follow authoritative signs and directions from legal authorities, and you have to figure out if you owe income taxes or not each year with professional help, if necessary, and you are well on your way to knowing what you need to know to obey the law. Even within "private law" there are lots of areas like patent law, product liability law, and oil and gas property rights, that the average person doesn't need to know. Knowing that if you are injured by someone else you should think about talking to a lawyer is usually good enough. These bare bones may prevent you from doing things that are legal close to the boundaries of what is allowed sometimes, but having standards higher than the bare legal minimum is rarely a deep impediment to living a decent life. It should also be enough to let you have some intuition that you are in a gray area and need to confer if you aren't sure if something is illegal or not. There are more complicated areas that many average individuals do have to deal with to some extent. The law governing privacy, copyright and speech comes to mind, for example. But, you can go a very long way on some very basic principles. Most law that applies to ordinary people flows from simple moral intuition. | No For the same reason that requiring a licence to drive might, in some circumstances, result in harm to a person who cannot drive because they don’t have a licence. The city (or any government) has legislative immunity for the laws they put in place even if those laws have negative consequences to some people. All laws have negative consequences to some people, for example, laws against theft are extremely prejudicial to thieves. Similarly, the executive is immune for exercising their discretion in the enforcement of the law. This is the basis of the police not having a general duty to protect. However, police have a specific duty to protect when they have taken an individual into their care and control. | This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court. | A teacher could not instruct students in how to build explosives for use in Federal crimes: It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction [...] with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence (source) This Federal statute creates a law preventing the teaching (in any context, including schools) of bombmaking for the purpose of committing a federal crime. So "bombmaking" is one subject that cannot be taught, although I don't think that there have been any prosecutions of regular K12 teachers under this law. | He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect. | The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. |
In what context can one reference or make points about pre-trial correspondence at trial? Suppose one has a claim against a corporate defendant, and up until the trial the defendant is represented in correspondence by a solicitor. At trial, a human director of the defendant is called by the defendant party as a witness, but the defendant itself is represented now by a barrister. If one wishes to reference claims or points made (I suppose nonetheless by the defendant, even if through its human solicitor) in pre-trial correspondence, these challenges couldn't necessarily be posed to the human director of the defendant in cross-examination, because the human director of the defendant is not actually the defendant itself, while the barrister will also not have been the one who had written the letters of correspondence (it would have been the solicitor). If one wishes to quiz or challenge the defendant, what opportunities in trial are there to do this? Even if we suppose momentarily that the legal representative of the defendant for the trial was the same one who had been writing all of the letters of pre-trial correspondence (ie the solicitor), as the legal representative is not a witness who can be subjective to cross-examination, are there any opportunities in a trial to enter into socratic, examination-style dialogue with the other side's representative? And which human entity in this scenario most corresponds to the defendant itself which is not a natural person? Is it true that the correspondence despite being humanly written by the instructed solicitor was legally with the defendant, so that they may be held responsible for everything that was written therein? | Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581. | One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant. | You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case. | If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y. | Is it normal under German law to just assume the accused will never go after a witness? This is not a question that can be answered here, or probably anywhere with any degree of certainty. The form seems to allow giving a different address (like a work address), but this seems to require a "good reason". What are acceptable reasons? These include an imminent risk of serious detriment to her well-being and a well-founded reason to fear she (or anyone else) might be improperly influenced if she gives here address. Staying anonymous; She is asked to provide a written statement. SHORT ANSWER A witness is not obligated to give the material witness statement to the police. Instead, a witness is only obligated to appear before and make a statement to the German public prosecutor (Staatsanwalt). AND... every (potential) witness is obligated to give their particulars at the hearing, including full names, maiden name, age, occupation and place of residence. Some or all of these details may be omitted, however, if there is a specific risk. In those cases, the identity of the witness may be kept undisclosed. LONG ANSWER Book1, Chapter 6 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, Strafprozeßordnung (StPO), gives the rules for examining, and protecting, witnesses. Section 48 (Obligations on witnesses; summons): (1) Witnesses shall be obliged to appear before the judge on the date set down for their examination. They shall have the duty to testify if no exception admissible by statute applies. (2) ... (3)... An examination shall, in particular, be made as to whether an imminent risk of serious detriment to the witness’s well-being requires measures to be taken pursuant to section 168e or section 247a, as to whether any of the witness’s overriding interests meriting protection require that the public be excluded pursuant to section 171b (1) of the Courts Constitution Act and as to what extent it is possible to refrain from asking non-essential questions concerning the witness’s personal sphere of life pursuant to section 68a (1) [see below] Account is, further, to be taken of the witness’s personal situation and the nature and circumstances of the offence. Section 68 (Examination as to witness’s identity; limitation of information, victim protection): (1) The examination shall begin with the witness being asked to state his first name, last name, name at birth, age, occupation and place of residence... (2) A witness shall, furthermore, be permitted to state his business address or place of work or another address at which documents can be served instead of stating his place of residence if there is well-founded reason to fear that legally protected interests of the witness or of another person might be endangered or that witnesses or another person might be improperly influenced if the witness states his place of residence. If the conditions of sentence 1 obtain at the main hearing, the presiding judge shall permit the witness not to state his place of residence. (3) If there is well-founded reason to fear that revealing the identity or the place of residence or whereabouts of the witness would endanger the witness’s or another person’s life, limb or liberty, the witness may be permitted not to provide personal identification data or to provide such data only in respect of an earlier identity. However, if so asked at the main hearing, he shall be required to state in what capacity the facts he is indicating became known to him. (4) ... (5) Subsections (2) to (4) shall also apply after conclusion of the examination of the witness. Insofar as the witness was permitted not to provide data, it must be ensured in the course of the provision of information from or inspection of the files that these data are not made known to other persons, unless a danger within the meaning of subsections (2) and (3) appears to be ruled out. Section 68a (Limitation of right to ask questions to protect privacy): (1) Questions concerning facts which might dishonour the witness ... or which concern their personal sphere of life are to be asked only if they cannot be dispensed with. Section 168e (Separate examination of witnesses): If there is an imminent risk of serious detriment to a witness’s well-being in the event of his being examined in the presence of persons entitled to be present and if that risk cannot be averted in some other way, the judge shall examine the witness separately from those entitled to be present. There shall be simultaneous audio-visual transmission of the examination to the latter. The rights of participation of those entitled to be present shall otherwise remain unaffected. Sections 58a and 241a shall apply accordingly. The decision referred to in sentence 1 shall not be contestable. Section 247a (Order for witness examination via audio-visual means): (1) If there is an imminent risk of serious detriment to the well-being of the witness were he to be examined in the presence of those attending the main hearing, the court may order that the witness remain in another place during the examination; such an order shall also be admissible under the conditions of section 251 (2) insofar as this is necessary to establish the truth. The decision shall not be contestable. Simultaneous audio-visual transmission of the testimony shall be provided in the courtroom. The testimony shall be recorded if there is a concern that the witness will not be available for examination at a future main hearing and the recording is necessary to establish the truth. Section 58a (2) shall apply accordingly. | It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs. | Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897. | This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer. |
are there any legal systems in the world where the judiciary and the legislature are the same? it's well known that the limited lawmaking power that a judiciary has comes from interpretation of statutes but are there any systems where the judiciary and the legislature are one and the same and have broad lawmaking powers ? | Historically, this was true in the Icelandic Commonwealth in the Middle Ages, and in some democratic Greek city-states in the classical era. Similarly, in non-democratic feudal regimes, the lord or monarch was both the law giver and sitting in court was also the arbiter of all disputes arising under the lord's own laws. In places like Saudi Arabia where the monarchy's power is more than symbolic, the system still works this way to a significant extent. The practical reality in most one party Communist states is similar. In the United Kingdom, historically, the Appellate committee of the House of Lords (staffed by a subset of aristocrats usually appointed for life by the Prime Minister to the post) was the highest court of appeal of other courts in the British Commonwealth (with the Judicial committee of the Privy Council handling final appeals from outside Britain), and it was also a court of original jurisdiction for certain criminal cases against other aristocrats to satisfy the Magna Carta's notion that one is entitled to a jury of one's peers. Top level general purpose legislatures rarely serve as courts at the highest level, except in very isolated political matters. A good example of narrow quasi-judicial legislative power is the power of the Congress in the U.S., to be the ultimate judge for Congressional election disputes and of some Presidential election disputes. Congress also has quasi-judicial jurisdiction over impeachments of government employees whether or not they are elected, and over expulsions for cause of its own members and over other ethical sanctions of its own members. Many other legislatures have some sort of quansi-judicial impeachment and/or explusion power exercised as a whole by by some committee within it. It is common in the United States for administrative agencies, within their narrow area of competence to exercise both quasi-legislative power to enact regulations with a broad mandate in a subject area, and also to have quasi-judicial power in that same subject area. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Merit System Protection Board, for example, all operate in this fashion to some extent. Likewise, it is very common at the local government level for a city council and its planning board to carry out both legislative roles and quasi-judicial role when disputes come up regarding its land use regulations. Similarly, school boards routinely both establish employment regulations and other school rules, and serve in a quasi-judicial role with respect employee discipline or termination, and with respect to student discipline. This dual role is also common for the boards of other public institutions like hospitals and state colleges, and for private non-profit organizations. A recent example in that kind of situation is Colorado's State School Board which both exercises legislative power over when charter schools (i.e. public schools not under the direct supervision of any elected local school board) may be formed, and has the ultimate and final judicial review role over decisions by local school boards to grant or deny school charters. | Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A. | In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels. | There are two kinds of immunity: absolute and qualified. Absolute immunity is limited to the official discretionary acts of judges, prosecutors in the litigation process (but not in the investigatory process) and the President. And, in the cases of judges and prosecutors this is only immunity from civil liability and not criminal liability. Thus, for judges the scope of absolute immunity extends to legal rulings and conduct related to being a judge in a courtroom. In the case of a prosecutor, it pertains to litigation conduct (but not conduct physically dealing with a defendant or investigating a crime). This is usually an open and shut question which can be determined on the face of the legal complaint against the official. Only the President has relatively broad kinds of activities covered and his saying he is immune doesn't mean that a judge trying a case will agree with him. If he's murdering his wife, no judge will believe that he's acting in his official capacity to do so. Other government officials generally have only "qualified immunity" which means that they have liability if they intentionally violate clearly established law, which basically means that there is a binding judicial precedent governing the facts and circumstances at issue. | Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989 | State supreme courts are not allowed to defy binding supreme court precedents and are quickly slapped down if they do. But not all U.S. Supreme Court rulings have that character. For example, even if a state has rules of civil procedure which are verbatim identical to the federal rules of civil procedure, it does not have to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of an identical rule. For example, many states have rules of civil procedure 8, 9 and 12 which are verbatim identical to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9 and 12. But, when the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted FRCP 8, 9, and 12 in a new way in cases known as Iqbal and Twombly, not all state courts adopted the new interpretation and this was not a defiance of binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, because the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents only apply to federal laws and rules. Similarly, many states have state constitutional rights in a bill of rights which are worded with language identical to that of parallel rights under the U.S. Constitution as amended. But, state courts don't always interpret that language in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court does. If the federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court is more protective of a right than the state constitution, then the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation sets a floor of protection (except in the small number of circumstances like the right to a civil jury trial, or the requirement that serious crimes be pre-approved by grand juries, where a federal right is not applicable to state and local governments). But, if the state constitution is interpreted by the State Supreme Court in a manner more protective a right than the U.S. Supreme Court, this is allowed and does not conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of identical language in the United States Constitution. | In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article. | No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt. |
What would happen if you entered a building and didn’t leave because you didn’t think the person there was the owner? Imagine you come across a building in a public place with some signs on it and an unlocked door. The signs make it seem like a shop or activity center rather than saying anything like “Keep Out”. You go inside and inside a person coldly says you aren’t welcome there and it isn’t a public place you can just enter at will, and you shouldn’t have just opened the door and walked in. If they actually owned or managed the building, I am pretty sure there are laws where if you do not leave a place after the owner, representative or resident asks you to, you are trespassing and it’s a crime. But, what if it turned out that the person inside was not who they tried to seem, or simply didn’t have the authority they claimed to. Maybe it is actually a public building, and you do have the right to go in, and that person isn’t telling the truth. Given the legitimate possibility on reasonable grounds that someone inside some given building is not actually supposed to be there, how might this apply to the law about it being mandatory to leave? What if you claimed you either did not think they were really in charge, or that you simply had no way of verifying? In other words, if it turns out it is their building, you have committed trespassing for not leaving, but this would seem to imply that you must follow the orders even of imposters or themselves intruders, just to avoid that potential illegal entering. You may not be legally required to leave, but you would have to even in that circumstance to avoid the claim against you. Does the law have any way of acknowledging that you cannot always make perfect legal decisions in situations where you are lacking the precise information you would need, to do so? | While the elements of criminal trespass vary from one U.S. state to another, the majority rule is that a good faith belief that you have a claim of a legal right to be present on property (even if you are ultimately found to be incorrect on the merits) prevents you from having the intent necessary to commit criminal trespass. The majority rule is that there is strict civil liability for trespass without regard to intent, but the minority rule that civil trespass is an intentional tort isn't terribly uncommon either, in which case criminal and civil liability for trespass would often be the same. Given the legitimate possibility on reasonable grounds that someone inside some given building is not actually supposed to be there, how might this apply to the law about it being mandatory to leave? What if you claimed you either did not think they were really in charge, or that you simply had no way of verifying? This is irrelevant. The burden is on you not to go into property where you are not allowed to be, and not on someone else to tell you to leave. If you know you have no right to be on the property, the fact that you believe someone else may also not have the authority to control who is on the property is not a defense to criminal trespass. You can be guilty of criminal trespass in most jurisdictions even if no one asks you to leave, if you know that you do not have permission to be on the property. Lack of permission is the default in the absence of someone with apparent authority to do so telling you otherwise. | Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed. | Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault. | The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other. | It is legally significant because you have certain protections from eviction is you reside in a place. If you are just a weekend guest (or an uninvited intruder), you don't enjoy tenant privileges and could be arrested by the police for trespassing. Whereas if you have been living in a house for some months, then removing you from your residences is typically a more involved legal procedure. Receiving mail at an address over a period of time is evidence that you reside there. | You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem. | How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. |
What happens if a Supreme Court decision is obviously wrong? Edited to add this summary: What happens if the Supreme Court issues a ruling that is obviously unconstitutional, such as interpreting a clause to mean something no reasonable person would believe it means, or ruling based on a nonexistent article? Suppose John Doe says "Dogs are the best pets ever." He is (for some reason) prosecuted for this. He is convicted, and appeals the decision, and keeps being convicted and appealing the decisions until he reaches the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rules that Article XVII Section 381 Clause 29 of the Constitution clearly states that cats are better than dogs, and Clause 30 says that anyone who says dogs are better must be imprisoned for at least 20 years, and Clause 31 says Clauses 30 and 31 override all other parts of the Constitution, including the First Amendment, and therefore John Doe is guilty and must go to prison. The President refuses to pardon him. What happens now? | The US Supreme Court has made some decisions that legal scholars, other judges, lawyers, and people in general have strongly criticized as mistaken, but none anywhere nearly as wild as the one suggested in the question. Many such, well let me call them "disputed", rulings have been later overturned by the court itself. A well known example is Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was overruled a few years later by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Many of the so-called Lochner era economic decisions were also eventually overturned by the Court itself. Some disputed holdings have been altered by changes in the law, State or Federal. Some have been overturned via a constitutional amendment, such as Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which is now held to have been overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Court did not come to that conclusion until early in the 20th century. Perhaps the most notorious case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) which held that a person of African descent could never become a US citizen, and that Congress was without power to prohibit slavery in any US state or territory. This is perhaps the most denounced decision of the US Supreme Court in its history (See the linked Wikipedia article for a few such comments.) This decision was undone de facto by the outcome of the US Civil War, and de jure by the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some cases have later been treated as "bad law" even though not formally overturned. An example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld the removal of US citizens of Japanese ancestry from the US Pacific coast during WWII, and their confinement in what has been described as a series of concentration camps. This has not been formally overruled, but in Trump v. Hawaii No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), Chief Justice Roberts wrote: The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution.' 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). [quoting Jackson's dissent in Korematsu] And some cases, although much disputed, still stand as good law. The case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), holding that Baseball continued to be exempt from anti-trust laws, federal and state, has been much criticized, but remains in force to this day. (See the section "Subsequent jurisprudence" in the linked Wikipedia article) Congress has not, so far, acted to limit the exemption, as the opinion indicates that it had the power to do. In short, a US Supreme Court decision, however "erroneous" or "absurd" commentators or the public may consider it, remains the law of the land until it is overturned or distinguished by the court, or made obsolete by changes in statute or in the Constitution itself. It the highly unlikely situation described in the question, John Doe would remain in prison until his sentence expired or he received a pardon. | I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. | In the USA, could a clause (article, proposition) of a State Constitution be held unconstitutional, with respect to the USA Constitution, by the Supreme Court? Yes. The supremacy clause in the US Constitution means that State law is supervened by Federal law. This includes State constitutions. If it could, has it ever happened? Yes. Here is a list of all SCOTUS cases that have overturned state law. For state constitutional provisions see nos 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 74, 75, 139, 140, 151, 182, 188, 202, 207, 224, etc. (there’s nearly 1,000 in the list, you can go through them yourself). Also, could a decision by a State Supreme Court be reversed by the USA Supreme Court? Most of those cases will have gone through the State Supreme Court first. Except where SCOTUS has original jurisdiction (those involving disputes between the states or disputes arising among ambassadors and other high-ranking ministers) the state courts must have ruled to enliven its appellate jurisdiction. | No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the "Vagueness Doctrine" which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition. | That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes. | How should one reconcile these conflicting understandings? A holding of the U.S. Supreme Court that it has not later abandoned is, by definition, the correct interpretation of the U.S. Constitution for all purposes of U.S. law, even if a plain reading of the constitutional language might suggest otherwise. | First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings. | Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps. |
Can private prosecution be brought against anoymous identifying placeholder? In a civil case, the proper name of the defendant need not be known and it can simply be filed against "the individual with this phone number" and their identity possibly later subpoenaed from the phone company. But what about in a criminal prosecution, private or public? | canada The name of the accused must appear in the indictment or information. See R. v. Turmel, 2005 QCCA 6, interpreting Criminal Code, s. 581: Nowhere is it mentioned that the name of the accused must be included in each count: the fact that the name of the accused appears in the heading of the indictment is sufficient. Practically, this is one of the barriers to private prosecutions. Private individuals do not have the same investigatory resources and powers as government to allow them to identify people that they will charge. | Only in a civil case Yes, in a civil case, Alice generally can call Bob as a witness to take the stand. In many cases, this is done very early, locking in their testimony, before expert witnesses or other evidence by the plaintiff are presented to try and undermine the testimony. Alice may ask only questions that have relevance to the case. Let's take for example a dispute about a contract: Alice may ask Bob if he engaged in negotiations to form the contract, about the matter of the contract, if he signed the contract, or how he (or his employees) fulfilled (or not) the contract. Pretty much everything that pertains to the contract or the execution thereof. This does not extend to the settlement of the case or attempts thereof. Alice may not ask if Bob has an affair with Clarice unless that somehow is material to the contract at hand. Alice may not re-ask questions where an objection was sustained in the same way. However, Bob might not need to answer all questions (there are things that are banned from being asked), especially as Bob's attorney will object to questions. A few examples of competent questioning can be seen towards the end of My Cousin Vinnie, though this is a criminal trial. Never in a criminal trial In a criminal trial, not only can the prosecution not call Bob to the stand, he has to elect to go to the stand to even be questioned by the prosecution. That is because he can "plead the 5th". There is a tiny exception for civil cases, where they can do so there too. | Privacy against publication of criminal convictions has been considered in the High Court in NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), if I may run the risk of posting a legal citation myself. But note that the claimaints there are anonymized, as often happens in criminal trials as well. In some cases, the court may give an injunction against disclosing names or details, and can hand down both a public and a private judgement, with the latter being a restricted document that does have the identifying details. So this question could only apply to mentions of criminal process where the accused is actually identified. (And I think just saying "R v Smith" is not enough - the posted or linked text would have to give some identifying detail about which Smith it is, the nature of the crime, etc.) I have no qualms at all about talking about NT1 and NT2. The claimants brought a case against Google for making available information about their long-spent convictions, including on GDPR grounds although it took place just before the implementation of GDPR in UK law. Dealing with that argument under the prior legislation, the judge found that of the various exemptions claimed by Google, the condition The information contained in the personal data has been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject. (found in the Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 3, paragraph 5, implementing the Data Protection Directive that preceded GDPR) applied, because of a longstanding principle for criminal conduct. The idea is that (paragraph 111): A person who deliberately conducts himself in a criminal fashion runs the risk of apprehension, prosecution, trial, conviction, and sentence. Publicity for what happens at a trial is the ordinary consequence of the open justice principle [...] The same must be true of the details of the offending, and other information disclosed in open court, including information about himself which a criminal reveals at a trial or in the course of an application. The core principles are the same as the carve-out from defamation law for the fair and accurate reporting of criminal proceedings (paras 44-49). That "made public" condition can now be found in a slightly different context in the Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 1, Part 3, paragraph 32, which mirrors Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR for the purpose of Article 10: This condition is met if the processing relates to personal data which is manifestly made public by the data subject. Since this is virtually the same condition of European provenance, in the same context of surrounding rules, I think the precedent is a good guide. For courts themselves, law reports, and journalism or scholarship, there are other specific grounds to rely on. Individual Stack Exchange posters are surely covered under the general exemption for posting on social media in a private capacity, GDPR 2(2)(c) as interpreted through its Recital 18. For the site itself, as in the case of NT1 and NT2, there could well be a legal claim made about the inclusion of criminal conviction information in a posted answer. (In general, such a post, being free text, could contain all sorts of defamatory statements or other objectionable content.) The court would have to look at the competing interests and the level of harm. NT1 was not successful but NT2 was. The example scenario, where we are talking about a very brief mention of a criminal case, cited because it illustrates a legal point rather than because there's anything relevant about the person mentioned, is quite far from the grounds complained of by NT2. For NT2, there was a newspaper article in which he was "quite inappropriately, portrayed as one of a rogues' gallery of serious criminals" (para 188), eight years after the end of his sentence, and it was this that he wanted removed from search results. In particular, the academic exemption (para 13) seems strong, in the same way that it would be for a publisher of legal academic content. The test of "substantial public interest" does not apply, because this exemption comes through paragraph 36 in the case of criminal convictions; it's enough to show a reasonable belief that publication would be in the public interest. Google was not able to rely on the "journalism" version of this exemption (again, under the prior law) because they are a totally generic search engine for all kinds of data and purposes (para 100 of the 2018 judgement). The public interest test, and the accompanying "legitimate interest" for the data controller, do not seem too difficult in this example. | Does a bail-jumper have any recourse from being apprehended with the help of illegally obtained information? No. The bail-jumper has no recourse from being apprehended with the help of illegally obtained information for reasons discussed at greater length below in response to another question posed which is somewhat broader. Say that a person is a bail-jumper, that is, someone who fails to appear in court after being let out on bail. If they are apprehended by a bail bondsman with the help of illegally obtained information, do they have any sort of recourse? The person apprehended has very little recourse. The relevant case law has held that an apprehension of a bail-jumper by a private sector bail bondsman or a private sector bounty hunter hired by a private sector bail bondsman, is not "state action" and hence not subject to the constitutional protections that apply to illegal conduct by law enforcement officers acting under color of state law. This is true even though bail bondsman attempting the apprehend a bail-jumper is given profoundly broad statutory authority to take actions that would otherwise be illegal for a private person to engage in when doing so, and even though the bail bondsman is, in substance, enforcing a direction of a court which is a governmental agency. Certainly, nothing equivalent to the exclusionary rule or Miranda or a lawsuit against the bail bondsman under Section 1983 for a violation of the bail-jumpers civil rights would be available. (Also, the exclusionary rule that applies to exclude evidence obtained illegally in violation of the 4th and/or 6th Amendments doesn't operate to prevent a criminal defendant detained by law enforcement from being detained on an outstanding warrant, even if the arrest is based upon illegally obtained information, although if law enforcement did it, the bail-jumper could bring a 1983 actions against the offending law enforcement officers subject to qualified immunity.) The bail-jumper would probably have a right to sue the company that disclosed the information illegally for breach of a privacy tort if this was done in a timely fashion. But, attorneys' fees can't be recovered in a case like that, the statute of limitations is typically short, and damages that could be awarded would normally not extend to any harm involving the criminal defendant's failure to be successful in bail-jumping. So, ordinarily the damages would be nominal at best. Likewise, there might be a claim against the bail bondsman for participation in a civil conspiracy with the company that provided the information to commit a privacy tort. But, this has all of the downsides associated with suing the company providing the information, and also, would pose an additional problem: it is quite likely that a suit against the bail bondsman by the bail-jumper for acts occurring while the bail-jumper is jumping bail is either contractually waived by the bail-jumper in a bail bond agreement with the bail bondsman that courts would uphold despite the fact that it arguably involves an intentional tort by the bail bondsman, or would be barred by a bail bondsman's immunity from liability created under an applicable state statute or the common law of that state created by judicial decisions. Furthermore, in some states, a suit like this by a bail-jumper against the bail bondsman and also against the company providing the information, would be barred under the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" that bars someone who has engaged in illegal or improper conduct in connection with the claim for which relief is sought from utilizing the courts in connection with that set of facts. Realistically, probably the best legal strategy for criminal defendants who have obtained private bail bonds would be to bring a class action against the companies that provide the information and the bail bondsmen who have used it, ideally brought on behalf of criminal defendants who are not bail-jumpers as well as those who are bail-jumpers, seeking injunctive relief only to prohibit continuation of this practice prospectively, subject to contempt of court sanctions from the issuing court if the company or bail bondsman defendants did so. | They can still be sued - they just can’t be found liable For example, as an adjudicator, I have immunity for acts and omissions done in good faith as an adjudicator. A suit could be brought alleging lack of good faith and/or acting as other than an adjudicator. If these were proved (and barring corruption it’s a very high bar) the adjudicator would be liable. However, adjudicators are often joined with the claimant (usually the Respondent is the plaintiff) and the ANA (Authorised Nominating Authority - the organisation that appointed the adjudicator, who also have immunity) not so they can be held liable but so that they can be subpoenaed and forced to give evidence - if they aren’t parties to the suit they can refuse to do this. My standard response when this happens is to write to the court saying “I submit to the decision of the court save as to costs” meaning I am not going to contest anything unless you try to make me pay costs - which I don’t have immunity from. | The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial. | Anonymous/pseudonymous works are still copyrighted. See, for example, 17 U.S. Code § 302(c), which provides for the length of copyright for an anonymous or pseudonymous work - obviously, they wouldn't have such a clause if these works did not have copyright. And you don't need to register a copyright to have copyright. The copyright office has instructions on how to register an anonymous work. I'm not quite sure how that works; presumably you could keep the author secret, but I'm not sure if you can keep your registration secret. But even if you can somehow register while remaining anonymous, what if someone infringes your copyright? What are you going to do - sue them? You'll be listed as the plaintiff. Courts usually won't allow anonymous plaintiffs in lawsuits unless there is a very good reason. One thing you might try is creating a corporation to own the copyright. If you could somehow arrange the work to be a work-for-hire for the corporation, then only the corporation would appear in the copyright records. Then it's just a matter of making sure you aren't publicly linked with the corporation. You could probably get an attorney to help you with that. | It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs. |
Are you allowed to solve an exercise from a book more than seven times? In Germany, apparently, you are allowed to make a "Privatkopie" at most seven times. Are you allowed to write down an exercise on a device using a note taking app more than seven times? Does writing down exercises count? Precisely, in math, when you solve an algebraic problem, you usually start by writing down the initial problem and proceeding from there. Now that means you made one "Privatkopie"? Now what if you some time later want to solve the same algebraic problem again, writing down the initial problem, ... You made another "Privatkopie"? I'm precisely talking about Germany, and books that the author told not to copy, ... | You can make as many "manual copies" of math homework for yourself as you like. The seemingly arbitrary number of "7" came into being because with the invention and popularity of devices for copying, private persons could make copies without considerable loss of quality. As it was impossible to control who made a copy and whom it was given to, a compromise was found: buying a copying machine (tape recorder, cd burner, dvd burner) or empty media (empty cassette tapes, empty CDs) came with an extra fee on top to be paid by the consumer, that would go to the copyright holders in general, with the assumptions that that would cover the "normal, uncontrollable, private between friends" copying. Like if you burn your mom a CD. Or gift your girlfriend a mix tape. Or copy a page of the book and hand out the excercise to your two study buddies. So there was a court decision that "more than seven" was more than what you would normally consider a private copy covered by this fee. If you make more than seven copies of a cassette for example, it would be okay to assume that you no longer did that "for a close friend". Obviously, copying something from a book as you describe, by writing it down with a pencil on a notepad, is in no way "a lossless copy". Even if you type it into an app, manually copying something into another medium is not lossless. Ever. It is also for your very personal use, you don't give it to anyone, not even close friends. So yes, you can make as many copies as you like, for yourself. If one breaks, and you make another, that is fine. If one breaks every day and you need 700 over the course of two years? Fine. But if you made 700 exact copies to give them to your "700 closest friends", that is not how the law thinks "closest friends" work. That is where the arbitrary number 7 comes from. | User manuals are indeed copyrighted. On the other hand, since the people building the cranes are most likely interested in people reading these manuals, there is a good chance that you would get permission to copy them, for example as part of a mobile app, if you ask the manufacturer. On the other hand, it is possible that the manual was written by a third party, who receives some fixed amount of money for every manual that the manufacturer gives away to customers for free. In that case, copying would destroy that persons earnings, so permission would be unlikely. You definitely need to ask for permission and can't go forward without permission. It would also be possible that the crane manufacturer will want to check out your app to make sure that everything is correct - if someone damages a crane because of some omissions in your app, that would be very bad for them. | Recipe books can be, and often are, protected by copyright. If the individual recipes are by others, this would constitute a collective work or compilation. See this recent answer for more on the rights protected for a collective work. The selection of which recipes to include would be a creative element, protected by copyright, and could not be copied or closely imitated without permission. However, division into groups by type of dish would be a "natural and obvious" arrangement, and not protected. So would alphabetical or chronological arrangement within a group, or over all. A "non-obvious" order of recipes would however be a protectable element. An individual recipe may be protected by copyright, but this protects less than one might think. Copyright does not protect facts or methods. This means that the list of ingredients is not protected, nor is the general list of steps of preparation. Only the exact wording of the recipe will be protected. Creating a new collection of recipes based on several different previously published collections of recipes (whether from the web, books, magazines, or other media) and making one's own selections of which ones to include that is significantly different from any of the previous collections would not violate the collection copyrights of any of the previous collections. If the actual recipes were rewritten so that any creative expression from the originals was not copied, then it seems that no copyright infringement has occurred. Most recipes, after all, are not fully original but are modified from older ones. There is no set figure for how many recipes could be copied from a given source before this becomes infringement. That would be, if a suit was field, a matter for the judgement of the count as to whether the new book was "based on" the alleged source. The more the list in the new work resembles a particular source, the more like a derivative work it seems and the more likely that it would be held to be an infringement. One could always ask for a license from the older source, to avoid any risk of suit, but it might not be available or the copyright holder might demand an excessive fee. Asking for a license risks drawing attention to the new work, as well, and might cause a holder to file suit who otherwise would not. | No, copyright absolutely does not protect anything "novel" or anything related to algorithms or generally anything functional at all. Copyright only protects your "expressed representation of a creative work". Other people can duplicate your work with a different "expression" and not be infringing on copyright. And if there is nothing creative in your work then it's not even eligible for copyright in the first place. For example, if you figure out how to sort an array with fewer computational steps than what anybody else is doing then that is functional code, not creative code, and anybody can reverse engineer/duplicate your sorting algorithm. However, patents do provide the protection you're looking for. If you want to protect your fancy algorithm then apply for a patent. Patents expire an order of magnitude sooner than copyright, but they are the only means of legally protecting this type of intellectual property. Unlike copyright, patent protection is only available if you apply for it, and it has to be approved by the relevant government department in your country (although you can start using the patented technology before approval has gone through). | In the most likely case No, but you can make it happen! First - almost every patent is rejected - at first. Then you respond to the office action rejection by arguing and/or amending and - guess what - you are likely to get a final rejection. That means the rejection is final until you pay them more money to file a Request for Continued Examination and get two more go-arounds with them. Can you keep doing this? Yes. A previous director of the USPTO tried to make a rule that limited the number of RCEs - the courts knocked it down. If you give up and let it go abandoned by not responding to an office action within the statutory limit (6 months) then the process of that application is over. If you have not filed a co-pending application before the initial application went abandoned then you are really starting over if you file a new application. The original application can be used against any new application on a similar subject matter if it has been published. But it might not have published. The law (35 USC 102) contains - (a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151 , or in an application for >patent published or deemed published under section 122(b) , in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Your application may or may not have been published. Then it is neither published or issued and does not fall under prior art under 102 or 103. Applications are automatically published by the USPTO at the 18 month point unless you requested non-publication. In that case if your application never issues it is never public and can't be used against you or anyone else as prior art. You could even decide to keep it a trade secret. Before the publication process came into being as part of TRIPS, an applicant could wait until they saw the claims that had been allowed and the patent was ready to go. If they didn't feel the claims were valuable enough they can chose to explicitly abandon and keep it secret. | Copyright includes authorization of derivative works such as translations, so you must have permission of the copyright holder to create a translation. You could be sued for creating the unauthorized translation for your friend. If you attempt to further distribute the book, the chances of getting sued increase substantially. That path probably includes your legal obligation to foot the bill for the publisher and distributor having to defend themselves in court, since your contract with the publisher or distributor probably includes an indemnification clause saying that you indemnify them (pay their costs) against damages for your infringement. So your are at risk, and it increases if you do anything to distribute the translation. | In the US, you cannot copyright facts. See, for example, Feist Publications Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co, where a phone book was held to be not copyrightable. You can, however, copyright a particular arrangement of facts, if there is at least a spark of creativity involved. You can't copyright a recipe, but you CAN copyright a cookbook. In general, you're OK if you copy the fluid capacity from the manual, so long as you don't copy the manual itself. | A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain |
What is a “submission”? It was used in a recent answer to mean “a legal argument”. Is it necessarily of this nature? Or is it broader (i.e. “anything one submits”)? | Submission is a legal term of art in Commonwealth jurisdictions, which refers specifically to OED sense 2(b): Something submitted for decision or consideration; a point of view, a theory of a case; a proposal, an application; spec. a proposition or argument submitted by counsel to a judge or jury. Parties can submit, in the ordinary sense of the word, various documents for the court's consideration, including evidence. Submissions, however, are legal arguments, not evidence. Preparing submissions is part of advocacy and in jurisdictions with a split legal profession, specialised in by barristers. This is the sense in which Supreme Court of the United Kingdom Practice Direction 3 uses the word, to describe the written submissions to be filed in advance, and the oral submissions to be made at any hearing, as distinct from the various other documents a party must file to conduct a Supreme Court appeal. | Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR. | It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal. | If a newspaper publishes an article that is actually defamatory (i.e. publishes false statements that cause you quantifiable harm), and you successfully sue the publisher, you might get a court order requiring them to retract the statements or remove them from their web page. An archive like newspapers.com isn't making false statements, it is making true statements about what the Poughkeepsie Journal published. At any rate, you name is not defamatory, it is (or was) a fact. | Sending a letter to the Governor is legal You can do it, I can do it and the elected officials of Lancaster County can do it. Thanks to the first amendment, that letter can say pretty much anything you like subject to limits that themselves are subject to strict scrutiny - things like threats and defamation. Outlining a course of action that you propose to take is legal even if that course of action is itself illegal. I will also point out that people - sometimes even politicians - have been known to say things they don't mean. However, that just begs the question ... This article explains what's going on and, more importantly, the actual letter is here. I've read it. Twice. I can't see where the county proposes to do anything concrete that might be considered illegal. Apart from the first paragraph, the entire letter appears to be a case for why the county should be permitted to move from red to yellow on May 15 and they are asking for the Governor's support. Even the first paragraph is ambiguous; while it asks the Governor to move the county from "red" to "yellow" and states that they "intend to move forward with a plan" it is by no means clear that that plan is moving from "red" to "yellow" even though you could get that impression on a casual reading. Basically, what they intend to do is so vague that it's impossible to tell if it's legal or not. Of course, just because something is illegal doesn't mean it can't be done. The USA is a free country and the fundamental freedom is to reap the consequences of your actions. If the county does something1 then the state can take them to court - the court will decide if it's legal or not. 1 Or threatens to do something sufficiently concrete that an injunction against it could be issued. | Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff- | I virtually never see "without prejudice" used in anything but court documents, unless the writer does not know what he's saying. A typical example would be when a person sues someone, but brings the case in the wrong court. The judge would dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could refile somewhere else. In contrast, if the person filed in the correct court, but the judge ruled that the plaintiff had done nothing wrong, the judge would then dismiss the case with prejudice. I believe I have on some occasions seen the phrase used in legal correspondence, perhaps noting, for example, that a party was willing to settle his sexual harassment claim for X amount of money without prejudice to their claims for some unrelated issue. In either event, "without prejudice" is typically referring to the ongoing ability to litigate a claim. I'm not entirely clear on how you're envisioning it being used as e-mail boilerplate, but I can't see any reason to do so. If you did, that would not have any effect on the e-mail's admissibility. EDIT: One other note, because I hadn't looked at it before. The LinkedIn article to which you linked and the comments on it are basically nonsense. Legal advice from a graduate of the "School of Life" is about as valuable as life advice from a graduate of a school of law. | The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification. |
In the USA, do parents have the right to control their children's possessions? Let's say a minor (17 or younger) living with his parents gets a job or does chores, and with the money thereby earned, buys a video game console. The parents decide that the console is not appropriate for the child and take it away. In fact, they sell it and put the money into their own bank account, with no plans to ever give it back to the child. Setting aside any question of ethics or morality, is this legal on the part of the parents? If the police are called in, will they seek to charge the parents with a crime (such as theft)? I am under the impression that there is no legal case here, as the parents are the custodians/guardians of everything for the child. Imagine a situation where the parents are very poor, and ongoingly need the fruits of their child's labor to simply put food on the table and pay for the electricity. In my mind, while parents should generally allow their children to own possessions and enjoy the fruits of their labor, they also have every right to take every last penny from their child if it is urgently needed for the basic good of the whole family. When considering this situation, perhaps it would be easier for you to think of the purchased item as something most would agree is unhealthful for the child, though not necessarily illegal for him to possess—say, a book on how to construct a bomb or on how to commit suicide. Perhaps it is a chain saw, or a gun, or a set of lawn darts, or pornography, or anything else that most/many people would recognize is good for parents to take away from their minor children, no matter where the money came from or what previous recognition there was in the family of the item's belonging to the child. In this way, please try to avoid responding from any distaste about the parents violating your personal feelings about a child's rights, as this question is specifically about the law only. I'd like to know if my impression here stands at odds with any laws or precedents that could inform me better. If a more specific jurisdiction is needed, let's hear answers from Washington state, California, Florida, and Maine. Or chime in with a few other states, so we can get an idea of what the laws are throughout the nation. Feel free to add information on laws in other countries, as well, but please try to answer the USA question first. | The fundamental question is whether children can own property: they clearly can. See Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (I improved the link so it can be more easily read). As a general rule any property acquired by the child in any way except by its own labor or services belongs to the child, and not to the parent McClosky v. Cyphert, 3 Casey (27 Pa.) 220 The right of an infant to be the owner of property is as clear and as well protected as that of a person who has arrived at full age. When anything is given to an infant to be held by him in his own right, he has the title to it, and the parent, guardian or master has in law no more right to take it (for any purpose beyond safekeeping) than a stranger. Wheeler v. R. Co., 31 Kan. 640, 3 P. 297, 300: As a matter of law a minor may own property the same as any other person. He may obtain it by inheritance, by gift, or by purchase; and there is nothing in the law that would prevent even a father from giving property to his minor child. A father may also so emancipate his minor child as to entitle him to receive his own wages. It is probably true that where a minor child lives with his father, and is supported by him, all things given to the child in the way of support, such as clothing, for instance, would still belong to the father and not to the child. But things given by the father to the child, not in the way of support, but with the understanding that they should become the property of the child, would, undoubtedly, become the property of the child. Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen 497, the father has no title to the property of the child, nor is the capacity or right of the latter to take property or receive money by grant, gift or otherwise, except as a compensation for services, in any degree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever therefore an infant acquires which does not come to him as a compensation for services rendered, belongs absolutely to him, and his father cannot interpose any claim to it, either as against the child, or as against third persons who claim title or possession from or under the infant. However, a parent does have the right to prevent their child from using or acquiring a computer, car (also prohibited statutorily in Washington), television, cell phone; they can also prevent a child from spending their savings. Parents do retain their property right in things that they give to their children for general support and maintenance, such as a pair of shoes, or books. There can also be specific statutes such as the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (Washington version) which partially recognize this right, making it easy for a person to transfer property to a minor, where the property is in the care of a custodian, but not owned by the custodian. | Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult. | Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court. | It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification. | It is not illegal to view pornography. It is illegal to possess or receive certain kinds of pornography, namely child porn, under 18 USC 2252 and 18 USC 2252a (there is a subtle legal difference between "child pornography" and "visual depiction (which) involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct"). In order to view anything on the internet, you have to first receive it, so there is potential criminal liability. These sections allows one affirmative defense, if one knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; but also (1) possessed less than three images of child pornography; and (2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any image or copy thereof— (A) took reasonable steps to destroy each such image; or (B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such image. A person's belief that the website was moderated is not a defense. There are also state statutes, typically stronger, which outlaw possession of child porn. Crabtree v. Kentucky is an example of such a (successful) conviction. The court addresses the question of whether "merely viewing" can constitute actual possession: the court found that it did: Crabtree urges us to consider that his merely viewing child pornography images before deleting them should not be deemed to constitute actual possession. After reviewing the facts of this case, we are not persuaded that this is a valid argument in light of the Ninth Circuit's definition of possession in Romm, supra: that the act of seeking out child pornography and exercising control over it constitutes criminal possession—regardless of whether it is downloaded. Crabtree admitted to seeking out the material and to having it on his computer. It would be impractical to try to review 50 states' worth of child porn laws plus the federal statute, but there is also a “Temporary innocent possession” defense, which is conceivably applicable to the situation where you click a link and surprise! In the above case, defendant had to click a link that indicated the nature of the contents, and had to confirm file-saving of a file whose name was indicative of its content. Such circumstances overrule the presumption of temporary innocent possession. A question raised in the comments is whether a porn-ambush could lead to a conviction. Suppose that a web page has a number of embedded child-porn images which are saved to a user's computer without his knowledge. As pointed out in this report of the US Sentencing Commission, A conviction for receipt, however, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knowingly came into possession of child pornography at the time that the image or video was received with case law citations. The case of US v. Kuchinski, 469 F. 3d 853 is instructive, because defendant did knowingly seek out and download a number of child porn images, and was convicted. In 94 of those cases, he knew he was receiving child pornography; in over 10,000 other cases, such images were found in his system cache (this is relevant to sentencing). The court found that it matters that "Kuchinski had no knowledge of the images that were simply in the cache files", and the court concluded, in K's favor, that Where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files, without some other indication of dominion and control over the images. To do so turns abysmal ignorance into knowledge and a less than valetudinarian grasp into dominion and control. Do you know about the system cache, and do you know how to control it? If not, you might avoid the charge. In other words, it depends on the circumstances surrounding the possession and the evidence of a knowing act, as well as the jurisdiction. | The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details. | These types of situations can, do and will get very messy and bitter fast. The key question here is actually two basic areas: What’s the legal situation now in terms of what you can actually claim etc? For this you need a lawyer familiar with the local laws. Second, and much more important, is how much you value your relationship with your sister. These types of situations can and do irreparably break families, and you need to think very hard about this element of the situation regardless of what your legal rights are. Personally I would err towards probing gently into what she thinks is fair/your mother intended etc and go from there, with the emphasis on extreme caution. Money can always be replaced. Families can’t. | In general As Dale M explained, if you give the money to someone who is not obviously authorized by the business to accept money and sell stuff in exchange, you have not entered into a valid sales contract. That means you are taking things without permission. Therefore the shop could sue you for any damage this causes (maybe you took something the shop did not want to sell, or the person at the information desk was not an employee and ran away with the money). However, whether this constitutes a crime such as theft will depend on jurisdictions. Germany In Germany, for example, it would probably not, because by definition a theft requires "intention to take posession in violation of the law" (StGB §242). You could argue that you did not intend to violate the law, because you paid the required amount, and only gave the money to the wrong person by mistake. Of course, I cannot guarantee that will convince the judge... England and Wales Similarly, the law in England and Wales defines "theft" in section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; [...] Furthermore, section 2 says: A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— [...] (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or [...] So, similar to the situation in Germany, you could argue in court that you intended to buy the item legally, and believed that the shop would be okay with that. |
Can counterpart's counsel be cross-examined on the validity/merit of their arguments, or only witnesses? In court, a legal representative may be conducting the case and calling witnesses and cross examining the other side's witnesses. Are these representatives "sworn in" under oath? As they may also deliver submissions of legal arguments, if not, perhaps, statements of fact, can they also be cross-examined by the counterparty? | In the united-states, attorneys are almost never placed under oath. Their statements -- whether they are assertions of fact or legal arguments -- are not evidence, and they are not subject to cross examination. There are limited circumstances in which an attorney would be competent to present actual evidence. In such cases, the attorney would be sworn in as a witness and subject to cross examination, but the attorney would likely also be disqualified from acting as an attorney in such a situation under Model Rule 3.7. | You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel. | Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. | Issues of strategy rest with counsel, not the client. Thus, in the situation you posit, the lawyer is not required to follow the client's desires. One might observe, however, that a competent lawyer will avoid the conflict entirely by addressing the issue before accepting the client. If the client is firm in wanting to direct the lawyer's negotiation or litigation strategy, and the lawyer is unwilling to do so, the lawyer should decline to take on the case. When I practiced, prospective clients who wanted to run things were very politely declined and shown the door. I don't see anything unethical about accepting such conditions from a prospective client, but the attorney isn't required to do so, and can decline the employment. | First off, the concept of "the whole truth" is legally undefined. It cannot possibly mean "everything that you know that is connected to this question", since otherwise a witness would be required to drone on and on for hours. Second, there is no way to determine what percentage of witnesses are not "telling the whole truth". We can be fairly certain that when a guilty accused takes the stand, there is a good chance that he is not telling the whole truth, and the oath does not compel you to testify against yourself. Even if there was some clear legal definition of "the whole truth", there is typically no way to know what the actual facts are, to know if a witness failed to say something that was part of "the whole truth". The promise part of the oath is irrelevant, that is, the requirement is not to "keep your promise", it is to not perjure yourself. Every jurisdiction in the US has a statute that makes it a crime to commit perjury. At the federal level, the law is 18 USC 1621, which applies to anyone who has "taken an oath" promising to testify truly, and punishes the witness if he "willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true". The landmark ruling Bronston v. US, 409 US 352 clarified the obligation of witnesses vs. the duty of interrogators, when it comes to not providing information desired by the interrogator. The court ruled that the perjury statutes does not apply to a witness's answer that is literally true, but unresponsive, even assuming the witness intends to mislead his questioner by the answer, and even assuming the answer is arguably "false by negative implication." A perjury prosecution is not, in our adversary system, the primary safeguard against errant testimony; given the incongruity of an unresponsive answer, it is the questioner's burden to frame his interrogation acutely to elicit the precise information he seeks. This was a classical "not the whole truth" case. The exchange was as follows, where the accused was testifying in bankruptcy proceedings: Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever? A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich. The fact is that Bronston used to have a personal account in a Swiss Bank, which he did not reveal. His answer could be considered misleading because he only answered part of the question, as it pertained to the company (but not him personally). The crux of the court's ruling is that it is the responsibility of the attorney conducting the interrogation to notice that he did not answer the question asked, and to insist on a response that also covers personal accounts. This established the "literal truth" doctrine for perjury conviction: if what you say is literally true, the testimony is not perjurous. As a later court (DeZarn) commented, because a nonresponsive answer, by its nature, requires speculation by the fact-finder as to what the answer “implies”, there cannot be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer is untruthful. Clinton successfully relied on this defense with respect to certain of his literally-true testimony. One tweak on this is US v. DeZarn, 157 F3d 1042, where a literal-truth defense was set forth but rejected by the court. The accused was asked about a party that was allegedly a fundraising event. His testimony was that it wasn't a fundraising event for the governor (in fact it was), and his defense came down to the fact that the prosecutor asked about a party in 1991, had earlier referred to it as a "Preakness Party" (which the governor had held previously), and asked about fundraising "at that activity". DeZarn's claim was that he thought the prosecutor was asking about a party in 1990 (which was a "Preakness Party", with no fundraising). The prosecutor was in error in previously calling it a "Preakness Party", but was correct in identifying that there was a party (with fundraising) at the governor's house, in 1991 time. The wording of DeZarn's testimony was, simply "I don't know... No... No": these are responses that have no literal truth value taken on their own, and can be judged only in relation to what question was asked (whereas Bronston's testimony was literally true on its own). DeZarn's conviction was upheld because he could not have been confused about which party was being referred to, and what the actual question was; moreover, in saying just "No", he gave no sign that his response was a partial answer to the question. The DeZarn court did not clarify matters, leaving it at the conclusion that a perjury inquiry which focuses only upon the precision of the question and ignores what the Defendant knew about the subject matter of the question at the time it was asked, misses the very point of perjury: that is, the Defendant's intent to testify falsely and, thereby, mislead his interrogators. This does not clearly distinguish DeZarn from Bronston, but that could be remedied by a more precise theory of the linguistic relationship between the question(s) asked and the literal answer – Bronston said enough that a reasonable person could detect that only part of the question was answered, whereas the testimony "No" gives no overt sign that the testifier had privately re-written the question to be something like "Was there fundraising at a Preakness Party in 1991", as opposed to "at that activity". The court relied on a subjective "sniff test" for distinguishing responsive from non-responsive testimony, so I would say that they simply did not draw the bright lines that could have been drawn (which would be based on better distinguishing "implies" versus "asserts"). | Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected. | A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal. |
Age you have to be to drive with a disabled parent I was in a car accident 9 years ago. My spine was fused twice and I know I am permanently disabled. I have 2 kids, one is 12 years old and another is 14. Can the oldest child get an early driver's license? If so, what age can he do so? | united-states Possibly, depends on the state. Texas law allows early drivers licenses under this circumstance, though there is an age requirement (15 years). California allows such a license for 14 years olds. OTOH, Washington state does not have such hardship exceptions to the general age rule. Also, in various states (e.g. Alaska), a person 14 years old can obtain a learner's permit, which would allow them to do the driving is there is a licensed driver at least 21 years old with at least one year of driving experience in the passenger's seat. | If you buy a large piece of land, closed to the public, then yes. You would need a license for your car to allow drivers to use it without hands on the wheel, or the driver will get arrested. But first you need a license that allows using the car on public roads at all. That’s what all the car manufacturers have to do. Requires for example crash tests, tests how polluting the car is, and so on. | Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook. | england-and-wales An adopted child can apply for their birth records once they are 18 years' old. There are different processes for doing this depending on the particular circumstances, and if they were adopted before 12 November 1975 they will need to attend a counselling session with an approved adoption advisor first. Source (detailing the different processes) Legislation | We cannot stipulate that a 6 year old does not understand the concepts of life / death / murder / assault, but that stipulation might be baked into the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, a child under age 8 is statutorily incapable of committing a crime. Between 8 and 12, there is a statutory presumption that a child is incapable of committing a crime, but that is rebuttable. The statute says "Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime", and it say nothing about understanding concepts. Florida law used to allow that a 6 year old can commit a crime, then when they arrested a 6 year old, they changed the law. But, the law says A child younger than 7 years of age may not be taken into custody, arrested, charged, or adjudicated delinquent for a delinquent act or violation of law based on an act occurring before he or she reaches 7 years of age, unless the violation of law is a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08 so a 6 year old can be arrested (charged, tried, convicted) for murder. Virginia does not appear to have any statute declaring 6 year olds to be categorially incapable of committing a crime. The question of capacity is of course a real consideration – insanity remains a defense against criminal charges. | If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules. | It's probably due to GDPR. You will see that around 2018-05-25 when GDPR came into force, many US-based websites changed their terms of service to increase the age requirement from 13 (age below which the U.S. COPPA law applies) to 16 for European users. For example, here are Stack Exchange's terms of service from 2018-05-02, mentioning 13 years, and here is the version one day later mentioning 16 years. The GPDR allows companies to process personal data under a variety of legal bases, such as “legitimate interest”, “necessary for performing a contract”, or “consent”. But children are not able to give consent in this context. If a website wants consent from a child for some data processing, Art 8 GDPR requires the service to make “reasonable efforts” to check with the parents first. This reasonable effort is more effort than just banning children from using the services. The GDPR itself does not define exactly when someone is a child for these purposes – it lets individual EU member states define the exact age limit, which may be anything between 13 and 16 years. Thus, websites that definitely do not want to have to comply with Art 8 GDPR take the upper bound of that limit and mention in their terms of service that the service is only intended for persons aged 16 or older. The text of Art 8 GDPR is: (1) Where point (a) of Article 6(1) applies, in relation to the offer of information society services directly to a child, the processing of the personal data of a child shall be lawful where the child is at least 16 years old. Where the child is below the age of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child. Member States may provide by law for a lower age for those purposes provided that such lower age is not below 13 years. (2) The controller shall make reasonable efforts to verify in such cases that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking into consideration available technology. (3) Paragraph 1 shall not affect the general contract law of Member States such as the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract in relation to a child. | The Highway Code said: Vehicles. Any vehicle driven by a learner MUST display red L plates. In Wales, either red D plates, red L plates, or both, can be used. Plates MUST conform to legal specifications and MUST be clearly visible to others from in front of the vehicle and from behind. Plates should be removed or covered when not being driven by a learner (except on driving school vehicles). [Law MV(DL)R reg 16 & sched 4] The good old Highway Code "Must" vs "Should". "Must" means that it is a legal issue, anything that is "Should" is only advisory |
Rent office space and sleep there Could someone theoretically rent out some office space in Pennsylvania in the United States and sleep in it? Some business owners work late all the time and some may sleep in their office. When does someone sleeping in an office become illegal? Or does it ever become illegal? | Whether it is legal to sleep in office space is generally determined under local zoning ordinances and wouldn't be uniform across an entire state. This said, the vast majority of localities would prohibit doing so under the relevant building and zoning ordinances of the municipality, or in unincorporated areas, the relevant building and zoning ordinances of the county. Typically, the penalty for doing so in violation of a local ordinance would be similar to the penalty for violating a minor to mid-grade misdemeanor, and each day you violate the ordinance would be a separate offense. Typically, the question under a local ordinance would be how the office space is being used. If the office space is being used for residential purposes, the building owner and/or tenant under a lease would be violating the ordinance. But, an isolated instance of falling asleep at your desk during the work day would not normally be considered to be a residential use of the property. If someone routinely spends the night at the office, not doing work, and has clothing and bedding and toiletries there, especially if the person doing so has no other residence, this would normally be treated as a residential use of the office building. This said, local code enforcement officials have great discretion to enforce such ordinances strictly, or to ignore arguable violations of them. A private citizen (perhaps a neighbor, for example) has no authority to compel the local government in question to enforce its ordinances as strictly as the law would permit. | Many states have laws providing for a residence for their governors, but I know of no state that mandates the use of those homes. Oregon's previous governor, for instance, lived in Portland rather than the governor's mansion, Mahonia Hall. Some cities do the same. In New York City, Mayor Bill De Blasio lives at Gracie Mansion, but Mike Bloomberg never did. Although we don't always think of them as government officials, some government schools provide their presidents with state-funded residences, as well. At the University of Virginia, the president lives at Carr's Hill. | could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)". | Close family members can stay as long as the tenant wants The tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property which includes living with their close relatives - spouse, de facto and children would all qualify; parents and siblings might as well. It doesn't matter if these people are children or adults. You cannot contract out of this as you are not allowed to discriminate in housing based on family situation. The tenant is also entitled to have non-relative house guests stay for as long as is reasonable. A month or so would be reasonable; longer than that and it starts to look like a sub-lease for which they would need your permission. There is generally a limit under texas law of 3 adults per bedroom but that doesn't seem to be an issue here. I also can't see where having a non-resident's mail delivered to the property is something you have a say about. I'd be very careful if I were you because it seems like you are on the wrong side of the law here. | Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them. | As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine. | If you sleep on the streets, you are considered a "SDF" (Sans Domicile Fixe), a tramp. Legality depends on where you sleep, and in which city. It's not illegal to be a SDF (under some conditions), but until the early 1990s it was illegal to be a beggar (mendiant/mendicité -- this reference, Mendicité, is about begging) For instance, sleeping in a car can be legal, except if you are located in a prohibited place where you could have a fine. Some cities have voted anti-SDF acts. See for instance (in French): Dormir dans sa voiture, est-ce légal? and Les précédents dispositifs anti-SDF qui ont fait polémique en France SDF in law acts: PERSONNE SANS DOMICILE FIXE (SDF) | Yes. For example, corporations can own copyright. They may own copyright after assignment (this is true across much of the commonwealth and in the U.S.). In some jurisdictions, when a work is made for hire, the employer may be deemed the author and initial owner (e.g. U.S.) or just the initial owner (e.g. Canada). |
Does the "reasonable person" standard change based on social acceptance? The "reasonable person" standard is the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would observe under a given set of circumstances. It serves as a comparative standard for courts to assess liability. However, Society is constantly evolving. Acceptance of things change over time. Does that mean that the "reasonable person" standard also changes over time? | Does that mean that the "reasonable person" standard also changes over time? The reasonable person standard changes every time a new finder of fact, either a judge or a jury, considers a case. To a great extent the whole point of a "reasonable person" standard is to inject irreducible uncertainty into the question of what conduct someone can be held liable for, thereby giving juries (or judges in bench trials) discretion to evaluate complex factual situations and consider those situations in light of the fact finders' collective moral judgment. There are seemingly objective tests by which reasonableness can be measured, such as the "Learned Hand test" which compares the risk of harm caused by not taking a precaution times the likelihood that the harm will manifest itself. But ultimately, this is very rarely so clear a standard that it overcomes the broad discretion of the finder of fact to determine what is and isn't reasonable under a particular set of circumstances. | Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials (including police) from civil liability in §1983 suits. Anderson v. Creighton describes the legal standard - objective legal reasonableness. There is no condition that would strip an officer of civil immunity and open him up to criminal liability because the criminal charges could attach regardless of the disposition of civil liability. I say "could" because who is going to charge and prosecute the crime? The CATO Institute tracks police misconduct. Not all misconduct is criminal, but reading through their site will give you an idea of why it is difficult to determine when and why cops are charged with crimes. Only a small fraction of the 17,000 law enforcement agencies actually track their own misconduct in a semi-public manner, and even when they do, the data they provide is generic and does not specify what misconduct occurred, who did it, and what the end result was. | No, but... Common law does not apply in countries that follow the legal school of Code Civil, aka civil law legal system, such as Germany or France. Some basic principles are common between them and common law: While there's generally no right to a jury, the innocence part actually stems in both cases from ROMAN law: in dubio pro reo - in the case of doubt, (you have to decide) for the accused. The similar Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies - is the source: It was butchered into "innocent until proven guilty", but the sentiment is the same. Other countries that have no relation to common law are based on Sharia and Fiqh. There is absolutely no relation to Roman law either. However, there is a presumption of innocence, or as one of the largest Scholars of Islamic law Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib said in the mid-600s: "Avert the prescribed punishment by rejecting doubtful evidence." However, what is considered doubtful is quite different. On the other hand, presumption of guilt was the foundational principle in other legal systems! | The court decides and there is precedent This type of definition is very common and the legislative intent is to give the court discretion to decide whether the particular relationship in the particular case is a “dating relationship”. The precedent for these is that the rules of statutory interpretation apply, primarily, what does the law say on plain reading? Well, this law gives three facts that need to be determined from the evidence (those in part B). When those facts are known, considering them as a totality, is it “continuing serious relationship of a romantic or intimate nature” and is it ongoing or “recent”. Once a court of record decides this for a case, that will set a precedent for similar fact patterns. That is, if the facts are close in another case, the result of whether it is or isn’t a romantic relationship will follow from the precedent. Other cases with dissimilar facts will set different precedents. In that way the woolly line will get more clear as individual cases are decided. | The English version of the law says By a maximum imprisonment of five years shall be punished for whosoever in public deliberately expresses their feelings or engages in actions that: a. in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia; b. has the intention that a person should not practice any religion at all that is based on belief in Almighty God. from the Bahasa Indonesia law Dipidana dengan pidana penjara selama-lamanya lima tahun barangsiapa dengan sengaja di muka umum mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan: a. yang pada pokoknya bersifat permusuhan, penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia; b. dengan maksud agar supaya orang tidak menganut agama apapun juga, yang bersendikan ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa The law does not define "public", so it would normally mean what it means in ordinary language (and that is not at all easy to figure out: it might be considered "public" if the expression was made to a single person). However, in this case, it was clearly in public (at a speech with about 100 people) that the statement was made. The law does not say that those people who constituted "the public" that heard the statement have to have been offended. Rather, (first) the statement has to be made in public (it was), and second, it is "in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia". That's a matter for the court to sort out. It appears, for example, that Shi'a teachings are legally blasphemous (case of Tajul Muluk). Unfortunately, there aren't any accessible resources here pertaining to the court decisions, so it's not clear if there are any concrete limits on what could be found to be blasphemous. However, it is established law that deviant teachings are legaly blasphemous, see the 39 case synopsis and the end here. | Preface: Why Is Service Necessary? A court order is not binding with respect to a person unless the court in question had jurisdiction over that person, or their predecessor-in-interest (or sometimes someone with a relationship with that person known as "privity"). To obtain jurisdiction over a person, the court must be a forum that is capable of exerting jurisdiction over that person with respect to this particular case, and there must have been service of process upon that person by an acceptable means. In order to obtain a valid court order against a person that makes that person personally responsible for money judgment, or orders them to do something or to refrain from doing something that is not simply with respect to a particular piece of property (i.e. in an in personam action), there must be either personal service (i.e. hand delivery of legal papers to the person), or substituted service (e.g. hand delivery to an adult family member in the same household, hand delivery to an employer, service by mail or email or text message when authorized by a court, etc.). Substituted service is generally not valid for service of a subpoena, only personal service will do in that case. A person can waive service of process by delivering a signed waiver to the person seeking process, or by filing certain kinds of documents with the court in which the lawsuit is pending. Service by publication is only allowed in actions that are in rem or quasi-in-rem, as opposed to in personam. Only Actions In Rem or Quasi-In-Rem Service by publication is only effective with respect to actions in rem, which is to say regarding rights with respect identified property and the relief granted with respect to that defendant is limited to relief in rem, i.e. with regard to rights in that property, or quasi-in-rem (as explained below). For example, no money judgment against the defendant can be entered on the basis of service by publication alone, although service by publication can bar a claim for money damages by the defendant to be satisfied out of the property at issue in the action, such as the assets of a probate or bankruptcy estate. Common in rem actions including evictions (limited to termination of right to possession and not a money judgment for rent owed), replevin (a suit to regain physical possession of tangible personal property), quiet title, foreclosure, civil forfeiture, probate proceedings, bankruptcy cases, and claims processes for failed banking institutions or corporations outside the bankruptcy process (e.g. FDIC resolutions of claims of failed banks). For this purpose, a suit regarding the the existence of or termination of a marriage or family relationship is in rem, although no in personam obligations or liabilities such as a child support judgment or a protection order can be imposed in such an action. For example, this is done in adoption proceedings, in certain guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, in divorces where the other spouse cannot be found, and in determinations of death due to prolonged absence or other circumstances where the death cannot be confirmed. A lawsuit supported by "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction, if a lawsuit is one that would normally require personal service of process or substitute service of process for the court to obtain jurisdiction, is permitted when any relief is limited to recover from specific property over which the court can claim jurisdiction. As Wikipedia explains at the link: On June 24, 1977, in the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the requirement that the circumstances giving rise to jurisdiction comply with the notion of "fair play and substantial justice" should apply to the quasi in rem jurisdiction questions. The Supreme Court significantly diminished the utility of the quasi in rem jurisdiction because if the case meets the minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice tests, the action can be brought under the in personam jurisdiction. Quasi in rem jurisdiction, however, can still be an effective option to bring the lawsuit to a particular court because quasi in rem jurisdiction allows litigants to overcome limitations of the long-arm statute of a particular state. Thus under Schaffer v. Heitner, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is basically only allowed when the court could have had personal jurisdiction over the case if the defendant had been personally served with process, but it is not feasible to serve the defendant with process, and publication (often together with service by mail to the defendant's last known address and the addresses of people like a former attorney or family member with a relationship to the defendant) is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defendant. For example, suppose that someone who owns real estate in Maine gets in a car accident in Maine, and the defendant who lives in China cannot be served with process despite duly diligent attempts to do so. If a process server in China had served the defendant with process, he would have been subject to the jurisdiction of a court in Maine where the lawsuit was filed because the accident that gives rise to the liability took place in Maine. Therefore, a court might assert quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant with relief limited to the real property in Maine (since a Maine court has jurisdiction over real estate in Maine). The court would then allow the injured victim plaintiff to serve the defendant with process via publication (in the county where the lawsuit is brought) and via mail to the defendant and known associates of the defendant such as a spouse and an employer and a former attorney of the defendant. If the defendant did not file an answer in the case by the deadline, a default judgment would enter against the defendant and an evidentiary damages hearing would be held ex parte (i.e. without anyone representing the defendant there). Then, based upon that hearing a judgment would be entered against the defendant by the court, with collection of the judgment limited to that parcel of real estate in Maine. The real estate could then be seized by the plaintiff in an execution sale conducted by the sheriff, to satisfy the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the damages caused by the car accident in Maine. There are two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction: 1) quasi in rem type 1 (QIM1); and 2) quasi in rem type 2 (QIM2). In QIM1, a plaintiff sues to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property. For example, actions that seek quiet title against another's claim to the property. In QIM2, the plaintiff has no pre-existing claim in the subject property. That is, the property rights of the owner are not in dispute, but rather the plaintiff seeks the property so that they may satisfy a separate claim. For example, a person who walks across another's real property and falls into an open pit might have no pre-existing claim regarding the property, but may initiate a QIM2 action to redress his injury. The line between in rem and quasi-in-rem type one jurisdiction (e.g. in the context of a foreclosure or an eviction for unpaid rent or enforcement of a personal property security interest where the property is collateral) is obscure and often ignored in practice. Usually, "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction refers to quasi-in-rem type 2 jurisdiction. Only Following Duly Diligent Efforts To Secure Personal Service Service by publication requires truthful statement from the person seeking it that a duly diligent effort has been made to locate and/or serve the defendant against whom it is to be effective in person. Service by publication is not effective against a known defendant who could have been served personally, unless the defendant had actual knowledge of the service by publication within a reasonable time before the service by publication is held against him or her. See, e.g. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988), In re Sheridan, 117 P.3d 39, 41 (Colo. App. 2004), and Estate of Russo v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 994 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. App. 1999). In an action where there is a known defendant in an in rem action, service by U.S. mail to a last known address of the known defendant, rather than personal hand delivery of the process to the defendant, is often sufficient. Service Via An Attorney Is Only Sometimes Available If the defendant is represented by a lawyer who has answered for the defendant in other aspects of the case, can service be effected just by notifying the lawyer? This is allowed if the lawyer represents that person in that lawsuit. With only a handful of exceptions (where ex parte motions are allowed) everything filed in court in a case must be served upon every lawyer who has entered an appearance in the case (usually via E-filing these days, but historically, usually by mail). An attorney for someone is not an agent for service of process upon a defendant unless the process served is within the attorney's scope of representation, normally, as disclosed by a general entry of appearance by the attorney in that particular lawsuit (what constitutes a general entry of appearance is something of a technical issue). But, if service of process cannot be hand with due diligence upon a party represented by a lawyer in a related case, a court will often order "substituted service" upon the lawyer (and mail to the last known address of the client) rather than, or in addition to, service by publication. Service upon an attorney does not suffice to establish actual knowledge of service by publication for purposes of issue #2 above. Or is this covered by attorney client privilege? Often the attorney cannot be compelled to disclosure to location of the party represented by the attorney due to attorney-client privilege. But, attorney-client privilege is not directly relevant to whether service upon an attorney constitutes effective service upon the client. Effective Date Usually, service by publication is in a newspaper that has been determined by law to be sufficient to provide legal notice defined by statute, and it must be published every week for three to five weeks depending on the jurisdiction and circumstances, with the date of service deemed to be the date of the last publication. Default judgment can be obtained based upon service by publication only on the X days after service that would apply if there was personal service of process upon that person. Effect Of In Rem Judgment A judgment against a defendant in an in rem action, does not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a separate action against the same defendant, in personam, seeking money damages. But, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the in rem action are not binding against the defendant in the subsequent in personam action and instead have effect only with respect to rights in the property at issue in the in rem action. For example, if you are evicted from real estate in an in rem action where there is service by publication, because you didn't pay the rent, you cannot be obligated to pay a money judgment for the rent unless you are served with personal service or substituted service in that lawsuit or a later lawsuit. And, if it is a later lawsuit, the court's finding in the eviction action that you didn't pay the rent as agreed is not binding against you except for the limited purpose that you are no longer allowed to be in possession of the real estate from which you were evicted and that you can't challenge the validity of the eviction in a counterclaim or collateral lawsuit. In other words, even if you later prove that you had actually paid the rent that was the basis of the eviction action in a later lawsuit, you are still evicted, because you lost the right to complain about being evicted when you didn't respond to the service by publication. | Your question is almost too general to answer, but the basic answer is; being wrong is not a crime. Negligence is, but applying generally accepted medical diagnoses and treatments is not negligent. Malpractice is also a crime (or at least reason to suspend a medical licence); but evolving a theory based on experimental evidence, submitting it to peer review and having it generally accepted, and then later seeing it superseded by another theory is not malpractice, it is the normal scientific method. And no definition has ever been "proven wrong" since a definition, like an axiom, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable. The definitions of disorders vary betweeen countries, and most certainly change over time, but that is not because of any discovery or proof. | Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here. |
Is there a line that excludes preaching religious murders from first amendment protection? In general, religious beliefs can be as free under the first amendment as they come. You can believe in any god or pantheon, or nothing at all in pretty much any fashion. Very free indeed. But is it truly unlimited? So to illustrate, let's take a look at a fictitious religion that is defined by how repulsive it is: Welcome to the world of Marvel Comics, where people like Reverend William Stryker create fringe cults with bloomy names like Purifiers that propagate hatred, demand genocide and hunt humanoid people for their cause since 1982. The ideology of the purifiers is simple in its core tenet: People carrying a specific gene shall be found and killed. For that they develop technology to combat those individuals. While most of the shadow-hidden acts that the purifiers do in the comics are crimes in themselves (abduction, mutilation, murder, genocide...), the Purifiers also are alluded to have a more public-facing side: They preach a rather fundamental offshoot of Christianity, heavily infested with their core tenet to kill mutants. Now, does that make the religious belief to kill the mutants protected by the Freedom of Religion? At what point does preaching the need for some kind of religious killing from a protected activity to unprotected speech and a crime? | As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent. | In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). | What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information". | Political party membership may be indirectly protected, insofar as party membership is a manifestation of a philosophical belief, but it is not a protected characteristic in itself. Political beliefs (e.g. in socialism) are capable of being protected characteristics, but not always. Nazism is not protected, because it is destructive of the rights of others and unworthy of respect in a democractic society. Businesses can usually choose who they do business with Assuming there is no other bad conduct going on (harassment, violence, discrimination, etc.), there is nothing to stop a shop or other business from excluding certain customers. This is the starting point. Some businesses have positive legal duties to serve the public in general. Your water company can't cut off your water, regardless of your beliefs. Barristers must follow the "cab-rank rule" and take your case even if you are a horrible person. So let's assume we just have an ordinary private-sector business, such as a shop. The protected characteristic of belief Contrary to the term "protected class", which is from U.S. law, the U.K. uses the words "protected characteristic" to mean those personal characteristics named in the Equality Act 2010. These include age and race. They also include "religion or belief", a characteristic inherited from prior equality law. Any discrimination claim relating to the "No Nazis allowed" sign would have to hang on the "belief" arm. Interpretation of "religion or belief" follows the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9. In relation to a philosophical belief, the applicable test is "the Grainger test" formulated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2009, The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Careful readers will notice that 2009 is before 2010; the statute law was different but the point was the same. Classic examples of beliefs meeting the test include vegetarianism, humanism, and pacifism. Political beliefs There is no sharp line between a "philosophical" belief and a "political" one. Support of a political party is not covered (Grainger at 35), but there is room for belief based on a political philosophy. In this way, "left-wing democratic socialism" met the test in GMB v Henderson. On this basis, one might be tempted to conclude that "Nazism" or "fascism" would be similar, even if "membership in a Nazi party" was not. However, Article 17 of ECHR does not protect totalitarian or Nazi beliefs. This is consistent in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in U.K. cases on equality. It is the source of the fifth part of the Grainger test, via earlier cases in the House of Lords and before the European Court. For example, in Forstater v CGD Europe, the EAT held: A philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy Grainger V if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by virtue of Article 17 thereof. Employment is more protected In Redfearn v UK [2012], the ECtHR said a bus driver's rights had been violated following his dismissal for being a member of the British National Party. That was in relation to Article 11 (freedom of association) and his Article 9 claim was dismissed. The court noted that the BNP had not been banned in the U.K. and it was also looking at an employment rights issue rather than (as in the question) access to business premises; there is a general set of rights relating to unfair dismissal which were in play. It had not been proved that the driver was actually unfit to do the job. So even though party membership is not protected under the Equality Act, people may still benefit from other legal protections. The case also shows the difficulties of inferring beliefs based on indicators like supporting a political party. If the BNP were banned then it would be another matter, and U.K. law does allow the banning of extremist organisations. (Principally, under the Terrorism Act 2000, part II.) Some extreme-right groups are proscribed in this way, although there is no general restriction of fascism or Nazism. | This is a partial answer as it doesn't address the religious aspect. Grainger plc v Nicholson may be of relevance. That case was about Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of religion or belief) and focussed on the belief element rather than the religion element. The court held that the following criteria must be met for something to be a belief under the ECHR: The belief is genuinely held. It is a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint. It relates to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. These are known as the Grainger criteria and are also of relevance in relation to Section 4 of the Equality Act 2010. | As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar. | What that church is doing is legal. There is a statutory exception in the Fair Housing Act for religious and non-profit organizations. 42 U.S. Code § 3607 - Religious organization or private club exemption Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. Nor shall anything in this subchapter prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its members or from giving preference to its members. | Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets. |
If you are serving a life sentence, die, are legally declared dead, and are brought back to life, are you now free? Apologies if this is too hypothetical and not allowed. I'm not trained in law, but am curious about the following question: If you are sentenced to 1 life sentence, die, are legally declared dead, and you are brought back to life (not going to address how, but who knows, maybe it's something that could happen in the future), will you now be free, having technically served a life sentence? You were in prison until your death. Would the second interval of life be considered the same life, and so imprisonment should continue, or would it be a second life? I understand that there is probably no precedent for this and so any answer may just be speculation. But if you were the judge, what would your opinion be? As a follow up question, if the answer is that your second life would be free, then what if you have 2 life sentences? Would you serve another life sentence upon your second life? In that case, would the second life sentence be considered served to completion upon your second death, in which case you would be free if you were lucky enough to be revived once more? | If you can be revived, you are not legally dead. To be declared dead you must be in cardio-pulmonary failure and have all attempts at resuscitation cease or be brain dead - no one has ever recovered from these conditions. Notwithstanding, if you are declared legally dead and show up alive, that declaration can be nullified i.e. you were never dead. | There is no absolute rule in such cases. It is often a matter of negotiation between the state and federal authorities, and failing agreement, a matter of which authority has the prisoner in custody. Often the question of which crime is more serious or carries a longer sentence is an issue in such negotiations. | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | Is there any state where someone doing this would potentially face manslaughter or murder charges, due to some variant of a 'life starts at conception' anti abortion law? Not really. Those laws are currently unconstitutional. A state could certainly prescribe some criminal punishment in a case like this one, but punishing under existing manslaughter or murder laws would almost surely not be upheld under existing law (subject to change without advanced notice by the U.S. Supreme Court). If someone knowingly and intentionally destroyed an embryo conceived via IVF but not implanted yet what kind of consequences do they face? Is the potential life treated differently or is this just destruction of property? This is a tough question that probably doesn't have a uniform answer under the law of all U.S. states. For one thing, it isn't clear who, if anyone, has property rights in the embryo. It is certainly conceivable that a state might instead conclude that the donor receiving the IVF treatment has only contract rights in it (and breach of a contract is not a crime). It might be viewed as a property destruction case. There might be a specific statute on point. There might be a civil lawsuit remedy. In most states, this would be an issue of first impression and a court would look a competing ways that cases had been handled in other jurisdictions to decide what to do in its case. | Typically in extraditions, the treaties will only allow for extraditions if both nations have a similar crime and similar punishment for that crime. In this case, there maybe some pause for Australia to grant an extradition as Australia no longer has the death penalty for any crime, so it could be that while the new crime the defendant is being sought for is Escape from Incarceration related (that's a yes in both countries), technically the punishment for an escaped Death Row Inmate is the Death Penalty. Australia can't extradite for any crime where death penalty is on the line, but the requesting nation can say they will give a more lighter sentance that is more compliant with the requested nation's own laws. However, since it is Death for another crime that Austrilia never had jurisdiction over, it complicates matters. There is precidence for procedural reasons for refusing to extradite. For example, while the U.S. and Italy have an extradition treaty and both view murder in the same light, the U.S. refused the extradition of a citizen who was wanted for a murder in Italy that she was previously aquitted of, but new evidnce was uncovered. Because it is illegal for the state to try a person twice for the same crime in the U.S., the U.S. declined the extradition treaty. Some additional notes, extradited persons can only be tried for crimes that they were extradited for, so there is an argument that Australia would refuse unless Indonesia promises to commute the Drug Trafficking sentence to Life Imprisonment | What would be an appropriate legal classification? A trust. How could this entity be structured so it could manage multiple estates? As a trust. Could this entity choose to keep, say, 30% for internal use e.g. resuscitation research? If that’s what it says in the trust deed, yes. How could this entity be made "recession-bulletproof," such that it could survive collapse of civilization? It can’t. Could it be given autonomy under the direction of a single person, or even sovereignty along the lines of a Mars colony? A trust is managed by its trustee(s) for the benefit of the beneficiaries. A trustee can be an individual or a corporation and there can be one or more of them. It couldn’t be given sovereignty - only nation states are sovereign. Could it be immune from legal jeopardy if it chose to accept clients who volunteer to be frozen before they die? No. What might happen to the estates if the economy is radically altered, e.g. a scarcity-free system where money is obsolete? Beats me - you’re the science fiction writer, you make it up. | Why do you think this is a hypothetical case? The facts almost exactly match R v Rogerson ; R v McNamara (No 57) [2016] NSWSC 1207 (2 September 2016) - 3 men enter a storage unit, 2 men and one dead body leave. Each of the men claims the other committed the murder - the DPP charged both, they were tried together, the jury convicted both and they both received life sentences. For the more general hypothetical: people can be tried together if that serves the interests of justice - defendants can apply to the court for separate trials but that is not always granted (and this may serve as grounds for an appeal ... or not). There is plenty of evidence of a murder, one (at least) of the two people is a murderer - prosecutors would charge both, present the evidence and let the jury decide which, if any, were guilty. | No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act. |
Are police legally obligated to read warrants out to you if asked? If you ask police to read warrants out before they enter your premises, are the forced to? Can police being asked to read out a warrant and not doing so be grounds for having a warrant deemed invalid? | england-and-wales No. The only1 requirement is for the officer serving the warrant to show the occupier the original and provide a copy or, if there's no one in, to leave it in a prominent position as per section 15 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: ... (5)Where the occupier of premises which are to be entered and searched is present at the time when a constable seeks to execute a warrant to enter and search them, the constable— (a)shall identify himself to the occupier and, if not in uniform, shall produce to him documentary evidence that he is a constable; (b)shall produce the warrant to him; and (c)shall supply him with a copy of it. (6)Where— (a)the occupier of such premises is not present at the time when a constable seeks to execute such a warrant; but (b)some other person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises is present,subsection (5) above shall have effect as if any reference to the occupier were a reference to that other person. (7)If there is no person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises, he shall leave a copy of the warrant in a prominent place on the premises. Delaying entry in order to read out the entire warrant could result with evidence being lost or destroyed, or suspects absconding. 1 there's also going to be some other paperwork depending on the particular circumstances. | united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky. | If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question. | There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around. | It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal. | The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf | Your attorney can help you answer those questions, if necessary. Generally, you cannot know for certain. Mass. criminal procedure rule 6 covers arrest warrants – the Superior court can issue an arrest warrant. That warrant must be "signed" by the issuing official, will have the name or other reasonable means of identifying the subject, and the offense charged. An electronic signature is a signature. If the arresting officer does not have the warrant at the time of arrest, the arrest may proceed anyhow, and if he has the warrant, he shall on request show it to the defendant as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant on him, he shall inform the defendant that a warrant has been issued. There is no practical way to look at a warrant and determine that is is a real warrant as opposed to a fake document created by thugs. There is no statute under which a person can resist arrest until they are satisfied that the arrest is by a legitimate officer and that the document was properly issued by the court. If there was no proper warrant, the arrest will probably be found unlawful and you will be set free until a proper warrant is issued. It would be unlawful for thugs to take you (impersonating an officer is a crime), and that is as far as the law goes. Ch. 267 of Massachusetts General Laws lays out the law regarding warrants, and those laws focus on the conditions for legally issuing a warrant, not for convincing a person that a warrant, search or arrest is legitimate. You may certainly attempt to confirm that the warrant and officer are real, but you cannot resist the search or arrest if you are not satisfied. | With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable. |
Is shipping an 80% lower to someone in Washington Illegal I was apart of a conversation where one person who lives in the state of Washington wanted someone who lives in Texas to buy a glock 80% lower for them and ship it to them in Texas. To me, this sounds like a really bad idea and I alerted the Texan about my concerns. I tried looking up the legality on it and it seems like it might technically be legal because the ATF doesn't consider an 80% lower a firearm until it's been milled. Can someone please explain to me if this would be a legal transaction, or should I continue to urge these two to back out. edit: An 80% lower is described as "An 80 lower is an unfinished lower - "80" meaning it is 80% percent complete. To turn an 80% lower into a 100% lower you have to mill out the fire control group" | Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket. | It could probably be argued that a bullet intentionally shot from a gun is abandoned property, and thus the shooter has no claim to its return. In addition, such a bullet might be evidence of a crime, to be seized by law enforcement, although that would not affect its ultimate ownership, at least not in the US. Intent matters in such cases. A person who shoots a gun probably does not reasonably expect to retain possession and control of the bullet, whatever may have been shot at. Well, someone shooting at a properly controlled target for practice on his or her own property probably retains ownership of the bullet. | You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner. | The contract between you and the company is for the supply of the goods. How they get them to you is irrelevant; they may have them in stock, or they may order them and ship them on, or they may send an order to the factory to ship them directly to you. There is nothing saying that they have to be in stock anywhere. The law you refer to says that they must ship within 30 days unless they provide a specific date. In effect "shipped within 30 days" is an implicit term in the contract. If after 30 days they have not shipped the goods then you are entitled to rescind the contract (i.e. get your money back). Where things get interesting is if they took your money knowing that they would not be able to ship within 30 days, or at least being reckless (i.e. not caring) about it. It does rather sound like this may be the case. If so then it may rise to the level of fraud, and the FTC or state authorities may take action. Try writing to the FTC. A single event won't get any action, but if they get lots of complaints then they might. | The statement ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. could certainly be considered as defamatory. However, in the US and many other countries, truth would be a valid defense, if the person making the statement could prove that the statement is true. I don't see how it could be construed as solicitation. If worn on a shirt into ABC, the management could surely ask the wearer to remove it. If that request is refused, they could ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer has a valid membership, then it would depend on the exact terms of the membership contract, and provisions of local law, whether ABC could insist that the wearer leave, or have the wearer arrested for trespass should the wearer refuse. Any regulations incorporated by reference into the contract would also matter. At least in the US. walking back and forth on a public sidewalk just outside ABC's door, wearing such a shirt or carrying a classic picket sign with such a message would be pretty clearly legal, provided that others are not unduly obstructed, and no valid local ordinance is violated. In the wear-the-shirt-inside case, if the wearer refuses to remove the shirt or leave, the management would probably call law enforcement. LE will not want to decide whether wearer has the legal right to remain in the club wearing the shirt. They will probably ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer protests that s/he has a valid membership and thus a contractual right to stay, who knows what they would do. If they still ask the wearer to leave, the wearer would be wise to comply and perhaps take legal action to enforce his or her membership rights, which will depend on the contract details as mentioned above. A lawyer would probably be very helpful if the wearer wants to take that route. The wearer would be wise to remain polite and appear calm, not yelling or using epithets. | I regret to inform you that it is unlikely you would be able to make a spreadsheet to calculate "reasonable atty's fees". You could make one for filing for reasonable atty's fees, but the reasonableness adds in the ambiguity. When I clerked for a Fed. Judge, more or less I would skim through the time spent by the attorney(s) and the time spent by the paralegal(s). Then when considering the case and its complexity (esp. after reviewing all the pleadings, etc.) and it didn't seem especially excessive, I would recommend accepting it. If I thought it was excessive, like they were really milking their claim for atty's fees, I would review more thoroughly. In that case, I would suggest knocking down hours for certain times spent or changing certain activities from Atty to Para, such as "Atty: Check PACER/CMECF for case status - 0.5hr" I would knock down to 0.1 and change to the paralegal, Which could change that one entry from like $300 down to like $60. Do that four times and you get a grand. Same with large times spent "filing" documents, it doesn't take a long time to file documents as long as cmecf is up. I usually wouldn't consider adjusting "skilled" entries, like Analyzing, Drafting, Editing, Strategizing, etc., unless they seems especially egregious (considering case complexity). Also, like commented above, when there are an excessive number of attorneys, the time may get knocked back as the number of hours spent on it may be considered unreasonable. Then, after I went through everything, I would give my bench brief to the Judge, he would likely make changes to it and give it back. Then I would draft the Order, he would sign, and it would be entered. | Probably moot considering how much time has passed but here goes. California 22349(a) states that no person may drive upon a highway at speeds of greater than 65 mph. So if you're going to be convicted under 22349(a), it doesn't matter if you're going 80 or 90. The charge is that you were doing greater than 65. The judge found you were going 90. 90 > 65. Conviction secured. The only sticky part is if the judge charged you the extra $150 because he alleges you went 90 instead of 80. You could appeal that, since even the officer argues you went 80, but since the officer testified that his radar clocked you at 90, you'd probably lose, especially since the officer's rationale for writing 80 was, by his testimony, your alleged admission at the scene, and you at the scene would have reason to downplay your speed. TL;DR: Yes, the judge, as the trier of fact, can do that. Something came out during the trial (radar at 90) that contradicted the ticket (80) so the trier of fact (the judge) resolved this by going with the radar. You might have been able to get out of it, if you asked the officer why he didn't write 90 when that's what the radar read. There was a reason the officer didn't trust that radar, and if he articulated it, then the judge would likely have stuck with 80. | There are no rules against private sales of firearms in Arizona. If you (or your mother) own the guns, you can sell them to anyone you like unless you have reason to believe they are a prohibited possessor. There is no legal requirement for you to validate their identity. There is no limit on the number of guns you can sell to one person. A bill of sale is optional. You don't need a lawyer and, honestly, I'm not sure what a lawyer would do to help you sell a gun. The laws, being what they are, lead some to conclude that this must be how prohibited possessors get their guns. It's not. Most "illegal" guns are bought through straw purchases in which a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is not legally allowed to own one. You can work through a licensed dealer if it makes you feel better. If you don't want to use a dealer, you can simply require that a buyer have a concealed carry license as evidence that they are not a prohibited possessor. The CCW is not a surefire way to guarantee anything though. Personally, I would transact a private party sale with individuals via a dealer. You're in AZ. There is no shortage of gun buyers! At the risk of breaking site rules, you can also list guns online. For example, www.gunbroker.com is a popular site and follows an eBay-style bid structure (I have no affiliation to them). This model ensures that you get market price for the gun rather than trusting that a dealer is going to give you a fair price (they won't; they make their money buying cheap and selling at market rate). |
Is awarding a day off for women employees on 8 March a discrimination against the male employees? Early this year I joined a new company. As part of the benefits they give to their employees is included a day off, paid by the company, to all female employees for the 8 of March because of the International Woman's Day celebration. So women employees get one benefit more than men employees, simply because they are women. I'm curious to understand under what conditions can employees be treated differently differently by the company based on their gender and not be considered discrimination. | In the US, prohibitions against sex discrimination in employment do not include an exception when males are the targets of a discriminatory practice, whatever the underslying rationale may be. The specific language of 42 USC 2000e-2 is It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin Although sex discrimination lawsuits are infrequent when the victim is male, extending a beneficial condition of employment to females only would be as illegal as extending a beneficial condition of employment to whites only. | First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages. | It does not really matter exactly how the employer chooses to count working hours. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires, among other things, that the employee is at least paid the official minimum wage for each hour worked, and gets overtime pay for >40 hours per week. The Act also defines what counts as "hour worked" for these purposes. The Fact Sheet # 79D from the U.S. Department of Labor gives more details about what counts as "hours worked" for domestic services under the FLSA. The general rule is that all time during the shift counts, whether the employee is busy or not: Generally, when an employee is “on duty” (that is they must be in the home and prepared to provide services when required), they are working. The only exception is that time spent sleeping may be deducted under certain circumstances: In some circumstances, an employer may exclude up to eight hours an employee spends sleeping at the worksite from the time for which an employee must be paid. The rules are different, depending on whether the employee permanently resides at the place of work ("Live-in employee), has shifts of >=24 hours or shifts of <24 hours. In your case the shift is >=24 hours, so the rule is (see page three of the document): Up to eight hours of sleep time may be excluded from hours worked, provided that: sleeping facilities are available the employee can usually sleep at least five hours without disturbance the employee agrees to exclude sleep time Even then, interruptions of sleep for work must be paid, and if the employee get <5 hours sleep during a given shift, no exclusion is possible. So in summary: For calculating hourly wage and overtime pay, the employer must count at least 16 hours for each 24 hour shift, and more if the employee cannot sleep for eight hours during the shift. It probably does not matter that the employer calls it "12 hours worked", but your mother is entitled to at least "minium wage x 16" for each shift worked, and is entitled to overtime pay (at least 1.5 times minimum wage) if she works more than two shifts per week. If the shift is ever reduced to less than 24 hours, even sleep time may not be excluded. | I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content. | In the U.S. a board member would not be an employee just by virtue of being a board member, even if they were compensated for attending board meetings. The CEO, an employee, might or might not also be a board member. Employees can be fired by their manager. A board member can't be fired from the board but, typically, only removed by a vote of shareholders. They are not assigned tasks by managers of the company. This is 100% clear in CA under employment code 622 (a) “Employee” does not include a director of a corporation or association performing services in his or her capacity as a director. I was a CEO of a private company I co-founded I was a board member as a result of voting myself on the board via my stock ownership. The majority of the board could fire me as CEO but I would still be a board member. If outside board members did get compensation, it would be as a consultant, paid with a 1099. The CA code does say that a board member could take on actual work, like auditing financial information, that might fall under the activities of an employee. | I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply. | Germany There is a group of civil servants called Beamte. They are expected to show special loyalty to the state, and in turn the state is expected to show special loyalty to them. Different pension rules from regular workers, different healthcare rules, they can only be fired for gross misconduct, but in turn they are not allowed to go on strike and the state has more leeway on simply reassigning them to a different office. Then there is a group of civil servants called Angestellte im öffentlichen Dienst, whose contract is much closer to a private sector employee contract in Germany. They are allowed to go on strike for better salary or better working conditions. Some teachers are Beamte, some are Angestellte. It differs from state to state, and also by the date when they entered the profession. So some teachers in Germany can go on strike and some cannot. Both types may be mixed in the same school. | if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate. |
Are all GPL Licensed projects free to use for commercial use even if they appear to be paid content? I'm having a few issues understanding how sites like gpldl.com can call themselves legal. This site appears to purchase paid plugins from various developers like WooThemes iThemes Gravity Forms WPML WPMU DEV Elmastudio Elegant Themes Sites like gpldl.com state that since their plugins/themes are licensed under GNU General Public License, they can then share them with members of their site for free. Are sites like these actually legal to use? Can I download plugins and themes from this site and use them on a commercial project? | They are GPL licensed. Each WordPress file contains either a licence.txt or readme.txt file that clearly states they are GPLv2 or higher. As such they are free to redistribute the files as they wish. Disclaimer: We also own a website that distributes GPL licenced WordPress software at https://www.gplvault.com and only accept files that are 100% GPL. The thing to watch out for is that none of the files carry a so called split licence where the PHP and HTML is GPL and the Images and CSS are non-GPL. | Software doesn't infringe any patents. Creating a product that includes the software may infringe the patent, and may infringe that patent because the software is included, but the software itself doesn't. Software on its own doesn't have any effect that could be patented, only as part of some machine. On the other hand, if you want to distribute software that is under the GPL v3.0 license, then a requirement is that you give everyone a patent license for all patents that would be infringed by using the software (as part of some machine), and if you are not the patent holder, then in practice that means you are not allowed to distribute the software. With your grand plan that you write software and then let the end users do the patent infringement, that will backfire in two ways: First, you'd be likely sued for contributory patent infringment, because it is you who enables the patent infringemnt. Second, you can be sued for copyright infringement because you have no license that allows you distribution of the software, depending on the Open Source license used. | To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together). | I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use. | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | What licence should I display in the footer of my website? None unless you want people to copy and reuse the content. The content (except for mere facts) will be protected by copyright regardless. When you expect people to want to copy and reuse it, it makes sense to tell them in advance under what conditions they can do it (instead of being bothered by their questions). This is what displaying a licence is for. If you were a visual designer then a licence would make sense as visuals are likely to be wanted to be copied and used. But a CV, list of projects and comments from customers are probably not likely to be wanted for reuse and distribution, though it is ultimately for you to decide. If you think someone will want to copy and further distribute your content, you'll need to figure out under what conditions you want to allow it, and then search for a licence that fits. If none found, just create your own. | Probably not, because you should be in a position to rely on the Safe Harbor provision of the DMCA. Safe Harbor protects service providers who provide open, non-moderated spaces for users to directly contribute content. Safe Harbor means you do not need an army of moderators to inspect every message posted to the site or system. It is essential for sites like Twitter, Youtube or StackExchange to exist. You are not liable for that content if you provide a means for IP owners to report copyright violations, and promptly take down any content which an IP owner reports as violating. You don't need to get in the middle of whether that's really true; there's a mechanism for the user and IP owner to "duke it out" directly at no risk to you. However you must take the required steps. For instance you must register an agent, and respond timely to DMCA takedown notices, which means you must be reachable as per the law. Your designated agent address must be staffed 9-5. Note that the "Designated Agent" can be the same person as the "Registered Agent" that you already must have when you are an LLC or corporation. And you'll want to be an LLC or corporation by the time you get big enough to worry about copyright lawsuits. | You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack. |
What can a lawyer do if the client wants to be acquitted of everything despite serious evidence? Alex the accused has been charged with a series of crimes. The list of charges is long (beating up his wife, speeding while drunk, trafficking...) and for most crimes, the evidence presented by the state attorney is very strong. Dave the defense attorney, seeing the evidence, suggests his client should follow the "I'm sorry, it will never happen again" strategy to get a small, maybe even suspended sentence. But Alex is very stubborn and sympathizes with the "Reichsbürger"-Movement, so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted and given not only a long prison sentence, but maybe even a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wishes of his client while still representing him as best as he can? | In several civil law systems, including in Switzerland, the involvement of a defence lawyer can be mandatory, even against the will of the accused. If the accused does not appoint a lawyer, a duty lawyer must be appointed by the director of the proceeding (the prosecutor or the judge depending on the stage of the proceedings). The obligation to have a lawyer may extend to important civil cases in some countries before higher courts to avoid wasting judicial resources. In criminal cases, this is also to ensure the accused's rights to a competent, diligent and effective defence. The accused is responsible for the costs of the lawyer, within their financial circumstances and subject to government legal aids, if they are found responsible for procedural costs. All lawyers at bar in a canton are required to accept mandates assigned to them due to obligatory provisions of law, provided that they are competent to do so. This is regulated by art. 130 to 135 of the federal Criminal Procedure Code, in particular, A defence lawyer must be appointed to represent the accused if: a. the period on remand including the period when under arrest has continued for more than 10 days; b. the offence concerned carries a custodial sentence of more than a year or a custodial measure or may result in expulsion from Switzerland; c. the accused is unable to safeguard his or her interests in the proceedings adequately due to his or her physical or mental condition or for other reasons, and his or her statutory representative is unable to do so either; d. the prosecuting lawyer is appearing in person before the court of first instance or the court of appeal; e. accelerated proceedings (Art. 358–362) are being conducted. Essentially, all serious offences are subject to this obligation. Until now this is not a direct answer to the question posed, but it is a factor that shows the relationship between the lawyer and the client is not a simple one. Now going back to your question. In Switzerland, or indeed in most legal systems, the lawyer is to ensure that the accused receives a competent, diligent and effective defense. Indeed, if the public prosecutor or the judge believes or reasonably ought to have believed the defence is clearly incompetent or otherwise negligent in their professional duties, the proceedings must be suspended until a suitable defence is appointed by choice of the accused or by the proceeding director. so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. The lawyer is a professional that must exercise their professional judgement. They are also a 'servant of the law' and a 'collaborator in the administration of justice' and bear responsibility for the correct functioning of the justice system (Federal Court rulings 106 IA 100, 130 II 270). In general, they are not allowed to induce the justice and the authorities in error. Thus, they cannot simply present baseless arguments before the judicial authorities. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted to a long prison sentence, but maybe even to a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wish of his client while still representing him as best as he can? If the lawyer is convinced that the strategy imposed by the client is clearly contrary to the client's interest, they may decide to withdraw from the mandate, if they can do so without seriously prejudicing the client's interest. This is the case when the accused had chosen their own lawyer, who under contractual law must follow the client's instructions and the recourse to avoid unprofessional conducts is withdrawal. For the duty defence lawyers, the accused cannot waive the right to a defence lawyer, indeed, it is an obligation on the accused, the lawyer and the judicial authority. While the law provides for replacement of the lawyer if the mutual trust between the lawyer and the client is seriously compromised, this is not simply so because the client says so. Loss of confidence on subjective grounds alone does not constitute a reason to change a duty lawyers unless the attitude of the lawyer is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the accused (Federal Court ruling 1B_307/2012). For lack of a better analogy, the duty defence lawyer would proceed to represent the interests of the accused as if the accused was mentally deficient or otherwise incompetent (not that the accused is recognized as so with respect to their criminal responsibility, but that the accused is unable, or in this case unwilling, to cooperate fully with the lawyer on their own defence). The duty lawyer can impose their own defence strategy and must do so if they sincerely believe it is in the best interests of their client (https://www.penalex.ch/faq-avocats/mon-avocat-doffice-peut-il-mimposer-sa-strategie/). Of course, the accused still has a right to be directly heard by the court, but such right is not unlimited. They can make their own representations and may note their disagreement with the defence counsel, but the accused does not have the right just ramble for two hours in the court. As it is not an adversarial system, the decision maker will take all circumstances into account and the disagreements between the client and their own counsel (despite being imposed by the law and the state) are not as much of an issue as in an adversarial common law trial. Note that an acquitted accused may still be found responsible for procedural costs (including for any obligatory defence fees) if they had deliberately caused the penal procedure to be opened unlawfully or wrongfully (even if "criminally" not guilty), or that they had deliberately made the proceeding more difficult (e.g. through multiple unjustified requests to change lawyers, or indeed possibly, presenting the arguments of Reichsbürger with insistence). Other consulted references: L'avocat dans la défense pénale : de l'obligation de dire la vérité à un droit de mentir, Flavien Morard https://sui-generis.ch/article/view/sg.53/661 | The victim of domestic violence is referred to as the complaining witness. Domestic violence arrests will result in a criminal investigation. It is not up to the complaining witness to determine if charges are brought against the one who was arrested - this is up to the prosecutor. Here is a good article at Findlaw that discusses the process. If the complaining witness recants, the prosecutor may decide to drop the charges. The prosecutor may, though, decide to continue the charges and prosecute the case. The complaining witness in recanting may face charges as well - for example, for making a false police report. If the prosecutor presses the case and your husband is convicted then, yes, it will be on his record. Seeking the advice of a New York attorney who specializes in these matters is the best course of action. EDIT: Here is additional information regarding New York Criminal History Records: New York State law does specify that, unless the court orders otherwise, arrest records are sealed when criminal actions are terminated in favor of the accused - dismissed, found not guilty, etc. This is spelled out in Criminal Procedure Law 160.50. Arrest records are part of the public record until disposition of the case is completed. At New York State's Court web site, you can read about how to get criminal records of anyone - they are public record so anyone can make a request about anyone. There is a fee of $65. Records can be ordered online and the results can be emailed to you. Searches are processed by an exact match of name and date of birth. From their web site you will see that criminal cases transferred or removed to Family Court are not reported. Neither are records for people who had a single misdemeanor conviction over ten years ago or pending criminal cases categorized as Youthful Offender Eligible. Generally speaking, New York criminal cases are part of the public record and are available to anyone unless they meet certain criteria or have been sealed under New York State law. Note that sealing records doesn't mean the record goes away. It just means that the record is not available to the general public without a court order unsealing the record. Here is the link to on-line direct access to records requests: http://www.nycourts.gov/APPS/chrs/onlinedirectaccess.shtml | Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted". | Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe. | How can a person with a similar experience with the defendant, help the plaintiff in a lawsuit? You may bring Joe as witness or present some sworn testimony from him. That could be in the form of affidavit, deposition transcript, or by testifying in court. In what way can I use Joe's story? Joe's testimony will be relevant to the extent that it proves the defendant's pattern of conduct or system for doing a thing. Many (if not all) jurisdictions in the U.S. had a provision similar to Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts [...] may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act [...] when the same is material, whether [they] are contemporaneous, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case. Thus, Joe's testimony would not prove your entire claim, but it can discredit important aspects of defendant's foreseeable denials in your matter. In some way the suggestion in the other answer makes sense, but I would discourage you from bringing suit together with Joe. That is because, despite all similarities, your claim are Joe's claim are different instances: Each cause of action stemmed from a separate contract; each contract/cause involves a different plaintiff; the statute of limitations of each wrong started running at different times; and your history with the defendant might differ from Joe's history with him on relevant aspects in a way that could prejudice you. Furthermore, if the defendant requests that the suits be separated, you and Joe would have no persuasive arguments on why your matters should remain consolidated. Lastly, the mere fact that a complaint is filed by two or more plaintiffs will not prompt a judge to act with honesty or with competence. | So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run). | Quick answer "Is a lawyer allowed to follow a client's instructions to hide evidence?" Probably not. I discuss this in the final section of this answer. About this specific case, the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the lawyer (Ken Murray) had intended to conceal the tapes permenantly or that he was aware of an obligation to disclose them prior to trial. As summarized by Austin Cooper, K.C.: Justice Gravely held that the concealing of the tapes for 17 months until Bernardo’s trial had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice, and therefore the actus reus of the offence was proved. On the issue of whether Mr. Murray willfully intended to obstruct justice, because it was feasible that Mr. Murray could have used the tapes for the defence and may well have believed that he had no obligation to disclose the tapes until the trial, he found the necessary mens rea was not proved. Accordingly, he found him not guilty. Deeper answer I'll first attempt to explain the trial judge's reasons (R. v. Murray, 2000 CanLII 22378 (ON SC)). At the end, I answer your more general questions. Facts February, 1993: Ken Murray was retained to defend Paul Bernardo on sexual assault charges; it was this charge for which Bernardo was already in custody at the time of the search of his home. April 30, 1993: The final search warrant of the Bernardo home expired. May 6, 1993: Ken Murray opened a letter from Bernardo that instructed the defence team to retrieve six 8mm videotapes. They located the tapes, removed them, and they committed to not tell anyone about the tapes. May 18, 1993: Bernardo was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related offences. Murray's retainer was expanded to include defence of these charges. Bernardo authorized Murray to copy and review the videotapes and make use of them as appropriate in his defence. Two of the tapes contained evidence of sexual assault and death threats. Others contained evidence about the character and actions of a co-accused which Murray thought could be useful in Bernardo's defence. Early June 1993: Murray made a copy of the tapes and became fully aware of their contents. July 11 and 12, 1994: Bernardo told Murray he intended to deny ever having any contact with the victims that were on the tapes. He told Murray that the tapes were not to be used to contradict this position. July 24, 1994: After learning about DNA evidence and learning what the co-accused told police (all pointing to Bernardo being with the victims in the home), and after confirming that Bernardo insisted on maintaining his position that he had no contact with the victims and that the tapes were not to be used, Murray "felt obliged to terminate the solicitor-client relationship". August 25, 1994: After a period of discussion with John Rosen (a lawyer from another firm), Rosen agreed to take over the defence of the first-degree murder charges. Murray did not tell Rosen about the tapes. Murray would remain defence counsel on the sexual assault charges. August 27, 1994: Rosen and Murray met with Bernardo to explain the change in counsel on the murder charges. August 30, 1994: Bernardo directed Murray to not reveal any of his materials to "other counsel retained on my behalf for other offences that are currently before the Court... unless I specifically direct the release of such materials, in writing." Murray retained his own lawyer who further sought advice from the law society. The law society advised that (1) Murray remove himself as counsel for Bernardo on all matters; (2) Murray give the tapes to the judge in a sealed packet to be subect to court determination; and (3) to tell Bernardo of these steps as soon as possible. Rosen (the new defence counsel on the murder charges) became aware of these plans, learned that the tapes existed, and was concerned the tapes would be turned over without any input from him. September 21 and 22, 1994: After much discussion with Crown counsel, Rosen got instructions from Bernardo to turn over the tapes; the tapes were delivered to the Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Niagara Regional Police. The charge Ken Murray was charged with wilfully obstructing or attempting to obstruct the course of justice. The law The judge applied what is known as the "tendency test". He said: Attempting to obstruct justice is construed as the doing of an act which has a tendency to pervert or obstruct the course of justice (the actus reus). "Wilfully" then constitutes the mens rea -- that is the act is done for the purpose of obstructing the course of justice He noted: The system functions within the broad principles of the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. The Crown must fully disclose its case. The defence has no reciprocal obligation. Application of the law Actus reus In this case, the judge found that Murray had done the actus reus of the offence: On the face of the evidence Murray's action in secreting the critical tapes had the tendency to obstruct the course of justice at several stages of the proceedings. The tapes were put beyond the reach of the police who had unsuccessfully attempted to locate them. Secreting them had the tendency to obstruct the police in their duty to investigate the crimes of Bernardo and Homolka. Further, there was no justification that negated the actus reus. This evidence on the tapes was not privilged; it was not communication between solicitor and client. The judge found that "once [Murray] had discovered the overwhelming significance of the critical tapes, Murray... was left with but three legally justifiable options": (a) immediately turn over the tapes to the prosecution, either directly or anonymously; (b) deposit them with the trial judge; or (c) disclose their existence to the prosecution and prepare to do battle to retain them. Mens rea The Crown had to prove that Murray's intention was to obstruct the course of justice. The judge found that the Crown did not prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge found that Murray may have not intended to permanently suppress the tapes and that Murray may have believed he had no obligation to disclose the tapes prior to the trial. He had presented several theories regarding the potential usefulness of the tapes to the defence which would have required holding back the tapes for their tactical or "surprise" value. Also, the judge noted that the law in this area was confusing.1 While Murray made only a token effort to find out what his obligations were, had he done careful research he might have remained confused. The weight of legal opinion in Ontario is to the effect that lawyers may not conceal material physical evidence of crime, but how this rule applies to particular facts has been the subject of extensive discussion. Lawyers in the United States have been afflicted with the same dilemma. In the materials supplied to me by counsel, there is reference to at least 15 law journal discussions on the issue. Ethical responsibility Doesn't a lawyer have a responsibility not to defend a specific fact that they know is criminal? No. But they do have an obligation to not lie to the court or to allow their client to lie to the court. This is why Murray knew he had to withdraw from the case when Bernardo was committed to the defence that he had never encountered the victims. To answer your title question, "Is a lawyer allowed to follow instructions from his client to hide evidence?", the answer today is "probably not." It has even been suggested that if defence counsel is faced with this issue, they should instruct their client: It is evidence that might convict you; if you give it to me, I may have to turn it over to the prosecution. Take it away and keep it in your residence; if you destroy it, you may be guilty of a crime. The Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct now say (Rule 5.1-2A): A lawyer shall not counsel or participate in the concealment, destruction or alteration of incriminating physical evidence or otherwise act so as to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the course of justice. Any lawyer faced with this dilemma should probably do what Mr. Murray eventually did and retain their own lawyer and/or get advice from their law society. 1. While the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" generally holds true, the mens rea of this offence includes an intention to obstruct justice. The judge understood this to invite an inquiry into what Murray believed the law required of him. This approach has been criticized: see Lucinda Vandervort, "Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse'... Even for a Lawyer", 2001. | Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established. |
What sort of facts are considered when determining if a work is inspired by or derived from another? All art is inspired by what came before. This is particularly obvious in visual art, where the progression of the medium can be seen from the cave art of the neolithic to the art of today, but is equally true for music and all other forms of art that occur to me. The creation of derivative works of art is a right protected by copyright. Being inspired by a work of art to create another work is not restricted by copyright and is how art happens. I assume the distinction between these two would come up in court, possibly in the various music plagiarism cases, possibly in upcoming AI cases. When making these determinations, what sort of facts are considered? How similar the works are? How original each is? How competitive they are in the market? How much work was involved? | In considering whether a work is derivative, the key question is whether multiple, significant distinctive elements of the source work are used in the allegedly derivative work. It is also significant whether the two works display "substantial similarity". The amount of effort that goes into a work is not relevant. Nor is the market value of each work. A work need not be totslly distinct from previous works to be protectable by copyright. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) the 11th circuit court of appeals held that a mere stock figure was not enough to make a work derivative. This case is still considered the basic rule on derivative works. The opinion held that copying musty be "substantial" to make a work an infringement. Judge Learned Hand wrote: It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. ... ... the question is whether the part so taken is "substantial," and therefore not a "fair use" of the copyrighted work; it is the same question as arises in the case of any other copyrighted work. Marks v. Feist, 290 F. 959 (C. C. A. 2); -Emerson v. Davies*, Fed. Cas. No. 4436, 3 Story, 768, 795-797. But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86, 19 S. Ct. 606, 43 L. Ed. 904; Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.(2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2). Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. ... In such cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression and what is expressed. As respects plays, the controversy chiefly centers upon the characters and sequence of incident, these being the substance. ... It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly. ... ... granting that the plaintiff's play was wholly original, and assuming that novelty is not essential to a copyright, there is no monopoly in such a background. Though the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it to herself; so defined, the theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she wrote. It was only a part of her "ideas." ... The testimony of an expert upon such issues, especially his cross-examination, greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more naïve, ground of its considered impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class of cases such evidence may in the future be entirely excluded, and the case confined to the actual issues; that is, whether the copyrighted work was original, and whether the defendant copied it, so far as the supposed infringement is identical. See also: "Open Source Copyright Casebook; Class 4: Derivative Works by Brian L. Frye, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. This discusses image copying and reproduction specifically. Frye writes: Notably, copyright only protects the original elements of a derivative work or compilation: "The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work." ... Notably, a work that copies the ideas expressed by a preexisting work is not a derivative work, because it is not a copy of that work. Copyright cannot protect ideas, so the author of the new work has not copied a protected element of the preexisting work. See further Frye's long discussion of Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) in which questions of whether a painting was a derivative work of a film, and what rights the painter had, are dealt with. | My remarks pertain only to US Law. Laws vary in other countries. Subject matter eligible for copyright protection in the US must be expressive and creative. To the extent data are merely measurements of observable fact in the world, they are not copyrightable. It may be that the presentation or interpretation of data is eligible for copyright protection (for example, artwork used in charts, graphs, graphics, etc., that is expressive and creative), subject to various equitable use provisions (in particular Fair Use, which is still a legal grey area). The methods by which data are gathered can be considered IP, but is the domain of patents. Methods are not copyrightable (17 USC 102(b)). | I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must. | It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement. | A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question. | Plagiarism is an academic category about the thoughts from another scholar/author. Copyright is a legal category about the words of another writer. When a student or a degree candidate present a paper or a thesis, they implicitly or explicitly claim that it is their original work, except for sections which are marked as the work of others. With a thesis for a degree, there may be a form where the candidate confirms this in writing, which brings the law back into the academic sphere. There are many situations in a school or even university context where there is no such claim of originality. Imagine the exam question "what is the third law of thermodynamics?" There would be no need for the student to give a source, because nobody asked for it and nobody could possibly believe that the student just invented that law. If the question was about who discovered the third law, they should say so. Schools which prepare their students for academic work should introduce both concepts and train their students in proper citation at some point. But not too early. | According to US law according to Cornell, copyright applies to derivative works. A derivative work is an original work based on a previous work (Definitions), so the adaptations would be copyrightable unless they were held to be unoriginal. In general, the courts don't require much creativity to consider a work original. Translations are original works. Therefore, the adaptations are almost certainly under copyright, while the originals remain public domain. | It infringes the copyright. It can easily be proved that both XOR1 and XOR2 derive from the source work by XOR-ing the streams with each other. It's just like any encrypted copy: it infringes the copyright, but only those who can decrypt it are in a position to know that it infringes the copyright. The posts on the forum are illegal because they infringe the copyright; it doesn't matter that they are derived works rather than the work itself, just as your drawing of a copyright-protected image infringes copyright because it is a derived work without being the work itself. |
Is it illegal to deface graffiti in England? From this site - http://www.environmentlaw.org.uk/rte.asp?id=49: In England and Wales, graffiti is considered an act of criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and offenders can be punished with an unlimited fine. Is it illegal to deface graffiti? For example, spray painting over existing graffiti on a public wall. By defacing I mean black-boxing, drawing a line through, painting over with the colour of the wall. So not tagging, but just spoiling or covering. | It depends... The statutory defence relevant to the OP may be found at s.5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/48/section/5?timeline=false if at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed that the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction of or damage to the property in question had so consented, or would have so consented to it if he or they had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances... So the burden of proof is on the over-painter to establish that they believed they had consent to commit further criminal damage (by over-painting black boxes etc). | The offences found in the Computer Misuse Act 1990 are criminal offences. The Limitations Act 1980 deals with civil offences and is thus not relevant. Apparently, there is no general statute of limitations for criminal offences in the UK (though for summary proceedings, the limit is in general 6 months). | In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work. | The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed. | Prostitution is legal in the UK, but soliciting prostitution in a public place is still illegal, as are a host of other related crimes. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prostitution_in_the_United_Kingdom Frequently in any business, you need to follow specific laws designed to prevent some of the issues around that business that are undesirable in some way. For example, banks have anti-money-laundering laws even though banking is legal. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | No, bare possession is not illegal under US law Nothing in Tile 17 of the US code (which is the copyright law) makes it illegal or even actionable to simply posses a single physical object (such as a game or a book) which constitutes a copyright infringement. Criminal copyright infringement is defined in 17 USC 506 and is limited to people who: Infringe for "purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain"; and Create infringing copies "which have a total retail value of more than $1,000" in a six-month period; or Infringe "by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution." However, in practice, the US Department of Justice only brings criminal copyright cases when infringement is carried on as a business, on a bulk or mass basis, and only when infringing copies are in fact distributed to the public. In practice the vast majority of copyright enforcement (both in the US and in other countries) is done by private suits by copyright owners or rights-holders. In the US such suits are generally to enforce the rights guaranteed in 17 USC 106. This protects six core rights (summarized): To make copies or phonorecords; To prepare derivative works; To distribute copies or phonorecords; To perform the copyrighted work publicly; To display the copyrighted work publicly; To perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. The copyright owner can do any of these or authorize other to do them. Anyone doing any of these without such permission is an infringer unless one of the exceptions or limitations in sections 107 thru 122 applies. There are also the "moral rights" specified in section 106A. These apply only to works of visual art in the US, and grant the artist the right to: Claim authorship of the work; Prevent the use of the person's name on any work s/he did not create; Prevent the use of the author's name on any work that has been changed so as to possibly harm the author's reputation; Prevent any "intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation"; and Prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature. Note that none of the six rights from sec 106 or the five moral rights from sec 106A covers possession of an infringing copy. One caution: so-called "first-sale rights" (from 17 USC 109) do not apply to an infringing copy, and it is infringement to knowingly sell, lend, rent or otherwise distribute an infringing copy. But the purchaser is not an infringer. Also, to play an infringing copy of a game might be a violation of the right to "publicly perform" the work, but not if done in private. However, in running a game it is likely that one or more temporary copies would be made. This is lawful if done from a lawful copy, but not if the person does not posses a lawfully-made copy. So playing an infringing copy of a game might well constitute an act of infringement, although a suit over a private act is unlikely. | What is the name of the crime and/or tort I have committed? You are guilty of the crime of fraud, the crime of theft of the money and the item (I can't point you to the precise statute). You have breached your contract of sale. You are probably liable for fraud civilly (i.e. you could be sued for fraud). But, if one was really creative, I imagine that one could find more grounds for civil and/or criminal liability, although they would probably be unnecessary since the victims have plenty of remedies to secure all possible relief already. Who gets to keep the object? Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, in the United States, the general rule is delivery of possession by the seller (which didn't really happen here to one distinct person), but for unique goods, title passes when the unique good is identified to a contract with a buyer, so first in time to contract, first in right to the car, would probably prevail. But, I don't know what the rule would be in England and Wales. Is it handled differently if the "valuable physical object" is real estate? Land is harder to defraud someone with, because a reasonable person knows that in England and Wales real estate title is (usually, but not always) represented by a certificate of ownership maintained by a public official in the Land Registry, and is easily checked (about 15% of land in England and Wales show in the link is not registered so the possibility for deception is somewhat greater in that context). Also, generally, you don't pay for real property until you simultaneously receive payment in good funds, while brief extensions of credit for a non-perfectly contemporaneous sale transaction are more common in cases involving tangible personal property. |
Does the XR vs. Shell case create precedent for environmental activism being necessary? Six Extinction Rebellion activists were charged with criminal damage to the Shell HQ building in London’s Waterloo in April 2019. All admitted the actions, and five of the six relied on the defense that their actions were necessary, in that their actions that day were required to prevent greater harm, specifically that they raise the alarm about the threat of climate change and pressure the UK government to act. The judge directed the jury that these 5 defendants had no defense under the law. The sixth defendant claimed that he believed Shell (considered as a whole, including all the staff, shareholders and management) would have consented to his actions, and this was accepted by the judge as recognised under law. All six were found not guilty by the jury. Does this create precedent for environmental activism being necessary, such that it could be cited in subsequent cases to demonstrate that similar action may be protected by the law? | Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989 | The law does not require any reference to science of any kind – that is a political choice. The law grant a certain authority to the governor, under certain circumstances, go give extraordinary orders at the governor's discretion. No actions are mandatory during an emergency. The laws may or may not require legislative approval for extending an order beyond a certain point, where the order is issue pursuant to declaring a state of emergency. There are two main bases for appealing to the courts to enjoin against some aspect of an order: lack of initial authority (the statute does not actually grant that power), or, violation of fundamental constitutional rights. The latter is the predominant basis for appeal in the present instances. | united-kingdom Yes. The landmark case in the UK is Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart, where the House of Lords*: established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege *Strictly speaking, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which functioned as the UK's highest court before the creation of the Supreme Court. | In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), the Supreme Court held that "there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation." The Court was unanimous on this point. This means that right now, there is no way to sue for a damages remedy for First Amendment retaliation by federal officials. The majority said that "Congress, not the courts, is better suited to authorize such a damages remedy." | There is a Defense of "Necessity" which would apply in such cases, even if the law had no intent element.. This essentially allows as a defense to an accusation of crime that the actions were essential to prevent harm. Dee, for example Justia's page on The Criminal Defense of Necessity. There it is said: The defense of necessity may apply when an individual commits a criminal act during an emergency situation in order to prevent a greater harm from happening. In such circumstances, our legal system typically excuses the individual’s criminal act because it was justified, or finds that no criminal act has occurred. Although necessity may seem like a defense that would be commonly invoked by defendants seeking to avoid criminal charges, its application is limited by several important requirements: The defendant must reasonably have believed that there was an actual and specific threat that required immediate action The defendant must have had no realistic alternative to completing the criminal act The harm caused by the criminal act must not be greater than the harm avoided The defendant did not himself contribute to or cause the threat Only if all of these requirements are met, will the defense of necessity be applicable. It is also important to note that in some jurisdictions, necessity is never a defense to the killing of another individual, no matter what threat they may present. The Justia page goes on to describe the elements of the defense in detail. See also The Wikipedia artifcel which makes many of the same points. Necessity is a broader defense than the intent or willfulness requirements of particular laws, because it applied even when the law does nor contain such an element. However, it has its own strict limits, described above. The exact scope of this defense differs in different jurisdictions. | None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage | The burden for proving claims in civil actions is "preponderance of evidence," i.e., merely that "more than 50% of the evidence favors a conclusion." However, the standard for conviction of any crime is "beyond a reasonable doubt." I.e., if the defense can raise reasonable doubt about one's guilt then the defendant should be acquitted. There is quite a bit of space between the two standards, which is compounded by prosecutorial discretion to even bring criminal charges. | Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it. |
What are the consequenses of reporting criminal damage by my partner? My domestic partner - we are unmarried - has maliciously destroyed a computer belonging to me (approx value £2000) following an argument. I don't want to respond in kind, but I want to send a signal that this is not acceptable behaviour. If I report criminal damage to the local police, will this be taken seriously? And is a prosecution automatic or will I need to press charges? I don't actually want to end our relationship (we have young children) but I want this incident officially logged. | If the police become aware of the domestic violence through you reporting it or otherwise the matter is entirely in their hands. They will decide if they want to prosecute or not. | user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney. | You have the copyright on all your pictures. He had no permission to copy any of them, so he has committed copyright infringement on a massive scale. You can just get a solicitor who will happily take him to court for you. You shouldn't be overdoing it, $750 per infringed work (per picture) as statutory damages should be fine. If you want it cheaper, the solicitor will write a letter for you that asks him to destroy all the pictures, sign that he has destroyed all the pictures, pay the solicitor's fees, or otherwise be taken to court for copyright infringement (see above). Now I am not a lawyer, so you go to a lawyer which will correct whatever I got wrong here. Just forgot: In addition to having the copyright, if he publishes pictures of people (like you and your family), he needs permission of these people. So if anything gets published, that goes on top of the copyright infringement. | The tenant is responsible for damage beyond “fair wear and tear” which this obviously is. If it is as bad as you suggest then it may require professional forensic cleaning which can run to thousands of pounds. At some point, things like carpets etc. can be cheaper to replace than to repair. There is no upper limit (beyond, at the extreme, the cost of demolition and rebuilding the dwelling), however, there may be a practical limit being the amount the tenant can pay before going bankrupt. | There are none. Damages against B’s clinic? A does not have a contract with B’s clinic. No duties nor rights without a contract. Damages against B? A does not have a contract with B. If there was a contract, we need details about it. Tort, § 823 Ⅰ BGB? No. B was neither negligent nor did he/she deliberately incur damage. Report B as criminal? A and B had consensual sexual intercourse. This consent (necessarily) comprises the risk of transmission. You cannot give “consent to facts” though. Yet here B had no knowledge of his/her contagiousness. He/she definitely did not deliberately infect A. Negligence is out of question, because there is no general expectation to get regularly tested before having sex with anyone. | Repeating a defamatory statement is itself defamatory This is known as the repetition rule and is illustrated in Brown v Bower & Another [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB). In essence, the "local news site" is responsible for the reputational damage suffered by their publication and you are responsible for the damage caused by your amplification of that publication. So if the local news article was seen by a few dozen people locally, the damages might be relatively modest. If your publication caused it to be seen by millions of people and caused nationwide or worldwide damage to the person's reputation so that they are at risk of losing income or opportunities in the future, the damages can be vast. How you shared it is important. If you endorsed it, which includes forwarding it without commentary, then it is likely defamatory. If you were more circumspect and said something that shows an open mind to the allegations like "This is an interesting story, I can't wait to see how it plays out", then it's likely not defamatory. Of course, if the allegations are true then you have nothing to worry about; truth is a complete defence to defamation. You can prove that they are true, right? I mean with real evidence like a conviction for fraud. Or, at the very least, pending or actual charges from the police. Or, failing that you have good evidence that you yourself have been scammed specifically by this person. Or that you have had people who have been scammed tell you personally exactly how it happened? No? Well, I wouldn't count on a truth defence if I were you. | A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them. | Is something considered stolen if it possibly could have been lost? Something is considered stolen if it was stolen. You don't have your passport + Someone entered the room where it was ≠ They stole it Can this be brought to small claims court? What damage did you suffer that could be remedied by a monetary settlement? Sure, the landlord entering your room without your permission is probably unlawful but it's not clear that it did you any damage. No damage; no case. Should the police or some other government agency care? Here is a ranking of government cares: Getting reelected National security Economic Management ... 42,567. Murder ... 421,762. Passport Fraud ... 7,656,232. Passport theft ... 58,432,546. Passports that might have been stolen but probably weren't |
If a law is new but its interpretation is vague, can the courts directly ask the drafters the intent and official interpretation of their law? The problem with old laws seems to be that many times the drafters aren't alive to tell what their intent or interpretation is of a given law, but in case a law is new and the drafter or drafters are alive, can courts ask them about the interpretation and intent behind a law? | No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the "Vagueness Doctrine" which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition. | No. In order to practice law, one must establish an attorney-client relationship. Participation in Internet forums absolutely does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Everyone involved in law spends a disproportionate amount of time disclaiming this, so nobody inside the field will be confused on this point. I believe this is also directly stated in the Terms of Service. And as Jen notes, upvoting/downvoting is not even agreeing with the legal validity of the answer. Take the tour or read help pages for what voting means. It's perfectly conceivable for a psychic who knows how to sway people could write a better voted answer than three lawyers. | There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News. | In practice, common law courts turn to academic writing, either law review articles or legal treatises or the "Restatements of Law", on a regular, but infrequent basis. These sources are not binding sources of legal authority but can shed persuasive light on the logic behind a legal rule or the course of action that has been taken in previous similar cases. In civil law countries (i.e. those not descended from the legal system of England), there are far fewer circumstances in which court precedents are sources of law. Much of the gap in credible sources for how ambiguities in the statutory law should be interpreted in these countries comes from academic writing. In a typical civil law country, a leading law professor has more impact on how the law is interpreted than senior appellate court judges. Again, academic writings are not binding legal authority, but in the absence of alternative sources for material interpreting statutes, they are very persuasive. | While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court. | When they start giving legal advice ... unless your PA is a lawyer. In a nutshell, legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver Unlike legal information - such as information posted on a street sign - legal advice proposes a specific course of action a client should take. For instance, it's the difference between telling someone what to do (legal advice) as opposed to how to do it (legal information). For your specific questions Can they research the CC&Rs, Bylaws or other such states, federal statues to help me better understand the letter? Researching and even summarising is not legal advice. If they give opinions on what you should do as a result of that research it is legal advice. Can they write up a response letter that I would look at and approve ... Yes ... or if minor enough they could just respond? It depends on what's involved. If it is a purely factual response ("Is this your car?") then this is ok. If it is legal advocacy, it isn't. Putting aside the legalities; how does your PA feel about you suing them if they stuff any of this up? If I was your PA, I wouldn't be acting as your agent without an indemnity. | No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void. | tl;dr: Statutory preambles are typically non-binding, and some states have laws to this effect (e.g. Florida, Illinois, Iowa, etc.). The most consistent interpretation I've found is that when the body text isn't clear, the preamble might be helpful in determining context and legislative intent. For example, in Shea v. Clinton, 850 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.C. 2012), the district court said that where statutory text is ambiguous, courts may look to the preamble and legislative history for clarification. This extends beyond the realm of statutes. In Catalina Marketing v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the court found that considering limitations in the preamble of a patent should be context-specific. |
If an employer owns any work you produce whilst employed, do you have to be un-employed before you can begin a startup? I've always liked the idea of owning a start-up company, during my employment history I've encountered problems and developed solutions I think could be developed into an actual product. I'm concerned about what effects the standard "company X owns all work produced whilst employed" has on my ability to take an idea and begin a start-up in my free time. For example, I've previously made software which collects specific data from the factory floor and displays it live. This software is very specific to the company's needs, but could be generalised and adapted to work across a variety of manufacturing companies. In theory, this idea could be packaged as a product, sold separately and be the foundation for a software startup. The end product, whilst inspired by the original task, would be very different from its current implementation. Would the previously mentioned clause mean that the idea (and any development on it) is owned by the employer as it was originally conceived on company time? Is this still property of the company, no matter how much external development is done? In a similar vein, If something I encounter at work inspires me with a different idea and I start work on it in my free time rather than during office hours, does the company own that idea? As I wouldn't have encountered the problem my idea solves if I didn't work at the company? Surely there is a limit to what a company can reasonably claim as their intellectual property, as it seems unreasonable for a magnetics manufacturer to claim a app which provides cooking recipes as IP just because it was developed by one of their employees. To properly pursue any start-up ideas I have, would I have to be completely unemployed or otherwise out of the industry for a grace period before I can legally work without infringing on the company's IP? Any help is greatly appreciated! | Ideas aren't property Your employer does not own your ideas. However, neither do you. Ideas are not something that is protected by intellectual property law. To be IP, you need more than an idea. What is IP? The most common types are: Patents - protect inventions and new processes Trade marks - protect logos, words and other branding Copyright - protects art, writing, music, film, and computer programs Registered designs - protects the visual design of a product Circuit layout rights - protect layout designs or plans of integrated circuits used in computer-generated designs Plant breeders rights - protect the commercial rights of new plant varieties. The normal operation of IP law is that if a person is engaged under a contract of service (e.g. an employment contract) then their employer owns all the IP they make which includes progress towards something that might be IP (e.g. all the work that leads up to a patentable invention). However, if they are engaged under a contract for service (e.g. an independent contractor), then the worker owns the IP. The work the employer owns is generally limited to work in the course of the employment. So if you are a software developer they will generally own all code you write that is useful for their business but won't own the romantic novel you write in your spare time. In either case, the specific contract can override the default assumption. What can you do? You can certainly use the idea for the app but you can't use anything that is subject to your employer's IP. That means you can't use any code or copy the user interface - it all has to be redeveloped from scratch. You also can’t develop something that would be of use to their business while you are still an employee. | For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue). | In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;" | At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent. | It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public. | No Let’s assume the most generous interpretation: you came up with a fully fleshed-out idea for a television show - name, characters, plot, scene-setting - the lot. You told this idea over the phone to someone else who made this show incorporating every single part of your idea. Here’s the rub: nobody owns ideas. Unless you had them sign a non-disclosure agreement before you told them (which you didn’t), they are free to use your ideas however they like. | A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap. | You will need to obtain permission from the company whose logo you intend to use before using it. Just because you use a product from that company in your devices doesn't necessarily give you permission to use their logo. Many companies have co-marketing plans that you can apply to be a part of but generally you and your product must meet certain requirements in order to be a part of it. |
What crime is hiring someone to kill you and then killing the hitman? Suppose that yesterday I was suicidal and decided to hire a hitman on the internet to kill me. Today, when they turn up, I have changed my mind and defend myself by killing the hitman. What crime(s) have I committed? This is completely hypothetical, so any jurisdiction would be interesting. | It appears you want to go for a defense strategy based on a self-defense argument. This won't work in many jurisdictions, because self-defense usually doesn't apply when you intentionally caused a situation where you knew you would have to harm someone in self-defense. Similar case: Bob regularly mugs old women in the park by threatening them with a gun. Charlie finds out and wants to stop him. But instead of reporting it to the police, he wants to take care of this himself. Charlie get a gun, dresses up as an old woman and waits in the park. When Bob shows up and tries to mug Charlie, Charlie shoots first. Well, anyone else who would have found themselves in a park threatened by Bob with a deadly weapon might have had a self-defense argument. But Charlie knew that by dressing up as an old woman, he would provoke Bob to attempt to mug him. This of course doesn't exonerate Bob. But Charlie actively caused the situation which would give him the opportunity to kill Bob "in self defense". Charlie even made a complex plan to arrange this situation and put serious effort into setting it in motion. It's premeditated murder. Your situation is basically the same. You caused someone to make an attempt at your life, and then killed them to "defend yourself". And you had plenty of other options: There are lots of ways to end your life without requiring the help of a hitman. By getting them involved, you incited them to commit murder (killing someone who wants to die is still murder under most circumstances). By hiring the hitman, you created two possible options: Either you kill the hitman, or the hitman kills you and they would be guilty of murder. Both are the direct consequences of your actions. You could have tried to cancel the hit when you changed your mind (if you tried and failed, that might give you a slightly better legal argument) You could have called the police and ask them for protection. Further, when you hired the hitman you committed a crime: incitement to commit murder. The fact that you were also the victim of that crime doesn't really matter. It also doesn't matter that you wanted to die: Assisted suicide is only permitted in very few jurisdictions, and those only allow it if performed by medical professionals under very narrow circumstances. Those circumstances would certainly not have applied, so the hitman would have been guilty of murder if he had succeeded (he is at least guilty of attempted murder, but you can't put a dead person on trial), so you would too. When you commit a crime and cause someone to die in the process, then that falls under the felony murder rule in many jurisdictions. You will likely be convicted of manslaughter or murder of the hitman, depending on when you decided to kill the hitman before they kill you. When you can convince the court that you did not premeditate to kill the hitman but only panicked in the last minute, and no felony murder rule applies, then you might get away with manslaughter. You might also be found guilty of incitement of attempted murder (your own murder). | germany Someone inciting someone to commit a crime is to be punished as if he committed the crime himself in addition to the actual perpetrator. §26 StGB Murder is punished by lifelong imprisonment. §211 StGB The attempt of a crime is punishable by the same punishment as the execution of it, or with a reduced sentence. §23 StGB You can agree to your body being harmed by someone (like in a martial arts tourney), but that doesn't make it legal if the harming of the body is against "Gute Sitten" (~morals) §228 StGB This includes (attempted) murder. Conclusion Hiring a hitman is punished by lifelong imprisonment for inciting someone to attempt/commit the crime of murder. Failure in murdering someone makes it an attempt. If your incitement of the (attempted) murder can be proven, it doesn't matter if the hitman never tried to execute the murder or grossly failed - Or even if you failed to hire the hitman: The attempt of inciting someone to murder you is punished as if you had murdered someone. | My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role. | Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is. | If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal. | There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case. | In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force. | Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.). |
Why was Alex Murdaugh sentenced so quickly after the guilty verdict? Normally, isn't there a big pre-sentencing investigation and victim impact statements and stuff like that? Not surprized about the withering rebuke and sentence, but that it occurred so immediately after the verdict. | Nobody who would have given a victim impact statement wished to speak to the court: Erik Ortiz, NBC, "No victim impact statements". And the prosecution did not seek the death penalty: N'dea Yancey-Bragg, USA Today, "Former South Carolina attorney Alex Murdaugh sentenced to life after murder convictions". | The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, "and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter." | This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe. | If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear. | Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge. | No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit. | Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system. | It is certainly not the case that all accused plead not guilty. Some plead guilty, often as part of a plea bargain. Some plead "no contest" meaning that the accused does not admit guilt, but will not argue the point in court. For many purposes this has the same effect as a guilty plea, but may matter later when the accused can truthfully say that no guilt was ever admitted. I think there are some other less common pleas available as well. It is not uncommon for an accused to plead not-guilty at first, and later complete an agreement with the prosecutor and change the plea to guilty, perhaps on only one accusation or some subset of accusations. This would often be in connection with some sort of plea bargain. In general, if there is any doubt about wanting to contest the accusation, an initial plea of not-guilty will be made by the accused, because this is fairly easy to change to a plea of guilty later, while changing a plea of guilty to not-guilty is much harder, and is not always allowed. I do not know what reasons there might be in the specific case mentioned, but I caution that news reports on such matters are not always accurate. |
Is training an AI on the internet processing personal information? There is an article on El Reg where the author asks ChatGPT about themselves, and they get back some information. If this data acquisition and dissemination process was being performed specifically by a company it would clearly be a situation where the GDPR applies, and the company would have certain responsibilities. However it seems probable that the actual design and implementation of ChatGPT was a bit higher level than that. Does the GDPR apply to ChatGPT and the other chatbots that are in development around the world that are trained by reading the internet? | Yes ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction; ChatGPT, or more precisely the owner of Chat GPT, certainly does all the things in bold and probably some of the others as well. | Your data is not anonymous since from the picture of the face the individual can be identified. It would be anonymous, if the face was blurred and other possible identifiable information was removed. Of course, that would defeat your purpose. Please note that, in any case, Anonymization Techniques are, themselves, a type of personal data processing that requires a legal ground, and achieving real anonymization is not a trivial matter (see Article 29 Working Party's opinion 0829/14/EN WP216 on the subject). 1. The face of a person includes biometric information, which is defined in article 4 (14) among other types of personal information regulated by the GDPR as: "personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data". A facial recognition software's purpose is exactly to perform a specific technical processing based on the facial features of the persons, to achieve a unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. Article 9 of the GDPR includes biometric data among the types of prohibited processing, unless one of the exceptions in § 2 applies. There are 10 types of exceptions among which: consent of the person, employment context, personal data made public by the person, scientific or historical research,... (each exception having its own conditions). You should check that you comply with one of these exceptions stated in article 9 § 2, if your application is about using facial images for unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. 2. In turn, if your processing is not about unique identification of a person based on these biometric features, but only about emotions recognition (which you briefly mentioned at the beginning of your post), it could be considered as not falling under the requirements of Article 9. That would still be a processing of personal information, but it would fall under the normal article 6 requirements. | Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike [...] So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? Yes, as far as I can see that is correct. The GDPR defines a data controller as someone who "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" - you just provide a tool, you don't control for what purposes your customers use their ride data. This is also discussed in this question: How does the GDPR apply to software developed by one company and used by another? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple [...] But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Yes, and yes. In that case, you are telling Apple to process data for you, so you would become the data controller (because you "determine[s] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"), and Apple is a data processor for you. That means also the usual mechanisms kick in - you need to inform your users about this processing, you need to make sure Apple plays by the rules, etc. etc. I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. This is exactly the kind of situation the GDPR is meant to address. Under GDPR, saying "I do not know what X does with the data" is not an option. This is something many companies tried in the past, that is why GDPR explicitly assigns responsibility to the data controller (i.e., you). As explained in a EU document, What is a data controller or a data processor?: The duties of the processor towards the controller must be specified in a contract or another legal act. For example, the contract must indicate what happens to the personal data once the contract is terminated. A typical activity of processors is offering IT solutions, including cloud storage. [...] So, no, you cannot just say "I do not know if Apple saves this request". Instead, you must make a contract with Apple which says whether (and how, and for how long...) they save the request, and you must inform your users about this in your privacy policy. And if Apple refuse to make such a contract with you, you must find a different company to work with. | The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were. | In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards. | The GDPR only mentions cookies once (Recital 30). (It says that cookies are personal data if they are associated with natural persons.) As far as cookies go, nothing has really changed since 2002, and the exception granted in the EU cookie directive Article 5(3) is still valid: This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service. If your site complies with the 2002 directive today, it will be GDPR compliant. All the "EU Cookie Law Compliance" plugins I've checked out let the admin configure the site to comply with the 2002 directive, and most let you choose between implicit consent (which is, and still will be, OK if you or third party services do not use cookies for profiling or to collect personal data), soft consent, or hard consent. The latter is however mandatory if you or third party services use cookies to for profiling or to collect personal data. However, if at least one of your cookies are used for profiling (and if you use Google analytics, you are), or if they are used to collect personal data, the exception from explicit consent quoted above does not apply and implicit consent (i.e.: "continued use of the site amounts to implicit consent to the use of cookies") has never been legal for the site. So while nothing has changed since 2002, there is a lot of misinformation about cookies floating on the Internet, and a lot of sites have their cookie banners set up wrong. You may want to do a new cookie audit for your site to verify that you comply with existing legislation. | No GDPR applies to people (not just citizens) who are in the EU. It has no applicability if both parties are not in the EU. | Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people. |
During a traffic stop, does silence serve as probable cause for arrest and search? Jurisdiction: Anywhere United States Valid driver license is provided during the stop, along with insurance and registration as required by the traffic code. Fifth Amendment provides a right against self incrimination. The law legally obligates a person to poses a driver license to operate a vehicle. Other than presenting a valid driver license, is a person required to answer any questions asked by a police officer? Example: I am driving in Dallas, Texas. I exceed speed limit by five miles. A police officer pulls me over for speeding. He approaches the window and asks for my ID. I provide a valid driver licence. The Officer Asks me: Where are you coming from? Where are you going to? Have you had something to drink? Etc... I respond: I am only required to provide you with a valid driver license. I do not have to answer any of your questions. I remain silent. I have broken no law. Right? Further, if police officer calls for back up, and searches my vehicle over my vociferous objections, I would have a valid §1983 Complaint for "unlawful search and seizure." Is my understanding correct? | Silence is not cause. However, this may not prevent a search. The officer does not need to tell you that he has probable cause, he must simply have it in order to conduct a search. If he obtained the probable cause before he pulled you over (this is likely), then he will order you out of the car and search over your vociferous (and silent?) objections. If the officer does not have probable cause, searches anyway, and can't come up with a convincing one in time for the court date, then yes you have a claim. But remember, just because the officer didn't inform you of the cause doesn't mean it didn't exist. Always consult an attorney before any legal action. | Identification rules vary from state to state, but there is no state which would require a person in Mr. Walker's position to identify themselves to law enforcement. The passenger is compelled to produce identification to law enforcement through the threat of illegal violence. | Yes, there are cases where refusing to respond to the question would be legal. The juror could plead the fifth – so long as he hasn't spilled the beans about what he is trying to protect – which provides for the protection from compelled self-incrimination (any incriminating statement that could be used against you in a criminal charge – civil liability doesn't count here). Anything that is said in voir dire is on the record and under oath. You are effectively witnessing against yourself. As stated on NOLO: Witnesses can assert the privilege against self-incrimination in civil proceedings as well as criminal ones, despite the seemingly limiting language of the Fifth Amendment. They can assert it in state or federal court, in a wide variety of proceedings (including trials, depositions, administrative law proceedings, and investigatory proceedings like grand jury hearings). . . . If, by answering, the witness could provide evidence that might aid the government in prosecuting him, then he has the right to refuse. There has to be evidence, though, that testimony would subject you to criminal charges. "What is your hair color?" obviously cannot subject you to criminal charges. "Have you ever driven while intoxicated?" Would only be incriminating while the Statute of Limitations has not passed. After that point, you have not 5th amendment protections for having driven under the influence because it will no longer subject you to criminal charges. Additionally, there are cases in which you could refuse to answer but the court could still compel you to answer. For instance, sometimes questions in voir dire get very personal. If jurors believe a question is too personal, they can try to refuse to answer on those grounds, let the judge know, and the judge would make the decision. If the judge decides they must answer, and they continued to refuse, the judge could hold them in contempt. On a slightly more practical note, if you are objecting to questions, it will impact whether the attorneys on either side will allow you to stay on as a juror. After an objection to a specific question, the attorney may just decide to nix you. | Yes, you would be responsible. Maintaining the vehicle in a state that enables compliance with the law is the owner's responsibility, and it is a driver's responsibility to comply with the speed limit. There is no knowledge or intent requirement in a speeding violation. That said, a judge might show leniency if you came to court with documentation of a repair or recalibration of the speedometer after the citation. | I believe there are courts that have affirmed convictions for obstructing official business or something along those lines, but the general consensus seems to be that conduct like this is not a crime, or that it cannot be criminalized without violating the First Amendment. The most recent decision on point came just a few weeks ago. In Friend v. Gasparino, No. 20-3644 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023), a man sued police for arresting him because he had set up a sign saying "Cops Ahead" two blocks away from where they were running an operation to enforce distracted-driving laws. The trial court dismissed the case, holding (1) that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment because it was "of little, if any, public concern"; and (2) that even if it was protected, the officer's conduct in arresting him satisfied strict scrutiny because if police wanted to prevent distracted driving, there was no less restrictive alternative to arresting the plaintiff. But the Second Circuit reversed, holding (1) that speech remains protected even if it is not a matter of public concern; and (2) that there was no evidence that limiting the plaintiff's speech was necessary to permit the state to write citations and enforce the law, even if it would have been helpful. | You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency. | Various cases heard by the US Supreme Court have established that an anonymous tip can indeed create reasonable grounds for probable cause, allowing the police to search and detain persons involved. For example, the case of Navarette v. California where a suspect was stopped on the highway after an anonymous tip was given to police - the court ruled that the tip established reasonable grounds for probable cause which allowed the persons to be stopped in the first place. The precedent set in that case would apply to the situation you are describing. | Yes, for the jurisdiction specified in the tag In the United States, questioning must stop as soon as the accused assserts his or her right to counsel. It's been upheld by subsequent precedent, but the origin is in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966): If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent. |
In the Dominion lawsuit at what point does a statement implying, but not explicitly stating, fraud occurred rise to the level of defamation? It seems the primary defense Fox News' lawyers are making in the Dominion defamation lawsuit seems to be that Fox was only sharing alleged allegations and expressing opinion, but they never explicitly said the Dominion fraud allegations were true so defamation didn't happen. However Fox has undeniable had moments when it's hosts stated opinions that implied they questioned the validity of the election, which Dominion apparently felt raised to the level of defamation to file a lawsuit. So for now let's presume there is no smoking gun of someone on air saying that the believed Dominion undeniable engaged in fraud. How much could Fox News, or anyone else, get away with statements that might imply they believed fraud occurred without explicitly saying it, and at what point does the implication of belief alone become blatant enough to constitute defamation? To give an example of what I mean it appears that Hannity told his audience that it was “impossible to ever know the true, fair, accurate election results”. As a result Fox's lawyer told executives that “Hannity is getting awfully close to the line with his commentary and guests tonight.” Where exactly is the line that Hannity was getting close to suppose to be, and what would be required to prove he, or anyone, had overstepped the aforementioned line? I realize that proving defamation also requires a statement to be false, or at minimum that the speaker had a reckless disregard of the accuracy of their statement, and for the statement to be proven to have harmed the one defamed against. I think I understand all those requirements, they aren't what I'm curious about so for now let's not waste time on them. If we presume all the other requirements for defamation have already been proven how much can a theoretical speaker get away with implying belief in the false claim without explicitly saying it before it rises to the level of defamation? | When it can be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference.” Which is the standard the New York appeals court endorsed in 2014 for “defamation by implication”. So, on the face of the statements, they have to imply fraud and they have to show that the speaker intended to imply fraud. Whether they did that is up to the jury. | Saying "they didn't have an affair", in isolation, would not be defamation. But we have to look at the context. Daniels had previously stated publicly that they did have an affair. So when Cohen said that it wasn't true, he was (claims Daniels) effectively calling her a liar. Calling someone a liar is potentially defamatory. You can read Daniels's complaint here. See paragraph 67: Both on its face, and because of the facts and circumstances known to persons who read or heard the statement, it was reasonably understood Mr. Cohen meant to convey that Ms. Clifford is a liar, someone who should not be trusted, and that her claims about her relationship with Mr. Trump is 'something [that] isn't true.' Mr. Cohen's statement exposed Mr. [sic] Clifford to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and shame, and discouraged others from associating or dealing with her. As to whether calling someone a liar is defamatory, there's a long article on the subject here. There are at least some cases where courts have held that it is. Gutterman, Roy S. "Liar! Liar? The Defamatory Impact of 'Liar' in the Modern World." Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 27 (2) 253-286, 2017. | From their website: Metro Vancouver Kink is an incorporated, non-profit society. That is, they are a corporation and corporations are legal people, capable of suing and being sued just like natural people are. The lawsuit alleges defamation which a corporate entity can do by making untrue statements that damage someone’s reputation. Based on the linked article, I can’t see that this is “retaliation”; the statements made are, if untrue, almost certainly defamatory and the defamed person is legally entitled to be “made whole” as far as possible. Incorporation is a method of shielding the members of the corporation from the corporations liabilities, legal or otherwise. From the article, it appears the allegedly defamed person is also suing the directors of the corporation - directors are usually legally shielded unless they have breached their duties as directors. One final point, not-for-profit entities still make profits or losses (called surpluses and deficits) and holds assets and liabilities just like a for profit business. Indeed an entity must at least break even over the long term if it wants to survive and make surpluses if it wants to grow. The difference is that a non-profit cannot return those surpluses to its members the way a company can; it has to use them for the purposes for which it was established or for defending lawsuits or paying out damages. | The standard of proof required to survive a motion to dismiss is very low. The factual (not legal) assertions of the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the case is dismissed if the defense shows that even when the plaintiff is given that benefit, the assumed facts don't establish the case. This standard is somtimes referred to as "sufficiency of the claims". | I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario. | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. | There is no magic about the word "allegedly". "Rob allegedly killed Alice" simply means "Someone said that Rob killed Alice". It implies that the person reporting this is not claiming that it is true or false, but just reporting what someone else has said. If in fact some person did say that, such a statement is true, and quite probably not defamatory. However, if the original claim is unreliable, and it is being repeated in a way that serves to lend it credibility, it could still be considered defamation by implication. If Rob has been charged, or accused by a credible source, or multiple such sources, reporting on that accusation will normally not itself be defamation. Saying "I allege that Rob killed Alice" is just saying that "I claim that Rob killed Alice" and might well be defamatory if Rob did not in fact do so. Again there is nothing magic about any particular word here. It is the overall meaning of the statement that makes it defamatory or not, as that meaning would be reasonably understood by readers or listeners. Any statement that will be understood as carrying a defamatory meaning may be an act of defamation. There is also nothing magic about Rob having been formally charged. Such a charge is a fact that can be freely reported on. Widespread or credible claims that Rob is the killer are also facts, and can also be reported. But if the only source is an anonymous vid on YouTube, with no supporting evidence, that is not a credible claim. Reporting it in a way that makes it sound far more credible than it is may cause people to believe the false accusation, and thus be defamatory. Again the overall meaning of the statement is important. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare |
Limits on right to demand a jury? Section 21 of the Washington State Constitution states: The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, and for a verdict by nine or more jurors in civil cases in any court of record, and for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given thereto. RCW 4.48.010 goes on to state in part: The court shall order all or any of the issues in a civil action, whether of fact or law, or both, referred to a referee upon the written consent of the parties which is filed with the clerk. Any party shall have the right in an action at law, upon an issue of fact, to demand a trial by jury. No referee appointed under this chapter may preside over a jury trial. The written consent of the parties constitutes a waiver of the right of trial by jury by any party having the right. However, RCW 3.50.135 imposes a restriction where it states in part: In all civil cases, the plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury, which shall consist of six citizens of the state who shall be impaneled and sworn as in cases before district courts, or the trial may be by a judge of the municipal court: PROVIDED, That no jury trial may be held on a proceeding involving a traffic infraction. Similarly, RCW 35.20.090 states: In all civil cases and criminal cases where jurisdiction is concurrent with district courts as provided in RCW 35.20.250, within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, the plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury, which shall consist of six citizens of the state who shall be impaneled and sworn as in cases before district courts, or the trial may be by a judge of the municipal court: PROVIDED, That no jury trial may be held on a proceeding involving a traffic infraction. Question: Does the wording of 3.50.135 and 35.20.090 impose a limit on the individual's right to demand a trial by jury, or is it instead a restriction on the ability of traffic courts to conduct a jury trial? The wording would seem to indicate the latter because individuals do not hold trials or proceedings, but courts do. And if my interpretation is correct, what would be an appropriate response or course of action on the part of the traffic court if the defendant in a traffic case insisted on their right to a trial by jury? | The right to trial by jury under the Washington State Constitution does not attach to mere regulatory infractions: City of Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn. 2d 87 (Wash. 1982) (still being cited as of 2019). While not at issue in that case, the Court listed "traffic offenses" and the corresponding "uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of these 'infractions'" as an example where a jury is not required by the state Constitution. At the same time, the Legislature has shown itself cognizant of the distinction between offenses which are criminal in nature and those to which such a stigma is not attached. This awareness is reflected in RCW 46.63, decriminalizing certain traffic offenses and providing a uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of these "infractions". As long as the offender commits only an infraction, no prison sentence can be imposed. RCW 46.63.060(2)(b). If it is thought that our conclusions here today will unduly burden the courts of limited jurisdiction, that situation can undoubtedly be ameliorated by legislative "decriminalization" of those offenses which are in fact regulatory, rather than criminal in nature, and limiting the penalty accordingly. As for those offenses which carry a criminal stigma and particularly those for which a possible term of imprisonment is prescribed, the constitution requires that a jury trial be afforded unless waived. | In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984). | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | As others have said, the reason for this is that the US Constitution grants a jury trial as a right in criminal proceedings. The reason for that right to be granted is to be a check against (that is, a limitation of) the power of the government, generally, and judges, specifically. To answer your specific question of why "the judge system is not reformed and stays like this and is more vulnerable to take a wrong decision because they do not know the law, thus the verdict depends on people’s morals?" Firstly, the jury does know the law (or at least, the specific portions of the law that are relevant to the case), by the time they render their judgement. An important part of the judge's responsibility in a criminal case is to craft "jury instructions" that are given to the jury before they are sequestered for deliberations. These instructions should have an explanation of what questions they need to collectively answer, and what evidence they can and cannot consider. Secondly, there are two central dogmatic difference between the points of view that your question seems to promote or be based on, and the one generally held by the US Founding Fathers, who wrote the US Constitution. Your question seems to assume that: judges are sacrosanct, or at least trustworthy; and rule by law is the foremost concern In contrast, the general view of the US Founding Fathers was that: judges have power, and thus need to be checked (in the US system, a judge's power is checked by the prosecutor, the jury, the chief executive, and by courts of appeal); and protection of the citizenry from the power of the government is the first concern. One thing to note, is that this second point means that the judge in a US trial can actually override a criminal jury, but only in the defendant's favor. | What the jury must do A jury must follow the law it is given by a judge. A jury cannot "go rogue" and bring back a verdict on something that has not been charged and/or that the jury has not been told to consider. So, whether a jury has the option of convicting a defendant of a lesser included offense - a crime contained within a more serious crime - depends on the instructions the judge gives. Is it up to the judge and the judge alone? Not necessarily. Typically, judges must issue the lesser included offense instructions to the jury if the lesser included offense is part of the charged offense if there exists significant evidence the defendant only committed that lesser crime. So, only if the evidence supports such instructions. Further, at least in some jurisdictions, a trial judge may not instruct jurors on a lesser included offense if there has been no request to do so by the defendant. There appears to be a disagreement over what, if any, power a prosecutor should have in making such a request. One side would argue that a prosecutor would want to ask for it so that a defendant who is getting off on the larger crime doesn't skate completely free on, for example, a technicality. Another side would argue that prosecutors should not have a say because they are in fact who control which charges are submitted to the grand jury for indictment. | Because HRA1998 says so, but it's not an absolute limit and is subject to discretion by the court: (1)A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— (a)bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act. (5)Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of— (a)the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place; or (b)such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question. | The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress. | It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a "vehicle" is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of "vehicle". We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that "Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and "legislative intent to assure safety" would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case. |
Is it safe to talk about ideas that I have not patented yet over public email? I have an idea with which I may someday make a startup. I can talk about it with experienced people, over public emails for example. However, I wonder if from patent point of view this is safe. My concern is from two separate perspectives: Publication, for example, can prevent a later patent if I understand correctly. However, this is over, for example, Gmail, and would not go into much details about it. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first in order not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. I wonder if later one says, "looking at your email, you seem to had this idea when you were employed by X company, so even if you filed a patent after leaving this company, X can still have claims on your idea." | With respect to the first question, discussing an idea in a non-encrypted email is not a publication that forfeits the right to patent an idea, even though it is not 100% secure. In the same way, talking about an idea for a patent with your patent lawyer in a secluded booth of a coffee shop in person does not constitute publication of the idea for this purpose, even if someone is secretly spying on you at the time. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. It is possible that the contract makes even ideas that you come up with yourself while employed by the company the property of the company. If so, you are legally in the wrong and the idea belongs to the company. But, proving the reality that you are stealing the idea from the company is harder if there is nothing in writing. An email discussing an idea while you are employed would have to be disclosed in litigation with your employer over whether the patent applied for belongs to you or to your employer under an employment agreement. If you didn't put it in an email, it wouldn't exist to turn over in litigation. | In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue). | While not categorically illegal, there is a risk that using a trademark in an email name is something that is being done with a purpose to defraud people into thinking that you are affiliated with that company (and indeed, such emails are frequently used for that purpose as are misleading domain names). So, while it isn't outright forbidden, it is generally unwise. | If you use the reviewer's code, or code derived from it (e.g. if you just changed a variable name) then they own the copyright on that part of the software. If the reviewer describes a solution which you implement, or if you re-implement the code from scratch while taking ideas and methods from the reviewer's code, then you own the copyright on that code. However if there are only a few ways to implement something in code then the code is not creative and hence cannot be copyrighted. For example the regular expression in the question you link to is (as far as I can tell) the only correct solution to the problem: any programmer addressing the problem will have come up with that RE. In this the position is akin to a database of phone numbers: while the collection may be copyright (depending on whether selection or arrangement required creativity), the fact that Alice Jones has the number 012345 is not copyrightable, and neither is the alphabetical arrangement of names. Where it gets messy is the boundary between the two. The requirement to detect 4 or more repeated digits in a credit card number could be implemented in a number of ways, but whether there are enough of these to qualify any particular solution as "creative" would be a matter of fact for a court to decide. | could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)". | The constitutional basis for all US patents is Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the US Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See "Intellectual Property Clause" from Cornell's WEX Legal Information Institute. US Patent law requires an applicant to include with a patent application "disclosures". As the page "Patent Disclosure: Everything You Need to Know" from UpCounsel states: [A] patent disclosure is a public claim of data about an invention. In general, it is any part of the patenting process in which data regarding an invention is disclosed. A good disclosure tells someone else how to create the product. [Emphasis added] The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the right to offer exclusive rights to people for their inventions for set periods of time. This is only if and when the inventor agrees to adequately disclose the invention in writing. [Emphasis added] A formal patent disclosure ... stipulates a set of claims regarding the invention, as well as other data that reveals the unique nature of the product. It should be expressed in writing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as part of the patent application. What Is Included in a Patent Disclosure? The Specification. A primary disclosure or "specification" is a main document in a patent application. It describes the ways in which the invention is innovative compared to similar inventions and explains the scope of monopoly the applicant believes he or she has to the invention. The specification describes the item and the way to make and to use it, in clear and exact terms. Someone in the field must be able to reasonably create it with these instructions. Further, the specification notes the patent application filing date on which inventor can the rely. It also offers evidence that the invention belongs to the person in question. The Enablement. This explains how to create the object and how someone in the field can do so. The instructions cannot be vague or unclear, but must be exact and detailed. When the patent expires, the enablement should still be usable. This section should include any figures or drawings, with explanations. Again, you will want to show how your invention is special. So, you might want to include many details and different variations of the invention. Later, many of these variations may be deleted from the document as unnecessary. This section may be numerous pages long. Best Mode Requirement. The path revealed must be the best way of creating the item within the author's awareness at the time of filing. Therefore, it may include specific or unique techniques. There should be no concealment. A poor-quality disclosure can risk the appearance of concealment. [Italics added] Claims. This area tells the reader the exclusive rights the patent offers to the inventor.... The official page "Duty of Disclosure, Candor, and Good Faith" from the USPTO cites 37 CFR 1.56 on the duty to disclose information material to patentability. This regulation provides, in the relevant part: A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim ... These disclosures include the state of prior art, as kown to the applicant and the applicant's associates. The page "BEST MODE: Noncompliance with the Duty of Disclosure is Not an Option" states: When you apply for a patent in the United States, you have a legal duty to disclose prior art that could be used to reject your application — in essence, information that may be used against you by the examiner of your application. While persons accused of a crime have a right to remain silent, so as to avoid self-incrimination, inventors applying for a patent have no such right. To the contrary, an inventor’s failure to comply with the duty of disclosure risks any resulting patent being unenforceable. The page "THE PATENT BARGAIN AND THE CURSE OF RETROACTIVITY" states: One of the requirements for the USPTO to issue a patent is that the applicant’s claimed invention be fully disclosed in the application and published in the patent. This is sometimes referred to as the “patent bargain.” This is at the opposite end of the spectrum from trade secrets law, under which a company can sue for © misappropriation of a trade secret but only if it takes reasonable measures to maintain confidentiality of the trade secret. ... Under patent law an inventor must fully disclose his or her invention before enforceable patent rights come into being. This disclosure requirement is sometimes termed the “patent bargain,” under which an inventor gains the right to exclude others from practicing a patented invention in exchange for disclosing the invention so that it may be known by the public and indeed practiced after the patent term has expired. ... [Emphasis added] In general a patent application is not just a description of a specific industrial process. It includes the research by which that process was discovered or developed. That research can benefit others in the same field, and so "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" in helping others to do further research and make further discoveries, which can often be done without infringing the patent itself. Of course, once patent protection expires, anyone may use the patent, and the final patent documents are supposed to include sufficient information that "one skilled in the art" will be able to build the invention or use the process that had been patented. This is in contrast to the situation which would exist had the inventor retained the discovery as a trade secret. In that case no one would have been able to use the patented discovery until some other person independently discovered and disclosed it. | One big hole in any scheme that relies on copyright is that it could not preclude people talking about the previous content or talking about you. This is well established First Amendment law. For example, see Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which holds that except in rare judicially established exceptions (relating to military information, obscenity, and inciting acts of violence), government censorship is unconstitutional. Thus, no statutory scheme could be used to prevent third parties who happened to have seen the material while it was freely available from re-iterating what they had seen, or talking about it, or talking about the author (you). People could even reproduce portions of the published content. Some types of reproduction would be protected as fair use in the US, especially if the reproduction is for the purpose of criticism. (17 USC 107, and this previous Law.SE answer) The closest approach would be to protect your work as trade secret, making sure that anyone that you share it with agrees to non-disclosure. But, if you "publish unique content under this pseudonym" there is no way to "arbitrarily or wholly revoke discussion about that content". If the cat gets out of the bag, while you may have remedies against the person who violated the non-disclosure agreement, you would not be able to prevent third-party discussion or reproduction. | No. You are correct in that this is not related to Copyright. Copyright is meant to protect expressions of an idea. An URL is simply an address, like a street address. Can you legally stop people referring to your home address? No. Can you legally stop people from passing by and looking at your house on the street? Also no. A famous case related to hyperlink is Ticketmaster v Tickets.com (2000). Tickets.com used information Ticketmaster's website and deep-linked to there. The ruling established that: use of information is not infringing hyperlinking cannot be copyright infringement because no copying is involved. deep linking is not unfair competition If you feel that it is necessary to avoid people linking to specific pages of your site, you may consider accomplishing this technically. UPDATE It does not matter whether your site is meant to be public or not. For example, an knowledge base meant to be shared internally in an organization, but accessible on the internet since staff are geographically distributed. Again, you may think of it like a street address. A private corporate building meant for employees only. An address, like Room C, 16/F, Example Corporate Complex, 4321 Lucky Avenue can be shared like any other address. You cannot demand people to never refer to your office address. You can, however, setup a security post at the entrance and only allow certain guests to visit you. In the case of a website, you may state in your terms that one cannot share access information to any external parties. This will include the sharing of any authentication data (e.g. password) which can be used to access content. |
What is the relevant age for a crime? When it is committed, when one is charged of it, or when one is sentenced for it? Bob committed a crime when he was young. After successfully getting away, many years later, it comes out (with good evidence) that he committed the crime, and so he is charged for it. Lastly, after many years in court (due to any number of complicating factors), Bob is finally successfully convicted. My question is, when sentencing Bob, which age is the most relevant? The age when he committed the crime, the age when he was charged, or the age when he was convicted in court? Just two examples: Bob committed murder at age 12, was caught and convicted at age 25 Bob committed murder at age 14, was charged at age 16, and only successfully convicted at age 19 Feel free to swap out the crime/ages with what you think is most relevant. Edit: Of particular note for consideration: isn't the fact that Bob, as an adult, hides a murder, worthy of being charged for any crime whatsoever? | england-and-wales It's the date, and therefore Bob's age, when the offence was committed The basic position when an offender is sentenced is that it should be according to the law at the time the offence was committed, not the law at the time when they are sentenced. This has been reinforced by Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights. It is a general legal principle that the law should not be applied retrospectively – so that people are able to know the penalty for an offence. Source | This occurred in Hong Kong, so Hong Kong law applies here. Hong Kong law's definition of rape is explicitly male on female (nonconsensual male-male is covered by sodomy laws instead). It is impossible for her to be charged with rape. Assuming you were over 16 at the time, the only offence that could be possible is indecent assault. As far as I can tell, there is no statute of limitations. However, the chance of her being charged is basically zero. | The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal. | In the US, only crimes that involve death or crimes against the state can be punished with death, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (this was a child rape case and execution was held to be unconstitutional). There is a consideration of "proportionality" whereby execution is not an option for all crimes involving death. The court doesn't include or exclude non-death cases, they explicitly kick the can down the road ("We do not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State"). Therefore, there is no ruling that bars execution for treason, but there is for rape and burning someone's stack of hundreds. This is a list of 2008 pre-Kennedy non-murder "surviving" state capital offenses (most of the cases listed in the article are for rape, which was ruled unconstitutional): Treason (Arkansas, Calif., Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Washington) Aggravated kidnapping (Co., Idaho, Il., Missouri, Mont.) Drug trafficking (Fl., Missouri) Aircraft hijacking (Ga., Mo.) Placing a bomb near a bus terminal (Mo.) Espionage (New Mexico) Aggravated assault by incarcerated, persistent felons, or murderers (Mont.) However, in Washington the death penalty is now unconstititional. The Missouri penalty for treason has been since reduced to a maximum of life imprisonment. On the other hand, Florida still has a "capital drug trafficking" penalty if you import 300+ kg of cocaine, knowing that "the probable result of such importation would be the death of any person" (death does not have to actually result). Here is a list of federal crimes that allow execution, which includes only large-scale drug trafficking, espionage and treason in the non-death crimes. | This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud. | In some states there is a law know as Caylee's Law, for example Connecticut General Statutes 53-21a(d) which requires reporting a child's disappearance: Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly fails to report the disappearance of such child to an appropriate law enforcement agency shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. For the purposes of this subsection, “disappearance of such child” means that the parent, guardian or person does not know the location of the child and has not had contact with the child for a twenty-four-hour period. Assume that they have done as the law requires, i.e. reporting the disappearance. It could be a crime for the parents to fake the kid's death, depending on what you did to "fake" the death. They might legally do things that could lead a person to think the child died; but telling the police, in the course of an investigation, that the child died in an accident, would be a crime. The parents would not have to convince the school district of anything, though someone at the school might alert the authorities that the child was gone (but they would know that anyway). They might well have to convince the police of something (i.e. that they didn't kill the child). It would certainly be a felony to lie to the IRS (i.e. claim the child as a dependent). It would also be a crime to continue to receive welfare payments or other benefits based on the fact of having a child. | In California (as in all states) there is a justifiable homicide defense which might be used in such a situation. For the force to be justified, you have to reasonably believe you are in danger of being harmed, that you need to use force to avoid the harm, and you may only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat. It then is a matter for the jury to decide whether those principles were followed in your particular instance. The reason why it's hard to predict the outcome is that it depends on a subjective evaluation by the jury, as to whether the shooter had a reasonable fear and whether lesser force was a viable option. The jury's decision is guided by instructions to the jury (#506, #506) which focus on relevant distinctions. The jury will be told that "Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be", and that you have to reasonably believe there is "imminent danger of great bodily injury". My evaluation is that that does not describe the scenario in the question. There is some possibility of future harm... but not imminent harm. People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470" states that "the rule developed at common law that killing or use of deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense was a forcible and atrocious crime" and "Examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem, rape and robbery", and that could support application of a justifiable homicide defense in a bank robbery. But in the present instance, the bank is being robbed and the shooter is a by-stander. Despite all of the bank robberies in California, there is no relevant case from which one could draw an analogy. | No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit. |
Subsets and Splits